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**European Cinema and the Cultural Identity
of North African Immigrants:
Tropes of Representation, Metamorphosis of
Stereotypes and Memetic Ambivalence**

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Requirements for the National Doctorate Degree**

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عنوان الأطروحة: الهوية الثقافية للمهاجرين المغاربة في السينما الأوروبية: مجازات الصورة والخطاب المتحول والتمثيلات المزدوجة.

مقتضب:

إذا كانت الهجرة ظاهرة كونية تتحكم في حراك الرأسمال البشري عبر امتدادات جغرافية لامتناهية، وتشكل رافدا من روافد التحولات التي تطال الثقافة والهوية الانسانيين ، وتمكن أيضا من بلورة هوامش متجددة للتعدد والتعايش والصراع، فبأن العلاقة المتداخلة بين الهجرة والهوية والسينما وفرت أرضا خصبة لظهور مجموعة من التصورات النقدية والدراسات النظرية، كاستجابة للتطورات المتسارعة للخطاب الثقافي والفكري المرافق لمضامين وردود الأفعال داخل المجتمعات المستقبلية إثر توالي الهجرات في مرحلة ما بعد الاستعمار. هذه الهجرات وخصوصا من شمال إفريقيا إلى دول الاتحاد الأوروبي، ترتب عنها جدل ونقاش حول سؤال الهوية والثقافة ، والانتماء والتصادم بين إثنيات وديانات متعددة في الدول المضيفة، والتي تشهد تحولات جذرية على مستوى نسيجها الثقافي والاجتماعي والديموغرافي والاقتصادي.

هذه الأطروحة هي محاولة لا تقتفاء أثر الخطابات المتعددة حول الهوية والثقافة وعلاقات القوة التي تؤسس لإيديولوجية الهيمنة وعقدة التفوق التي ينبنى عليها الخطاب الثقافي الأوروبي ، وأنساق السرد في مجموعة من الأفلام الأوروبية حول المهاجرين من شمال إفريقيا مثل فيلم: " النبي" لجاك أوديار وفيلم "الأسود لا يلبق بك" لجاك برال وفيلم: "صنع في فرنسا" لنيكولاس بوخريف وفيلم: "العودة إلى حنصلة" لشار غوتيريز وفيلم: "الطفل لدانييل مونزون". هذا البحث، ليس فقط معني بكشف التوجه الإيديولوجي للسينما الأوروبية وإرثها الكولونيالي الغرائبي والمروج للتفوق العرقي والمركزية الأوروبية، بل يحاول إثارة جوانب أخرى مرتبطة بالمناخ الثقافي الجديد للهجرة والهوية، آخذا بعين الاعتبار متغيرات سوسيواقتصادية وأنماط الضغط التي شددت الخناق على الأقليات المسلمة في أوروبا، كالإرهاب والأزمة الاقتصادية العالمية والإسلاموفوبيا واللجوء بعد ثورات الياسمين. في هذا الإطار ومن منطلقات أخرى، تحاول هذه الأطروحة مساءلة الثابت والمتغير في الخطاب السينمائي الأوروبي ، من خلال رصد أشكال الإقصاء أو الإدماج/ التبني التي يصادفها شخوص ينتمون لديانات مختلفة وإثنيات مهمشة، بتبنيها لأفكار نمطية سائدة أو لاحتفائها بلحالات شبه عنصرية ترمز للدونية والتخلف.

كما ستثير هذه الأطروحة مسألة عزز هذه الأفلام عن مواكبة خطا باتها والتزامها بنمط سردي منسجم لا يظهر فلتاته الإيديولوجية، وذلك بالوقوف على أشكال التناقض والتوتر والغموض والازدواجية والصراع، الذي قد يعتري كثيرا من مظاهرها السردية والتقنية بشكل واع أو غير واع. وهذا ما قد يطيح بمصادقية العمل الفني وبموضوعيته وحياديته، وعدم انحيازه لأي شكل من أشكال التغليب. هذا أيضا لا يعني أن الأطروحة ستكتفي فقط بمراجعة/ مساءلة الأنماط السردية المهيمنة للسينما الأوروبية وتفكيك أفقها الإيديولوجي، ولكن ستحاول أيضا البحث عن الخطاب المغاير أو البديل في بعض الإنتاجات السينمائية الأوروبية، وأوجه التحول التي طالت توجهاتها الفكرية والجمالية عبر تبنيها لقضايا المهاجر والدفاع عن كينونته كإنسان لا ككائن مختلف دينيا وثقافيا. وأخيرا، ستفرد هذه الأطروحة هامشا للإنتاجات السينمائية المغربية في المهجر أو الشتات حتى تسلط الضوء على مقاربتها للهوية وتمثلاتها في أفلام المهاجرين من الجيل الثاني والثالث، وكيف تلتزم هذه السينما الصاعدة لإعادة بناء أشكال وعي رمزي يحتفي بالهوية والثقافة الأصليين أم أنها تدعز لخطاب المركزية الأوروبية وتعيد إنتاج أنساقه السردية النمطية وإيديولوجيته المهيمنة أم أنها تكسر خطيتها الروتينية السائدة و تصحح

مغالطتها وتشهر سلاح الرد كمقوم من مقومات سينما بديلة أو تكريسا لنظرة مغايرة. وهنا نسوق بعض الأمثلة من قبيل فيلم "إلهيات" لهدى بنيمينه وفيلم: "جسد غريب" لرجاء عماري وفيلم: "صورة" لعادل العربي وبلال فلاح.

تنتطق الأطروحة من تصور تركيبى تعددي يتبنى مجموعة من المناهج والمقاربات، كالمدرسة الفينومينولوجية ونظرية الدراسات المابعد الكولونيالية ونظرية جيمس فيرغسون، التي تتشارك مع بعضها في الاشتغال على الخطابات الخفية والتناقضات الداخلية والتوترات الصغيرة، التي تشكل العناصر الأكثر تهديدا للخطاب المهيمن، وتطيح بحسابات السلطة وقواها النمطية والثقافية، وهذا ما قد يخلق إمكانية المقاومة والتفكيك. وقد خلصت هذه الأطروحة إلى وجود خطاب مغاير نسبيا في كل من سينما المهجر والسينما الأوروبية حول المهاجرين المغاربة، وذلك من خلالها التركيز على الغموض الذي يلف العلاقات بين العناصر المتصارعة، والاحتفاء بالهويات المزدوجة للشخصيات، والتخلي عن أشكال الصراع التقليدية بين الذات والآخر. هذا لا يعني أنها تخلت كليا عن الخطابات التقليدية والمجازات النمطية التي روجتها لعقود عديدة.

الكلمات المفتاحية : الهوية الثقافية، السينما الأوروبية، التمثلات، الشتات، الإسلاموفوبيا، الإرهاب، الأفكار النمطية، الازدواجية، السينما الكولونيالية، شمال إفريقيا، المهاجرين.

ABSTRACT

If migration and human mobility have noticeably enriched the diversification of cultures and the transnationalization of identities, the complex interplay of cultural identity, expatriation and cinema has significantly contributed to the emergence of massive corpus of critical literature and visual studies responding to the current conceptualizations and debates about cultural identity, postcolonial encounters and (mis)representation of North African immigrants in the European cinema. This dissertation traces the multiple discourses of cultural identity, power relations and the hegemonic knowledge of Eurocentric migrant filmography. It is not exclusively limited to the questioning of the dominant ideology of the European cinematic traditions of exoticism and its deterministic cultural assumptions about foreigners, but it goes beyond the traditional models of representation to the new context of diaspora, islamophobia, terrorism and the global economic crisis. The dissertation tries to question the dominant paradigms of (mis)representation by tracing narratives of identification, disidentification and the ideological predicament that challenges the visibility of Maghrebi protagonists in cinematic postcolonial encounters as it is mapped in a partial system of narration. In the same way, the analysis highlights the disruptive forces of film narratives that rupture/ deconstruct the discursive import of European cinema because of the ambivalences, indeterminacies, conflicts, contradictions and tensions that internally impede and problematize the narratives' own construct and texture in films like *el Nino* by Daniel Monzon, *Retorno a Hansala* by C. Gutierrez, *Prophet* By Jacques Audiard, *le Noir te va si Bien* by Jack Bral, *la Désintégration* by Phillipe Faucon...

These works, equally, engage in probing how European migrant cinema offer new spaces of identifications and solidarities by divorcing representation from old essentialist regimes of knowledge and traditional hierarchical differences between the self and the other as well as framing cultural otherness from the perspective of (un)successful intercultural encounters (romances, marriages), implying a liberating discourse of metamorphosis and reconciliation. In parallel, this paper tries to construct a framework by asking how Maghrebi migrant cinema in diaspora can contingently raise the possibility of “returning gaze” against the essentialist construction of identity and reconstruct the pre-established perceptions of immigrants. It asks how diasporic Maghrebi filmography challenges dominant construction of North African identities and how they subvert or accentuate hegemonic or counter-hegemonic (self) representation of diasporic experience, expatriation and identity negotiation in films like Raja Amari's *Foreign Body*, H. Benyamina's *Devines* and A. el Arbi and B. Fallah's *Image*.

The thesis relies basically on an interdisciplinary approach, taken from the methodologies of phenomenological studies and the symptomacity of reading. The thesis comes to the conclusion that both European and North African diasporic cinema show a relative shift from old paradigms of representation and politics of encounter by venturing to new territories of narration and different tropes of perception in emphasizing the complexities, indeterminate identities and contradictions of the migratory experience. The analysis confirms that there is an oscillation between continuity and discontinuity, tropes of visibility and invisibility, attachment to conventional discourses and ruptures of boundaries by redrawing traditional conflicts and encounters and metamorphosis and conformism from different perspectives, at least relatively.

Keywords: Cultural Identity, European Cinema, Postcolonial Encounters, Tropes of Representation, Diaspora, Islamophobia, Terrorism, Ambivalence, Colonial Cinema, Immigrants, Stereotypes.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMERM : Moroccan Association for Studies and Research for Migration.

AQIM: Al Qaeda in the Maghreb.

AEMNA: Association of North African Muslim Students.

AFENA: French Association of North African Students.

CBP: Common Basic Principles.

FPO: Austrian Freedom Party.

ICMP: International Centre for Migration Policy.

IOM: International Organization for Migration

ILO: International Labor Organization.

ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

ITT: Integrated Threat Theory.

GAMM: Global Approach on Migration and Mobility.

INLA: Irish National Liberation Army.

IRA: Irish Republican Army.

MENA: the Middle East and North Africa.

NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa's Development.

OSI: Office of Strategic Influence.

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

WCAR: World Conference against Racism.

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DEDICATION

To my : *Mother, Father, Brother and Sisters*

Introduction

Generally speaking, identities are not immutable and stagnant structures of material and physical constructs, they are playgrounds on which meanings and signification are differently reflected to express the interplay of culture, society and structures of human praxis. They embody the visible and invisible traces of historical changes they have undergone and the cultural complexities they have interiorized. Identities are not devoid of meaningful and symbolic identification of individual and collective belonging that define ethnicities, races, forces of history, relations of power, layers of positioning and hierarchies of economic and political presence, which distinctly intersect with categories of gender, origin, religion, language, self perception, cultural judgment and representation. Effectively, cultural identity, which is a plurality and convergence of individual, ethnic, racial, religious and cultural attributes that mark particularities and discrepancies between people and groups, is massively influenced by a multiplicity of discourses and phenomena like wars, natural disasters, economic change, colonization, globalization, market rules, immigration...

Consequently, identities and cultures are subject to permanent change and exposed to a variety of external variables, putting them to an ongoing transition, negotiation, reframing and predefinition from forces of dualistic or binary nature: The center/ the margin, the old/new, the dominant/ subordinate, the private/ the public. Influential variables like migration, demography and geographical mobility have contributed greatly to the process of cultural diversity and dislocation of ethnic and cultural identities bringing about new identity constructions and hybrid experience of the self and the other all together. Immigration implies a diversity of connotations, discursive practices, power relations, dominance, marginality, resistance, rebuilding of lost cultural belongings meeting with other cultural groups.

Moreover, in the context of immigration and transnationalization of people with the change brought by globalization, mobility across borders and political instabilities, cultural identities experience many modifications and displacements of its inner selves, especially with the inherent nature of immigration and movement that brings people face to face with racial difference, geographical alterity and civilizational confrontation with different people from different religious backgrounds and varied ethnic divisions actively engaged in continuous process of mobility and metamorphosis, forging a new, transitory and flexible definition of boundaries and hybrid construction of cultural affiliation. Stuart Hall states that we “should think of identity, instead, as a ‘production’, which is never complete, always in a process, always constituted, within, not outside, representation.”

So, identity is the ultimate site of a shifting politics of recycling and reconstruction, the mutable tablet of narrations, transitory connotations and the permanent dynamism of erasing pre-established cultural identification and the writing of newly formed conception of the self and the other within both subjective and impartial reading of the world, particularly in cultural contexts saturated with mutable conceptual paradigms and ambivalent notions like multiculturalism, acculturation, globalization, heterogeneity, hegemony...

Migration has played a substantial role in the shaping of modern Europe from the glorious thirties to the 1990's visa requirement and integration policies. European countries have received generations of migrants who contributed to the social and economic prosperity of an aging continent, which suffered a declining population growth and sharp shortage of work force. European policies towards immigrants have adopted a range of measures including border control, regularization campaigns, return programs, biometric computer database, high-tech detections, selection policies... However, a sufficient European labour market and dramatic events related to terrorism, security issues and trafficking have turned the phenomenon to a real challenge, especially with increasing controversies about European identity and uncertain environments created by media and radical right, policies became stricter and more complicated. According to international migration report 2017, the number of international migrants world wide reached 258 million in 2017, 78 million in Europe and 25,8 million of Muslim population living in Europe. According to UNHCR, the number of forcibly displaced people and refugees reached 65.6 by the end of 2016. Between 1998 and 2013, 623.118 illegal immigrants arrived at the coast of Europe, 40.000 per a year and 1.5 millions admitted regularly every year. About 350.000 immigrants and refugees have crossed the Mediterranean since January and 100.000 reached Europe in July 2015 (France 24 15/9/2015). In the last seven month of 2015, about 224.000 have crossed to Europe illegally (Sky News Arabic 7/8/2015), 200 thousands crossed the Mediterranean, 2520 drowned (France 24, 30/05/2016) and 30.465 total arrival to Europe 2017 according to UNDOC. For the first time, Europe has arrested smugglers in 2016 as new protective measure to control illegal migration.

Immigration has become very complicated issue, particularly after the Jasmine revolution in the Arab world. Many migrants have reached Europe across Turkey and Libya with the help of terrorist groups and since Al Adnani, spokesman of ISIS declared that he would drown Europe with immigrants. The Libyan group, Fajr Al Islam, has turned smuggling of immigrants to a lucrative trade since prices starts from 1000 Dollars upwards. Migration has contributed greatly to the diversification of Europe and the Mediterranean had the inevitable consequence of multi-ethnic population, which have not only been defined from the basis of homogeneous

national identities, but also from the multicultural discourse of diversity of religious, cultures and languages. However, it has become a challenge to the European community to absorb such differences with a coherent cultural discourse in the absence of clear social, political and legal mechanisms that protect the rights of immigrants and refugees.

The substantial number of immigrants and refugees from North Africa and sub-Saharan has become the most vulnerable groups because of nationalist and xenophobic ideologies. The rise of nationalist feelings and the increasing economic difficulties have marked interracial relations with tension and discrimination, particularly among radical right parties and economic institutions. Xenophobia and cultural threat are used by many radical groups to justify their agendas and policies towards Muslim immigrants. Discourses of refusal and intolerance feed on what is called the intolerability and disintegrability of immigrant and Muslim communities. Besides, the prevailing discourse about Muslims is often associated with Islam as intolerant to gender equality, secularism and Western democratic values. Migration is a complex phenomenon with no clear boundary or precise definition since it involves a variety of processes, migration patterns, modes of entry and a range of migration types like family reunion, colonial migration, labour migration, asylum seeking, refugee, illegal and tourism migration.

Identity and immigration

Within the context of immigration and cross border mobility, cultural identity and ethnicity are subjected to total or partial symbolic dislocation from one culture to another one and from one geography to another, constituting estrangement/revision of self identification. Furthermore, immigration symbolizes anxiety and discontent about moving outside the familiar geography as an "up-rootedness" with the fear of abandoning "sweet home" lands and of losing passionate "mother lands"... with connotative symbolic heaviness of ancestor's land of history, religion, land of "correct" set of values and familiar belief system. If immigration, from the view point of immigrants, represents a threat to cultural identity and the embodiment of loss of native geography, immigration, on the other side, has other political resonances and oppositional meaning from the Eurocentric view point of the host cultures. With the influx of immigrants from North Africa to the countries of Euro for the specific political identities as the ex-colonized subjects of the West, embodying past heritage of long colonization, exploration and abuse.

With the spread of cross-border crime, drug dealing and crimes of global terrorism, distrust and fear from immigrants descendent from North Africa lead to the creation of anti-immigrant political parties and passing laws to limit the influx of culturally loaded and politically charged Muslim and Arab immigrants, who represent a permanent threat to European identity and its political stability. Jean Marie le Pen associates immigration with cultural threat to

European identity. He declares that immigration leads to "submersion of our country, our identity and our civilization". From the view point of plural voices and discourses, the experience of cultural identity and immigration leads to compulsory sense of fragmentation and inconsistency, Rouse said, quoted in Ali Behdad, "we live in confusing world, a world of crisscrossed economies, intersecting system of meaning and fragmented identities".

Immigration, cinema and reshaping identities

The intersection of cinema, identities and cultural representation forces ethnicities to undergo a plurality of redefining processes that either distorts or completes their unfinished identity. The open sense of identity is achieved through distance, exile, travel, assimilation of minorities, difference, complexities of cultural encounters. However, with the rise of this intolerable political climate in press, media, academia and cinema, a kind of ethnic tension, hostile climate and growth of racism towards immigrants have been generated on many levels by passing laws against the access of immigrants to Euro zone and by reflecting that ethnic and cultural tensions in films and other symbolic forms. Western cinema (European American) has been the spokesman of (dis)identification and visual representation of other identities, ethnicities and cultures. European media and cinema have built the body of its writing, visualization and mass cultures sometimes on prejudicial conception and ideological representation of many people and geographies on ethnic and racial grounds.

Cinema, like other forms of fiction, is shaped by and operated in complex of biased cultural, social and political construction from the view of omnipresent narration, transmitting ideological conception of alterity and otherness in a sort of reactionism or excessive vanguardism, historicism of classical approaches or geographical determinism. Western cinema, especially the European, is the imaginative continuum of the visual fantacization of early western and American literature, novel and adventures of travelers, explorers and traders, like Gulliver, F.M foster, R. Kipling. These fictional works about non-Western ethnicities have encompassed dominant and imperialistic visioning, obsessed with prevailing discourses or tropes; exoticism and cultural curiosity about linguistically and culturally different "other". This other can be the location of folkloric and erotic associations. Said Edward wrote "The Orient was almost European invention, and has been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic being, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences... the harem". The North-African or non-European is sometimes displayed in an excessive psychological fear and cultural religious phobia since they are the source of Western discontents and embodiment of haunting religious fanaticism, horror and terrorism.

Following the tradition of the Western discourse of imperialism and domination, the praxis of visual representation through films started early with the invention of picture motion by Lumiere brothers who travelled to North Africa as French Spanish colony to experience different type of feeling via the camera and with the ethnographic cinema of early 20th century North Africa has been perpetuated as uncivilized or savage geography and virgin/barren landscape that is in need of enlightenment, fecundation and exploration in many artistic, fictional and cinematic works. Many Films have relatively changed truth about cultural identifies of North African geographies and ethnicities by exoticizing, fantasizing and eroticizing Muslims and Arabs to justify and legitimize conquest and colonization. After independence and with the rise of third world cinema and postcolonial thinking and literature, there have been a shift in the ideological discourse of the European cinema and its discursive colonialist formation because of the variables mentioned before and because of an emergent counter discourse of ex-colonized countries.

The demise of cold war, The rise of Islamic extremism, radical Islam movement, global terrorism, the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and recently the trasnationalization of the Magnetski Law and the impasse of Brixit, immigrants flux to Europe and anti-immigrant laws(ultrafiltration, cultural buffering, salmon bias policies) have introduced a shift in the cultural discourses, tropes, metaphors of European cinema and its construction of North African, especially those immigrants of second and third generation, who were associated in Western media with drug trade, riot, terrorism, metropolitan trafficking and sex crimes and came to the conviction that return to homelands is a myth . The issue of second and third generation of immigrants from North Africa has raised another phase of cinematic representation of ethnicities and otherness in European cinema, which is criticized by post colonialist approaches as using biased auto-references and projection of invented stereotypical signification and prejudicial frames metaphors when tackling immigrant problems from ex-colonies: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia...

Representation and beyond representation

So many Dutch, French and Spanish films about North African immigrants deliberately change the truth about Arabs and Muslims, transforming their identities to caricaturized versions of reality. So many films, shaped by the narratives of white the European superiority and the dynamics of dominant ideologies, conceptualize North Africans as drug dealers, trouble makers, thieves and religious fanatics and terrorists bringing instabilities, terror and devastation to stable, rich democratic and homogenous Europe which is sometimes visualized as being conquered by the south and sometimes its identity is being threatened by racial and cultural difference in films

like *la Désintégration*, *un Prophet*, *el Nino*, *Made in France*, *Caché*, *le Noir tevasi Bien*, *Retorno a Hansala*... However, with the emergence of the Beur cinema in France, Spain, Italy and the Moro cinema in the Netherlands with filmmakers of North African origins, there may have been a counter discourse, writing back and revision of North African identities in European cinema to the worse or the best. Self-representation and cultural correction of this cinema has introduced a set of films like *le Grand voyage*, *les Indigènes*, *les Ambassadeurs*, *Traverse*, *Miss Mouna*, *Entre les Murs (the class)*, *Image*, *Devines*, *un si Beau Voyage*, *JassadGharib*, *Exiles*, *Outside the law*, *le Gone du chaaba*, *Inchllah*...

This dissertation traces the multiple discourses of cultural identity, power relations and the hegemonic knowledge of Eurocentric migrant filmography. It is not exclusively limited to the questioning of the dominant ideology of the European cinematic traditions of exoticism and its deterministic cultural assumptions about foreigners, but it goes beyond the traditional models of representation to the new context of diaspora, islamophobia, terrorism and the global economic crisis. The tries to question the dominant paradigms of (mis)representation by tracing narratives of identification, disidentification and the ideological predicament that challenges the visibility of Maghrebi protagonists in cinematic postcolonial encounters as it is mapped in a partial system of narration. In the same way, the analysis highlights the disruptive forces of film narratives that rupture/ deconstruct the discursive import of European cinema because of the ambivalences, indeterminacies, conflicts, contradictions and tensions that internally impede and problematize the narratives' own construct and texture in films like *el Nino* by Daniel Monzon, *Retorno a Hansala* by C. Gutierrez, *Prophet* By Jacques Audiard, *le Noir tevasi Bien* by Jack Bral, *la Désintégration* by Phillipe Faucon...

These works, equally, engage in probing how European migrant cinema offer new spaces of identifications and solidarities by divorcing representation from old essentialist regimes of knowledge and traditional hierarchical differences between the self and the other as well as framing cultural otherness from the perspective of (un)successful intercultural encounters (romances, marriages), implying a liberating discourse of metamorphosis and reconciliation. In parallel, this paper tries to construct a framework by asking how Maghrebi migrant cinema in diaspora can contingently raise the possibility of "returning gaze" against the essentialist construction of identity and reconstruct the pre-established perceptions of immigrants. It asks how diasporic Maghrebi filmography challenges dominant construction of North African identities and how they subvert or accentuate hegemonic or counter-hegemonic (self) representation of diasporic experience, expatriation and identity negotiation in films like Raja Amari's *Foreign Body*, H. Benyamina's *Devines* and A. el Arbi and B. Fallah's *Image*.

This dominant European cinema and its counter immigrants films affected by the 9/11 attack in the American twin towers, Oklahoma bombardment, the Paris suburb riots (2004) terrorist attacks in Madrid (2005), London attacks (2005) and lately Brussels, Nice... bringing change in attitudes towards Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians in Europe because of their Arabo-Islamic identity, especially with the rise of political right nationalist like Geert Wilders in the Netherlands who called for the stop of influx of foreigners to Euro-zone.

Associated with this political discourses and socio-cultural variables about immigration and identity construction, how do European cinema and diasporic films as culturally and ideologically loaded systems of representation reproduce North African identities and people? What are the stereotypes, tropes, and metaphors used in those films to culturally portray North African immigrants? How otherness and difference is perpetuated on the screen of dominant cinema before and after terrorist attacks in Europe and America? How second and third generations of North African immigrant are represented in visual media? Do Europeans really represent North African identity unbiased and regardless of racial and ethnic difference? How do geographies and ethnicities interweave a playground for the construction of imaginary identities and patterns of cultural prejudice?

How cultural meanings in films directed by both European and immigrant are constructed and deconstructed? How colonialist discourse of European cinema about second and third generation immigrant respond to political events? What were the changes and twists introduced to the stereotypes, tropes and the ideological narratives of that cinema as a reaction to terrorist attacks and riots undertaken by immigrant? Did immigrant cinema of second and third generation cinema correct the image produced on immigrants in Western cinema? How does such cinema articulate a counter-narrative to the grand narrative of European cinema? How does immigrant cinema conceptualize and self represent immigrant? Does it rectify the stereotypes or does it reproduce the same images of European cinema? Is there any reproduction of the history of stereotypes about Arabs and Muslims from the "Savage" to the "Folkloric", and to the "fanatic and terrorist"? What are the contradictions and ambivalences that fracture dominant discourse and ideological formation in those films? How the imperialistic discourse of European cinema is dislocated and subverted by counter-narrative and resistant gestures, rhetoric within those films?

Objectives and Methodology

This thesis is an attempt to interrogate or read differently the representational politics of European cinema of immigration and the cultural identity of North African immigrants by exploring filmic stereotypes, the metamorphosis of the political discourse and potential existence of ambivalences and tensions which could be used to deconstruct and disrupt the essentializing

content of its texts. The main objectives of this dissertation will look for the (mis)representation of North African immigrants in European cinema and the discursive formation of their cultural geographical and religious identities. The analysis will go deeper to unveil the nature of stereotypes, prejudices and how European cinematic representation of second and third generations North Africans is influenced by political events associated with Muslims like the terrorist attacks in Europe and America and riot in France, by tracing the twists introduced to the tropes of ambivalences and constructions of North Africans. My contribution to the discussions of post colonial encounters in European cinema and its perception/representation of North African expatriates and their cultural identity is developed, dissimilarly from other analyses and works, by interpreting textual depictions and visual constructions of Maghrebi migrants from the perspective of three or four conceptual gears.

A deconstruction of European cinema of migration can not be disengaged from the classicism of its thought essentially countering the different paradigms that historically made the same dominant system of knowledge subject to twist and rethinking. Tracing the metamorphosis of the stereotype and the changeability of cultural prejudgments will take a comparative study of narration and focalization before and after the terrorist attacks at the beginning of the new millennium and how reflections of the dramatic event forces/influences European filmmakers to subjectively or objectively change the politics of encounters to the positive or the negative. Second, the complexities of ambivalent discourses in European cinema can be put to test by deploying and taking advantage of recurrent tropes in European consciousness which are cultural anxieties, postcolonial phobias and complexes that offensively target the new subaltern or underclass of Europe, immigrants, turn to be disruptive, resistant and empowered under the politics of subcultural justice which brings them face to face with still orientalist, imperialist and essentialist fantasies. Finally, the symbolic space of survival and resistance, identification and disidentification granted for or taken by North African protagonists in both European and Maghrebi diasporic cinema to build a margin of negotiation politics for the sake of emancipation or entrapment, for dismantling or consolidating the pervasive force of hegemonic regime is produced and appropriated cleverly by playing on both sides of the game, maintaining a politics of identity codeswitching or open resistance. The emphasis of this work will deploy a double critique of the dominant discourse by questioning disidentification of complicit discursive practices of visual representation, by adopting a delicate way of deconstructing existing colonial tropes and questioning dominant ambivalences as well as capturing moments of identification that exceptionally overwhelm protagonists.

The thesis uses cultural studies, postcolonial theory and colonial discourse analysis to interrogate or to construct a criticism of cinematic representations and postcolonial encounters in contemporary European cinema by articulating a basis of discussion which share theoretical and methodological polyphony that permits a diversity of frameworks, perspectives and concepts. This will be carried out through the adoption and the deployment of variety of deconstructivist and counter-dominant approaches and concepts like "subversion", "resistance" "gaze" "counter narrative as well as other analytical concepts like Deniz Goturk's "pleasures of hybridity", Milan Kundera's "childcracy", Jaon Gross's "widening the margin"... within the scope of cultural studies discourse analysis and postcolonial theories in sort of an interdisciplinary approach to the content analysis study of cinema, which combines the use of counter-argument deconstruction and dependence on grand narrative texts to look for the traces of hidden ideologies, ruptures, contradictions and slipperiness that dismantle text's own building. As such, there will be a kind of rereading of the dominant voices of ethno-centric identifications in European cinema to deconstruct the ambivalences and disabilities of those discourses, without forgetting a deep analysis of North African migrant cinema of diaspora by foregrounding the experience of self-representation, rediscovery and rectification of North African identity as way of writing back or counter-writing. It will take into consideration how North African second and third generation diasporic filmmakers self-portrait themselves, how they respond to the popular perception of Muslims in Europe and whether they objectively or subjectively reproduce the same stereotype system of the dominant discourse, especially after the emergence of global terrorism.

Moreover, to extend the methodology of this paper, the criticism of visual works will be based on content analysis of films, texts, opinions, interviews and using the "symptomacity of reading" by Fredric Jameson, who approaches literary texts, in his influential work the *Political Unconscious*(1981), by paying close attention to unconscious silences, invisible structures, elisions and hidden anxieties, sharing the deconstructing strategies of colonial discourse analysis and postcolonial theory in uncovering the latent political/ ideological import of films/texts and the inconsistencies/tensions of its discourse. The symptomatic reading of Jameson is borrowed from the phenomenology of M. Heidegger which is itself taken from the philosophy of the German theologian Schliermacher, juxtaposing the dualities of the visible/invisible, the perceived/unperceived and the textual/discursive or the linguistic/the translinguistic in Julia Kristeva's term. This phenomenological interpreticism is also reminiscent of Islamic philosophy and fiqh studies, especially the work of Sahrouddi, Mohamed Abdelbaker, the fifth Shiit imam, and Sarkhatsi, who used the double of the *zahir/batin*(explicit/implicit)to read and analyze sacred texts. The thesis suggests this deconstructive phenomenological symptomatic reading in film

analysis to unravel ideological constructs imbricated in the narratives and captures some of the weaknesses and fallacies that subvert the political import of the text.

Theoretical Framework

Writing on identity, immigration and cinema is very complicated since it constitutes a rich area of research that is subject to permanent modification, evolution and innovation in very fast pace. This thesis is supposed to take into account the accumulative studies, texts and contributions by scholars and critics who reshape and reform this field of study with the conditions that trigger this mobility. An abundant body of literature about identity, immigration and cinema is available both in print form and internet digital libraries, offering possibilities for analyzing the phenomenon from diverse perspectives. This body of literature provides a playground of interaction and connection between different perspectives and data resources which put immigration, identity and cinema in the midst of political, social and economic mosaic.

This body of literature will be used selectively and critically to generate a fruitful study of identity and cinema. Meanwhile the thesis of this research will restrict the area of study to a detailed analysis pertinent to each chapter theoretically and practically with concrete documentation and referencing trying not to fall in the trap of abstraction and redundancy although research in the field is risky and trap the process in major pitfalls and keeps changing and updating every day, constituting a challenge and problem to the methodological characteristics of the thesis. Thus, to catch up with the latest development in this field of study and for methodological necessities, I will rely on articles and recent studies from the internet for the shifting nature of immigration and its related literature due to the unstable political and cultural contexts.

The questioning of visual truths of cultural identities of second and third generation North Africans in European and diasporic cinema will be carried out by applying a body of theories and approaches that rely on the text of Edward Said's colonial discourse analysis, the work of cultural studies scholars (Stuart Hall), postcolonial/subaltern theories of Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha as well as the work of Hamid Naficy's accented cinema, Robert Stam and Ella Shohat, James Clifford's diaspora, Arjun Apparudai deterritorialization, Eden Brubaker and Alec Hargreaves' migration research, Alex Schmid's terrorism studies, Mohamed Nouredine Affaya, Tariq Ramadan's Muslim identity in Europe.... Some articles about representation of North African immigrants in European cinema and identity construction in diasporic filmmaking like Barbara Mennel's article *the Politics of Space in the Cinema of Migration*, DenizGokturk's *Turkish Delight-German Fright: Migrant Identities in Transnational Cinema*,

Verena Berger and Daniel Winkler's *Mediterranean Perspectives: Early Spanish and Italian Contribution to the Cinema of Irregular Migration* and Garcia M. Roldan *Spanish Cinema: Meeting of Cultural Identities* will be taken into account for comparison and criticism.

Filmography, Period of Study and Rationale for the Corpus

There is no specific time span or time boundary which situates films being studied between a departure point and a closing date. Films are not chosen with strict criteria or follow a narrow chronology of event, aesthetic or time; rather, the majority of selected movies share thematic content of a category of European cinema which is dedicated to the fictionalization of North African immigrants' identity and diasporic experience. Generally, the nineties was the inauguration decade when European cinema starts a real preoccupation with the phenomenon of immigration because the latter has seriously touched the social economic and cultural fabric of European societies, particularly in a context marked by an excessive migrant labor force, frequent regularization campaigns and surplus of illegal migrant arrival to the continent. Although European cinema showed a relative interest in migrant themes in the seventies and the eighties, it is post-Schengen and post 9/11 terrorist attacks decades that influentially forced European filmmakers to the representation and portrayals of second generation North Africans who brought a radical change to the traditional views of Beurs, Moors and Muslims in the classical symbolic imaginary. Any film that touches upon the perception of North Africans in Europe will be a significant contribution to the analysis and the documentation of visual construction of immigrants. This does not mean that filmography about North African immigrant is available.

Finding films related to the subject matter was a major challenge to the progress of the thesis because of the auteurist character of the filmography. In the theoretical part about migrant stocks and figures, the thesis run the obstacle collecting the exact number of North African immigrants entering and residing in Europe; different statistics is given by different countries of OCED or data are country based. Lack of consensus, precision and unreliable statistics resources are due to a number of reasons, among them disparities between departure and destination countries and governmental and non-governmental databases. The other major difficulty facing the thesis is availability of filmography. Some films which will be studied as case studies are not available in DVD / VCD/ VCR format either they are not commercial success or they are too abstract for popular viewership or are not available at all in disc stores or online. Thus, the dissertation will use other sources of filmography from Spanish, French and English cultural centers and TV channels (ARTE, MBC, TV orient), film festivals (Tetuan, Tangier, Agadir) and the Moroccan cinematographic centre. Another constraint to the thesis, most candidates do not

mention, is the potential failure of adapting/fitting the conceptual framework of sophisticated philosophical theories to the content analysis because some movies do not achieve acceptable intellectual mastery and qualified aesthetic level to be analyzed through their methodologies, which may turn the whole thing to random projection. Generally speaking, a deconstructive reading and a content analysis based on postcolonial and cultural studies theories allow this study to trace how the visual focalization of European cinema shifts the politics of cultural encounters from traditional discourses and stereotypes to a new set of postcolonial complexities and contradictions fuelled by tropes of fear, discontent and uncertainties.

Chapterization:

Part I: Locating identity: conceptual Frameworks plurality of voices and interdisciplinary politics. This part contains two chapters and it will be a detailed informative analysis and descriptive reading of studies and theories which worked on the concept of identity from a multiplicity of angles: philosophical, literary, constructivist, deconstructivist, postcolonial... It will look not only at the historical deployment of the term in contexts purely related to immigration and geographical dislocation, but it will also visualizes how the intersection of identity, immigration and geography formulate an intermingled ground for different paradigms of anti-immigrant discourses, postcolonial studies and countercolonial discourse theories, which drove cultural identity to undergo a myriad of redefinitions, interpretations and ideological constructions in a sort of assemblage of literature and critical studies about identity, representation, diaspora and hybridity.

Part II: North African Migration and the European Union: statistical stocks, changing politics and socio-cultural attitudes. This part will review the major statistical references, figures and immigration trends of North African immigrants to the countries of the European Union without overlooking the dire consequences of the economic crisis and the Jasmine revolution patterns. It will shed light, as well, on the changing European policies towardsimmigrants flows, integration systems, anti-immigrant attitudes and political voices, by tracking the evolution and transformation of migration patterns, political contexts, the different phases of the phenomenon... as well as capturing the changing mosaic of entry modes, citizenship systems, economic cooperation between sending and receiving countries, models of integrations...

Part III: Legacies of Empire, European cinema and North African immigrants: Colonial discourse and tropes of representation. This part will specifically focus on colonial legacy of European empire and the genealogy of representation of North African Muslims in early colonial literature, cinema and paintings from the excessive fear and threat presented by

Islam to European religious consciousness. It argues that metropolitan discourse of power and domination kept changing and metamorphosing its politics towards cultural alterity and ethnic difference on stereotypical and judgmental basis. It suggests that the visual and literary representation of North Africans have made a shift , positively or negatively, in context of Islamophobia, the rise of salafist ideology and terrorist attacks in Europe.

Part IV: Cultural Identity of North African Immigrant in plurality of voices: (mis)representation and self-reconstruction. This part will raise the question of power, domination, resistance and ambivalence in the political import and discursive content of European cinema on Maghrebi migrants. The argument in this chapter will be built on the hypothesis that contemporary European cinema may have inherited the judgmental and stereotypical structures of early orientalism and colonialism as continuity to former knowledge system and there may be a rupture or relative shift, positive or negative, in paradigms of representation because of influential political and cultural contexts. Equally, it will look at the fragile textual authority of the embedded colonial discourse by revealing its tensions, instabilities, ambivalences, identification, disidentification as subversive force that contribute to the fall of the symbolic system, where difference and otherness take command by the power of hybridization, menaces, mimesis, resistance and subversive counter-authority. It will not only trace conscious and unconscious forms of resistance and modes of discursive fallacies, but it will also consider whether Maghrebi migrant cinema has really written back to correct the image of immigrants in European cinema or it objectively figures up the experience of diaspora with its complexities and tensions. The chapter will also focus on how migrant cinema conceptualizes and self represents North African identity and discrepancy to the dominant discourse of European cinema. For the record, this dissertation has reached a size of more than 420 pages, but it was shortened by dropping some sections (one section about illegal immigration and the other about economic crisis), paragraphs and tables because I was asked to do so to respect the norms and the guidelines of the department although it was difficult to introduce those modifications without touching the chronology and the organization of ideas. The title is itself a problem because it is too long and needs rewording or change to better reflect the contents of the thesis. For example, the word “memetic” is arbitrary and has no sense or contribution to the symbolic signification of the title. Thus, if it is possible, the change or the shortening of the title could be one of the recommendations of post-defense modifications.

Part I

I-LOCATING IDENTITY: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS, PLURALITY of DISCOURSES AND INTERDISCIPLINARY POLITICS

1-Theorizing Identity: Borders of Society, Geography, Religion and Virtuality

A-The Theoretical Trajectory of Identity from Classicism to the Negotiated Spaces of Interdisciplinarity

Identity is one of the most ambiguous concepts in cultural, social and political studies. The term is the most widely debated because of its controversial nature and because of its adaptability or capability to be used in a variety of discipline: media studies, sociology, cultural studies, gender studies, social psychology and philosophy. As a loose and subjectively defined concept, identity frequently gains new uses, definitions and conceptualizations, especially with the development of new schools and the emergence of new fields of research driven by the innovative force of globalization, technological evolution and political turmoil, which brought instability to cultural and geographical knowledge by factors of displacement, exile and immigration.

The historical trajectory of identity as a concept within the shadows of analytical and critical theory started early with the Greek philosophers who used the term to address the phenomenon of “philosophical problems of permanence amidst manifest change and of unity amidst manifest diversity”¹. By the 1960s, the vernacular of identity and its cognates were introduced as new concepts to public discourse and social sciences under the work of Erik Erikson who introduced the term “*identity crisis*”². Originally, identity as a concept was appropriated and borrowed from the traditional conceptual framework of psychanalysis (Freud) by Gordon Allport who used the term in his book *the nature of prejudice* (1954)³ for conceptualizing ethnicity and theory of prejudice formation. The popularity of identity as a fashionable concept for addressing varied range of research paradigms was strongly fuelled by the work of sociological role theory by Nelson Fookes and, then, by the very influential studies of symbolic interactionist social theory by Erving Goffman. The concept got out of the confines of specialized disciplinary research, entering the jargon of journalism, academia and political propaganda,⁴ tracing a prototypical feature of a concept that is used variably to address a variety of questions (race, class, religion...). Identity, therefore, represents a fertile soil for sociological, psychological and political approaches to develop whole range of studies to capture the concept

¹Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond Identity," *Theory and Practice*, 29: 1 (2000), p. 2.

²Ibid., p. 2.

³Dina L. Anselmi, "The Meaning of 'Race': Psychologies's Troubled History," in *Race and Racism in theory and Practice*, ed. Berel Lang (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2000), p. 40.

⁴Rogers Brubaker and Frederic Cooper, "Beyond Identity," p. 3.

from different perspectives and positions. Identity resides amidst a storm of conceptualizations that categorize its significance among a shared knowledge and representational formation torn between the boundaries of individual selfhood and the collective consciousness; in the realm of individualization and socialization to a collective cultural system of beliefs, attributes, lifestyle, language and family relations.⁵

Identity is a heterogeneous concept and defined in a variety of contexts, ranging from human engineering, geographical/ cultural representation and national sovereignty. Identity is a socio-cultural system which structures the life of people or groups under an organic like system that is comprised of common and conformatory belief.⁶ This socially constituted selfhood or commonality prepares and predisposes members of community not only to feel, think and perceive the world around them in specific way and different to other communities, but also to develop a pattern of conduct towards the community and the readiness to behave in particular manner or a “*système de dispositions réglées*”⁷, which Pierre Bordieu calls *habitus*⁸. Biometric identity is a totality of legal and biological features as biological / natural persona with the exclusive properties that differentiate him / her like DNA, figure prints and other genetic features.⁹ Biometric identity is one of the most challenging and sensitive issue that raises questions associated security, information control and identity fraud, especially it is subject to the risk of confusion and camouflage (religious conversion, fingers prints loss and identical twin DNA)¹⁰. Legal identity is the legal status of a person as member of legislative society and who is subject to the rules, procedures and the legal norms that define citizenship which gives a person a clear identity like birth document, residence certificate, identity card, medical and financial information.¹¹

As a philosophical/psychological notion, the analysis of identity focus on personal traits that are characterized as definable and recognizable self continuity on time, a kind of link between the mind and the body. The psychological approach to personal identity is an experience of being someone with specific persona and traits. Personal identity goes beyond genetic characteristics to the person’s emotional, intellectual and spiritual makeup that is defined in

⁵Amine Maalouf, *Les identités Meurtrières* (Paris: Grasset and Fasquelle, 1998), p. 28.

⁶David Matsumoto, "Culture, context and Behaviour," *The journal of personality*, 75: 6 (2007), p.1292-1293.

⁷Pierre Bordieu, "Le sens pratique," in *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* 2: 1 (1980), 43-86, p. 89.

⁸Pierre Bordieu cited in Abderrahman Al -Malki, *A-Thaqafa wa-Lmajal: Dirassa fi Sociologia Aa-Tahadur wa l-Hijra fi l-Maghreb* (Fes: University of Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah, 2015), p. 219.

⁹Amine Maalouf, *Les identités meurtrières* (Paris : Grasset and Fasquelle, 1998), p. 28.

¹⁰[www://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/biometrics](http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/biometrics)

¹¹Nick Bostrom and Andress Sandberg (2011), “*Future of Identity*,” retrieved on 04-07-2015 from, <https://nickbostrom.com/views/identity.pdf>

terms of innate gifts, talents, predispositions and tendencies. Internal identity has impact on the way people manifest themselves to others, the decision they take and the choices they make (open, introvert...) ¹². This type of identity represents, also, an accumulative process of maturization and experience of complex additions and growth. Some social psychologists classify personal identity as the lowest rank of social identity or the lowest level of self-categorization because it consists of considering the self as different from others. ¹³ Kay Deaux (1992) draws a distinction between personal identity and social identity by expressing one's membership in group along personal and idiosyncratic lines. ¹⁴ Personal identity is committed to the individual sense of the self. Although the perception of personal identity seems to distance from other types of identity, it comes to term with the meaning of other social identities (roles theory) which has the capability of overlapping with the meaning of other cognates like personal identity, "personal identity is defined, at least in part, by group memberships, and social categories are infused with persona meaning". ¹⁵ As a role theorist, Stets argues that masculine gender as a role identity has a link to the mastery personal identity, sharing the meaning of control. Potential and dangerous impacts on personal identity threaten the very existence of human nature with the development of highly advanced biotechnology, genomics and regeneration medicine (transplantation, repairing, implant). ¹⁶

An other type of identity, Paul Ricour calls "*narrative self*", through which people make a sense of themselves by the stories they tell of their lives, giving a particular definition to the self as a persona with past, present and future with meaningful attributes fit to system of values and social context accumulated gradually with retrospective attributions of causation and emplotment of subjects. ¹⁷ This approach is criticized of being static and traditional because it perceives identity as an accumulation. This concept of identity is vulnerable to instability, disorders and mediations that can impair the core self sense of existence (drugs, alcohol, delusion, amnesia) or it can be transformed intentionally by what Robert Weber calls deliberate modification under the power of new technology ¹⁸(cosmetics...). In the 18th century, Emanuel Kant differentiated between individual and social identity. The transcendental subject / ego is a

¹²Jane W. Davidson, "Innate Talents: Reality or Myth?" *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 21:3(1990), p.400

¹³Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets (2000), "Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory," *Social Psychology quarterly*, retrieved on 3 July 2015, from <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d07/>

¹⁴Kay Deaux cited in Peter Burke and Jan Stets, p. 3.

¹⁵ Kay Deaux, "Reconstructing Social Identity, " *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 19:1, p. 4.

¹⁶Nick Bostrom and Andress Sandberg, *The Future of Identity*, p. 33.

¹⁷Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative I* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984), pp.59-64.

¹⁸Nick Bostrom and Andress Sandberg, "the Future of Identity", p. 7.

site of knowledge and perception and the empirical ego as an access to social life and its communicative values.

Social psychological analyses within the realm of traditional approach to identity (primordialist approach) envisions identity as a stable and never-changing attachment to collective selfhood and repertoire that preserves the primary embodiment of values, ethics and assumptions that eternally are resided in the precinct of the past and a source of conflict among ethnic groups (Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz).¹⁹ The situationalist approach (Wheeler and Petty 2001) of social psychology argues that people identity is subject to unconscious external stimuli that lead to the change of behaviour and the negation of acquired new meaning as in the case of stereotypes. Moreover, with the “personality psychology” of Erik Erikson (who introduced the terms identity crisis and stage model of psychological development) identity becomes an entity in which different aspects merged together as unified whole; it is a double dynamic which brings together the personal characteristics with the realities of social existence so that a balanced meaningful relatedness could be achieved between the internal/ personal identification and the external/ real ascription.²⁰ Weberian sociology of Foucault and Bordieu argues that the state name, identify and legitimize not only by using force but also by soft power.²¹

Other aspects of this interdisciplinary term is social identity which embraces aspect of the self in relation to group and the different personas, roles and relations in different contexts within a multiplicity of social grouping (gender, vocation, language, religion). Social identity is a collective definition of a group through which individuals make sense of themselves, of their practices, of what they share and how they differ from others. Identity is a source of shared knowledge that persuades members to behave in guiding their choices, identity denotes “fundamental and consequential sameness among members of a group or category ... this sameness is expected to manifest itself in solidarity, in shared dispositions, or consciousness, or collective action.”²² This collective selfhood as the basic condition of social being denotes the process through which members of a certain social affiliation shares a categorical characteristics and attributes come to construct meaningful significance to formations as race, gender, family, profession.... and shared understanding of their interests / beliefs to take collective action expressive of group identity (one can be a student, a soccer fan, Muslim, a brother, a son of an

¹⁹Jack David Eller, "Affect Identity and Ethnicity: Towards a Social-Psychological Model of Ethnic Attachment," *Ethnic Studies* 19: 2/ 3 (1996), pp. 141-142.

²⁰Justin T. Sokol(2009), "Identity Development though the life time: an Examination of Eriksonian Theory," retrieved on 20 May 2015, from <http://epublications.maquette.edu/gjcp/vols/iss2/14>

²¹Brubaker et al. op. cit. p. 16.

²²Brubaker et al. op. cit. p. 7.

immigrant).²³ Social identity does not only embrace shared social classification including ethnicity/ nationality (Asian, American, Moroccan), religion, language, political, affiliation (republican, feminist) vocation (teacher, athlete) or relationship (wife), but it also manifests a shared system of cultural representations, conformative characteristics and even stereotyping as socially shared attributes (woman represented as understanding, emotional)²⁴.

In studying the dynamics of social identity, the situational approach defines society as an entity which is always in the process of creating through the interpretation of actions and situations (Blummer). This approach pictures society as being devoid of organization /structure because of that flux. The structural approach, in contrast, defines society as a stable and durable entity with “*patterned regularities that characterize most human action*”.²⁵ Social identity is also associated with the work of role identity (McCallan Simmons 1978)²⁶ which defines the self as occupant of a role through which members internalize the meanings and expectations associated with their role. As a system of moral regulation and collective assumptions with a hierarchy of race, gender, family, profession...) and shared understanding of their interest / belief to take collective action expressive of group identity (one can be a student, a soccer fan, Muslim, a brother, a son of an immigrant).

With Henry Tajfel, identity theory as a process of identification, identity theorization sets foot on intergroup identification. For Tajfel, identity signifies more than a categorization of a certain group. Social identification (Freud) contains a plurality of motivational considerations and emotional associations.²⁷ For example, experiences and feelings associated with being black American are probably different from those associated with being Mexican American. This process of intergroup interaction, which Tajfel calls identification and Turner self-categorization,²⁸ involves strong alignment with the group to the extent that members under a sort of cognitive and emotional process of depersonalization, seeing themselves as self-image of the group, as prototypical agent of the group interchangeable copy of other members. They become capable of taking action for the group despite the fact that individuals are dominated and taken advantage of and fused to group ideology.

²³Kay Deaux(2001), "Social Identity," Retrieved on 30-06-2015, from <http://www.utex.edu/courses/stross/ant3936/files/articles/identity>

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵J. C. Turner, “Social categorization and social discrimination in the Minimal Group Paradigm,” *differentiation between social groups*, ed. H. Tajfel (London: Academic press, 1978),p. 103

²⁶S. Stryker, *Symbolic interactionism: a Social Structural Version* (Menlo Park: Benjamin Cummings, 1980), p. 65.

²⁷Henry Tajfel and J. C. Turner, “An integrative theory of intergroup conflict” in *the social psychology of intergroup relations*, eds. W. G. Austin et al (Monterey CA: Brook / cole, 1979), p. 37.

²⁸J. C. Turner (1980), “Social categorization and Inter group Behaviour,” retrived on 10 May 2016, from <https://psycnt.apa.org/record/1981-23596-001>

As a system of moral regulation and collective assumptions with a hierarchy of norms, identity judges behaviour as right or wrong, desirable and undesirable.²⁹ This judgemental characteristic of identity is based on pattern of classifications which valorize and devalorize, include and exclude. Identity also presents itself as a core set of values and community worthy, it urges metamorphosis of values, convictions and modes of expression to continue living. Furthermore, identity as a collective feeling gives its members a sense of security by rendering the world and phenomena meaningful, eligible and rational. Identity sets boundaries or control filters³⁰ to members in order to maintain itself as unique and different (language, dress codes as markers...). This filtering of identity is secured and bounded by mechanisms like sacralization (make things appear sacred, natural and even scientific) and sophistication (comments by others are dismissed as irrational or failure to understand).³¹

Language is one of the most essential forms of identity construction and potent force for expressing individuals/ speakers' identity, whether it is class, gender or ethnicity. Language has the capability of telling people who you are, where you are from and what do you do. Sociocultural and linguistic studies see identity as an adequate potential of cultural representation capable of building discourses of difference, distinction, demonstration and indexicality.³² Language positions interlocutors in social hierarchies, where the powerful controls the content and the volume of speech. The dominant uses authority to punctuate the speech of the dominated to keep a distance like in the relation of the supervisor doctor and the doctor trainee. Fairclough invented the phrase "gate keeping encounters" where white middleclass British determines previously the mechanics and the discourse of job interviewees from marginalized minority classes³³.

While language, as well, can be a tool of resistance for marginalized groups to mark difference, the use of grammatical and lexical resources of certain kind is associated with discursive announcement of social and ethnic difference. Afro-American dialect version of

²⁹S. Stryker, *Symbolic interactionism: a Social Structural Version* (Menlo Park: Benjamin Cummings, 1980), p. 65.

³⁰de George Schopflin (2010), *the Dilemmas of Identity*, retrieved 20 August 2016, from <https://books-google.co.ma/books?id=DbGnSGAMC2pg=PA102&/pg=PA102&da.the+dilemmas+of+identity+De+george>

³¹de George schopflin (2001), "the constructions of identity," retrieved 16-07-2015 from http://www.net.tweint.ac.at/nthft/temp/oefg/text/wiss_tag/Beitrag_Schopflin.pdf

³²Pierre Bordieu in Jan Blommaert (2015), "Pierre Bordieu : Perspectives on Language and Society," retrieved 16 July, 2016 from, https://www.researchgate.net/107283134_Pierre/Bordieu_Perspectives_on_language_and_society_JanBlommaert

³³N. Fairclough, *Language and Power* (London: Longman, 1989), p.46

English and its vocabulary is used by Afro-Americans to position themselves as non-white American and antagonist sense of blackness merged with social pride of Americans constituted not only through material symbols like clothes, but also through symbolic codes of language that is innovative, complex and different in structure. Language is a central attribute to group identity from the standpoint of group relations. It is an ideological tool for the elite and the ruling classes to maintain stratification and social boundaries in term of formality, standardization and free speech. Basing his Analysis on Ontonio Gramsci, Van Dijk concludes that discourses of domination become natural and complete when members of certain community take for granted the hegemony of the dominant as a “given”, especially when they is unable to problematize and distinguish its own interests from that of the dominant³⁴ because the dominated/defeated always tries to look up the powerful and imitate his belief, lifestyle and language³⁵. Language influences the patterns of communication with the group.³⁶ However, ethno-linguistic groups identify and show solidarity with those who speak the same language more than with members who has the same national and geographical sameness. Bilingual Moroccan Amazighs resist the use of Arabic as a symbol of dominant culture, by using code switching (change to Amazigh when Arabic speaker joins the group or French). To stay in Moroccan context, language is used to signal class or age difference. The marked and the purposeful use of French or mixture of French and Arabic (code-switching) by some Moroccans is symbolic of class superiority or an identification with a sort of identity that is elite, elevated and bourgeois (to say that we are different). As such, language use represents a specific identity show (parade) or demonstration that is constructed through context of action and negotiable socio-cultural circumstances. In his study of immigrant groups, especially Korean American, Chun (2001) found out that young Korean American use the lexicon and stylization of Afro-American slang as a masculine identity discourse. Through the appropriation of such version of English Koreans identify themselves with the gendered content embodied in that use, producing a counter-discourse to dominant representation of Koreans as “parsine, feminine and desirous of whiteness”.³⁷

Because of Afro-American black cinema, revolutionary rap music and black fashion, black youth American language has become as symbol of masculinity, roughness and smartness. This hybrid and permeatable view of identities through novel form of language use and the creative use of its lexicon is also appropriated by immigrant group of Pakistani and Indian origin

³⁴Van Dijk, *Ideology* (London: Sage Publications, 1998), p.102.

³⁵Ibn Khaldoun, *Al Mouqqadima* in Abdellah al Harassi, “Mina al-Haymana al-Haqiqya ila Tadafoa al-Waai: nahwa Roeya Loghawiya Arabiyya,” *Nizwa*, ed.Saif er-Rahbi, 34 (2003)23-38, p.27.

³⁶Pierre Bordieu, *Distinction* cited in Jan Blommaert, op .cit.

³⁷E. W. Chun, “the Construction of White, Black and Korean American Identity through African American Vernacular English” *the Journal of linguistic Anthropology*,11: 1(2001), p. 61.

in Britain to identify with their peers and establish their position in desired social connection. Through language use, identity is proved to be flexible, emergent and situated in the midst of social and cultural change. Identity is “precarious, contradictory and in process, constantly reconstituted in discourse each time we think or speak”³⁸. Language is not a pure, uniform and stable content which resides in the mind of people, rather, it is another component of identity that is unpredictable and dynamic outcome of the lived experience and the agentic moves of both individuals and groups

Religious identity is an other influential component of identity, religion is defined as a set of rites, beliefs and practices that unify groups/individuals who -regardless of their origin, nationality, race, language – in manner that reflects the way they manifest those affiliations in regard to their community and to other groups. Religious meaning is essentially derived from a comparative sense of signification between the metaphysical and the physical, the human world and the after world, and the individual and the social. Religious identity fundamentally depends on the promotion of stable definition of group identity, favoring unchanging belief system, immortal symbols and immutable form of doctrine among believers who have to share old content unrevised and within the boundaries of rigid moral discourse that resists constant change in negotiating meaning and ensure individuals and groups safer “self-reference.” This self-reference strengthens, for Durkheim, “unity and belonging as result of group membership through participation in rituals...and behaviors towards symbols perceived sacred and treated withwith asenseof awe and wonder”.³⁹For Erickson, “religion is closely connected with an essential part of the socio-historical matrix that provides the needed plaform for identity formation”.⁴⁰

Religion has the capacity of the bringing together unity and harmony to conflicting geographical, racial and linguistic communities, offering a matrix of communication through which collective values, ethics and shared knowledge transmitted softly by group to consolidate a certain vision of the world, people and society. Muslim’s religious identity, for Tariq Ramadan, is a combination of faith, spirituality, responsibility, socialization, social participation and knowledge that should be transmitted through education⁴¹. For Seul Jeffery, Religion is “a unified medium of communication capable reducing the complexity of the social environment

³⁸C. Weedon, *Feminist Practice and the Poststructuralist Theory* (Combridge: MA. Blackwell, 1997), p. 33.

³⁹Reward Harisson Oppong, “Religions and Identity,” *the American Journal of Contemporary Research*, 3: 6, (2013), p. 13.

⁴⁰E. H. Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis*, (1968) cited in Reward Harrison, op. cit. p. 14.

⁴¹Tariq Ramadan, *les Musulmans dans la Laïcité* (Lyon: Editions Tawhid, 2013), p. 24.

and presenting it as united that which is derived in society, thus providing vision of reality. Notwithstanding existing social differences”.⁴²

This unified vision of reality influences the social conduct of people which bring peace and homogeneity to social order with religiously derived normative conformity and symbolic obedience, socialization and imparting of correct behaviour. When this system of belief is subject to social and geographical deconstruction as the case of globalization and immigration, the members of the group try to reconstruct and redefine their identity vis-a-vis religion in order to overcome the tensions of encounter and difference, adjusting the codes to the new environment using many strategies like politicization and compromise, redrawing of frontiers against the driving force of globalization. Moreover, religious identity is challenged by many cultural tensions in the context of immigration, exile generational conflict and differences among members of the same religion and conflict with local government and authorities. Inside this conflictual environment, Muslim religious groups in hostile climate of Europe which is antagonist to different religious symbols (scarf) try to find new channels to keep difference (religion) recognized in public sphere through partial integration to the norm of “plural” Europe by gaining some rights and privileges like other minorities (catholic, Jewish, protestant). The selective use of religious texts and the ideological manipulation used by some groups or individuals to generate discourses of dehumanization, fear and threat of the “other” (Bush’s famous speech –Israeli left) to legitimize and Justify conflicts in the name of religion. Elites play a role in taking advantage and using religious metaphors, symbolisms and myths to legitimize their acts or compaigns.⁴³

With the post structuralist and post modern tradition, identity has become the product of multiple discourses associated with the meaning of identity as being in constant state of redefinition, fluctuation and fragmentation. The contemporary collective selfhood is always in state of production, destabilized and dismantled under the rubric of evolution. Identity keeps being constructed and reconstructed by a plethora of external factors, capturing malleable, fluid and elastic existence.

“Globalized identities” can capture this belated version of identity as being in a state of flux and movement.⁴⁴ Globalized identities take credibility from the diverse voices brought by the modern means of communication and the new media which carves long distance nationalities

⁴²R. Seul Jeffery, “Ours in the Way of God: Religious Identity and Intergroup Conflict,” *the Journal of peace research*, 36: 5 (1999), p.556.

⁴³Enzo Pace and et al., eds., “Introduction: Religious Diversity in Globalized Religious Field,” retrieved on 4 June 2018, from <http://www.mdpi.com/journal/religious>

⁴⁴Saira Yamin (2008), “Understanding Religious Identity and Religious Violence,” *the South Asian Journal of Peace Building* Retrieved on 27 May, 2015 from topic statement-wiscomp

and transnational lifestyle. This perception of identity as universalistic founded the emergence of world citizens who identify with global membership weakening ties with traditional loyalties and challenging the traditional notion of state / border which is abandoned for new borders (terrorist cells) which engendered a sort of “Common perception of people that they are citizens not just of a city and a nation, but also of an international community”.⁴⁵

Moreover, with rapid technological change and radical evolution in medicine, human identity has become complex and an endangered specimen. With cloning, geronomic, artificial fertilization, embryo freezing, implant and transplantation, human identity and body have been profoundly affected by such fields of experimentation (selection of genes, test tube babies, gender selection, transplant of hearts, kidneys, chips, brain interfaces)⁴⁶ producing what might be called genetically modified human that changes people identity from natural entity and normal social being to a selective creature operating by the assistance of transplants and chips. Intervention to human identity as an endangered specimen was facilitated by implantation technology, especially with implanted identity chips⁴⁷ which is used to identify human individual based on radio-signaling (like domestic animals) especially for people with amnesia.⁴⁸ Turkle states that “Our technologically enmeshed relationships oblige us to what extent we ourselves have become cyborg, transgressive mixture of biology, technology and codes”.⁴⁹

In the Weberian sociology of the modern state, which is influenced by the work of Bordieu and Foucault, identity of people is not only controlled and manipulated by the physical force and material power, but is completely softened and constructed by symbolic regulation (meaning, selecting...). People identity designates individual as cultural “dupes” and social robot embodying a homogeneous ideology and hegemony that bring peace to the state.

The constructivist theorizing of identity as fluid, flexible and unstable existence was criticized for being a broad “elastic” concept incapable of giving eligible understanding of phenomena and of undertaking effective analytical work. Scholars also acknowledge the elusive nature of identity that “saddles us with blunt, flat undifferentiated vocabulary”. Moreover, identity’s interdisciplinary nature and its multiuse make of the most frequent analytical tool of

⁴⁵S. Hall, “Introduction: Who Needs Identity,” in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, eds. S. Hall et al (London: sage, 1996), p.7.

⁴⁶Nick Boston et al, op. cit. p.17.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 17.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 40.

⁴⁹S. Turkle, *Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of internet* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1995), p. 21.

social studies, psychology and cultural studies to the extent that the concept has become the “Purest of the clichés”.⁵⁰

B-Globalized Transgressions: Second Life Virtuality, Identity and Hypothetical Spaces

Internet and computer mediated geographies have become the new market of multimedia where members and people of different nationalities and communities practice the complexities of global cultural experience, especially with accessibilities to a wide range of choices and availability of rich hybrid cultural immediacy. The shared experience of online culture and internet landscapes have multiplied the possibilities of maintaining selfhood among widespread context mobilized on dynamic of decomposition and recomposition of bordered identity which has become open to the closure of its old meaning and the opening of new spirit which is expressive of a dynamic social life. This blockage of old structures of societies and the involvement of communities in divorcing systematic cultural fixedness into more flexible and fluid universalism does not necessarily imply collective action on the part of communities to be detached deliberately from a deeply-rooted cultural practice and authentic structure of identity. The fragmentation experience of individuals and the dislocatory logic brought by an evasive visual symbolic announce an anchorage of the self-individual or collective to what Stuart Hall called “a moveable feast” of a globalized consciousness of 3D technology and an attractive fantasy of marvellous virtual world which celebrate experience of identity that is:

Conceptualized as having no fixed, essential or permanent identity. Identity becomes a moveable feast formed and transformed continuously in relation to the way we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us... the subject assumes different identities at different times, identities which are not unified around a coherent self... we are confronted by bewildering fleeting multiplicities of possible identities.⁵¹

The internet new grammar and the cultural modalities, which made salient by the globally channelled alternatives, take part in the emergence of various subcultures and virtual values interfacing subjectivity with the circulation of complex contact modes and interchangeable reception of sharing mosaic, ranging from immediate participation of Skype to political resistance and environmental activism. The connective geographies of cyber space and the cultural transmission are consolidated globally the complex imagery, visual narrative and travelling identities forging a landscape of no physical ties and related to dissolving cultural

⁵⁰Robert Coles cited in Bubaker et al, "Beyond Identity," p. 2.

⁵¹John Tomlinson Quoted in Stuart Hall. "The Question of Cultural Identity," p. 2.

realm that do not categorize the material boundaries of reality, constructing a digital logic that keeps blurring the norms of distance, temporality and the control of physical proximity.⁵² As a symbolic form, Internet transcends the circumvention of locality, counting on reviving already existed social ties, while enriching the personal repertoire with fresh contacts and connections:

Internet potentially reduces the importance of physical proximity in creating and maintaining networks of new localities... the internet opens opportunities for social interactions that do not depend on the distance between parties. People use the internet to keep up with those whom they have preexisting relationships. But they also develop new relations online.⁵²⁵³

Identity activation / disactivation and the communicative nature of social intimacies via a diverse range of applications like Twitter ,Facebook, Youtube, Instagram defend the flexibility of identity and the freedom users' formation of virtual experience²⁶oriented towards widening opportunities for constructing rich environment that are open for mediated friendship and screen-to-screen contact instead of face-to-face contact. Sociologically speaking, internet has largely becomes an outcome of social condition that regulates membership to a cultural system through embracing heterogeneous practices of the group's rituals, values and mainly submission to the screen as sacred text approached with awe and reverence in order to achieve a level of unity, familiarity and connectedness of the group. The moving experience and the sense of perfection made available by 3D Avatars, the smooth contact between political groups and the fertile privacy for stigmatized minorities do not express any distancing from what is happening down there in the real world or disinvolvement from the true selfhood; rather, it is a kind of sociability translocated to the virtual and the experience, in its minimum, is an extension tactic:

Cyberspace's inherent immateriality and malleability of content provides the most ramping stage for the acting out of mythic realities... cyberspace can be seen as an extension, some might say an inevitable extension of our age-old capacity and need to dwell in fiction, to dwell empowered or enlightened on other mythic spaces.⁵⁴

Internet users as new settlers of new geographies are seen as undermining the connection with the true collective self and enacting a crisis of sociability. Marxist ideology sees virtual imagination from a hegemonic point of view, considering online life as capitalitic process aiming at the distribution of digitally engendered consumption to reach a worldwide consumership and the dominating power of homogenous culture which controls and determines the taste of passive

⁵²Stuart Hall, op. cit. p. 277.

⁵³Ibid., p. 188.

⁵⁴Michael Benedikt , *Introduction to Cyberspace: First Step* cited in Kevin Robins, *Into the Image: Culture and Politics in the Field of Vision* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 89

users “the new image technology has been shaped by... values of western culture ... (and) by a logical rationality and control, and they are formed by culture that has been both militaristic and imperialistic in ambition”.⁵⁵ Equally, for Durkheim and Adorno mass media do not only turn viewers and masses to passive creatures, but it also lead to the bankruptcy of culture where consumerism and entertainment industry melt down to the real identity and culture of people in an involuntary way⁵⁶. It groups them and illicit their consensus to belong to a majoritarian consumer family as if they are members of a “primitive clan”⁵⁷. In the age of virtualization, culture has not only become consumerized, but also subject to processing, regeneration and reconstruction by market forces where the human loses its connotation as ant-thesis to the Gresham’s law to reside in the hyperreal.⁵⁸ In his book *the Fourth Discontinuity*, Bruze Mazlish states that human history is a form of discontinuities since Copernicus, Galileo, Darwin and till the age of communication or network society or digital era or microrevolution, where humans are on the edge of losing human identity because of excessive virtualization, digitalization and domination of cyber culture become threatening to human future and existence⁵⁹. The machine might become uncontrollable as in films *Automata* 2014 by Gabe Ibanez and *Tron: Legacy* 2010 directed by Joseph Kosinski, where second life, world games and the machine do not only control and affect human behaviour, but also threaten human identity/legacy and lead people to a mysterious future of no boundaries between reality and virtuality.

This deterministic perspective from which late Marxism builds its argument of high culture suppresses the voice of an interactive not passive –audience that develop a different reaction to the real from the angle of unreal and carve positive appropriation of the web to speak up opposition and resistance.⁶⁰ However, Social media (facebook, Youtube, Twitter) have become immediate battlegrounds for the manifestation of political activism and condemnation of injustice. EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de la liberación Nacional) Zapatista (political movement in Mexico 1994) made a successful use of the internet to mobilize anti-globalist, localist and animal right activist through various internet outlets to roll back against globalization, liberal economic

⁵⁵Raph Shroeder Quoted in Kevin Robins, *Into the Image* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 81.

⁵⁶Jorge Kator, *Durkheim and Adorno: Jadal at-Tanweer* (Bayrut: Dar al-Kitab al-Jadida al-Motahida, 2006), p. 167.

⁵⁷Freud, *the Psychology of the Masses and the Analysis of the Ego*, trans. Jorge Tarabshi (Bayrut: Dar at-Taliaa, 2006), p.108.

⁵⁸Jean Baudrillard, “the Ecstasy of Communication,” in *Postmodern Culture*, ed. Hal Foster (London: Pluto Press, 1985), p.127.

⁵⁹Bruze Mazlish, *the Fourth Discontinuity* in Joseph Slid, “Almaalomatiya wa Tashkil a-Thaqafa,” trans. Hassan al-Katib, *Nizwa* 2009, p. 49.

⁶⁰Kevin Robins, *Space of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 38.

reforms, World Trade Agreement and world trade organization⁶¹. Internet is the new contested terrain not only for countering corporate capitalism and nature destruction, but it is also the anonymous zone for radical thinking and extremist communities. Many “terrorist” groups plan, locate, register members, control and finance their missions and targets online because the web offers a very powerful tool to maintain identities unknown and gives an immediate channeling of information worldwide to variety of national, geographical and racial groups who share the same religious feelings, which means that internet is not only as it was, transgressive, deceptive and pornographic, but has also taken new dimensions: it is terrorist, murderous, rebellious and suicidal.

Currently, many videogames on internet and smart phones have become an existential threat to the life of children all over the world because they control the behavior of children and order them to engage in suicidal behavior⁶². If electronic games like *Fortnight* and *Pokemon* attracted billions of users and of less risk, other games like the Russian *Mariam* and the *Blue whale* have put to danger and ended the life of many children as was the case of the collective suicide of Russian teenagers⁶³. Apart from religion, what is known as the “Arab spring” was the immediate outcome of face book political activism, encouraged with a long history of dictatorship which deprived Arab people of the right of voicing their subjective experiences as individuals with full access to dignity, equality and fair social Justice. Thousand of videos and messages were uploaded and circled in Youtube and Facebook and watched worldwide. The images of people victimized and violated by security forces in Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, Yemen and Libya mobilized the creation of transnational communities within the confines of virtuality with the aim of calling for protest agreeing on the place and time online. During the Arab spring, Israeli State imposed a censorship and a ban on using Facebook for fear of being infected by the insurgent discourse coming from the Arab world. Donald Trump uses his Facebook and tweets everyday from his office to shape new world politics and change the liberal system. He does not only exercise foreign policy online, but he also tries to remap the geopolitics of the world in Europe and Asia. Internet has become a fertile soil for geopolitical conflicts and power relations in term of hacking software virus attacks like the ones that targeted internet corporate themselves and their engines in Estonia in 2007, dysfunctioning the system for about two weeks.

⁶¹Roy Krovel , (2013) “Insurgency in the Age of Internet : the Case of the Zapasistas,” retrieved on 11-10-2015 from https://odo.hioa.no/nb/samlinger/asset/dspace:14523/20krovel_31_07_13.pdf

⁶²Ghassan Morad, “Idman al-Aasr: al-Idtirabat a-Natija an Alaab al-Video wa l-Hawatif a-Dakkiya,” Majallat *Thaqafa al-Arabiya*, ed.M. Abdellah Asaif, 505 (2018), p. 26.

⁶³Amer Waqia Allah, “al-ALaab al-Electroniya: Barzakh al-Ahlam a-Namiya,” *Thaqafa al-Arabiya*, 505(2018), p.29.

In geopolitical context, Mark Zokermberg was brought to court in the shadow of 2016 American election for violation of privacy of many facebook's users and leaking their data under the influence of Russia similar to the violations associated with Edward Snodden in 2013⁶⁴. In 2017, the *Wanakray* virus attacked, in an unprecedented compaign, more than 300 thousand computers targeting basic infrustructures and services in Germany, China and Great Britain, decoding security code and recoding them for ransom .This ransom piracy was different from that of *Notpitia* virus attack in 2017 which targeted Ukrania and later Europe trying to dysfunction and weaken the operating systems of banks, airports and communication which America accused Russia to be behind the virus. In 2015, the *TV5 Monde* was attacked by hackers as well as the Saudi Arabia petroleum company *Aramco*, without forgetting the attacks of the digital services company Dyn in 2016 and the piracy against the American bank *G.P.Morgan* bank in 2014⁶⁵. While such piracy organizations like *Anonymous*, *Wikileaks* and *Telecomix* has an ideological and political nature⁶⁶, the cybernetic conflict between America, Russia and China is a kind of an electronic cold war that try to reshape the geopolitics of the internet via spying and piracy for economic and political objectives. While Russia tries to construct a counterdiscourse to the dominant Western foreign affairs, China also takes the internet to defend its economic interests and carves a space for its giant corporate *BATX* in world markets. The 2007 famous *Stocksnet* virus was developed by America and Isreal to destroy the Irani nuclear project⁶⁷.

The murder of Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi intillegence in Turkey, the intoxication of the Russian agent Skripal, the killing of two European tourists by extremist in Marrakesh and the sad story of Hayat from Tetuan, who died when crossing the Mediterranean, could not become top stories without social media. Lately and in the context of political activism in social media, the song or the anthem of RajaCasablanca fans “f Bladdi Dolmoni” has become the new trend in international and social media. The song is a social and political text with universal appeal that touches mass audience all over the Arab and Western world translated to many languages and travelled worldwide from Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia to Uzbikistan, Argentina and Mexico. It is a cry against injustice, killing of taste/ passion exclusion, oppression and silencing of young agency in the Arab world, rendering sport and football stadiums to a site of resistance and counter discourse mobilized via social media.

⁶⁴Julien Nocetti, “al-Goghrahpiya a-Siyassiya l-Liciraa a-Cybernetiki,” trans. Hamid Omar, *Majjalat ad-Dawha*, ed.Falih ben Hussein al Hajiri, 132 (2018), p. 35.

⁶⁵Ibid., p.36.

⁶⁶Ibid., p.37.

⁶⁷Ibid., p.35.

A sense of virtual / online identity continuously works on crafting fluid and volatile interplay of global electronic transnationalization and derritorialization of the modern sense of community divorced from geography and ethnicity. The state no longer regulates conformational meaning and its social consensual social imaginary of individuals who has been seen as hegemonized models reproducing and performing state narratives. Online identities designate a variety of distinctive user's accounts and personas of people on the web defined as a multifaceted accessibilities to real and fictional belongings, from e-mail addresses, pay pal accounts, videogame world to E-pay accounts, twitter and face book... this massive landscape of memberships encounters and identities made members' social and virtual person in a state of fluctuation oscillating between the real / offline and the virtual online. A code switching which makes that sort of ideality loses a sense of reliability and confidence.

Virtual identity as a virtual world embodies the collective of imaginary culture fantasmically constituted as a model of the self. Unlike other applications, virtual world are 3D environment categorized into virtual social worlds (second life) and virtual game worlds (world war crafts) whose residents enjoys the capability of interaction both virtually and non-virtually, using Avatars for self – representation and 3D induction of strong presence sensation and positive simulation of reality and identity⁶⁸. James Cameron's *Avatar* 2009 is the best film that embodied the idea of how technology, virtuality and science may alter the future of humanity and fights of different natures and worlds. In sophisticated "second life" identity, members create an accepted mental model of the self. Avatar –with graphical appearance as online personality / identity representing them as personas recognized by other Avatars. To gain acceptance and membership in second life, users must create Avatar names, colours, gender, race, worlds, build their houses, purchase their lands, select their furnitures, currencies⁶⁹... Avatars navigate the world flying, walking and communicating via broad casting text and chatting. For registration, navigators are required to choose default Avatar from a range of Avatars with a set of graphics, genders, races.⁷⁰

Virtual identity is the sum of thought, interaction and feeling in the cyberspace which provide a fertile soil for varied discourses, networks and services. Although membership in virtual community seem to have effaced old notion of identity as physical embodiment of the self in relation with the real, virtuality has the essence of creating and establishing an integrated

⁶⁸R. Bartle, "Game Over? Negotiating Modern Capitalism in Visual Game Worlds," *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 14:3(2011), 305.

⁶⁹Lawrence Muller, "Virtual Worlds and Stereotypes," in *Images that Injure: Pictorial Stereotypes in the Media*, Susan Dente Ross et al.eds., (California: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2011), pp.398-399.

⁷⁰John Barth, et al., eds., "Can You See the Real me? Activation and Expression of the True Self on the Internet," *The Journal of Social Issues*, 58 (2002), pp. 34-35.

group identity based on communitarian principles. Virtual online identities are fully disembodied encounters characterized by anonymity, privacy and free from self Commitment and social expectation that entails corporal presence (body) and the consistency of the identity you assume (sex, race and other real characteristics. This “virtual incarnation” (Bargh, 2002) can also be switched off or on without stating that despite the multiple personas you assume.⁷¹

Psychologically, the construction of virtual identities implies an empowering symbolic for navigators and stigmatized minorities (sick, criminal, oppressed, people with unattractive appearances...) to by-pass social barriers because of a certain psychotism, emotional vulnerability/incompatibility⁷² or for the sake of composition. Jones states that identity is “advocated to recreate a world as better place and to recreate the body digitalized and customizable, as a perfect body” seeking to physical transcendence and creating body image out of body, in Cartesian duality of body and mind to reach an iconography of pleasure.⁷³ Thus, virtual identity is a sense of a refined and embellished self which embodies human ambition for perfection and idealism. It demonstrates users desire to look intelligent, sexy and after all different.

Internet is also a fertile field for the development of virtual criminality since privacy is granted unquestionably to the extent that a single progenitor can assume multiple false identities (from high school girl to widow...). Virtual community does not only frame terrains of vibrant nuance of identity code switching (on / offline), but it constitutive the back base for deviant conduct like identity theft, money laundering, lacking, spying. Deception is another characteristic of the communality of virtual communities.⁷⁴ Jenay Much is virtual community that constitutes a reliable and valuable source of support for the victims of sexual abuse. The site / community was abusively attacked by a user with a false gender identity, posting graphic and visual content full of violent sexual assault (virtual rape)⁷⁵.

The growth of computer –mediated communication and the influence of globalized internet technologies gave a rise to reflexive, flexible and open modes of identity and community which derive legitimacies from shared landscapes and environment of virtual cyborg culture.

⁷¹Second life as a widely used virtual application was founded by Sanfransisco based community Lidon research 2003 in Dallas with totality of 5.5 millions in 2007. The program is downloadable from www.secondlife.com

⁷²E. T. Higgins, “Self-Discripancy: a Theory of Relating Self and Effect,” *Psychological Review*, 94:3 (1987) p. 320.

⁷³Donald Jones (2006), “I- Avatar = Construction of the Self and Place in Second Life and the Technical Imagination,”retrieved on07-06-2016from, Donald-E-jones-I-Avatar. Pdf

⁷⁴T. Bartle States (2004), that there is a variety of Avatars classification of identities that people construct in the virtual worlds: ideals, realistics, role players and fantastics.

⁷⁵Nick Bostrom and Andress Sandberg, *the Future of Identity*.

Regardless of the user's geography, class, race and religion, accessibility to internet landscapes and worlds is granted limitlessly whoever you might be (poor, criminal, white, ugly, rich, African...) with a sort of freedom and privacy. This kind of identity or community construction does not acknowledge old constraints and traditional dictatorships or filters. The virtual presence of collective selfhood offers great possibilities for constructing multiple formations similar to those happen in the social arena no matter what geography or gender you are associated with. However, online identities remain pure incarnation of identity experimentation and negotiation.

C-Spatial Identity: Geographies of Meaning and the New Landscapes of the Self

Geographical attributes or the influence of space make reference to different aspects of people's identity formation and the knowledge that facilitates members a sense of community, gender, the rubric of shared geographies, the space's sense of association and connectedness incorporate individual members of the group to the geographical variation of identity with its normative and participatory value system. Shared geographies in the form of nation state and regional entitlement (North Africa, Europe, Arab world) have risen to the status of powerful source of identity when other forms of identity came to crisis and quotioned because of its failure and deficiency in protecting of members who are marginalized , seen as mavericks or left alone in coping with their life in a storm of global regimes and vibrant political shifts, adopting alienation or disfranchisement from traditional social institutions⁷⁶ .

The convergence of geography on the theoretical work of social science, humanities and other field of research (anthropology, colonial science) has made the concept widely studied and heterogeneously appropriated to the extent that geography and space got developed, defined and redefined from different perspectives. Geography / space is not a mere physical setting with pure material features, nor is it a container of human actions like the classical definition of mind / body; rather space is defined in terms of human behaviour, people contact, relations of meaning and power and the experience of place with its psychological and cultural importance.

Psychologically, people develop certain emotional psychic affinities to the place where they were born, lived and grown up. Home or homeland is most of the time associated with strongly experienced feeling of nostalgia, haunting memories and attachment, particularly for individuals detached dilebrately or indelibrately from their homelands in the case of

⁷⁶J.E. Coté, "Sociological Perspectives on Identity Formation: the Culture Identity Link and Identity Capital" cited in Seth Schwartz, "the Evolution of Eriksonian and the Neo-Eriksonian Identity Theory and Research: A Review and Integration," *Identity: International Journal of Theory and Research*, 1:1(2001), pp.35-36.

immigration, exile, refuge and imprisonment. In the political context, space or territory marks the geographical dimension of social control in term of people behaviour and their cultural participation as specially demarcated embodiment of political meaning of both material and symbolic ideology (festivals, prisons). Place as territory has gained political dimension since the treaty of Westphalia (1948) which defined the state sovereignty and the areas upon which the state territory facilitates the exercise of power and social control⁷⁷. Etymologically, geography was derived from the describing the world. This classical meaning of the concept found entry of geography to the field of humanities from spatial and economic perspective. It was traditionally concerned with the study of earth's environment, populations and the interaction between them on statistical and scientific basis. With the evolution of empirical research and with the many turns in the field of humanities, geography and space were stripped gradually from being equated with the convergence of cultural / symbolic form, meaning representation and power praxis as things go blurred in the imagined territories of diaspora, displacement and postcolonial.⁷⁸

Space is argued to be the product of commonality and collective meaning constructed through discourses of power relations and embodies the codes of dominant social ideology which organize and disseminate its mode of control spatially through appropriation, positioning and mapping. Place is associated with identity formation, some traditional communities defines themselves in terms of where they live. This territoriality is the lived experience of place which characterizes many groups identification with space, histories and mythologies and symbols.⁷⁹

Colonial geography in the 18th century has developed another dimension of relation between people and identity since it relies on colonial science and explorer's knowledge of place outside Europe. Territorial expansion has contributed greatly to the knowledge of space, its cartological information and its regional structure which function in controlling the population, clearing the way to colonization and invasion. The geographical encounters of early travelers, explorers and colonialists characterize the native people of subsaharian Africa, North America, Pacific Ocean and the Indian subcontinents as a lower rank of humans; savage, pagan and in need of christianization and civilization.

In the vocabulary of this geographical thinking, "other" identities were associated with different vision as people that are not fully humans and who are physically and symbolically positioned in opposition to white and civilized European identity. This territorial expansionist

⁷⁷https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/westphalian_sovereignty

⁷⁸Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, "Beyond Culture: Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference," *Intercultural Psychology*, 7:1 (1992), p. 10.

⁷⁹Thomas Rohkramer and Felix Tschulz, "Space, Place and Identities," *History Compass*, 7:5 (2009), p. 1340.

notion of geographical knowledge equates identity with the natural environment where they live, basing its premise on the intellectual climate provided by theories of human selection of social Darwinism and its cognate evolution theory by Jean Babtiste Lamark, explaining human attributes, behaviours and identities as an outcome of environmental variation in a kind of determination that echoes Montesque's idea about the relationship between climates and human cultural traits in which the first affects the second⁸⁰. This vision of geographical knowledge is a: "Naturalistic theory that justified the imperial in the language of scientific geography".⁸¹

In the humanistic tradition of space, geography was related to the integral experience that shapes and is shaped by particular geographical identification place is not only a material container, rather, it constitutes geographies of meaning to which people attach meanings and relations. Although geography according to D. Livingstone "has meant different things to different people and at different places"⁸², space and place may have the same meaning in public discourse but it is not exactly the case; space for positivist geographers implies universal and abstract connotations, while place for humanistic geography emphasized people's sense of place and their attachment to personal experience of places. Introducing the idea of space as social product, Henri Lefébre differentiates between three types of space; the space lived, experienced and used by people(*espace perçu*), the space of knowledge and signs or the representation of space (*l'espace conçu*) and *l'espace vécu* which is the space of representation (the imagined space of image)⁸³. Humanists see space as a tablet upon which people, communities and generations exert their influence and render it a source of identity that makes them differentiate distinction from geographies and communities. Humanist Yi-Fi Tuan(who created the word human geography) states how people create meaning out of space identify with it more intimately and how they develop with it a sense of identity. This sense of identity lead to associate space with psychological confort and safety in what he calls "Topophilia", "as the affective bod between people and place or setting" and "Topophobia" where space becomes representative of fear and anxiety.⁸⁴ The significance of space to human experience is derived from the fact that spatial context influence, the way it allows identity to demonstrate its unity, specificity and difference (diversity/ difference). Space as an isometric entity can not only reflect

⁸⁰Michael A. Osborne, "the Geographical Imperative Ninteenth Century French Medicine," retrieved on 15-06-2015 from, medhistsupp100027-0039.pdf

⁸¹D. Livingstone, *the Geographical Tradition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 201.

⁸²Ibid., p.7.

⁸³Henré Lefébre, *the Production of Space* cited in Thomas Rohkramer and Felix Schulz, "Place, Space and Identities," p. 1340.

⁸⁴Yi Fu Tuan, *Topophilia: A Study of Environmental perceptions, Attitudes and Values* (New Jersy: Prentice – Hall, 1974), p. 4.

its materiality as pure geography, rather, it is cultural historical and political repertoire, mixed with groups' experiences and meanings constructed in regard to place. This is what Relph calls place identity which is "Persistent sameness and unity which allow that place to be differentiated from others".⁸⁵

People geographical attachment is a feeling that a person gives to a place (city, country, village, neighbourhood) from which he / she derives psychological harmony, security, confidence and enclosure. This sense of place or what Ralph calls "insidness" equals Tuan's topophilia.⁸⁶ "Outsidness" (Tuan's Topophobia) is an attitude people develop towards place because of factors like immigration, exile, deportation or political position. Being displaced out of place, implants in people strange feeling of loss, alienation and insecurity. As case in a point, in the construction of "Lwahda" reservoir dam in Taounate, many villagers situated along both shores of "Wargha" river were forced to leave involuntarily their "homeland" for no return. Involuntary displacement of villagers from their rich fertile lands and vast prairies of orange has turned their life upside down. As historically built identity and as to pophilia of generational tradition, villagers found it a bitter to leave the place where they have grown up, married, founded a family, may be rised a family and where multiple social accession will disappear in a glimpse of an eye.⁸⁷ "a man dies defending either his family or land".

This insideness which is associated with the stability and the unity of space makes it a very distinctive from others because of the specific characteristics, events and the collective experience of the group. In the south of Morocco, identity is experienced as passion to the nomadic life of people who have lived for long time in the heart of desert depending on grazing and camel rising. Even with the coming of independence and the change brought by urbanization, many Sahrawi people stick to tea preparation in its celebratory nature. Sahrawi people, who settled definitely in cities, plant a very big tent near their houses or villas. What is more is the fact that they brings tons of sand and put it as sandunes in front of or in the roofs of their houses. Practices are symbolic of strong feeling of space and dialectic between human and embodiment of deeply-rooted traditions of dialectic between human and nature / space.

However, space as a positive incarnation of people security and unity is subjected to change and conditioning of its variables as a result of displacement and dislocation. Geography and locality as influencing and being influenced by people identities may undergo dramatic changes introduced by mass media and its globally interconnected worlds which keep

⁸⁵Edward Relph, *Place and placelessness* (London: Pion, 1976), p. 45.

⁸⁶Tuan Talks about esistential Topophilia which a psychological effect of displacement that put expatriates, exilers in state of alienation and show because of losing home lands.

⁸⁷Edward Relph, *ibid.*, p. 55.

restructuring spaces and local communities and connecting different geographies with a modified perception of identity and meaning mediated through place. This conscious intervention in the redefinition of space by mass culture leads to certain “placeness” of special identity. The concept was coined by the place phenomenologist, Relph, who does not literally mean loss or total absence of place, rather, he argues that placelessness is an authentic experience of place, “The casual eradication of distinctive places and the making of standardized landscape that results in from an insensitivity to the significance of place”.⁸⁸

Because of globalized consumer culture, distance between localities has lost authenticity since people all over the world share the same cultural products as if they live in one singular geography with shared technology symbolic capital. People everywhere use the same smart phone, mobile computers, Ipads they drive the same cars and they wear the same T-shirts, trainers, they listen to the same songs and watch the same films and football matches.

This version of identity construction through space is criticized of propagating a notion of place as a continuity and as an accumulation of taken for granted knowledge, especially with the salience of diasporic identities brought by immigration. Naficy argues that immigrant identity is characterized by ruptured sense of geography. Cinematic landscapes of director who experience exile or immigration, for choice or compulsion, associate their protagonists with spaces that are emblematic of transition and fluctuation (airports, ports, bus stations, hotels, frontiers, inspection zones...) and they are always threatened with evacuation and displacement:

There are the important transitional and transnational places of mobility, such as trains, buses, and suitcases that are frequently inscribed in the accented films. Accented film makers are subject to momentous historical dynamism and to intense national longings for forms. They cross many borders and engage in many deterritorializing and reterritorializing Journeys....⁸⁹

In “Imagined communities”, Benedict Anderson considers nation and territory as intellectual constructs and cultural representations narrativized and diffused via state mechanisms, invention of traditions and imagined symbolic belonging apparatuses like education, schools and media of all sorts. The construction of geography is fundamentally associated with the symbolic force of building a national identity / feeling derived from historical and material signs (monuments) enforced with a set of rituals, ceremonies to create consistency

⁸⁸Ibid, op. preface.

⁸⁹Hamid Naficy, *An Accented Cinema, Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 3.

in the imagination of people.⁹⁰ Via such images and narratives, territoriality and identity are strengthened since people have the desire to resemble each other and share the same symbols (myths, gods, law, justice, music band, music idol). Space (nation, city, village...), representing an imagined community which hides symbolic narratives and practices of power that make people believe in a given specificity, mapping identity as an open form of collectivity that is adaptable to radical change and to the progression of temporality and spatiality. Because of the powerful transnational industry of image, mobility of people and services and the borderless geographies of globalization, space has become a placeness or even it arrived to the phase of disappearance according to Paul Virilio⁹¹. Identity develops a sophisticated form of feeling and new setting of borders with brand new signs that stand for whole geographical affiliation like football clubs, performances in Olympic Games, winners of musical shows (Arab idol) which became the new generation of identifier or identity markers “the simultaneous fragmentations and flows set in motion by the globalization of capital and culture have so undermined previously secure definition of space that to speak with certainty of any such grouping such as community, region or nation”.⁹²

In his book, Arjun Appadurai “fear of small Numbers” about the new geographies of meaning’s construction, he sheds light on the postmodern meaning of nationalism with a “liberal thought which is ill-equipped to deal with the politics of majorities and minorities”.⁹³ Minorities all over the world and immigrant communities have become a challenge to the already existing form of identity since they have acquired recognition and the right to express resistance, dissent and difference to majoritarian religions, nationalities and ethnicities. In this sense of liberal imagination and rapidly changing world system, minorities built a rationality that is founded on conception of group identity (way of thinking) that challenges national hegemonies hold narratives of social cohesion and majority dominance. Apparently enough, the radical switch of globalization and the challenges it brought to national sovereignties and group identifications have given rise to what Appadurai calls “predatory identity”⁹⁴. It is a kind of group feeling developed as an outcome of another group (that is religiously different ex) and which seems to threaten the stability and the certainty of the group identity. This uncertainties and contradictions

⁹⁰Benidict Anderson, *Imagined communities: Reflections on the Origins and the Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), p.30-47.

⁹¹Thomas Rohkramer, *Place, Space and Identities*, p. 1338.

⁹²J. P. Jones, “Segmented Worlds and Values,” *Textures of Place, Exploring Humanistic Geographies*, eds. P. Adous et al (Mineapolis: University of Mineapolis press, 2001), p. 124.

⁹³Arjun Appadurai (2006), “*Fear and small numbers: An Essay the geography of Fear*,” retrieved on 3 May 2015, from www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/ecrd/new/reviews/606.html

⁹⁴ Ibid.

brought by “other” groups and face group identity engender fear, anger and anxiety that lead to violence, war, terrorism and genocide in order to defend one’s identity, security and to project the stable structuring of “identity building”.⁹⁵

Appadurai puts into questions Huntington classical approach to identity in “the clash of civilization”, which argues that there are cultural and religious war against the West (and America).⁹⁶ Huntington develops a coherent, unified and dychotomous view of identity, geography and culture, stating that civilization or reality flows from one geography, either from the west or the non-west, from the Muslim world or the non-Muslim world. Appadurai’s “geography of Anger” is fuelled with the new media which participate in the recontextualization and diffusion of local geographies to more globalized territories. This is what makes these geographies always fluctuate between two oscillating agendas: tradition and modernization, vertebral geography of anger model of organization (military treaties) and cellular model formation (terrorism capitalism)⁹⁷.

This “disjunctive” form of geographies are product of oscillation between different forces created by globalist empowered by that sense of anger, fear and power that characterize the conduct of either diasporic communities or minorities (new nationalism) “ideocide” like Sikhs, Basques, Chicheneans. Appadurai, also, includes “terrorism” as a component of this disjuncture geography which defines new form of ideological totalism that comes to existence as globalized minority as small numbers. Territories have intensities and certainties to a national identity and sovereignty, but terrorism is different from other small numbers because it is untraceable, unpredictable and unexorsible (any one can be a part of sleeper cell or potential suicide bomber uncertainties...) ⁹⁸.

2-Blurring Classical Structures: Post Coloniality, Shifting Identities and Diasporas

A-The shifting paradigms of cultural identity: The construction of identities, representation and identity politics

Cultural identity is a group or community’s value system that is framed by collective and individual affiliation and belonging and which derives its legitimacy from geographical location

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Samuel Huntington, *Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1997), p. 115.

⁹⁷Arjun Appadurai, “Fear of Small Numbers,”

⁹⁸Ibid.

where members are aligned on shared characteristic like language, religion, ethnicity and other cultural symbols. It is a conformative system of established beliefs, practices, structures and cultural values⁹⁹ which provides community or members of group a sense of attachment, family, nation, meaning and knowledge of the self. Cultural identity is conceptualized under identification categories like race, nationality, shared geography and other social affiliations that bring members together under a fundamental sameness and resemblance that manifest itself in multiple ways with shared dispositions, symbols, collective codes which make members of a community read each other unmistakingly. This feeling of collectivity opens a channel of interaction, awareness and development that emanate from solidarity and group homogeneity that lead to the possibility of collective political or social action¹⁰⁰.

With rapid global change, the rise of consumer culture and the new insight of social media, the formation of identities and cultural selfhood have become eager in consolidating sameness among ingroups and erasing resemblance to different national, ethnic and cultural groups. While social identity produces individuals in sort of an ideological collective with attributes of class, gender and vocation, cultural identity builds a sense of identity with a complex network of dialectical presence in the sense that it positively ties individuals, groups to a national and cultural symbolic from where they foster the ability to render cultural encounter with “others” controllable, negotiable and resistible.

Like social identity, cultural identity is interestingly symptomatic of filtering its contact with different cultural knowledge, setting up a sense of classification of behaviours or cultural traits as being desirable or undesirable, negative/ positive... Cultural identity is also associated with a dichotomous identifications in relation to its behaviour towards other cultures, a behaviour that makes us non-identical to and different to an outgroup, to “them”.

At the very beginning of humanism, cultural identity was constructed on biological basis of race as a marker of both identity and difference. Biological endowment and racial features were used to rank people and cultures as inferior as superior, civilized or savage. This biologizing¹⁰¹ of cultural identity and human races was the outcome of political and colonial science that perpetuated the racist construction of difference to Justify colonization, slavery... “The sense of difference... in European representation [is] a difference of ‘race’, that is, primarily biological and natural difference which was inherent and unalterable... the supposed

⁹⁹P. Jones, *Introducing Social Theory* (New Delhi: Atlantic, 2005), p. 5.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁰¹Simone Clarke, "Culture and Identity," *the Sage Hand book of Cultural Analysis*, 24 (London: Sage Publications, 2011), p. 518.

difference was presented as scientific¹⁰². So, scientific enquiry has given birth to a racialized form of cultural identity to prove that common origin of humanity is invalid in colonial cultural classification. However, with many cultural and scientific turns, cultural identity has underwent involuntary shifts and metamorphoses that made cultural difference a discriminatory regime in symbolic discourse of dominance that eliminates and excludes “others” for the threat they bring to the self as a pure, unpolluted and unstigmatized essence. This leads to a subjective construction of cultural identity obsessed by the fear of “polluting other”¹⁰³.

With Cashmore and Trogna (1990) cultural membership was envisioned inside group’s shared knowledge of themselves as being a part of common culture under the new concept which replaces “race” with ethnicity¹⁰⁴. This movement from physical identification of races to cultural identification of ethnic group lead cultural encounters to redefine identity as strong sense of belonging to a collectivity disengaged from the concept of ‘race’ as stigmatized notion to attain global presence, tresspassing national boundaries to diasporic communities. Nonetheless, different immigrations, and displacements of people with multiple cultural backgrounds have revived racial conflict and rigid cultural encounters that brought identity to contested grounds, increasing fears of losing people’s specificities and their shared assumptions. As result, cultural identity has become an embodiment of anxiety and discontent to the dominant cultural paradigm in the context of Europe and the notion of “us” and “them” has recaptured a new meaning with the capability of “foreigner”, “alien” immigrants to write back and resist. In the context of migrants’ identities, the dominant practice of cultural identity relies on stigmatizing and pathologizing¹⁰⁵ of cultural difference to prove that dominant identity is the taken for granted reality that feels anxious about difference which is seen as a source of trouble and fear. Right wing agenda uses the same discourse to outlaw immigrants’ accessibilities to Europe institutions, Markets and privileges because of cultural and ethnic discrimination.

Cultural identity is similar to culture as analytical category since it is associated with foggy and problematic signification. Illusory nature has driven many scholars and critics to present a different view of the phenomenon. Friedman sees people as cultural creatures and their cultural identity as the absolute “attribution of a set of qualities to a given population”¹⁰⁶.

Focusing on specificity and uniqueness that strip out a given community from being similar to any other one, Freidman conceptualization of cultural identity makes it equivalent to

¹⁰²Robert Miles, *Racism* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 31.

¹⁰³Marry Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (London: Routledge, 1966), p. 5.

¹⁰⁴Simone Clarke.op.cit. p. 519.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 520.

¹⁰⁶J. Freidman, *Cultural Identity and Global Progress* (London: Sage, 1994), p. 29.

ethnicity. With “imagined communities” of B. Anderson, nation states try to find a foundational start to the formation of an imaginary connection and the creation of a sense of community among citizens. National culture or identity is a narrative that makes people feel collectively and identify with each other on localized national cultural identity¹⁰⁷. In contrast to national imaginaries, Chen’s conceptualization of cultural identity is a combination of personal and social attributes of individuals which are gathered with other characteristic to form a complex concept. Cultural identity is “personal, sexual, national, social and ethnic identities all combined to one”¹⁰⁸.

With Bauman¹⁰⁹, cultural identity has become a sort of competition with other forms of global cultures and alternatives. Identities have forsaken the familiar meaning with the violation of boundaries by many intrusions. Yet, this globalized diffusion of novel identity and culture which was mobilized by consumerism and new technologies has motivated several localized cultures to be attached to traditional conduct and revival of strong religious practice to maintain continuity and react to globalization. This reappropriation of cultural identity lead “Communities and individuals to develop a knowledge about themselves and others, to recognize history that is handed down by previous generation... a coherent narrative that connotes events, actions, people, feelings and ideas in a plot”¹¹⁰.

For Many scholars like Stuart Hall, Z. Bauman, Charles Tilly and M. Maffesoli, cultural identity can never be reductionist or essentialist view point, which sees identity as a singular entity protected by boundaries and stable historical transition of knowledge because, if so, cultural identity becomes a source of conflict and humiliation. From constructivist perspective, Cultural identity, instead, is a constructed and plural existence which depends on multiple discourses and a context of shifting, contextual and relational displacements¹¹¹. Cultural identity is not defined on the basis of coherent ideologies and consistent practices that give a perfect picture of the self as being non-contradictory and homogenous. Cultural identity is not a wisely locked house which stays unlocked forever, it is, rather, an open field, subject to playfulness of

¹⁰⁷Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Spread and Origin of Nationalism*, (London: verso, 1991), p. 3.

¹⁰⁸L. Chen, *Writing Chinese: Reshaping Chinese Identity* (Gordonsville: Polgrave, Macmillan, 2006), p.12.

¹⁰⁹Z. Bauman, *Identity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 20.

¹¹⁰S. Jovchelovitch, *Knowledge in Context* (London: Routledge, 2000), p.76

¹¹¹R. Brubaker et al,” Beyond Identity”, In *Theory and Society* (the Netherlands: Academic Publishers (2000), 29, p .1.

culture and history, it is a site of suture, rupture, discounting and difference. For Ewing, experiencing the self sounds like this¹¹²:

At any particular moment a person usually experiences his or her articulated self as symbolic timeless whole, but this self may quickly be displaced by another, quite different 'self' which is based on different definition of the situation. The person will often be unaware of these shifts and its consistencies and may experience a wholeness and continuity despite their presence.

More than that, the argument which vigorously presents itself nowadays is that old notion of cultural identity is in a process of decline and dissolution, giving way to more flexible and unsettled sense of the self because of the fragmenting power of globalization which is working on destabilizing the sense of belonging as unified, stable and coherent cultural identity. Technological transformation has displaced our sense of personal and national selves, undermining the very basis upon which people generate meaning and formulate a new perception of the world. These processes of change introduced wide ranging erosion of identities that have become the victim of crisis, questioning and doubt, "Identity becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty".¹¹³

With modern societies, globalization pushed cultural identity to the edge of constant fluctuation, defining cultural experience with extensive dependence on what is coming from outside and not from inside, entailing a displaced character of constructing the self in constantly moving system of ideas, concepts and cultures "Social practices and constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character"¹¹⁴.

Immigration as a form of global displacement constitutes another factor in cultural transformation and encounter which influence the construction of identity as an experience developed between local definition and the fringes of the host culture. In the context of (European) immigration, members of immigrant communities, especially young people of Maghrebi origin, confront a variety of choices when it comes to identity formation. This variance takes place in plural environment that makes members face to face with dual identification: the

¹¹²K.P. Ewing, "the Illusion of Wholeness, Self and the experience of Inconsistency," *Ethos*, 18:3 (1980), p. 251.

¹¹³Kobena Spencer quoted in S. Hall, "the Question of Cultural Identity" in *Modernity and its Questions*. Eds. Stuart Hall et al (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 597.

¹¹⁴Anthony Giddens, *the Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 37-38.

culture of parent and shared geography of origin; and the host country's language, educational system...:

Situated within two cultural worlds, they must define themselves in relation to multiple reference groups (sometimes in two countries and in two languages) and to the classification into which they are placed by their native peers, the school, the ethnic community, and larger society¹¹⁵.

This identity formation differs extremely from their parent's since they are torn between double attachment which forces them to experience a conflictual cultural context which dissonantly complicates their sense of ethnic, national and geographical belonging. Immigration raises questions of incorporation, integration, assimilation and fears of abandoning cultural identification of origin or being¹¹⁶ subject to cultural shock that may result in failure of adaptation to both cultural poles. Nation or national culture constitutes another source of generating a sense of identity with its connotation, cultural representation and difference, which provide community with cultural distinctiveness. Educational systems, narratives, heroes, standard and dialect languages and other institutions formulate important features of homogeneous identity. National cultures narrate identities by constructing meanings, producing stories, symbols codified that are symbolically effective in rising a collective consciousness, which B. Anderson calls "imagined communities". This narration of identity is repeated and perpetuated in many discourses like media, popular cultures and histories, the myths of origin and of purity.

Drawing on Benedict text, Homi Bhabha connects nation or national culture to narration as a process of ideologization of identities in the form of stories and narratives that unify people around as existing. Nonetheless, Bhabha states that national culture has suppressed many differences that could destabilize homogeneous narrativized sense of identity. It divorces communities from categories of class, sexuality and gender as components that participate in the composition of identity. This conception of national identity is displaced by reproduction and temporal movements; this is what makes Bhabha declare that national identity embodies both "nationalist pedagogy" and subject process of signification:

The people are the historical objects of nationalist pedagogy or a constituted historical origin in the past; the people are also the subjects of a process of signification that must

¹¹⁵R.G. Rumbaut, "Assimilation, Dissimilation and Ethnic Identity," in *Ethnicity and Causal Mechanisms*. Eds. M. Tienda et al (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005b), p. 304.

¹¹⁶de la Rosa quoted in Hani Zubida (2013), "Home and Away: Hybrid Perspective on Identity Formation in 1.5 and Second Generation Adolescent in Israel," In *Glocalism: Journal of Culture, Politics and Innovation*, retrieved on 12 May 2016, from www.glocalismjournal.net

erase any superior or originary presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principle of people as contemporaneity... as reproductive process¹¹⁷.

Hence, this narrativization of natural culture and the discursive internalization of its pregiven essence as “linear equivalence of event... as holistic cultural identity” can be displaced and brought to ambivalence, slippage and liminality because of an evasive global difference. With the rise of postmodern nationalism, the idea of national culture knocks the doors of dismissal and “dissemination”.¹¹⁸

As we have mentioned before, identity is loosely associated with other concepts like representation. Even more, cultural identity depends for its existence on the way representation contributes to the construction of social identities and the perpetuation of such image, either positive or negative, to define some cultural groups or communities. Representation and its cognates stereotype, prejudice, attitude are social signs that are used for classifying social/cultural categories and the use of these images to experience and position themselves vis-à-vis other social or cultural groups, demonstrating the right to have place, voice and discrete notion of identity among multiplicity of other identities. This “epistemological realities” are perspective and symbolic constructs that allow individuals to compose signals of interaction with each other and negotiates meaning with other different system as means of identity creation.¹¹⁹ For Moscovici, representation is an exercise of meaning, social codes among groups and a channel for communication “Social representation are system of values to take place among the members of community by providing them with a code of social exchange and code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their worlds and their individual and group history”,¹²⁰.

Stereotypes are concrete embodiment of social and cultural representation that constitute a sort of symbolic boundaries between groups, ingroups or outgroups. Stereotypes are usually associated with the invocation of false representations and negative attributes ascribed to a cultural or social category because of its behavioral, geographical or linguistic difference. For example, women as social group are regarded as being private, kind and emotional, while doctors are viewed as being rational careful...

For Stuart Hall, representation is associated with identity production and the ability to shape identity via a network of relation-representation that bridges the gap between culture and

¹¹⁷Homi Bhabha, *the location of culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 145.

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 140.

¹¹⁹R. Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard, 2006) p. 79.

¹²⁰Serge Moscovici, *La Psychanalyse, son Image, son Public*, (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1991), p. 13.

meaning in the sense that people take positions from which they can define themselves. Representations are signifying practices and systems of symbols and signs which comprise a sense of meaning production and the subject position which enable people to develop a sense of experience:

Representation is the process by which members of a culture use language (broadly defined as any system which deploys signs, any signifying system) to produce meaning. Already, this definition carries the important promise that things... do not have in themselves any fixed, final or true meaning. Meaning, consequently, will always change, from one culture or period to another¹²¹.

Psychoanalytically, representation or the stereotype is a form of dominant colonial knowledge that constitutes a basis of prior understanding that represents a kind of anxiety and ambivalence to the coherent identity of the dominant discourse. Bhabha compares the discourse of stereotype to the Lacanian “mirror stage”, whose visual identification is associated with the “fullness” of stereotype. The fantasy of stable (full) ego/ identity is in permanent risk of being disturbed by loss or lack¹²².

The stereotypical content and the representation practices of cultures are also politically and ideologically oriented as structures whose purpose is to fix communities and cultural identities is a set of images to confirm their inferiority. They are an exercise of power with political influence aiming at distortion and misrepresentation of others to practice a certain legitimatization of dominant regime of representation, like colonialism and totalitarianism. Host cultures in contexts of immigration traumatically position subjects in the position of an “other” as an exercise of normalization and legitimatization of discriminatory practices. In Edward Said’s orientalist meaning, people are made to feel that they are the “others” of the dominant discourses. Not only with its material power, but also with its knowledge system of representation that forces people to conform to the norms and experience themselves as different; may be uncivilized or inferior.

Bar-Tal describes representation as a set of images and narratives that are the outcome of visual, cultural, economic and dominant status. It is bounded by the shared logic of group and loses credibility according to social contexts¹²³. Representations of Arabs and Muslims in western media have undergone different shifts because of the political / economic contexts that

¹²¹Stuart Hall, “the Work of Representation,” in *Representation: Cultural Representation and Signifying Practices*, eds. Stewart Hall et al (London: Sage Publications, 1997), p. 45.

¹²²Homi Bhabha, *the Location of Culture*, (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 77.

¹²³Bar-Tal, “Formation and Change of Ethnic Stereotypes: an Integrative Model,” In *Journal of International Relations*, 1997, p. 492.

influence the regime of representation from lusty Sultans in Harims to pirates to lazy immigrants and bloody terrorists. The work of Jack Shahin about the representation of Arabs and Muslims in Western media and Bollywood traced the negative associations and unjustifiable content of mediascapes of cartoons, detectives, comedies and other shows, concluding that, *the TV Arab*, “television tends to perpetuate four basic myths about Arabs: they are fabulously wealthy; they are barbaric and uncultured; they are sex maniacs with penchant for white slavery; they revel in acts of slavery. These notions are as false as the assertions that blacks are lazy, Hispanics are dirty, Jews are greedy and Italians are criminals”¹²⁴. Moreover, in 2001 Shaheen completed his exhaustive book (and documentary) *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies People*, confirming that “Hollywood has projected Arabs as villains in more than 900 movies . The vast majority of villains are notorious sheikhs, maidens, Egyptians and Palestinians”¹²⁵.

In the context of immigration, legal or illegal, Maghrebi people construction of identity is a complex process since immigrants of Maghrebi origin and their children who were born in Europe face a difficult state of having to choose between double social and cultural identity associated with their country of origin and the newly acquired identity of displacement to Europe. This sense of plural life (Celebration of Christmas, language, dress) and navigation between two different cultural and social systems drive some young Maghrebi to develop or adopt a kind of code switching of identity to meet the need of plural cultural identification.

This code-switching of identity is a double-edged strategy: in the presence of their parents or relatives, those young people connect with them using family values and the cultural codes of the country of origin. However, they switch codes of behaviour and cultural practice in the absence of their parents or in the presence of their peers from other culture (language, piercing, alcohol...). This negotiation of cultural identity on the part of Maghrebi immigrants of the second and third generation in Europe is what Zaragaza Called “camouflage identity” in which “they neither embrace nor reject their minority identity, but rather vary their actions depending upon their company”¹²⁶.

This identity code switching, the term I will use to describe this dual identity definition, is a kind of an intelligent construction / negotiation of identity that is two folds. It allows those young people access and integration to dominant cultural system, while maintaining their ties with the culture of origin...

¹²⁴Shaheen J.G, *the Arab TV* (Ohio: Popular Press, 1984), p. 4.

¹²⁵J.G. Shaheen, *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People* (New York: Olive Branch Press, 2001), p. 13.

¹²⁶Esteve Zaragaza quoted in C. Turvey, “Identity Construction among People of North African Descent Living in Europe,” *Mediterranean Migrations*, eds.P. Borges et al, May (2013), p. 238.

At the end of this section, I would like to go back to Stuart Hall conception of cultural identity. Hall argues that cultural identity could be visualized from a double perspectival position. The first view, positions of cultural identity as shared cultural identification of the deep self which encompasses a collective of shared historical knowledge and cultural codes that designate people as “oneness” as a “stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of our actual history”¹²⁷.

This understanding of cultural identity has contributed greatly to the formation of postcolonial movement that was keen on the rehabilitation of national identities that have been destroyed by colonization like the case of Leopold Senghor’s Negritude, the panAfricaness of Franz Fanon and the Jamaicaness of S. Hall¹²⁸. The second position of that looks at cultural identity as a cultural process that keeps oscillating between the past and the present, but always seems to prefer residence in the future. Cultural identity is subject to frequent transformations brought by culture, history and time:

Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But, like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject to the continuous “play” of history, culture and power¹²⁹.

B-Aesthetics of Fragmentation and Ambivalent Identification: Discourses of Diaspora, Exile and Hybridity

The previous section has point out briefly to the argument that identities are not unified and homogeneous realities that keep fighting cultural and social transformations. Nevertheless, the obligatory obedience to the historical politics of late modernity with which its borderless geography won out over the traditionalist paradigm of cultural definition and national identification gendering a dislocatory inconveniences and extensive symbolic that acknowledge the instability of both locality and temporality. As a cultural phenomenon with special and temporal influences, globalization marked a movement from classical definition of geography, society and culture as singular, non-changing categories to transnationalizing rhetoric that grants unlimited autonomy to displacement and technological change. A new notion of spaciality and discourse of temporality which is supranationally located by televisual and cyborg culture mobilize communities, social groups and identities, rearranging and negotiating the geographies

¹²⁷Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora,” *Identity, Community, Difference*, ed. Jonathan Rutherford (London: Lawrance and Wishart, 1990), p. 223.

¹²⁸Ibid., p. 223.

¹²⁹Ibid., p. 225.

of identity in quest for potential confirmation of the global validity of the new selfhood. The massive proliferation of globalized culture has revolutionized the basics of contemporary cultural life, blurred the situatedness of local loyalties and restaged the new context of interaction and temporality. Globalization's most dominant feature is its ability to shrink distances and compress time. Local cultures entered the phase of transnationalization and deterritorialization¹³⁰ because "In conditions of modernity... locales are then roughly penetrated and shaped in terms of social influence quite distant from them".¹³¹

Strengthening of the new alliances, globalization and transnational conception has contributed to the weakening of national identity and undermined the old shores of identity, generating fragmentation and loosening of cultural codes and social symbols which have been raised to the status of plurality and difference (diversity). National and ethnic identity have been subjected to factors of change, shifting their very eventual properties. The flow of technological and consumer culture attached identity to new lands of political, social and cultural practice of shared or plural sense that see "shared identities – as "customers" for the same goods, "clients" for the same services, "audiences" for the same messages and images- between people who are far from one another in time and space."¹³²

Predetermined singular identities, nowadays, experience the presence of other identities and cultures as an outcome, of mobile logic and a dynamic of displacement, immigration and hybridity, from this perspective, as sort of symbolic and material displacement come to embody this mobility on the part of national and ethnic identities that are heading to a position of multiple, flexible and dynamic existence. Identity formation in contexts of diaspora, exile and immigration is, to some extent, premised on forsaking the mytho-utopian conception of identity as a coherent and fixed logic, questioning the way cultural codes of rigid insidness and parental orthodoxies of the traditional structures. Symbolic and physical encounter of young immigrants and exiles with host cultures put their identities in process of negotiation and reappropriation of plural patterns of identity and flexible discourse that an interactive visibility of the self. Immigration and exile as forces of change beside the transformatory nature of late modernity have extended the playfulness of its cross-cutting hybridization and cultural universalization in to the postmodern subjectivity which presents a source of experience and cultural meaning that

¹³⁰ Arjun Apparudai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Economy," *the cultural Reader*, ed. Simon During (London: Routeledge, 2000), pp. 229-230.

¹³¹ Anthony Giddens, *the Consequences of Modernity*, (combridge: Polity, 1990), p. 18.

¹³² Stuart Hall, "the Question of Cultural Identity," in *Modernity and its Futures*, eds. S. Hall et al (Combridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 222.

emerge from the memory of future and the rich space of hybrid symbolic rituals.¹³³ The structural changes brought by transnationalization of culture and immigration do not necessarily imply a complete detachment from national and cultural identification or a direct disengagement from the local experience of the self into more permissive zone of identity. Rather, people become material embodiment of a culture and representation of an anchorage to the collective self that always be at the reach of a “moveable feast” and a candidate for more possible identities. Identity should be having “fleeting multiplicities of possible identities.”¹³⁴

Within the plural discourse of immigration, hybridity is the product of encounter between double geographical cultural and social elements which erase boundaries, voluntarily or unvoluntarily, that put different and contradictory paradigms to a state of contest and rethinking. Hybrid identification is a process of immigrant adoption of the cultural and the linguistic aspects of the host country to cope with the complexities of a conflictual contest or manifest a tolerant attitude towards ethnic groups that celebrate difference or a display fascination with relativity of cultures and identities. For pragmatic reasons, hybridity can imply a compulsory process of identification with the host country social, economic and cultural model in order to have accessibility and avoid racism¹³⁵. First generation immigrants express a likelihood of maintaining strong feeling of identity and attachment to religious and national cultures. However, with second and third generation, things changed and hybridization is associated with fragmented/ hyphenated sense of feeling torn between a superficial identification with the culture of origin –to show respect to parent’s family values- and an increasing attachment to liberal European cultural paradigm.

In the context of Maghrebi immigrants to Europe, young generations do not only practice identity code switching, but they also consciously create tactics in expressing their identities and fostering the very dynamic that enables them to be distinctive in terms of their culture and discourse. Moroccans and Algerians of second and third generation born in France map their identities with resistant tone to the dominant French culture which has been fighting over decades to suppress their voice and exclude them from a tempting social and economic system (Jobs / housing).¹³⁶ Besides, this generation of young North Africans, were born to face an explicit version of racism and ugly hostility no matter how much efforts made on their part to access to integration and assimilation project (hide their religions) resorting to their parent’s culture and valuing its cultural symbols, these French and Spanish young people of Maghrebi

¹³³ Ibid., pp. 276-277.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 277.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p.278.

¹³⁶ Esteve Zaragaza I C. Turvey, op. cit, p. 241.

descent react materially and symbolically to the lack of recognition on the denial of the right to practice their ethnicity and religiousity. European politicians keep accusing them of criminality and trouble / riot making (urban riots in Lyon 1981). This accusation is fueled with an already existing cultural system of prejudices, cliches and a feeling of cultural threat.

Public accusations and (terrorism) censorship of Muslim symbolic visibility fuelled a revival of religious feeling among Maghrebi descent as a reaction to Islamophobic attitudes and intolerant discourse of Europe. Some women have never worn scarves or burkhas in their life, but they have stated to adopt it as response to recurrent violation of Muslim rights and dignity not only in Europe, but all over the world. As result, hostility, racism and refusal encourage people to reappropriate cultural discourse and strengthen affinities with group identities:

France also fears that the increasing visibility of Islam threatens integration. The French emphasize the “laicism principle” or belief that public spheres must be secular spaces, free from the distinctiveness of overt religious and cultural display.

Long enough before immigration with its contemporary context, diasporic existence started with the early colonial encounters between Europeans and native people in America, Asia and Africa. For Stuart Hall, the violent cultural encounters in forms of slavery, deportation and conquest has staged continuous diaspora and displacement of people who were enforced to migrate, dislocate, creolize, assimilate and negotiate their very cultural identity by both “presence Americaine and Europeane”¹³⁷.

Diaspora does not necessarily imply the literal meaning of the word as the scattering or dispersion of people across different parts of the world in constant expectation of returning home. It symbolically associates¹³⁸ “the diaspora experience as I intend here is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of ‘identity’ which lives with and through, not despite, difference, by hybridity”.¹³⁹

Hybrid or diasporic identities keep changing and negotiating not because of an intrinsic character, but because of a compulsory postcolonial experience full of cultural transformations, discourses of difference and narratives of resistance.¹⁴⁰ If the term is historically associated with the dispersion of Jewish, the Greek, The Arminians and the Palistinians who hold a positive emotional and utopian feeling of unity and return, diaspora, nowadays, is used to describe the condition of any community living outside the country of origins with a feeling of ethnic or

¹³⁷Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora,” in *Identity, Community and Difference*, ed. Jonathan Ruthford (London: Lawrance2 Wishart, 1990), p. 230.

¹³⁸Esteve Zarazaga cited in Catherine Turvey, “Identity Construction amongst People of North African Descent Living in Europe,” p. 241.

¹³⁹Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora,” p. 234.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 235.

national sharedness and ancestral cultural connection with members of the same community like the community of Moroccans living in Europe, African-American in America, Americans in Europe, North Africans in western Europe. Diaspora could be the voice of marginalized minorities and groups who were denied access to the white dominant western cultures. Diasporic identity derives its symbolic force from “an oppressive national hegemony... and its identifications reach beyond ethnic status within the composite liberal state [fostering] a sense of being a people with historical roots and destinies outside the time/ space of the host nation.”¹⁴¹

With frequent migrations and displacements of people to North America, Western Europe and other parts of the world, diaspora as a political dispersion has been eclipsed by the more dynamic significance of the term as cultural manifestation of global movement of migrant groups identical to each other in host countries. North Africans in Europe can develop a multiple diasporic identity that unites them on basis of geographical kinship and history of shared resistance and religion or on more global scale. North Africans feel that sense of connection because of a similar linguistic system (Arabic/ Amazigh) or geographical belonging to North Africa, and they can connect globally, as Muslims, with co-believers in the part of the world. A political feelings of religion as diasporic identity is very influential medium of transnational groupness that transgresses boundaries of nation states and challenges old imaginaries of diaspora as scattered, exiled, and oppressed community. For example, People from different social classes, ages, educational levels and geographies (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, France, Spain) are connected with the notion of “religious” diasporic identity and culture. As such, diaspora is political celebration of a transnational experience that revolves around globally collective diasporic sense of minority that carve an imaginary of pride in culture and the deterritorialization of the state as bounded notion, asserting alignment with the marginalized dream of decentering the centre. Yet, diaspora is a double-faced view of the world encompassing both national cultures and the contemporary belief in diaspora "member's adherence to a diaspora community is demonstrated by an acceptance of an escapable link with their past immigration history and a sense of co-ethnicity with others of a similar background.”¹⁴²

As a source of “sociocultural innovation”,¹⁴³ hybridization implies a powerful ramification of people itineraries of encounters that begun with the very violent history of colonialism to the current condition of immigration and diaspora. People and their cultural

¹⁴¹James Clifford, *Routes: Travel and Translation in late Twentieth century*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University press, 1997), p. 255.

¹⁴²Robert Cohen, *Global Diasporas*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 9.

¹⁴³Garcia Concilini, 2000, “The State of War and Hybridization,” in *without Guarantees: in Honour of Stewart Hall*, eds. P. Gilroy et al, (London: verso, 2000), p. 49.

identities are, by force or will, doomed to negotiate their cultural existence to difference and to soften symbolic boundaries to claim a structure of belonging detached from singularity and integrity. Hybridized engagement with the alterity put cultural identity on transformatory logic that brings contradiction and uncertainties to essentialist definitions. Hybridity implies shifting nature of identities that reside in the in-betweeness or third spaceness of cultures.¹⁴⁴

“North Africaness” is an identity of complicated existence a hybrid presence living in the borders between the self (N. Africa) and the other (Europe). North Africans in Europe, but they are mentally and emotionally connected to North Africa as geography of shared culture, history, religion and land of other proximities or united by “imaginaire culturel”. Hybridity is preoccupied with what Robert Young calls “the impossibility of essentialism”¹⁴⁵. Tiyanba Zeleza does not accept the notion of African diaspora for its marks the failure and the insufficiency of the concept to fully account for the very conditions that surround the migration phenomenon for Africa “whereas other diasporas are defined in national or ethnic or even ideological term, for Africa they are simply called Africans, Whether the referent used is racial or spatial is not always clear”.¹⁴⁶

With new patterns of immigration policies in Western Europe, the presence of African and North Africans has become more complicated in the sense that chances of accessibilities to health care, Jobs and civil rights are decreased especially in the thought of economic terms more than cultural ones. The new form of diaspora is a desire from the unprivileged to be a part of the rich economic system as “we cannot use’ cultural identity as a permission to difference and an instrument for discovery that Eurocentric economic migration... persists in the hope of justice and capitalism.”¹⁴⁷

Cultural identity cannot claim an easy entry to the dominant European economic system, especially third world immigrant who represents what Spivak names “detritus of globality” and lack of legitimacy although factors of displacement are known all over the world. For Spivak the marginalized -undocumented immigrant- colours the diaspora notion with a neocolonial economic condition created by thirsty global capitalism regardless of the fact that South-North African migration¹⁴⁸ hides global inequalities which are originated in the very root of

¹⁴⁴Robert Young, *Hybrity in Theory, Culture and Race*, (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 27.

¹⁴⁵Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁴⁶Tiyanba Zeleza, “Rewriting the African diaspora: Beyond the Black Atlantic,” *African Affairs*, 105(2005), p. 35.

¹⁴⁷Gayatri Spivak, *a Critique of Colonial Reason: Towards History of the Vanishing Present* (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1999), p. 395.

¹⁴⁸Gayatri Spivak, “Cultural Talks in the Hot Peace: Revisiting the Global Village,” in *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation*, eds. Pheng Cheah et al (Minneapolis: University Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 334.

imperialism that defines disport and authorized residence for asylum-seekers who are temporarily fleeing physical or mental torture.¹⁴⁹

A contemporary usage of diaspora in cultural theory signifies a sense of displacement and dislocation brought by the condition of exile and emigration. It is also a challenge to the normative constraints of the traditional homelands which were defined by fixity and geographical limitation. Diasporic people as a category of citizens who have multiple loyalties and special belongings have given rise to a new construct that resist hegemonic values of nation and cultures because their mobility and plurality. This inbetween state of diasporic and hybrid process produces an intervention on the existing political and cultural system by "turning of boundaries and limits into the inbetween spaces through which the meaning of cultural and political authority are negotiated".¹⁵⁰

As postcolonial studies concept, hybridity is associated with the concept of cultures and identities as processes of open construction and encounter of different, multiple and divergent voices. Hybridity believes in the cross-fertilization of culture that develop plural, dynamic and heterogeneous nature, liminality, creolization, diaspora, translation and in-betweenness has become the defining structures of post colonial theory which reframed colonized-colonizer relationship which offered a hybrid or ambivalent split between pure and original identity and its production as repetition and difference. For Bhabha, hybridity is a "third space" emerging outside traditional essentialism giving voice to an alternative position, "for me the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original moments from which the third emerges, rather hybridity to me is the third "space" which enables other positions to emerge".¹⁵¹ The impurity of cultures and the mixedness of identities in the context of hybridity make Ella Shohat "discriminate between the diverse modalities of hybridity, forced assimilation, internalized self-rejection, political co-option, social conformism, cultural mimicry and creative transcendence".¹⁵²

In Europe and France, for particular reasons, diasporic communities of Maghrebi origins construct vibrant and accented cultural identities/languages with hybrid sense of the self that emanates from their situation as immigrants or ex-colonies subjects, claiming a place within dominant French culture. For Mohamed Bennis belonging to two cultures and translation make identity and writing a process of transformation, becoming and deferral; an interplay of appearance and disappearance, but this concept of hybridity may lead to destruction (against

¹⁴⁹Paul Timbaye Zelza, "Rewriting the African Diaspora: Beyond the Black Atlantic," p. 37.

¹⁵⁰Homi Bhabha, *Nation and Narration* (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 4.

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 211.

¹⁵²Ella Shohat, "Notes on the 'Postcolonial'," *Social Text*, 31/32 (1992), p. 110.

deconstruction of Derrida and Bhabha). When working on *le Coup du Hazard*, a poem by S. Mallarmé, he experiences hybridity and translation between cultures and languages as incomplete and a process of becoming¹⁵³ because of the multiphonic nature of identity and intertextuality of Mallarmé's text which borrow from Islamic, Andalusian and Arab texts¹⁵⁴; which makes translation impure and difference impure as well¹⁵⁵. It is this polyphonic identity and ambivalence in writing, language and culture, though sometimes invisible, makes identity a synergy of forms, genres and metaphors which make discourse, a "parlure" or the mirror of speech (reflection) according to Dante¹⁵⁶. This also what Julia Kristeva means by "gènotexte" as translinguistic, open to engenderment against the closure of "phenotexte", which is complete and prescriptive¹⁵⁷.

Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians and their descendents of second and third generation have been associated with a "dual cultural heritage" of cultural identity derived from belonging to historical, eastern pannational and Islamic culture of North Africa and a culture that is the outcome of their displaced situation to host country with secular, western and universal vision of the world¹⁵⁸. North African diasporic identity has come to formulate its own dynamics to cope with hostile context loaded with discourses of Islamophobia and exclusion. A context that has a hand in "riots", demonstrations and insurgencies in Lyon and other European countries; Those uncertainties, tensions and militancies, associated with divided, contested and hybridized identities, that have become emblematic of plural beur literature¹⁵⁹ and cinema.¹⁶⁰ Accented film-markers of North African origin have focused on the dream of return, on racism and exploitation and later on and rhetoric of split ambivalent identity.¹⁶¹ Hybridized presence of North Africans in Europe has exceptionally broken the norms to influence dominant cultural representations in Europe with its symbolic practices as the case of ray music and films that

¹⁵³Mohamed Bennis, "al-Hayat wa Tarjama: Yawmiyat al-Ghiyab," Nizwa, ed. Saif Rahbi, 54 (2008), pp. 91-92.

¹⁵⁴Abdelwahab al-Moueadeb, *Histoire de l'Islam et Musulmans in France* in Mohamed Bennis, al-Hayat wa Tarjama, p. 92.

¹⁵⁵Jack Derrida, *Mawaqif al-Thaqafa*, trans. Farid Ezzahi (Casablanca: Dar Toubqal, 1992), p. 64.

¹⁵⁶Dante, *al-Koumidia al-Ilahiya* in Fillipe Solerz, "Danti wa Rihlat al-Kitaba," Trans. Mohamed al-Arabi, Nizwa, 81(2015). pp. 168-169.

¹⁵⁷Julia Kristeva, *la Révolution de la Langage Poétique/ Sèmiotikè* in Halima Sheikh, "Mafhoum al-Kitaba ainda Julia Kristeva," Nizwa, ed. Saif Rahbi, 66 (2011) pp. 67-77.

¹⁵⁸Alec Hargreaves, "Beur Fiction: Voices from the Immigrant Community in France" cited in Hamid Naficy, *Accented cinema*, p. 96

¹⁵⁹Ibid., p. 96.

¹⁶⁰Hamid Naficy, *Accented cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking* (New Jersey: Princeton University press, 2001), p. 96.

¹⁶¹Ibid., p. 97.

realized high degree of viewership and spectatorship inside Europe. This hybrid success of North African “Beur” culture in Europe has been seen as an equivalent to the dominant French culture.

Exile is another analytical cognate of diaspora and hybridity in cultural theory and post colonial studies that defines groups and individual imaginaries of displacement and dislocation. Like diaspora, exile does not prescribe to a singular and homogeneous cultural identification, rather, it is a cultural form of flexible, fluid and pluralistic space with mental and psychological realities. Exile embraces a dual cultural identification of complicate forms and plural constructs in terms of language, location and cultural rituals. While exile identity symbolizes a hesitant incorporation to the strong dominant cultural discourse of the host land, at the same time it consciously signals a continuity of family, history and the cultural practices of the homeland. The context of exile, in turn, set identity as a playground of cultural discourses and geographical construction, drawn from subjection to mutual relations of continuity and discontinuity, construction, belonging and orphanage. Exile is a forceful emergence of the third self paradoxically entangled in veritable double cultural narratives of familiarity and difference of formidable force of tradition and challenging power of modernization, of the memories of the past and the realities of the present and at last recon conciliation between “here” and “then” as Hamid Naficy says. Exilic experience projects a state of strange loss of space and a dizziness that symbolizes spaces insideness related to the sense of who you are and who you may be. Salman Rushdie, as a famous Indian exilee, describes his arrival to London in this extract in sense of space dizziness, loss and alienation:

London was not the centre of my world. I had been misled, but there was else to go. It was a good place for getting lost in ... here I became not more than an inhabitant of a big city, robbed of loyalties, time passing, taking me away from what I was thrown more into myself, fighting to keep balance.¹⁶²

In his book “an Accented Cinema”, Naficy drawn a distinction between diaspora and exile as two forms of geographical and cultural displacement in terms of the differences and similarities they embrace. In contrast to diaspora, which resonates a cultural phenomenon that entails membership of part or whole community, exile is most of the time individual, in principle, because it is basically associated with political or religious persecution of people¹⁶³. Diasporic existence builds its consciousness on hybridized relationship with the country of origin

¹⁶²Salmane Rushdie quoted in V.S. Naipal, *An area of Darkness: an Experience of India* (London: André Dentsh, 1964), p. 45.

¹⁶³Hamid Naficy, *Accented Cinema*, p.14.

with spirit of multidimensionality and plurality “involving not only the homeland, but also the compatriot else where ”.¹⁶⁴

On the other land, both exile and diaspora represent a dislocatory politics that makes people leave up their homeland, an experience which brings instability and rupture to an already stable identity. Diaspora and exile imply a potential creation of a double narrative that is actually constitutive of an already established selfhood in the country of origin and the newly acquired identity in the host country. Whatever differences and similarities between exile and diaspora, both remain problematic cultural constructs that put identity to the test of experimentation and problematization. Both diaspora and exile develop hybridized identities characterized homogeneity and heterogeneity, stability and instability and fragmentation. What is specific about exile is the fact that it is mental experience more than a cultural metamorphosis psychologically associated with feeling of sadness, a sense of fragmentation, trauma and homelessness:

Exile is strangely compelling to think about but a terrible to experience. It is the unhealable rift forced between human being and a native place, between the self and its true home: its essential sadness can never be surmounted and while it s true that literature and history contain heroic, romantic, glorious even triumphant episodes in exile’s life, these are no more efforts meant to overcome the crippling sorrow of enstrangement. The achievements of exile are permanently undermined by the loss of something left behind for ever.¹⁶⁵

An application of diaspora, hybridity and exile to day’s migrant communities in the west, would articulate the idea that migrants and expatriates play from within western discourse, repeats, use part of its values to form a newly hybrid subjectivities. The appropriation of the western dominant cultural paradigm and transforming it through repetition and miming make migrants as post colonial subjects at the intersect and borders of cultures. Exile and diaspora then, represent identity as plural constructive force which puts culture in state of flux, formation and negotiation. If Spivak asks the question: can the subaltern speak?, Stuart Hall addresses the question of cultural identity in conceptualizing the “Jamaicaness” of Jamaican people with another question: from where people speak? Hall always confirms that subjects and their identities are the outcome of a certain historical and cultural conditions (colonialism, immigration). That is to say, people speak from an enunciative “truth” about a past that make their “oneness” revolves around a shared historical and cultural identity:

¹⁶⁴Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁶⁵Edward Said, Quoted in Hamid Naficy, an *Accented Cinema*, p. 27.

Our cultural identities reflect the common historical experiences and shared cultural codes provides as, as one people, stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of our actual history. This oneness, underlying all the other, more superficial differences, is the truth, the essence, of carribeaness.¹⁶⁶

In the second sense, Bhabha argues that cultural identity doesn't reside in the past as a fixity. It is a question of "being" as much as a question of "becoming" since cultures and people are always subject to displacement, change and transformation not only because of the shifts brought by globalization and consumer society, but because of the intervention of difference and cultural encounters (immigration, exile...) Shifting the logic of identity as a "becoming" and fluid process. This sense of identity stresses Derrida's "difference", whom S. Hall uses as reference, where identity has no fixed essence and meaning is always deferred, postponed, slippery and constructed through difference "cultural identity in [the] second sense, is a matter of be coming as well as of 'being'. It belongs to the future as much as to the past".¹⁶⁷

At the end, the equation of hybridity and diaspora with resistance, subversion of traditional boundaries and the hegemonic fixities neglects the fact that identities are not only linguistic and cultural assumption, but, according to C. Mitchelle, they are also economic processes and sites of capital culture: hybrid subject positions..., luminal and partial sites can be used for the purposes of capital accumulation quite as effectively as for the purposes of interventions in the hegemonic narratives of race and ethnicity.¹⁶⁸

C-The New Old Politics of Otherness: Identity, Resistance and the Making of Difference

The idea of identity as a consciousness of shared history or past was discussed by Renan as the foundation of group identity (qu'est-qu'une nation 1982) which is attached to certain mythical continuity¹⁶⁹. This continuity is strengthened by a variety of rituals, liturgies and festivities legitimized by the symbolic power of the church or monarchy (Shils 1981)¹⁷⁰ to bring past to presence to maintain that permanence. The collective historical consciousness and

¹⁶⁶Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora," p. 223.

¹⁶⁷Ibid., p. 225.

¹⁶⁸Katharyne Michell, "Different Diasporas and the Hype of Hybridity," *Environment and planning D: Society and space* 15: 5(1997), p. 536.

¹⁶⁹Ernest Renan "ma hiya al-Ouma,". Trans. Hassan Shami, *Nizwa* 34 (2003), p73.

¹⁷⁰Edwards Shils cited in Massimo Rossati, "Ritual and the Sacred: a New –Durkheimian Analysis of Politics, religion and the Self," retrieved on 13.07.2015, from <http://books.google.com.ma/books?isbn=1317062418>

the invention of tradition (Habsbawn and Ranger 1983)¹⁷¹ involve identity formation in stable and unchanging process that delves to the past to carve a sense of communal identification. Yet, identity is a fundamental component of individual existence, the experience of the self as implied ego (Descartes) or sentient subject as it manifest a subjective interpretation of the world or environment (positioning). Sartre differentiates between conscience de soi (self-awareness) and connaissance de soi (self-knowledge)¹⁷². In this sense identity and difference the subjective experience and the unfamiliar environment constitute the very essence of defining group identity and its difference from other groups in process of othering which demarcates boundaries between each group's distinctiveness. Identity does not only exist in the dialectical relationship between the individual / ego and the social sameness of his / her group, but it is also conflictually built in the process of confrontation with other external factors out the group which breaks down the singular anatomism of identity in facing difference. Identity has become dynamic, diverse, relational, conflictual and contextual, while difference has become decisive player in identity construction and in the formation of subject identity which becomes free from the burden of relativism.¹⁷³

Identity and difference are the core concepts of othersness which implies identification and inclusion of values and cultures as self, while it sets up opposition and exclusion to other different discourses, otherness necessitates a dialectical relationship between the self and the other (man / woman, colonizer/ colonized, slave/ master). While Freud conceive the “other” as a necessary component in the construction of subjectivity, Lacan differentiates between two types of others, one with capital “O” and the other with small “o”. Nouredine Afaya states that the idea of otherness in Western consciousness is founded on opposition/negativity (“us” against/versus “them”) from Descartes’s cogito to Hegel and Marx to Sartre and those who came after¹⁷⁴. Equally, Vernan Braudel is radically convinced that civilization are not only built on wealth, sacrifice and intelligence, but also on unfavourable relations with others, defined by hatred, neglect and denial¹⁷⁵.

For Bhabha, the other can be identified with the discourse of the empire –and the dominant in general- that categorizes people and makes them take the position of other whose

¹⁷¹Dorothy Lelan, “the Sartrean Cogito,” in *Existentialist Ontology and Human Consciousness*, p. 182 (176-199) <https://books.google.co.ma/books?isbn=1135631824>

¹⁷²Ibid., p. 172.

¹⁷³G. Levines (1991) cited in Peter L. Caller, "the Sociology of the Self," *Annual reviews*, 29 (2003), p. 119.

¹⁷⁴Mohamed N.Afaya, *al Gharb al-Mutakhayal: Surrat al-Akhar Fi al-Fikr al-Arabi al-Islami* (Bayrut: al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-Arabi, 2000), p. 25.

¹⁷⁵Mohamed N. Afaya, *Surrat al-Ghayriya: Tajaliyat al-Akhar fi al-Fikr al-Arabi al-Islami* (Bayrut: al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-Arabi, 2018), pp. 136-137.

identity or subjectivity established and mediated by the dominant discourse of the colonizer colonization itself has built its discourse on the formation of colonies and its subjects on the idea of difference and the negative stereotype which makes use of colour race and culture as attributes that classify the “other” as a inferior to the superior western self:

The objective colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administrations and instructions... colonial discourse produces colonized as a social reality which is at once an “other” and yet knowable and recognizable.¹⁷⁶

Difference, identity and otherness constitute an amalgam of political and psychological configurations that contribute to the creation of agency. Bhabha suggests that the colonizer / colonized encounters engage in a complex negotiation and participation in the construction of agency.¹⁷⁷ This encounter between the colonial self and the colonizer subject ‘other’ reveals a vulnerable identity of the colonizer since the colonized as ‘other’ is able to use colonial difference, imitates and subverts its authority. The colonized subject as the “other” of colonial discourse has an effective tactic to open ruptures and tensions in the process of othering and domination constructed into different cultural difference, black subject in Fanon theory otherness, was produced as a distorted version and “sprawled” figuration of projective othering of white imaginary "The white man has woven me out of thousand details... I was battered down with Tom-Tom, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects...".¹⁷⁸ The black otherness was constructed by the projective white fantasies, gazes and fears of black sexual and biological superiority.

Like Fanon, Foucault suggests that the regime of power contributes to the constructions of otherness. Social identities are shaped with reference to societal norms and are founded on the discourse of difference. Since the boundary between pathology and the normal, the mad and the rational is evaluated by a system or a model of normalization and regulated by the framework of power and discipline. In *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault tries to probe the way disciplinary system construct the identity of the madman, the socially deviant in accordance with the norms and regulations of the “rational man”. Foucault explores the network of power and knowledge integration, exclusion and how these discourses contribute to bind the lines between the self and the other. He argues that the objectification of others (mad, sexually deviant...) is a progression of historical discourses in the western civilization that begins with the madman as a holy person

¹⁷⁶Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 57.

¹⁷⁷*Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹⁷⁸Franz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (London: Pluto Press, 1986), p. 112.

in midieval ages¹⁷⁹... to the view of madness in the 18 and 19 century as unreason, contagion and disease/pathologies like delirium and melancholia¹⁸⁰.

As result, the madman objectified as another to the whole rational society and the insane, also, becomes the animal “madness dispossesses man of what is specifically human in him”¹⁸¹. The rational society, hence, has to retain a disciplinary order to make him to the norm and regulation as it/ they are embodied in a system of knowledge that serve power relations in societies (through the clinical system ‘doctor’) madness becomes insanity and the madman become the subject of investigation¹⁸². However, with the rise of new social movements and identity politics of subaltern or marginalized groups (like anti-war activist, environmentalists, sexual politics, women separatist movement black rights movements) identity and difference have switched the positions of enunciation and the classificatory order was innovated since oppressed or marginalized minorities defines relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed not from cultural view point but from the perspective of political mobilization. They take the position of marginality as departure to scrutinize the roots and the historical factors of their oppression. The celebration of and the fascination with group uniqueness was an essentialist characteristic of women as separatist movement aimed at correcting history (herstory) and decentering masculine narrative that relegate women a position at the periphery of history culture and society. New social movements have launched:

an active rethinking of politics, refracted through and reflecting on, the impact the new social movements and identity politics of the past generation, around race and ethnicity, gender lesbian and gay politics, environmentalism and the politics of HIV/AIDS.¹⁸³

As new social movement, black feminists claimed the right to represent themselves and construct their identities that was distorted by the discourse of other. They fought against “feminist reductionism” that recognizes only one race of woman which is the white woman.

Spivak who contributes to the question of subalternity explores the subaltern / subalternated ability to speak for himself. Spivak argues that marginalized subjects don’t have voices or their voices silenced so that they wouldn’t be able to speak. They are always spoken for and (mis) represented by others (especially those who exploit them). Spivak concerns with “the itinerary of silencing” posing the question about the condition of subject speaking agency in

¹⁷⁹ Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, pp. 15-22.

¹⁸⁰ Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*. Trans. Richard Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), p. 121.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁸³ J. Weeks, *the Lesser Evil and the Greater Good: the Theory and the Politics of Social Diversity* (London, River Oram Press, 1994), p. 4.

the context of Western radical knowledge that pretends to give a voice to the subaltern and how humanism declares to put an end to old essentialisms (male, bourgeois, sovereign culture)¹⁸⁴. Spivak criticized Western knowledge (Deleuze and Foucault) for painting a utopian picture of power relations between the self and the other, the dominant and the marginalized, the center and the periphery in the sense that the subalterns have become able to represent themselves within the context of subject position construction. Spivak also questions the dominant poles of culture that imprison woman between colonialism/ newcolonialism and the native patriarchy. G. Spivak argues that third world women are caught under the violent norms of the disappearance of women, "The figure of the women disappears, not into pristine nothingness, but into violent shutting which is the displaced figuration of the third-world women caught between tradition and modernization."¹⁸⁵

In the western masculine analytical theory, woman as an "other" –Spivak states- was not only silenced, but she was also constructed as victimized figure and traumatized subject "The deep ambiguity of Freud's use of woman as a scapegoat is... continuing desire to give the hysteric a voice, to transform her to the subject of hysteria".¹⁸⁶

Spivak subsequently criticizes woman identity not in relation to their "others" or 'suppressors' but in the sense that western feminism constructs a biased knowledge in terms of race, class and sexuality. She suggests western feminism was unable to give women narratives free from the traditional dominant presupposition since it manifests itself as white, middle class feminism that has nothing to do with dehomogenizing or decolonizing dominant ideologies.¹⁸⁷

In relation to construction of identity by the discourse of "others", hybridity, as we have seen in the previous section, comes an outcome of cultural and geographical transformation that bring people of different identities to an open incorporation of difference and identity at the same time. Homi Bhabha proves that, in general, hybridity as cultural phenomenon has become a characteristic of exchange between people, cultures and places. However, in postcolonial theory, hybridity stresses a certain connection between two oppositional blocks: the dominant and the marginalized, the colonizer and the colonized. The problem does not lie in the superiority or dominance of one discourse over the other. Rather, the matter is that the system of colonial representation which has repercussions capable of revising the whole situation against the dominant discourse expectations:

¹⁸⁴Gayatri Spivak, "the Postcolonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues," , ed. S. Harasym (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 31.

¹⁸⁵Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁸⁶Gayatri Spivak (1988), "Can the Subaltern Speak?" repr. In *Colonial Discourse and post colonial theory: A reader*, eds. Patrick Williams et al (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p. 102.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., p. 92.

Colonial hybridity is not a problem of genealogy or identity between two different cultures which can then be resolved as an issue of cultural relativism. Hybridity is a problematic of colonial representation and individuation that reverses the effects of the colonialist disavowal, so that other “denied” knowledge enter upon the dominant discourse and estrange its authority, its rules of recognition.¹⁸⁸

Bhabha’s postcolonial theory is drawn on semiotic and Lacanian psychoanalysis’s concept like liminality, mimicry and ambivalence which represent the core relationship which not only equates colonial history to oppression and domination but also to the very tensions and uncertainties that underpin the complex cultural encounters. He asserts that colonial authority tried to suppress the real sameness of the colonized which undermines the very existence of colonial difference. This illusion on the part of the colonizer attitude was pushed to the edge of anxiety which opens indeterminacies and blanks in the coherent structure of the discourse, whose norms of civility and rationality are copied, resisted and mimicked in a distorted form. Bhabha uses the concept mimicry to portray the way colonial authorization is put to question and imitated in a mocking way-the colonizer desire of putting the colonized under control and manipulating gaze results in a mimicry that gives rise to a subversive power and a “weapon of anti-colonial civility” in the hands of colonized people, countering it with disobedience, ambivalence and “multiple acts of translation”. This very “disobedience” marks a transition from colonial sameness to anti-colonial reappropriation of the normative discourse by turning it to mimicry with a sense of ambivalence like the “not-quiteness” of colonized subject of English Empire in India.¹⁸⁹

This mimicry, which stirs the colonizer anxiety and destabilization does not imply full assimilation of subjects to supposedly dominant discourse, but rather, constitutes an exaggerated copy of the colonizer symbolic system including language, manners... it marks an “accented identity” that translates, repeats and accepts relatively and differently what the other says, does and thinks. What is specific about colonial theory is that it is known of being a comic approach to the colonized-colonizer relationship since mimicry and imitation is associated with a form of an ironic performance of behaviour and a mocking discourse that counters, disturbs and subverts a prevailing knowledge of colonialism¹⁹⁰. The mimic property of the subject is strengthened by the fact that colonial authority manifest itself as a solemn and unnegotiable discourse with

¹⁸⁸Homi Bhabha, op, cit. p. 114.

¹⁸⁹Leela Ghandi, *Postcolonial Theory: an Introduction* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1999), pp. 149-150.

¹⁹⁰Homi Bhabha, op.cit, pp. 85-86.

strong desire to control and assimilate people through education and systems of integration in orders to embrace colonial rule and its culture easily:

Colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed recognizable other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is construed around ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excenes, its difference.¹⁹¹

Bhabha argues that native cultures and identities compose a decentering presence to the colonial intellectual discourse with a force to “rupture” and bring colonial power uncertainty which defines subjects in a frame work of partial presence. Mimicry and ambivalence reimagine colonial discourse because they present subordinate subject as no simple creatures easily manipulated and exploited, but as complex mimics capable of resembling and translating the external authenticity and capable of incarnating anxiety, terror and menace. Sameness and difference in colonial discourse are no clear manifestations since mimicry present an identity of different type (not identical to itself) relying on metaphorical terminology (metonymy) with colonized subjects as parts stand for or substitute a whole (never reach a full presence) this strategy strengthens mimicry as a site of ambivalence with identity process that is not complete and final, but as changing and unstable.¹⁹² This is what makes mimicry results in undermining the colonizer original self as the colonized challenged authority by repetition, sly civility, writing...¹⁹³ Borrowing the concept from psychonalysis, Bhabha extends ambivalence to embrace the tensions and contradictions that characterize the colonial discourse which is between two divergent feelings: desire and derision, love and fear, acceptance and refusal. This irresolvable property of colonial discourse is shared with the colonized subjectivity, which represents both resistant practice to the colonizer and complicit sameness that enacts the colonizer values and discourses by mimicry. Yet, as an ambivalent subject, the colonized can not only destabilize that sameness and make it lose its effective discursive practice by mockery, but also disorders the dominant colonial discourse “Ambivalence... enables a form of subversion... [and] turns the discursive conditions of dominance into the grounds of interventions”.¹⁹⁴

The concept of uncanny or uncanniness, based on Freud and Kristiva, is used by Bhabha as well to feed postcolonial theory besides ambivalence, mimicry... . Psychologically the “uncanny” refers to the deep experiences and traumas that have been silenced and repressed long back in childhood returns at certain moments later in a person life Bhabha applies the “uncanny”

¹⁹¹Homi Bhabha, op.cit, p. 86.

¹⁹²Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁹³Ibid., p. 86.

¹⁹⁴Homi Bhabha, op.cit, p. 112.

to the behaviours of colonial discourse. He compares the uncanny to the split experience of colonial discourse with its tensions and ambivalences threatened by the return of the repressed since the structure of its political discourse confronts the unconscious repetitions and recurrence of old guilts and fallacies of the past, opening ruptures in the coherent, self-sufficient and homely discourse of coloniality as it is displaced, changed and even made meaningful by others. This uncanniness is formulated in space and time since national identities are playgrounds of tradition and modernity, past and future, and attachment to fixity and openness to transformation.¹⁹⁵ This is what defines history as a confrontation with its uncanny doubles. In addition, the meaning of monstrosity and doubling associated with the uncanny is seen as questioning the homogenous narrative of western knowledge¹⁹⁶.

Resistance is another complex concept within a network of conceptual frameworks like power, knowledge, domination that have been debated strongly. For Foucault “where there is power, there is resistance” and “there are no relation of power without resistances”, which implies that the existence of power is conditioned by the existence of resistance not at a direct consequence, but as an entailment for its operation constituting a component that is its double.¹⁹⁷ What is specific about this sort of power is the fact that it is part and parcel of power relations and it is homogenous practice –like power- that can’t be reduced to a total resistance or as “locus of great refusal ... a soul of revolt source of all rebellions, or pure law of rebellion”.¹⁹⁸

As such, there is no single resistance, rather, there are multiple types of resistances that keep changing and reshaping. For Foucault, social transformation and historical change brought by revolution couldn’t take place if only a view of resistances come together. And to bring unity among different heterogenous contradictions that underpin social structures to constitute an oppositional force against the dominant system: Just as the network of power relations ends by forming a dense web that passes through apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly localized in them, so too the swarm of points of resistances traverses social stratifications and individual unities. And it is doubtless the strategic codification of these points of resistance that makes revolution possible, somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies on the institutional integration of power relationships.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁵Ibid., p. 194.

¹⁹⁶Ibid., p.194.

¹⁹⁷Michel Foucault, *Power and Strategies/ power –knowledge Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (Brington Harvester, 1980), p. 142.

¹⁹⁸Michel Foucault, *the History of sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 95-96.

¹⁹⁹Ibid., p. 96.

Like Louis Althusser, Foucault believes that for resistance to be effective and ruptural force in the form of revolution, there must be a certain social context or conjuncture that has to facilitate the overthrow of the dominant regime and transition to an alternative one.²⁰⁰ Foucault's notion of power and resistance was accused of being pessimistic in the sense that he believes that there is no use in fighting to replace the existing political system since the alternative system can't change the status quo or can't be better than the previous one. In the operation of power and resistance the subject is a component of power, it is made by the system, that is, it is inside the regime it intends to resist. It does not allow a position outside the network of power resistance in this Foucauldian epistemology is near to "complicity" than to opposition.²⁰¹

Bhabha conceives resistance as a subversion of colonial power and the rupture of its authority from within. It is not an oppositional dynamic of resistance countering dominance, but inner ambivalences and textual tensions that reside within the discourse. As such, Bhabha's model of resistance represents an agency without subject since the way colonial authority tries to exert power and control over its subject is broken by the very tensions meant to take hold of the subject as object of knowledge:

If control slips away from the colonizer, the requirement of mimicry means that the colonized, while implicit in the process, remains the unwitting and uncounscious agent of menace with a resulting paranoia on the part of the colonizer as he tries to guess the native's sinister intensions.²⁰²

Hybridity overlaps with mimicry and ambivalence since the product expected from the mimic man results in subversive identity that is familiar and new at the same time, similar but not quite. So hybridity, like mimicry, represents a resistant and subversive ability on the part of the colonized, by downplaying the "universal" voice of colonial discourse. Hybridity is:

The moment in which the discourse of colonial authority loses its univocal grip on meaning and finds itself open to the trace of the language of the other, enabling the critic to trace complex movements of a disarming alterity in the colonial text.²⁰³

So, the colonizer's ability to return the gaze and transform colonial discourse by using them, altering them and, then, splitting their univocality as an act of resistance even through in "slight displacements" and small differences which are most effective in subversion. Resistance

²⁰⁰Simon Jon, *Foucault and the Political* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 87.

²⁰¹A. Varadhanjan, *Exotic Paradises: Subjectivity in Adorno, Said and Spivak* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), p. 12.

²⁰²Robert Young cited in *Exotic Paradises*, p. 2.

²⁰³Robert Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 21.

is not always embodied in an oppositional form. It can be performed with the “effect” of ambivalence, subversion... For Bhabha:

Resistance is not necessarily an oppositional act of political invention, nor is it the simple negation or exclusion of the context of another culture, as a difference once conceived. It is the effect of an ambivalence produced within the rules of recognition of dominating discourse as they articulate the signs of cultural difference.²⁰⁴

Resistance, then, does not exist outside the colonial network of power as an independent force, rather the native subjectivity exists inside the discursive practices of the colonizer and even it may overlaps with its functioning of power. Hybridity and mimicry emerge from the discursive construct and the appropriation of colonial discourse not only to subvert its authority and produce menace to the colonizer, but also:

Marks those moments of civil disobedience within the disciplined civility: signs of spectacular resistance. When the words of the master become the site of hybridity... then we may not only read between the lines but even seek to change the after coercive reality that they so lucidly contain.²⁰⁵

For Bhabha, the subversion of colonial power happens inside the confines of its practices and discourses unconsciously performed by the native subjects who are unaware of that they are doing. It is resistance with Foucauldian prints, an “agency without subject or it happens out side the conscious control of the subject, a kind of representation which produces effects, a sameness, which slips to otherness...”.²⁰⁶ However, Homi Bhabha and postcolonial theory were criticized as being an elitist and nonrational postmodern thought, as a fascination with and celebration of minorities/ subaltern neglecting the fact that the marginalized reproduce hegemonic structures (of violence, inequalities) similar to that of the dominant in the contemporary context of labour and capital global circulation²⁰⁷. Trilogy of gender, class and race are used in an oversimplified manner that put them on an equal ground without boundaries while class is social concept, gender and race are biological²⁰⁸. By focusing on textual tensions, ambivalence and deconstruction, subaltern and postcolonial studies seem to substitute Fannon’s call for radical change and Hegel/Marx’s revolution with inconcrete/impractical notions of

²⁰⁴Homi Bhabha quoted in W. T. Mitchell, “Translator Translated Interview with H. Bhabha,” *Artforum*, 33: 7 (1995), p. 82.

²⁰⁵Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 1994, p. 121.

²⁰⁶Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West*. S. Edition (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 188.

²⁰⁷Terry Eagleton, *Awham ma Baad al-Hadatha*, trans. Thaeir Dibb (Ladiqqiya: Dar al-Hiwar, 2000), p.17-18.

²⁰⁸*Ibid.*, p. 113.

hybridity and fragmentation²⁰⁹. Equally, Russel Jacobi states that postcolonial theory plays with concepts like authority, resistance, difference and counter discourse that lose anchoring in real life and lack materiality because they are textual and symbolic²¹⁰.

Issues of resistance, agency, identity and the relationship between dominant and subaltern formation is used in the contemporary migrant experience. Bhabha equates today's immigrant with the colonized experience as a subaltern of neocolonial practice. Migrant's hybrid culture represents a resistant agency in the same old manner (Hijab visibility is a resistant sign to the dominant culture). Immigrants question and hybridize the dominant European culture. They interrogate dominant metropolitan discourse of civility (democracy, equality) since immigrants and other minorities are suffering discrimination.

By being part of the dominant western culture, immigrant cultures undermine the assumption of pure and unified European identity. The understanding of the dominant values has been unsettled by the immigration phenomenon with forms of mimetic behaviours in intercultural encounters. The acknowledgement of cultural difference for assimilation purposes has opened a space for the incorporation of migrant cultures to the dominant discourse as sign of multiculturalism. This proximity enables the migrant, as subaltern, to produce new sites of agency and resistance.

²⁰⁹Nigel Gibson, "Thought about Doing Fanonism in the 1990s," *College Literature*, 26:2 (1999), pp.96-97.

²¹⁰Russel Jacoubi, *Nihayat al-Yotopia: as-Siyassa wa Taqqafa fi Zaman al-Lamobalat*, trans. Farroq Abdelkader, *Alam al-Maarifa*, 269 (May 2001), 78.

Part II

II-NORTH AFRICAN IMMIGRATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: STATISTICAL STOCKS, CHANGING POLICIES AND SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES

1-Statistical References, Figures and Migration Trends

A-Chronicles of Immigration: Colonial Legacies, Official Numbers and the Glorious Thirties

Today, world migration has reached a total number of 232 Millions in 2013, making up 3.2% of the world population. Refugees have a share of about 15.7 Millions, comprising 7% of all international migrant the number has reached 68.5 millions of refugees who were forcibly displaced in 2018 according to the high commissioner for refugees.²¹¹ While young migrants represent 34.8 millions, women share represents about 48% of all migrants around the world.²¹²

In 2010/2011, the number of migrants residing in Europe estimated by 100 million people, including 51.9% of women from all nationalities. In 2013, 33.5 millions migrants are foreign birth and represent 4.1% of Europe 27 state 500 million populations.²¹³ As for Arab migrants, there are more than 4.7 millions migrants of North African origin residing and working in Europe in 2007 with another 2.4 millions in Arab oil countries.²¹⁴ North African immigration to Europe has a long history of migration traditions triggered by colonization, demands of labour market, economic growth and structural unemployment, lack of job opportunities²¹⁵ in departure countries. North African migration system has changed the character of migration to Europe because of variety of demographic, historical and cultural patterns that characterize the system. Besides, the different migration trends and forms of North African migrants ranged from colonial and postcolonial trends to labour and guest worker patterns to family reunification and illegal migration systems.

North African immigration has been a crucial contribution to the development and reconstruction of European states since the end of WW II. Ex-colons and Haarkis (90.000 left Algeria to France after independence, now their children estimated by 500.000)²¹⁶ were integrated to the European economic Market, providing a silver rocket for empowerment of labour Market which have just entered a race of modernization and industrialization. The European Markets absorbed labour surplus from overseas colonies and compensated for labor

²¹¹France 24, 19 June, 2018.

²¹²United Nations (2013), "Trends in International Migrants Stocks: The 2013 Revision," retrieved on 13 May 2016, from www.org.un/development/desa/population/data/index.html

²¹³Dioc. 2010/2011, www.decd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm. pp. 1-2

²¹⁴Hein de Haas. p. 147.

²¹⁵Hain de Haas, "North African Migration Systems: Evolution Transformations and Development Linkages," *Immigration and Development: perspectives from the South*. ed. Stephen Castles (Geneva: IOM, 2007), p. 147.

²¹⁶Al Arabiya News, 23 August, 2018.

shortages in labour force caused by sharp losses in wartime, providing for France alone 255.000 wage-labourer in industries and agriculture.²¹⁷

However, the pre and interwars period experienced a forced labour of colons and pionniers of colonization who served as backup soldiers for European colonizer like France which has lost 1.4 million nationals and 1.5 handicapped²¹⁸ 173.000 Algerians, 40.000 Moroccans and 56.000 Tunisians have fought with France. In 1919, about 119.000 Algerians immigrated to work in France and Moroccans were working in France as early as 1916 with a number of 35.000. As result, the number of Algerian Colons and migrants has jumped from 600 in 1912 to 80.000 in 1928 recruited in heavy industry, agriculture and construction and regulated under a system of work contract.²¹⁹ In 1945, the number of Algerian working in France was 350 000²²⁰.

Labour migration during colonization and interwar period marked a remarkable contribution for the revival of collapsing economies and the enabling of capitalist market. Historically, colonisation and industrialization went hand in hand with the immigration of wage labourers and cheap workers from colonies to pave the way for the new Europe, strong, healthy and heterogenous.²²¹

With post WW II period, as the beginning of the glorious thirties, a large movement to Europe from ex-colonies came as result of a process of decolonization and booming economic growth. Former colonies constituted a tremendous source of cheap labour for an old continent, which emerged from the war devastated and in dire need for young labour force. To enhance economic expansion and rehabilitation of labour market, European countries facilitated immigrant movement by granting work contract and residency permits. First the recruitment of unskilled migrants was regulated by bilateral agreements, which were supposed to be temporary and fill in the gaps of labour shortages, but the majority of temporary and guest worker did not return home and a growing number of migrants settled permanently in Europe²²². To strengthen modes of industrial production with large scale economic strategies and fast growing labour migrant, UK hired thousands of immigrants under the banner of European voluntary worker scheme, Germany created guest worker system, Belgium employed immigrants from different

²¹⁷Hain de Haas, "North African Migration Systems," p. 148.

²¹⁸Afan Seljuq (1998), "Cultural Conflicts: North African immigrants in France," International Journal of Peace studies. retrieved on 20/06/2015, from <http://www.gmm.edu/academic/ijps/vol:2/seljuq.htm>

²¹⁹Ibid.

²²⁰Hein de Haas, "North African Migration Systems," p. 149.

²²¹Abdellah Laroui, *History of Maghreb* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp, 351-352.

²²²Christian Dustmann and Albrecht Glitz (2005), "Immigration, Jobs and Wages: Theory, Evidence and Opinion," retrieved on 06-10- 2016 from, <https://books.google.co.ma/books?isbn=1898128871>.

nationalities to work in iron and coal mines industries, while France created the National Office of Immigration in 1945, the number of Algerians and their families have reached 350.000 people.²²³

The office facilitated the flow of immigrants from North Africa and other colonies as coverage for demographic insufficiency. Seasonal migrants in Agriculture were the favorite type in this period. Germany was known for guest worker recruitment by the Federal Labour Office, which selected worker according to certain procedures like skill health and clean profiles.²²⁴

As result, a total of about 250.000 North African ex-colons, Haarkis and immigrants have participated in the process of reconstruction of Europe. The largest share was 220.000 Haarkis and Algerian migrants, while Moroccans represents 20.000 people and 5.000 Tunisian.²²⁵ In 1962, about one million colons and Haarkis immigrated to Europe after the NLF took control of Algerian decolonization and resistance. Algeria and France agreed on a quota of 35.000 migrants every year in 1968, but after some years, Algeria stopped all from of migration to France, seeing migration as a from of new colonialism.²²⁶

The flows of migrants to Europe continued in massive modes till the oil crisis in 1973, which launched a new phase economic downturn and stagnation. The post 1973 period experienced a reduction in the recruitment of colonial workers and a decrease in North African migration to Europe as result of the economic recession, the emergence of new labour Markets (Gulf countries) and the favouring of new worker profiles in Europe as industries became dynamic and complicated. Markets were no longer dependent on manual and traditional semi-skilled work force,²²⁷ particularly with salience of fields like electronics and services. The Europeanization of labour and the emergence of second wave migrants (from family reunification) have caused a reduction of unskilled job market as many children and woman entered the process. There has been a decrease in the influx of traditional migrants; yet, migration trends keep changing and shifting throughout this period as response to the changing nature of economy. Migration from Maghreb to Europe did not stop, but it continued by mass flow of refugees, highly qualified workers, legalization and family reunification. So, the oil crisis period introduced a switch in migration patterns by favoring humanitarian trends as family

²²³Hein de Haas, "North African Migration Systems," p. 150.

²²⁴N. Guennouni, *Rapport Introductif : Migration et Droits dans les Pays du Maghreb, in les Migrants et leurs Droit au Maroc* (Rabat : Editions la Croisée des chemins, 2004), p. 25.

²²⁵Hein de Haas, op.cit, p. 150.

²²⁶Philippe Fargues, "Arab Migration to Europe : Trends and Policies," *International Migration Review*, 38: 4 (2004) p. 1360.

²²⁷Hein de Haas, "North African Migration Systems," p. 153.

reunification. The feminization of immigration has resulted in an increase woman's share by 12% and children by 52% between 1973 and 1981. Although demands for migrant workers declined in European Markets because of the crisis, family reunification led to permanent migration between 1970s and 1990s²²⁸. Moroccans have increased from 400.000 in 1975 to one million in 1992 in France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany. While Egyptian migrants abroad moved from 70.000 in 1970 to 1.4 million in 1976 to 2.3 millions in 1986 (because of infitah policy by Sadat)²²⁹. The same characteristic is shown by Tunisian migrant patterns by growing from 225.000 in 1977 to 444.000 in 1992 in France, Germany, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland and Although the Algerian authorities banned all forms of migration to France, the number of Algerians moved from 500.000 in 1964 to 800.000 without inclusion of Haarkis and colons.²³⁰ The seventies have also witnessed the migration of a great number of North Africans to the petrol exporting countries in the Middle East.

The 1990s has introduced new migration trends because of the political, economic and social transformations that North Africa experienced. This era was characterized by the outbreak of Algerian civil, United Nations' embargo on Libya and the introduction of visa requirement by Spain and Italy on North African migrants. This transitional stage in the history of North African migration knew the birth of illegal immigration, as pattern with substrational increase through the 1990s as borders were intensified by control and visa requirement, making an end to a migration trends that was mainly seasonal, circular and of colonial nature and the beginning of new migrations to Southern Europe²³¹.

The magnitude of migration flow starts increasing in unprecedented manner because of low birth in the European continent and economic growth. North African migration patterns witnessed acceleration and diversification by the process of family reunification, intermarriage and regularization compaigns²³² of illegal migrants who worked as low-paid wagger in informal sectors of Agriculture and industry. Illegal migrants in the 1990s were not traditional work force but represented a mosaic of unemployed graduates and qualified group of migrants from different social, educational and demographic backgrounds. Most North African governments have strongly encouraged the immigration of their citizens to fight unemployment and benefit remittances and foreign currencies. These policies have resulted in great figures of expatriates in Europe. The number of Moroccans in the European countries has risen from one million in 1992

²²⁸Chrestian Dustmann and Albrecht Bletz, "Migration, Jobs and Wages,"

²²⁹Hein de Haas, op.cit.

²³⁰Hein de Haas, "North African Migration Systems," p. 153.

²³¹Ibid.

²³²See Chapter "Migration policies" which discusses regularization and naturalization compaigns in Europe since the 1980 S.

to 1.6 million in 1998, including 430.000 immigrants with European nationalities.²³³ The Moroccan diaspora reached the climax in 2004 with 3 millions Moroccans world wide and 2.6 Million in Europe. Although Tunisia was known for repatriation policies, Tunisian Nationals in Europe have reached more than 700.000 Migrants by the beginning of the third millinium.²³⁴ Despite the fact that Algerian policies were built on oil strong economy and oppositional attitudes towards Europe –mostly in France- reached 800.000 Algerians in 2000.²³⁵ Egyptian people were not allowed to migrate until 1971 when a huge number of nationals migrated to the Gulf countries. The number of Egyptians has reached 800.000 in USA, Canada, Australia, UK, Italy and Greece. At the end of the ninties,²³⁶ International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that 590.000 Tunisians are in Europe.²³⁷

The mass migration of females in the 1970S started with family reunification as wives and children joined their parents in host countries. Intercultural marriage was another factor behind the growing flow of female migrants as result of unification between European nationals and their foreign partners because of encounters in tourism, education and business. In this respect, 119.000 permits in France were issued for family reasons in 1998. In Sweden, 60.4% of 374.000 immigrants were under family reunification category in 1999. In Etaly, 366.122 of residence permits in 2000 were for family reunification.²³⁸

Female migrants constituted a number of students who entered Europe to finish education and research. Most students became permanent settlers after graduation or marriage or integration to the job Market. 50% of migrant students in Europe are female.²³⁹ Most North African female migrants work in low paid/3D jobs and less rewarding jobs (cleaning, domistic work and health care).²⁴⁰

²³³Hain de Haas, (2005a) “Moroccan from Emigration Country to Africa’s Migration Passage to Europe,” *Migration information source* Retrieved on 8 August, 2015, from www.migrationinformation.org

²³⁴Fatima Sadiqi, (2007) “Morocco: The political and social dimension of migration,” retrieved on 6 June 2016 from <https://chabaka2000.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/2007>

²³⁵CARIM *Mediterranean Migration* (Tunisia) Report 315 (Flerence: European University intitue, 2005) pp. 375-76.

²³⁶M. Baldwin Edwards. (2006), “Between a Rock and Hard Place: North Africa as a Region of Emigration, immigration and transit Migration,” *Review of African Political Economy*, 33: 108 (2006), p.325.

²³⁷IOM (2003 a) *World Migration*, V. 2, IOM World Migration report series (Geneva: International Organisation for Migration, 2003)retrieved on 23 June 2016, from <http://www.iom.int/world-migration-report-2003>

²³⁸Eleonore Kofman (2003) “Women Migrants and Refugees in the European Union,” *European Commission and OECD Conference* retrieved on 3 November 2016 from <http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/id/eprint/4446>

²³⁹Ibid.

²⁴⁰M. Morokvasic cited in Eleanore Kofman.

Migration continued in the form of family reunification, illegal immigration and brain drain, favouring highly skilled immigrants with tertiary degrees. The drain of professionals and highly qualified people were/ are source of remittances and GDP growth for departure countries and attractive payment in host countries for professionals who are demotivated by lack of career opportunities in origin countries. The flight of North African brains to Europe and North America were so immense to the extent that some portrayed as exodus. Mghari gave a very shocking number 1.600 of Moroccan researchers who are working only in one scientific institution in France.²⁴¹ Other factors that pushed Africans to migrate are demographic gaps, economic instability, unsatisfactory job standards, violation of human rights and freedom of expression... France, Italy and Spain were and are the favorite destinations of North Africans because geographical proximity and family reason. Besides, Spain and Italy are characterized histories of newly arrived immigrants, immigrants with violated visa conditions and countries legalisations.

Maghrebi immigrants in Europe are distributed according to the favorite destination countries. In 1999, the number of Maghrebi nationals reached 1.733.441 in France, 566.967 in Spain (2005), 347.156 in Italy (2003) and in Germany 222.807 (2002). Moroccans ranked first in migrant stocks with a number of 1.812.510 in 2004 as estimated by host countries, but according to Moroccan consular registers it was 2.616.871, followed by Algerian stocks (789.459-991.796), then by Tunisians with a number of (358.926 – 695.765) and finally by Egyptians.²⁴²

It is extremely difficult to give a precise conclusion or succinct statement about the exact number of immigration flows and stocks because of the multiplicity of sources and disparities between sending and receiving countries. Statistics and inferences are relative to the shifting nature of the phenomenon and dependent on citizenship, nationality laws among unharmonized European migration policy. For example, Moroccan immigrants are estimated to reach 2616871 by the database UN in 2004, while the statistics given by Moroccan authorities are 1434986. For the Tunisian immigrants, the UN gives a number of about 695765 in 2003, but the statistics of the Tunisian authorities are half that 358269²⁴³.

Sources of migrant measurement and analysis of data related immigrants depend on the regulation of destination countries and according to annual reports of organisation – governmental and non-governmental. In addition to what have been mentioned before, the

²⁴¹M. Mghari, "Exodus of Skilled labour," cited in Paola Monzini "Smuggling Migrants into, through and from North Africa," retrieved on 23 July 2016 from https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/migrant_smuggling_in_north_africa

²⁴²Phillipe Fargues (2006), "International Migration in the Arab Region: Trends and Policies," retrieved on 23 August 2016, from po9_fargues.pdf.

²⁴³Ibid., p. 26.

quantitative nature of immigrant stock is made difficult by whether to include children born in host countries and those who acquired nationality or legalized. The previous examples show a huge discrepancies between North African consular records and the stocks of European countries. These differences maximize chances for the misinterpretation of the precise statistics of migrants, giving false grounds for economic and social developments.

Europe seems to be the favorite destination of Tunisians living abroad, namely in France, Italy and Germany. The highest numbers are concentrated in France with percentage of 54.5, Italy with 13.9% and Germany with 7.8%.²⁴⁴ Egyptian migration trends were characterized by favouring the Gulf, North America and European Union. 80% of Egyptian nationals are concentrated in the main countries of the European Union (510.878). Egyptian migration to Europe characterized by the high levels of qualification and tertiary education scientists, doctors, engineers and university teachers. Italy (210.000) ranks as the top favourite destinations for Egyptian migrants with a rate of 41%, followed by UK (74.764) as second favorite destination with 14% and France (70.000) comes a third destination country by 13.7% in 2006.²⁴⁵

The new challenges brought by the new trends of migration in the beginning of the new millennium, particularly after 2011 as result of “Jasmine revolution”, have marked a remarkable surge in the destination of unfortunate group of people who started seeking shelter and protection from hardships and violence in conflict zone. Illegal migration after Jasmine revolution in North Africa signalled a return to forced migration or a crisis related displacement of people that required very particular mechanisms to address the conditions of people in crisis situations, taking into account the fact that the phenomenon is closely related to issues of economy, security and Human right. After the outbreak of “Jasmine Revolution” in North Africa, The Mediterranean Basin and Southern Europe witnessed unprecedented waves of refugees and immigrants that escaped armed conflict and violence that characterize those types of transitions a total of 59.000 illegal immigrants and refugees arrived in Europe in 2011, fleeing armed conflict and seeking shelter and humanitarian assistance. 28.000 are from Libya, 28.000 from Tunisia and 1.500 are from Egypt. In 2011, about 1000 Tunisians were arriving to Italy everyday, in Lampedusa, and about 1.500 people had drowned in the Mediterranean since the beginning of 2011. The Arab Spring and world economic crisis have strongly affected migration patterns to Europe by reducing the number traditional immigrants as being competed and replaced by new

²⁴⁴Migration Policy centre www.migrationpolicycentre.eu retrieved on 4 September 2015.

²⁴⁵Ayman Zohry (2009), “The Migratory Patterns of Egyptians in Italy and France,” CARIM Reports, 2009.retrieved on 10 May 2016 from <http://repository.forcedmigration.org/pdf/?pid=fmo:5067>

comers who are mainly war and political refugees from North Africa and the Middle East²⁴⁶. Besides, a tremendous wave from sub-Saharan Africa keep arriving to Malta and Italy as a new route of migration (beside Turkey) assured and facilitated by Islamic State in the Maghreb as it swore to flood Europe illegal immigrants in 2014. Continuous arrival of undocumented migrants to Southern Europe put much pressure on receiving countries like Italy who refused recently to give entry to ship with 900 illegal migrants on board, which Spain and France offered to receive after a diplomatic crisis between Rome and Paris after describing the behavior of Josepi Conti government as irresponsible and disgraceful. Denying entry to migrants' ship in June 2018 has triggered the criticism of Phillippe Grandi, High Commissioner for Refugees in Europe, who describes European policy for migration as shameful. Angela Merkel has called for unified European approach on migration for it became a decisive test for the unity of Schengen especially after Brexit and the emergence of dissent block in Bavaria, Austria and populist government in Italy.²⁴⁷

Family reunification has played an important part in the emergence of second and third generations of North African immigrants in Europe. Entries of wives, marriages and children of immigrants, especially in migration streams of the 1970s and the 1990s, have shifted the structure of both labour market and population in Europe. Second generation migrants represent a different migratory trend. They are more qualified than previous generations and their educational achievement is higher than their parents. However, the employment characteristics of this category are affected by culture and race. On the legal level, second generation is relative differential factor. Some statistics covers only those children whose parents are foreigners, while others include these people born in the host country with at least one immigrant parent. In 2005 in France, Algeria was the largest second generation community with 13.7%, followed by Moroccans as the second community with 12.5% and Tunisia came as third community, as result, North African second generation constituted a total of 1.5 Million children in comparison to 1.7 million immigrants from member state of the European Union.²⁴⁸

North African migrant children constitute 38% of all children of immigrants in Europe.²⁴⁹ The stock of second generation Moroccans in the Netherlands is estimated 147,421 migrants

²⁴⁶Madeline Garlick and Joane Van Solar, "From Commitment to Practice: The EU Response," *North Africa and Displacement 2011-2012*, eds. Marion Couldrey et al, 39 (June 2012), p. 201.

²⁴⁷Aljazeera Channel, Newline 13 June, 2018.

²⁴⁸Thomas Kirsbaum, Yael Brinbaum and Patrick Simon, With Gezer "The Children of Immigration France: The Emergence of a Second Generation," *Innocenti Working Paper*, 13 (2009), Florence, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, retrieved on 16/05/2015 from, IRC website <<http://www.unicef.org/irc>>

²⁴⁹Ibid.

among which 131.497 with both parents born in Morocco and 15.924 with one parents born in Morocco²⁵⁰. At the end of the first decade the new millinium, from 2008 onward, migration patterns of North Africans were characterized by diversification of distination (North Africa) and those destined to Europe were framed within family reunification education migration and braindrain. The flow of North Africans was dominated noticeably by destination like Spain, France, Italy and Germany. In 2009, Moroccans constituted the dominant flow to Spain (62.000) followed by Algerians and Tunisians, Italy was the second favourite destination for Moroccan community in Europe by 33.000 people, followed by 8.000 of Egyptians on the contrary for France (2008),which was the favorite destination of Algerians with 28.500 people followed by Moroccans with 24.000²⁵¹. According to Eurostat, the available stocks of North Africans reached a total of 20.8 million. The stocks are remarkably dominated by Moroccans, followed by Algerians and Tunisians.

Table : Stock of North African nationals in some European countries, 2010.

Nationality	Spain	Italy	France (2005)	Germany	Greece (2006)
Algeria	57.667	25.449	477.500	13.199	-
Egypt	3.086	82.064	-	12.278	9.500
Libya	374	1.460	-	4.332	-
Morocco	740.819	431.529	461.500	63.570	550
Tunisia	1.946	103.678	146.500	22.956	-

Source : Eurostat, OECD German federal Statistical office, 2011.

At The beginning of colonial migration and during the glorious thirties, migrants were typically, male, single and uneducated. Early profiles of North Africa to Europe were characterized by lower level of qualification, lack of language and skill profeciency and determined by destination countries:

The earliest flows (Algerians in France, Moroccans in the Netherlands) account for the highest proportion of migrants with the lowest levels left their country of origin at a time when education was not as developed as it has become since... Morocco will have very different edcational profiles according to whether they are bound for Spain or USA. In

²⁵⁰Ibid.

²⁵¹Eurostat, OECD, German Statistical Federal Office, 2011.

the former case they will tend to have only an immediate, or lower secondary level of education, while the majority of those leading for the USA will have a University degree.²⁵²

Irregular migration and economic crisis have made a shift in the characteristic of immigrant flow from North Africa. There is a growing number of immigrants whose profiles are different from early population. The latest waves included a number of Moroccans, Tunisians, Egyptians and Algerians with a well-educated and professionals belonging to public sector and increasing numbers of women. Most Moroccans are between 20 and 30 years old. They belong to poor middle class families and they are Victims of unemployment and lack of opportunities²⁵³ Algerians and Egyptians also suffer from poverty and lack of opportunities. They are mostly males with secondary technical certificate and sometimes with university degree levels, migrating to send money back home to their families.²⁵⁴ After "Jasmine revolution", mass exodus toward Europe was characterized by poorly educated youth and desperate graduates, who are driven by ravergeous feeling of frustration and resentment at the political system back home, representing a generation of displaced human capital coming from the impovereshed south, populous, jobless and depressed.

According to UNHCR (2005), 120.000 irregular migrants attempted to cross the Mediteranean, including 35.000 of subsaharan origin and 45.000 and only a part of total EU migrants 2.6 millions from North Africa despite the fact that much of data is not available because of the Irregular nature of the phenomenon.²⁵⁵ World migration report 2012 has published new figures of illegal migration to Italy and other European countries. About 55.000 illegal immigrants, with 3.700 unaccompanied children arrived in Lampedusa in the first seven months of 2012. 12.000 Tunisians arrived before April 2012 were given a temperary visa because of bilateral agreement between Tunisia and Italy.²⁵⁶

Illegal immigrants make up 0.68% of the total population in France and 1.4% in Britain.²⁵⁷ 600.000 people are residing transitionally and illegally in Libya, waiting for an

²⁵²Phillpe Fargues, "International Migration in the Arab World," p. 11.

²⁵³Hassan Boubakri Cited in Poala Monzini, op. cit.

²⁵⁴Ayman Zohri, Cited in Poala Monzini, op. cit.

²⁵⁵H.de Haas, *Illegal Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union*, IOM migration series, retrieved on 07-05_2015 from, <http://www.iom.int>

²⁵⁶"World report 2012 Eurpoean Union-Human Right Watch World," retrieved on 15 July 2017, from %20 report %20 2012 %20 Eurpean %20 Union %20 Human %20 Right %20 Watch. Htm, p. 4.

²⁵⁷Eurostat, (2013) "Third Country Nationals in Europe," Annual data retrieved on 20 June 2016, from 2013. <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nuil>

opportunity to cross the Mediterranean to Italy.²⁵⁸ UNODC gave an other statistic in 2006, which showed that around 200.000 people migrate illegally to Europe each year most of them are smuggled and about 1000.000 didn't reach Europe either intercepted, lost or drowned at sea. Between 65.000 and 120.000 subsaharans enter the Maghreb annually. In, 2011, about 344.165 illegal immigrants and asylum seekers were intercepted and stopped from crossing the Mediterranean via land and sea routes. In, 2012, the pressure on Spain multiplied as the Spanish maritime guard and Eurogrec patrol system registered a number of 63% of total rejection.²⁵⁹

Historically, the post war era, the majority of immigrants in the European Union came from North Africa as result of decolonization process and postwar economic growth, which demanded a great amount of workers from ex-colonies. However, the 1973 oil crisis has introduced a break in migration pressures and trends by curtailing the stocks of immigrants, maintaining family reunification as the dominant stream²⁶⁰. By the 1990s, another change breached migration patterns from North Africa to southern Europe because of the new restriction of visa requirement adopted by Italy and Spain against Maghrebi immigrants.²⁶¹

Yet, association of migration with terrorism brought up the securitization of migration and mobility of immigrants in international market which was initiated with the Single European Act (SEA) which decided to open borders between member states for people and goods, while it insisted on strengthening external borders. Matters of security and provisions of Justice and freedom were formalized in the third Pillar on justice (1992) and the treaty of Amsterdam (1997)²⁶² which pointed to the fact that opening internal borders will allow both law abiding citizens and people with ties to terrorist and criminal organization.²⁶³

The security continuum between crime, terrorism, money laundering and border crimes has led to the establishment of security professionals and clubs to control migration, collect information and identify potential danger to European society and challenges to public order. These agencies and clubs were born in the bureaux of customs and police. After that, they have developed to semi-independent organization that facilitates ties with professional knowledge about the mobility of people, immigrants, and the circulation of information about sensitive issues. Security clubs like Bern Club and the police working Group on terrorism constitute²⁶⁴:

²⁵⁸“Migrants Crossing the Mediterranean –Key numbers- News” retrieved on” July 2017, from The guardian.htm, page. 1.

²⁵⁹Eurostat 2013, op. cit. p. 9

²⁶⁰Hein de Haas, op. cit.

²⁶¹United Nation on Drugs and crime (2006) “Organized Crime and Irregular migration from Africa to Europe” retrieved 1-8- 2016, from www.undc.org/pdf/research/migration-Africa.pdf

²⁶²Jef Huysmans, “the European Union and the Securitization of Migrations,” pp. 754-755.

²⁶³B. Bigo, “the European internal security Field,” cited in Jef Huysmans, op. cit, p. 760.

²⁶⁴Jef Huysmans, p. 761.

A bureaucratic network, the knowledge it produces, and the field of struggle and domination in which it exists, play a key role in the Europeanization of justice and home affairs and in the institutionalization of an internal security field.²⁶⁵

However, his connection of migration to a multiplicity of problems like illegality, criminality and terrorism is an excuse or an attempt to camouflage Europe's economic failure and its internal frustration in the age of recession. This exaggerated conflict and clashes with foreigners signals its democratic bankruptcy and Europe's inability to stick to the old principles of human right, equality and democracy. Immigration has become a geography of power and domination over public sentiments and resources. Between radical and liberal ideologies immigration is blamed for many problems, it became a password or what Faist called it "meta issue".²⁶⁶

B-European Sufficient Labour Markets, Entry Laws and Restriction on Residency.

Migration has played a substantial part in the shaping of Europe's social and economic history, from the glorious thirties to the 1990s visa requirement and to the current economic crisis. European countries have received generations of migrants from North Africa, who contributed to the prosperity of an aging continent which suffers a declining population growth and a sharp shortage of work force. Postwar Europe has become a paradise of labour both to legal and illegal immigrants not only because of the opportunities available, but because of other incentives related to the structure of demographic growth and decreasing labour participation by the native people. Migration flows to Europe from ex-colonies and third world countries before the 1990s have not been perceived as cultural threats to the integrity of European identity. In the glorious thirties, attention was drawn to the positive contribution of immigrant mobility and its valuable influence on the noticeable growth of economic efficiency, availability of cheap labour force and the creation of tolerant cultural heterogeneity. As a result, immigrants in early stages of immigration flow to Europe were seen as beneficial to filling in gaps in the job market, a source of cheap labour, extra source of tax revenue and balance to demographic cut down.²⁶⁷

However, migration was extensively influenced by political and economic events such as the 1973 oil crisis, the Gulf War and terrorism worldwide. When the issue is addressed by

²⁶⁵B. Bigo, p. 761.

²⁶⁶Ibid., p. 762.

²⁶⁷Hain de Haas(2008), "the Myth of Invasion: the Inconvenient Realities of African Migration to Europe," retrieved on 2 May 2016, from, afrique-europe-interact.net/files/de_haas_2008_myth_of_migration_artikel._pdf

politicians and public opinion, it is associated with crimes, unemployment and public policies. At the beginning, labour migration policies favoured immigrants as contract workers to fill in the shortages of European labour in the economic growth. Migration became a substantial player in the economic growth. The migration equation changed drastically as the contract immigrant and guestworker gained permanent settlement in Europe.²⁶⁸

Besides, the Bulk of immigrants had considerably increased after family reunification of post 1973 and regularization campaigns of the 1990s. The 1990 also witnessed a spectacular public perception on the part of destination countries on the importance of raising migrants to the status of being an illegal part of human resources in Europe by improving legal status of illegal immigrants through legalization and documentation campaigns, granting long-term permits²⁶⁹. However, dramatic events associated with phenomena of terrorism, trafficking and security / identity related issues have turned migration to a sort of challenge facing Europe, particularly and increasing controversies about European identities, uncertain environment created impartial media and public confusion about the genuine loyalty of minorities to represent an authentic citizenship. Within a sensitive and everchanging contexts of migration policies, migrations management has been fluctuating, for many years, between different positive and negative responses, presenting a mosaic of procedures, laws and policies. The European experience of migration has encompassed a variety of strategies and reform policies, ranging from border control, visa restriction and selective integration patterns to regularization campaigns and repatriation measures.

Policies were in favour of migration between 1950s and 1970s primarily as a result of pressure of labour shortage and demand of cheap work force after war period especially in France, UK and Germany which offered a flexible access to their countries. After WWII, European countries embarked in industrial decolonization and incorporation of ex-colons to the economic system of Europe. Economic expansion and reconstruction of Western Europe necessitated the recruitment of low paid and unskilled force works from North Africa²⁷⁰.

The period has seen the creation of agencies which recruit labourer in the country of origin although policies were very biased and exploitable. Some Maghrebi countries, like Tunisia and Morocco, signed formal agreements on the recruitment of guest worker with European countries.²⁷¹ In France, the creation of the National Office of immigration (1945) (NOI)

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Hain de Haas, "Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union,"

²⁷⁰ Jef Huysmans, "the European Union and the Securitization of Migration," pp. 753-754.

²⁷¹ C.V Marie cited in Jef Huysmans, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration," p. 754.

categorized 3 types of residence permits for colons and harrkis who became the first asylum-seeker from Algeria when the National Liberation Front came to resistance in Algeria and after the Evian accords between France and the Algerian National Front in 1962.²⁷² The rebuilding of Europe after WWII continued in active immigration policies by the creation of European coal and steel community to unify migration policy and economic cooperation among founding members, encouraging guest worker migration to sector like industry, mining and agriculture.

The 1970s marked a turning point in the history of migration because it was the beginning of restrictive immigration policies due to the instabilities in labour market and contracted / guest immigrant turned into permanent settlers fears of social and economic destabilization. The council regulation of 1968 resolution insisted on privileging free movement of nationals in internal markets over non-nationals and the establishment of common legislation for migrants at the summit of Paris 1993.²⁷³ The oil crisis of 1973 has changed the character and face of North African migration to Europe with new restrictive measures on the flow of immigrant. Recession because of oil embargo marked the end of recruitment phase since stagnation engendered a rise in structural unemployment and, hence, lower demands for unskilled foreign labour. This phase of migration was characterized by quota system, reunification immigration asylum seeking and North Africans changed of their migration trends to Libya and the Gulf region²⁷⁴.

In the 1980s, immigration was politically associated with asylum seeking, which was considered as a cover for economic migration (The Austrian work programme adopted Eurodoc finger print system, database to detect connection between asylum seekers and illegal migrants). The 1980s launched the beginning of Europeanization²⁷⁵ of migration policies via coordination, transnationalization, cooperation and intergovernmental networks (the Trevi, the Schengen group) the incorporation of migration to the Bureaucratic and institutional structure clearly concretized via the Single European Act (1986) and later on the 1990s treaty on European Union on the Third Pillar on Justice and Home affairs through its intergovernmental regulations were unsatisfactory. It was reformed in the Treaty of Amsterdam on Asylum and illegal immigrant.²⁷⁶ The Dublin convention introduced restrictions on migration flows and complicated procedures for asylum application reducing chances for being accepted as it was restricted by family links and place of application.

²⁷²Klaus J. Bade, "Migration and Migration Policies in the Cold War," retrieved on 03-08-2015 from , Bade-Migration-and-Migration Policies in the Cold War.pdf

²⁷³Jef Huysmans, op. cit, p. 754-755.

²⁷⁴Hassane Kassar et al.eds (2014), "Emigration Flow from North Africa to Europe," retrieved on 17 September 2016, from <https://doi.org/10-1093/eurpub/cku105>

²⁷⁵Ibid., p. 755.

²⁷⁶Ibid., p. 759.

The 1990s has also marked a noticable transformation in migration patterns and migrations policies, which relatively retained some of its previous policies and introduced new ones. North African diaspora witnessed diversification of destination and acceleration due to the process of family reunification intercultural marriages, regularization compaigns and brain drain migration. Italy (1990) and Spain (1991) introduced Visa requirement which led to the emergence of illegal migration.

The increase of migrants, illegal migrants and asylm seekers flow were connected to the composition of social identity and stability by the 1990 convention on the Schengen group, which considered immigration as a threat to the welfare state and challenge to political stability as it was associated with transnational crime and terrorism.²⁷⁷ The rise of this discourses about the protection of cultural and social identity significantly affected migration policies and hardened accessibilities of migrant to European market and identity "Massive immigration has just begun. It's the beggist problem facing France, Europe and probably the world. We risk being submerged".²⁷⁸

The council and commission action plan after the treaty of Amsterdam (1997) stimulated worries and fears about free movement, the danger of terrorism, international crime and migration:

The issue was no longer, on the one hand, terrorism drugs, crime and, on the other hand, rights of asylm and clandestine immigration, but they came to be treated together in the attempt to gain an overall view of interrelation between the problems and the free movements of persons within Europe.²⁷⁹

The Tampere European Meeting (October, 1999) strengenthend professional institution cooperation (police, custom) among European states with the creation of clubs like Bern club and Trevi specialized in collecting and sharing security knowledge on terrorism, drugs, crime and immigration as fundamental challenges to public and social order.²⁸⁰ European nationalist policies are ambivalent in the sense that they erect exclusive and protective migration policies and at the same time calling for fighting xenophobic feelings and multi-culturalism.²⁸¹ Faist stated that migration policies are biased since access to welfare and social services prevelegs and

²⁷⁷B. Bigo (1996 b) cited in Huysmans, op. cit, p. 759.

²⁷⁸BBC.Profile: Jean-Marie le Pen .23 April retrieved 05-06-2014, from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/1943193.stm>.

²⁷⁹B. Bigo (1994), "The European Internal Security Field: Stakes and Rivabies in a newly developing Area of police intervention," in Anderson, M. and Den Boer M. (edsj). pp. 161-73, p. 164.

²⁸⁰Jef Huysmans, ibid p. 761.

²⁸¹R. Leveau, cited in Huysmans, op. cit, p.766.

favour nationals over immigrants. Access of immigrants to social welfare represents both economic and cultural threat:

Recent political conflicts around social rights of immigrants... have tended to refer to the alleged threat immigrants pose not only as economic competitors in the labour market and for social policies as (they take Jobs and our benefits) but also as a threat to the cultural homogeneity of the national state.²⁸²

Naturalization throughout the European continent varies from one country to another. Access to citizenship is governed by different stages of immigration and the nature of migration laws which regulate the framework of entry and residence in each country. Discrepancies between destination countries is also attributed to factors like birth, descent and soil. Sweden, France and UK have somewhat flexible and uncomplicated citizenship law in comparison with Germany, Italy and Spain, countries with strict and complicated access to citizenship. There are two citizenship systems; if they apply the *jus soli* Model (soil), citizenship is granted automatically to all children who were born in the host country regardless of their race..., but if the country applies the *Jus sanguinis* system (blood) the law requires both birth and blood relation parent or grandparents.

Policies of amnesties and regularization were adopted by many European countries to solve the problem of illegal migrants. Italy has launched a series of regularization programmes in 1986, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2009 for a number of over 3 million migrants, most of them from North Africa and Eastern Europe. Spain conducted legalization programmes in 1985, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2005 for one million over 25 five years. A large number of immigrants regularized under “*Arrigo*” process for clear profile and family and work ties. Greece legalized in 1998, 2001, 2005 for 900.000 applicants.²⁸³

The Schengen Agreements, Home Affairs, the Dublin Convention and the Third Pillar on Justice made a shift in migration by adopting restrictive and flexible policies and addressing cultural and social implications of migration. The association of migration with threats to identity, economic welfare and labour market fluctuation led to the strengthening of control and security oriented approaches. The battle against migration has become a never ending process, taking many forms like border patrols, bilateral agreements and funding developmental projects. However, the supervision of exterior borders has become a priority in the agenda of European

²⁸²F. Faist (1995), “Boundaries of Welfare States: Immigration and Social Rights on the National and the Supranational Level,” In Miller, R. et al (eds) , p. 189.

²⁸³Kate Brick (2011), “Regularizations in the European Union: the Contentious Policy Tool,” retrieved on 10 September, 2016, from <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/pub/EURegularization-insight.pdf>

migration policies. The intensification of borders targetted undocumented migrants, who arrive at the Mediterranean in great numbers, using subtle ways and innovative techniques. Europe has put into work high-tech controlling system which is called "Integral system of Exterior Surveillance" (SIVE) which detects departures and movements of people and boats from long distances²⁸⁴. This system of extensive patrol started in 1998, with the Juan Cotino, police officer, "Plan Sur", aiming at more border fortification and heavy surveillance. This "Plan Sur" was extended to "Frontera Sur", by Guardia civil, detecting undocumented immigrants on spanish land, seaports, frontiers roads, using helicopter and motorized technology in 1999, the SIVE used to intensify more effectively border control with an integrated system of cameras and radars ability of 9 miles radar detection stations.²⁸⁵ The SIVE was adopted by EU to facilitate cooperation between member state, to control the phenomenon of illegal migration and control external borders and stop border crimes and suspect vehicules and vessels. After the Tragedy of Lampeduza, home affairs mobilized the "Frontex operation" from Spain to Cyprus, which was welcomed by the European (80%)²⁸⁶ to work out an effecient plan to save lives and reduce death tolls of asylm and illegal migrants.

This security-oriented approach to illegal migration has succeeded in reducing the number of crossings, but it did not stop the flow of immigrants and the control border system was severely attacked by Catholic associations and human rights organization for the high budget devoted to the construction ot the project and the racist intention of the walls and fences.²⁸⁷ The money could have been invested in employing immigrants in developmental project in departure countries. In 1991, the Buddabest process and the international centre for migration policy (ICMPD) formed a consultative forum of about 40 European and non-European members to fighting illegal migration and regulation plans. Amesterdam Treaty forced in 1997 migration policies has become top priorities of European policies, which signed agreements with sending nations about common border control actions. In the summit of Sevilla (Feb, 2002) the Spanish goverment presented a kind of "Global Action Plan" against undocumented migration, even sanctions against countries that refuse to cooperate, which was refused. The summit of

²⁸⁴ Hain de Haas, " the Myth of Invasion,"

²⁸⁵ Franck Duvall and Bastian Vallner (2011), " European Security Challenges," retrieved on 20 August, 2017, from <http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/publications/EU-US> Immigration Systems2011_10.pdf

²⁸⁶ Memo 131864 of the Euro commision, October 2013.

²⁸⁷ Ali al-Hawat, "al-Hijra ghayr Sharaiya ila Europa abra Buldan al-Maghrib al-Arabi: Asbabuha wa Nataejuha wa baad Lhulul," *Dirasaat* , 28(2007) ed .Nadia Benyousef, p. 11.

Thessaloniki (2003) proposals were oriented toward extra funding for border control and the establishment of common visa-database.²⁸⁸

Disembarkation is another problem facing European policies against illegal immigrant. Frontex operations were challenged by the disembarkation of rescued and intercepted immigrants or immigrants in crisis situation, especially the search and rescue convention (1979) obliges states to receive, remedy and give help to immigrants. However, no state takes responsibility to receive immigrants. The best example is the *Acquarius* crisis, the migrants ship that spent 10 days in the Mediterranean in June 2018 after Italy and Malta denied disembarkation. Although the Schengen Border Code suggested disembarking intercepted immigration high seas in the place from where they sailed, the proposed was cancelled by the court of Justice. European Union proposal of disembarking in the nearest and safest place in Europe was also opposed by Spain, Italy and Greece, which is not the case with *Acquarius* for Spain which offered entry to ship in crisis. Both the Dublin system and the treaty of Lisbon suggest a framework of immigration and asylum seeking and put emphasis on sharing responsibility among European States, by setting up a fair share of allocation and asylum seekers distribution.²⁸⁹

From developmental perspective, European states tried many policies. In the European Migration Summit in Tripoli (2006) participants planned to fuel job creation sector (40 Millions Euros), stimulate trade and sustainable African Market.²⁹⁰ However, the World Bank and NGOs have criticized EU for just worsening African economic situation in North African markets by favoring the economic benefits of the member states over the real promotion of North African trying to deny them the privilege to full remittances benefit in kind of euphoria or “development mantra”.²⁹¹ In addition to visa requirement, border checks and frontier fortification, European Union tried to control migration pressure by advocating long term policies through employment creation and economic assistance to origin countries. The 1995 Euro Mediterranean agreement with Tunisia and Morocco was on developing a free trade area, encouraging Job creation, reintegration of immigrants, repatriation and reduction. However, cooperation agreement between Europe and the Maghreb were advantageous to European countries. Sustainability of

²⁸⁸Sergio Carrera et al, eds., (2015), “EU External Migration Policies : Preliminary Mapping of the Instruments, the Actions and their Priorities ,” retrieved on 5 March, 2017, from TASK3.1REPORT_UM_CEPS_final_v4.pdf

²⁸⁹European Parliament, (2009) *The Evaluation of Dublin System and Dublin III proposal*, retrieved on 18/06/2015, from [http://www.eurocapital.eu/regdata/etude/nite/join/200991410690/IPOL-LIBN\(2009\)410690](http://www.eurocapital.eu/regdata/etude/nite/join/200991410690/IPOL-LIBN(2009)410690)

²⁹⁰BBC – news Africa: “Eu Unveils New migrations plans” Nov 30th, 2006.

²⁹¹Hein de Haas, (2005) “International Migration, Remittances and Development, Myths and facts,” *third world quarterly*, *Global Migration Perspectives* (April 2005) retrieved 04-06-2015 from, <http://www.gcim.org>.

development means protection to Europe. The free trade zone was characterized by concessions in the case of agricultural products, textiles and fisheries. All agreements are underlined by a relation of power/ top down preferential and cautious to the demands of North African countries, in game of stick and the carrot system.²⁹²

At the global level, the G8 summit in 2002 has introduced “Africa Action Plan”, which worked the framework of the African-led initiative NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development). It set up a work plan on major development issues, including promotion of security and peace, improvement of education, technology, health care and governance. The G8 summit (2011) in France (Deauville), importance was given to developmental solutions and technical aid to North African countries. The “Deauville Partnership”²⁹³ was launched by a loan of about 20 Billions Dollars for both Tunisia and Egypt (2011-2013) covered by multilateral banks if the countries facilitate social and democratic transition. The European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 focused on economic prospects, political stability and security issues in North Africa.²⁹⁴ The “Salmon Bias Effect” policy (return migration) was based on returning or repatriating selectively less healthy migrants and “cultural Buffering” which regard immigrants from less modern societies tend to have healthier life styles regarding risk factors such as cigarette smoking, obesity, alcohol consumption. “Healthy Immigrant Effect”(selective migration) used by some European countries as selection prior to immigration, adopting health screening and health tests. Thus, immigrants are better be: more educated, less risk exposed, more entrepreneurial and better be prepared to confront stressful situations.²⁹⁵

Intellectually and educationally, this refined and filtered version of immigration targets highly qualified and talented foreign born immigrants. New migration policies headed to give priority to foreign experts, artists, athletes, engineers and entrepreneurs over unskilled migrants. Policies encourage students and researchers by residence and work permits to facilitate their access to labour markets and host societies. France, UK, Germany and Sweden provide student migrants with contracts for more than a year as transitional step to labour market. Academic credentials of immigrants estimated as beneficial national economies and of quality value to economic growth. Brain drain or elite migration to Europe was strengthened by the 2011 European Union Blue card. The Blue card facilitates mobility of immigrant between

²⁹² Hain de Haas, “the Myth of Invasion,”

²⁹³ G. 8 Summit (France, May 28, 2011.

<http://www.g20.wom/g8-g20/g8/english/live/news/news.708.html>

²⁹⁴ ENP, May 03, 2011, <http://ex-europa-eu/world/emp/index.en-htm>

²⁹⁵ Alexander Domnich et al, eds.(2012), “the ‘Healthy’ Immigrant Effect: Does it Exist in Europe Today?” retrieved on 9 June, 2016, from *Italian Journal of Public Health*, 9/3 7532-9706-2-PB.pdf

countries of the Schengen zone, offers permanent residence and flexible family reunification the European states²⁹⁶.

European immigration policies were addressed by the application of prevailing security and prevention measures, which prioritize the halt of reduction of migration flows over adopting effective economic perspectives. The supervision of migration entries embraces the principal demands of stepping up border controls and security. The "Joint Migrations and Development Conference" of Rabat (July, 2006) and the Tripoli Summit have insisted on the cooperation between the European Union and North African countries to contain in terms of control and protection measures member of the Summits suggest legal ways of promoting employment in transit countries and long circular migration as the vice president of the Tripoli Summit suggested quota system of migration according to the demands of Europe.²⁹⁷ Other proposals were also criticized fiercely by human rights and many European states like the setting up of reception centres or concentration camps for irregular immigrants and refugees in transit countries²⁹⁸. Despite opposition, two camps were established in Libya with the assistance of Italy and the other one in Nwadhibou with assistance of Spain 2006. In addition to being predominated by migration control and protective strategies (control patrol, Frontex, detection technology a readmission), European migration agendas neglect fundamental problem of Africa and the lack of balance in the economic, historical and cultural relation between the two. Most policies don't take migration as social and economic actor, contributing in the exchange of expertise, evolution of human contact and economic phenomenon whose benefits proportionally exceeds its costs. Most South-North cooperation are prevailed by a charity or philanthropic tendency of European states to silence or bribe transit countries and poor countries in Africa to participate in controlling the movement of their citizens as well as win-win paradigm is a myth. What is worst, emergent democracies and economies with promising experience are fought and destroyed by powerful western countries as the example of Yemen, Jordan, Iraq²⁹⁹. Departure countries could be assisted in term of big developmental projects like the creation of agropoles, aliopolis (free export zone), webhelp and offshoring (management of services) and cite de l'innovation in order to ensure favourable climate for nationals and build strong basis of human capital.

²⁹⁶Martin Kahanec and Klaus Zimmermann (2010), "Highly-Skilled immigration Policy in Europe," retrieved on 20 August 2016, from <ftp.iza.org/dp5399.pdf>

²⁹⁷Dirk Konert(2007), "African Migration to Europe: Obscured Responsibilities and Common Misconceptions," retrieved on 18 May, 2016, from <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/47120/wp49>

²⁹⁸Hain de Haas, "the Myth of Invasion,"

²⁹⁹El Mehdi al Manjra, "Hiwar a-Thaqafat," *Silsilat Shiraa*, 1(1996), p. 77.

2-The European Shifting Policies and Immigrants Influx from Haarkis to Haraga

A-Integration of Immigrants and the Growing Public Consciousness: Integration, Assimilation or Containment?

In social sciences, the concept of integration refers to the homogeneity of social components and the cohesion of social groups as their relationship is based on a shared set of values and practices. Socially, integration involves mechanisms of frequency, intensity³⁰⁰ and identification processes in contact between groups and individuals. These characteristics involve feeling of proximity, belonging and familiarity as well as it exhibits a complex outcomes. For example, many people spent more hours at work than the time is spent with at home; yet, ties with family members are stronger.³⁰¹ For identification, immigrants spend most of their life in host countries, but they identify strongly with their home country. Thus, integration necessitates identification; that is, if contact between two groups is intense and frequent, identification and understanding would be very easy; if identification is lower, integration and cohesion will fail³⁰².

In the context of immigration, integration has taken a variety of meanings and interpretations. With the increasing flow of immigrants to the countries of European Union, integration has become dominant issue in political and cultural debates, particularly when second generation immigrants made an end to their parent (first generation) dream of return and stayed permanently in Europe³⁰³. Full integration or assimilation to the dominant culture is conditioned by different reasons such as integration differences between the first and the second generations and because of the big disparities between immigrant minority cultures and mainstream cultures.

Early approaches to integration, presented a somewhat opposing definitions. Structural approach (Gordon 1964) rested on immigrant participation in the larger society and its institution as education, labour market and health care system. Structural approach to integration focuses on incorporation of immigrants to the cultural system of mainstream societies, identifying with values of the host community³⁰⁴. Acculturation is another concept linked to the sphere of integration. While it is used interchangeably with integration and assimilation, the term signifies a

³⁰⁰Han Entzinger and Renske Biezeveld(2006), *Benchmarking in Immigration: Report for the European Commission*,” retrieved on 7 October 2016, from <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents>

³⁰¹Ibid.

³⁰²Ibid.

³⁰³Mona Fayad, “al-Islam al-Muhajir fi Dawla Lqawmiya - a-Namodaj al-Faransi,” *Minbar al-Hiwar*, 7 :25 (1992), p.46.

³⁰⁴Han Entzenger and Renske Biezeveld, “*Benchmarking in Migration*,”

process of negotiating immigrant identities in the context of foreign culture by partially identifying with elements of main culture and, the sametime, preserving origin culture. While European government favours a complete / full integration of immigrants, most immigrants prefer partial integration and keeping ties with home's culture and religion; which is complicated and risky process especially for second and third generations who inherited cultural conflicts and contradictions their parents failed to resolve.³⁰⁵

Despite the fact most European countries show willingness and agreement on principles of integration policies, implementation of directives is hampered by the nature of political systems (national/ republican) and variations on interpretations and instruments. Besides, integrations tendencies are not taken seriously; they may exhibit conflict with existing laws and protocols. Generally speaking, although integration implies a political Euophism for a full assimilation and fusion of minority cultures to mainstream cultures by most political systems in Europe, most literature about integration revolve around three models or subvisions of fields where the term could be applied³⁰⁶.

Socio-economic integration: this dimension of integration arised from the context that guest worker and temporary immigrants from North Africa Spain, Italy, Greece and France became permanent residents and the economic needs arisen from. Economically, the success of integration is measured by effective participation in the Job market, comparing immigrant's type of jobs, income level and educational level of workers to those of the natives. It is also evaluated through welfare and social benefits of immigrants by seeing wether it is closer to the overall level opf population in the host countries. Low level of unemployment is sign of successful integration. Education and housing are other indications of socio-economic integration³⁰⁷. In France, educational achievement of immigrant children is most of time below nationals children because of segregation and housing patterns which clusters immigrant at the surburbs and ghettos of big cities. This is also due to "white flight"³⁰⁸, a situation where French nationals send their children to other schools which do not have a lot of immigrant children. Poor housing is sign of exlusion. Cultural integration assures the cultural integration of immigrants to the value system of the host European culture. This is the most complex dimension of integration because it involves relegion and other srong cultural rituals like rules of marriage, burrials, sacred

³⁰⁵Mohamed al-Ghashi, "al-Islam wa Lgharb: mina al-Hijra ila Wahm al-Indimaj," *Majalat Siyasat al-Hijra*, ed. Mostapha Hanafi,1 (2016) ,p. 156.

³⁰⁶Christophe Bertossi (2011), "Models of Integration in Europe: Comparative and Critical Analysis," retrieved on 13 May 2017, from <http://sagepub.com/content/early/2011/02/23/0002764211409560>

³⁰⁷Ibid.

³⁰⁸Han Entzenger and Renske Biezeveld, "Benchmarking in Migration ,"

elements and gender relations. Integration in this context is the most challenging for European governments since it puts them face to face with rhetoric of plurality and diversity. Integration is measured with the extent to which host countries respect the religious values and the cultural specificities of minorities, Particularly North Africans. In this respect, Britain and Sweden³⁰⁹ have tendencies to multicultural approach to minorities, endorsing the plural character of society and protecting immigrant to achieve harmony. France, in contrast, relies on an assimilationist³¹⁰ model of integration which stresses the full incorporation of immigrants to the French society, viewing them as individuals not as minorities. Maghrebi immigrants in France find it very difficult to adapt to the French public and private spheres. It is partially related to lack of respect and tolerance to religion and partially due to the “Laïcité” principle of the republican state that separates religions from state³¹¹. Many North African immigrants and Muslims across Europe are not allowed to practice their cultural rituals, religious traits and eating habits like polygamy, circumcision, slaughter of sheep at Aid Kbir because such practices do not respect national institutions and liberties.

Legal and political dimension of integration focuses on integrating immigrants in the legal and the political system by having access to “civic citizenship” rights and core rights included in the 2000 Communication on a Community Immigration Policy.³¹² The right of citizenship is acquired through residence by fulfilling the time needed or through naturalization or reunification process. Granting citizenship to immigrants was characterized by two approaches, which were subject to factors of place and time: “Jus sanguinis” and “Jus Soli”. Using “Jus Sanguinis” approach, governments grant the rights of citizenship based on descent and blood ties, while “Jus Soli” system is based on birth on the soil of the host country. Because of strong national feeling, Germany has adopted Jus Sanguinis mode of citizenship till 2000, but after that children born to foreign parents were granted dual citizenship until the age of 23³¹³. Naturalization and citizenship acquisition are the most difficult in Europe. In France, because of long history of immigration and colonization, children of immigrant automatically obtain citizenship if they are born on French soil (this law was resisted by Algerians, in 1990s, who saw it as new colonialism). French citizenship system has oscillated for long time between the “Soli”

³⁰⁹Ibid., p. 14.

³¹⁰Hollifield cited in “*Benchmarking Immigration*,”

³¹¹Christophere Bertossi, “Nationals Models of Integration in Europe,”

³¹²Guideline Employment Policy, European Commission, Communication on a Community Immigration policy, COM (2000), 757 final, Brussels (November, 2000), article 18.

³¹³Han Entzenger and Renske Biezeveld, “*Benchmarking in Migration*,”

and “singuinis” model depending on the economic and the cultural climate of the Republic and on the agendas of political parties (far right and liberal parties)³¹⁴.

In another context, Berry (1997) talks about acculturation strategies of immigrants and reactions toward different forms of integration in four distinct ways (1) integration as an identification with both original and new culture (2) Assimilation a showing complete merger to the host culture and weak ties with origin culture³¹⁵ (3) separatism as strong identification to original culture and weaker feeling toward the host culture and (4)³¹⁶ marginalization as weak connection to both cultures.

Multiculturalist model of intergration stresses two ways integration process in which immigrants and minorities co-exist and live side by side with nationals of European states. Immigrants keep their basic cultural traits, while participating in the culture of host country. Defenders of multiculturalist aspect of integration argue that it fosters tolerance among groups, protection of minority rights and their accessibility to economic and social institutions³¹⁷. However, radical right parties criticizes multicultural and integrationist policies because they lead to the break down of social concord and present threat to national identity and undermine community sense of cohesion –Giovani Sartori (2000) states that pluralism and diversity in the field of immigration involves "an excessive alterity". Integration, for him, should include only minorities that are integrable not unintegrable minorities like Muslims. He states that “in maintaining that the Muslim immigrant is, for us, the most “*distant*”, the most “*foreign*”, and thus “the most difficult to integrate”.³¹⁸ Some critics saw multiculturalism as an essentialist and categorizing ideology, stressing on the esthnicization of minorities and emphasis is put on melting to host culture. It is kind of “corporate” or “boutique” multiculturalism that “keeps diversity in a box”.³¹⁹

Assimilation theory is premised on the complete abandonnent of immigrant culture and the total incorporation of the immigrant’s behavioral and cultural patterns to the host culture through an intergenerational process of social and economic melting. While integration is process of inclusion of immigrants in the economic, political cultural and educational institution

³¹⁴Han Entzenger and Renske Biezeveld, “*Benchmarking in Migration*,”

³¹⁵John w. Berry, “Immigration, Acculturation and Adaptation,” *Applied psychology* 46: 1(1997) : 5-34. p. 9.

³¹⁶Giovani Sartori cited in S.Vertover and S.Wessendorf, *Migration and Cultural, Religious and Religious Diversity in Europe*. Centre on Mgration, Policy and Society.Working Paper 18 (2005) Oxford University, pp. 12-13.

³¹⁷Christophere Bertossi, “Nationals Models of Integration in Europe,”

³¹⁸Jasmin Alibhar –Brown, “After Multiculturalism,” Foreign Policy Centre (2000a). p. 42.

³¹⁹S.Vertover and S.Wessendorf, *Migration and Cultural and Religious Diversity in Europe*, pp. 12-13.

of the country, assimilation represents a one-sided model that favours the complete merger of immigrants and multicultural approach insists on intergration as plural process of two cultures co-existing and borrowing from each other³²⁰.

Regardless of its varied content (acculturalist, multiculturalist, assimilationist), integration remains a very debatable topic and controversial concept associated with a variety of discourses and interpretations. It is also associated with lack of consensus among governments, politicians and researchers for there is no single model with clear definition and can be founded on unified variable. In addition, intergration in the European context is torn between a mosaic of political systems and the colours of political parties³²¹. The Dutch governments has passed an immigration law that requires from immigrants to pass an integration test before migrating to the Netherlands with the exception of Turkish. In September 2001, the Netherlands introduced a stricter family reunification code with bunch of fines and sanctions (prison) for unauthorized (women have to stay with their husbands For 5 years before being able to ask for residency permit independently). French model of citizenship were influenced by economic and political orientation of the country. As republican state, most of time France was attracted to the “Jus sanguinis” sytem (by blood) in the beginning of the 19th century and it shifted to the “Jus Soli”(by place of birth) by the end of the same century. Between 1889 and 1940, it was characterized by less stringent policy to facilitate integration of immigrants who fought with France in the war to composate for its aging population and human losses in war.³²² After 1945, the French gouvernement fundamental principles of immigration policy granted “automatic assimilation”, which enabled North African third generation immigrants to become automatically French citizen if they have residence in France.³²³ Great Britain uses both soli and sanguinis system. With the post national forms of citizenship of non-citizens in Europe, the extention of civic rights has been subject to influence from liberal democracies and nationalist agendas as well as to Marshallian interpretation of citizenship, which focuses on political and economic rights and weberian explanation of citisenship as an institution of both inclusion and exlusion.³²⁴

However, European States are far from carving a unified policy of citizenship and non-citizen rights. Some countries give access to citizenship, but they have restrictive non-citizen

³²⁰Christophe Bertossi “Nationals Models of Integration in Europe,”

³²¹Ibid.

³²²Christopher Bertossi, (2007) "French and British Models of Intergration: Public philosophies and state institutions," ESRC Centre on migration, policy and society, working paper, 46 (2007) Oxford University, p. 16.

³²³Garzilla Bertocchi (2005), "Citizenship Laws and International Migration," Retrieved on 15 September, 2016, from Bertocchi 10052005pdf

³²⁴Christopher Bertossi, (2007), p. 13.

rights. While others give easy access to citizen status, but non citizen enjoy few rights, other citizenship laws are restrictive and the rights of non-citizens are limited.

The European Economic and Social Committee and Region on Immigration, and Employment (2003, 336) defined Integration as “two-way process based on reciprocity of rights and obligations of third country nationals and host societies that foresee the immigrant full participation”.³²⁵ In November 2004, the European Commission introduced the Common Basic Principles (CBP) as a reference frame work for applying integration on common ground to unify countries of European Union. The CBP project focused on encouraging equal rights to non European citizens and anti-immigration policies. In preamble 1 and 2, the common basic principle sees immigration as great contribution to the economic, social and political life of the European Union basic. It also focused on religious diversity and political participation.³²⁶

Human rights and NGOS have criticized the integration policies of CBP as vague, paradoxical and echoes assimilation cannnotation. It includes many ambivalent principles related to immigrant generations, excluding illegal immigrants. Besides, there is no budget or legal frame work for enforcing the implementation of the principles.³²⁷

Integration of North African and Muslim immigrants in Europe involves immigrants in process of identifying with the structures of the host society and the structures of the host culture, learning the language and having access to better education and other institutions. However, integration can happen at the socio-economic level and may fail at the cultural and the political level or vice versa. The structuralist approach attributes the failure of integration to structural factors like discrimination and globalization. Racism, violence and maltreatment of North African youth by police increased their number in Prison. In France, like most other European countries, laws do not recongize the existance of racism based on the fear that any recognition of difference will threat the cohesion of society.³²⁸ Institutional racism greatly hampers the integration of Muslims. In 2000 and 2006, 7 Turkish immigrants were killed in racist assault. The police treated their families as suspects and deny the racial motivation of the crimes. Integration can not be accomplished without the abolition of complicity with racism and refusal to recognize the presence of racism. Discrimination and segregation of North Africans in HLH

³²⁵“the European Economic Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Immigration, Integration and Employment,” (COM, 2003), 33 final, Annex 1, retrieved on 22 May, 2017 from http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/common-baasic-principles-0_enegov_communication_EU.pdf

³²⁶Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration, Policy Home Affair Council, the Hague (2004), retrieved on 26 May 2017, from http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/common-baasic-principles-0_enegov_communication_EU.pdf

³²⁷Ngolongala Appolinaire,(2011) is Immigration a Threat for France ? (l’immigration est-elle une menace pour la France ?) retrieved on 20-10-2015 from, <http://www.association-OZP.net>

³²⁸Karima Laachir (2006), “French Muslim Youth and the Banlieus of Rage,” 92 (2006), p. 65.

project and banlieues with poor design and poor management has become sign of marginalization, riots and symbol of exclusion³²⁹. Citièns residents suffer from inferior services and conditions in comparison to centre cities and neighbourhoods, these disparities breed discontent and resentment among North African second generation, who revolted so many times, particularly in Novembers 1981, 2005 riot known as the ‘festival of automobiles brulees’. The housing project in France targetted Harkis and later becomes a means to silence³³⁰ discontented youth who feel abandoned by inhospitable French society.

Muslim immigrants in Europe suffer from economic inequalities, financial hardship, unemployment and economic disparities. Most European companies avoid recruiting them. The majority of them are unskilled workers who are engaged in low paid Jobs,³³¹ finding difficulties in finding jobs and unequal pay for the same job “about 30% of men of Algerian origin between the ages of 25 and 39 are unemployed. Or there to five times more than the jobless rate for men that are of native French origin”.³³²

Discrimination at the educational level is one of the most dangerous obstacles to the integration of young generation immigrants in the institutional life. According to Brinbaum and Kiffier (2008), 37% of African children are concentrated in problem schools in France in comparison with nationals with other European nationalities (12% Portuguese). Segregation includes streaming and selection to high or low ability classes on the basis of ethnicity and religion.³³³

While it is easy for European immigrants and subsaharian African to fully integrate and adapt to the French and European cultures, Maghrebi immigrant and Muslim minorities find it very difficult to find a place in the European society because of their religion. Europe has become forcibly hyphanated Europe because of mixed marriages of foreign born citizens (Algerian-French), but they ignore the diversity of society and Islam has not been adopted yet as European religion beside chritianity and other religions. In France, The laicite principle of the secular state still plays an important role in the disintegration of Maghrebi Muslims and the

³²⁹ Han Entzenger and Renske Biezeveld, “*Benchmarking in Migration*,”

³³⁰ Tahar Benjelloun, *French Hospitality: Racism and North African Immigrants* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1999), p. 39.

³³¹ Affan Suljuq (1985) “Cultural Conflicts: North African Immigrants in France,” *International of Peace Studies* retrieved on 12-07-2015 from, <http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol22/seljuq.htm>.

³³² Andrew Boroweic, “Religious Symbol of Secular Conflict” *Washington Times*, January 11, 2004, p. 2.

³³³ T.Brinbaum and A. Kiffier, (2009) “les Sclolarité des Enfants d’ Immgrés de la Sixieme au Bacalaureat : Differentiation et Polarization,” retrieved on 05-06-2016 from, <http://www.cairn.info/revue.population.2009-3-page561-htm>

promotion of discriminatory discourse against them³³⁴. The hijab affaires in 1989, 2004 and the banning of Burqa in 2010 in France and other European countries made up under the excuse that headcover is a demonstration of religious identity and overt display of belief which is against the Republican principle of secularism. Although the 1905 law protects personal expression and religions freedom and other practices as Talaq, Hallal food, ritual slaughter, the question of hijab in public spaces is viewed as a negative sign³³⁵. These cultural events and legal framework of European institutions are paradoxically characterized by unwillingness on the part of governments and European populations to accept difference and recognize immigrants as part of European society. Integration policies are topdown, opportunistic and conditioned to the European labour market state and needs.

It is challenging enough to maintain Maghrebi identity for North African immigrants while integrating to the European secular state, torn between different options full assimilation, partial integration, hybrid identity or resistance. In the European context, the myth of integration targeting Maghrebi nationals represents a fake version of European migration politics flavored, most of time, with economic spices and racist overtones other times. Integration is not a free option for maghrebi immigrant, it is “a dialectical between internal and external ascription”³³⁶ fostered by forces of legal systems and public perception. Young generations are the most vulnerable immigrant categories to this duality of existence between two conflictual languages, cultures and nationalities. Some of them accept this middle position between Europe and the Maghreb, creating hybrid identity, a feeling of being both European and Maghrebi: "I feel as much Moroccan as French, I am 'French' in quotation. I am not 100 percent Moroccan. I am not 100 percent French. I think I am the best bits of both."³³⁷

This sense of hyphenated / hybrid identity doesn't mean that all Maghrebi young generation succeeded in absorbing difference and negotiating their identities. While some immigrants show high degree of integration either by embracing western principles or hiding their identities, some second and third generation immigrant refuse integration and show resistance to the ethics of European identity because they are unrecognized by host society and subjected by their European peers at school and street although they are European by birth. So, lack of recognition, institutional discrimination and the volatile European discourse on immigration forcibly drives young generation to resort to resistance and strengthening ties with ethnic and

³³⁴Tariq Ramadan, *les Musulmans dans la Laïcité*, p.97.

³³⁵Ibid., p.96.

³³⁶Ghazi Falah Walid et al., eds., *Geographies of Muslim Women: Gender, Religion and Space* (New York: Guilford Press, 2005), p. 63.

³³⁷Moroccan Interviewee in Turvey, Ibid, p. 12.

religious identity. Resistance to integration finds explanation also in sense of pride³³⁸ in immigrant identity. The conflictual status of maghrebi immigrants as muslim minority in Europe today is centrally attributed to different factors, ranging from negative public perception and biased immigration policies to misinterpretation of Muslim identity and its relations with other groups and lack of genuine political will to truly address issues of integration amidst many constraints in embracing the values and civil patterns of the European society.

Being subject to a public discourse, which is strongly influenced by xenophobia and exclusion, Maghrebi youth were driven to a supportive arena to look for alternative sources of identification (like extremism) despite the presence of other integration modes like football³³⁹. The negative attitudes of most European governments, the secular ideology of most states, lack of courage on the part of Europeans to accept non-white immigrant as citizens of their society and the fact that there is suspicious recognition or no recognition of Islam³⁴⁰ as domestic European religion like Christianity strengthens the belief that integration is acceptable myth and excuse for covering real European intention regardless of the visible integration policies and the different common agendas implemented over many Years.

For integration to take place, blame should not be put only on immigrant unwillingness to sacrifice certain social and cultural elements, but it is bound to political systems and the dominant population in Europe to accept difference in economic recession as in time of economic prosperity, protect minorities rights and stop claiming that immigrant groups (particularly Muslims) are unassimilable and incompatible. Parekh states that: “most contemporary societies are culturally diverse, but only some of them are multicultural or culturally plural”³⁴¹, meaning that plural societies are not societies which made up of a great number of minorities, rather, it is a sort of society that achieve multiculturalism in its laws, policies and institutions because there is a big “difference between multiculturalism as lived experience and multiculturalism as an enforced ideology”.³⁴² Therefore, it refers to integration as an “enforced ideology” and top down state mechanism which tends to bribe or silence minorities lead to more tensions and complexities in immigrant’s attitude towards the dominant culture.

What is focal to Maghrebi immigrants in Europe is the fact that they embrace multiple set of loyalties. They do not manifest as unified commonality and a single ethnicity/ identity.

³³⁸ Esteve Zaragiza, op. cit, p. 50.

³³⁹ Nouredine Affaya, *Communication de l'Adversité: identité, Démocratie, Création* (Rabat: Editions Az-zaman, 2015), p. 83.

³⁴⁰ Tariq Ramadan, *les Musulmans dans la Laïcité*, p. 98.

³⁴¹ Bhikhu Parekh (1999), “Political theory and the multicultural society,” *Radical philosophy Articles*, retrieved on 13 August, 2017, from Radical Philosophy LTD www.radicalphilosophy.com

³⁴² Khalid Mlik, Lecture at Institut Français, London, 16th Nov, 2002, p. 2.

Historically, Maghrebi immigrants share the experience of colonization and a history of resistance. Even before the emergence of contemporary diaspora, North African students in France were active in fighting colonization in the 1920s and 1930s by combatting its expansion and supporting resistant movement back home; this could not have been achieved without being organized in associations like the French Association of North African Students (AFENAP in 1931) and the association of North African Muslim Students (AEMNA in 1927)³⁴³. Geographically, they are nationals of the Arab/Amazigh Maghreb. Religiously, the strongest of all bonds among Maghrebi immigrants, is Islam, a belief that strongly unites them more than any other tie, particularly among youth generation who don't view themselves as Algerians, Moroccans... but as Muslims. Muslim immigrants "Defines themselves on the basis of points of reference that explain their sense of belonging to the same community of faith, and at the same time, more profoundly, root them in the universe of Islam".³⁴⁴

The European political and public agendas have to develop a flexible framework and tolerance in integrating and embracing Muslim responses because resistance or hesitation on the part of Maghrebi immigrants to successfully adjust to the norms of host societies represent a sort of defense mechanism or attitude to protect themselves in new and hostile contexts. After protection phase, Ramadan states the process of integration step by step as long as the host countries take that into consideration and accept the slow metamorphosis of group mobility:

Western Muslims (and immigrants), because they are undergoing the experience of becoming established in new society, have no choice, but to go back to the beginning and study their points of reference in order to delimitate and distinguish what, in religion, is unchangeable or *thabit*, from what is subject to change/ mutable or *Mutaghayir*.³⁴⁵

B-Anti-immigrant Attitudes: Nationalists and Defenders of Northern Identity

A great number of nationalist and anti-immigrant parties have emerged in the political scene of Europe by the mid 1980s. Those radical right wing parties have rapidly become a major player in electoral campaigns and decision making of major European states like France, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Italy and Greece. The strong influence of the radical right came as

³⁴³Elkebir Atouf, "le Role des Premiers Etudiants Marocains dans l'autonomisation Politique Nord-africaine," in *l'Emigration/l'Immigration Marocaine à l'Ere de la Mondialisation*, eds. Mohamed ait Hamza et al (Rabat : al Maarif el Jadida, 2013), p. 76-77.

³⁴⁴Tareq Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 9.

³⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 9.

result of disappointment from the democratic ruling elites and the disenchantment of masses with the established political systems. The very fragmented political discourse coupled with an unceasing economic difficulties and influx of migrants in labour market in Europe paved the way to the turbulent rise of populist parties with radical agenda, that does not believe in social and individual equality and defines its principles from xenophobic and racist rhetoric. Radical right parties rely substantially on people sentiments and marginalized groups frustration at the liberal democracies of institutional Europe and at external change brought by globalization, which creates winners (who adapt to change) and losers (jobless); marginalized group like uneducated youth and unskilled farmers are targeted by the ideology of the parties:

The losers of the modernization and individualization process, marginalized blue collar worker, young people with lower levels of education and the unemployed... are driven by diffuse fear of encirclement and invasion and by growing resentment... and disappointed by the left wing parties failure to address their plight and ambiguous positions on immigration, they vote for the radical populist right out of general frustration and resentment.³⁴⁶

Radical right parties significantly derive its support from using oppositional terminology that targets economic instabilities in globalized Europe and the resentment of disadvantaged. They presented an alternative ideology that feeds on hostile and racist discourse as gate to gain voters sympathy against liberal parties, by adopting ethnic nationalism and chauvinistic ideology against minorities. The radical right undermines the very basis of European Union "unity in diversity" and marks a shift from centrality to conservative extremism, a threat that Europe is attempting repeatedly to combat in its so-called war on world terrorism and extremism or world war four (G. W. O .T) or the Fourth Generation of Wars which the conservative Bush administration declared after 9/11 not only with its strategic , protective, symbolic and ideological contents³⁴⁷, but also based on supporting terrorism , creating multinational international terrorism, use of social media and destructive psychological warfare³⁴⁸ against countries that the west and America want to eradicate.

Beside the Republican in Germany and the Nationalist front in France, the Golden Dawn is the most radical extremist party in Europe for its overt hostile discourse and Nazi symbolism, which received a substantial amount of support within broken Greek society stricken

³⁴⁶Hans-George Betz, "The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right Wings in Western Europe," *Comparative Politics*, 25:4 (1993), p. 423.

³⁴⁷Mahmoud Haidar, *Lahut al-Ralaba: a-Taesis al-Dinni Lilfalsafa al-Siyasiya al-Amrikiya* (Bayrut: Dar al Farabi, 2009), p.194.

³⁴⁸Amer abd Zayd al-Wael, "al-Media bayna a-Tassnia wa Tassnim," *Majalat al-Istighrab*, 11(2018), p. 238.

by economic crisis. After the demise of old radicalism (fascism) in 1945 and the victory of liberal democracy, more tolerant political system was developed across Europe, inaugurating a phase of economic growth, lower unemployment and prosperity, but the 1980s marked a decline in liberal democracies and witnessed the rise of new radical with new agendas of skeptical economic discourse and xenophobia.³⁴⁹ In the *Populist Radical right : A Pathological Normalcy* (2010), Mudde adopts a normal pathology thesis which states that people who support radical right parties are the losers-not the winners- of globalization who were unable to adapt to change, resorting to extremist parties to express their frustration.³⁵⁰ Others attributed the rise of radical right to the necessity of finding solution to the demands of post-industrial society. As result, the functioning of radical nationalist discourse derives its legitimacy from the causes it defends. It markets itself as the authentic voice of the people, the voice of the neglected, the little man, proletarian and anti-liberal. It is against Europeanization and Maastricht treaty because it destroys national boundaries:

Europe has a dissonant voice, anti-Muslim, anti-elite, anti-globalization and increasingly against Brussels, populists now comfort for something in the Nordic countries, among the Dutch and the Flemish, in France, Italy and Austria... they all claim to represent what Vierre Poujade called the ripped-off, lied-to little people³⁵¹.

Radical right nationalists don't only attribute its success to oppositional rhetoric by celebrating anti-global and anti-egalitarian attitudes, but also through the institution of election and the percentages of voter's voice which empowered its position as an emergent rival in European politics. The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), under the leadership of Jörg Haider, won 33 parliamentary seats in 1990 election and became the 2nd largest party in Vienna. La Liga Lombarda of Umberto Bossi, after its Union with other parties to form La Liga Nordi, became the fourth largest party in Italy, winning 8.7 percent of votes in national election in 1992. The front national, under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, has won 14% of votes in the 1980 presidential election. Sweden Nationalist party the new democracy won 27 seats in parliament in 1991. The German Republikaner came to life in 1989 in Berlin. The party scored 12 percent of the votes in the state elections in 1992.³⁵²

Hostility towards immigrant, nativism and nationalism are fundamental ideologies of the radical right which is based on the notion of pure and homogeneous national identity that is

³⁴⁹H. S. Vural, *the Rise of Extreme Right in Europe* (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2005), p. 23.

³⁵⁰Cas Mudde, "Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy," cited in P. Ingazi, *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 2-3.

³⁵¹"Beyond the Fringe," *the Economist* 12 November, 2011 retrieved on 01-08-2016 from, www.economist.com/node/21536873.

³⁵²Hans-George Betz. "The New Politics of Resentment," pp. 414-415.

organic and indivisible. In this context, minorities have no place in their agendas unless they are assimilated to the nationalistic system of the radical organization. The most dominant ideology of the nationalist parties is anti-immigration policies.³⁵³ Across all European states, the increasing number of immigrants has been regarded as both economic and cultural threat to European citizen. Economically, immigrants are accused of taking away nationals' Jobs. Populist parties translate fear and discontent to political earning by addressing sensitive issues like unemployment among native Europeans and the social cost of immigration.

All parties share fundamental agendas of ethno-national xenophobia, taking advantages of emergent political opportunities and appealing discontented popularism and the politicization of immigration. Racist populist positions are recurrently manifested in discourses on the necessity to reduce the number of migrants and adopting restrictive conditions in this quotation, Jean-Marie Le Pen is accusing Sarkozy of not keeping his promises to voters:

It is in the field of immigration that Nicolas Sarkozy has perhaps the most harshly betrayed the French in general and its voters in particular, in conducting, contrary to his discourses and promises, the most loose immigration policy in the history of the fifth Republic.³⁵⁴

North African immigrants and Muslim diaspora constitute the overwhelming majority of foreigners in Europe. The increasing naturalization and incorporation of Muslim immigrants have stimulated anti-immigrant sentiment among nationalists, who stood to protect Europe from the cultural dangers and threats presented by Islam and Muslim minorities. In Addition to the threats of decomposing the homogeneity of European identity, Northern identity defenders criticize Muslim immigrant in issues related to gender relations, marriage rules, eating habits, media, public perception and other cultural institutions insist on excluding Muslims and pushing them to social periphery. Muslims are perceived as distant outgroup. Biffi, the cardinal Archbishop of Bologna called for excluding Muslim immigrants from immigration minorities in Italy because they pose threat to Italians. He said "let us welcome only immigrants who are culturally compatible... to avoid trouble and suffering for the Italian People. The government should regulate immigration giving preference to Catholic immigrants".³⁵⁵ He also called for the shut down of 130 mosques in Italy.

³⁵³ Marcel Lubbers et al., eds., "Extreme Right Wing Voting in Western Europe," *European Journal of Political Research*, 41: 3 (Oxford, 2002), p. 350.

³⁵⁴ Jean-Marine Le Pen (2011), *Projet pour la France*, November.
<http://www.marinelepen:12.fr/leprojet>

³⁵⁵ Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, op. cit, p. 12.

The origins of hatred and hostility towards Muslim immigrants are more than cultural since defenders of northern identity and supporters of nationalist radicalism claims that immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers play a major part in maximizing unemployment among Europeans and contribute to underground economy and rise in state expenditure and social benefits which burden the state budget.³⁵⁶

However, radical right wing parties populism, which derives its presence from the racist and xenophobic feeling against minorities and blame immigrants /refugees for the problems facing the welfare state. They ungratefully ignore the important contribution of immigrants in filling in the gaps of labour market in Europe, by substituting the vacant occupation that European nationals refuse to do, particularly in times of prosperity and economic growth. More than that, immigrants are necessity to Europe because they guarantee a cheap labour force that bring balance to an aging continent. The French labour market will have a deficit of about 165.000 and 315.000 immigrants between 2000 and 2039 to fill in the gap in the active population.³⁵⁷

The rising tides of xenophobia and hostility towards have become visible in many parts of Europe and the world, culminating in acts of killings, burning Koran, slaughtering pigs in front of mosques, profanation of sacred places and offending religious symbols in media. The racially and religiously motivated hostility encompasses multiple dimensions and involves a multifaceted criteria based on gender, colour and ethnicity. Acts of racism and intolerance against immigrants of Muslim background is fuelled by the hot climate of nationalist discourses and anti-Muslim rhetoric in mainstream media. Intolerant and racist public discourse remains unchallenged by existing laws and reported victimization are faced by indifference from police and authorities. Violent acts against immigrants vary according to contexts and forms: Physical violence, day to day harassments, assault on properties and intimidations.³⁵⁸

French racism style transcends public and popular sphere to institutional and intellectual elites. The 1989 headscarf affair of the 3 Maghrebi females who were suspended from state school because they were wearing headcover under the claim of breaking the laicity principle. Many associations put pressure on Lionel Jospin Minister of education, who overturned the suspension order at the time. Instead of defending personal expression and religious freedom, some intellectuals like Bernard Henri-Lévy and Régis Debray, supported the suspension

³⁵⁶ Florian Hartleb, *After their Establishment: Right Wing Populist Parties in Europe*, (Brussels: The centre for European studies, 2011), p. 31.

³⁵⁷ Hans-George Betz, op.cit, p. 417.

³⁵⁸ BBC, "Muslim Couple Say Attack Was as Racial Hatred", April 8, 2010, BBC News.

order.³⁵⁹ Reactions against North African particularly in France are fed by an exaggerated threats and fears of common people as well as political and intellectual excuse for hiding hatred and unjustified refusal of others. Racist attitudes against immigrants are a zone of great confusion and a battle field of power relations. Not all Maghrebi Muslims support the wearing of headcover and not all Muslim women wear headscarves. Besides, there is a tendency among Maghrebi young people embrace western liberal values and adopt European life styles. In an opinion poll on the issue of headscarf, 45% of Muslim interviewees were against wearing headscarves in schools, while 30% of Muslim interviewees were for wearing the headscarf.³⁶⁰

Within this hostile context, targetting foreigners and immigrants in European host countries, international organization brought attention to the worrisome aspect of discrimination and xenophobia. The world conference against racism, radical discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance (WCAR) has alarmed the international community about hostilities and crimes committed against refugees and migrants³⁶¹ are manifested everyday, violence against immigrants is carried through discriminatory practice in employment, and access to social services. The phenomenon of hostility against foreigners is not taken seriously by host countries and there is no clear legislation that condemns racism on European or national levels:

The ethnic or racial inequalities implied by discrimination or racism would be inconsistent with official ideologies of liberal democracies, and, thus, instead, recognizing such “imperfection”, it is more expedient to deny them or explain them away as characteristic of the victims, or as temporary phenomena of transition for new immigrants. Furthermore... as long as the existence of racism is denied, it also denies the need for anti-racist and antidiscrimination.³⁶²

Victims of racial tensions and xenophobia are refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants and displaced people. Dominant discourses on racism and xenophobia link the latter to an increasing economic difficulties and high unemployment rate among nationals, who blame immigrants for taking away their jobs. However, Quillian (1995)³⁶³ found that economic stance was unable to explain that some European nationals have that xenophobia and prejudice even though they are not economically vulnerable. Variables of age and educational level show that less educated and

³⁵⁹P. Bernard, *L’immigration*, Paris, Le Monde, 1993. p. 4.

³⁶⁰A. G. Hargreaves, *Immigration, Race and ethnicity in Postwar France* (London: Routledge, 1987), p. 127.

³⁶¹“*International Migration, Racism, Discrimination and Xenophobia*.” publication of ILO, IOM and OHCHR, August 2011, retrieved on 08May, 2016, from www.iom.int/www.ilo.org

³⁶²Van Dijk T, *Racism and Migration in Western Europe* cited in Ibid, p. 9.

³⁶³Gregory D. Saxon and Michelle A. Kenson, 2003 “The Origins of Socially and Politically Hostile Attitudes Towards Immigrants and Outgroups: Economy, Ideology or National Context?” *the journal of political science*, (2003), p. 112.

older nationals are more prejudiced than other categories. Some studies attribute violence against migrants to the government restrictive policies, the criminalization³⁶⁴ and the stigmatization of illegal immigrants. The association of migrants with trafficking, crimes and social ills (like Aids) condone and legalize the exploitation, abuse and the violent acts against immigrants since they are criminalized and represented by some media as threatening to national security.

This does not mean that all communities keep blind eye on criminal and violent act against immigrants, rather, there are a myriad of individuals and collective initiatives that promote diversity and tolerance among citizens, institutions and policies in order to reinforce participation of minorities and encourage integration. The 1988 project of “Rotterdam in the Netherlands Society” of municipality and city council of Rotterdam in the Netherlands is a good example of Diversity:

42% of the Rotterdam population is of immigrant origin of which 27% are ethnic minorities. The percentage of ethnic minorities employed by the municipal authority is targetted to rise from 16.1 in 1998 to 22% in 2002...³⁶⁵

Although some countries showed unwillingness to take decision and follow legal basis to combat xenophobia faced by migrants and refugees, fundamental human rights granted by international law and human rights convention, including international convention on economic, cultural and social rights and the international covenant on civic and political rights. The core rights of this covenant were ratified by small number of countries, while other countries expressed reservations. Other conventions include elimination of all form of radical discrimination and the ILO 1958³⁶⁶ convention on discriminations in employment and occupation. The ILO 1949 on Migration and Employment proscribed discrimination against immigrants in work on issues related to social protection, hours of work, minimum wage and taxes. The 1990 UN convention on rights of migrant workers and their families presented a legal framework for the fair treatment and protection of migrant rights in work; protection from all forms of racism, forced labour and exploitation although the convention ratified by all countries.³⁶⁷

Despite the hot debate in Europe about multiculturalism, integration and the inassimilability of some minority group is far from being real; this rhetoric is far from being a lived experience since illegal immigrant still represent the subconscious of Europe mind.

³⁶⁴Ibid., op. cit, p. 7.

³⁶⁵International Racism, Racism, op. cit, p. 11.

³⁶⁶Ibid., p. 19.

³⁶⁷Ibid., p. 16.

Employers in Europe prefer illegal immigrants and unskilled workers because they are exploitable and vulnerable to abuse.

Part III

III-LEGACIES OF EMPIRE, EUROPEAN CINEMA AND NORTH AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS: COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND TROPES OF REPRESENTATION

1-An overlapping intertextuality: North Africa in literature, Cinema and Media

A-Defamiliarization of North Africa in Literature and Painting: Geographical Topes and Oreintalist Conventions

Since the eight century D.C, North Africa and the Orient have been subject to a system of Western knowledge, reiterated tropes and orientalist metaphors because as James Ferguson puts it North Africa, and the Middle East in general “Continued to be described through series of lacks and absences, failings, problems, plagues and catastrophs”.³⁶⁸ Colonialists, explorers, travel writers, missionaries and colonial administrators launched a discursive knowledge about “dark Africa”, Juxtaposing Western notions of enligtnment and racial supporiority to African darkness and inferiority, starting with the fictional work of J. Conrad *Heart of Darkness* and Henry Stanly’s *Through the Dark*, *the Mummy* film series , all of them associate the continent with primitivism, exoticism and darkness. Travel writing and adventures contributed immensely to the contruction and the persistence of orientalist tropes and modalities of cultural superiority, which strengthened the European colonial discourse of North Africa that fed on negation, naturalization and surveillance. Explorers and writers shared a persistent topoi of the native territory as exotic, bizzare, abundant and beautiful as disguise for claiming the possession of the landscapes to save it from emptiness and absence. Michael Curtiz in *Heart of Darkness* shows an exaggerated fear of going native which constitutes another trope of imperialist knowledge and practice, associating ethnic and geographical difference with inferiority and degeneration when getting in touch with indigious cultures, westerners can use the territory, can appropriate and ridicule it, but they can’t risk coming closer to it because of fear of losing Western sense of purity and superiority. The tropes of noble savagery and exotic closiness to nature have become a justifiable discourse of western civilization and science to govern and control knowledge. Colonial discourse has also propagated topois of nothingness and blankness of the North African lands, depriving whole civilization from history and human cultivation “Africa is an essential nothingness”³⁶⁹ is a visualized as inviting exploration, fecundation and colonization, tropes which imply the classical image of colonial discourse as legitimate act of creation, building and civilising. North Africa has become the inevitable virgin of the male European explorer, who penetrated to the mysterious fertile land and unveiled its darkness through the use of his rationality. The discourse

³⁶⁸James Ferguson, *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order* (Durham NC: Ducke University Press, 2006), p. 2.

³⁶⁹David Spur, *The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing and Imperial Administration* (Durham, NC: duke University press, 1993), p. 92.

of colonialism has paradoxically narrated North Africa as “object of beauty, horror, pleasure and pity”.³⁷⁰

Crusades, trade and other political and cultural encounters between the Maghreb and Europeans have contributed to the persistence of a set of images about North Africa and a dominating discursive construction of North Africans. Representative of the “Moor”’s and Muslims dates back to the first encounters of Roman in the first century A. D, who settled in North Africa. The geographical proximity to Europe and the history of Moroccan empire, which conquered the Iberian Peninsula has enriched the textual and the visual representation of Moorish North Africa. In primordial narrative, North Africans were seen as valiant knight, powerful, wicked and inferior because of their strange geography, black otherness and their “heretical beliefs”.³⁷¹

In the French literary traditions of Mid-twelfth century, the *chanson de Ronald*, which talks about The defeat of the Moors in front of the queen of Zaragoza, represents the people of Barbary as pagan and savage. The fall of Andalusian state of the Maghreb has marked another phase of representing Moorish North Africa especially in captivity narratives, which dominated public readership through the following centuries with a mosaic of images and attributes. The Moorish powerful knights of primordial age were replaced by the viciousness and the mercilessness of pirates and corsairs of Barbary. Thus, “the adventures and the misfortunes of the corsairs and their victims provided fodder for dramatic accounts and political pleas”.³⁷²

In Elizabethan Renaissance, the social representation of North Africa and the Moors has equally reconfigured the knowledge system because of many cultural and political facts, identifying them with greater moral and psychological degeneracy “the Moor as villain becomes a convenient locus for those darkly subversive forces that threaten European society from within but that can be projected onto the outside”.³⁷³ In Peele’s *Battle of Alcazar*, the Moorish Moly Mohammed was portrayed as Negro traitor with bloody intentions and deeds. His villainy and cowardice is derived not only from his deeds but also from his blood thirsty speeches and inability to show signs of bravery and knighthood of his ancestors of other Moorish characters in the play like Abdelmalic.³⁷⁴

³⁷⁰Ibid., p. 5.

³⁷¹Ahmed I. Alami, *Mutual Othering: Islam, Modernity and the Politics of encounters in precolonial Moroccan and European Travel Writing* (New York: Sunny Press, 20013), p. 27.

³⁷²Ibid., p. 28.

³⁷³Jack D’Amico cited in *Mutual Othering*, p. 29.

³⁷⁴Mohamed El Askary, *the Image of Moors in the Writings of Four Elizabethan Dramatists: Peele, Dekker, Heywood and Shakespeare*. Unpublished Thesis. University of Exeter, 2008. P. 46.

Another sixteenth century Elizabethan play was Thomas Dekker's last Dominion (1667), which contained the end of relation between Elisabeth and Almansor and equally narrated the expulsion of the Moors from Spain. Khalid Bekkaoui stated that last Dominion is the first English play with Spanish Moors as its main character.³⁷⁵ The Moriscos or "the Moors of Andalusia", as Khalid Bekkaoui called it, embrace a totally negative image of the Moors as devilish, vilaneous and bloody, an image attributed to the prevailing picture of North Africa as a locus of piracy and captivity. When Elezar refused to share the throne of Spain with the queen, she called him like other characters you "savage slave". In other portrayals, he is "clammed Moor" "black divel".³⁷⁶ However, for Bekkaoui, Elizar is not villain and devil "by nature as by necessity".³⁷⁷

His villainy and criminality seems acceptable if we compare it with his Spanish counterpart (the queen who will not hesitate to kill her son for the love of Elizar). Thomas Hywood's *the Fair Maid of the West* portrays the story of British captive in Barbary where the racial attributes of North Africa is juxtaposed to the moral ethics of Great Britain. North Africa is portroyed as geography of anarchy and pagan religion with characters that are mostly portroyed as coward, lustful and irreligious in comparison to English characters (Bess, Spencer) as honest, brave, religious and sexually restrained. Even Joefer, the positive image of the Moor in the play, was discribed as "noble Moor" because he was submissive and convertible. Joffer's conversion to Christianity symlizes the English sense of pride and victory, which reprents the European orientalist discourse and desire to tame others and Christianize them because they are seen as pagans and infidels.³⁷⁸

In the same context, the 15th and 16th century diplomatic and commercial relations between renaissance Europe and North Africa has contributed to the construction of a set of representation system and knowledge patterns, based on the visual portraits of such elite and retinue made of ambassadors and diplomats. The visual representations of Barbary through its public figures were tended to meet the need of a thirsty European consumption and satisfy the curiosity of an andience that was introduced to new unfamiliar people representing both unfamiliar geography and cultural otherness.³⁷⁹ Deplomatic relations of North Africans with

³⁷⁵Khalid El Bakkaoui, *Signs of Spectacular Resistance: The Spanish Moor and British Orientalism* (Casablanca: Imprimerie Najah El Jadida, 1998), p. 77.

³⁷⁶Mohamed El Askary, op. cit, pp. 81-82.

³⁷⁷Khalid Bekkaoui, op. cit, p. 83.

³⁷⁸El Askary, op. cit, p. 126.

³⁷⁹Kate lowe, "Visual Representations of an Elite: African Ambassadors and Rulers in Renaissance Europe", in *Revealing the African Presence in Renaissance Europe*, ed. Joaneath Spicer (Baltimore: Walters Art Museum, 2013), p. 1.

Europe gave to a visual and narrative construction of distinctive strangeness or defamiliarity of Muslim Morish identity, particularly at the turn of sixteenth century. The oil Kanvas painting called the Moorish Ambassador or the Ambassador from the king of Barbary/ Morocco, reflects the historical figure of Abdelwahid Ben Massud who was the Ambassador of the king Ahmed Al Mansur to the queen of England. The portrait, which presents the ambassador with traditional clothes like turbain, haik, sword, associates him with negative qualities like being spy to the kindom of barbary and expressing hate to christianity.³⁸⁰ Although the painter of the portrait is unknown, the emphasis was put on rich unfamiliar fashion which resonates premodern overtones like moustache, beard, decorated North African sword, olive complexion of strict face and hard smile. The discourse of painting associates North Africa in term of cultural alterity, geographical dissimilarity and black otherness to mark ethnic distance and produce generalized European perception of the Moor as embodying alien cunningness and racialized cruelty.³⁸¹ In term of diplomatic relations, Morrocans were, most of the time, represented in different tone by adopting a positive attitude towards ambassadors. This is how King George III portrays Abdel Kader Hodeil, Sidi Mohamed's ambassador to London in a letter sent in 1764 to the sultan "a person of so distinguished rank and merit...who hath executed Your Imperial Majesty's commands with great prudence, care and exactness,"³⁸²

Visual narratives of renaissance art in Europe were always contrasted with European standards of beauty and appreciation of human body. So, a range of corporal features, facial characteristics and colors were associated with certain geography and ethnicity, which gave rise to a negative perception and stereotyping of otherness. The black color was associated with the emptiness of the soul, slavery and with a sense of naturalism related to the Moor body that made Christian descriptions of that time violent. In Albrecht Durer's book *Four Books of human Proportion*, He presented an array of human bodily variations based on facial and physical classification of races and ethnicities.³⁸³ This is how his aesthetic judgement of human forms, which embodied European perception of otherness, classified the Moors this way: "the faces of the Moors are rarely lovely due to their very flat noses and thick mouth... However, I have never seen some of that are otherwise in their entire body so well built and handsome that I have

³⁸⁰Ibid., p. 103.

³⁸¹Ibid., p. 103.

³⁸²Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations* cited in Khalid Bekkaoui, *Moroccans in Europe: Fassi Merchants Comes to Manchester* (Fez: the Moroccan Cultural Studies Centre, 2016), p.20.

³⁸³Kate Lowe "Visual Representations of an Elite," p. 106.

neither seen nor can imagine something better built".³⁸⁴ Queer bodily construction and stange beauty of black North African is articulated to express a certain discourse of dominant judgement. North African presence in Renaissance art was overtly associated with blackness or certain Africanness with figures addressed in exotic defamiliarization and black otherness, threatening, but under control.³⁸⁵

For Edward Said, orientalism was centred around the study of the Orient (including North Africa) which was constructed as whole set of knowledge systems, representations and tropes. Geographical and political production of the orient and interpretation of truth about localities, cultures and people regularized and orientalized under wide field of biased visions and subjectives. Connotations and meanings associated with the orient was a sort of dominant cultural obligations among Western travelers, anthropologists, historians, adventures and colonial administrators, who took a firm hold on exoticizing, essentializing and denigrating different ethnicities and unfamiliar geographies.³⁸⁶ This defamiliarization of geographies and cultures in the European orientalist traditions was a legitimization of domination and colonialism in North Africa. Orientalism, for Said, is an apportionistic "political doctrine" of geography, which fundamentally relies not only on its strength to subjugate weaker localities but also on imperialist and racist sentiments: "Orientalism was such system of truths, truths in Nietzsche's sense of the word. It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the orient was consequently a racist, an imperialist, an almost totally ethno centric".³⁸⁷ European perception of North Africa and the Orient was associated with erotic and sexual fantasies. Although the sexual discourse oscillates between desire and threat, most orientalists look for an exotic type of sexuality, different from "unobtainable" sex in Europe, "more liberantime and less guilt ridden".³⁸⁸

Flaubert's voyage to Egypt introduced a set of images and associations about Egyptian Alema, as prototype of oriental femininity and sexuality. Alema was a copy of his novels' oriental characters *Salambo* and *Salome* which embody a sense of delicate sexuality, oriental odour, cheap merchandise and mental emptiness, "The oriental woman is no more than a machine –she makes no distinction between one man and another". Beside being self-sufficient and inexpressive femininity, oriental woman symbolizes both sexual looseness and

³⁸⁴Joaneath Spicer, "European perceptions of Blackness as Reflected in the Visual Arts," in *Revealing the African Presence in Renaissance Europe*, ed. Joaneath Spicer (Baltimore: Walters Art Museum, 2013), p. 46.

³⁸⁵Ibid., p. 52.

³⁸⁶Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, Pantheon book, 1978), p. 203.

³⁸⁷Ibid., p. 204.

³⁸⁸Ibid., p. 190.

barrenness.³⁸⁹ European knowledge of the orient and its intellectual power has produced North Africa with a discursive practice which involved rationalization and epistemological manipulation, rendering its landscapes as illegible, identifiable and accessible for domination. North Africa is represented as instinctive and irrational. Lord Cromer, an English colonial administrator, compared in his book *The Modern Egypt* between the European and the North African:

The European is a close reasoner... he is a natural logician... he is by nature skeptical and requires a proof before he can accept the truth... the mind of the oriental, on the other hand, like his picturesque streets, eminently wanting in symmetry. They are often incapable of drawing the most obvious conclusions from any simple premises of which a plain statement of facts from any ordinary Egyptian.³⁹⁰

This is a form of overt dominant attribute of orientalist colonial authority which establishes the standard and the status of things ranking and classifying geographies in terms of biological, anthropological and scientific truth and knowledge. The Orient and North Africa are not only barbaric and inferior and anti-democratic, they are also fertile and barren geographies waiting for cultivation and fertilization of Western science and civilization. Chateaubriand sees the conquest of the orient as the resurrection of the land from death and redemption from degradation; it is an ejection of the orient with principles of liberty and justice. This is how he puts it in his *Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem, et de Jérusalem à Paris 1810-1811*:

Of liberty, they knew nothing; of propriety, they have none: Force is their God. When they go for long periods without seeing conquerors who do heavenly justice, they have the air of soldiers without a leader, citizens without legislators and family without a father.³⁹¹

In his study of the educational and social systems of Jbala in the North of Morocco, Edward Michaux-Bellaire –French sociologist and administrator (1906) reported that Coranic schools and traditional learning contribute greatly to the destruction of critical thinking and creative development among pupils and students. He stated that kind of ritual learning “kills the principles of reasoning and neglect critical thinking”. A kind of learning that “depends completely on rote memorization and last for life time”.³⁹² Education made pupils more intolerant and narrow-minded to the extent that they are made to lose focus on the true nature of their belief.

³⁸⁹Ibid., p. 187.

³⁹⁰Lord Cromer, cited in *orientalism*, p. 83.

³⁹¹Chateaubriand cited in *Orientalism*, p. 172.

³⁹²Edward Michaux-Bellaire. *Surrat Jbala fi Ll-waay Alkoloniali Aleoropi: Nussos Mokhtara mina laarshiv Almarribi*. Trans. Hanan Al Madra3i (Tetouan: Bab-al-hikma, 2014), p. 47.

Jballa shows a strong hatred to Christianity and Christian people because the latter are associated with disbelief and desecration, not because of ethnic distance but on the basis of religious difference. "This religious feeling is strongly influenced by their violent and cruel character"³⁹³ they are very loyal to superstitions and Marabout worshipping.

In his *Voyage to North Africa* 1989, André Gide traced the orientalist conventions of early travellers and colonizer to the orient. André Gide portrayed the geographies and deserts of both Tunisia and Algeria as romantic, fresh and healthy; yet, people represent an obstacle to the sight of the dominant European gaze. Human presence is the only problem. For him, this abundant lands are very rich and beautiful, but they need professional and good gazer in order to filtrate or make distinction between beauty and horror and, richness and misery³⁹⁴ and, of course, the good sightseer is André Gide and French colonizer. André Gide always relates people / human in North Africa to Animals in terms of health and care. He insists on portraying native people as a skinny child or old sick man, who are like native animals suffering from malnutrition and weakness.³⁹⁵ He contrasts people to nature as classical trope of orientalist knowledge which romanticizes colonial presence and legitimizes colonial intervention since the geography is barren and people are sick /lazy and unable to use the land.³⁹⁶ He represents Algeria as rounnd society; cities are about to collapse, disgusting smells, unhappy children (and paradoxically happy sometimes).

Generally speaking, Gide represents North Africa as atemporal geography that has no connection to time or historical change. Human slothfulness (lazy square, vague evenings) simplicity (happy smiling natives) timelessness (archaic, old people, sick, skinny child) and other negative tropes (boredom, sounds of animals, flute, palm trees) constitute metaphors of turn of century colonialism that negated native presence and highlighted the romantic tradition of nature inviting cultivation and salvation from emptiness. Gide invented the trope of "futile nature smiling happily" and calling for him; a rescue trope keeps appearing and disappearing in 18th and 15th century orientalist art and literature.³⁹⁷ Even Cervantes portrays Zoraida the Algerian protagonist of his novel as a girl from wealthy family who enjoys no freedom or choice as female that is why she escaped with the Spanish prisoner to make an end to her imprisonment³⁹⁸. Other

³⁹³Ibid., p. 22.

³⁹⁴André Gide, *Rihla el Shamal Efriqia*. Trans. Mohmoud Abdelghani (Casablanca: Toubqal, 2012), p. 43.

³⁹⁵Ibid., p. 40.

³⁹⁶Ibid., p. 60.

³⁹⁷Ibid., p. 7.

³⁹⁸Assi Djebar, "Khitab Frankfurt," trans. Abdelhamid Borroya, *Majjalat a-Dawha*, ed. Fallah beh Hussein al-Hajiri, 188(2016), p. 77.

dominant tropes and topos of nineteenth century art and literature are the recurrent idleness of oriental people and the corruption of political and social systems.³⁹⁹

In his document *Holy land and Egypt and Nuba*, the British painter David Roberts portrays the Muslims of North Africa, particularly Egypt (1938), as people living and sleeping on the ruins of wonderful and glorious civilization:

Splendid cities, once teeming with a busy population and embellished with... edifices, the wonder of the world now deserted and lonely, or reduced by mismanagement and the barbarism of the Moslem creed, to a state as savage as the wild animals by which they are surrounded... Cairo contains, I think, more idle people than town size in the world.⁴⁰⁰

The famous tableau *Snake Charmer* of Jean-Léon Gérôme adopted the popular trope of the Orient as place of mystery, sexual fantasies and mystified serenity.⁴⁰¹ The tableau equally embraces the dominant reference to idle and childlike character of this people who prefer snake charming and laziness over work. Other paintings like *Moorish bath* represent an ethnographic and naturalistic reflection of banal oriental fantasy about Harem and its related-theme. The inclusion of the servant shows the classicism of oriental anxiety of interiors and the exotic beauty of the white Moorish mistress as an erotic availability to the master of the Harem.⁴⁰²

The inevitably picturesque traditions of nineteenth century reside on two generalized visions: first, they embrace the colonialist rhetoric of absence of time, a world without change. The Orient's timeless rituals are not affected by cultural change. Second, orientalist paintings embrace two ideological assumptions about power, "one about men's power over women, the other is about white men's superiority to, hence Justifiable control over, inferior, darker races, precisely those who indulge in this sort of regrettably lascivious commerce".⁴⁰³

The orientalist picturesque and imagery had the function of masking colonial atrocities of nineteenth century France in North Africa with images of ethnographic tranquility and cheap exoticism. The geographical and ethnic difference of North Africa stirred superior discourses that mark others with backwardness and inferiority because they are simply strange to those who produce or consume the picturesque.⁴⁰⁴ In his documentation of his diplomatic mission with Comte Morny to North Africa in 1832, Eugène Delacroix states that North Africa is: "place completely for painters, economists and Saint-Simons would have a lot to criticize here with

³⁹⁹Linda Nochlin, *The politics of Visions: Essays on Nineteenth Century Art Society* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), p. 39.

⁴⁰⁰David Roberts cited in Linda Nochlin, p. 38.

⁴⁰¹Ibid., p. 35-37.

⁴⁰²Ibid., p. 45.

⁴⁰³Ibid., p. 45.

⁴⁰⁴Ibid., p. 51.

respect to the right of man before law, but the beautiful abounds here".⁴⁰⁵ Spanish colonialism was a part of a campaign that created a division among Moroccan Muslims and Jews by trying to separate them and raise their consciousness to the specificity of their identity as Sephardic biblical diaspora, whose real nation is Zionist Jerusalem. Ester Dahan, with a heavy colonialist thinking, concludes that the invasion of North Africa and the defeat of Tetuan by Spain was redemption and liberation for Moroccan Ashkenazim⁴⁰⁶ despite the fact that Jews of Morocco were respected by Moroccans (tolerance) and protected by dynasties and kings of the kingdom (king Mohamed the fifth who strongly refused any discrimination among his citizens on the basis of their belief)⁴⁰⁷. Moroccan Jews produce a favourable conception of Moroccan traditions, tolerance, identity and interreligious relations before migration to the promised land by praising the Andalusian, Jewish and Muslim coexistence in the kingdom such as the writing of Ashir Knafo (born in Essaouira 1935) and Orna Bazis⁴⁰⁸, while other writers like Albert Suisa, Merry Bensimon, Isaac Kennan and Shelly al Qaym were taken by the question of identity, Moroccan Jewish consciousness, the influence of exodus to Jerusalem on belonging and disappearance of their heritage and past. Moroccan Jews, after immigration and settling in Jerusalem, were subject to a racist public discourse similar to that of early colonialism from Ashkenazim, their European coethnics. They were refused prejudicially for their belonging to an inferior geography/culture (Morocco), the complexion of their skin, their adoption of low Amazigh/Arab traditions⁴⁰⁹. For Ben Gorion, everything associated with Moroccan Jews stands for ignorance, lack of education and abhorance of miscegenation. The political and intellectual elite reflects the same xenophobia and hatred against Moroccans when they arrived, despising their culture, level of education and representing them as savages without spirit or values. This is how Areal Jilbloom pictures Jews from Morocco in a column in Haaretz newspaper about his experience in reception places the moment they arrived:

I have never seen such specimen of human being in Israel. I am talking about a primitive people to the full. Their educational level can not be more than total ignorance, worse than that, they can not even perceive/grasp anything even when it comes to religious and spiritual matters. Generally speaking, those Moroccan Jews can not be distinguished/separated from Arabs, Blacks and Amazighs whom they have shared the

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 52.

⁴⁰⁶ Abderrahim Hamid "al-Hijra wa al-Waay Belhuwiya lada Yahud al-Maghreb," in *al-Hijra al-Maghrebia fi Zaman al-Awlama*, ed. Mohamed Ait Hamza et al (Rabat: el Maarif al Jadida, 2013), p. 62.

⁴⁰⁷ Haim Zafrani, *le Judaisme Maghrébin: le Maroc, Terre de rencontres des Cultures et des Civilisations* (Rabat: Marsam, 2003), p. 46.

⁴⁰⁸ Abderrahim Hamid, "al-Hijra wa al-Waay Belhuwiya lada Yahud al-Maghreb," p. 67-68.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 68.

same geography. Anyway, they are much more inferior than the Arab of Palestine...they are driven by their cannibal, savage and primitive instincts⁴¹⁰.

B-Colonial Cinema: Rhetorics of Legitimatization and Aesthetics of Nostalgia and Fragmentation

Cinema as a form of expression contributed substantially to the visualization of African cultures, geographies and people. Like the photography of nineteenth century, European cinema of late 19th and early 20th century was arrogated the role of reflecting African “realities”, recording exotic landscapes and visually remaking tropes of borders between cultures and communities. Conceptualizing African otherness, cinema used the heritage of colonial photography, visualizing and recounting colonial stories and subjects within the confines of geographical discourse of alterity. Under the imperial gaze of colonial cinema, Africa was subject to ideological practice of orientalism which made use cinematographic experience in the service of conquest, legitimatization, propaganda and celebration of colonial achievement overseas. Cinema goes hand in hand with European colonialism of North Africa because the latter serves the ideological assumption and the propaganda of the imperial forces as a mean of legitimatization of expansion similar to that of the Nazis and the Soviet⁴¹¹.

European cinema has contributed to the containment of native people persuading them with the civilizing and enlightening nature of colonization. Cinema colonial did not only use propaganda, but played a role in deceiving native masses by initializing rupture in their homogeneous identity building a ground of trust towards and fascination with the culture of the colonizer⁴¹². Besides, British and French colonial cinemas assumed the responsibility of pushing deeper colonization to the heart of cultural superiority and rationality in comparison to the colonized exotic and savage cultures, which have been mapped and translated to serve all aspects of domination to facilitate western colonial enterprise. Visions of Africa from the "superior" gaze of European cinema effectively offered representation of history of colonial territories in projects called "actualities", which produced both fictional and documentary films. These genre of films, which was sponsored by colonial administrations, had the significance of documenting colonial achievements and administrative decisions. Thus “the task of attracting mass audience and financial backing was complicated by an urgent need for logistical support. French authorities in the Maghreb provided such support but extracted a price, influencing content and manipulating

³⁹¹Ibid., pp. 69-70.

⁴¹¹M. Ahmed Jaadi, *le Cinema Coloniale: Histoire de cinema au Maroc* (Rabat: Collection al-Majal, 2001), p. 10.

⁴¹²Ibid., p. 24.

the message, reflecting the worldview and mind-set of Europeans, colonial and metropolitan.”⁴¹³ As an ideological apparatus, European voyeuristic rethorics of European cinema have brought Africa naked and savage to a thirsty Metropolitan audience by constructing narratives of wilderness, strange customs and queer religious rituals. Most films portrayed natives in their immutable state: slothful, savage, exotic, primitive, enslavable and, sometimes resistant. Yet, when colonial cinema assumes objectivity and positive attitude towards the colonized, it is pictured this way: "If there was a ‘good’ African in the film, he was defined by the characteristics admired in servants: honesty, courage, submission and unflagging loyalty.”⁴¹⁴

Early twentieth century cinema has embraced a gendered discourse of primitive North African geographies as virgin lands and barren landscapes, waiting for fertilization and fecundation of Western masculinist colonization. This gendered tropes of male European enlightenment of native lands has constituted a dominant essentialist European narrative of colonial penetration, which combined both divine right of Christian Europe to civilize "other" and enacts a possession of what European called *Terra Incognita*. This gendered metaphor or trope is what Ella Shohat calls *Prospero Complex*:

The revivication of wasted soil evokes a quasi- devine process of endowing life and exnihilo, of bringing order from choas, plenitude from lack. Indeed, in the west’s “Prospero complex” is premised on an East/ South portrayed as a prospero’s isle, seen as the site of super imposed lacks calling for Western transformation of primival matter. The endendering of “civilization, then, is clearly phallo-centric, not unlike mythical woman’s birth from Adam’s rib”.⁴¹⁵

Ella Shohat prioritizes the role of sexual difference in the construction of both colonial tropes and discourses. North Africa has always been source of sexually manipulative metaphors of Western cinema and a location of permissive human delight, reflecting both European desires and fears from racial difference. Both D. W. Grifith’s *Intolerance* (1934) and Cecil.B de Mille’s *Cleopatra* (1916)⁴¹⁶ represent the Orient as degenerate ancient corporal pleasure with visual scenes, decors and archeticture that bear resemblance to the paraphelnia of *Femmes d’Algiers*, odalesques and colonial postcards. The figure of Cleopatra as feminized and archaic orient/

⁴¹³David Henry Salvin, *Colonial Cinema and Imperial France* in Roy Armes, *Postcolonial Images: Studies in North African Film* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005) ,p.5.

⁴¹⁴David Murphy, “African filming Africa: Questioning Theories of an Athentic African Cinema” *Journal of African Cultural Studies*, 12: 2 (2000), p. 247.

⁴¹⁵Ella Shohat, “Gender and Culture of Empire: Toward a Femenist Ethnography of Cinema,” In *Visions of the East: Orientalism is Films*. Eds. M. Bernstein and G. Studlar (London: I. B. Touris publishers, 1997), p. 21.

⁴¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 24.

Egypt/ North Africa was focalized by the extensive exploitation of oriental architecture and writing like Hieroglyph and Hebrew script, bringing to the screen an colorist ethnographic authority of colonialist discourse, a quest for ancient civilization by highlighting the role of male Western colonization of rescuing other cultures that were on the edge of destruction:

The cinematic Orient, then, is best epitomized by the iconography of papyrus, sphinxes, and mummies, whose existence and revival depend on the "look" and "reading" of the westerner. This rescue of the past, in other words, suppresses the voice of the present and thus legitimates by default the availability of the space of the orient for the geographical maneuvers of the western power".⁴¹⁷

Scientific discourses and capitalistic exploration in western narratives, which started as early as *Robinson Crusoe*, *Indian Jones*, *Passage to India* and *Raiders of Lost Ark*..., narrative that launched a map-based adventures and treasure hunt backed up by archeological knowledge and topography, thus, claiming appropriation of empty oceans and islands discovered by Western pioneers.⁴¹⁸ Cinematic use of science/ technology has the echoes of the last frontier being explored by powerful male penetration of feminized terra incognita by structuring scenes and camera shots that equate the female body to that of a geography which needed a complete grasp and comprehension in order to be fully possessed, "the genealogy and the topography of the land, then, are explicitly sexualized to resemble the physiology of female".⁴¹⁹

The visualization of North Africa and the Orient in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century European cinema has involved an aesthetic of representation that is based on a manichean notion of contrasting the dominant European self which embodies qualities of good and moral triumph and the native as evil, uncivilized, savage and easily defeated. European cinema has relied on an exotic parade of unknown culture, which persuade Western audiences to identify with the biased gaze of Western camera that renders a whole cultural traits and social codes to a mere spectacle devoid of history and consciousness. Basing his notion of behaviourism cinema Image-Act of Deleuze, Merlo-Pontey argues that cinema does not enlighten or give us ideas, but changes/influences our behavior in looking up to the conduct of the protagonist as a model; that is why audience is persuaded to reproduce the same visual content, gestures and stereotypes of the dominant character. If Walter Benjamin states that cinema emancipates people from critical thinking, shocks/fascinates him with the deceptive motion of the image, theorists of Frankfurt school of phenomenological criticism like Amedie Aver see

⁴¹⁷Ibid., p. 26.

⁴¹⁸Ibid., p. 28.

⁴¹⁹Ibid., p. 29.

cinema either as a mean of propaganda for the dominant ideology or as sensual content addressing audience desires, focusing on eroticism and distracting his concentration⁴²⁰.

Cinema as colonial mechanism has reproduced many truths of early orientalist literature and interweaved the claims of archeology and anthropology to turn non-Western geographies to minimized /reduced identifications such as Africa as a dark continent, desert and obscurity. This topographical reductionism and metaphors in European cinematic traditions erected the image of foreign places as the anti-thesis of Europe, while the forms are associated with barrenness, primitism and wilderness. The West is represented as redemption, exploration and masculine production. This unveiling of non-western cultures is not only limited to the unveiling of oriental female and its liberation, but also symbolizes the masculinist power of reappropriation of ancient heritage through recovering the suppressed. The hidden past of Phoenician and Babylonian civilizations are possessed by its real owner, not only rescue it, but restore it to the real owner:

Not only the western imagery metaphorically rendered the colonized land as a female be saved from the environmental disorder, but it has also projected rather more literal narrative of rescues of western and non-western women from Africa, Arab or native American men. The figure of the Arab assassin/ rapist, like that of the African Cannibal, helps produce the narrative and the ideological role of the Western liberator as integral to the colonial rescue fantasy.⁴²¹

Tropes of exoticism and eroticism which have overwhelmingly dominated the visual discourse of European cinema were adopted to allegorize the relationship between the centre and periphery and uncannily surfaced the West's ambivalent substructures of attraction and repulsion /otherness. Most films associate North Africa and its people with an array of traditional Jewelleries, furnitures, architectures and folklores. Moreover, when the native is granted a sense of authenticity, he/ she is allowed to appear in "illegible crowds or rendered tolerable only on the folkloric level".⁴²² Natives were also subject to imperial imaginary and visual fantasies of sexual eroticization and exoticization through filmic practices of associating Orientals with eroticized belly dancing, nudity and rape. Harem or harem's complex, as Prospero Complex, featured a typical European obsession with the intimate life of Pompeii, particularly the female. The trope has stirred the visions of sexual fantasies among many writers, colonizers and filmmakers, most of whom aligned with the dominant discourses of colonialism which recurrently saw harem as a site of male domination and a nest of female oppression. Although the voyeuristic gaze of Western cinema resided on eroticizing female gestures:

⁴²⁰Badriddine Mostapha Ahmed, "al-Falsafa wa Sinima," *Nizwa*, 67 (2011), p. 184.

⁴²¹Ibid., p. 39.

⁴²²Ibid., p. 48.

The camera's omnipresent and mobile gaze... embodies the overarching look of the absent present master that is of both directors/ producers and vicariously the spectator. The production members tend to exclude the male presence but all for the fantasies of the spectator, positioning his/ her gaze as that of a despot entertained by a plurality of females.⁴²³

European "Cinema Coloniale" was built on an orientalist metropolitan self and the peripheral "other" through spacial and symbolic representation of the familiar and the strange, the civilized and the uncivilized. Exoticism constituted a distinctive trait of European films which consciously relied on norms of priority to display to a thirsty audience a far away North Africa, unfamiliar and savage. Forruccio Cerio (1951) represents an exoticist piece of art that celebrates Italian colonization of Libya. The initial sequence takes place in an Italian cafe before the departure of Italian troops to Tripoli. The scenery emulates the context of harems with oriental complexion⁴²⁴ women slaves and dancers being lashed and beaten by dark-skinned males, alluding to the perceived oppression of women in colonies. The crowd in the concert were dancing and singing on nationalistic and propagandist war song, which praises invasion of Libya. "Beautiful soil of love" and "enchanted Tripoli" romanticized Joyfulness bring Libya under the guns of the tricolors. The film creates a stark opposition between the masculine Italian colonizer (the protagonist Alberto and his girl friend who after entering fight became masculinized) and the effeminate Libyan Soldiers, who are dressed in female like uniforms, reflecting a stereotypical binary definition between the colonizer and the colonized.⁴²⁵

The exotic dance sequences, musical lightheartedness (comedy) representative of celebration of Italian superiority and glorification of colonial victories in North Africa. "The colonial discourse and the colonial imagery in this film are clearly interwoven with issues of gender. The images of Africa that this movie produces are highly exoticized".⁴²⁶

Pascal's *Cesar and Cleopatra* (1945) presents an essentializing moral rhetoric of the British empire and knowledge. The film is sexually and culturally biased discourse, which is structured in depriving Cleopatra, as feminine, from the ability to govern because she lacks the wisdom and the dominant qualities of western ruler. When Cesar came to Egypt in the pursuit of

⁴²³Ibid., p. 52.

⁴²⁴Imma Colata Amodeo, "In the Empire's Eyes: African in Italian Colonial Cinema between Imperial Fantasies and Blind Spots," in *Empires and Boundaries*, eds. Harold Fischer –Tiné and Susanne Gehrmann (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 171.

⁴²⁵Ibid., p. 172.

⁴²⁶Ibid., p. 170.

his rival, Pompey, a Roman general, found Egypt governed by children⁴²⁷ (Ptolemy, the king, and his sister (Cleopatra). As result, Cesar decided to teach Cleopatra the principles of government and enable her to assume authority in order to acquire the status and the wisdom of queen as it is envisioned by western knowledge; “the meeting between Cesar and Cleopatra offered a moment where a wise and skeptical man had a chance to educate an ignorant girl, that is, to transform her by sharing what he himself had learned”.⁴²⁸

Because of her ethnicity and femininity, oriental man and woman represent antithesis to the western wisdom superiority which always seeks the rescue and the salvation of cultural and racial difference. Since his heterosexuality is suppressed or absent, pedagogy structures the relationship between Cesar and Cleopatra, Rome and Egypt, the West and the East and his instruction or knowledge will rescue Cleopatra from the obscuranism and ignorance of her culture.⁴²⁹

La Bandera, a film by Julien Duvivier 1935, is the story of French expatriate, Gilfieth, in Spanish colonial Morocco, the Rif region. As studio work, the film is one of the most exotic movies of colonial cinema. It traces the fate of hero, Gilfieth, who has been chased from Paris to Barcelona to the Rif Mountains in Morocco because of criminal past to work in Spanish foreign Region. The hero represents classical theme of refue, exile and integration in an alternative environment as he got married to a native Aicha, whom he met in brothel. For Gilfieth, North Africa is both a refuge and protection from his past and exile that entrap him with meloncholy and nostalgia for lost time. As result, France was "physically inaccessible and forbidden, while remaining mentally present during time spent in a new locations shown to be starkly different from the one left behind".⁴³⁰

Although the film was appreciated for its technical perfections, it represents ungovernable flow of exotic images, landscapes and tropes that underlie the ideological structures of orientalist discourse. The eroticized image of Anabella delivered a striking message of how-life harlot who learned French perfectly as a result of countless French Soldiers whom she had sex with. This sexual confrontation with difference encoded both in exotic and mythical cannotations is governed by the eroticized and exoticized of French colonial vision of North Africa:

⁴²⁷Mary Hamer, “Timeless Histories: a British Dream of Cleopatra,” in *Visions of the East: Orientalism in Films*, p. 274.

⁴²⁸Ibid., p. 275.

⁴²⁹Ibid., p. 277.

⁴³⁰Colleen B. Kennedy –Karpas, *Empire and Exoticism in French Fiction Cinema, 1930-1939*. Doctor of philosophy (New Jersey: The University of New Jersey, 2011), p. 43.

La Bandera figures North Africa (Morocco) as a lawless, anonymous zone but as female body whose contours are veiled, by something larger than law, something like fate, traps those who think to race accross its sands or hide in its unstoppable redoubts... This eroticized space, utterly mythological, nevertheless, appear authentic to the French.⁴³¹

Besides the cannnotative content of North Africa as mysterious dark geography and fate-like entrapment, the film is structured to reveal other trope like Aicha loyalty to the French Legionnaire, Gilfieth. Aicha symbolizes North Africa, as feminine, as colonizable geography: Conquerable and romantically submissive to European colonialism.⁴³²

Le Marchand de sable by Hugos André (1931), is celebration of European civilisation and exoticist ideology of French colonial cinema. It is about the life of French young lutenant in Mission to Gharday, Algeria, and Russian expatriate businessman, Warneskine, who lives suspiciously in stigmatized polygamous family.⁴³³ Warneskine lives with his wife and two other Russian women after two of his brothers died in the Russian revolution. He married the two widows and moved to live in North Africa with his Harem. The film is romanticization of native people in exotic show of North African music and rituals. At the end of the film, Warneskine was killed by his male Russian servant, Igor, which discursively implies the fact that Western culture does not tolerate cultural difference and the queer practices of ethnic otherness embodied in polygamy.⁴³⁴ The film equally associates North Africa as savage and antithetical to European civilization in a bare discourse of ethnic superiority and racial purity. Warneskine informs Varniere, the French lieutenant that he has left Russia in search for primitive quiet and simple life in North Africa. Warneskine says: "La civilization ! Ah ! je vous jure bien qu'elle n'a rien à exvier aux excès cruels des peuplades sauvages".⁴³⁵

Like Aicha in *La Bandera*, Zinah in *Barroud*, a film by Rex Ingram 1932, is in true love with André, but her father refuses this interracial romance because he arranged her marriage to Amarok, a tribal leader, to promote peace between tribal. However, this political marriage failed because of Amarok's ill intent to declare war on their tribe.⁴³⁶ The film is structured on colonialist sterotype of African politic as being weak and dominated by anarchy and rivalry between tribes. Intercultural encounters in the film entail interracial romance,⁴³⁷ a recurrent topoi

⁴³¹Dudley Andrew, "Praying Mantis: Enchantment and Violence in French Cinema of the Exotic," *In Vision of the Orient: Orientalism in Films*, p. 234.

⁴³²Colleen B. Kennedy, op. cit, p. 45.

⁴³³Coleen B. Kennedy, op. cit, p. 91.

⁴³⁴Ibid., p. 98.

⁴³⁵Ibid., p. 95.

⁴³⁶Ibid., p. 147.

⁴³⁷Ibid., p. 147.

of colonial cinema, between native Zinah and French André, Which implicitly implies the impossibility of success despite Zinah's true love to her colonial partner. *Barroud* ballantly essentialize the trope of rescue arrogated to the western hero. As narrative of colonial discourse, André is destined to liberate native woman and save her from the disasters of tribal / native cultures that celebrate the value of arranged marriage. The film is also reminiscent Lumiere freres's Film *Giglos Muselmans* in term of racial stereotype of the funny black North Africa. The funny black Moroccan servant of Zinah, who exhibits a discourse charged with sexually deviant behaviour and racially charged comedy or language.

In *Appeal du silence* by Léon Poirier, 1936, after working in colonial legionnaire in North Africa, Charles de Faucault returns to France, but he was unable to fit in, missing the quietude and simplicity of desert life in North Africa. Hence, he returned to North Africa not as colonial administrator, but to live there after giving up his military career and working as missionary alone in the desert. The film is classified as an overt pro-catholic and imperial propaganda as the film open message the protagonist shows no regret or nostalgia to leave France forever as the antithesis of other heroes in the colonial cinema of the 1930s like *Pépé in Pepi la Mokko* and Gilfieth in *La Bandera*.⁴³⁸ The prevailing discourse of the film represents a convergence between the Christian church and cinema in the pacification of North Africans, which insists on the stretching of French colonial borders and the creation of territory that goes further to catch up with the imperial horizon. *Appeal du silence* is a "work of art of highest moral and spiritual standards concerning a pioneer of French colonization in North Africa".⁴³⁹

Pepe Le Moko is another film by Julien Duvivier starred by the same actor, Gabin, under the role of Pepe. Like Gilfieth in *La Bandera*, Pepe is a French outlaw, who escaped his criminal past in 1930s France to settle down in the impenetrable Casbah in Algeria, which provides him with immunity from colonial police which is unadminstrable for them as well. Pepe is always contrasted with Salmane, a native inspector, who is represented as double-faced Arab and has a little solidarity with his fellow Arabs.⁴⁴⁰ Salmane is both accepted in the Casbah and tolerated by colonial administrator for his special services. Pépé and Salmane relationship is characterized by mutual attraction and repulsion, admiration and scorn. Whereas, Pepe is represented as masculine centre, Salmane is strangely presented as feminized other. The camera shots Pepe as holding central or higher position, while Salmane is presented in position of, for example,

⁴³⁸Ibid., p. 65.

⁴³⁹Ibid., p. 66.

⁴⁴⁰Janice Morgan, "In the Lybrinth: Masculine, Subjectivity, Expatriation and Colonialism in Pépé Le Moko," In *Visions of the East*, p. 258.

lighting cigarette for Pepe, which symbolizes a sort of repressed sexuality.⁴⁴¹ This is a persistent trait of cin ma colonial, native protagonists are not only marginalized, but minimized by the force of mise-en-scene. Extreme close-up shots of camera focalize the superiority and the domination of white characters in contrast to the inferiority and the subordination of native protagonists, who are conjured up as crowds and choes. When extreme close-up shots focalize individual natives, they are meant to define them as anti-thesis or in juxtaposition to the positive qualities of white characters in a structure of what Abdelkader ben Ali calls “fausse individualization” against true “individualization”. Of course, “fausse individualization” intentionally invokes negative connotation of threats, mistrust and fears⁴⁴².

Pepe is always announced clearly in his positive taste for women –either in the presence of the native Ines or the French Gaby, while Slimane always associated in negative warning “On t’aime trop, P p , les femmes to perdent”.⁴⁴³ Pepe relationship with the native Gipsy Ines and the French Gaby has two different tones. The Gipsy represents both his shelter from the past /reality and his confinement in the Casbah “Deux ans de Casbah, deux ans que je suis avec toi... Tu es pas une femme, t’es un r gime,”⁴⁴⁴ Gaby with her pearly whiteness, Jewels and parfums symbolizes the glittering of lost homeland and a promise of escape from exile. Gaby and Ines dissimilarly embody a spacial dichotomy that influences the identity of the male protagonist who is torn between the representativeness of both women as Algiers and Paris, the present and the past. Metaphorically, Ines stands for fear of cultural dissolution of European male feminized geography of oriental woman’s and culture. Gaby, however, represents a fear of sexual male ego in the geography of female body.⁴⁴⁵ Deborah Linderman states that *Pepe Le Moko* constitutes a bare example of orientalist discourse “it is will to power, and an intention to control, manipulate, and finally incorporate a world which is manifestly different, alternative, or novel, and which is implicitly resistant”.⁴⁴⁶

The film highlights the entrappment of the white working class European male hero by the sexual, cultural and the racial difference. Pepe decided to commit suicide after being caught not because lack of cultural knowledge or intellegence but because of cultural compliance between the Arab police and femininity (Ines helped the police to find Pepe).⁴⁴⁷ Many films of the

⁴⁴¹Ibid., p. 259.

⁴⁴²Abdelkader Ben Ali, *le Cin ma Coloniale au Maghreb : l’Imaginaire en Trompe-Loel* (Paris: Cerf, 1998), pp.149-150.

⁴⁴³Janice Morgan, p. 259.

⁴⁴⁴Ibid., p. 262.

⁴⁴⁵Ibid., p. 263

⁴⁴⁶Deborah Linderman, cited in Janice Morgan, p. 268.

⁴⁴⁷Janice Morgan, op. cit, p. 267.

1930s were predominated by the question of cultural difference and exotic romance, which shows indigeneous woman's love to European colonizer. They defend their true love by challenging traditions, religion and patriarchy as the case of Aicha and Laurency in *Le Sémou*, Zinah and André in *La Marchand des Sables*, Gilieth and Aicha in *La Bandera*. Equally, colonial cinema has presented European protagonists with preferential status. The protagonist is the most active, superior and outstanding among those who surround him (*La Bandera*, *Pépé le Moko*):

Place au sein d'un groupe d'homme divers, mais toujours inférieurs à lui. Gabin est à la fois l'exception de ce groupe et son condensé. Alors que ses amis ou complices sont unidimensionnels, il est complexe: chacun d'entre eux est porteur d'une valeur traditionnellement codée comme masculine (force physique) autorité pouvoir sur les femmes, sagesse) tandis qu'il les amalgame toutes.⁴⁴⁸

C-Celebrating Islamophobia: Media, Gender and Muslim Immigrants in Europe

Today, global media has extended its primary role to inform, educate and entertain people to a more alternative function of an ideological apparatus and discursive pattern involved in political socialization and fabrication of identities. TV, radio, internet and press as media of mass communication are playing a substantial part in the politics of public perception. Modern media were accused of manipulation, bias, brainwashing and propaganda by violating ethics of impartiality and principles of professionalism, becoming a part of soft or open imperialism that destroy the world value system and establish its hegemony as well as changing the notion of power of traditional nation state to the post modern state which relies on the monopoly of nuclear weapon, permanent international allies and high technology; a fact which can be clearly seen how media was powerful player in the war in Afghanistan, Irak, Syria, nuclear negotiation with Iran and the latest development in the Gulf crisis between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. This is what Jürgen Habermas calls the strategic mind which is logocentric and seeks global hegemony, making the crisis of the modern man more complicated because the so-called war on terror breeds counter-violence and barbarism⁴⁴⁹. Since the fall Soviet Union, the Khomeiny revolution, the first Gulf War and the 9/11 attacks, Islam has become subject to a variety of discursive practice and misconceptions.

Prejudices of fundamentalism and extremism, particularly after Madrid and Paris terrorist attacks were adopted to portray Islam as an overgeneralized representation of

⁴⁴⁸Ginette Vincindeau, op. cit, p. 68.

⁴⁴⁹Ali Harb, *Azmat al-Hadatha al-Faeiqa* (Casablanca: al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-Arabi, 2008), p. 15.

extremist religious ideology connected to barbarity and violence , particularly the American media which implemented the famous saying of Donald Ramsfield, secretary of defense in Bush administration, that strategic truths should be consolidated and protected by guards of lies⁴⁵⁰ and worse than that American government used media and dominant internet providers like Earthlink, AOL and Hotmail to control information exchange as well as the use of disinformation and publication of fake news by OSI (Office of Strategic Influence) for foreign press according to New York Times ⁴⁵¹. Association of Islam with violence and Jihadism constructed within a context that portrays Muslims as desiring to engage in unjustifiable war to unreasonably kill non-believers. This erroneous public perception is always accentuated by different genres of Media which impartially mix between discourse of politics and religion:

But this coverage (coverage of Islam by European and American Media) is misleadingly full, and great deal in this energetic coverage is based on far from objective material... In many instances Islam has licensed not only patent inaccuracy, but also expressions of unsestrained ethnocentrism, cultural, and even racial hatred, deep yet paradoxically free floating hostility.⁴⁵²

Racism, prejudice and discrimination against North Africans and other Muslim Immigrants in Europe date back to Nazism and the post world war II period. In addition, the increasing migration from ex-colonies created a substantial community of different religious and racial backgrounds, which infuse fears among native white population of cultural otherness. The media favour the consolidation of ethnic stereotypes and ideologies of cultural difference. They record, reconstruct and put a “special focus on negative conflictual or dramatic events, and generally a white, Western male, and middle perspective on news events”.⁴⁵³

News production also involves the reproduction of dominant ideology and the discourse of political elites and the making of social consensus. This category of discursive practice of white western journalism benefits from a viewing / reading public who favour negative representation and “in western Europe, there are as no dominant counter ideologies or anti-racist forces that are strong enough to have regular access to the media in order to counter balance the prevailing definitions”.⁴⁵⁴ Even minorities’ resistance and disobedience capture the attention of

⁴⁵⁰Ali Qassir, “al-Media tahta Satwat al-Ideologia: al-lalam al-Amriki baada al-Hadiashar min Aylol,” *Majalat al-Istighrab*, 11(2018), p.192.

⁴⁵¹*Ibid.*, pp.186-187.

⁴⁵²Edward Said, *Covering Islam: How Media and the Experts Determine how we See the Rest of the World* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), p.81.

⁴⁵³Teun Vandjik, *Mediating Racism: The Role of the Media in the Reproduction of Racism*, (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1987), p. 203.

⁴⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 204.

press and media which give great importance to negative attributes and strengthen ethnic prejudices like violence, deviance....⁴⁵⁵ Vandjik stated that press topics centre around negative perceptions and structures with prevailing themes such as: minorities are criminals, minorities use drugs, Dutch authorities help minorities.⁴⁵⁶

Minorities are not only disallowed access to express their version of reality in dominant media, but they are voided by journalists, who don't involve immigrants as respondents and don't listen to them because they are seen as unreliable source of witness or because of cultural prejudice, journalists feel uncomfortable to contact/ interview them.⁴⁵⁷ Reporters, editors and journalists represent immigrants in biased ways and mediated styles that predominantly conveyed in persuasive discourses that reconstructed and reproduced them in juxtaposition with the normal positive coverage of dominant white European such as the case of Spanish media's unbalanced coverage of crimes of young immigrants and xenophobic violence against North Africans⁴⁵⁸. Immigrants are most of time mediated and associated with thematic structures of arrest, illegality and protest.⁴⁵⁹

Negative perceptions of Islam and Muslim immigrants in Europe have been sensitively influenced by political events related to terrorist attacks or economic conflict of interests such as the oil crisis 1973 and 9/11 attacks in United States of America. Islamophobia as negative anti-muslim discourse is framed in Europe principle of secularism and vision of Islam as antithesis to democracy and human rights:

Islamophobia is a modern and secular antimuslim discourse and practice appearing in public sphere with the integration of Muslim immigrant communities and intensifying after 9/11. The term has been used increasingly amongst political circles and the media, and even Muslim organizations, especially since 1997 Runny-Med report: Islamophobia: a challenge for all.⁴⁶⁰

Islamophobia, anti-Islamic discourse, anti-Islamism or anti-Muslimsness define forms of media discourses and speeches that construct Muslim immigrants' situation as potential phobia and danger to the stability and the welfare state of democratic Europe. Taboild discourse and misleading media images associate immigrants with derogative connotations and demonized

⁴⁵⁵Ibid., p. 205.

⁴⁵⁶Ibid., p. 211.

⁴⁵⁷Ibid., p. 215.

⁴⁵⁸Ahmed Ildothén, *al-Maghreb wa Ispanya: al-Hijra wa Taalim wa Tarbiya* (Tangier: Manshurat Shiraa, 1995), p.14.

⁴⁵⁹Teun Vandjik, *Mediating Racism*, pp. 218-219.

⁴⁶⁰Jocelyne Cesari, "Muslims in Western Europe after 9/11: Why the Term Islamophobia is more a Predicament than an Explanation," in *Challenge Project Report: Securitization and Religious Divides in Europe* (Paris: GSRL Paris and Havard University, 2006), p. 5.

portrayals, which facilitate justification of public hostility, intolerance and violence against them. Taboild discourse takes one incident to overgeneralize it and make it representative of whole Muslim community trying to problematize the existence of second generation immigrants in Europe.⁴⁶¹ According Pimfortyn, a Dutch populist leader assassinated by left-wing animal right activist in 2002, Islam is a backward religion and the presence of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands represents a threat to democracy, tolerance and open-mindedness.⁴⁶²

The EUMC report on Islamophobia showed that after 9/11 attacks,⁴⁶³ Muslim immigrants were subject to multiple violent attacks that exceeded 80 incidents ranging from threats, grapffiti and desecration of Islamic symbols. Anti-Muslim feelings and racism against immigrants have increased after the assassination Van Gogh (2004) by the Moroccan Mohamed Bouyeri because of the famous film *Submission* which associates Muslim with violence and physical abuse related to the text of Koran. A bomb exploded in the gate of Muslim primaru school in Eindhoven in November 7th, 2004 and November 13th 2004, a small mosque was burnt by radical right wing activists. In an opinion poll, the Dutch participants showed that 68% felt threatened by migrant youth and 53% feared a terrorist attacks.⁴⁶⁴ The image of Muslims, strenghtened by political context and media-motivated prejudices, have become a daily occurance in public sphere and intellectual arena. After the Danish cartoon affair in 2006, another opinion poll in the Netherlands found that the stereotypes about Muslim were strengthened. In the minds of Dutch people, Islam is “unfriendly to woman” by 70.7% of participants, and 54% of respondants think that Islam and democracy are “incompatible”⁴⁶⁵ this implies that Muslim immigrants are subject to the the political context and media discourses that feed sentiment of discrimination and negative public perceptions among native European.

Media coverage of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands started in the 1990s with suspicion of some immigrants as belonging to Wahabist fundamentalism. Yet, 1980s has witnessed new reactions and attention, particularly with the “Rushdie Salmane” affair, the Khomeiny revolution and demonstrations of Dutch Muslims against Rushdie. The affair of Imam Moumni who stated in the press that European are “lower that dogs and pigs” because of homosexuality was taken to court, but vindicated by the Judge who declared that he expressed his religious belief. After this incident, Islam and Muslim immigrant have become antithetical to

⁴⁶¹Chris Allen in “Securitization and Religious Divides,” in *Europe challenge project Report*, p. 70.

⁴⁶²Marcel Maussen, “Anti-Muslim Sentiments and Mobilization in the Netherlands: Discourse, Policies and Violence,” in *Challenge Project Report*, p. 121.

⁴⁶³Ibid., p. 122.

⁴⁶⁴Ibid., p. 123.

⁴⁶⁵Ibid., p. 124.

tolerance, freedom of speech and obscuranism.⁴⁶⁶ In the same context, a journalist of the weekly HP/ Detijd declared in 2001 that Muslims do not fit the state of law, they should be forbidden from residing in the Netherlands.⁴⁶⁷ Equally, Gert Wilders, a radical nationalist, made a famous declaration, which states that second generation immigrants with petty crimes should be deported “if they have two passports, we should take back the Dutch and expel them to Morocco”.⁴⁶⁸ Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali born Muslim refugee and a member of liberal right party, is known for its overt anti-Muslim feeling and discourses in media and election. She propagates the incompatibility of Islam to democracy and associates the Prophet Mohammed with “Pedophile” and perverse behaviours. Hirsi Ali “continuously warns the Dutch not to be naive and to understand that even Muslims who seem modern and liberal are dangerous, because “liberal Muslims” simply try to camouflage their adherence to a deeply illiberal and archaic religion”.⁴⁶⁹

In an essay published by the Rotterdam city, Marianne Vander Anker, alderman of liveable Rotterdam, expressed a very violent anti-Muslim discourse and overgeneralized assumption that classify ‘hatred of homosexual’, ‘honour killings’ and ‘female circumcision’ “Muslim (as) guilty of ‘gang rapes’ because they considered western women to be ‘whores any how’ and she argued that Muslims were guilty of ‘stoning’ women. According to her, there were seven ‘plagues of Islam’, inclusion the ‘cult of virginity’”.⁴⁷⁰

In Germany, anti-Muslim feelings and immigrant xenophobia are described as latent and less negative in press coverage, which link immigrant or “Auslanders” (foreigners in general) to crime and failed integration. Islamophobia, in Germany, is associated with unfavourable attitudes towards mosque buildings and Islamization of Europe, which means that western media is influenced by international contexts. The “Zukunft –Europe” (future Europe) claims that migration, nationalization and high birth rates of Muslim population have the intent of conquering the west and reaching world supremacy.⁴⁷¹

Media coverage of 9/11 attacks and the murder of Theo Vangogh has limitedly influenced the image of German Muslim. Discussions in German press mostly deal with multiculturalism and the failure of immigrant integration. When the German minister, Trittin suggested the creation of Muslim holiday, the German Newspaper *Bild* (17, 11, 2004) has

⁴⁶⁶Ibid., p. 126.

⁴⁶⁷Ibid., p. 126.

⁴⁶⁸Geert Wilders cited in Chris Allen, p. 129.

⁴⁶⁹Ibid., p. 128.

⁴⁷⁰Ibid., p. 130.

⁴⁷¹Jasemin Karakasoglu et al “Germany Report: Securitization and Religious Divide in Europe,” in *challenge Project Report*. pp. 143-194, p. 158.

palyed into the topic and made a photomontage of the minister with a beard on the front page with the caption saying “by the beard of the Prophet, send Trittin into the desert.”⁴⁷²

Although Islamophobia is seen within a general discourse of xenophobia, this press photoshopping contains subtle messages of rejection and and critisim of ‘auslander’ cultures despite the fact that Muslim immigrants are not overtly rejected, German media is somtimes preoccupied by a range of topics related to immigration and culture like the scarf debate (Muslim teachers), forced marriage and oppression of female. The talk revolves around, for example, the high number of forced marriages without a reliable data and the problem of Muslim female students who refuse to attend certain classes like swimming.⁴⁷³ In TV programmes and soap operas:

There are examples in the ninties, but in most series migrants played a victim’s role either because they were badly treated by Germans or their community, or because they needed help. Migrants also often played the roles of offenders, but they were only seldom portrayed as citizen... female migrants are mostly stereotyped and discriminated as “alien”... although a positive development in their increasing presence in the German TV.⁴⁷⁴

Alec G. Hargreaves argued that perception of Arab immigrant in France as "sale" (dirty) symbolizes the persistence of colonial views of Maghrebi people in past colonial France, which reflects the indecent treatment of Muslims is still influenced by colonial supermacy and resilient negative connotations.⁴⁷⁵ Moroccan descendent immigrant Arbib was celebrating the qualification of Algerian national team to world cup finals in 2009, when a police officier sprayed him with tear gaz and insulted him with the commonly used offence "Allez, dégage sale Arabe. On peut vous tabasser cimme on vous", a sentence was taken as it is and published in le Monde November 24, 2009.⁴⁷⁶

In Italy, most media representations are negative stereotypes, which oscilliate between Islam as a totalitarian order and as an enemy to the western cultural ingeneral. Misconceptions of Islam equally represent it as a monolithic ideology with overgeneralized connotations of woman

⁴⁷²Ibid., p. 160.

⁴⁷³Ibid., p. 161.

⁴⁷⁴Ibid., p. 146.

⁴⁷⁵Alec. G. Hargreaves, cited in Kathlean Lange, “Monkeys and Moors: Rerceptions of Maghrebis in France and Spain in Mediterraeen Migration Mosaic,” eds Rose et al. April 29th, 2013, p. 13.

⁴⁷⁶“Allez Dégage Sale Arabe. On Peut vous Tabasser Comme on Veut,”. Le monde, sec. Societé, Nov 24, 2009, <http://www.lemonde.fr/société/article/2009/11/24/allez-degage-sale-arabe-on-peut-vous-tabasser-comme-on-veut-127156-3224.html>

oppression scarf affair and religious obscuranism.⁴⁷⁷ After 9/11 attacks, Italian Press have focused on the representation of attacks and migration issues, disseminating an overgeneralized propaganda of threat posed by Islam and Muslim immigrant in Italy. A Common characteristic of media in Italy is that it does not refute false news after they proved to be erroneous. In 2002 August, after the arrest of four Moroccans, who visited the church in Bologna, were charged with terrorist intent which was proved false later. The accusation was based on the church recording system.⁴⁷⁸

Many immigrants were falsely arrested under the claim of being linked to the Al-Qaeda because of suspicion and of overcharged discourse of biased media that inflame public fear and popular worries about an enemy that should be faced at any cost. The minister of Institutional reform wrote in an editorial, July 8, 2005:

Islam outlaws, we answer with crusades... Islamic people must be considered "outlaw" until they renounce their political and religious doctrine, based on violence... Islam spread hate and we spread love. That's why we must pursue crusades like in the battle of Lepanto... we are leaving in a real war in which the enemy is using the weapon of terrorism.⁴⁷⁹

In Spain, the Radio Channel COPE is well-known of its hostility to Muslim and immigrants. In its program, *Lamanana*, Islam is also represented as antithesis to the western democracy and Maghrebi immigrants are always associated violence terrorism, crime and other problems like "the destabilization of Spain by Morocco authorities".⁴⁸⁰

In March 16, 2010, the Italian agency ANS wrote about a group of Moroccan descent second generation immigrants who attacked two young Italian for revenge, one of this Italians is the son of Rome's mayor. The journalist who reported the event used a specific jargon that perpetuates discourses of rejection and subtle racism and foreignness. This is how the agency journalist portrays the attack: "a group of seven young gays... Italians, but sons of immigrants,"⁴⁸¹ The phrasing of the news and the insistence on immigrant connotes ethnic distance as related to this kind of behaviour. What's striking is the use of "Italians but...", which

⁴⁷⁷ Mirna Liguori, "Report on Islamophobia," in *Challenge Project Report: securitization and Religious Divides in Europe*, p. 313.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 315.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 310.

⁴⁸⁰ José Maria Ortuno Aix, "Report on Islamophobia in Spain," in *challenge Report project: Securitization and Religious Divides in Europe*, pp. 285-286.

⁴⁸¹ Bjorn Thomason, "Second Generation Immigrants, or Italians with Immigrant Parents, Italian and European Perspectives on Immigrants and their Children," *Bulletin of Italian Politics*, 2: 1 (2010), p. 29.

implies the persistence of notion of second immigrant as foreigner and reproduced as alien to Italian code of conduct.⁴⁸²

In an article *Europe's Angry Muslim* published in foreign Affairs in 2005, Robert Leiken talked about Muslim second generation immigrants as being an easy prey to the lure of radicalism as Europe melting pot model of integration failed to absorb Muslim immigrants to the dominant western values and norms. He warns Europe of this dangerously equipped and prepared young minority, which is both unemployed and unintegrated, and whose exclusive religious belief pose security threat to both USA and Europe.⁴⁸³

Gender in Italian media has a specific coverage with links to international context. According to the general media discourse, Muslim immigrant girls are victims of double discourse of Muslim culture and patriarchal authority. The split between two cultures discourse represents female embracement of Western norms, a situation made them subject to the authority of narrow-minded patriarchal and cultural authority which do not jettison and illegalize crimes like honour killing. Media discourses about female rights inflamed in cases like that of Sanaa, second Moroccan immigrant, who was killed by her father after she left family house to live unmarriedly with her Italian partner in 2009,⁴⁸⁴ while females are reproduced in conflictual tones as are portrayed torn between the double Jeopardy of traditional Muslim culture and Italian modern lifestyle, males are reproduced in confrontational metaphors as they are always radicalized and associated with extremism.⁴⁸⁵

Hijab affair has constituted a rich topic for popular imagination in Europe and constituted a rich encounter because of the images provoked by its gendered nature and associated with issues of human rights, freedom of expression and sexual liberty since Ayatollah al-Khomeini imposed the veil on Iranian women who work in the public sector⁴⁸⁶. Western media have brought up the topic in connection with violence that characterizes Muslim immigrant presence in Europe. News and press give priority to negative perception of the veil and dramatize narratives related crimes of honour, female circumcision and forced marriages. In European Media, the veil /hijab/ burqa became allegories of religious otherness and cultural difference. More than that, the veil is synonymous with women restrictive identity, "I can not think of a

⁴⁸²Ibid., p. 29.

⁴⁸³Ibid., p. 35.

⁴⁸⁴Ibid., p. 37.

⁴⁸⁵Ibid., p. 35.

⁴⁸⁶Fatima el Mernissi, *Hal Antum Muhasanon dida al-Harim*, Trans. Nehla Baydon (Casablanca: el Fanak, 2000), p. 159.

more dramatic visual symbol of oppression, the vast majority of women who cover their hair, faces and bodies do so because they have no choice.”⁴⁸⁷

Hijab discourse does not only deprive Muslim woman from her choice and freedom of expression agency, but it also is made to cannote a patriarchal masculinist dominant authority which desecrate woman body without a cover. It is metaphorically encoded as “3awra” or sin that should not be allowed to speak for itself or to declare its own existence since its is annihilated by Muslim norms and traditions. Suzane Moore, a journalist in *the observer* talks about the Burqa in this horrific image:

In the female body is so sinful it must be completely covered, or if its exhibition shows the whorishness of all women. We make all sexuality something which is women’s fault. The idea men can’t control sexual impulses while women must do nothing to liberate women –or men- from the horrific round of repression, guilt, blame and shame.⁴⁸⁸

The veil constitutes a historical continuation is western literature and art which exhibit spectacular symptom of Hijab complex or disorder of European media hysteria about oriental women. The European masculinist discourse of oriental woman was characterized by frustration and attaction, but the most dominant topoi in discursive references relied on reproducing woman as a prisoner of patriarchy and culture. Hoodfar argues that Western media, in general, hold the “assumption that ‘the veil’ equals ‘ignorance’ and ‘oppression’ has meant that young Muslim women have to invest a considerable amount of energy literate students/ persons ”.⁴⁸⁹

The persistence of misrepresentation and racist prejudices about Muslim woman is not only limited to the fantasies and the frustrations of male colonialist discourse, but it was racially perpetuated and adopted by Western feminist who uncritically represent non-western and Muslim women in the same standards of their male counter parts. Muslim women were subject to a similar perception from western feminism which see them from the eyes of a superior discourse that cast them as backward, submissive and victims of patriarchal domination, they did not question male colonial rhetorics “significantly western feminist failure to interrogate critically colonial, racist and androcentric constructs of women of non-Western cultures forces Muslim to choose between fitghing sexism or racism”.⁴⁹⁰

Although the veil has become symbolic of Muslim woman identity, misconception of woman veil by western discourse continued to see it as immutable symbol that is immune to

⁴⁸⁷Joan Smith, *the Search of Common Ground: Muslims, Non-Muslims and the Media* (London: Greater London Authority, 2007), p. 13.

⁴⁸⁸Suzane Moore in *the Search for Common Ground*, p. 14.

⁴⁸⁹Homa Hoodfar, “The Veil in their Minds and on our Heads: The Persistence of Colonial Images Muslim Women” in *RER / DRF*, 22: 3/4(1993), pp. 5-18, p. 5.

⁴⁹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 6.

social, political and aesthetic transformation. For Homma Hoodfar, the veil is not a static homogeneous piece of clothing, whose cultural functions and meanings is to sequester and constrain woman's freedom and violate their personal expression; rather, the veil has been subject to a range of shifting meanings "It may be worn to beautify the wearer... much the same western woman wear make up, to demonstrate respect to conventional values... or to hide wearer's identity".⁴⁹¹

Between 1800 and 1930 Muslim woman became a source of male western fantasy and fascination as the orient was representative of Harems in which oriental males / masters enslave their women. Equally, women were seen as spending their boring life in drinking coffee, smoking hookah and getting beautified for the huge sexual appetite of their husband.⁴⁹² The famous *Les Femmes d'Algers dans leur Appartement* 1848 by Eugene Delacroix represents a popular tableau of European colonial orientalism in North Africa. Delacroix artificially decorated studio Harem by perfectly imitating Arabic calligraphy of writing on the plaque with other oriental paraphenia like hookah, coffee black servant. *Women of Algiers* is a typical orientalist piece of visual art, reproducing oriental women exoticized and eroticized by the voyeuristic western gaze.⁴⁹³

Exoticism emanates from the ethnographic picturesque spectacle of the brilliant colours of local clothes, gold/ red glittering and the strange setting of oriental interior. Eroticism is the "uncertain sensuality" and the explicit sexual change of seclusion of women and their passivity.⁴⁹⁴ All this private content is reported through the voyeuristic gaze –or stolen gaze as Assia Djebbar calls it- of the male western beholder to present the other is an inviting spectacle. The Orient "is arrayed in the brilliant colors of exotism and exuding a full brown yet uncertain sexuality, where unflamable sensuality msyteries durrell and cruel and barbaric scene are staged, has fascinaed and disturbed Europe for along time".⁴⁹⁵

Photography in colonial Algeria plays a significant role in the orientalist desire of unveiling Arab female and the penetration into the veiled and borbidden Harem, making connection with the colonization of North Africa by framing accessibility to geography and private interior. However, being denied accessibility and deprived his own gaze, the photographer of the post card set up his own studio to fabricate artificialcontext of exoticism

⁴⁹¹Ibid., p.7.

⁴⁹²Ibid., p. 8.

⁴⁹³Barbara Marlow, *the Colonial Harem*, Introduction.

⁴⁹⁴Ibid, introduction.

⁴⁹⁵Malek Alloula, *the Colonial Harem*, Trans. Myrna Godsich and wlad Godzich (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), p. 3.

and meet his scopic curiosity of the "forbidden".⁴⁹⁶ The artificial setting of postcard shot in studio with hired model and encats the perceived image of exotic people exhibits unspontaneous posters, gestures of models who were staged in an array of traditional Algerian clothes and Jewellery. The postcards signify the voyeur manipulation and instruction to generate a certain reality or "truth" transparent, similar to objective facts, but ideologically constructed.⁴⁹⁷

Malek Alloula states that the disappointment of the photographer and his impotence immanate from the power of Algerian woman's veil, which represents an obstacle to the gaze and the camera of the voyeurist.⁴⁹⁸ The veil of the Algerian woman discourages the photographer previous knowledge and preparedness to uncover the exotic body of woman. The Algerian woman white veil forms an attire that challenge the voyeur ego and his nostalgia to precolonial exoticism. The veil is: "a concrete negation of his desire and thus brings to the photographer confirmation of a triple rejection: the rejection of his desire, of the practice of his art and his place in a milieu that is not his own".⁴⁹⁹

However, the representation of Muslim woman in 19th century reflected the invisible reality of occidental woman in the Western ideology. The images of oppressed oriental woman were equally applied to the situation of woman in the west. Occidental women and travellers were not completely free agent; they were not allowed to travel unless accompanied by men. While westerners criticized polygamy 19th century Europe was know for the phenomenon of "mistress" and "illegitimate" children and their mothers were denied access to economic and symbolic rights.⁵⁰⁰ Hoodfar states that:

Both oriental Muslim and Christian occidenatl woman were thought to be in need of male protection and intellectually and biologically destined for the domestic domain. Moreover, both the orient and the occident women were expected to obey and honour their husbands.⁵⁰¹

Homma Hoodfar tried to deconstruct the veil stereotype as as static practice which stands for the oppressive nature of Muslim culture. She worked on the signification of the veil among Muslim women and the view of Western and oriental feminism and came with the conclusion that the veil has become a symbol of Muslim woman agency, personal choice and practice of resistance "many veiled Muslim women employ the veil as an instrument of mediation between

⁴⁹⁶Ibid., p. 15.

⁴⁹⁷Stuart Hall et al., eds., *Different* (London: Phaidon Press, 2001), p. 38.

⁴⁹⁸Malek Alloula, p. 14.

⁴⁹⁹Malek Alloula, p. 7.

⁵⁰⁰Homa Hoodfar, op. cit, p. 8.

⁵⁰¹Ibid., p. 8.

Muslim women minority cultures and those of host cultures”.⁵⁰² The masculinist European images of oriental women perpetuate a dominant belief of superiority that recreates the other in different range of negative discourses and perceptions. Rana Khabani says that Western discourse about Muslim women and her veil is characterized by continuity and ambivalence. They are historically perpetuated both as “desire, pity, contempt and outrage” and as “erotic victims and schimatizing witch”.⁵⁰³

Before 11, 2004 Madrid attack, Muslim women in Spain were portrayed as subservient and submissive. This image is related to European colonial discourse and international context of 11/9 attacks. Representation and relations with Muslim woman were seen by Spanish from the Historical Moorish conquest of Andalusia, based on kind of Maurophobia⁵⁰⁴ as and equivalent of old Islamophobia which equals the Moors with conquest and violence. Nowadays, Spanish press, after being affected by the terrorist events in both America and Europe, has shifted its narratives from defining Muslims on ethnic / racial grownds to religious basis.⁵⁰⁵ With the politicization of immigration and the presence of terrorist attacks in Europe and Spain, press as the voice of intelegencia and elite has contributed widely to the inflamation of racism and conservative discourse on Muslim and Islam which became representative of threat and terror, particularly when this phobia has a historical echoes:

Everything that refers to the Moroccans –To moros- the secular object of phobia in Spain, leaves its storian on Islam and is perceived as Muslim. An increasingly collective sense of fear coupled with vague, implied threats lends legitimacy to Islamophobia which its ancestor Maurophobia enjoyed.⁵⁰⁶

Generally, the western discourse has associated for long time Muslim people, wether in the Mashreq or the Maghreb, with certain moral and intellectual inferiority and incompatibility with democratic values, relating this inferiority to the oppression of oriental Muslim woman. For Tareq Ramadan, it is not only a question of inferiority, it is the dominant discourse of media that turns hijab and Islam to adangerous enemy which is radical, strange and different from “us” ; besides, the visibility/practice of Muslim faith in French public space is not only seen as challenge to laicté, but a potential threat to security or sign of radicalization⁵⁰⁷. Before the March

⁵⁰²Ibid., p.9.

⁵⁰³Rana Kabbani, *Imperial Fictions: Europe's Myths of the Orient* (London: Pandora, 1994), p. 26.

⁵⁰⁴Angeles Ramirez, “Muslim Women in the Spanish Press: The Persistence of Subaltern Images,” In *Images of Muslim Women in War Crisis*, ed. Foegheh Shirazi (Austin: The University of Texas press, 2011), p.227.

⁵⁰⁵Ibid., p. 227.

⁵⁰⁶Ibid., p. 229.

⁵⁰⁷Tarq Ramadan, *les Musulmans dans la Laïcité* (Lyon : éditins Tawhid, 2013), p.96.

2004 attacks of Madrid, the Moroccan Muslim – Moorish- woman was represented in Spanish press as submissive and powerless creature, but after the attacks, the Muslim woman was perpetuated as rural, ignorant and stubborn-minded.⁵⁰⁸ The Spanish perpetuates the image of woman wearing scarf as symbol of obscuranism and portrays her as a victim of masculine manipulation not as personal option or choice , "through the lens of the Spanich press, one habitually viexed Muslim women in contexts of instabiliy, passivity and poverty, contexts that seemed incompatible with a newer more assertive image" .⁵⁰⁹

This new assertive image of Moroccan Muslim women wearing scarf has become the thematic structure of the Spanish press after March attacks, particularly in the El Pais ,The voice of socialist party, El Mundo,The voice of Popular conservative party and critique of socialist goverment, and ABC, Monarchical and catholic traditional popular party.⁵¹⁰ After March 11th train bombings, Muslim women and their headscarves have become the leitmotive of these newspapers and the source of popular protest against Muslim students wearing veils in schools (February 2002, October, 2007). The ABC opinion discourse was characterized by violent, vitriolic and pejoratic references and associations resembling with those directed to the gypsies and the poors of Andalusia. For instance, “a little poor chaymaa”, refering to girls wearing Hijab.⁵¹¹

After the terrorist attacks, El Pais wrote an article about the sister of the two terrorists who blew themselves in Leganes. El Pais presented Naima Oulad Akcha, the sister, as person who is totallly preoccupied with her religiousity and seclusion as well as showing a strong resistance to remove her scarf.⁵¹² Although Naima was not involeved in the attacks, El Pais reported her as an "*already guilty*" before the result of investigation. However, the 13 –year- old Moroccan girl, victim of the attacks, was represented as any other Spanish teenage girl. The article reported that she has never spoken Arabic and she was not wearing a headscarf although she was wearing it. She was represented as one of “*us*” .⁵¹³

El Mundo covered the attacks by interviewing the two sisters (25, 27 years old) and the mother of one of the terrorists. The mother was portrayed as wearing the headscarf because she is old and not for religious reason. The sisters reported as following western life style. They pray five times a day, but they don not visit the mosque on Fridays. The paper discourse implies that although they are the sisters of a terrorist, they don’t like to wear the headscarf, focusing on

⁵⁰⁸Angeles Ramires, “Muslim Women in the Spanish Press,” p. 3.

⁵⁰⁹Ibid., p. 230.

⁵¹⁰Ibid., p. 230-231.

⁵¹¹Ibid., p. 232.

⁵¹²Ibid., p. 236.

⁵¹³Ibid., p. 235.

the “Normalcy of this family”⁵¹⁴ which strengthen the belief that the headscarf is associated with bad Muslimism and terrorism.

But what is interesting is that both El Mundo and El Pais adopted the same strategy, that is, they decided the best way to exonerate Muslims in articles of printed interviews was to minimize the impact of being Muslims. In this way, Islam, usually symbolized by the head scarf or by incompatibility with democratic values, was made invisible in order to play on reader’s sentiment.⁵¹⁵

The affair of Fatima, who was expelled from quasi-private school because of the headscarf in 2002, has caught the attention of press. El Mundo portrayed the Moroccan as an “introverted” and her parents don’t speak Spanish. The articles contrasted Fatima to other Moroccan girls who do not wear the veil and are better adopted. The article reports that “the only feature that betrays their Moroccan origin is their eyes”.⁵¹⁶ ABC article about the affair of Fatima talks about her family as conservative and the father forces the wife and the daughter to wear the head scarf.⁵¹⁷ El Mundo published statistics of Moroccan dropouts which vary accordingly; sometimes, it is high among females, while, other times, it is higher among males. The socialist city council, who prepares the statistics, perpetuates the image of Islam as “restricting people freedoms”.⁵¹⁸ In 2007, Moroccan Shaima was ordered to take off her head scarf at school. El Pais uses the phrase “a little Muslim girl” and portrays her family situation as unstable, nomadic and poor. The family equally was reported as not conforming to simple social requirement and shows readiness to migrate again if her daughter was not allowed to wear the veil. The veil in Spanish press became a symbol of school failure and copy of the nomadic situation of the Gypsy as poor cultural out cast.⁵¹⁹

However, in 2007 both the editorials of El Pais and El Mundo agreed on the fact that Muslim students under no circumstance should be prohibited from attending school, but in March 2007, El Mundo related the image of new Muslim women who are spending too much money, using credit cards and expensive accessories, with fundamentalism and obscurantism. El Mundo published photos of Niqab woman pushing little boy on expensive stroller, which changed the traditional image of Muslim woman as a poor.⁵²⁰ ABC editorials support the

⁵¹⁴Ibid., p. 236.

⁵¹⁵Ibid., p. 237.

⁵¹⁶Ibid., p. 238.

⁵¹⁷Ibid., p. 238.

⁵¹⁸Ibid., p. 239.

⁵¹⁹Ibid., p. 240.

⁵²⁰Ibid., p. 242.

prohibition of chador, headscarf because it represents a challenge to society whose culture is predominantly against subordination of women.

The Islamic headscarf could be, of course, a discutional exercise of individual freedom, but in its natural context, which is not European, it symbolizes a way to order society in accordance with directives that despite being internalized by women, are opposed to the equality of sexes.⁵²¹

El Pais, equally, in an article entitled *women without attributes*, Suzane Fortes equates chador to poor education and the idea that Europeans educate is a way to liberate women: "may be the only way that within a few years we will see a little Shaima with her face uncovered, having become an adolescent who can dress as she wishes, even showing her belly button as she wants, feeling proved of her body and mind ...".⁵²² Feminist discourse in El Pais relates the wearing of shador either to the dictatorship of traditions – traditions mean Islam- or to youthful silliness or foolishness. This foolishness is refered to by Soledad Gallego –Diaz in her article of october 12th, 2007 *Traditions does not suit women well* as response to a Muslim girl letter to El Pais, saying that wearing hijab is her own personal choice not a coercion.⁵²³ Another columnist in El Mundo, Ivan Tubu, who associates scarf wearing with potential fanaticism:

When a young decides to wear the headscarf as anti-establishmentarian statement and not because of her authentic belief, this is serious because she can easily become a full brown fanatic, as we have seen through history with other religion .⁵²⁴

In Spanish press, the perception of Muslim woman is still echoing both transmutive and immutable construction of oriental woman as passive, subbordinate and submissive creature, suffering the tripple Jeopardy of patriarchy, matriarchy and religion. Muslim immigrants are assoicated with poor education and failure to integrate. The absence of headscarf symbolizes modernity and adaptation, while its presence signals obscuratism and threat to democratic values reminescent of Maurophobia. Young woman's choice of wearing the veil is not seen as a choice-making or religious requirement or as personal preference or resistance⁵²⁵, but, rather, as something imposed by a certain force (Shaima's grandmother, Fatima's father...).⁵²⁶ The chador/hijab is like a pawn for the Spanish press. It has become a retro-verso-cassete:

⁵²¹Ibid., p.242.

⁵²²Suzane Fortes cited in Ramirez. p. 243.

⁵²³Soledad Gallego – Diaz cited in Ramirez, op. cit, p. 19.

⁵²⁴Uvan Tuba cited in Ramirez, op. cit, p. 20.

⁵²⁵Victoria Gairin, "Pourquoi Elles Portent le Voile," *le Point Références, L'islam ce Qu'il Faut Savoir*, 65(2016), p.68.

⁵²⁶Ramirez, op. cit, p. 249.

When the newspapers intention was to bring readers closer to the Muslim women (or woman) featured in an article, the headscarf was made visible there by creating a sense of sameness and solidarity. When the press wanted to accentuate feelings of opposition and alienation, the hijab became a central focus.⁵²⁷

2-The History of Stereotypes and Allegories of Representation: Continuity Narratives and Shifting Paradigms

A-Between Tradition and Reformism: The Stereotype as Transmutive and Resurrective Performance

Stereotypes are forms knowledge which are produced and transmitted among members of dominant communities or groups and across generations. Stereotypes about other communities and cultures or cultural groups rely substantially on a system of beliefs and classifications shared by members of the dominant cultural group and serve as boundaries better people. The stereotype “signifies prejudiced and socially widespread ideas about foreigners”⁵²⁸. Even within the boundaries of one society/ community, stereotypes are perceptions of in groups in term of gender, age, class occupation, religion and geography. Samovar and Porter defines stereotypes as “perceptions or beliefs we hold about groups or individuals based on previously formed attitudes of opinions” .⁵²⁹

Stereotypes, which can be both negative and positive, are generated over periods of time and through encounters with other people and cultures, forming a form of categorizing/ classifying cultural process adopted by dominant people to make sense of the unfamiliar and the foreign “ stereotypes are standardized conceptions of people, primarily based on an individual’s belonging to a category (usually race, nation, professional role; social class, or gender) or the possession of characteristic traits symbolizing one of these categories”.⁵³⁰ The stereotype is the perpetuation of certain truth about "other" it is "a cognitive structure that contains a perceiver’s knowledge, beleifs and expectations about human groups".⁵³¹ Stereotypes are overgeneralized attitudes and perception of other people and their cultures, associating them with definite

⁵²⁷Ibid., p. 249.

⁵²⁸Jorg Schweinitz, *Film and Stereotype: a Challenge for Cinema and Theory*, Trans. Laura Schleussner (New York: Colombbia University Press, 2011), p. 3.

⁵²⁹L. A. Samovar and R. E Porter, *Communication between Cultures* (Belmont CA: wadsworth, 1991), p. 280.

⁵³⁰Jorg Schweinitz, *Film and Stereotype*, p. 3.

⁵³¹Hamilton and Trolie cited in Mellissa J. Williams and Julie Spencer –Rodgers, “culture and Stereotyping Processes: Integration and New directions,” *the Social and Personality compass* 4:8 (2010), p. 599.

attributes and assumptions and involving great deal of distortions and fallacies. While the stereotype is an over generalized and simplified knowledge of outgroup (Brown 1995), prejudice is defined as a refusing attitudes against individuals. It is the "unfair, biased, or intolerant attitudes or opinions towards another person or a groups simply because they belong to a specific religion, race, nationality or another group".⁵³² The prejudice represents the middle location between the streotype and discrimination since it embraces explicit rejection of others. Pettigrew and Meertens differentiate between two types of prejudices; "balatan prejudices" which are overt of forms of discrimination and "subtle prejudices", which are covert or implicit forms of rejection.

These categorizations of groups and over generalizations are mediated and fortified through a variety of patterns like jokes, literature, cinema and othertypes of media. Many ethnic groups are racially victimized by discrimination in employment, education and housing because of dominant cultural discourse that negatively atributes characteristics to "others", playing an important role in defining them as for minorities of ghetto minorities. Subtle or overt stereotyping is expressed by, for example, putting blame on "others", hilighting their lack of responsibility, of their cooperation and lack of their competitiveness, from the dominant view point, the stereotype is an integral part of the nature of the subordinate group. The stereotype is characterized by generalization and strengthened by repetition and historical transculation in the literary and fictional traditions of dominant cultures.

In sociopsychological discourse, Walter Lippman defines stereotypes "as pictures in our heads"⁵³³. In social science, stereotypes are defined in a range of attributes; they function as mental fixation of people (stability), they submit to consensus and standardization (conformity), they rely on few characteristics (reduction), they are socially communicated and have the cliché effect⁵³⁴. In humanities and linguistics, stereotypes take the form of standardized expressions, recurrent patterns of narration and fixed colocations born out of alliance between paralinguistic usage and language system conventionalized over the course of time and experience change according to social context. For Riffaterre, in literary prose stereotypes are clichés of verbal nature; they are fixed lexeme connections, being banal, but "categorized as the *Gadus* and *Parnassum* and recommended as a 'pleasant phrase'"⁵³⁵. For Ruth Amossy, the stereotype is interpreted within reception aesthetics and has to do with "the reader's cultural memory" in kind of compliance between the text and the reader. Albert Memi states that the "stereotype is

⁵³²Samover and Porter, op. cit, p. 281.

⁵³³Walter Lipmman, *Public Opinion* in Jorg Schweinitz, *Film and Stereotype*, p. 4.

⁵³⁴Jorg Schweinitz, p. 5.

⁵³⁵Michael Riffatere, *Essais de Stylistique Structurale* in Jorg Schweinitz, pp. 16-17.

produced and perpetuated in the plural ”⁵³⁶. This collective marking in the plural is coupled with object fixation (turning into object). The cliché enables the dominant discourse to give a legal picture to its illegal practices. It helps colonialist and orientalist ideologies to appear normal and unquestionable. In this passage, Albert Memi talks about the characteristics of the stereotype as as contagion which renders the colonized/ subaltern/ immigrant passive and subject to as internalizing process:

The accusation disturbs him and worries him even more because he admires and fears his powerful accuser. ‘Is not partially right?’ he mutters. ‘are we not all a little guilty after all?’ lazy, because we have so many idlers? Timid, because we let our selves be oppressed’. Wilfully created and spread by the colonizer, this mythical and degrading portrait ends up by being accepted and lived with to a certain extent by the colonized. It thus requires a certain amount of reality and contributes to the portrait of the colonized... He ends up recognizing it as one would a detested nick name which has become a familiar description.⁵³⁷

The stereotype is equally reductionist if we take into account the fact that people identities are not immutable attributes; rather, they are subject to historical, social, individual, psychological and cultural transformations, which obliterate ahistoricism and profoundly influence the internal and external construction of identities. The stereotype, as an external ascription, exhibits another feature. It is contradictory:

The traits ascribed to the colonized are incompatible with one another. He is depicted as frugal, sober, without many desires and, at the same time, he consumes alcohol, meat... etc; as a coward who is afraid of suffering and as a brute who is not checked by any inhibitions of civilization. At the basis of the entire construction, one finally finds a common motive; the colonizer’s economic and basic needs, which shape and explain each of the traits he assigns to the colonized.⁵³⁸

The stereotype does not only constitute the totalitarian European discourse of difference, but, rather, it defines its very superior nature. It has become the lived experience of otherness in Europe. The stereotype is the daily code of cultural praxis. It shapes the norms of encounters and the structures of its very existence since “other” are undisputedly rejected on religious and racial grounds. The European discourse of difference has persistently rendered itself as one of the most spectacular site of complexes: prosperity complexes, Mummy complexes and the belated hijab complexes. The visibility of others in the European public and imaginary space has become the

⁵³⁶Ruth Amossy, *Idées Reçues* in Jorg Schweinitz, P. 20.

⁵³⁷Albert Memi, *the Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), p. 83.

⁵³⁸Ibid., p. 83.

prevailing obsession. Homi Bhabha defines the stereotype as a "form of knowledge" that relies on the discursive strategy of colonial ideology. The effectiveness of this knowledge is drawn from an identification that is ambivalent and keeps residing on fixation and repetition. Hence, the stereotypical knowledge of the dominant discourse maintains its:

Repeatability in changing historical and discursive conjunctions, it informs its strategies of individuation and marginalization; produces that effect of probabilistic truth and predicability which, for the stereotype, must always be in excess of what can be empirically proved or logically construed.⁵³⁹

Bhabha has forsaken the traditional dichotomous perception of the stereotype as a pure judgement of the direct relation between the colonizer and the colonized within a game of loser and winner. Rather, Bhabha, reversely, situates the stereotype on the ledge of both parts of the game. The stereotype lies in the "productive ambivalence of the object of colonial discourse; that "otherness" which is at once an object of desire and derision, an articulation of difference contained within the fantasy of the stereotype is what made Bhabha gave it another characteristic, which is paradox. For Bhabha, the stereotype manifests a paradoxical identity, whose manifestation appears in its adoption of colonial knowledge, denying and desiring cultural difference, recognizing others, and, at the same time, disavowing them. The stereotype is "a complex, ambivalent, contradictory mode of representation, as anxious as it is assertive".⁵⁴⁰

The latent enunciation of colonial discourse, which Edward Said described in the forms of "dreams", "myths" and "fantasies", is always obsessed with threats of the "return of the oppressed" in the form of old threatening stereotypes: The Canibal, the lustful and the savage. Hence, one of Bhabha's stereotype functions is its ability to be both the desirable and the fearful, the dream and the nightmare, tranquility and threat, the familiar and the strange, the phobia and the fetish. This experience of perception appropriates the function of:

West contempt for what is familiar and shivers of delight in-or fear of - novelty controlling what seems to be threat to some established views of things... the threat is muted, familiar values impose themselves... The mind reduces the pressure upon it by accommodating things to itself as either "original" or "repetitions..." the orient... vacillates between them.⁵⁴¹

Bhabha relates the function of stereotype to a process of disavowal, seeing fetishism as reactivation of original fantasy which is embodied in the anxiety of castration and sexual

⁵³⁹Homi Bhabha, "The Other Question... Homi Bhabha Reconsiders the Stereotype and the Colonial Discours," *Screen*, 24: 6 (1983): 18-36, p. 18.

⁵⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁵⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 26.

difference. The discourses of race and sexuality establish connection with the image of the fetish in terms of recognition and, at the sametime, disavowal of difference;⁵⁴² that is, the subject of desire always osciliates between the primal fantasy, cultural and racial purity and the threat of being ruptured. Fetishism is always a “play” or vascillation between the archaic affirmation of skin/ race/ similarity –in Freud terms “all men have penises, in ours “All men” have the same skin / race /culture – and the ansxiety associated with lack and difference –again for freud "some do not have penises", “for us” some do not have the same skin / race/ culture” .⁵⁴³

So, being threatened by difference of race and culture, the subject (colonizer, colonized), uses the stereotype /fetish to build its identity on both “mastery and pleasure as it is on anxiety and defense” .⁵⁴⁴ However, the act of disavowing difference embraces the rise of threatening the homogeneous structure of the subject in a form of false “doubling” or “grotesque memory”.⁵⁴⁵ In addition, for Bhabha, stereotyping does not necessarily implies a "false representation, but it is a simplified form of representation since it predicates the stereotype as “arrested and fixated” .⁵⁴⁶

Stereotyping, exclusion and violence against minorities in Europe is not, however, considered as context that lead second generation youth to revolt and protest. For instance, French and European are made to believe that they are right to feel racist and discriminatory because of the violence of minorities and banlieue youth to legitimate their attitudes as a form of self defense against otherness and non-Europeaness rather than discrimination:

The discourse of urban violence intensifies these tensions when supposedly unsuspecting public is told that, ultimately, they will be the victims of outer-city youth, if they are not controlled and confined... while the degraded conditions typical of outer city public housing and schools in the other France are not understood as a form of violence.⁵⁴⁷

Stereotyping and structural discrimination appear in police profiling, regulation of mobility and un the public discourse of the threat posed by the presence of illegal immigrants and refugees, who are subject to certain types of confinement and imprisonment system in the new Europe. This enstragement of immigrants and refugees is not only limited to discredit them from possessing rights, but they are, also, subject to, in countries like Germany, to other

⁵⁴²Ibid., p. 27.

⁵⁴³Ibid., p. 27.

⁵⁴⁴Ibid., p. 27.

⁵⁴⁵Ibid., p. 27.

⁵⁴⁶Ibid., p. 27.

⁵⁴⁷Keaton cited in Fatima El Tayeb, "European "Others": Queering Ethnicity in Postcolonial Europe," In *Difference Incorporate*, eds. R. A. Ferguson G. Kynngwon series (Mineapolis: University of Minnesota press, 2011), p. 25.

disfranchisements like they don't have the right to find a work, they rely on their only source of income, which is help and welfare payment of the state.⁵⁴⁸ What is worse is that civil war refugees do not have the right to move freely, particularly those regulated by Duldang. They are confined to a place, which constraints them from leaving the country of city where they were born the place where they were originally assigned to take as refuge.⁵⁴⁹ The stereotype and racism depend substantially on silencing postcolonial minorities in Europe. These silencing of cultural and ethnic others and enforced diasporas led to the rise of vernacular culture and alternative means of expression and forms of identity construction among marginalized groups like Rai music, Beur cinema and hiphop culture. Both protest and resistance through new forms of identity gave an expression of specific identification of autonomous heterogeneous alternative voice.⁵⁵⁰

Second generation immigrants could not identify both with traditional immigrant culture and racist ideologies of Europe by generating a hybridized cultural discourse that challenges the oppositional discourse of new Europe that defines them as ghetto minority of underclass of the continent (Roma, Muslims, Asians) their unwillingness to adopt the culture of their oppressor and speak the language of racism enabled them to hybridize it and to destandardize it. Equally, British perception of Muslim immigrant is characterized by bias and unfairness. Anti-Muslim prejudice in Britain is particular case since it combines between nationalism and xenophobia. Tariq declares that "muslimophobia is the heart of contemporary British and European cultural racism". Moddod emphasizes that:

Radicalized groups that have distinctive cultural identities or community life defined as "alien" will suffer an additional dimension of discrimination and prejudice... cultural racism is likely to be particularly aggressive against those minority communities that want to maintain, and not just defensively, some of the basic elements of their culture or religion and if, far from denying their differences (beyond the color of their skin and demand to be accepted just as they are).⁵⁵¹

According to the Runny Trust Report, Islamophobia and xenophobia have different forms, inclusion, exclusion (from government, employment), violence, prejudice and discrimination. The dominant European narrative perpetuates the cliché of Muslim inability to integrate and they constitute threat since they show support for extremism, a threat is also

⁵⁴⁸Fatima El Tayeb, p. 25.

⁵⁴⁹Ibid., p. 27.

⁵⁵⁰Ibid., p. 29-30.

⁵⁵¹Tariq Modood, *Multicultural Politics, Racism, Ethnicity and Muslim in Britain* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh university Press, 2005), p. 38-39.

concluded from a deliberate conflict of mainstream culture of Britain and Europe.⁵⁵² Muslim immigrants have become the actual and the potential dangerous underclass of Europe like the old ones: Roma, Jews, Christians; “Islam is profoundly different from, and a serious threat to, the west, and within Britain Muslims are different from and a threat to “us” ... (Muslim) are challenging “our” culture, values, institutions and way of life” .⁵⁵³

After the 9 / 11 attacks, North African Muslims and immigrants have been subject to hostile treatment and violence in Europe. The European centre on Racism and xenophobia registered 48 incidents of violence against Muslims in the Netherlands in 2001.⁵⁵⁴ 51% of Dutch participants in the Pew Global Project had unfavourable attitudes about Muslims in comparison to 36% of French respondents. The anti-Muslim feeling is related to the Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) which is based on the fact that Muslim immigrants and their presence in Europe and the Netherlands constitute a threat to national identity and security. Studies and research in this type of feeling showed the perceived fear of otherness and threat of cultural difference, which characterize attitudes towards immigrants and religious outgroups. Fear contributes significantly to the generation of hostile behaviour against immigrants, believing that the growing inflow of immigrants to Europe will win over the continent. The cultural identity of immigrants as an out group is seen as is seen as threatening and weakening to the belief, norms and cultural symbols of the European national identity.⁵⁵⁵ In this study of Integrated Threat Theory, Karima Gonzaliz found that 54% of Dutch participants had negative feelings of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands.⁵⁵⁶

Migration has contributed greatly to the diversification of European societies. Growing migration to Europe and the Mediterranean had the inevitable consequence of population which are not defined on the basis of homogeneous national identity but from the multicultural discourse of diversity of religious, cultures, races and languages. However, it has become a challenge to European countries to absorb such differences with a coherent cultural discourse without ensuring an effective economic, social and political vision, in the absence of global legal mechanism, the substantial number of refugee and migrants from all over North Africa and sub-Saharan have become the most vulnerable communities in Europe because of xenophobia and racist ideologies. The rise of nationalist feeling and the increased economic difficulties had marked interracial and intercultural relation with tensions and discrimination, particularly from

⁵⁵²Runny Made Trust, *Islamophobia: A challenge for us all* (London, Runny week trust, 1997), p. 4.

⁵⁵³the Search for Common Grounds. op. cit, p. 119.

⁵⁵⁴Karima Valesco Gonzalez et al, “Prejudice towards Muslims in the Netherlands Testing Integrated Threat Theory,” *the British Journal of Social Psychology*, 47(2008), p. 667.

⁵⁵⁵Ibid., p. 675.

⁵⁵⁶Ibid., p. 667.

racial groups and economic institutions. Religious xenophobia and racial discrimination still denied by authorities and governments. Statistics and record of racist incidents are not taken seriously by as result of the fact that levels of exposure and degree of racial abuse lack concrete grounds because most racist acts are not reported by victims. Discrimination is defined as:

Any distinction, exclusion, restriction of preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedom in the political economic, social, cultural or any other field of public.⁵⁵⁷

Although xenophobia designates the fear of the unfamiliar and attitudes of threat posed by people from other nationalities and cultures. Discrimination is a form of distinction based on race and physical characteristic. However, both of them are driven by desire to exercise domination and control over foreigners. Discrimination and xenophobia are not only limited to exploitation and excluding “others” from accessing economic equalities and the practice of freedoms (scarf wearing), but they also involve racially motivated hostility and material violence ranging from assault on migrant businesses to murder. Migrants have mobilized non-governmental and human rights organization, which denounced the abuse of migrants, refugees and foreigners, who become the victims of human rights violation. Xenophobia is manifested in both overt acts of violence and implicit exclusion in employment, education and housing. The public perceptions of migrants as the “other” of European citizen provoke many xenophobic reactions. The growth of racist hostility against immigrants is also instilled by government migration policies as “illegal” and “criminal”. a situation which places them outside the protection of laws and norms. Xenophobia is not caused by the “massive” waves of immigrant in Europe, rather, it is an institutionally and culturally motivated phenomenon:

It would be a serious error to say that immigrants or minorities “generate” racism. In actual fact, they are the main victims of it, though not only ones. Nor can it be said that the number of immigrants is proportional to the number of racist acts. The fact remains that. By definition, xenophobia is an attitude of rejection and stigmatization of foreigners, and that it can be very quickly and very easily cross the line that divides it from racism.⁵⁵⁸

Xenophobia and hostility against refugees and illegal immigrants are persistent and prevailing among new Europe. In recent Poll in Russia, about 84% young participants are

⁵⁵⁷United Nations, *The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination*, Article 1.

⁵⁵⁸European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia Looking Reality in the Face: The Situation Regarding Racism and xenophobia in the European Community. *Annual Report for Activities in 1998*, EUMC, Vienna, Austria, 1999.

favorable of white Russia unstained by the presence of foreigners. New-Nazi Russians who call themselves nationalist socialist is made of a group young nationalist adolescent chase irregular residents and immigrants and inform the police who arrest them and deport them to their countries of origin, particularly those who were arrested and even subjected to terror and violence by those nationalist under the claim that they are drug dealers and homosexuals.⁵⁵⁹ Xenophobia and hostility also stereotypically perpetuate Arabs and immigrants from the Maghreb. Moroccans have become an easy prey to Spanish people and media. They are seen from the lens of Spanish Andalusia conquest and the political superiority over Morocco in such sensitive issues like Sahara, Ceuta and Mellillia:

Moroccans and Maghrebi immigrants are represented as historical adversaire, confrontational and unintegrable people from the Maghreb... do not share the same language or the faith. Moreover, we should add to these the geographic proximity to their country (the Maghreb) and the historical adversity (the expelled Islam from in 1492)... They light again identity conflicts of the remote past of the Iberian Peninsula. The rhetoric of the "breaking wave" of immigration nowadays in the media and the supposedly "innocent" discourses of reputed politicians, does not reuse the same cultural categories of the anti-Muslim substrate? is not the anti-Moroccan attitude another from of the rooted imaginary of the reconquest of the Peninsula from the Moors? The useful obedience of the Moroccan workers to the "*nouveau riche*" of Andalusia of Terrassa does not come from the same legacy from the collective unconsciousness, of the submission of the Moor.⁵⁶⁰

Stereotypes are conscious system of representation and categorization relying on the exercise of power and ascription of group with certain cultural and social "truths". Stereotyping is classificatory cultural patterns that entrench other ethnicities in offensive, funny and mocking attributes fortified by a process of normalization of long-existing images and approved by boundaries of power, domination and rejection.

B-Cultural Anxieties and Xenophobia: the Stereotype as a Cultural Threat

The stereotype evolution and transmutations have undergone versatile stages since early Muslim-Christian encounters to post 9/11 era, which substantially marked a mosaic of

⁵⁵⁹Grand Format- Medi 1 TV. 30/07/2015.

⁵⁶⁰Juan Goytisolo and Sami Naira cited in Abel Albet I Mas et al,"the Moor: a Neighbour under Suspicion. Maintenance of Colonial Ambiguous Stereotypes in the Relations between Spain and Morocco," retrieved on 08-10-2016 from, <https://zdoc.site/queue/the-moor-a-neighbor-under-suspicion.html>, pp. 6-7.

manifestation on orientalist tropes and metaphors. The evolution of western discourse has relied on a system of questioning North Africa identity in accordance with cultural and political contexts, which modulate the stereotype as an reserructive and resilient process of categorization. The inevitable interplay between the stereotype and the ideological discourses of European imagination has led to the excessive intensification of misconception and forms of overgeneralized truths, which still shape today cultural responses to Arab and Muslim immigrants in Europe.

Western construction of the orient and North Africa was persistently based on presenting non western others to western andiences as archaic, sensual irrational, alien and caught in an unhappy fates. The assumption was/ is structured in an essentializing ideology, that is "the orientalist approach to Islam can be summerized as and essentialist, empericist and historicist. It improverishes the rich diversity of of Islam by producing an essentializing caricature".⁵⁶¹

Beside its resurrective and transculative essence, the stereotype is defined by its ability to generate distortions and biased associations, maintaing its very nature as repetitive negative and malignant. It is a principle that rules human relations and shows that ethnic groups are in need for showing their differences more than their similarities to build boundaries between them for the sake of maintaining a distinct identity and defending it via producing false conceptions and prejudices about others⁵⁶². Stereotypes are not unconscious false perceptions; rather, they are deliberate categorization of other social and cultural groups aiming at denegration and justification of cultural and political domination and control over sublttern cultures. This is what Alice walker calls "Prison of image",⁵⁶³ referring to cinematic traditions in western cinemas. Lack of impartiality in the representation of minorities and ethnicities in dominant modes of representation create a profound essentialization of cultural discourse which always perpetuates cultural identities of "others" as prestablished categories.⁵⁶⁴ However, the adoption of content or film analysis based on steretype approach is subject to theoritical politicall pitfalls. First, because preoccupation with studing only negative stereotypes may produce a parallel discourse of essentialism since critics "reduce a complex variety of portrayal to a limited set of reified

⁵⁶¹Bobby S. Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islam* cited in John Richardson, *(Mis) representing Islam: the Racism and the Rhetoric of British Boadsheet Newspapers* (Philadelphia and Amsterdam: John Benjamins.B.V, 2009), p.5.

⁵⁶²Abdel Kebir el Khatibi, *a-Naqd al-Muzdawaj* (Rabat: Manshurat Ukad, 2000), pp.25-26.

⁵⁶³Alice Walker cited in Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 198.

⁵⁶⁴Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, op. cit, p. 197.

‘formulae’. Second, this type of essentialism contributes to the rise of a historicism; a concept that negates evolution and ignore the mutation of stereotypes and their multiple metamorphoses”.⁵⁶⁵

Stereotypes about Muslims and the Moors of North Africa were shaped and mediated over a period of twelve centuries, showing a different and diverse images and attributes that were contextualized in a variety of political and historical influences. The Muslim conquest of Iberia, the renaissance expulsion of the Moors from Europe, The romantic period of scientific revolution in Europe, history of colonialism in North Africa, the wake of liberation wars in colonies, the 1973 oil embargo, migration and the first Gulf war, the Khomeiny revolution and the 9/11 “terrorist” attacks and its sisters, all of them present contexts for the making of multifaceted discourse and visual /textual characterization of Muslims and North Africans according to a significant framework of orientalist representation the interpretations of people from North Africa have involved a negative array of different, contradictory and opaque types of images inspired the political and cultural moods of the rhetorical philosophy of political interest or national superior ideologies and the perilous races.

The gendered representation of Islam and Muslims echoes a dominant stereotype double negativity : males were/ are represented slothful ,oppressive, childlike, lustful and fanatic, while female were are constructed ad passive repressed creatures who are sequestered/ domesticated in harems, forced to wear hijab, deprived of their own choice and subject to patriarchal violence. Textual and visual representation of North Africans were mediated in context of conflict, violence, morbidity, terrorism, backwardness, exoticism and obscuranism, while individuals were/ are marked as suicide bombers, hijackers militant, despot and rapers, conquerors. The historical trajectory of the sterotype has built enough pace of an all-encompssing cocktail of ubiquitous characterization as resourseful as: the Barbaric, the powerful knight, the pagan, the savage, the devil, the villain, the enslaveable, the submissive, the convertible, the mercilless, the pirate, the lustful, the lazy, the erotic, the faceless, the primitive, the folkloric, the happy smiling savage, the bloody resistant, the expetionally intelligent, funny, the violent, the moribund, the morbid, the unassiminable immigrant, the terrorist, the fanatic...

The transfer or transmission of image construction involves a ranking political process by which the West affirms its identity as the super and the East as the inferior, the self and the other, the dominant and the dominant. Edward Said argues that orientatlism has been influenced by three major historical facts and discourses. The first one is the the reproduction of differnce in a form of dichotomy of early renaissance drama, which has focused on the characterization of the Moors as villain, cowardly and pagan as conscious distortion to create a juxtaposition between

⁵⁶⁵Ibid., p. 199.

the backward other and the civilized self. Second, the discourse of orientalism was presented in over generalizations fortified by "scientific objectivity",⁵⁶⁶ Making no distinction between the historical and the mythical for the sake of imperial hegemonic objectives. The last characteristic is that the East or the other was represented as wild dangerous geography that poses cultural and religious threat and needs to be controlled, tamed and brought back to civilization.⁵⁶⁷

In the early encounters between Islam and Christianity, Islam was accused of lascity, sensuality, prophet's lastfulness based on Coran's depiction of afterlife with images of paradise, concubinage and polygomy. Violence was another old-new stereotype that is associated with the spread of Islam by blood and sword. The premedieval discourse about Islam and Maghrebi Muslim was predominantly religious. As cultural foe, Islam has become synonymous with conquest, barbarity and emanent brutality.

The stereotype of the violent conquering other has dominated textual production of pre and medieval ages, influenced by the historical trauma of Moorish conquest of southern Europe in the 8th century. As result, the Moors of North Africa and Islamic Andalusia were portrayed as powerful knight, pagan, wicked, black and savage, images have persisted to the middle of medieval ages. In Medieval ages, orientalist discourse was still predominantly religious because Christianity was the central element and shelter of people life in old Europe. In Medieval paintings Moorish ambassadors were associated with a strange characterization, rich but cruel and cunning.

The naturalistic traditions of perceiving difference was based on associating North Africans with attributes of slavery, demonishness, emptiness of soul, threat and hatred to Christianity (see chapter 1 part III). In Elizabethan Renaissance drama, the Moors have become the visible symbol of moral degeneracy, bloody deeds and cowardice as reported in many plays (*the maid of the west, last dominion, battle of Alcazar...*). Some images made a direct reference to the typical Moor as villain, loosely sinister, treacherous cowardly, criminal and driven by his sexual lustful desires. Another paradoxical portrayal of the Moor was described as either pagan and irreligious or submissive and convertible (for more information, see chapter one part III).

In the renaissance and enlightenment period, perceptions of Muslim have recorded a form of an early anti-Muslim discourse (early Islamophobia) that was characterized by both admiration and rejection. Positive images of Islam and the prophet Mohammed (Pbuh) were about the prophet's charismatic⁵⁶⁸ Personality and his worldly success, while Islam was

⁵⁶⁶Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, Pantheon books, 1978), p. 301.

⁵⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁵⁶⁸Kate Zebri, "The Redeployment of Orientalist Themes in Contemporary Islamophobia," *Studies in Contemporary Islam*, 10 (2008), p. 8.

represented as a source of irrationality and obscuratism and as antithesis to reason, which reflects the dominant thinking of the enlightenment period. The post-enlightenment and romantic stage, the period of secular Humanism, produced a fertile fabric of oriental, Arab and Muslim attributes which associated them with negative discourses about geography, exoticism and gender:

Fierce, lavish scenes in a wild array of colors; harems and seraglios; decapitated bodies; women hurled into the Bosphoros in sacks; feluccas and brigantines displaying the crescent flag; sound turquoise dames and white minarets soaring to the heavens; viziers, eunuchs, and adalesques; refreshing springs under palm trees; giaours slit, captive women forced into submission by their captors.⁵⁶⁹

The romantic period, which coincided with Europe restrictive moral boundaries of middle class sexuality, gave rise the referential trope of sexualized view of harem women, who were seen as imprisoned in private space, drinking coffee, smoking hookah and getting prepared to sexually gratify the huge appetite of their despotic master. Rana Kabbani analysed that bulky repertoire of images and paintings, which portray the sexual orient as a site of sexuality and lustful sex as a form of western projection of its repressed Victorian sexual mores, “such portraits, in wishing to convey the east, described more accurately, Europe. They portrayed the repressiveness of its social codes and the heavy hand of its bourgeois morality”.⁵⁷⁰

Nineteenth century colonialism has contributed substantially to the rise of another orientalist discourse, which was geographically motivated to justify imperialism and press on the need to civilize backward and barbarous North Africa and to save it from ignorance and darkness. Perceived images of barbarity, irrationality slothfulness, obscuratism and backwardness were associated with North African Muslims to legitimize colonization and to prove European existence in colonies as favourably undertaken under the claim of putting primitive societies in the roads of development and civilization. Hence, native lands were feminized and claimed virgin, fertile and enviting European male cultivation, while native people were portrayed as passive submissive and enslavable. Quasi-enlightenment discourse emerged to endow nature and primitive geographies with the tools and knowledge of the west. This geopolitical discourse of European knowledge has produced a certain kind of truth and:

Interpretation whose material happens to be the orient, its civilizations, peoples and localities... This doctrine was fashioned out of the experiences of many Europeans, all of

⁵⁶⁹Norman Saniel cited in Kate Zebiri, op. cit, p. 8.

⁵⁷⁰Rana Kabbani, *Imperial Fiction: Europe's Myths of Orient* (London: Pandora, 1994), p. 85.

them covering upon such essential aspects of the orient as the oriental character, oriental despotism, oriental sexuality and the like...⁵⁷¹

In *Islam and Science* (1983) Earnest Renan philosophically took orientalist discourse to the arena of scientific rationalization. For Renan, Islam was the antithesis of everything that is rational, creative and logical. The orientalist scientific vision of nineteenth century knowledge was keen on making a sort of disequilibrium between the west and east, "Sacy and Renan were instances of the way orientalism fashioned, respectively, a body of texts and philosophically rooted by which the orient took on a discursive identity that made it unequal to the west".⁵⁷²

In his novel *Les trois femmes de la Kasba*,⁵⁷³ Pierre Loti portrays North Africa, Algeria, as embodiment of atemporality and associates it with a historical sense of place that stuck it people to the sadness and the eternity of Maribund race. This depiction of North Africa in the novel represents the written copy of the snake charmer and les femmes d'Algiers dans leur appartements as its repetitive structures involve the condemnation of oriental races, who favour passivity and slothfulness over work and progress. This abstract reflects the old-new image of harem, where women are dedicated to drinking coffee, playing music, smoking:

Parfois elle s'occupaient à presser des roses et des fleurs d'oranges, pour composer des parfums. Elles fumeraient aussi des narghilée, on s'exerçait à chanter en Jouant du tambour basque et en battant la derboucca. Elles étaient comme prolongées dans une tristesse immense, dans une écroulement d'abruties, filles d'une race condamnée, subissant des choses fatales avec une résignation morne.⁵⁷⁴

As colonial naval officer, Loti celebrates the glories of French colonialism in North Africa almost in all his work (le Roman d'un Spahi, Aziyadé, les Trois Femmes). However, *les Trois Dames* was a typical example of biased discourse on race and gender. Women as portrayed in *les trois dames* reflects the 19th century ideologies of portraying feminine morbidity and cheap exoticism,⁵⁷⁵ his heroines were associated with contexts of suicide, prostitution and illness; and the colonized space/ Casbah has become representative of prostitution, unhappy fates and dreariness "Alger avait le débaillement cynique des lieux qui ont perdu leur nationalité pour se prostituer, s'ouvrir à tous".⁵⁷⁶

⁵⁷¹Edward Said, op. cit, p. 203.

⁵⁷²Ibid., p. 156.

⁵⁷³Ibid., p. 156.

⁵⁷⁴Pierre Loti, In Robin Anita White, *19th Century and 20th Century French Exoticism: Pierre Loti, Louis Céline, Michel Leirs and Simone Scharz-Bart*. Unpublished Dissertation, the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University, 2004, p. 116.

⁵⁷⁵Ibid., p. 71.

⁵⁷⁶Ibid., p. 119.

The passage portrays Algiers as an open bordel for soldiers and sailors of French colonization, perpetuating the stereotype of the desecrated colonized city and the architypal imagery which reflects the transportative nature of colonization and its effects on the structure of the colony. In *Exotic Memories: Literature, Colonialism and Fin de Siecle* (1991), Christopher Bongie suggested that *Le Roman and les trois dames* of Loti represent a kind of fin –de- sciecle despair and frustration at moribund exotism and nostalgia to look for a past that has gone for no return because of the change and the destruction of traditional cultures by colonization.⁵⁷⁷ Thus, the exotic was no longer accessible as result of colonial achievements. The exotism of Loti was kind of melanchony and nostalgia for the pristine, the pre-colonized: "There is an impossibility for him of coming into contact with the exotic world and there by distancing his self from the colonial one of which he is part. The space of the other is moribund, covered with a funeral veil that Pierre Loti in his later' works, will offer no hope for lifting".⁵⁷⁸

Foreign woman has also inspired ubiquitorisly the evolution of the stereotype. Woman as it was imagined by the European gaze in the nineteenth century colonial paintings and travalogues ; a period dominated by the revival of the old-new stereotype of the domesticated savage North African woman –as prisoner of naturalized space- harem- immune from the contamination of civilization and domesticated in its naturalness. The following passage is Delacroix's first discursive typical impression of European cultural conception of difference and the image of foreign female: "I was extremely lucky to have the opportunity to visit a harem in Algiers. It is so beautiful! it is like in Homer's tome ! a woman in the female quarters, looking after her children, spinning or embellishing a scarf with embroidery. That's a real woman as I understand it".⁵⁷⁹ A "real woman" where Delacroix saw when he was coming back from his diplomatic voyage to Algeria ; real woman, untouched by the shifting fabric of time and embroidered by the hands of antiquity.

This stereotype keeps coming back and resurrecting because of political and historical contexts. Besides embracing the exoticized trope of inspoiled wildreness and the canibalized hierachical epitome of inferiority since the enlighment and the discovery of the new world, Oriental woman still echoe the scars of "Christian discursivization" which demonized her as the

⁵⁷⁷Bongie Christopher, *Exotic Memories: Literature, colonialism, and the Fin-de-Siecle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 89.

⁵⁷⁸Ibid., p. 89.

⁵⁷⁹Eugene Delacroix in Claudia Gronemann "A Hybrid Gaze from Delacroix to Djebbar: Visual Encontres and the Construction of Female 'other' in the Colonial Discourse of the Maghreb," In *Empires and Boundaries: Rethinking race, class and gender in colonial setting*, eds. Hanald Fisher-Tiné et al (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 151-152.

cause of sinfulness and desecration.⁵⁸⁰ The European imaginary of North Africans was intertextually weaved by the adoption of long existing texts and tropes which appeared in certain periods. "In the tradition of the 'noble savage' topos and following the enlightenment concept of nature, the people of other cultures are conceived as creatures of nature having no part in what is deemed as 'civilization'".⁵⁸¹

The end of nineteenth century and the beginning of twentieth century colonial cinema is another source of the translocation of the stereotype which showed its adaptability and resilience. The return of the exotic, inferior, dark, backward, superstitious savage and uncivilized North African was the spectacular attributes of an intertextual identity of colonial representation. The exoticized and the feminized discourse in the Italian film *Tripolii! Bel Suol d'Amore* escapes the characterization of Libyans within overgeneralization stereotyping process of colonial authority. In the British film *Cesar and Cleopatra*, Cesar as representative of the West's knowledge and wisdom was brought to Egypt by chance to save Cleopatra from the darkness and inferiority of her race and the superstitious ignorance of her culture. The film perpetuates different tropes: paganism, inability to govern and the need to be rescued. *la Bandera* the French film shows the mysterious geography of North Africa and traps people in an eternal timeless fate. The film embraces both an eroticized and exoticized vision of oriental woman and cultures; women are submissive and culture is structured in superstitious rituals like blood sucking in marriage ceremony of both the bride and another groom. The film also reveals another stereotype of North Africa as colonizable and conquerable territory. *Le marchand de sable* is another parade of exoticist romance which features North Africa as bunch of queer ritual, anarchy, tribal rivalry, polygamy, savagery and funny deviances. The film celebrates cultural superiority and intolerant objection of cultural difference and governed by the classical topoi of the European as the liberator and the rescuer of non-western woman (for more details, see chapter II part III).

Les Cinq Gentlemen Maudits by Duvivier (1931) represents an ethnographic piece of cinema filmed in the Moroccan city Molay Driss. The film features a series of mysterious death of tourists which remained unsolved till the end of the film when the story reveals the identity of the killer (tourist who targeted the rich ones). Although the film ended with the absolution of North Africans from committing those killings, it insists on associating North Africans with irrationality, mystery, sorcery, occultism and superstition.⁵⁸² Occultism was embodied in the fact

⁵⁸⁰Claudia Groneman, op. cit, p. 150.

⁵⁸¹Ibid., p. 152.

⁵⁸²Charles D'Brien, "the 'Cinema Colonial' of 1930s France: Film narration as Spatial practice," in *Visions of the East: Orientalism in Films*, eds. M. Berstein and G. Studlar (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1997), p. 217.

that the five western gentlemen were cursed by a local sorcier after one of them has been tempted to remove the veil of a woman. The ethnographic content of the film structured the rituals of animal sacrifice 3issawa dance, music, playing and burning with fire in the festival of Sidi Ali Ben Hamdouch. However, *Pepe le Moko* has introduced a paradoxical depiction of North Africa, featuring a differencet function space/ Casbah as resistant identity and intellegent amorphouness that invetably entraps the expansionist ideology of colonial appropriative desire. It is represented as site of both disguise for the out law and the premissively illicit and a shelter / refuge,⁵⁸³ for the socially inferior and outcast. Differently with the decline of colonialism and the wake of wars of independence in the colonies, the cinema of the 1930s witnessed a slight modification in the discourse of cultural and social superiority as a great number of films explored a mockery of exoticist norms by introducing marginal western protagonists and colons like thieves, criminals and at odd with borgois class norms (*La Bandera*, *Pepe Le Moko*, *Cinq Gentemen Maudi*). Colonial cinema has equally brought alternative identities ; broken, transgressive and in conflict with the old exocisit consciousness of early colonial cinema (the criminal activities of Pepi in *Pepi Le Moko*, the polygamous life of Waneskine in *le Marchand de Sable*, alcoh-al-induced madness of Pierres in *le Grand Jeu*, the Lesbian experience of Alice in *le Club de Femmes*) in addition to the fact that many films end up with unhappy fates of western protagonists like suicide (*Pepi Le Moko*) and funerals (*La Bandera*).⁵⁸⁴ The questioning of old metropolitan identity has made a shift in the classical consciousness of the colonial discourse "By provinding an imaginary space for the transgression of established boundaries of cultural identity: depiction of the colonial world secred to organize and represent a desire at the limits of bourgeois normality".⁵⁸⁵

The public perception of Muslim woman and the assuptions related to its veil was, sometimes, erraneous, and the other time comoflated in racist and biased interpretations of public discourses and popular media, stressing the controlling nature of patriarchy and religions. This views which shape cultures, are usually explained by the argument that western intellectuals, feminists and schoolars compare non-western woman and culture from the reductionist perspective of western middle class ideology, equating the cultural identities of different experiences under the same umbrella of political, social, economic and cultural contexts (Kabbani 1986, Alloula 1986, Mobi, 1991).⁵⁸⁶

⁵⁸³Ibid, p. 220.

⁵⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 220-221.

⁵⁸⁵Ibid., p. 220.

⁵⁸⁶Homa Hoodfar. op. cit, p. 5.

Since the 19th century, the veil has symbolized, for the West, the inferiority of Muslim culture, it remains a powerful symbol for the West and Muslim societies. However, while for Westerners its meaning has been static and unchanging, in Muslim cultures the veil's functions and social significance have varied tremendously, particularly during times of rapid change.⁵⁸⁷

The persistence of orientalist images of veiled woman and Muslim culture since early colonialism deepen the biased responses of the racist discourse of European culture and reflect the extent to which the cultural stereotype has become synonymous and identified with European public perception of "others". This eternally adaptive negative public perception dates back to the fall of Ottoman empire and the submission of North under the mandate of colonial powers in the nineteenth century. The outcome was a predominance of new stereotype in the western imaginary of the orient, which shifted its archetypal representation from focusing on males to females as a part of the changing rhetoric of western legitimizing imperialism (woman liberation). Hence, there was a kind of feminization of the stereotype discourse, which has identified oriental man, in relation to woman, not as barbaric and savage, but as uncivilized and ignorant male who mistreat woman and whose sense of masculinity was derived from his ability to enslave and submit woman. Within this changing contours, the orient was addressed in context related to woman oppression and victimization:

By the nineteenth century the focus of representation of the Muslim orient had changed the barbarian, constructed over centuries during the crusades, to the "uncivilized" ignorant male whose masculinity relies on the mistreatment woman, primarily as slave.⁵⁸⁸

This nineteenth century feminized stereotype was exhaustively keen on stressing the backwardness and the inferiority of masculine oriental culture, which constituted an unjustifiable incentive for westerners to civilize and colonize the uncivilized and liberate woman from violence and enslavement. Paradoxically, harem and oriental woman's interior life has become a source of all sentiments: imagination, fascination and frustration.

The historical traumas that resulted from the conquest of Iberia by North African Muslims in the 8th century and the participation of the Moroccan soldiers under Franco regime in the Spanish civil wars had influenced the representation of Maghrebi people, particularly in Spain. The negative perception of Maghrebi people is still generated by the inevitable conjunction between history and migration. The Moors, from the word Mauris which means black or dark, are stereotypically personified in "the figure of the violent, lustful Moor who invades Spain to kill

⁵⁸⁷Ibid., p. 5.

⁵⁸⁸Ibid., p. 8.

and rape its inhabitants has haunted the Spanish imagination”, the Moor is used today to portray immigrants of Maghrebi origins associated with historical contexts and connected as the reconquesta or “*the return of the Moor*”.⁵⁸⁹ The stereotype of the violent North African immigrant is also instilled by terrorist leader’s speeches and uses of Andalusian part by making invasion of Iberia and legitimacy of potential return, which intensifies anti-migrant Maghrebi sentiment. The Spanish civil war of 1936 strengthened the stereotype of the violent and cruel Moor. Morocco was a part of Spanish colony in North Africa and General Franco took Moroccan Soldiers – *regulares* – to fight with the nationalists against the Republican colonized participated in the battle of Badajoz, the capital of Extremadura in August 1936.⁵⁹⁰ The images of violence and rape in Spanish civil war have influenced the association of the Moors with violence, viciousness and cruelty.

Eric Savarex states that before the 1980, the stereotype about Maghrebi people showed a similarity and reference to the colonial representation, which was affected by resistance and war of liberation in both Algeria and Morocco:

Les Maghrebins ont tous en commun de figurer parmi ceux qui sont redoutés physiquement en raison d’un goût supposé immodéré pour les armes et la violence, et a cause du souvenir des difficultés liées à la conquête de l’Algérie ou à la participation du Maroc. Cette stéréotypification de l’Arabe agressif et dangereux, fourbe et voleur, traître et menteur est, bien avant les années 1980, dénoncée par les cinéastes d’origines maghrébines.⁵⁹¹

In *la Machine* a film by Paul Vec Chialli, the presence of Maghreb people is marginal and near to absence. Witnesses or in profession related to tourism. Maghrebi characters are portrayed accessory or decorative to the narrative line of the film, with traditional costume signing a folkloric existence.⁵⁹²

Lately, Media and news networks have witnessed an unprecedented categorization of Muslim North African migrants as threatening, dangerous, violent, treacherous and criminal. A part of this association, which connects them to terrorism and extremism, is due to the fact that the discourse is influenced by the contemporaneous terrorist attacks in Europe and USA, while the other part emanates from the resurrective and the transmutative nature of the stereotype, which is influenced by the historical and cultural events. The violent Muslim immigrant finds its root

⁵⁸⁹Kathleen Lange, op. cit, p. 20.

⁵⁹⁰Ibid., p. 25.

⁵⁹¹Eric Savarex, “Reinventer l’Autre: le Corps des Maghrebins dans le Cinéma Français de 1962 à nos Jours” *Sciences politiques*, 30 (2001), p. 180.

⁵⁹²Ibid., p. 180.

very far away back in the eight century and the middle ages when Islam was misconcepted as bloody religion spread by the sword – The post colonial period has given a rise to a similar discourse of religious difference. The Muslim represents the violent, repressive and the intolerant. The end of cold war and the replacement of communism with Islam as a threat / enemy doesnot influence substantially European cinema as it has done with international or American cinema. As politically minded discourse, the stereotype remained the same archaic machine of the West by which its discourse about cultural difference, and at the same time, it is the oriental closet upon which it dries or hangs its dirty psychological projective laundry. In cinema, the stereotype persists in embracing the same recognizable and idendical systems of perception with the broad billboard dichotomy of the civilized West and the backward East. New stereotypes are hardly and in separably detached from the classical erotic and exotic stereotype, which means that it relies exclusively in unconscious insertitions, conscious intestextualities and repititions to pay tribute to the pioneer ideology and eternalize the continuity of colonial consciousness.

C-Reframing Cultural Discourse: Terrorism, Metamorphosis of the Stereotype and the Revictimization of North Africans

Terrorism, extremism and salafist wahabism are mostly related to Muslim immigrants in Europe and seen as continuity to the prevailing belief of radical Islam or Jihad, which derives its legitimacy from the establishment of khalifate state ideology. This version of Islam which targets ruling classes and governments in Asia and Africa makes a contrast between the land of Islam, believers, and the land of harb, war, has become a kind of global notion of Islam politically deployed to different groups of followers and based on the immediate influence of internet to disseminate diverse ideologies and motives, taking advantage of historical realities, economic exclusion and generalized hatred to liberal global values...The land of war should not be interpreted wrongly and confused with the land of kufr, infidelity as Tariq Ramadan explains because it does not necessarily mean a state of emergency. According to Hanafit theologists like Ibn Taymiya and Zarrakhsi, the land of war is a situation where Muslims are not protected all together outside the territory of Islam and where the political system does not apply the rule and the jurisdiction of Islam⁵⁹³.

As matter of fact, the great masses of immigration to the countries of European union have engendered generation of European born citizens, whose parents have been ex-colons of

⁵⁹³Tariq Ramadan, *être Occidental and Musulman Aujourd'hui* (Paris: Archipoche, 2016), pp. 160-161.

Europe and constituted a majority of were labourer brought from North Africa and Asia and denied equal economic opportunities and favorable cultural status in comparison to European nationalism in recent years, North African diaspora in Europe was generally characterized by an emergent dissident voices of second and third generations Maghrebis made of broken and disaffected youth expressing their disatisfisation with racism, exclusion and xenophobia. These “angry” Maghrebi youth are unified by a desire to take revenge from colonial powers and fuelled by the bitter conditions of poverty and unemployment in the housing project of big cities’ suburbs. Cultural systems of European countries contribute to the implant of resentment and frustration among North African youth, who are trapped in a fructured/ fragmented cultural identification; they become unable to fully identity with the culture of their parents not do they keep a clear bounds with host societies, Which reject and despise them on the basis of their culture and religion.⁵⁹⁴

New terrorists groups and cells in Europe follow a different path, but maintain a certain continuity with extremist traditions and violent practices with the classical European nationalist terrorism like fascism and skinheads. Classical terrorist groups include many organizations like Redbrigades in Italy, Action Directes in France, Fraktion Roter Arme in Germany, the Basque ITA in Spain and IRA in Norther Ireland.⁵⁹⁵ Islamist terrorism in Europe has introduced a different version of extremism interms of ideologies, tactics and motives as it defines itself as having the historical legitimacy to revive khalifate in Andalusia as an alternative to a corrupt and unreligious western states. Besides, it feeds on the feeling of taking revenge from Europe and America for their foreign policies and coalition wars in Afganistan, Iraq and Syria. Islamist radicalization in Europe historically extendeded back to groups like FIS (Front Islamique de Salut) which fought against French intervention in the Algerian election in 1992. Because of French government support for the Algerian Army, FIS started to recruit unemployed and desperate Maghrebi youth, who participate in riot events in Paris and Marseille. New radicalization takes advantage of cultural and emotional sensibilities of immigrants to maintain a justifiable background for sacred cause:

They attain two fold goals by engaging under the banner of radical Islam: they fight against society which never accepted them as such and they fought for Islam against the entire West... Through their engagement, they gain the salvation (they become marityrs if

⁵⁹⁴Farhad Khosrokhovar (2009), “Jihadism in Europe and the Middle East”Centre for studies in Islamism and Radicalization,” retrieved on 01-08-2015, from www.cir.au.dk

⁵⁹⁵Ibid.

they die, they accede to new honor) and dignity and they find meaning and sense for their life which, previously, meaningless and without any end.⁵⁹⁶

Extremism in Europe is not an external phenomenon based on direct links with Alqaida and ISIS in the Middle East, and depend totally for its presence on ready made Mujahideens, who sneak to the continent as refugees or in fake tourist visas, rather, terrorism is a homegrown internal phenomenon, which recruits educated and highly trained Maghrebi youth who were born, educated and socialized in European cultural institutions as well as it attracts European nationals and converts of middle class who see Islam as a utopian alternative to Western democracies like leftist ideologies (marxism and communism) in 1970s and 1960s... Aba3wd brothers, Mohamed Abselam and Mohamed Boyeuri who murdered Van Gogh, all of them were born and educated in Europe.

In his article in *Foreign Affairs Europe's Angry Muslims*, Robert S. Leiken argues that the massive immigration of Muslim to Europe after WWII and successive waves of family reunification in the 1970s and regularization in the 1990s, Europe has become a new colony of Muslim immigrants who are estimated between 15 and 20 millions, marking state absolescence in the continent.⁵⁹⁷ The salient character of Muslim diaspora in Europe is they cluster in culturally homogeneous and geographically close communities of compatriots (unlike Muslims in USA) like Algerians in France, Turks in Germany, Pakistanis in Britain and Moroccans in Spain.⁵⁹⁸ Moreover, Muslims of Europe stayed improvershed, distinct and retentive of their cultural specificities because of many external and internal factors. They never enjoy a genuine citizenship and the right to access freely to national institutions. They feel not being fully integrated to host countries, not accepted for their difference and treated with despise by extreme right movements and nationalists⁵⁹⁹. European Muslims have experienced a history of disintegration and racism against their culture, history and their children who suffer identity problems and variant forms of rejection:

Neither the blood spilled by Muslims from North Africa fighting in French uniforms during both world wars nor the sweat of migrant labourers, living under deplorable living conditions, who rebuilt France (and Europe) for pettence after 1945, has made their children... full fellow citizens.⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁶Ibid.

⁵⁹⁷Robert S. Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslims," *Foreign Affairs* July, August (2005), p. 2.

⁵⁹⁸Ibid., p. 2.

⁵⁹⁹Ibid.,p. 3.

⁶⁰⁰Gilles kepel quoted in Robert S. Leiken, op. cit, p. 3.

This indifference and lack of interest on the part of European countries for the shared history that connect them with ex-colonies migrant foster a kind of anger and resentment among young generation at the conjunction of economic vulnerability, cultural stigmatization and racism, strenghtening their predisposition to embrace extremism and take actions their oppressions and sympathizing with fellow Muslim in Palestine, Syria, Irak and Afghanistan. Paying allegiance to Alqaida and ISIS affiliates reinforce ties with standarized organization which enable them to give their mission a global vision and transnational image serving the bigger goal of establishing the khalifate state assoociating them with prestigious structure that tempted many memebbers of Muslim community who are denied a genuine citizenship in Europe. However, some Maghrebi radicals are classified as having ties to external organization or as “Lone wolves” like the Hofstad group in Amsterdam, which was behind the assassination of the Dutch filmmaker, Van Gogh by the Dutch born Moroccan second generation immigrant Bouyeri. As lone wolves, Bouyeri and Moroccan immigrants who blasted the Madrid trains made a shift in the evolution of Jihad in Europe because they operate alone or coordinate locally with other groups and they are unknown and silent. This new category of terrorists is educated and marginalized and angry over massacres of Muslims by western invasion all over the world. According to Robert Leiken, the Hofstad as a cell of second generation Islamist militants came to existence because of the “legendary tolerance of minorities” by the Dutch gouvernement, which has done a lot to accomodate and integrate Maghrebi Diaspora in the Netherlands by giving them access to the freedom of religious practice, economic wellefare and social wellfare⁶⁰¹ a tolerant climate that allows Hofstad group to meet at Bouyeri house to listen to preaches by Abukhatib, a Syrian imam on DVD, to plan operation and to connect with local groups in Spain and Belgium.

Robert Laikan defines Islamist radicalism in Europe within the confines of historical influx of immigrants from North African countries and put absolute blame on the way European countries open their societies to Muslim neglecting other factions that play a major roles in the radicalization of such youth. Europe is the destination of two types of terrorists, outsiders, who pass to Europe under the cover of asylm seekers like imams and students. This category migrated intentionally to Europe to spread Jihad and recruit members in mosques and minority communities. The second catergy of Jihadists are insiders or homegrown made of second and third generation immigrant like Bouyeri, Mohamed Abdesalam who were born, educated and benifited from Europe liberal democracies. The majority of this Jihadist comes from the slums of

⁶⁰¹Ibid., p. 4.

Europe angry and uneducated, while some of them represent ambitious, employed and angry too like Zakaria Moussaoui and Omar Khayam.⁶⁰²

After 9/11 attacks, Alqaida under the leadership of Oussama Benladen, started targetting professionals and highly trained operatives from universities, high schools and institutes, networks of training in war zones and access to Jihadist websites. Involvement of the west in Iraq and Afghanistan, Hijab affair in France and reclaim to Muslim Andalusia are used by Alqaida to give legitimacy and motives for followers. Unlike USA, European countries are unable to track terrorist plots because of loose legislative and fragmented security corpus terrorists in Europe enjoy a little tracibility and detection benefiting from outdated and traditional proceduces which hamper efficient counter terrorism systems. France flexible reception of Maghrebi Muslim comes from a little comparasson of grateful empire that embraces ex-colons who fought with it against Nazism in World War II, while United Kindom and the Netherlands treat the question of minorities from a multiculturalist approach by granting a bunch of rights and accessibilities like association, preaching and practising cultural rituals. However, this permissive tolerance was behind religious radicalization according to Robert Laiken, which resulted in the emergence of Hamburg cell, assassination of Theo Vangogh and other terrorist plots. Equally, Khrosphar distinguishes between two types of Muslim radicals in Europe; a minority of middle class citizens who identify with the utopia of new-Umma and discontented at the plight and the crisis of Muslim in Europe and the world today. This sense of anger and despair stems out from their victimization by racist ideologies in host societies and from the contempt of Islam by the wicked "white" West, which engage in violent wars in Africa and the Middle East perpetuated virtually via globalized television networks and social media. The second category attracts a majority of unemployed and disadvantaged Maghrebi Muslims who are a victim of economic vulnerability and social fragility which makes them easy prey for terrorist networks.⁶⁰³

Association of their multiple nationalities with a common ground of plotted conspiracy against Islam and Muslims makes them ready to desert their poor district in the Netherlands and UK and gettoes in France in liberation war against the west's involvement in the Arab world, puppet Muslim geoverments and to set up a globalized caliphate state without a border or nation state⁶⁰⁴ that operates politically, socially, legally and economically under the sharia as the Palestinian Abdullah Azzam, Che Guevara of global jihad, wanted to found when he established

⁶⁰²Ibid., pp. 6-7.

⁶⁰³Farhad Khosrokhovar, op. cit.

⁶⁰⁴Ibid.

the “Bureau of Services” to recruit jihadist for Afghanistan⁶⁰⁵. A third category of terrorist is made of European nationals who identify with the new ideology of political Islam to fight empetious and anti-religious in Europe. This category find Islam as an alternative faith or ideology which has the look or fashion of leftist and avangardist mouvement in 1970s and anachist ideology that fought for proletariant against bourgeois to establish classless egalitarian societies across Europe⁶⁰⁶. Most terrorists claim allegiance to Middle Eastern terrorist networks and loyalty to Alqaida’s Emir, Zarqaqui and ISIS Bardadi in term of apprenticeship, ideology and adhesion to its discourse. The extension of this ideology from Asia to Europe takes different aspects, either through direct contact by proponents who pay pligrimage to war zone in Iraq and Syria in order to fight, train and experience what is really going on the ground like the case of Mohamed Abdeslam. The second form of apprenticeship is socialization of perpetrators via technology and social media, which facilitates the transfer of ideologies and ethos through the use of websites, videos facebook. Internet facilitates not only anonymosity, secrecy and untracibility of operatives, but also quick flow of information, penetration and precise timing. As such, internet has become an informal school for an emergent generation of extremist which allows a freedom of communication without being infiltrated, detected or contralled by local authorities. The last category has nothing to do with member’s belief or dileberate recruitment they are members who softly integrated to the system gradually around mosques of in incorporated by coercion for false imprisonment. Their joining comes as result of feelings of grudge and resentment at being sentenced for false suspicion as member of sleeper cell.

Radicalism in Europe shares the same salafist ideological tenets in the Muslim world which seems sometimes more an imaginary utopia than a concrete realization. One of the basic tenets of this ideology is the revival caliphate or new Umma in the world.⁶⁰⁷ The second is wicked, corrupt and atheist. Salfist ideology believes in the conversion of non-Muslim and Jihad is the only device to spread Islam as the correct faith to regain its rule over the world. Jihad, as a third tenet, is the practical means to stop antagonistic attitudes against Islam and martyrdom is the most sublime.

Recently, ISIS has revisited Europe in new school of thought and violent surge, sendening messages of how could terrorism could adapt to the changes and transformation in the field.⁶⁰⁸ The escalation and strategic shifts in the organization modus operandi is correlated with

⁶⁰⁵Catherine Golliav, “le Jihad, Nouveau Myth Unificateur,” *le Point Références*, 65 (2016), pp .75-76.

⁶⁰⁶ Farhad Khroshvar.

⁶⁰⁷Ibid.

⁶⁰⁸Fred Kaplan, “We Must Stop ISIS,” in *Slate, War Stories*, (Military analysis) July 15, 2016, p. 1.

both progresses and set backs in battlefield in Iraq and Syria. In January 2014, series of attacks took place in different parts of the world (Libya, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Indonesia and Egypt). However, when ISIS underwent series of severe losses in its forces and a cut in its supply lines, it diverted attention by launching a range of violent attacks in different places in Asia, Europe and America (Orlando, Jordan, borders, Lebanon, Istanbul, Baghdad, Mekka, Bangladesh and Nice).⁶⁰⁹ Bruce Hoffman states that there is no coordination of ISIS attacks or has relationship with its losses or gains with its terrorist operations and perpetrators lone wolves claim allegiance in last moment "They are inspired rather than directed by ISIS".⁶¹⁰

In the case of Lohouaej Bouhlal, the Tunisian truck driver who killed 85 people in Nice, prime minister Bernard Cazeneuve states that he has no ties with any organization. He is lone wolf who had no history of radicalization and radicalized himself quickly. As ISIS started losing ground in the field for Al Qaeda strong Branch Jabhat A Nusra (now Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), which attracts its followers and takes control over several zones ruled by ISIS. Brett McGurk, Obama's envoy to the region told the senate foreign relations in June that Nusra is "establishing schools and training camps, recruiting from enjoying a sophisticated online presence, all the while providing haven for some of Al Qaeda's most experienced terrorists".⁶¹¹

In this context of loss and competition, ISIS made shift in tactics and Mohamad Al Adnani encouraged operatives, in 2014, to use whatever means they could, like trucks, stabbing..., to keep fighting for their position. After Nice's event, ISIS declared that Bouhlal is one of its soldiers and stated, on Saturday on its channel, Amaq News Agency, executor of the deadly operation in Nice, France, was a soldier of the Islamic state. He executed the operation in response to calls to target citizens of coalition nations, which fight the Islamic state.⁶¹²

The husband and wife who killed 14 people in San Bernardino in December, the agency declared that they are "supporters" of the state, meaning that they are not directed by it. But, ISIS called Omar Mateen a "fighter", who killed 49 in a gay night club in Orlando because he declared loyalty to the organization. This new escalation strategy of the Islamic state, which sympathizer to execute terrorist attacks against crusader coalition countries. Abu Mohamad Al Adnani called on supporters and followers to take revenge against enemies by training some of

⁶⁰⁹Ibid., p. 1.

⁶¹⁰Bruce Hoffman cited in Fred Kaplan, p. 2.

⁶¹¹Brett McGurk in Fred Kaplan, p. 3.

⁶¹²Alissa J. Rubin and Aurelian Breudem, "ISIS Claims Truck Attacker in France was its 'Soldier'," *New York times*, July 17, 2016, p. 13.

them, inspiring others and encouraging sympathizers to attack directly and spontaneously or without any planning".⁶¹³

Nany scholars and social analysts see terrorism as one of the most threatening, complex and constantly changing phenomenon that overshadows the future of encounters all over the world. The complexity of terrorism stems from its ability to manifest multi-layered nature because its different motivations and ideologies ranging from nationalist, separatist, right wing, and left wings affiliation.⁶¹⁴ Although it embraces different meaning and form, Islamist radicalization has a combination of political Islam and the notion of Jihad which based on the duty of implementing God's commands on earth and fight unjust rulers. This new jihad does not differentiate between full-fledged fighter and half jihadist as Sayyid Abu Ala Maududi, the founder of Jamaat al-Islam⁶¹⁵, it deploys sympathizers and untrained individuals, engage supporters and practitioners in political and social mobilization to create pan-Islamic Umma or theocracy and the revivification of the Caliphate through the use of internet or attacks on civilian to communicate their ideas like European Anarchist groups⁶¹⁶. This view of Islam sees religion not only as faith, but a complex social and political system with legal and economic philosophy of a state that derives its imperatives from Islamic view. The Council of European Union defines terrorism:

International acts that were committed with the of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing many action seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.⁶¹⁷

Violent acts of terrorism which carried out in the form of suicide bombing, high jacking, assassinations and kidnapping were limited to Muslim countries in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine before 9/11 attacks, which marked the rise of terrorism from a local to a global phenomenon. New forms of terrorism in Europe display a different nature and ideology from the previously existing one in the Muslim world. Terrorism distinctly features resides in the organizational structure and modus operandi that keeps shifting the execution of variety of bombing and killing in different places and sometimes at the same time as the case of attacks on

⁶¹³Ibid., p. 13.

⁶¹⁴Edwin Bakker (2006), "Jihad Terrorist in Europe," retrieved on 19-07-2016 from <http://www.clingendael.nl>

⁶¹⁵Catherine Golliay, "Le Jihad, Nouveau Mythe Unificateur," p.75.

⁶¹⁶Dany Deschenes, "Réflexion Historique et Dimension Théorique du Terrorisme," 11 Septembre 2001, *Paix et Sécurité Internationales*, 2 (2003) eds. Rachid el Houdaigui, pp. 16-17.

⁶¹⁷Ibid., p. 2.

Belgium (2016), Turkey (2016), France (2015-2016), London (2005), United States embassy in Eastern Africa traditionally associated with three types of terrorist: nationalist (IRA and ITA), left wing terrorist (Raf and Red Brigade) and right wing terrorist (New Nazis). Although different in agendas and ideologies, Islamist terrorism in Europe before 9/11 attacks executed by members outside to the continent as the case of GIA, which staged attacks on public transportation in France killing 8 and 100 injured. After 9/11, Europe knew homogenous terrorism consists of radicalized members of European born Muslim (Madrid bombing, Vangogh assassination). In *understanding terrorism Network*, Mark Sagman studied salafist terrorists and fundamentalists and rejected the notion that perpetrator join terrorist networks because of poverty, broken families and education. He refused the idea that terrorist are poor, angry and fanatically religious by stressing the fact that they are middle class, educated young, from caring religious families married and have children. He found out that they did not display educational training, but their unemployment is source of frustration for them. Sagman also agrees that joining terrorist networks is accomplished through friendship, kipskip and discipleship.⁶¹⁸ The preexisting racial bonds of relatives and friend clusters play determinant roles in containment places of worship (Ije Baker street mosque in London and Al-Faruq Mosque in New York) around which friendship are founded.⁶¹⁹

In April 2002, Al Zarqaoui cell in Germany arrested for preparing attacks on Jewish targets and buildings in Dusseldorf and Berlin. In January 2003 in UK, Kamal Bourgas arrested for toxic resin and chemical terror charges. In April 2003, Abbas Boutrab was arrested for terror intent they found in his flat computer discs and cassette player for Bomb making instruction. In September 2005, Andrew Rowo, a British convert was arrested for the possession of explosive materials. In October 2003 Italy, Mohamed Rafic and Kamal Hamsaoui (Moroccan and Tunisian), who have links to Ansar Al Islam (Iraqi, Jurdish Suni Islamist group) arrested for plotting attacks on Milan and Cremona. In 11 March 2004, the bombing of commuter Madrid train resulted in the killing of 2000 people. Seven Maghrebis killed themselves before the police arrest them. In May 2006 (Uk) Abu Hamza Al Misri was arrested for inciting racial hatred and for possessing guns, knives and terrorist manuals. In June 2004 (Belgium) members of *Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain* were arrested for their link with "aspargus case" and bombing of Madrid in september 2000 (the Netherland), Yahya Kadouri was jailed for posing death threats on the internet towards Dutch politicians and possession of materials to make

⁶¹⁸Mark Sagaman cited in Edwin Bakker, p. 10.

⁶¹⁹Ibid., p. 12.

explosives.⁶²⁰ In October 2004 (Spain) a group of *Martyrs of Morocco* formed in Topias prison of Salamanca plotted for attacking high court of Madrid by using a truck full of explosives. In July 2006, three suicide bombers: shehzad Tanweer, Mohamede Sidique Khan and Hassib Hussein exploded metro trains and a bus in London, Killing 50 people. In January 2015, Said and Chérif Kouachi attacked the head quarters of the Charlie Hebdo comic, killing about nine cartoonists. Mohamed Merah has killed soldiers, civilians and Jewish children in Toulouse and Mosstauban in March 2012, taking revenge on France and Europe silence over massacres in Palestine.⁶²¹

In April 2014 (Brussels), Mehdi Nemmouche has killed four visitors in the Jewish museum by opening fire on them. In November 2015 (Paris), Mohamed Salah Abdesalam and other friends (8) killed about 130 people in French cafés, bars and restaurants, making one of the biggest death tolls in Europe.⁶²² In March 2016 (Brussels) the Islamic state claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing of Belgium subway and airport killing 31 people of different nationalities.

The main characteristics of terrorist members in Europe are most of them are males aged between 25 and 30 years old belonging to second and third generation Muslim with non-European family origin, but born and raised in Europe. Most terrorists in Europe are from middle and lower classes which reflects the socioeconomic character of Muslim immigrants in Europe. Some of these members have graduated from university and some finished secondary school, while others have not finished education.⁶²³ Some are with history of petty crime, drinking and drug use (Bohlal) and discovered faith at later age. Unskilled workers and unemployed consist a high category of terrorist which does not mean that the high skilled stay uninvolved generally, tied with kinship and friendship, North African terrorists joined terrorism through different processes, their faith intensified in the months before recruitment, they start participating in courses on Quran and debate of Islam on the net.⁶²⁴ For Bobakker terrorists are mainly singular, the majority of them unskilled and belong to lower classes, while Sagan's terrorists are skilled, Middle class and were secular in their youth because of education in host countries.⁶²⁵

The changing character of terrorism makes the organization untraceable by finding new grounds and making new relations particularly after 9/11 attacks. Terrorist organization expanded its activities by involving in organized crime network across Europe and North Africa

⁶²⁰Ibid., pp. 20-22.

⁶²¹France 24, News March 12th, 2012.

⁶²²France 24, Newslines, January 10th, 2015.

⁶²³Edwin Bakker, op. cit, p. 38.

⁶²⁴Ibid., p. 41.

⁶²⁵Ibid., p. 39.

taking hold of trafficking fraudulent documentation and drug networks. The transnational operations find convenient climates in areas of instability and conflict zones in North Africa, Sub Sahara and the Sahel, where AQIM predominantly operates this transitory borders allow possible recruitments of perpetrator and strong coordination between terrorists and mafia network across the two continents where common interests centred around fund –rising from illegal migrations, trafficking drugs and weapon trade:

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) participates in the heroine trade through West Africa en route to Europe by means of providing security, which may affect European Union's members in terms of criminal activity, and potential terrorist attacks... North African terrorist cells indigeneous to the European Union are increasingly engaged in criminal activity to fund terrorist operations while externally based terrorist cells, such as AQIM, pose two fold threat, targetting European citizens in its kidnap –ransom operations and using Europe for their drug trafficking operation.⁶²⁶

So, driven by the need to operate independently and build logistical support, terrorist members and networks get involved in a range of criminal activities as source for financing its project and trading its services with a provision of arms and accessibilities to its targets. Despite differences of ideologies and motivations, terrorist networks and mafia groups meet at the convergence of economic profit and the perpetration of criminal activities resulting in alliances of varied nature specialized knowledge (of money laundering), access to services (of counterfeiting) operational support (human smuggling) and financial support⁶²⁷. In 2002, the Italian organized crime groups smuggled arms to North African based terrorist groups in return for supporting Italian narcotics smuggling networks. Latin American drug traffickers cooperated with AQIM to smuggle Cocaine to Europe with Corsican Mafia that facilitated the movement of Cocaine to Europe under the protection of AQIM.⁶²⁸ To raise more money for the organization, members of AQIM in Switzerland was involved in petty robbery (phones, laptops...). AQIM in the Sahel, particularly in Northern Mali and Niger, become flourishing zone of smuggling and trafficking. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, AQIM Leader, is notoriously named 'Mr. Marlboro' for his involvement in the drug trade in the Sahel.⁶²⁹ In his documentary film *Sahel wa Sahrae*, Hassan el Bouharrouti states that Polisario is involved in criminal activities in cooperation with terrorist organization in exchange of interests, weapon smuggling, profits and

⁶²⁶Tamara Makarenko (2002), "Europe's Crime- Terror Nexus: Links Between Terrorism and Organized Crime Groups in the European Union," Brussels, European parliament: Policy Department C, citizen's Right and Constitutional Affairs. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies>

⁶²⁷Ibid.

⁶²⁸Ibid.

⁶²⁹Ibid.

logistical support for political reasons⁶³⁰. Terrorist networks cooperation with organized crime has two major purposes for terrorists; first, profits taken from partnerships are used to finance operations and targets. The second aim is a logistical support, in which terrorist networks benefit from the expertise of organized crime groups to transport its militants through smuggling networks.⁶³¹

Following 9/11 attacks, European cinema introduced a significant shift in its narratives and approaches that changed a little bit the many ways Maghrebi immigrants were conjured up in fictional and cinematic representation in post-terrorist attacks Europe. This period is characterized by the emergence of new cinema on the politics of encounter between the North and the South which inherited some tropes of the classical biased cinema, but participated in the redefinition of screening immigrants by working on the struggle of North African immigrants' struggle in negotiating identities in a transformed ideological discourse of the global security environment and the right of indigenous character to the claim of recognition after long histories of colonialism and Islamophobia. This kind of new cinema of immigration is characterized by a dual narrativization that addresses the new definition of European identity and the voice given to the stigmatized minorities who were subject to rejection, exclusion and victimization with a complex combination of styles, discourses and contents. Yet, this transition in European filmmaking retains an ambivalent attitude towards the massive body of stereotypes and prejudices on Maghrebi immigrants, who are trapped in conciliating the complexities of multiple discourses and identities in raising global terrorism, Islamophobia and anti-immigrant feelings, where identity became a complicated source of fragmentation and social rupture, and the self and difference consolidate the "broken mirror metaphor"⁶³². However, the religious identity of immigrants and the laic model of secularization in Europe have paradoxically transformed encounters into conflicting rhetoric in public sphere where religious identity faces an ambivalent double position between permission and prohibition, conformism and resistance, visibility and invisibility.

There are two modes of narration and filmic representation of Maghrebi Muslim in European cinema. The first one is a form of light cinema which is half identificatory and half disidentificatory. This type of films tries to distance and get closer to the humanity of immigrants in a sympathetic tone. Other bunch of films have introduced a thematic twist and

⁶³⁰ Hassan Bouharrouti, *Sahel wa Sahrae-Connexions*, retrieved on 10 August, 2018 from <https://www.youtube.com/watch>

⁶³¹ M. Freeman, "the Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 34 (2011), p. 467.

⁶³² Gilles Kepel, *Quatre Vingt-Treize* (Paris: Gallimard, 2012), p. 257.

change, not necessarily negative or positive, in terms of topic, reflecting the current concern and discourse on transnational mobility and global terrorism. The politics of identification of this cinema is influenced by new realism in Italy which is famous for documentary style and unprofessional casting.⁶³³

The majority of this film features disaffected immigrant characters in state of crisis and at the margin of European society exposed to exclusion, unfortunate fate and forced to lead illicit involvement like prostitution in *from the edge of the city* by Gonstantine Gio maris and *El Viaje de Said* (1998) by..., exploitation in transplant industry in Stephen Frear's *Pretty Little Things* (2002) and failure of integration (death) in *Raod Blocks* by Stawros Iaaunon (2000)⁶³⁴. The incorporation of immigrant human experience from the percepectives of immigrant themselves and identification with their positions seems to introduce a relative change to the cultural depiction and the representative system of Europe. The deprivation of Muslim immigrants by the fallacies of fake multiculturalism of post colonial Europe that still see others with a sense of ansxiety and threat. Although reproduced in moderated discourse, North Africa immigrants still represent the nightmare to Europe's sweet dreams, disrupting the very homogeneity of a stable rich economic supremacy and its secured identity demarcation.

In *Caché* (Hidden) 2005 by the Austarian director, Michael Haneke, Majid, a French of Algerian descent, embodies the impossibilities of encounter in postcolonial Europe and the justified European fear of alterity, which still invokes suspecion, mistrust, unpredictibility and intrusion. The film is about a thrilling experience of threatening videos sent to the house of George laurent revealing secret about his past life. As ac child, George was involved in the disappearance of Majid, the son of Algerian immigrant who worked with George's parents and disapeared during the police massacre of 1961. Hidden is about this police massacre of Algerian protestor and the trauma of violence that is still attract the privileged French bourgeois class to the legacy of colonialism in North Africa. The anynomous videos and notes disturb the happy stable family life of George by featuring a detailed knowledge of past secret life which creates feeling of fear and menace. The content of video which alludes to the childhood of George makes him suspect majid as the culpable behind the sending of videos. Majid, as child, was adopted by George's parents after his parents disappeared, but George caused Majid's expulsion from his parent's house by fabricated incident. Tracing the contents of videos, Geoge goes to the banlieue, where he met Majid and asked to stop harrassing his family. Majid refuses George's accusation and commit suicide infront of his eyes. George insists on not being responsible for

⁶³³Alex Lykidis, "Minority and Immigrant Representation in Recent European Cinema," in *Building Walls in a Borderles World*, ed. Jaime J. Nasser 29:1 (2009), p. 37.

⁶³⁴Ibid., p.38.

Majid's past traumas and today suicide. George's second encounter is with Majid's son, who receives the same threats and accusations from George who denies any relationship with Majid's suicide. Although it is narrated from the perspective of upperclass French protagonist, *Caché* is a critique of post colonial Europe and the way immigrants denied recognition and access to society. Haneke's criticism of failed intergration process and multiculturalism centres around the impossibility of encounters between characters of the same shared history and with a different postcolonial positions. Immigrants still occupy the bottom of social stratification and play marginal identity, which reduces the chance of smooth transition from a colonial to postcolonial subjectivity.

Lorenc Suler's *Said* (1998) is another melodrama of irregular migration cinema which presents the struggle of undocumented Maghrebi Muslim from the perspective of identification and sympathy. *Said*, the film, represents a new trend in Spanish and Italian cinema of migration which soliatly focuses on the visibility of Maghrebi subject at the Margins of racist and xenophobic Western Europe. The appropriation of legal status and visibility has become the fatal trajectory of Said, a Moroccan illegal Migrant, which became impossible because he was always chased violently by police and skin heads of Barcelona, where his friend, Ahmed, was killed. Said's access to visibility is relatively facilitated by his Spanish girl friend, Anna, who has an identificatory stance towards foreigners. However, all attempt of characters to adjustment and integration are doomed to failure, the victimization of characters (like Ahmed) and lead to theigmatization of Maghrebi culture, this film does not break completely with old tradition of Spanish cinema, but keeps a relatibe space for humanizing the figure of immigrant by granting protagonists like Said territory and refuge despite the violence encountered in the public space (police, skinheads) and the atrocities of hostile xenophobic environments. Ahmed is killed, Hussein is hospitalized and Said's Romance with Ana failed because of cultural disparities and undocumented life of Said. Despite its violent critique of Spanish society and its racist discourses, the film perpetuates the stereotype of impossible remance between a Maghrebi and a European, cliching the potentially hurt, killed or at least, unassimible North African immigrant.

Departure from preestablished biased stereotypes associated with North African and celebration of human multicultural stance in the focus of chus Gutierrez's *Retorno a Hansala* (2008), which is about the death and life of Moroccan immigrants who ventures crossing the Mediteranean in search for better life. The story starts with the drowning of Moroccan immigrants from the village of Hansalla and washed up to the shores of Spain, where Martin, owner of funeral buseness, and Leila, Moroccan residents in Spain, meets. Martin contacts Leila with phone number held in piece of paper in the hand of yuong drowned men, who is found to be

the brother of Leila, who reach a deal with Martin to repatriate the corpses back a Hansala. The journey from Spain to Hansala across Morocco to the Atlas Mountain changes Martin's vision and philosophy of life because of the catharsis he experienced while he was staying in the village of Hansala and how Human values of Moroccan people influences the way he will see things later in his life.

Despite the identificatory attitude of the protagonist and celebration of community values of Hansalla, the film does not completely liberate its narrative from the ideologies of early Spanish cinema by focalizing the identity of narration from a dominant view point. Despite its very sympathetic tone and its stress on the humanity of immigrants, *Retorno a Hansala* echoes geographical dichotomies and political organization with overtones of hidden and silent juxtaposition of the superior and the inferior. Using the notion of *pleasures of hybridity*, Dennis Goktuik explored how contemporary German or Turkish migrant cinema captured new definitions by focusing on transnational and complex subjectivities with a generation of protagonists who are set free from the spatial entrapment of dominant structures and provided with the tools to deterritorialialize one-dimensional traditional politics. It is about cinematic experiences which represent nonclausorophobic spirit and transition to hybrid cosmopolitan pleasures of narration and space.

In this sense in quite different sense, pleasures of hybridity could be applied to the analysis of some Italian films about illegal migration in southern Italy, adapting a kind of oppositional perspective to the xenophobic stance of traditional cinema. This category of films features narratives which celebrates the humanity of immigrants and sympathy with survival stories. *Retornando a Casa* (2001) by Vincenzo Marra is a one of many recent films that belongs to the Italian emerging cinema of migration which works on the construction of hybrid narrative with transnational human experience of Marginalized characters on both shores of the Meditanean. The film potrays the hard physical work and the pain of three Italian and Tunisian fishermen, who are bounded by the dream of better life and the dangers of illicit tuna fishing, spending their days being chased by the Italian Marine patrol. It is mainly about the friendship of Franco and Samir, their dreams and the way they come to terms with their hardship in the sea. The Italian was apprehended by the Italian Marine in an illegal immigrant boat. Franco get rid of his identity card deliberately to look after a Maghrebi immigrant, allowing Marines to deport him with other undocumented migrants to the Tunisian coast⁶³⁵. *Retornando a Casa* questions the victimization of both Italians and North Africans and adopts a narrative of tolerant ethnic

⁶³⁵O'Healu Aine, "Mediterranean Passages: Abjection and Belonging in Contemporary European Cinema," retrieved on 08-08-2016 from, [http://escholarship.org/uk/item/2qh5d59c\(2010\)1-18](http://escholarship.org/uk/item/2qh5d59c(2010)1-18)

encounters in “Mediterranean passages” as chronotopes of hybrid, fluid and complex construct marked by mobility, fraternity and sympathy with human being :

Several recent films self-consciously strives to humanize the anonymous, demonized figure of the migrant by briefly mobilizing a positive discourse of fraternity of spiritual affinity with those arriving from nearby shores, either in terms of specific postcolonial ties or by gesturing broader transnational vision of the Mediterranean belonging.⁶³⁶

L'Articulo2 (1994) by Maurizio Zaccaro is a vivid reflection of the nineties' doubts and anxieties of European societies brought by the emergent phenomenon of migration. The nineties was marked by undefeatable waves of immigration after the Italian government adoption of restrictive immigration policy (Visa requirement). A feeling of threat spreads among nationals about the future of European identity as a huge number of Maghrebis were regularized and given access to citizenship and social protection. This environment of cultural tensions fed on the fervor of popular media and right wing ideologies which defend the cohesion and the purity of national orthodoxy setting barriers against cultural difference and multiple approach to identity. *L'articulo2* tells the story of Maghrebi immigrant who experiences the pressure of transporting a controversial component of Islamic law to Italy, which holds both Christian and liberal traditions. The story introduces the audience to what the narrative will look like by juxtaposing two oppositional geographies and cultures (the Maghreb and Europe) and giving signs of possible conflict rising from the first sequence. The camera alternates between a distant location in North Africa, where a young woman is looking after a sick old man; and a popular neighbourhood of Milan, where the camera focuses on the life of the immigrant with his wife and children. The young Maghrebi woman is the second wife of the man and she will arrive later in the film in Italy to join her husband in Milano. At her arrival, the narrative reaches climatic turnings as the husband enters a stage of clash with the Milanese authorities because of polygamy. As the issue was taken to court, the narrative searches for a twist or an exit to overcome potential dead lock being growing up in the evolution of the plot. Although the director chooses a middle position by making the court issue a verdict that grants the second wife residence papers with clear legal explanation of polygamy, which represents a disgusting cultural practice in the conscience of Europeans, the film avoided further extension of textual tensions by inventing a symbolic excuse to get out of the tough situation by killing the father at the concluding sequence (accident at work). *L'Articulo2* comes to the conviction that Italy is not yet ready to accept cultural difference and there still is wide gap between the Maghreb as traditional, polygamous and poor geography and Italy as modern liberal and middle class society. Possible human fraternities and

⁶³⁶Ibid.

potential cultural encounters between the North and the South are subverted by the supposed dark forces of identity and culture, imbedding layers of narration with tropes of illegality and disintegration which represent other ground for the practice of a changing discourse of cinema in general⁶³⁷.

Ali: fear Eats the Soul (Aust esson seele euf) (1974) by the German director Rainer Werner Fassbinder tells the story of Moroccan migrant of first generation in West Germany. El Hedi Bensalem represents the loss of Maghrebi immigrant in the trap of new culture and geography. Detached from his old space, El Hedi has to cope with both economic challenges of post war Germany and different cultural codes. As a lover, Bensalem is portrayed as social outfit, unable to engage in real contact with the outside world. The film shows not only how he is silent and alienated, but also unable to communicate with others as he does not master the German language. Despite its direct criticism of racism and exclusion, the film falls under a category of the eighties cinema that configures the alienation and victimization of male migrant characters and the oppression of female characters by repressive eastern patriarchy and violence need to be rescued by western liberal males like in Hark Bohm's *Yasmin* (1988) and *Shrin's wedding* by Helma Sanders (1976)⁶³⁸. This trend in German cinema of the seventies and eighties reflects similar cultural tones of Spanish cinema at the beginning of the nineties reproducing degrees of negativity and cultural adversity Maghrebi characters who were conjured up as inferior, funny, poor and unworthy of human treatment. In this category of films, Spain has become the impossible dreamland for immigrants, who are rejected because of historical background and cultural superiority that denied access to encounter and integration. They are either portrayed as subject of sexual permissiveness as the case of the Maghrebi in Luis Garica Berlanga's *Paris-Tomboctu* (1999) or marked by illegality and poverty as the case of *Tocando Fondo* (1993) by José Luis Cuerda or in a Comic context in *Morierda* (1992) by Carlos Suarez or they are most of time allocated secondary roles that help the dominant character reaches certain degree of development.

The other category of films in European cinema of migration was substantially influenced by the continuity of change on global level and the feverish discourse on world terrorism, particularly its impacts on social and cultural security. Traditionally, Films on terrorism in Europe dates back to the cinema of national terror which provoked the social and

⁶³⁷Ibid.

⁶³⁸Deniz Gorturk (2001), "Turkish Delight- German Fright: Unsettling Oppositions in Transnational Cinema," retrieved on 14-06-2017 from, <file:///C:/Users/HP/Downloads/Deniz%20Gorturk%20Turkish%20delight%20German%20fright%20%20eipcp.net.html>.

cultural roots of leftist and right wing violence which emerged as result of desperation and resentment of Europeans at the policies of liberal democracies. After the event of 9/11 attacks, there was controversial debate about the motives behind terrorist attacks, resulting in an ideological warfare of opinions. Some scholars connect religious fanaticism to cultural and political causes, while some stresses the lack of valence between rich North and impoverished South. In cinema, many filmmakers tried to reflect the official views of their political system, linking terrorist acts to an evil cultural and religious ideology that target the stability of Europe. This film brings a change to the phenomenon of representing immigrants in Europe, yet, this change does not influence the way immigrant are constructed and the stereotype around them replaced by new ones like the fanatic, the untraceable, the disintegrable.

However, films, like *la Desintegration* by Phillipe Faucon (2011), have substantially introduced a conventional change in the content and ideology of French new cinema. It makes break with the continuity of "beur" traditions of French movies which has long associated Maghrebi characters with a range of popular stereotypes and misconceptions related to crime, disintegration and identity crisis in part, *la Disintegration* stands in partial alignment with certain films like *la Haine* in its attempt to link some characters with history of victimization and racism of the dominant discourse. In other part, it breaks bonds with conventional cinema in the sense that, first, totally divorces terrorists from the immediate socio-economic context. Second, all Maghrebi terrorists in the film do not resemble classical terrorists (no beards, no Pakistani outfits) handsome and young. *La desintegration* opens with the Aid prayer, where the Imam of local neighbourhood urges French Muslims to behave correctly coexist and live in tolerance; in the other side, a group of radicalized North African youth, who attend Friday and Aid prayers, are not satisfied with the official tone of the Imam, who is for them, preaches wrong interpretation of Islam. For them, the true meaning of Islam is Islam that is militant, violent and anti-thetic to western values and permissiveness. After several meetings between the members of the cell, doctination and preaching was built selectively on citations from Coran and enhanced by the daily frustration of some of its members, whose economic background seems fragile and on the edge of collapse. At the end of the film, three members of the cell are assigned to execute a suicide bombing of United Nations headquarters in Belgium after a series of training and practice arms use. While two members drove their cars and blasted themselves, the third member panicked, left his car and escaped. *La desintegration* focuses on the fact that maghrebi youth are victims of falsified ideology that take advantage of their age and fragile economic background to impose its religious interpretation of society and culture. This terrorist cell is represented as local

network with foreign support and global fanatic ideology that pays allegiance to a wider salafist wahabism with tenets of human values and the project of pan – Muslim umma.

Le Noir te va si bien (2002) written and directed by Jaques Bral, is the story of Koubra, third generation immigrant of Maghrebi origin. Koubra is a beautiful and young Muslim woman living with her family and working in female shoes factory. She spends her daily life moving between home, work and cafebar. Her Muslim family tries to socialize her in a way that is coherent with traditional and religious structure of family and culture, while Koubra subjectively locates herself in a third position that makes her acceptable to both family norms and the liberal values of western societies. Besides the surveillance of her father, Koubra's brother constitutes a backup to the father's restrictive rules. Koubra's incorporation to the French society does not go without compromise since she accepts to take off headscarf and wear fashionable clothes to gain the acceptance and complement of western society. She keeps appearances to her family and shows fake consensus to community values by removing her hijab as soon as she leaves the family house, which contributes to losing the solid ground her family provides because of her double identity. Koubra is torn between her love to Richard and Serge, who chases her everywhere.

However, after several attempts by Serge to gain her consent, Koubra refuses because she is in true love with Richard, the bar tender. The night Koubra would tell her parents that she would marry Richard, her father discovers her other life in the bar and informs her brother, who choked her to death in her way home. The film demonstrates, as third generation Maghrebi, the ability of Koubra to reconcile oppositional positions relatively combining elements that belong to different cultural blocks –Western, Maghrebi-. *Le Noir te va se to bien* keeps loyalties to old conventions of representation by configuring characters struggling to survive in classical conflictual system of identity problematization, confirming the impossibility of intercultural romances and the unassimilability of third generation maghrebi because of religious and cultural difference. Although the French society seems liberal and independent, there are still symbolic boundaries that hamper those societies from embracing ethnic alterity and cultural difference. The story of honour killing links the film to a popular mainstream cinema in England, Germany and France, which celebrates in dominant view the failure of adoption of migrant culture and misfit of cultural identities to different environment this stories always end with honour killing, suicide and, to lesser extent, divorce.

As it has been discussed before, there is a relative departure from the traditional regime of representation of post war European cinema by showing a little compliance to the racialized conventional misconception of Maghrebi immigrants. New cinema in Europe stands a half way

to classical content as it turns from narratives of cultural accusation and ethnic conflict to anxieties and threat felt by European nationals about the identity of Maghrebis which makes cultural difference reproducing an other transitory stage in the evolution of old tradition with new range of prejudices about Maghrebi protagonists as intraceable, unassimable, estranged and unanticipable. Yet, a variety of filmic approaches try to give voice to immigrants by, at least, identifying with their struggle against xenophobia and exclusion. While some films stresses the humanity of immigrants identifying with the very conditions and marginal positions, while other films are unable to construct affinities with the nature of circumstances that force them to embark in infinite quest for recognition and fails to cut off continuities with preestablished racial discourse about the inferiority of immigrant and the menacing character of cultural encounters. Some films submit old politics of European cinema to the challenge of redefining traditional conflict focalization and problematization of national symbolic boundaries, particularly at the turn of 21st century, which was substantially marked by the emergence of new claims to identity appropriation/ manifestation with terrorist penetration to Europe and America. As result, cinema tries to get away from one – dimensional overt stereotypical representation and give birth to somewhat different portrayal characterized by complexity and ambivalence.

However, a great amount of films does not promote completely different perspective as it stage characters under the mercy of cultural system that destroys their dreams underscores intercultural romance and render them to a category of alienated human being with no right to coexistence or access to socio-cultural fabric of Europe. Because of its ambivalence and complexity, this cinema does not represent a real disruptive force that dysfunctions the domination of singular voice, but results in another parallel dimension of power relations and restoration of the status quo. What reinforces the narrative of continuity are tropes of disintegration and plots of failed encounters. Tainted as stranger, the immigrant is envisioned in a logic of dual process of familiarity and estrangement, inclusion and exclusion, incommensurability and valence. Sara Ahmed states:

These others (immigrants in European cinema) cannot be simply relegated to the outside: given that the subject comes to existence as an entity only through encounters with others, then the subject's existence can not be separated from the others who are encountered. As such, the encounter itself is ontologically prior to the question of ontology (the question of being who encounters).⁶³⁹

⁶³⁹Sara Ahmed, *Strange Encounters, Embodied Others in Postcoloniality* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 7.

Other categories of films go smoothly from a pattern of representation that was conventionally associated with cultural queeriness of exotic pleasures symptomatic of uncivilized rituals of first generation immigrants to a conception revolving around identity problematization and religious accusation, reflecting the current discourse about radicalism, in Europe, which bleakly tainted the destiny of whole second and third generations of Maghrebi immigrants. Such films switch up focalization to packing a range of new stereotypes about youth accused of being suspect, guilty and potential sleeper subjects of terrorist and suicidal identities.⁶⁴⁰

⁶⁴⁰Ibid., p. 7.

Part IV

IV-Cultural Identity of North African Immigrants in a Plurality of Voices: Tropes of (Mis)Representation and Politics of Self-reconstruction

1- Striking Ambivalences, Textual Tensions and Narrative's Own Rupture

A-Tropes of Redemption and Cultural Conversion in Spanish Cinema about Moroccan Immigrants in Chus Gutiueres's *Retorno a Hansala* and *el Nino* by Daniel Monzon

Despite the controversial nature of migration as a phenomenon, migration has substantially contributed to the making of new Europe as the Mediterranean basin has become a location of ethnic diversity and cultural encounters, giving birth to a new politics of identity. The dramatic transition brought by Mediterranean crossings was / is very influential in shaping the social fabric and the cultural pattern of new Europe by bringing together a mosaic of differences and cultures. The Mediterranean has become the contact zone of transcontinentality, erasing the old notion of border controlled by the traditionally hegemonious Europe as cities and islands like Aljageras, Lampedusa, Ceuta and Gibraltar display multiethnic shape because of the growing number of undocumented and legal migrants from all over the world share the same ambivalent human space characterized by confrontation, negotiation and reciprocity. With the shifting dynamics of the Mediteranean and the southern border of Europe, the question of national identity has been affected by the transitory nature of space as it is reappropriated and displaced by the heavy circulation of people, new concentration of transnational of identities and circuits of multi national capital.

However, the mobile and the fluid character of the Mediterranean came to birth not by choice, but by necessity because the meaning of mobility associated with this space does not transcend the conventional experience of encounters operated on the tragedies of illegal immigrants and illicit practices reminiscent of colonial exploitation and economic invalence. Paradoxically, the Mediterranean still encompasses the embodiment of dominant dimension of white metropolitan culture which contributes to the dehumanizing conditions of ex-colons and illegal immigrants, who are exposed to all forms of exploitation (trafficking, sex trade, drowning, apprehension, detention). Today, the Mediterranean has become a spectacular site of inconsistencies and anxieties engendered by ramifications of colonial history and compulsory imbrication of cultural relations of power, manifesting a kind of return of the political subconscious suppressed by the continuous patterns of rejection and exclusion⁶⁴¹. Immigrants in

⁶⁴¹Martin Ed .Baldwin (2004), "the Changing Mosaic of Miditeranean Migrations," Migration Policy Institute, retrieved 12-07-2016 From www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=230.2004

the Mediterranean are subject to all forms of violence and atrocities, they are either drowned by their traffickers or pushed overboard by patrol boats or abandoned in the middle of nowhere in the sea:

The so-called “boatpeople” are the most vulnerable to media visibility, to spectacularization. Many of them die of starvation, overcrowded conditions, deliberate drowning by their traffickers, dehydration or hypothermia while on the boat, and their bodies are washed upon the shores...⁶⁴²

Those images in the Mediterranean have become the frequent reality of every day life, rendering the basin a collective cemetery of third world and southern citizens. The illusory nature of discourse about Mediterranean countries as a part of collective historical memory and common heritage hides the growing anxieties among political and intellectual elites about the status of European identity with regard to the diversity of ethnicities, cultures and religions that put at stake the claim of European cosmopolitanity and ability to respect universal human right values. With the slow process of integrating second / third generation Maghrebi immigrants and the growth of xenophobic discourses, the notion of multicultural Europe was put into question as North African citizens experienced a violent climate of religious segregation and institutional racism on levels of education, housing and employment. Besides, traditions of non-integration has contributed to an excessive invisibility and marginalization of North African in spatial power relations that take in silencing and banning them from being fully naturalized as legal and visible subjects. As symbol of peripheral and mobile identity, Maghrebi immigrants are stigmatized by being associated with illicit existence and a form of illegality because of their cultural alterity and religious difference. Despite the fact that migration from the Maghreb changed the demographic character and economic fabric of Europe, xenophobic and misconceived connotations have characterized European ambivalent logic, which embraces both identification and indifference to the desire of immigrants to assure their access to host societies⁶⁴³.

Spain, as Mediterranean country, is one of the most popular destination for North African immigrants because of geographical proximity, colonial history and flexible border mobility. During the nineties, however, with successive regularization programmes and the rise of extremism at the turn of the century, Spain adopted a selective migration pattern and establishment of Euro SEVE system to block excessive influx of immigrants from North Africa across the Mediterranean through the strait of Gibraltar and Ceuta or Melilla. As a receiving nation, Spain has entered a decisive phase in the reshaping of society and culture as side effect of

⁶⁴²Ibid.

⁶⁴³Ibid.

the migratory phenomenon, which consciously or unconsciously engages in tough process of hybridization of society through the complex and fluid structures of encounters between multiple cultures and nationalities. Yet, because of migration pressures and new patterns of human mobility around the Mediterranean, Spanish migration policies shared the never-ending worries of new Europe's changing landscape by trying collectively to respond to the phenomenon of illegal migration externalization and militarization of "Fortress Europe" by new detection technology and the use of North African countries as a new geopolitical 'buffer zone'. The recurrent migration policy shifts and revisions made Spain a part of regime that search for the point that it has become "a central, generating moment of the new liberal transformation of Europe".⁶⁴⁴

Migration issues in Spain does not only mark a shift in the political and demographic landscapes, but it also triggered controversial polemics in media,⁶⁴⁵ literature and cinema, focusing on the very hybrid and complex anxieties brought to test under the transformative experience of difference and cultural encounters. Literature and cinema of migration in Spain and Europe have always confirmed the conformism of public imaginary with narratives obsessed with potential dangers and threats that destabilize cultural specificity and the purity of national identity when being subject to intrusion and unfamiliar invasion. The tradition of literary and cinematic representation was a source of knowledge and curiosity about other cultures and ethnicities, particularly North Africans and Muslims, who sometimes represent the repressed historical trauma of Moorish Andalusia or the stigmatized colonized other who provokes cultural morbidity and religious inferiority. Spanish cinema and arts play a part in the construction of Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians as the racial and religious others of Christian white Spain, whose perceived cultural distance, interpreted with the recurrent return of the reconquesta both in socio-cultural and geopolitical forms.

Moroccan- Spanish encounters date back to the religious confrontation in the middle ages when Muslims conquered and occupied Andalusia for about 800 years, followed by liberation Christian wars, which resulted in the expulsion of the "Moors" from Spain in 1492. Spanish collective imaginary still associates North African Muslims with the violent regime of Franco, who recruited colons from North Africa to silence and subordinate the insurgencies of large section of Spanish population in the period of civil war⁶⁴⁶. In addition, continuity of traumatic

⁶⁴⁴Hein De Haas, "Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union: an Overview of Recent Trends," p. 11.

⁶⁴⁵Papa do Paulas, Dimitries et al., eds., *Escape Routes : Control and Subversion in the Twenty – First Century* (London: Pluto press, 2008), p. 162.

⁶⁴⁶Albeit I Mas, op.cit, p. 4.

encounters between Catholic Spain and Islamic Morocco fuelled by the late events of Moroccan immigration in El Ejido, terrorist-attacks in 2004 and the dispute over the parsley Island in the Mediteranean.

However, neither geographical proximity nor histories of cultural encounters played a role in bridging distances of ideological conflicts and gaps of political difference by overcoming boundaries of accusation and misconception, and celebrating human co-existence and tolerance. As part of the Spanish collective unconscious, the Moor, the Maghrebi or the Muslim was denied any chance to share the participation in the construction of identity as positive compoment of history despite geographical and cultural disparities. The North African has always been the subject of a superior discourse and a locus of perceived instances of antiquity that associates him/ her with pejorative depiction like the violent Moor, the dirty, the sensual and the traitor... While Moroccans as Muslims still remembered for their beautiful architecture in Moorish Granada, their military honour and bravery , most generalized stereotypes associate them with exoticism, violence, hypocracy, religious obscurantism and sensuality. Other portrayals are characterized by evoking complexity and ambivalence in th sense that Spanish were taken by the patience and hospitality of Moroccans as well as a mixture of curious stance towards women as embodying both fashination and mystery. This ambivalent attitude explained this way by Parajes:

The process of racialization of the Moroccan group is built upon multiple factors. And among those, they have particular importance along history of conflicts and specially the eight centuries of reconquest, or in other words, of fighting the Muslim invader and also a long tragic colonialism in Morocco in the twentieth century.⁶⁴⁷

Contemporary Spanish cinema has contributed to the shaping of North African identity in Europe by choosing to offer a relatively modified version of (mis) representation⁶⁴⁸ and modalities of subject positioning in regard to Maghrebi immigrants as the new "Moors" of Andalusia in postcolonial Europe. Spanish migrant cinema by Spanish filmmakers recasted the dynamics of encounters and reiterated forms of cultural miscegenation for long time, addressing patterns of identification and victimization in liberal global environment profoundly affected by return of colonial legacies, global terrorism and new politics of belonging. Despite its ambivalent and dichotomous tone, new voices of spanish cinema offer a form of cultural encounter that distanciates itself a little bit from the very overt xenophobic and Eurocentric discourse of traditional texts and films about the identity of North African immigrants, who have been

⁶⁴⁷Albeit I Mas, op. cit, p. 5.

⁶⁴⁸Miguel Parajes, "La Inmigracion en Espana," cited in Albeit Mas, *the Moor: a Neighbour under Suspicion*, p. 11.

historically reduced to archetypes of stereotypical existence or symbols of invisibility and inferiority to some extent, contemporary migration cinema represents an emergent trend in European cinema (France, Italy, Germany) with substantial number of film makers who are revisiting old boundaries of classical biased politics of metropolitan cinema, introducing a shift in the paradigms of representation and critiquing the social and political roots of racialization and victimization. The contested tones of this cinema do not only show the condemnation of failed encounters, but the emphasis is equally put on the cosmopolitanity of citizenship, the fluid character of European identity and the identificatory transformation of protagonists who participate positively in the process of integration. The contextualized subjectification of Spanish –and European- new cinema is determined by intrafilmic factors of globalization, transnational mobility and religious radicalization, which problematized old notions of identity and brought about a growing polarization of cultural and ideological nature⁶⁴⁹. As result, Spanish cinema has reshaped old politics of encounters to respond to transition from monolithic, Spain to the state of multicultural and plural identity. Drawing on the work of multiculturalist and the notion reciprocity by Amine Maalof, Garcia M. Roldan argues that contemporary Spanish cinema celebrates the multiculturalism of Spanish society and abandoned the old politics of encounter with Maghrebi immigrants, giving space to the rise of hybrid and plural conception human identity:

Spanish cinema, as result of the migratory phenomenon and the complexity of our multifaced society, presents us with new concept of both our individual and national identities. We no longer see just a concept of "us" and "them", but rather one of collective identity : open, hybrid, tolerant, and inclusive. Spanish cinema, which has historically harbored biased against North African immigration now contributes substantially to the new reality built on the harsh conditions of immigration... the sensual, violent and chauvinist stereotypes associated with North Africans are now replaced by complex, and ideneral, more positive images.

Retorno a Hansala (2008) by chus Guteurez is an example of Spanish and European cinema about immigration, which received a positive reception among critics and intellectuals for the new perspective from which it tackles issues of identity, cultural encounters and illegal immigration. While *El Viaje de Said* by Coke Riooba focuses on the critique of racial⁶⁵⁰ and xenophobic discourses of Spanish society against Maghrebi immigrants, *Retorno a Hansala* builds a narrative of identification in which the protagonist undergoes a psychological

⁶⁴⁹Garcia M. Roldan, "Spanish Cinema: Meeting of Cultural Identities," *International Journal of Humanities and Racial Sciences*, 2: 19 / special issue (October 2012), p.196-197.

⁶⁵⁰Garcia M. Roldan, "Spanish Cinema: Meeting of Cultural Identities," p. 197.

transformation that leads him to accept difference and sympathise with the dehumanizing conditions of illegal immigrants and with those who live on the margin of society. Chus Gutierrez embarks in a kind of comparative narrative that establishes economic and cultural profiles of different protagonists, who belong to oppositional geographies and identities on the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean. *Retorno a Hansala* seems to launch a departure from the preestablished biased stereotypes associated with North Africans and highlights the human multicultural stance of immigration, but with geopolitical tones.

The film is based on a true story occurred in 2001, when a group of Moroccan illegal immigrants drowned while they were trying to cross the Mediterranean to Spain in Search for better life. This group of immigrants belongs to the same village in the Moroccan Atlas. Chus Gutierrez was touched by this human tragedy and decided to visit the village of Hansala in 2008 to have better knowledge of why people risk their life to embark in such deadly journey. The opening sequence of the film focalizes a number of dead bodies of illegal immigrants in the sand of the Southern Spanish shores. One of the drowned young men was holding a phone number in a piece of paper, which later will be revealed that Rachid is the brother of Leila, a Moroccan immigrant living legally in Spain. After hearing the news, Martin, owner of funeral house, comes to the scene of the event to have knowledge of what is happening. Through the use of phone number, the director prepares the encounter between Leila and Martin around which the narrative will evolve and develop till the end.

After several contacts and meetings between Martin and Leila, they came to a deal to repatriate the dead bodies back to Hansala, starting in journey to the south which will bring Martin to the gates of internal self-discovery, change⁶⁵¹ and cultural conversion. Martin agreement to the repatriation of corpses was driven both by his desire to save his business at home from bankruptcy, to keep distance from tensions in his family life and to take part in human mission of redemption even when it is too late. The journey to Hansala with Leila is done under the psychological and the omnipresent perspective of Martin, who is prepared for transformation on many levels; First, Martin's return to Hansala was hard as he encounters many difficulties. He was prohibited from crossing the Moroccan custom check point for not having the sufficient legal documents for transporting corpses.

After solving the first obstacle, Martin and Leila were victims of robbery in the Moroccan highway when two thieves stole the car, corpse of Rachid, their money and the clothes of the dead immigrants. Fortunately, later on the journey, they found the car and the stolen cargo. Second, the journey works on symbolic level to involve audience in the progressive

⁶⁵¹Ibid., p. 200.

transformation of the diegetic narrative of the hero, where Leila, the car and the events become accessories and secondary components in the completion of his journey. This characteristic is a defining element of road movie cinema which depends on the creation of conflicts and collision on the road to self discovery and change. The film is reminiscent of Ismael Farokhi's *Le Grand Voyage*, an intracultural narrative of hero who sets up in a journey by car with his father from France to Mekka. The film ends up with a total change in the protagonist's vision of life. For *Retorno a Hansala*, as the story develops the director takes us to the village where Martin meets Said, the young brother of Leila, who finds connections with Martin because of his little knowledge of Spanish language culture and football. Said, as another secondary character, works on the success of Martin's identification and human affection. The director puts Martin's evolution at crisis when Said asks him to transport him illegally to Spain, hiding him in car, a request makes Martin embarrassed and confused. In the course of their stay in the village, the film offers a kind of political and anthropological coverage of the hard life of people in Hansala, who are living in destitute poverty, but strongly bounded by sublime human values and relation:

With this experience, Martin is able to understand how people like Leila's brother feel; they leave every thing behind and only with the clothes on their backs they risk their lives in a small boat with the hope to find a better future in Spain... (backhome) they do not have electricity, water or medicine and the community has stayed alive thanks to solidarity and mutual support, sharing absolutely everything they have.⁶⁵²

Under gradual process of identification with simple aspects like solidarity, the value of word and hospitality, Martin was able to undergo cultural conversion, which leads him to respect and deeply sympathize with the very hard circumstances that drive thousands of youth from Morocco to set off in a journey of no return. Martin's solidarity and sympathy amplified with his sadness and remorse for not helping Said, who also left to Spain illegally with knowledge of his family and Martin after. He refused to transport him to Spain. After hearing the news of Said's departure, Martin feels responsible for what might happen to Said in his dangerous crossing of the Mediterranean. Fortunately, Said survived the journey and remembered the way to Martin's work place, where he meets Martin after the latter returned from Hansala after a call from a friend about an other group of immigrants being washed up to the shore.

For Garcia M. Roland, *Retorno a Hansala* is a celebration of Multiculturalism and the human character of contemporary Spanish cinema as it renders cultural encounters possible, giving voice to the already racialized and marginalized of mainstream cinema. Chus Gutierrez focuses on expressive details and suggestive components to reach a certain codage of meaning:

⁶⁵²Ibid., p. 159.

For me, the story of the clothes (the drowned immigrants' clothes that were taken back so the dead could be identified) was very symbolic. This was the most telling detail, this was the resume of the situation, no one would recognize you by your shirt, because you may buy or have 20 shirts like this or 20 people have a similar shirt.⁶⁵³

However, interpreting *Retorno a Hansala* from a pure multicultural stance seems to neglect a corpus of political and cultural contexts uncovered and unquestioned. *Retorno a Hansala* retains some of the textual and visual traditions of conventional cinema which, reinforces impartial conceptualization of identity via a body of unvoiced and hidden ideologies. It is true that the film could be taken as a model of how Spanish cinema switched up from the violent racist depictions to identificatory discourses and humanization of North Africans. Yet, this modification in the degree of (mis) representation does not mean that the audiovisual politics of the film goes without incorporating discursive practices reminiscent of old regimes of racialization and stereotypization of a “neighbour” that embodies religious threat, cultural morbidity and political adversity. A close look at *Retorno a Hansala* gives the impression that the film is illusiory and work as distractor to the viewer's eye as it depends on succession of spots of identification and emotional inclusion of the audience. So, any discussion of the film takes the risk of tracking the textual and visual gear that make the viewer filters the deep structures and unresolved anxieties determining the body of the narrative, which need to be subjected to the symptomacy of fictional reading.

My contribution to the analysis of *Retorno a Hansala* will be in the light of two major notions: minimized narrative of survival and redemption or/ rescue trope. Minimized narrative of survival is simply about lone or exeptional cases of protagonist that are incorporated to the dominant discourse and accepted as successful prototypes of integration within the narrative. This type of characters in European cinema is given credit because of their endowed capability to go against mainstream discourse and undergoes a change of identity to exhibit obvious assimilatory or identificatory roles. This category of characters proves to appropriate a distinctive/ exeptional dynamics and embodies a double experience: some films celebrates European protagonists who undergo an experience of catharsis or identification with characters of Maghrebi origin in state of crisis, other narratives configure Maghrebi protagonists as being able to change their destiny and having access to incorporation in the dominant chronotypes of discourse. The achievement of this narrative agency is defacilitated by a range of cultural and ideological structures that make protagonists subject to rejection and opposition from the dominant counter-forces which resist difference and exception.

⁶⁵³Ibid., p. 200.

Retorno a Hansala is tolerant with a certain category of characters like Laila and Said for a reason. Laila is the representation of desirable Maghrebi character, who flexibly adapts to oppositional cultural structures and meets the unsurmountable constraints of identity, demonstrated in her identity code switching roles that makes able to switch up between multiple hegemonic cultures and spaces, Laila's ambivalent attitude and adaption to both Spanish identity (Liberal, Europeanized) and Maghrebi culture (conservative, traditional) legitimizes her relative passage to the dominant narrative of the film and guarantee her integration in the Spanish society. The elided and silenced reality of the film asserts that immigrant identity is determined by the identificatory mood of the dominant discourse which decides whether you will be given permission and accessibility to social approval. Laila's incorporation depends on her ability to go Europeanized and conformist to the values of host cultures as well as keeping close to original identity. As such, cultural encounters and acceptance of difference remains relative and conditional (to what extent can you distance or move away from your original identity ?

Laila represents, what I call, minimized narrative of survival because it belongs to the category of characters who survived the machines of violent socialization, victimization and cultural stigmatization. This form of exceptional cases is a demanding mechanism that necessitates a change in the protagonist diegetic identity; yet, the transformation is not sufficient to fit and adapt or to be fully accepted, the character is obliged to experience cultural compromise to achieve an advanced stage of approval. Being a misfit exposes the character to the risk of rejection and elimination. Besides, Laila's agency and identity code switching is not by choice. Rather, her dual identification is by necessity since it is caught in a reconciliatory position, negotiating two hegemonic discourses. Laila's subjectivity is conditioned by variables of identity and culture, and determined by transition between two conflictual spaces (Morocco and Spain, rich / poor, metropolitan/ marginal, modern/ traditional). Both spaces demonstrate a degree of dictatorship and hegemony and defined by oppositional imperatives. Both of them offer no choice to Laila, except being submissive to their double jeopardy –she has to negotiate her Muslim identity and European culture. Back at home, Laila has to meet the conventional and patriarchal character of society by behaving and wearing in accordance with local norms. Back in Spain, she has to cope with the demanding and permissive character of space, that equally impose its hegemonic power of judgement on Laila because its post liberal ethics oblige her to express consensus in order to gain approval and survival from the machine of xenophobia, racism and exclusion.

Minimized narrative of survival can be applied to the character of Said, the younger brother of Laila in *Hansala*. The film involves Martin and Said in process of identification and

harmony where things go well until Said asks Martin to take him to Spain between the wheels of his car. Martin advises Said and explains to him the dangers of crossing the Mediterranean without legal documents. When Said left to Spain illegally, Martin was overwhelmed by feelings of guilt and responsibility. The stereotype invoked by this narrative is the already made immigrant, integrable and convertible in advance. Said is a character of post liberal affiliations that will face no problems of identity and integration (this is why the filmmaker made him survive the journey while his friends drowned at the end of the film). The film gives the impression that Said is giving a kind of audition in front of Martin performing and staging his talents of being the perfect figure of immigrant integrability and consensus to Martin expectation. Said brings things to Martin, communicates with him in Spanish, has knowledge of Spanish sport and life style represents fictional realities that present Said as the already prepared and integrated postcolonial subject, who overcomes constraints of culture and language. However, Said's use of Spanish in his communication with Martin does not occupy the right extradiegetic reality that parallels the content of the narrative. As fact, immigrants from Beni Mellal, Khoubetga and the surrounding rural areas prefer Italy as their destination, which means that the use of Spanish language is not convincing enough. Besides, Moroccan young generations are strongly influenced by global and American trends in cinema, music and culture ; Yet, this inconsistent use of Spanish is justified because Said's sister is an immigrant to Spain and may also used to reflect an excessive mode of identification to justify Said's survival .It is a gesture of mis-en-scene to prepare the success of Said's journey at the end of the film and anticipates his potential integration as a survivor of the destructive force of the narrative (death). Said is included in the same discursive dynamics of Leila as he is provided with qualities of translation, similarity, mimesis and identification which made him open, flexible and unbreakable despite the harsh difficulties in the way to achieve his dream.



Figure 1. Sympathy and Disidentification in *Retorno a Hansala*

The film maintains continuity with early colonial tropes and classical regime of knowledge that dominate colonial science and literature of early twentieth century. At the period, many travellers, antropologists and colonial administrators tried unaunthetically to find justification for imperial invasion with the claim that colonies and colonized people deserve occupation because it is the only way to bring them to civilization, enlitlement and progress. Being uncivilized and inferior, European's others were in need of being saved and rescued from darkness, illiteracy and savagery. The dominant European male has always been the savor and the liblator of both barren geographies and oppressed native females. In *Retorno a Hansala*, cultural conversion and psychological journey to the depth of a poor geography brings Martin redemption in relation to his family because his relationship with his wife was destroyed by some problems, which is itself a stereotype (immigrants'prescribed/fatal poverty). The journey plays an influential role in the empowerment of Martin and opens his eyes on the privileges and bless of being European citizen in comparison with the demeaning and improverished conditions of immigrants and people in Hansala. Martin's journey to the south is not only a journey in psychological terms as Garcia M. Roland argues, but a journey of disidentification with Western capitalism, individualism of the Spanish family values and questioning of his cultural difference's impasse.

Martin undergoes a process of "Moroccanization" like Gino, the Italian protagonist of the Italian film *Lamerica* by Gianni Amelio, who travels to to Albania in business journey experiencing inversed position of identity loss and the improvereshed conditions of Albanians⁶⁵⁴, who live in a destitute poverty which drives them to migrate to Italy despite the fact that Martin does not experience identity loss. The psychological transformation does not occur only on personal level, but it also lead him to adopt an identificatory and positive attitudes towards immigrants, affecting the way he envisions difference by accepting and embracing the community values of Hansala⁶⁵⁵. Yet, the filmmaker keeps discursive overtones of dominant discourse that direct and control the escalation of the narrative by involving Martin, Western male protagonist who narrates the events from Western prospective –as the catalysor of the story and the manipulator of other character movements, Martin holds the threads of narration moving characters like in puppet show and determines who dies and who survives, who undergo cultural conversion and who is the subject of identification, who will be the savor and who will be the redemed. As if the filmmaker wants to leave the audience with this strong impression: despite

⁶⁵⁴Katerina Leung (2011), "Foreign Fears in Lamerica: Exile, Liminality and Hybridity in the refugee as a Monster," *Kino, the Western Undergraduate Journal of Film Studies*, 2:1, retrieved on 10 August 2017 from <http://ir.lib.uwa.ca/kino/vol2/iss1/1>.

⁶⁵⁵Garcia M. Roldan, "Spanish Cinema: Meeting of Cultural Identities," p. 202.

family problems and unprofitable business journey, Martin takes the risk of embarking human mission of repatriating dead immigrants back home. Traditionally, European male protagonists challenge whole community to liberate native female from patriarchal repressive system, in *Retorno a Hansala* the rescue seems ironic because interference in the destiny of immigrants comes too late by helping packaging corpses backhome. Eventually, North African immigrants are saved by Martin though it seems that Maghrebi dead bodies rescued Martin's business from bankruptcy. This continuity with preestablished European cinematic representation reflects the film affinities with a parallel hidden and invisible discourse that is still loyal to old traditions of European cinema.

In addition to the classical stereotype of the impoverished destitute illegal immigrant, *Retorno a Hansala* reflects the dominant responses of Spain and other European countries, who expressed their resentment at the huge number of illegal immigrants arriving and drowning at the southern shores of fortress Europe and the maximum they could do is sending corpse back home in black packages. Equally, *Retorno a Hansala* shows compliance to the national European policy about Maghrebi immigrants in recent years. The film's inherent structure and unvoiced textual discourse embrace the ideology of selection, ultrafiltration and cultural buffering, which marked the latest patterns of immigration policies in Europe, imposing new selective conditions of access to European Union and citizenship (blue card, point technology, high academic qualification...).

Leila's incorporation to the dominant discourse is because of Martin's anxiety about Leila as a possible sexual subject of desire. Leila may still be the oriental feminine figure suggestive of both fascination and mystery, admiration and abjection (Martin watches Leila secretly while she is having a bath in Hansala). The film also perpetuates a kind of exotic trope of colonial romance of the happy noble savage as it makes juxtaposition between Spain as postliberal and developed space that lost affinities with genuine human values and Hansala as utopia of idyllic connotations with people living in destitute poverty, but in harmony, happiness and solidarity. The film echoes certain positioning of power relations, particularly its sadistic meaning as identification of audience is built upon the suffering and the victimization of marginal characters stigmatized groups (illegal immigrant) are given credit only when they are poor, oppressed and abandoned.

EL Nino (2014) is Spanish film by Daniel Monzon, which highlights the Mediterranean as transitory space (*nonlieux*) where characters are engaged in different forms of encounters characterized by contact and conflict with tensions dramatically structured in oscillation between clandestinity and invisibility. The space created by the film is an intertextual vision of the

Mediterranean as sea that exhibit pamplest identity with records of human expriences and histories of mobility, somtimes in the form European perspective because of asymetrical relation of economic and cultural powers, imposing a rhethoric of belonging that is dominant and Eurocentric. Cinematic usage of Mediterranean water invokes a variety of discourses and contents, ranging from the unknown, the beautiful, the tragic, the romantic, the colonial, and the transnational. Traditionally, the Mediterranean basin frequently connoted the political adversity between the rich North and the poor South, signalling histories of colonial invasion and conquest, and the constant conflict over soverneity and political domination between catholic Spain and Islamic North Africa.

Contemporary version of the Mediterranean has captured new politics of mobility and disjunction as the late discourse of globalization and transnationality marked a shift in the spacial identity of the sea. Frequently, the Mediterranean obtains an identity of new political, cultural and economic discourse associated with the notion of southern and fortress Europe because of the conflictual dynamic brought by illegal migration, human trafficking and organized crimes. Late media reports and discourses link the Mediterranean with new waves of “invasion” from the South and the occupation of a territory that represented, for a long time, an iconic image of tourism and human luscious meeting. Today, for the international imaginary, the contemporary Mediterranean exclusively invokes new symbolic and physical division of space, triggered by media images about stories of arrival, disembarkation, drownings and detentions of illegal immigrants from the south. Refugees, illegal immigrants, traffickers cross the Miditeranean in speed boats, pateras and containers, bringing new forms of encounters and mobilities with a shifting interstics of power and identity. The new anxieties of Mediterranean crossings have great impact on the widening of divisions in geographical forms and the transformative context of European countries, which over whelmingly obsessed with stability of its law and discourse. With the unification of European Union countries, the post-Schengen Europe entered an intensified stage of exposure to multiple forms of migration and mobility, particularly during economic crisis and velvet revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East. This period was characterized by the emergence of Southern Europe as a new border and the notion of fortress Europe, tragetting the control of mobility accross the Miditeranean to Europe by intensifying border control and marine surveillance by relying on heavy militarization and securatization of Miditeranean fences.

However, the frequently transmitted image of the Mediterranean embraces a context of unsettled and disurptive mode of existence defined by flow of multi-faced spaces, fluid routes and unequal power relation. The Mediterranean is a site of becoming, not being:

A solid space crossed at different depths and with different vectors by clearly distinct fluxes of people, goods, information and money. Those who enter the Mediterranean today have to acquire an exacerbated identity, a “Costume” that will not abandon them until the end of their journey and across the water. Clandestine immigrants, cruise ship tourists, armed forces, fishermen, sailors, submarine and rig engineers cross the Mediterranean waters everyday without communicating and often without even noticing each other, regimented in their own identities and constricted with their prefixed courses.⁶⁵⁶

Within this context of diversity and liminality, *El Nino* captures moments of encounter between characters on borders of collective existence that involves them in a process of evolution, negotiation and conflict. The film configures two categories of characters; the first one represents the legal corpus of Spanish Guardia Civil and Marine, which work on enforcing the law of crossing and (dis) embarkation on the Spanish south between Algeiras and Gibraltar. This category includes Jesus, Eva, Sergio and Vicente. The second category of characters represents the counter force of traffickers and dealers of Coke and resin cannabis, who operate illegally in the transportation of illicit product between Spain, Morocco and Gibraltar. This aspect of characterization is interpreted by El Nino, the protagonist, El compi, Khalil, Rachid, Amina and other characters.

The film is the story of El Nino, the main protagonist, who crosses the Mediterranean from the crowded port of Algeiras to the shores of Morocco, between Tetuan and Ceuta) transporting cannabis in his Jetski, using his physical and mental dexterity to get rid of marine and border patrol. At the course of his recurrent mortal journey between the two sides of the Mediterranean, he was introduced to Amina, a Moroccan girl who works in transporting products from Ceuta to Tetuan. Amina is the sister of Khalil, coworker of El Nino who represents a link between trafficker groups in Spain and cannabis producers in Morocco. Khalil assures smooth circulation of the trade because of his geographical knowledge and his boss Rachid, a Moroccan trafficker who presides connection with illicit mafia networks in Europe. After several meetings between El Nino and Amina, who becomes the mediator between the producers and El Nino in Morocco, he transported her illegally to Spain on his Jetski and started a romantic love story.

El Nino keeps trafficking Cannabis between Algeiras and Tetuan, sometimes, alone, other times with El Compi and Khalil with the compliance of Moroccan Gendarmerie. El Nino has escaped many chases because of his intelligence, confidence and mental composure.

⁶⁵⁶Solid Sea by Multiplicity quoted in Nilgün Bayraktar, *Moving Images against the Current the Aesthetics and Geopolitics of Mobility in Contemporary Europe*. Unpublished Dissertation, California, 2011, p. 120.

However, in one of his return journeys from Morocco with Khalil in his speed boat full of cannabis, Spanish marine chased him in violent action in the midst of the Mediterranean, resulting in the crash of the helicopter in the sea by flash pistol used by Khalil to keep them away from their way. This turning instance in the narrative constitutes a departure point for Spanish police to intensify surveillance and control over the port of Al Jageras port, deploying high tracking technologies and cooperation with Interpol. After patience and insistence of Jesus and Eva, the marine and police detected an attempt to trafficking 200kg of coke in sophisticated suitcases in a truck arrived to the port from Latin America. This incident gives them access to the network of English Eastern European and Spanish drug trafficking, by setting up a trap for El Nino who was sentenced with seven years verdict in Prison.

The opening scene of the film shows a headless man hanged on bridge near the port and the closing sequence ends with the same scene with a man decapitated head on the side of the road near the bridge. This unresolved pattern of systematic crimes contextualizes the nature of encounters in the Mediterranean as a legitimate territory for the dispute over spacial privileges and confrontational strategies deployed by mafia organizations, configuring the conflictual nature of heterogeneous voices and oppositional forces that claim the appropriation of waters and economic sovereignty. While the film unifies characters in common structure of existential qualities as being entrapped in dissuasion, quick profit loss, the transnational identity of the Mediterranean is coded as "cosmopolitan, syncretic, rhizomatic"⁶⁵⁷ and fluid, but it is violent and murderous, damaging to the so-called complex subjectivities as its deceptive surface hides the dictation of manipulative depth controlling the threads of dominant narration. Although the film interfaces with a spacial politics of the new global sense of mobility and the innovative dynamics of transnational traffic of identities, characters' movements is patterned under a containing force of the "predator" entrapment of space and the authority of hierarchies trope that stage their enclosure and dependence on a disempowering politics that leave them no chance to go beyond their imprisonment or transcend the very economic desperation.

In the opening scene, the director has already charted the landscapes of their destiny and prefigured characters subordinate encounter with seascapes of with murderous or predator borders. In complex network of spatial hierarchies, Khalil represents the weak ring of the chain as he is subordinated to El Nino, who gives him orders wherever he goes, but he gets some respect because he has got knowledge and expertise of drug market. This symbolic authority does not have any value regarding his relationship with Rachid, his boss. Khalil is always threatened or

⁶⁵⁷ Gilles Deleuz and Felix Guattari, *a Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* in Barbara Menel, "the Politics of Space in the Cinema of Migration," retrieved 6 March, 2017, from Menel.pdf

hospitalized by Rachid's mafia group and expresses his fear by saying "do you want Rachid to cut off my balls?". Despite El Nino's resistance and rebellion against superior forces, he is frequently victimized, not physically, by Rachid and conditioned by his threatening discourse. Jesus's professional connection to Vicente, the chief of marine department, evokes a sense of tension, disrespect and unchangeable valence because of the vertical content of Vicente's order and speeches. Sergio, as low rank in department, represents the outcast of the legal body of the marine, marginalized and surveilled by his colleagues because of suspicion of passing or leaking information for mafia networks. The film is infused with trope of power relations and strata of (im)mobilities imbricated in unbalanced hierarchies. This "power geometry" exhibits circulation of multi-faced characters:

Different social groups have distinct relationships to this any way different mobility: some of them are more in charge of it than others, some initiate flows and movements; some are more on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it... mobility and control over mobility, both reflects and reinforces power... the mobility and the control of some groups can actively weaken other groups.⁶⁵⁸

El Nino, the film, is structured by trope of mobility and space geometry that interweave different discourses and intersections of spatial appropriation and confiscation. The oppositional and contradictory voices of space in the film could be interpreted in Foucault's concept of heterotopias as it opens up a kind of negotiation that encompasses dominant, transitory and resistant rhetoric that links disparate experimentation of tactics and strategies juxtaposed in conflictual, incompatible and invalent forms. Monzon explores the transnational traffic of people and the globalized form of economy by interweaving the stories of protagonists in multi-playerd space, where encounter, victimization, identification and redemption are experienced asymmetrically and disimultaneously. The fragmented trajectories of protagonists and the complex appropriation of space disrupt the old politics of identity as a stable and traditional embracing the global mobile landscape with an overlapping nature despite divisions and inequalities. The film also evokes a differentiated form of mobility by contrasting legal traffic services to trafficking of illicit products and illegal migration, generating a counter discourse of crossing and encounters in the sense of Dimitris Eleftheriotis notion of "converging routes", "the routes and destinies converge but done so in conflict and with difficulty, foregrounding and

⁶⁵⁸Doreen Massey, *Space, Place and Gender* (Minnapolis: University of Minesota press, 1994), pp. 149-150.

negotiating deeply rooted differences, belonging to different types of travelling and involving different emotive registres.”⁶⁵⁹

Traditionally, Southern Spain has been a definite place of tourism and utopian paradise for luxurious life. Today, the Spanish Mediterranean has become a transit zone and permanent tragedy place, where thousands of illegal immigrants and refugees experience all forms of victimiation, death, detention and deportation. The militarization of the Southern sea and the securitization of European borders have reproduced the Mediterranean in a binary politics, a politics of approval which allows legal passage for businessmen, tourists and the privileged. *El Nino*, the film, adapts this juxtaposing appropriation of the Mediterranean by contrasting images of rich European tourists enjoying beautiful beaches of Al Jageras with all forms of material pleasure (food, girls, drinks) and the poor Moroccan porters, who transport heavy packages and merchandises on their backs through the gates of Ceuta.

Although the film celebrates the heterotopic sense of the Mediterranean by involving encounters between characters of different nationalities and the use of three languages (Spanish, Arabic, English), it invokes a wide topophobic division between disparate chronotopes. The freedom of crossing and mobility of *El Nino*, the protagonist, as trafficker is permanently threatened and interrupted by the dominant force of marine and police, which manifest a vertical control of space by material execution of power from the top (detecting devices, helicopter). *El Nino*, the protagonist, represents the counter-narrative of spatial power as he embodies resistance and interruption to the dominant order that organizes and rearrange the power geometry. The marine has also put international crime mafia (English, Moroccan, East European) under permanent disappropriation of space. The constant visit to the port and the frequent inspection of transnational trucks to control illicit trade represent a certain flow of order and mechanism of taming a wild, transgressed and open border, assuring the closure and immobility of space. As such, the free mobility of some characters could be made possible only by the immobility and through the exclusion of intervening hegemonic forces (marine, Rachid...).

The superior nature of mafia network power (Rachid and East Europeans) exposes an interruptive tactic on *El Nino* and his friends, as subdevisional of power. This relation represents a conflict between consensus and disensus, foregrounding the authority of hierarchies and subhierarchies within spatial development of power. This is best explained when *El Nino*, Khalil and *El compi* trafficked a big cargo of Cannabis from Morocco without the knowledge and agreement of Rachid. The latter cruelly attacked them and confiscated the cargo.

⁶⁵⁹Dimitris Eleftheriotis, *Cinematic Journey: Film and Movement* (Edinburgh University Press, 2010), p. 133.

The patterns of mobility in *El Nino*, the film, rested on the Juxtaposition between two conflictual geographies, economic systems, political regimes and two migratory policies. Morocco and Spain represents paradoxical definition of the Mediterranean from the perspective of its borders. El Nino, the protagonist, transition and mobility between the two sides of the Miditeranean gives a clear division of geographical topos in term of law, order and migration policies. El Nino has no problem with authorities in his departure from Moroccan coasts because of the absence of authorities and patrol police, when the Moroccan patrol body appears in the scene, they seem indifferent or do not interfere because they are bribed. When El Nino and Khalil saw a Marine boat in the coast of Morocco, they change the trajectory without being chased or followed. An other time, when they were boarding cannabis from land to the speed boat, the Gendarmerie arrives, but khalil informs El Nino that they are “paid” (bribed).

However, in the Spanish water, el Nino is always chased by police and guardia civil in stark opposition between the two systems, where the first is associated with absence, disorder and corruption, and the second represents order and the supremacy of law. This juxtaposition evokes an extranarrational image of disparate national policies of migration, where Spain and Europe are fully engaged in fighting illegal immigration and transnational organized crime by mobilizing border patrol and financial resources. The absence of Moroccan authorities alludes to the reality that North African and departure countries are non-cooperating and indifferent to the efforts made by the countries of European Union. El Nino, the character, plays substantial role in the unfolding of the narrative as he is given credit for the composition and the decomposition of many spatial and temporal relations inside the story. The camera always zooms the character mainly from a double focalization, the medium and close-up shots. The camera configures El Nino (which means the child in Spanish language) as the catalyser of events within the textual growth of characterization, evoking Milan Kundera’s notion of *enfantcracie* or *childcracy* because his charisma, self-confidence, magnetism and likeability affect other characters and persuade the audience with certain innocence and victimhood. Horizontal extreme close-up shots foreground the determination and dexterity of El Nino, who engages in parallel rally and chase with authorities to highlight the character centrality to the theme of trafficking and illegality and gives sense of equal appropriation of space. The static camera is also function as fixation of his magnetism to fool the audience in order to align with his gaze.



Figure 2. the Gaze of el Nino or the Childcrat: Magnetism and Dexterity

The mobile camera and tracking shots follow the anxiety of the journey on the road to the heart of cannabis plantations in Ghmara back to the coastal line through Bellyonesh and Wad el Marssa in Northern Morocco. The vertical medium aerial shots and the tracking (moving) mode of the camera render the contrability of space top-down as El Nino was chased by the helicopter and ordered by the Marines, which has always failed until the big arrest at the end of the film. He is endowed with a relative force that underscores the absolute power and his disruptive (disabled) resistance may play a role in rearranging the narrative and asymmetrical textual relations in an unstable and everchanging waterscape of the sea. The horizontal extreme-up camera shotting may also function as quality of the character identificatory and convincing attitude.

The beautiful, wise and insistent gaze of El Nino makes other characters consent to his temptation and becomes victims of innocence and spoiled needs (Rachid says to el Nino “they call the kid because you like to play”). This gaze has got the magic touch of changing or influencing the life of other people, positively a negatively. Amina, the Moroccan immigrant, is one of the characters that fell in the trap of El Nino, who convinced when she told him that she is saving money from her trade to immigrate to Spain illegally with the help of Moroccan – Belgian trafficker in Tangiers, who smuggles girls to Europe for 30.000 Dhs. El Nino identifies with her and feels responsible for her redemption and rescue from the destitute conditions she is experiencing everyday by transporting items between Tetuan and Ceuta. This identificatory stance of El Nino influences the narrative two folds ; first, it reinforces the childcracy of the character who begs for the sympathy of audience as it is immersed with a mixture of feelings towards the childcrat as embodiment of kindness, likability and innocence, and his representation of victimhood, excessive needs and spoiled greed. Second, juxtaposition between El Nino as the redeemer and Amina as the redemee invokes the classical stereotype of European male protagonist saving a native female from the dictatorship of geography and oppression of cultural

system. This narrative uncovers the invisible threads as an intertext with structure of rescue and trope redemption staging continuity with the old rhetoric of the dominant and the subordinate. When El Nino and El Compi commented on her beauty and El Nino says that she “must be adopted”. Later in the film, El Nino offers her a safe trip and saved her from embarking in perilous adventure across the Mediteranean with the Moroccan trafficker.

Against his friend’s prejudicial refusal and hesitation of Spanish family, El Nino surprisingly asked Amina for marriage. Although El Nino’s encounter with Amina is built on a romantic story and although she resists the lure of the wealth he made from cannabis cotraband because she is searching for stability not for prison, this relationship alludes to a recurrent and traditional trope of “imported marriage”, asymmetrical power relation and patriarchal intransigence, where females from ex-colonized South accept a kind of arranged marriage from usually wealthy and old Europeans in turn for wealth, security or legal status as in films like *Flores de Otro Mudno* (1999) by Iciar Bollain and *Prinsesas* (2005) by Pedro Leon de Aranoa⁶⁶⁰. El Nino is young, handsome and attractive, but still represents the dominant omnipresent force because he is the one who offers her a safe crossing, made her feel grateful to this gesture and hides a sort of undeclared guilt in case she declines his proposal. This is what turns this love marriage to an arranged one since it is associated with or hides the invisible tropes of hospitality, apathy and rescue. The ability and power of El Nino to do things for her and for free accentuate the unseen trope of domination which strengthens the superiority and the almightiness of the white European male as well as the vulnerability and dependence of migrant females, whose freedom and inclusion are credited to others.

The gaze of El Nino embraces another “geopolitical aesthetics” of early colonial discourse, which associates other geographies with lawlessness and spatial mystery that calls for western expertise and exploration. When El Nino was in romantic meeting with Amina in the beach of Al Jageras face to face with Moroccan coasts, he told her that he always feels that the Moroccan “Mountains were calling for me to come to you”. The mountains or horizon beyond the sea have always charmed early colonizers (and contemporary traffickers) for discovery and invasion, foregrounding colonial symbolic attachment to the rich potentiality of the "other" landscape. The perception of Morocco through Fredric Jameson’s geopolitical aesthetic⁶⁶¹ invokes

⁶⁶⁰Maria Van Liew, “New Modernity, Transnational Women, and Spanish Cinema,” *CLCWeb: Comparative literature and Culture*, 12:2 (2010) , retrieved on 19 August 2017 from <https://doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.1599>.

⁶⁶¹Fredric Jameson, *The Geopolitical Aesthetics: Cinema and Space in the World System*. (Indianapolis: Indiana University press, 1995), p. 3.

the narrative adoption of continuity and compliance to the historical discourse of Spanish people about Morocco and how far the film is attached to traditional stereotypes.

Morocco is still depicted as geography of chaos, disorder, unlawfulness and a paradise of producing and trafficking cannabis. The permanent bribing and absence of Moroccan authorities across the Mediterranean borders is a deliberate sign of political abandonment and withdrawal from political organization, which stands as anti-thesis to the advanced and developed Spain, where order and control prevail. The unbearable conditions of Moroccans and the dysfunctional family background of the immigrant is related to a geographical conception of oppositional economic systems of Spain and Morocco, where the latter is inferior, corrupt and economically underdeveloped. The absence of tourists and leisure economy on the Moroccan coasts serves as geographical metaphor/ allegory for the continuity of Spanish imaginary to confirm and idealize economic and political superiority over Moroccan coast and beaches has become destination of thousands of international tourists. The crowded and the poor neighbourhood, where El Nino stays in hotel, goes with the perspective and the dominant gaze of the protagonist. The crowded gates of Ceuta crossed by thousands of poor Moroccans transporting commercial items from the Spanish enclave stresses the film intention to focus only on the destitute elements of Moroccan society and the negative aspects of geography, erasing the existence of beautiful coasts and the modern hybrid face of Tetuan city from the film symbolic landscape.

Romanticization of the horizon and the stigmatization of political and economic systems of Moroccan do not make the film neglect other variables of the narrative encounters in the Mediterranean display a transitory and fluid transformation of identity. The Mediterranean seems as a playground of mafia authority and contested terrain of an emergent global economic market affected by trafficking and transnational organized crime. The drug market in Europe has been estimated by a number of 33 billions Euro,⁶⁶² profited from professionalized technological use and internationalized transport infrastructure with multinational networks and routes across the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Smuggling routes and networks around the Mediterranean involve organized crime groups in illegal crossing, document forging and identity counterfeiting. Frontex (the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of Member States) detected 73.000 illegal immigrants trying to reach Europe through the Mediterranean in 2012.⁶⁶³ The nature of this encounters are apparently explored by the film his head cut off, signalling the dangerous game played by multinational mafia operating around

⁶⁶²the transatlantic Cocaine Market. UNODC – April 2011, <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/studies/transatlanticmarket.pdf>

⁶⁶³“Annual Risk Analysis 2013” Frontex, April 2013.

the Mediterranean. The film ends up with the same of another victim. This form of violence (cutting off heads) is representative of professional organization of mafia networks that leave no chance for mistake, improvisation or disloyalty.

The Mediterranean offers a hybrid and mobile identity for Amina as her dream of crossing the sea to Spain comes true when El Nino offers her a ride on his Jetski. Amina's depiction in the film reflects Stuart Hall's notion of identity as fluid and mobile by her code switching between Arabic and Spanish and her ability to appeal to two styles of dressing (emancipated appearance, light hijab, unveiled, Europeanized fashion) reflects the flexible agency of immigrant femininity. Amina's intelligence and sense of freedom (smoke, dress...) partially contests old perception of North African feminine identity. Amina is able to tame beautiful seductive narrative of the main character by her counter-discourses and disrupts the dominant gaze of El Nino by her resistance and intelligence. When they were alone in the beach, El Nino tries to convince her that he was always feeling invited to the Moroccan mountains to bring her to Spain, she responded ironically "of course me and some packs of cannabis", alluding to the fact that his visit to Morocco is driven by the desire of quick profit from Hashish. Despite her intelligence, resistance and hybrid identity, Amina still represents the notion of the immigrant in crisis. She is a victim character in need of and deserves sympathy because of social/ family victimization (Amina is divorced, she did not see her parents for 2 years because of some problems), consolidating the image of victimhood that is still perpetuated in the cinema of immigration in Europe despite the relative identification expressed in variety of filmic representation that marked the experimental tendency of European cinema after 9/11 attacks which diversified perspectives and angles of analysis.

In addition to the stereotype of the victimized and desolate immigrants, the film is imbricated in a regime of perceptions with overtones of antiquity and classification. Besides the plural and hybrid identity of Amina, Khalil, the third generation Maghrebi immigrant, constitutes a contested character through the development of conflict and denouement of the narrative. Khalil occupies an inferior position to El Nino and El Compi because of his nationality and race as he always reminded of his backward culture and refused on this basis couple of times in the initial sequences of the film. However, he shares many personal and psychological characteristics of his comrades like greed, effortless profit, disillusionment, friendship and victimhood of globalized economies, yet he was stripped of full growth at the end of the story, which fortifies the criminal tendencies in his personality (when El Nino informs Khalil about his intention to stop trafficking by saying that this is his last operation, Khalil was dissatisfied and angry); Khalil stands in an inferior position to other characters in their conflict over spatial power and claim to authority.

His free mobility is constrained by Rachid's absolute power as he is able to rearrange spatial geometry because he represents the voice of invisible organized mafia in Europe.

He also receives orders and dictations from El Nino. Khalil's identity is controversially constructed in the film because it embodies both power and inferiority. Other character's dependence on Khalil's knowledge makes him acceptable and sociable to the group's *modus operandi*. Yet his reaction and handling of tasks seem surprising and unexpected. When they were chased by the marine helicopter El Nino asked him to stay nearby the speed boat engines because the marine were trying to dysfunction the boat by exploding the engines, Khalil found a flash gun and threw a fire ball into the helicopter, causing the helicopter to crash in the water. The other incident takes place at the end of the story. After being tracked to a boat house in a beach near Al Jageras, where they transported a Cargo of cocaine, El Nino and Khalil were sieged by marine and police agents, at the turn of events, Khalil disarm a marine officer, takes his gun and tried to kill him with violent recitation of Koran with anger and fear, alluding to the new sleeper identity of young Muslims in Europe, who can turn frenzy and terrorist at any moment (potentiality of terrorism). Fortunately, he was convinced by El Nino after they have a deal with the marine.

Although Khalil is sometimes accepted and treated as a member of the group, he still occupies the position of the inferior and the marginalized; and rarely given the power to act, rather he is the site of action, not the actor. He is the embodiment of what Haraway describes as the represented "the represented is always reduced to the recipient of action, never to be co-actor in an articulated practice among unlike, but joined, social patterns."⁶⁶⁴ As the represented, Khalil is attacked by el Compi, Rachid, the mafia, El Nino and the marine. When he is the actor, his moves are portrayed as irrational and instinctive or fanatical. Khalil is an agent of action or a friend with benefits; yet, the film ends with a favourable identificatory tone by showing Khalil going back to Morocco with money in order to pay debts of the foiled cargo and free el Compi who was taken as a hostage as well as Amina's visit to el Nino in the prison to ensure that her marriage is based on true love not on winning residence documents in Spain.

⁶⁶⁴D. Haraway, *Semians, Cyborgs, and Women, the Reinvention of Nature* cited in Zèlie Asava, (2011) "Drole de Félix: A Search for Cultural Identity on the Road," *Wide Screen*, 3:1retrieved on 12 June 2016 from <http://widescreenjournal.org>.

B-Post Colonial Encounters and Identity Construction in French Migrant Cinema: Anxieties of Corrosive Conscience and Minimized Narratives of Survival

Contemporary discourse about European identity and the fear associated with the transformation brought by immigration to national cultures reflects a tendency to exclude immigrants not only economically, but also historically as it denies them legitimacy to a shared participation in the building of during and after colonial campaigns. As the new outsiders of Europe, Maghrebi immigrants are reproduced in a national consciousness that strip them of colonial heritage with the colonizer who wants to forget what happened in the past for the sake of Europe's best interest. The Pasqua laws of 1986 and 1993 tried to control immigration by issuing strict family reunification measures, limiting immigrant access to social benefits and tracking illegal immigrants by including prefects and police in expulsion:

Governance in their place : blood for roses... there is also an other Europe, one no less real but existing outside Europe's geopolitical consciousness : namely, a Europe oddly unreflexive about its own imperialism, past and present, as well as its contemporary less than enlightened attitude towards its strangers.⁶⁶⁵

The religious identity of North African immigrants constitutes another conflict zone among legal, intellectual and public spheres of postcolonial France. The rise of Islamist extremism and the late terrorist attacks in France contribute to foster a feeling of a country being culturally and economically insecure and threatened as many terrorist attacks were linked to second and third generation Maghrebis. Debates on Islamic identity in France are frequently foregrounded in relation to the hijab affair and the legal discourse about it reflects the phoney-like nature of the veil as it keeps appearing and disappearing under different political contexts and ambiguous cultural paradigms. The contested character of the hijab touches upon the ethical principles of the republic which oscillates between its universalistic values and the protection of national identity. It embraces the dichotomy of both legitimacy to religious difference and cultural right; and the evolution of French laicity principle which bans the visibility of religious symbols in secularized public sphere. So, the hijab of Maghrebi women does not only pose threat to the stable and unified cultural identity of France, but it also subjects secular public discourse to contradiction and rupture:

⁶⁶⁵Barbara Hooper and Kramasch Olivier, "Post-colonizing Europe: The Geopolitics of Globalization, Empire and Borders: Here and There, Now and then," *T. Hetschrift voor Economische en sociale Geographie*, 94: 4 (September 2007), P. 526.

The wearing of the hijab is seen as so threatening to the republican principle of universalism and laïcité, as well as to the freedom of women, that in February 2004 the national assembly voted to ban such symbols in schools rather than encourage tolerance for signs of difference.⁶⁶⁶

The late debates about Burkini, Islamic woman swimming suit, explains how French public and legal body becomes sensitive to difference and cultural alterity. The margin of freedom seems to witness a massive regression as is ironically linked to recent fears of extremism and associated with threat to public order, tendency in public discourse that has turned France from a nation of equality and diversity to republic of Burkini.

Beur and Banlieue cinema by both Maghrebi and French filmmakers have captured the constant ups and downs of the controversial rhetorics about immigrants and their position in French society, which transmitted a multiplicity of voices and a merger of different ideological modes. French Banlieue cinema focuses centrally on the marginalized second-generation Maghrebi immigrants, who were born in the suburban ghettos (banlieue) and chancytowns (bidonvilles) where they live in total exclusion from the mainstream France and experience unemployment, poverty and racism. Beur-as popular label for Maghrebi male immigrant/beurette for female-inconsistently used with both pejorative and resistant tones to portray the double position of North Africans in the fictional and cinematic of French imaginary. As a resistant notion, Beur is adopted by North African people and filmmakers to prove their difference and visibility, while its derogatory use is something of devalorizing meaning that associates them with an inferior and stigmatized identity; an identity that experienced a long tradition of accusations and offences (sale Arabe)⁶⁶⁷. Beur or Banlieue cinema features the different forms of disadvantage and displacement of North African immigrants, stressing the difficulties they encounter to get access to the dominant cultural system of host societies involving migrant identities from the perspective of integration, identity crisis and intracultural conflict between first generation and younger generation. Many French films trace the daily life of young Maghrebis of the suburbs associating them with crime, delinquency and laziness, while others emphasized the role of xenophobic and exclusionary discourses in the failure of their integration and marginalization because of their difference or because of the vulnerability of the social class they come from⁶⁶⁸.

⁶⁶⁶Carrie Tarr, *Reframing Difference: Beur and Banlieue Filmmaking in France*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 2.

⁶⁶⁷Jalene Betts 2009 "Identities in Migrant Cinema the Aesthetics of European Integration," retrieved on 28 June 2017, from <http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol22/iss1/8>

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid.

Colonial heritage and violent encounters between immigrants and French society still overshadow cinematic representation and the presence of stereotypical politics, which manifest an intertextual continuity of narratives transmitted from one generation of film-makers to another one. The dominant discourse of this cinema emphasizes the fixed nature of migrant identity by allocating them in the hegemonic system of knowledge by favouring the metamorphosis of identities and liberatory characters over disintegration and racialization. Yet, the liberation of North African characters do not go without costs as narratives involve intracultural conflict between parents and children replicating tropes of identity crisis and generation gap that were celebrated by early mainstream French cinema. Because of the Eurocentric content of mainstream French cinema, Maghrebi characters are subject to discursive negation; first, North African protagonists represent a category of people involved in illicit social conduct like robbery, drug dealing and prostitution. Second, those characters occupy secondary roles when they are exposed to racist and exclusionary system which push them to the periphery of social and existence⁶⁶⁹. For Carrie Tarr, this cinema embraces a rhetoric of naturalizing a certain power relations Maghrebi Protagonists “are objects of, and contained within, white eurocentric gaze and discourse which takes for granted and “normalizes” the hierarchical power relations generated by colonialism and imperialism.”⁶⁷⁰

La Haine (1995) by Mathieu Kosssovitz is one of the most popular movies of banlieue cinema that foregrounds the daily struggle of second-generation North Africans with discrimination, poverty and unemployment. Besides its depiction of marginalized and displaced characters of different ethnicities, *La Haine* is about the entrapment of Maghrebi immigrants, who are caught up in racist social system and xenophobic French space that play a substantial role in their resort to violence, delinquency and family dysfunction. The film configures the gloomy life in the Parisian housing project, where Said, Hubert and Vinz spend their time in different forms of encounters, overt patterns of exclusion and marginalization. The trio becomes frustrated at the inequalities of police, who killed their friend Abdel, and their victimization from the dominant hegemony of biased media as well as economic institution which judges them from their physical look and the social class they belong to. Said, Hubert and Vinz frequently contained in the poor banlieue and prevented from trespassing the dominant space, where they are not allowed, by police, to visit their hospitalized friend and they are expelled from the art Gallery by the owner. As result, the group adopts anti-social stance against authority and

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁰ Carrie Tarr, *Reframing Difference*, p. 10.

dominant space, involving in drug dealing and other crimes as kind of resentment at marginalization, exclusion and displacement⁶⁷¹.

The cinematic discourse about exclusion and marginalization of North African protagonists is also the context of *Le Thé au Harem d'Archemède* by the Algerian immigrant Mehdi Charef (1985). Both films made a shift in the conception of immigrant in French cinema by celebrating the struggle and difficulties experienced by Maghrebi immigrants in their way to integration and the prejudicial/ stereotypical discourse they have to achieve certain level of legitimacy and approval. *Le thé au Harem* traces the story of second-generation immigrant, Majid, and his French friend, Pat. After graduation from high school, Majid together with Pat face unsurmountable barriers to get a job because of the racist nature of economic and social institution of the French society. Pat represents a category of French citizen, who does not make any effort to improve his life, while Majid's ethnic identity contributes effectively to his exclusion from an economic system characterized by veiled discrimination and partiality. Out of despair and frustration, the protagonists are driven to choose different choice to get out of unemployment and the vulnerability of their social life, resorting to robbery, violence, trafficking and delinquency.

However, the bounds of freindship and solidarity do not delay their doomed destiney when they surrender to the police after they have solen a car and chased to the ouskirt of the city where they are arrested and taken to the prison. Like *la Haine*, *Le the au Harem* criticizes the French society for illusionary nature of equality and fraternity as it contributes to the disintergration of Maghrebi characters and denies them access to mainstream France because of ethnic difference. Maghrebi Protagonists face many challenges when they have a desire to integrate and fit in as French citizens. Yet, their identity by French birth and Maghrebi descent make them neither North African nor European, neither French nor Arab. This category of citizens receives a double criticism from both their communities, who blame them for ignoring familiy values and host communities who judge them for their difference.

To further discussion of migrant cinema in France, my analysis will focus on the construction of North African identity in three films by two French filmmakers and a German-Austrian director, who explores the relationship between identity, immigration and ethnicity in post colonial France. *Le Noir te va si Bien* by Jack Bral, *a Prophet* by Phillipe Faucon and *Caché* by Michael Haneke are movies with a similar narrative that configures ambiuously the struggle of Maghrebi Protagonists in the margin of social discourse that attempt to escape responsibility for the outcome of long histories of imperialism and victimization of immigrants from North

⁶⁷¹Ibid.

Africa. These films represent a belonging to new trends of cinematic representation in Europe by proposing different approach to migration and identity by emphasizing the role of cultural encounters in constructing multiethnic identification, contested negotiation of ethnicities and forms of displacement caused by new forms of xenophobia.

In *Le Noir te Va si Bien*, Koubra, second generation immigrants of Maghrebi descent, born and socialized in France, leaves her parent house to work everyday. Before she leaves her parents, especially the father, comments on every detail of her look and clothes. Koubra leaves the house in traditional veiled outfit, but on her way to the shoes factory where she works, she makes a stop at cafebar run by her French friend, Richard, who allows her to change the outlook in the bathroom by removing her traditional veiled woman look to a Europeanized modern woman. At work, Koubra has to spend her day with Serge, an insistent young French boss, who falls in her love and does his best to make her accept his marriage proposal. Serge tries to take advantage of Anais, their colleagues at work, to persuade the beautiful and audacious Koubra. Anais's friendship with koubra is characterized by both jealousy and admiration as the latter seems to capture the attention of the men surrounding her. At home, her parents are in a constant search for husband that will assure a descent and hounorable life for Koubra, who represents the dignity and the image of the family. Koubra spends her life in routinely muting between home and work, but one day her father discovers her other life, unveiled and liberal, in the cafe bar after he was informed by a freind. Moncef, the father, desperately informs his son, Younes, who in turn gets angry and exasperated by the information and coldly strangled her to death by his hands on her way home at night.

The film is structured in a long flashback after a first sequence in prison, where the father expresses regret and remorse for leaving his country by repeating "if I had had the chance to start again, I would have done things in different way". An opening sentence that summarizes the whole narrative as it fortells the sense of exile and alienation experienced by the main characters, who find themselves entrapped in a conflictual cultural and spatial confinement. It alludes to a sense of entrapment and hoplessness similar to the one expressed by Amina, the protagonist of Sabiha Al Khamir's *Waiting in the Future for the Past to come*, who says about the nature of exile "oh, you the one who builds in a country other than your own, it neither for you nor for your children"⁶⁷². *Le Noir te va si bien* is about cultural conflicts and failed politics of encounter where oscillation between two oppositional cultures, (Maghrebi, French) which defines identity

⁶⁷²Sabiha al Khamir, *Waiting in the Future for the Past to Come* cited in Mohamed-Salah Omri, "Voicing a Culture 'Dispersed by Time': Metropolitan Location and Identity in the literature and Art of Sabiha al Khemir," in *the Arab Diaspora: Voices of an Anguished Scream*, eds.Zakia S.Salhi et al (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p.60.

construction of postcolonial subjects and leave them no choice for developing a negotiated or third place positioning. Although the film provides Koubra with emancipated and independent character able to alternate between traditional Muslim values and European liberal ethics, she is permanently threatened by the loss of her female agency and flexible embodiment of complex identity.

The seeming paradox of Koubra is her ability to address forces of modernity and tradition, by negotiating in a dangerous game, confrontation with a restrictive family codes which restraint her mobility and change, and connection with the outside world where she seeks emancipation from a dominant Eurocentric vision that maintains a conditional identification that could potentially turn to erasure and annihilation. Koubra is obliged to abandon her difference in public space and to embrace an assimilable / independent attitude to avoid racialization and incompatibility of secular tradition which blackmails her for individual freedom and obliges her to be in permanent search for recognition and credibility from a transcendental white society. Although Koubra constantly changes her outfit and identity, she seems that she internalized the structure of both hegemonic regimes. She is obliged to accept her Muslim identity to keep appearance and affinities with her family, particularly the father who always asks her to hide her hair and where she is going as well as she is obliged to maintain an unveiled Europeanized look to capture / obtain the recognition and attention of her white society and colleagues, particularly Richard, the one she loves. The complexity of Koubra's identity code switching is not by choice (though free) as it seems, rather, it is by necessity as her ambivalent conduct is incited by the hegemonic imposition of two conflictual ideologies, modernization and tradition, which equally participate in the victimhood of feminine identity. When Serge invited her for lunch at his parent's villa, he informs his father about his plan to marry Koubra. Despite his neutral tone, which is negative and indifferent, the father says that his only family is Serge and his mother. However, after being informed, the mother completely went angry and rejected by ironically commenting on the religious identity state of their children who will have to go to church on Sundays and to the mosque for Friday prayers.

Third and second generation immigrants are still silenced and repressed in the name of religious identity and torn between the clash of two cultural paradigms, which both claim legitimacy and absolute truth. Navigation between two identity models, Koubra defines a complex belonging as she attempts to integrate to the French culture and retains affinities with family codes. As French by birth and North African by descent, Maghrebi character adopts identity code switching between her claims of Frenchness and the veiled criticism her father gestures and comments. Initially, Koubra's conscious adoption of identity instrumental codeswitching seems

working effeciently by establishing her own space througout the spatial polarization of identity, which allows her, for a while, to underscores the rigidity of one-dimensional appropraition of visibility and reclaiming a politics of enounter that brings her credibility and empowerment from the same dominant regime that rejects her (French society), but, at the end, it does not guarantee her a full readdmission to her traditional community. When the father discovers the game she is playing, at the end of the film, she was strangled to death by her brother.

However, Koubra's sense of resistance and instant freedom convey that Koubra's metamorphosis is only temporary. This ephemeral change or transformation offers no choice and lead her nowhere because straddling dual identification is not fictionally and ideologically accepted and perceived as something negative as well as adoption of two conflictual cultural paradigms involves disloyalty and violation of cultural codes of one side over another. The film identificatory and emancipatory tone is deceptive/falsified because Koubra is not humanized for her powerful personality and emancipated decisions, but, rather, Koubra is used to fulfil ideological roles and envisioned with a diegetic aesthetic trap to make her dig her own grave because she embodies the syndrom of murderous or suicidal identity. Symptoms of murderous identity is displayed, first, in the black outfit and hijab she is wearing throughout the film, second, it is the misfortune invoked by the mythical cannotation of the colour. The film takes its title from the frequently used sentence by Richard, her true love, adressng her every morning when she passes by his cafebar to remove her taditional clothes "Le noir va te si bien". However, when she was wearing a light blue skirt, Anaïs commented that she looks beautiful in that coulour. In many cultures, the black colour is associated with death, sadness, hard luck and curse, which makes the filmmaker choice of the black intentional and deliberate. The association of Koubra with a deadly snake and black colour contributes significantly to the negative development of her character as determinant to the narrative anti-heroic attitude/antisubject and stimulant of negativity which turns the life of other protagonists upside down.

Koubra has got the magical touch that affects people's life. She represents the cultural curse that condomns encounters and mobilities between cultures, bringing destruction to whole social construct. Koubra poisoned the life of Serge, who loved her compassionatly, by refusing his proposal. She left him in great sadness and frustration. Koubra made her family life collapse by causing her mother sadness and eternal loneliness because her father went to prison taking responsibility for her death to protect his son. With her death, she equally ruined Richard, her could be husband. By extention, Koubra's codeswitching and mobility between two antagonistic cultural paradigms is proved destructive and negative. Koubra as third generation immigrant is

still representative of cultural morbidity and an agent of religious threat that figuratively encompasses murderous identity and projective European fear of ethnic difference and religious alterity. The authorial Western voice of the filmmaker interrupts the process of identification by confirming miscegenation and putting an end to the interracial marriage between her and Richard, by honourably killing her, imprisoning her father.... She represents the postcolonial morbid and abject thought and otherness, which invoke the fear and discomfort of Western audience and may dispossess them of what they possess.

Koubra symbolizes a potential shift from purity to pollution and from righteousness to morbidity. As an immigrant with ambivalent and unidentified politics, she goes beyond the label of the “uncanny” to reflect Bompiani’s notion of exile/refugee as a monster/ evil which is “something or someone whose extremely determined nature allows the indeterminate to stand”⁶⁷³. There is a fear of miscegenation and racial pollution/ contamination in the sense of Marry Douglas’ *Purity and Danger*⁶⁷⁴. Koubra is representative of forms of hybrid identities like exile, migrants and refugee in Europe, which introduce heterogeneity to the homogeneity of national identity in Europe and symbolizes the impasse and emptiness of postcolonial European discourse of multiculturalism/ interculturalism and the failure integration philosophies as well.

The film’s politics of identity negotiation and cultural encounters intertextually replicates the discourse of *Yasmin* (2000) a film by the English filmmaker Kenneth Glenaan, who works on identity problematization and immigration in post September 11 attacks. Yasmin is a Pakistani immigrant who is obliged to reconcile between Muslim belonging and modern Britishness. Like Koubra, Yasmin’s identity code switching is staged in her ability to keep appearances to her conservative community, but tries to confirm her liberal and emancipated stance to the English society. Both Koubra and Yasmin portrayed as intelligent and independent women, whose strong agency make other look at them with respect and caution. Yet, Yasmin’s second metamorphosis (to radicalization) and radicalization is incited by police violence and atrocities which in the case of Koubra does not exist.

Gender, spatial divisions and family relations take a part in the making of the narrative in *Le Noir te va si bien*, Koubra seems to have a delicate relation with her parents and brother. When her brother Yones brought his fiancée home, she tells him that she is beautiful and her body is perfect by pointing with gesture to her nice ass. Though open and liberal, their relationship is dominated by the heritage of patriarchal ideology since he is her protector and killer, supervisor and patriarch by extension as he is his father, consiliary about Koubra, a

⁶⁷³Bompiani Ginerva (2011), “the Monster as a Refugee,” in Katrina Leung “Foreign Fear in Lamerica: Exile, Liminality and hybridity in the Refugee as a Monster,”.

⁶⁷⁴Marry Douglass, *Purity and Danger* in Katerina Leung, “Foreign Fear in Lamerica,”.

situation is intertextual and similar to Yacine, the brother of Samia in Phillipe Faucon's film *Samia* (2001), who plays the role of honor's protector of his sisters and the patriarch of the family after his father who left for Algeria⁶⁷⁵. The film builds a paradoxical juxtaposition between two oppositional family spaces. Koubra's family house is associated with restrictive family values and patriarchy where the father dominates the dos and the donts of family affairs (the scene when Koubra invited Anais to lunch at her parent house). This private space invokes exile and entrapment of characters who have to come to term with its patriarchal content in diffirentiated manner ; Koubra's submissiveness to parental oders is only relative and limited to appearances and vaporates because when she gets out she handles things in her own way. Contrarily, her mother seems prisoner to the dynamics of space which confines her to its absolute power and limit her individual choices as she claims total dependence on the patriarchal structure of the family. The mother embraces patriarchal ideology for free and by choice and already interalized patriarchal discourse as she keeps saying that she chose "*L'homme de ta vie*" and consently comes to him without dowry or conditions. Systematic incorporation to the system made the mother's submissiveness unquestionable.

Conversely, Serge family house represents the opposal positive space partaked and claimed by guests and every member of the family. Despite it symbolizes hegemonic authority (the mother refuses the idea that Serge gets engaged to a North African), the space is portrayed as liberal, spontaneous and punctuated by the absence of omnipresent / omnipotent authority that influences negatively the flow of events. When Koubra gets invited to Serge's house, things move smoothly at lunch time, everyone shares discussion with no domination of a part over another, foregrounding the true intimacy of meal time. Serge family's space represents emancipation and freedom for Koubra from the oppressive nature of her parental space or a virtual call to be saved from an existing cultural system dominated. Claustrophobic connotations of her family house and the projective fear of her father patriarchy associate public space and Koubra mobility with paranoid projection and threat. When the mother told the father that he must allow Koubra to hang out outside to become visible for marriage, he replies angrily by saying "do you want her to fuck boys, that what you want?".

However, public spaces in both Spanish and French migration cinema have been reconstructed as claustrophobic paronia, where their visibility is underscored in favour of invisibility for African and North African protagonists and where imprisonment and entrapment from the oppression and surveillance of patriarchal parental private space in mainstream cinema

⁶⁷⁵Heather Bigely, "Muslim Mothers and French Dauthers: Women Caught between Religion and Secularity a Post-Beur Culture," *Transitions: Journal of Franco-Iberian Studies*, Special Issue, 7 (2011), p. 125.

are taken and transmuted to public spaces which become anti-thesis of accessibility and freedom because of violence, threat and death. This new identity of public space as claustrophobic and threatening protagonists exhibits an ambivalent character in many ways. For the dominant/privileged; they are open, emancipating and enabling; whereas for the migrant/marginalized, they are enclosed, claustrophobic and a site of struggle for survival and fear of being visible⁶⁷⁶. Paradoxical and contradictory for immigrants because they encompass both visibility and invisibility (they have to be visible to earn living, but invisible to avoid police, deportation and xenophobic violence). It is the public space (café-bar) that brings Koubra's codeswitching down, which is the same threatening and insecure public space of Barcelona that limits the mobility of Said and Hussein in *Said* (1998) by Llorenç Soler because of aggressiveness of racist groups and police. It is the public space where Ombassi and Yambo get brutalized by skinheads and killed respectively in *Bwana*, a film by Imanuél Uribe⁶⁷⁷, which is also the case of Alou who is apprehended by police in train station and deported in *Las Cartas de Alou* by Montxo Armendariz. Public space brings about the end of intercultural romances between nationals and immigrants like Koubra and Richard, Ombassi and Dori, Said and Anna, Alou and Carmen.

Like the characteristics of Turkish-German cinema of the 1990s and 1980s, the private claustrophobic Turkish Baser, *Le Noir te va si bien* articulates a trope imprisonment of the father, whose only escape is resorting to far away images and memories which invoke a sense of regret and sadness. Moncef's exile is three fold: first, geographical because of displacement from North Africa. Second, an experience of homesickness with a lost homeland of ancestors that represents a state of cultural comfort towards traditions and premigratory value system. Third, the confinement is generational. The father is exiled in his constant conflict with liberal ethics of space that makes him lose control over his children's socialization to Islamic traditions. The silent pain of the father is triggered by his permanent fear of losing track of Koubra, who represents a threat to the consistency of family and community values.

Koubra's spacial hybridity and cultural complexity allude to potential identity crisis and fragmentation of split subjectivity invokes Foucault notion of anti-subject (hence antihero) as an outcome of conflictual politics of identity and power. If Afro-Americans as *mulattos* and Latinos as *mestizos* represent the tragic identity because of their race⁶⁷⁸, Koubra is the tragic mulatto

⁶⁷⁶Verena Berger and Daniel Winkler, "Mediterranean Perspectives: Early Spanish and Italian Contributions to the cinema of Irregular Migration," *Cinèmas*, 22: 2-3 (2012), p. 166.

⁶⁷⁷Ibid., p. 170.

⁶⁷⁸Henry Puente, "Racial Passing: Images of Mulattos, Mestizos, and Eurasians," in *Images that Injure*, p.123. 121. 132.

figure with culturally flawed character doomed to failure because of cultural difference. Because of *mèttissage*, identity paradoxical codeswitching and conflict, she is doomed to failure. She could be accepted economically and socially, but her cultural difference can not go without stigmatization because the extradiegetic dominant voice prefers economic inclusion over cultural identification. Owing to the spatial and cultural clash she is experiencing, Koubra's identity seems fragmented, incomplete and incarnating the violent allegory of life threatened by trope of death overriding the culmination of the textual tensions of the physicality and the virtuality of exile, an amphibolic⁶⁷⁹ conflation of a real omnipresence of the father's patriarchal figure inside and outside.

Koubra's feminine agency oscillates a double repressive and omnipresent ideologies that projects her in a paralleled threat politics; in the private space of parental house, she is the subject of patriarchal inspection and symbolic violence, while the public space encompasses a threat to the unpredictability of her metamorphised identity by the virtual presence of the father figure, which constraints her full emancipation, foregrounding the fracture of Koubra's agency between the physicality of the private and the projective virtuality of the public. By investing in identity codeswitching of Koubra, the filmmaker offers her a relative agency and potential for taming conflicting paradigms and playing both visibility (for the dominant white society) and invisibility (from parental surveillance), thus, negates for a while both hegemonies. However, Koubra's resistance/struggle to consolidate her emancipation and her interrogation of old hierarchies/boundaries do not come to term with reconciliation and recognition, but her ambivalent agency is enforced to collapse at the end as in movies like *in this World* 2002 by Michael Winterbottom and *Road Blocks*⁶⁸⁰ by Stravros Ioannou because cultural alterity and difference still invoke cultural morbidity, ethnic impurity and ethical disrecognition; a fact which replicates the hegemonic construction of migrant cultural identity in the 1990s' European migrant cinema of failed intercultural romances and encounters.

⁶⁷⁹Hamid Naficy, *An Accented cinema*, op, cit. p. 4.

⁶⁸⁰Alex Lykidis, "Minority and Immigrant Representation in Recent European Cinema," p. 38. 37-45.



Figure 3. Koubra's Identity Codeswitching and Paradoxical Agency

Comparatively speaking, Koubra's identity codeswitching or ambivalence seems authentic and evades the trap of interrogation by identifying clearly with western values(and concealing a bit from parental custody), she does not show interest in arranged marriages, she refuses to marry her colleague and choose to marry the barman; the one she loves. Unlike Sibel in *Head on* by Fatih Akin, who despite her renouncement of traditional Turkish values in Germany, she identifies as a Turkish woman by falling in love with Turkish Cahit and not with a one of her Geman lovers. Yet, Sibel and Koubra bear slight resemblance in term of the nature of building agency. Sibel's sense of ambivalence is conflicted because her search of identity makes her in conflict both with Turkish and German identification (she is westernized in Turkey and Turkish in Germany)⁶⁸¹ in contrast to Koubra's free choice of taking side with Western values with a sense of an emancipated agency, but there is a sense of a paradoxical ambivalence in Koubra's case, which may equate her with Sibel's fragmentation, since she takes decisions and enjoy her codeswitching. Unfortunately, this pleasure of codeswitching is turned to a necessity and deprived of tangibility and credibility by both hegemonic cultural discourses in the film similar to that of Quantin Tarentino's *Kill Bill* (1and 2) where perpetrators sympathize and apathize with the victim (desire and threat) by saying that she deserves her revenge, but they brutalize her when they have a chance. Koubra's attempt to be a double agent of narration and discourse is foiled and reoriented to paradoxical ambivalence and her sense of hybridity is configured as abject, threatening and pollutant.

Le Noir te va se bien represents continuity with old policies of disintegration and unsuccessful stories of encounters between Europeans and North Africans, where the "other" is blamed for underscoring universal human values like freedom, justice and gender equality similar to the trope of domestic violence and cultural abjection (polygamy) in *Articulo2* by

⁶⁸¹Temenuka Trinova, "Code Unknown: European Identity in Cinema" Trinova.pdf.

Maurizio Zaccaro which are used as excuses for the death of the Maghrebi protagonist. Koubra's gender roles and female victimhood is associated with a wider allegory of the feminine subaltern figure obliterated under Muslim patriarchy and the violence of honour killings, highlighting a tendency of cinematic conceptualization that allocates Muslim woman as an agent of conflict between modernization and tradition, reislamization of clash between civilizations.

Koubra belongs to a generation of minimized narratives of survival, which is an exceptional prototype of subjective mobility that exhibits a hybrid and fluid conception going beyond the stable politics of selfhood. Koubra is an incomplete counter-narrative of Maghrebi characters who is either entrapped in total crisis of transition or embraced a radical stance. She is able to negotiate her dual identification and selects "l'homme de ta vie", Richard, and tamed his seductive gaze. When they were alone at Richard's apartment, she imposes protocols of encounter (by ordering him to close his eyes, does not permit him to touch her unless she wants...) she turned an oppositional gaze against serge's plans. Koubra equally avoids the restrictive nature of her family rules by adopting identity code switching. Yet, this was not enough for her to develop successful management of conflict immune from collapse and degeneration and really fit in as she can't avoid being killed at the end.

The film reinforces other stereotypes of Maghrebi immigrants as unassimilable and disintegrable subject highlighted by the substory of Richard and Koubra which configures the impossibility of intercultural marriage in the failed romance of Richard and Koubra. The film puts into question the validity religious value and the degree of religiosity of the parents are measured by the politics of encounters. The film strips Koubra's parents of attachment to religious principles and its authentic credibility. When they went to the funeral of a relative, the parents commented on the beauty of one Maghrebi female character with transparent hijab displaying the whole geography of her body reminiscent of Van Gogh's Muslim women in *Submission*. The filmmaker seems to draw attention to the hypocrisy and the falsification of the parent double standard. Despite the shift in intertexts and perspectives of the new French cinema, the figure of submissive and victimized Maghrebian woman is still present. The mutual understanding and respect between Malek and Moncef enhances a power distribution dominated by patriarchal control, where she is in a position of behaving unquestionable passivity and total consensus. Equally, the father, as representative of first generation immigrants, still internalizes the stereotypical character of the serious and the silent immigrant who routinely mutates between the place of work and home. Although born and educated in France, Koubra is portrayed as very naive and innocent immigrant. She knows nothing about sex and knowledge of alcoholic drinks. Koubra tells Anais that she has never had a kiss or sexual encounter with a

male. In another incident, she took a sip of wine from Anais' glass and commented on its better taste, telling her that it was her first time. This image of a socially illiterate Koubra resonates a rhetoric of a noble savage naive that needs to be civilized and socialized. Beautiful Koubra is projected as a noble figure of antiquity.

Michael Haneke's *Hidden* is another cinematic exploration of postcolonial Europe with its former colonizer from the view point of Lacanian psychology and allegory of postcolonial cultural encounters, presenting a narrative with both complicated storylines and conflation of different aesthetic and ideological discourses. As a psychological thriller, *Hidden* depends on the detection of tactics useful in bringing antagonistic reasoning adopted by oppositional agents of discourse to claim legitimacy and truth about what has been committed in the past. Focalization of colonial violence by Michael Haneke takes the form of restored traumatic experiences of violent colonial past with the memory of 1961 police massacre of peaceful Algerian protestors against *Maurice Papon Law*, which banned Algerian immigrants from circulating at night⁶⁸². The police massacre resulted in the killing and the drowning of two hundred Algerians in one of the most horrible tragedies of the republic that put into question the allegedly claimed people's shared humanity and foregrounds the permanent anxieties brought by ethnic difference⁶⁸³. George, the main French character, has a grimmy discrete life kept secret to preserve strong family ties with his wife, Anna, and his son. This other life of George is about to be revealed by child like drawing and videos sent to his house by an anonymous perpetrator to destabilise his mirroring bourgeois life. Although the identity of the sender remains anonymous, the content of videos gives clues from past life George to suspect Magid. Magid is the son of an Algerian immigrant who worked in George parents' family projects and disappeared during the massacre. After being orphanated, Majid was adopted by the parents of George, who fabricated a story that led to the expulsion of Majid from the house out of jealousy. Neither Majid nor his unnamed son proved culpable or responsible for the terrorizing videos and notes sent to George house, a fact that agitates and tremendously threatens him because of the secret details revealed about his involvement in the traumatic experience of Majid. Majid is the troubling and haunting memory of past that keeps overshadowing French postcolonial silence and amnesia⁶⁸⁴, which still determine its lack of recognition and indifference toward the ex-colonized. Though differently put, the questions of Amnesia, silence and colonial memory explored by many Maghrebi women

⁶⁸²Nilgun Bayraktar, *Moving Images against the Current: the Aesthetics and Geopolitics of (Im)mobility in Contemporary Europe*. Unpublished Dissertation, University of California, 2011, p. 54.

⁶⁸³Alice Mikal Craven, "la Goutte d'Or: Localizing a Banlieues Aesthetic," *Transitions: Journal of Franco-Iberian Studies*, 7 (2011), pp. 23-24.

⁶⁸⁴Nelgun Bayraktar, p. 55.

filmmakers like Yamina Benguigui in her film *Mémoires d'Immigrés: L'Héritage Maghrébin*, Rahma el Madani in *du Coté de chez Moi* and Djamila Sfaxi in *à ma Mère*, where she foregrounds the experiences of first generation females by focusing on the transmission of memory, especially from mothers to daughters, and raising questions of exile, return and patriarchy; whereas, Sfaxi and el Madani develop an understanding of heritage, memory and identity from personal perspective not from collective level as Benguigui by interviewing their mothers and concluding that migrant experiences and struggle differ from one family to another⁶⁸⁵.

In one aspect, Majid represents a ruptive force that destabilizes the allegation of postcolonial dominant bourgeois ideology by stimulating the collapse of its hidden anxieties and the fragility of its construct. In an other aspect, the traumatic encounters between colonial subjects foregrounds the permanent threats of post colonial immigrant who returns as a pervasive intrusion to homogenous, guilt free and secured Europe, putting blame on the culpability of Majid's "terrorism": a defense mechanism that makes George suppress the devastating burden and the inability to feel responsible for past violence. Empathetic disidentification with the traumatic experiences of post colonial immigrants is of the guilty conscience troubled by the "return of the repressed"⁶⁸⁶; a return of a memory that functions not as cathartic stimulant for George's regret and admission of responsibility, but works as fortification of his sadistic feeling. George represents a class of post colonial subjects that refuses to be disturbed by intruder identity (immigrant) and tries as much as possible to hide their unspoken feeling of responsibility and guilt. Nilgun Bayraktar explains encounter between Majid and George this way:

Haneke's *Hidden* seems to be saying that the true crime may be not George's acts as child but rather his inability as an adult to recognize the profound affects of his actions on Majid's life and his refusal to face the past in a responsible way.⁶⁸⁷

The denial of responsibility on the part of George and his insistence on the culpability and the accusation of Majid and his son, as immigrant and ex-colon, can be interpreted within the tradition of new German French cinema that frequently shows loyalties to the ideology of migration politics in Europe. French and Europe have not yet come to term with the diversity of its post colonial society and multi ethnic nature of identity. North African immigrants are still representative of cultural alterity that brings discomfort to majoritarian France treated as the new

⁶⁸⁵Leslie Kealhofer-Kemp, "Mothers, Daughters and the Transmission of Memory in Documentaries Directed by Women of Maghrebi Origin" *Studies in French Cinema*, 13-3 (2013), pp. 230-231.

⁶⁸⁶Nilgun Bayraktar, *Images against the Current*, p. 53.

⁶⁸⁷*Ibid.*, p. 53.

stigmatized underclass of the country, sequestered in poor housing projects exposed to different forms of violence (ex 2005 events and the state of emergency) and institutionalized discrimination. France's militarization of its boundaries and intensification of its legal system against North Africans shows a persistent tradition of associating them with illegality and criminality. Henecke embraces the ideology of banlieu cinema by allocating Maghrebi characters in an inferior spatial position to French characters, are imprisoned in the margins of society by living in the Parisian housing projects which are sites of exclusion and poverty, while George by owning a beautiful house and sophisticated furniture in the centre of Paris city. The frequent police patrol in the housing project alludes to the potentiality of border demarcation, militarization of the banlieues and the invocation of claustrophobic beur space.⁶⁸⁸

As a different space, the flat of Majid in the banlieu does not only allegorize an imprisoned beur identity but a metaphor of displacement and death (Majid's suicide). Majid represents the suicidal immigrant identity and the ultimate displaced character with traumatic experiences of multiple natures; He is victimized historically as an ex-colon from North Africa. As post colonial immigrant, Majid is excluded from belonging fully to mainstream France. Majid also has a fragmented and split identity because he is caught between the past and the present, he has to deal with the traumatic experience of the murder of his parents and challenge the accusations of post colonial French subjects.

Hidden's narrative of amnesia and inability to give enough space to violent traumas of the past was criticized by many scholars for the legacy of silence that reduces the migrant to the peripheries of stories structured from the dominant gaze/ perspective of the white protagonist. Paul Gilroy says:

When the Majids of their worlds are allowed to develop into deeper rounded character endowed with all psychological gravity and complexity is taken for granted in ciphers like Georges, we will know that substantive progress has been made towards breaking the white, bourgeois monopoly on dramatizing the stresses of lived experience in this modernity.⁶⁸⁹

Baysaktar's analysis of Hidden draws on Nireille Rosello's notion of "performative encounters", which evokes the idea that social and cultural encounters of postcolonial subjects can not take place in the context of prestablished historical traumas and violent histories. Rather, postcolonial encounters should transcend preexisting conflict like the victim-perpetrator

⁶⁸⁸Ibid., pp. 57-58.

⁶⁸⁹Paul Gilroy, "Shooting Crabs in a Barrel," *Screen*, 48: 2 (2007), p. 234.

dichotomy and engage in a collective politics of consciousness mapped in performativity of compatibility and coexistence:

To produce unexpected meltings between people and spaces that are unusually seen as incompatible. Exceeding character's desire and agency, images in *Hidden* seek to produce what Rosello defines as "new protocols of cohabitation and coexistence" rather than new identities... the notion of performative encounters helps to envision subject positions and types of engagement with history that extends beyond preestablished ones.⁶⁹⁰

Despite the transformative politics of encounter between North Africans and Europeans, the complex and ambiguan tones of identity of Haneke's film misses a clear positioning of immigrants, which does not introduce enough change in cinematic representation of colonial past. *Hidden* does not launch a radical break with conventional tradition of victimization and racilization of post colonial conflict about identities, mapped a narrative of blurred lines and monitor changeable a subject position between the dominant and the dominated reflective of politics of vulnerability and fragility detached from the ethical value of the European elite.

The spatial status of Majid does not change and spatial encounter in the film does not offer him a possibility of abandoning the bottom of social ladder, as second generation immigrants, He still occupies the space of first generation immigrants. The banlieue is the repetitive historical territorialization of both first and second generations, carving a circular status quo that emanates from the very extradiegetic ideology that politically controls the policy making discourse of immigration. Invisible boundaries take hold of the symbolic (claustrophobic) and physical (im)mobility of the stigmatized subject as result of certain miscounted historical disjuncture. The relative invisibility of Majid echoes unconsciously the old trope of criminality and illegality that disqualifies him from appropriating the same narrative and physical spaces of George and denies him subsequently access to an open and full-fledged visibility. Majid's search for recognition and equal narrativity is frequently tempered by continuity of George superior agency, which overwhelmed by lack of responsibility and inability for that happened in the past and juxtaposing Majid's terrorizing⁶⁹¹ harassment to George's sadistic violence is a total erasure and obscurazing the boundaries between the victim and the perpetrator. The film conflict management develops a deficient duality of guilt posed equally on both characters. Evaluation of Majid and George's terrorism on an equal traumatic experiences generates a form of comparison with uncalibrable scale that open a space for a possible

⁶⁹⁰Ibid., p. 65.

⁶⁹¹Ibid., p. 73.

intersubjectivity ; false consciousness that falsifies power relations by enabling an interchangeability of subject position in paradoxical roles distribution. By making George deserves equal victimization (like Majid), the film engenders a fake translation of “other”’s traumatic pains and wrong memesis of Majid’s traumatic experience. George and Majid’s unfair performative encounters under protocols of cohabitation and coexistence resonates a rhethoric of ungrounded forgiveness and spirituality with transcendental amnesia to take guilt off historical responsibility of past violence, but at the expense of whom?

Haneke’s *Hidden* belong not only to what Patrick Crowley names as “wider notion of collective guilt”⁶⁹², but also to , what I call, anxieties of corrosive conscience that practices an invisible touch of turning encounters both defensive and unexorsible adopting representative of differentiated discursive strategies. As far as conscience is concerned, anxieties arise from the fact that its defensive mechanism prevent subject from admitting the commitment of past mistakes, making encounters more unexorsible and unsayable. Secondly, tensions which determine postcolonial protocols of encounters, generates a new state of conflicts that contribute the complication of old ones. In other words, losing track of postcolonial reality makes new encounters more impossible and prevailed by silence in term of culpability and responsibility of traumatic experiences that lead to the perdition of truth and perpetuates a corrosive and regressive disappearance of guilt as it deeply retreats to hidding and stagnation as well as may render encounters more aggressive. Anxieties of corrosive conscience is a paralleled cinema of migration, with ambigunt and complex politics of narration, is different in both content and aesthetics, but still supress the voice of postcolonial subjets and restores violent encounters by denying historical responsibility of post traumatic experiences in non-therapotic tone. *Hidden* is (a sort of) interrogation of France’s postcolonial self view and a reflection of its ambivalence between guilt and reconciliation, recognition of its multi-ethnic identity and denial of its colonial history.

Although white characters express guilt and anxiety, *Hidden* does not break up with the projective fear of dominant Western narrativization that still rearranges encounters from the perspective of white conservative upperclass ideology, rendering reconciliation with difference and cultural alterity impossible, untraceable and questionable. Unable to compsate for or correct historical traumas, postcolonial agents of power is suffocated with guilt represented by subaltern subjects who bring a deal of rupture and unsettlement to its discursive politics by the revivation of psychological presence of the ex-colon as the uncanny or the subconscious that

⁶⁹²Patrick Crowley, “When Forgetting in Remembering: Haneke’s *Caché* and the Events of October 17, 1961,” in Nilgun Bayraktar, *Moving Images against the Current*, p. 55.

keeps coming backs in different forms, but western cinema keeps suppressing it in a controllable narrative of guilt.

Although the film sets cultural encounters in a trap of anxieties and restlessness, it celebrates fragmented sense of moving between cultures and geographies; and despite the slight transformation brought by the representation of North Africans in *Hidden*, it is still attached to old politics. Majid is an alienated migrant enclosed forcibly in the privacy of poor banlieue, excluded from the main privileges of European characters and dually traumatized by his parents' disappearance and expulsion from his adopted parent house and intentionally prescribed to death. The nonreconciliatory potent representation of violent past eclipses the visual transgressive pleasures of new footage by the resurrection of a living dead like migrant subjects are doomed to suicide or murder in their claim to the right of recognition and existence, engraved by a desirable state of cinema that perpetuates ambivalent celebration of postcolonial Europe as a place of antiquity and corrosive conscience.

A *Prophet* is French film by Jacques Audiard (2009) about the life of Malek El Jebena, a North African third generation immigrant in prison. EL Jebena, who is sentenced for six years for assaulting a police man, comes to prison as fragile and naive adolescent, but the violent experience of prison contribute to his self-discovery and transformation, which makes him powerful and more experienced. Initially, El Jebena is controlled by Luciani, the head of Corsican Mafia, who takes a strong hold of the place, using violence, bribe and the trade of illegal commodities. Luciani does not only intimidate and victimize prisoners, but he is feared and respected by prison guards who execute his commands and take his orders without argument. El Jebena becomes both the victim and the servant of Luciani, doing his dirty work like cleaning his room, preparing coffee for the mafia, killing and spying on both Lucian's Corsican group and the Muslim community in the prison. El Jebena's incorporation to the Corsican group is accomplished when he murders Reyeb, an Arab Prisoner, who is supposed to testify against the Corsican Mafia. At first, El Jebena refuses to kill Reyeb and tries to inform the warden, but the latter is involved with the group. Under threat and violence, El Jebena is obliged to do what he is ordered to do by Luciani, whose motto is "*to kill or to be killed*".



Figure 4. Luciani and el Jebena: the Master and the Slave in a *Prophet* by Jacques Audiard

To assure survival, El Jebena slit Reyeb's throat with a razor in violent and messy scene that leaves him trembling and shaking for a while. El Jebena comes to prison tabula rasa and shy, but he gradually gains power and more experience under the protection and education of the good father and the Corsicans despite their constant violence and despise, addressing him "*dirty arab*". He becomes the apprentice of Luciani and, step by step, his right hand, and a confidential member of the group, performing many tasks for him inside and outside the prison, affirming his existence with both non-violent and violent means. Luciani's relation with corrupt prison authorities and lawyers enables him to have furoy, permission outside the prison for twelve hours a day, which is an opportunity for the Jebena to strengthen his relations with Muslims and drug mafia outside like El Atrash and Rayad, a former inmate.

So, the prison is a remaking and empowering experience for El Jebena, where rediscovery of his potential and intelligence grants him power and survival. He learns quickly how to read and write French, Corsican, How to observe survive, run his drug business with Jordi, the Gypsy, and use his relative power. However, this relative empowerment can only be accomplished by submission to and permission of Luciani, who adopts him for his valuable position as an intermediary between two rival groups: The Muslims and the Corsicans. At the end, El Jebena turns against Luciani, his master, and joins his fellow Muslims when the majority of the Corsican gang's members get reduced under the Sarkozy law which permits the transfer and vindication of the group, leaving Luciani almost alone and powerless inside a melieu runs by the authority of outnumbers and alliances among inmates. Now, El Jebena becomes no longer dependent on the recruitment of Luciani, or submission to his orders, who is weakened by the loss of his band. Although El Jebena restores connections with Muslim community, gains new life, new family and clean profile, what drives, moves, and motivates him, throughout the film, is in the hand of his boss, Luciani, who is given credit for his metamorphosis and self-discovery.

Prophet is a film about the education,⁶⁹³ submission, and empowerment of Malek El Jebena. He comes to prison unexpectedly because of miscalculation of conduct and has to face the ugly truth of solitude in a milieu where survival is determined by alliances and solidarity among members of ingroups. El Jebena's experience under correction does not replicate the story of other prisoners in American cinema like *Shawshank Redemption* (1994) by Frank Darabont and *No escape* (1994) by Martin Campbell, whose protagonists see their imprisonment as redemption and repentance for past deeds. He is in prison for breaking the law and has to find a way to serve his sentence. Malek El Jebena rises to power through a series of empowering mechanisms, as deliberate growth determined by the film maker – intelligence, initiative, survival and adjustment to prison norms – and flexibly plays on both sides to launch his evolution and metamorphosis from the beginning, becoming a group member and archetypical survivor. Although coming to prison both defenseless and empty-handed, the education of El Jebena under the rules of Luciani amplifies his state of being as successful survivor and *Prophet*, who is able to negotiate two conflictual dominant forces (the Corsicans and Muslim).

In the sociology of cinema, El Jebena represents an outsider or an outcast of the two rival groups, moving on the margins of in/ outgroups membership. Although he is socially adopted by the Corsicans and charged with dirty jobs bringing food, murdering, making coffee, sweeping the floor, its members always remind him of his inferior identity “dirty Arabness”. Performing the sadistic education, violent socialization of Luciani and submission to Corsicans brings him enmity and conflict with the Muslims, which offers him no choice to come to terms with its members who see him as traitor and outsider. Malek El Jebena, later in the film, becomes relatively a part of the group when he saves El Atrach, Muslim mafia leader outside prison, from a deadly car accident when he is in a mission for Luciani in Marseille by his prophetic warning. In this scene, he warned El Atrach from wild animals unexpectedly crossing the road; a warning that makes El Atrach and his group avoid a deadly accident. El Atrach addresses El Jebena “are you a prophet or what?”, hence, the title of the film.

The identity of El Jebena is defined by difference and duplicity of voices. He is the subject of experiment for all prisoners. Ryad introduced him to learning (French), Jordi provides him with the tricks of trafficking and everything about crime and illicit conduct. Prison does not only offer him tools to “survive, improvise, adapt, overcome”, as Yuri Boyka, the hero of *Undisputed III* (2010) by Isaac Florentine says, but reversely enables him to launch a metamorphosis from an innocent and shapeless human being to an experienced criminal and

⁶⁹³Manohla Darcis (2010), “Learning to read, Murder, Survive,” *the New York Times*, retrieved on 3 June, 2017, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/26/movies/26prophet.html>

hardened individual involved in all forms of illicit trade thanks to his role internalization under the dirty education of Luciani and other inmates. Infact, the brutal socialization, the violent rituals of passage and the reversibility of El Jebena experience contribute to the protagonist as container or multiplicity of different voices, which shape the identity of immigrant, whose inbetweeness between plural identification defines the cultural conflicts associated with displacement and immigration.

Despite the fact that prison represents emancipation and liberation from former self, El Jebena experiences metamorphosis in discourse dictated by the rules of survival, which conditions empowerment with submission and freedom with loyalty ; a fact that alludes to a lingering identity of underclared discourse that is kept repressed by forces of identification and disidentification. This duplicity or ambiguity that conjures up the evolution of immigrant character, who arrives to self-discovery not himself, but by the sadistic violence exerted on him by "others". El Jebena is victimized and threatened by both the Corsican, who despised and enslaved for his inferior identity, and members of the Muslim community in Prison, who see him a traitor working for the rival, in a balance of power possession.

Audiard intertexts, implicitly, the narrative of Michael Haneke in *Code Unknown* and *Hidden* by equalizing terror and violence among members of all ethnicities and communities ; that is all people commit violence regardless of the fact that they are poor rich, dominant or subordinate, French or Muslims. Audiard tries to speak from an interchangebole position where roles of victims and perpetrators, the innocent and the culpable are reversed. Yet, this ambiguity seems to give a pretext or cover for hidden and distantiated content to avoid falling in the determinism and classicism of French Beur cinema. Although the film is a celebration of El Jebena's survival and intelligence, he is confiscated his free will and the prison is denied reliability and legitimacy and reflect a proxy mapping of an invisible mapping of old conflict about immigrant space and identity, which European cultures and politics want to suppress and silence.

El Jebena is the embryo child of a western false consciousness that finds pleasures in quasitherapeutic experiment/ treatment of successive generations of migrants. Immigrants are seen as the new disease of Europe, fought and cured but its contagion is feared. El Jebena is the subconscious (immigrant figure) that is treated with euphemism both politically and fictionally, a discourse that keeps changing and metamorphosing according to political and cultural contexts.

Identification with El Jebena is materialized by ambivalent discourse of dominant ideologies about Maghrebi immigrants between adoption and objection which still reflect the idea that the "other" brings feeling of anxiety, insecurity and discomfort. Institutionalization of

cultural difference still brings to mind unstable European discourse about immigration and fears of security threatened by the disruptive force of the changing ethnic and cultural landscape in Europe. Prison and restriction can never be an option or a correct alternative to normal social institutionalization (like school and family) as it foregrounds deniability of healthy and socially correct individuality which depicts the inmate from the truth of being a normal European citizen with clean profile and full integration institutionalization of abnormality, associated with immigrants, perpetuates an attitudes toward immigrants, who are seen from dominant and biased perspective that wants to bring them to conformism, civility and cultural white values. Socialization and correction through Jail hides the regrettable truth about a failure of multiculturalism and integration programs and the perfect handling cultural/ religious tensions of the French society, which is changing into multi-ethnic one.

Prison seems to equal immigrants with the deniability of normal social membership and insanity that necessitates an institutional intervention to make that passage or transformation from defective personality to an empowered state of being. For El Jebena, this only concretised and realised through the unquestionable submission to be institutionalized to the regime, which itself encourages violence and insanity, and becoming part of prison society thanks to Luciani, whose permission and credit assure him a peace among inmates. The metamorphosis and survival of El Jebena is blessed by his white master and facilitated by the intervention of others, who are given credits to the positive aspect of his success story.

El Jebena is not frenchised and destigmatized not for his masculinity, noblty or for his leadership, rather, the celebration of his identity and survival skills are discovered by Luciani and developed by the intervention of others like Reyad. El Jebena is the raw material that needs refining and the social sava that needs to be baked properly. Equally, El Jebena represents the social 'savage' which is enlightened and civilized by making him aware of his innate predispositions, initiative intelegence and ability to temper pressures. El Jebena is sadistically introduced to social correctness through violent education of Prison. Like Haneke's immigrant protagonists, Audiard grants his hero visibility only when is supposed to go through traumatic experiences, which may work as cultural catharsis that exorcises him out of cultural stigmas to turn into an acceptable social creature.

In comparison to other Muslim characters in *Prophet*, El Jebena is an other archetype of minimized narrative of survival, in European migration cinema, where intelligence and adaptive negotiation of loyalties and conflicts makes him able able to handle encounters with ambivalence or paradox of excessive submission and light resistance. In fact, he is an exceptional case of integration that is given access to identification and inclusion to the margin

of dominant cultural discourse. The integration of El Jebena is not a vindication of an already stigmatized identity and from deeply rooted traditions of (mis) representation and marginalization, rather, it is a matter of experimentation by narrating the life of El Jebena, as North African protagonist, from the view point of immigrant and giving him the right or access to visibility is a twist in the rhetoric of representation on the part of Audiard to break with traditional beur cinema in terms of content and perspective.

However, Audiard as role distributor, makes great effort in filling in the blanks of discourse with deep and distantiated political import manifested in constant fight over power (Corsicans / Muslims) and the non-interchangability of positions; (a fact he tries to deny many times⁶⁹⁴). By foregrounding the film as antidote to classical migration cinema and autocritique of France's Prison system, Audiard envelopes the film with a sense of objectivity to silence the cultural import of the film by universalizing⁶⁹⁵ the case of El Jebena as prison subject rather than cultural subject, thus, minimizing and trivializing cultural conflict and understanding whole anti-immigrant legal corpus, which is determined by unresolved anxiety and discontent which drive the unsayable of the film, backgrounding untold stories of failed encounters between characters of disparate ethnicities, cultures and identities.

The filmmaker avoids falling in the trap of political bias and cultural subjectivity by representing the protagonist not as cultural case but as human experience with criticism of violence and corruption in the legal system in form of Darwinism that contributes to the remaking of El Jebena's persona through metamorphosis and survival strategies. Although the film dileberately meant to keep distance from traditional banlieue/ beur theme, Muslim protagonists are still subject to context of stereotypical representation. Malek El Jebena is introduced to the viewer as archytipal cliched young immigrant with Juvenile delequent history, a victim to dysfuctional family and ancestral tendencies to violence, tropes classically exhausted by French migrant cinema about the Maghreb. Besides violence and delenquency, *Prophet* maintains boundaries between ethnicities and stories of failed encounters since the Arab community in the prison reflects the same image / discourse about Muslim diapora in Europe, perpetuating the image of Muslim community that separates and segregates itself from the rest and resists patterns of integration and reconciliation with host cultures. If encounters happen to take place, it is always characterized by anxieties and determined by fear.

That is why the film can not escape political content as pervasive force that drives the consciousness of the script and constantly engages in obliterating the trace of distant discourse

⁶⁹⁴Richard Porton, "Currency/un Prophete (Jaques Audiard, France) retrieved on 10 August, 2017, from cinema-scope.com/currency/currency-un-prophete-jacques-audiard-france/

⁶⁹⁵Ibid.

narrated with hidden voice. The presence/ absence of invisible discourse, suggestable of cultural resonances and shapeless in addressing sensitive issues related immigration identity and culture. Audiard's works on the implications of political engagement and duplicity of identification/ disidentification with contemporaneous cultural and social divisions to reconcile between rival camps even if it takes to simulate / create conflict to feed crescendos to include other categories of audience or provide identification for an audience that was abandoned politically, historically and symbolically (fictionally). Terminologically, the filmmaker uses the umbrella term of 'Muslim' to designate North Africans in general instead of Arabs, North African as Moroccan... When the word 'Arab' is used as an identifier or name for protagonist, it is usually taken to mean Muslim.

Yet, Jacques Audiard tries to give positive or favorable context for representing difference by granting it space, language and perspective. Commenting on his films about migration, particularly *Deephan*, Audiard states what is happening by giving voice to the marginalized and identifying the unidentified. He says I want "to give a name, a face and thought to the people who are invisible, unidentified and unqualified. That is to give them a life."

C-Inglorious Prophets or Rebels without Cause: French Terrorism Cinema and the Representation of North African Immigrants in *Made in France* by Nicholas Bokhrief and *la Désintégration* by Phillipe Faucon

After 9/11, terrorism research, as a defined discipline, witnessed a huge development of different accounts, explanations and analytical models about the causes of terrorism in order to arrive at better perception of what is exactly happening and to develop preventive measures against terrorist attacks. Ultimately, many scholars and politicians, among them neo-conservatives in USA, were convinced that Islamist terrorism is an evil ideology that should be countered by military force.⁶⁹⁶

This approach in Bush administration and Tony Blair was theoretically encouraged by orientalist thinkers like Bernard Lewis who confirmed that Islam is a totalitarian religion / culture, which is against modernity, democracy and in need of military response to bring about cultural transformations to the whole Great Middle East⁶⁹⁷. This war on terror was proved immature, disastrous and many governments, policy makers and critics were convinced of the fact that neo-conservative model is unable to correctly explain the roots of the phenomenon as diaspora

⁶⁹⁶ Arun Kundnan, "a Decade lost: Rethinking Radicalization and Extremism," retrieved on 03-07-2017 from, Download / Claystone-Rethinking- Radicalizations. pdf

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid.

members and third generation Muslims, although born and socialized in Europe, carried out terrorist attacks in London, Paris, Madrid, Brussels and Nice.

European and British intelligence analysts and scholars focus on the argument that the most prominent reason for the growth of extremist thinking in diaspora is the failure of integration the liberal value systems which define the Europeaness of Europeans. Tolerance, according to the official public discourse of some European states like Britain, for example, towards Muslim minorities create cultural permissiveness that allow the likelihood of encouraging extremism and radicalization.⁶⁹⁸ This atmosphere of multiculturalism stands as a barrier for forceful defense of Britishness or Frenchness and a promotion of European values against minority ones. This model links extremism to the question of identity and community values.

British prime minister Tony Blair, with his muscular liberalism, essentially criticized that the passive tolerance of Britain, and Europe, facilitates the growth of Islamist terrorism in speech to the Munich security conference 11 January, 2011 and emphasized the fact that they should celebrate British/ European values of democracy, rule of law and respect of different faiths.⁶⁹⁹ In addition to the 'battle of ideas' against extremism, the British report of 2013 Task force on tackling Radicalization and Extremism classifies the boundaries of how ideology of Islamist terrorism is being drawn from a false consciousness of causes and many interpretations of religious texts:

An ideology which is based on a distorted interpretation of Islam, which betrays Islam's peaceful principles, and draws on the teachings of the likes of Sayyid Qutb. Islamist extremists deem western intervention in Muslim-majority countries as a 'war on Islam', creating a narrative of 'them' and 'us'. They seek to impose a global Islamic state governed by their interpretation of shari'ah as state law, rejecting liberal values such as democracy, the rule of law and equality.⁷⁰⁰

Between the past and the present, theorists and researchers have given a variety of explanations and causes of terrorism. Political violence and terrorism will be irrelevantly reliable on old schools and techniques because they are no longer of terrorism, which transform both its modus operandi and target groups. An investigation of causes and level of terrorism is partial and relative because earlier patterns of recruitment among terrorist groups challenge an established system of analysis. If the past terrorist networks rely on mosques, prisons and schools for recruiting new members, nowadays, they deploy the most intracible and anonymous

⁶⁹⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰⁰Ibid., p. 12.

communicative means, which is social media. Internet and social media extended the notion of Ummah beyond traditional physical boundaries, constructing a visual imaginary of jihadist ideology for both lone wolves and networks in diaspora and in the Islamic world. Internet revolutionized access to safe grounds for incubations of radical belief by accelerating the mass of world wide connectivity, communication between members and networks, dissemination of ideology and recruitment of new members.⁷⁰¹ Internet influences the speed of propaganda and facilitates the flow of commands, *modus operandi*, broadcasting of Martyrdom, glorification of victories against alleged enemies, fund raising, instructions for bomb building and preparation for attacks.

However, what causes terrorism remains complex and can not be reduced to radical thinking, individual motivation or belief system. There is no single cause to terrorism. Religious ideology is one of the many causes of radical extremism, which is built on the radicalization of its members. The radicalization model as cause of terrorism was criticized for being reductionist and not having empirical strength. Scholarship on radicalization, equally, was a little bit taken by the concept on the hey days of “*war on terror*”, thus, falling on the trap of exaggerating unquestionable relationship between terrorism and religious ideology.⁷⁰² In his famous study *Understanding Terror Networks*, Mark Sageman, a former CIA operation official and psychiatrist, offers an influential analysis of causation patterns. He concludes that radicalization starts by encounters on social networks, which involve transformation from ordinary Muslim to terrorist and importance is given to ideological and group dynamic.⁷⁰³ In *Radical Islam Rising* (2002), Quintin Witorowicz studied many members of Islamist groups, for example supporters of Shariah, coming to the conclusion that recruitment are deployed through social networks and takes advantage of individual crisis to brainwash the previously established belief system to facilitate passage of target recruit to radical thinking.⁷⁰⁴

Religious ideology gives coherence and a sense of belonging to members, but does not necessarily drives them to commit terrorist violence. Understanding the root causes of Islamist terrorism resemble the case of historical groups like anarchist bombers, the provisional Irish Republic Army, necessitate the recognition of global political context and decision making on level of foreign policy in America and Europe. Religious ideology provides a vocabulary and

⁷⁰¹Alex Schmid (2013), “Radicalization, De-Radicalization and Counter-radicalization: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review,” retrieved on 4 July, 2017, from [http:// www.icct.nl](http://www.icct.nl)

⁷⁰²Ibid.

⁷⁰³Mark Sageman, op. cit, p.23.

⁷⁰⁴Quintin Witorowicz, Cited in Arun Kundnani, “*a Decade Lost*,”

cohering identity, but politics provide the compelling impetus.⁷⁰⁵ Whatever said about Islamic terrorism and religious radicalization, it can not be interpreted without or separated from a broad European discourse on Islam, which is not yet institutionalized as part of value system or still seen as non –European religion. It is not an official religion. European Muslims are still constructed as suspect minority, inconsistently and deliberately treated with intolerance and as culturally different group. European discourse about identity tries to negate multiculturalism and made it appear conflictual to public concern, particularly those related to identity in order to return to demands of assimilation.⁷⁰⁶ Bush administration and Tony Blair accuse every Muslim who criticizes western culture and foreign policies. However, Tony Blair was criticized for his involvement in the immoral war on Iraq after the publication of Chilcot report and wikleaks scandals about the true lies of war on terror. As result, multiculturalism criticized by official discourse for contributing to ethnic division and lack of integration of Muslim or assimilation of European values is seen as national security threat.

However, Multiculturalism in Britain and Europe ignores other minorities and focuses only on Muslims, which is, in itself, a weakening of European belief in civil rights of all people and liberal society.⁷⁰⁷ Extremism discourse and terrorism media is falsified speech deployed by powerful countries to legitimate and deligitimate assumptions and the activities of specific cultural groups, who differ socially and religiously. Media propaganda and disinformation is compared to nuclear weapon because it represents a powerful violation of sovereignty and the making of audience consciousness or what is called the “*Engineering of Consent*”⁷⁰⁸. As case in point, USA started military operations in Phillipines in 1998 to reactivate its military base (Swipk Bay) under the excuse of fighting Abu-sayaf terrorist group.⁷⁰⁹ This rhetoric of associating prejudicial content with some population represents partial refusal and denouncement of dissent and cultural difference. The colonial police in India used the term terrorists to refer to nationalists who fought for idenpendence and Martin Luther king was descibed extremist by Christian leaders. Western media make use of extremism selectively and ideologically to portray and accuse religious difference.⁷¹⁰ Non – Muslim extrimists/ terrorists are labelled as dissenter/freedom fighters or downplayed as psychopath. Young immigrants who sympathize

⁷⁰⁵ Arum Kundnani, op. cit.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁸ Ahmed Fahmi, *Handassat al-Jomhur* (a-Reyad: Maktabat al-Bayan, 2015), p. 9.

⁷⁰⁹ Mohamed Gharbi, “al-Wilayat al-Mutahida al-Amrikiya bayna Ustorat Moharabat al-Irhab a-Dawli wa Istratijiat a-Saytara ala Laalam,” *Majalat a-Silm wa l-Amn a-Dawliyyayn*, eds.Rachid al-Hdiki et al, 2 (2003), p. 13.

⁷¹⁰ Arun Kundnani.

with and denounce killing of Muslims in the middle East are accused of being extremists confiscating immigrants the right to differ, protest, criticize and to practise other fundamental liberties and grievances encourage violence. In Addition, Muslim diaspora made to appear as the only source of threat. In fact, the demonizing discourse of western diaspora is meant to neglect other sources of violence, between 1980 and 2012 in Europe, far right radical violence has killed 249⁷¹¹ and Alqaed inspired violence 263.

Terrorism literature and research have produced a variety of definitions for the phenomenon. Tillema (2002) compared terrorism to other forms of violence like guerrella warfare, stating that the former seeks symbolic political effects, while the latter look for weakening millitary power or security forces of target governments.⁷¹² Wilkinson and Stewards went further to explain the differences arguing that the weapon of the terrorist is fostering fear and disseminating intimidation among a group by targetting a sample victims. They kill, terrify and destroy immediate victims to make other wider audience to (government, society, international organization...) surrender to their demands.⁷¹³ For example, *the East* (2013) by Zal Batmanglij is a film about an anarchist ecologist terrorist organization which targets corrupt economic organizations.

The instrumental approach stresses the idea that terrorist violence is an end-to-means philosophy intentionally embraced to achieve political ends like changing policies, influencing decision and deliberately hampering government actions by using force and violence. According to Genshaw, a very few terrorist organization achieved their goals wether they are nationalist or anarchist. Yet, Genshaw confirms that tactical success of terrorist may achieve publicity and recognition for the group.⁷¹⁴ Conversely, The organization approach does not seek political achievement, rather, it aims at maintaining its major goal, which is survival. For its members, it is not a question of ideology or politics, but it is organizational survival like financial resources and enterprises.⁷¹⁵ Grenshaw argues that the organizational approach seems inconsistent and unpredictable since their purpose is not political, they focus on material benifit and public good, they are not subject to pressures from dominant power (goverment). Second, they are like firms, compete with each other and they are more concerned with members stimuli that govenment

⁷¹¹Ibid.

⁷¹²Ozgur Ozdamar, "Theorizing Terrorist Behaviour: Major Approaches and their Characteristics in Difference against Terrorism Reveiw," 1:2 (2005), p. 91.

⁷¹³Ibid., p. 91.

⁷¹⁴Ibid., p. 92.

⁷¹⁵Ibid., p. 93.

policies (the Irish Republican Army (IRA) competes with the Irish national liberation Army (INLA)).⁷¹⁶

The psychological approach to terrorism looks at why people turn terrorists, who are terrorists and what is the state of mind of people who commit those acts. From the perspective of this approach, people who commit terrorist acts are not normal people, have defective profiles and they usually prefer violence than other forms of interaction. This explanation is simplistic and deterministic since it excludes a variety of social, political and ideological factors that can stand as motivation.⁷¹⁷

The communicative approach sees acts of terrorism as a political communication with the ultimate goal of spreading terror among a group by targeting a minority. In this context, the choice of violence is deliberately deployed to evoke a state of threat, fear and terror among particular groups for their potential compliance with a government a community. This the content of the Indian film *Fanaa* (2006) by Kunal Kohli when Ihssan the main protagonist says to his recruits that they have to strike violently to terrify American citizens and politicians for involvement in unjustified war in Afghanistan. Alex Schmid and Jane De Graf states: "Terrorism, by using violence against one victim, seeks to coerce and persuade others. The immediate victim is nearly instrumental, the skin on a drum beaten to achieve calculated impact on wider audience".⁷¹⁸

The communicative act is based on an epistemic philosophy of rhetoric and persuasion. In terrorist rationality, the act could be means to an end although sometimes there is a dissent or contradiction between the content of the attack and rhetorical justification declared by the terrorist. Austin's levels of speech (locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary) can be applied to the communicative content of terrorist acts in relation to audience, but without focusing on the perlocutionary (effect) of these acts like deterring opposition.⁷¹⁹ Yet, for scholars like Ahmed Mohsen, the intended meaning and message is determined not only by the driving force for persuading and communicating, but its symbolic nature can play a part in changing reality: "The rhetorical use of violence and terrorism could be defined as the process of delivering message

⁷¹⁶Ibid., p. 94.

⁷¹⁷Ibid., p. 98.

⁷¹⁸Schmid Alex and Janny de Graf cited in Elaine Martin, "The Global phenomenon of 'Humanizing' terrorism in literature and cinema," CLC web. *Comparative literature and culture*, 9: 1 (2007): <http://dx.doi.org/10.771/1481-4374.1023>

⁷¹⁹L. J. Austin cited in Ashley Pattwell, T. Mitman and D. Porpora,(2005) "Terrorism as a Failed Political Communication" *International Journal of Communication* 9 retrieved on 13/07/2017 from, <http://ijoc.org.P.1122>

through the use of symbolic acts, into a form of violence; to create a change on the part of receiver's political behavior."⁷²⁰

The communicative illusionary acts of terrorism, for Laquer is search for demonstrating the ability of terrorists to attack civilians without being protected by their government because they rely on challenging the monopoly of power by state and its inability to provide shelter for its citizens in time of crisis.⁷²¹ From another aspect, some scholars, like Alex Schmid and Jany De Graf, maximize the role of the mass media in serving terrorist goals, arguing that terrorist selection of target is instrumental to achieving "publicity value and of communication potential".⁷²² Victimization does not rely on literal target solely, but performances and staging acts is meant to challenge, warn, persuade others from the large public it addresses, the groups of the victim or the ingroup creating climate of fear and shock of the public, terrorists play on the emotional effect of the violent reality, which should be spectacularly staged and performed for wider audience. Mark Juegensmeyer states:

Without being noticed, infact terrorism would not exist. The sheer act of killing does not create a terrorist act... what makes an act of terrorism is that it terrifies... Terrorism without its horrified witnesses would be as pointless. A play without an audience.⁷²³

The essential character of terrorist victimization is different from other forms of violence as the whole process involves three parts: the terrorist (perpetrator), the immediate victim and the target. Influencing a group needs a sacrifice with a victim from the same group to create shock and terror. Brian Jenkins says "Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dying".⁷²⁴ The staged violence or the spectacle of terrorism is deployed to have access to free publicity and coverage seeking attentions, sympathy or legitimacy for their acts. Brigitte Nacos states, "In real sense, then, immediate victims of bombings... are simply pawns in the plays that terrorists stage... By staging horrific spectacles...the public watches and decision makers pay attention both to the media's frenzy and the public's fearful reactions."⁷²⁵

In his discussion of the theatricality of 9/11 attacks and the visual effects of the shocking events, Jean Bandliard posits that the attack is experienced as spectacle/ show, not as a reality "The terrorist violence here is not then, a blowback of reality, any more that it is a blowback of

⁷²⁰ A. Mohsen cited in Ashley Patwell et Al, " Terrorism as a failed Political Communication,"

⁷²¹ Ashkey Patwell et al.

⁷²² Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf Quoted in Ashley Patwell et al.

⁷²³ Mark Juegens Meyer, *Terrorism in the Mind of God: the Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California press, 2000), p. 139.

⁷²⁴ Brian Jenkins, cited Alex Schmid. Ibid.

⁷²⁵ Brigitte Nacos, cited in Alex Schmid, foot notes.

history. It is not 'real'. In sense, it is worse: it is symbolic."⁷²⁶ The problem with the symbolic is has profound root in the image and media. Jean Baudliard has also says that "terrorism is nothing at all without media",⁷²⁷ where Western media themselves become part of terror and the maker of symbolic violence worldwide by building moral and legal grounds⁷²⁸ for an open war against potential and real enemies . With similar tone, the RAN terrorism analyst, Brian Jenkins says that "terrorism is a theatre."⁷²⁹

However, academic explanation of causes is speculative and detached from grievances of terrorist. Terrorism studies offer a variety of explanations, but it reflect dominant paradigm, a policy oriented and state- sponsored literature, influenced by the narrative of western media and goverment, lacking objectivity and having pro-western vision. For Baudliard, it is more than a clash of civilization between the West and East or antagonism between Islam and America, it is liberal globalization and powerful media system starts fighting its own values and tuns to reactionary movement with more control, less freedom and more terror as reaction against terrorism after 9/11 shock trying to cope with its own failures⁷³⁰. Moreover terrorism discourse in Western and American media was a literature of "terror for terror", ignoring the fact that the dominant system and its allies are themselves the producers of terrorism's its favourable conditions.⁷³¹ As result, it seems that the system (globalization, open imperialism) of hegemony is in war or conflict against itself. Miller and Mills (2009) wrote "what has been called an "invisible college" of experts operates as a nescus of interests connecting academia with military, intelligence and goverment agencies, with the security industry and the media."⁷³²

Radicalization and terrorism literature has been criticized for lacking precision, complete image and non-applicability in certain cases, missing root causes and ignoring circumstances and foreign policy influences. Most research is biased, narrows the scope of scientific study and focuses on how to counter terrorism. Arun Kundnani says that terrorism is "a concept has been contrived which builds into official thinking biases and prejudices... resulting in discrimination

⁷²⁶Jean Baudliard quoted in Elise Silva, (2015) "Terror as Theater': Unraveling Spectacle in Post 9/11 Literatures" *Liminalities : A Journal of performances studies*, 11:5 retrieved on 12/08/2018 from [http : // liminalities.net/11-5/spectacle.pdf](http://liminalities.net/11-5/spectacle.pdf)

⁷²⁷Jean Baudliard, *Dihniyat al-Irhab*, trans. Bassam Najjar (Bayrut and Rabat: al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-Arabi, 2003) p. 105.

⁷²⁸Mahmoud Haidar, Ghaymatun Sawdae fawqa Amrika cited in Ali Qassir, *al-Media tahta Satwat al-Ideologia*, p. 189.

⁷²⁹Brian Jenkins in Elise Silva, p. 2.

⁷³⁰Jean Baudliard, *Dihniyat al-Irhab*, p.107.

⁷³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 112-115.

⁷³²Miller and Mills quoted in Lisa Stampanzy, (2015) "The Emergence of Terrorism Studies as a Field," *the Routledge Handbook on critical terrorism studies*, ed. Richard Jackson. 2015. Downloads/routledge – handbook- crit – terr- stud – stampanzy chapter – 1 –feb- 12 – 2015, pdf

and unwarranted restrictions on civil liberties."⁷³³ Attempts to stabilize terrorism as neutral and depoliticized field of research was challenged by dominant production of discourse about terrorism was characterized by the "the intrusion of political definitions into what ought to be an apolitical scientific area".⁷³⁴ In addition to the fact that terrorism studies are polluted the use of it for geopolitical interest by western/ powerful countries, Stampanzy argues that academic discourse that shapes literature of terrorism is characterized by anti-knowledge, which is an active refusal to define or explain terrorism by expert and popular discourse.⁷³⁵ The so called war on terror in post 9/11 attacks was an excuse for America and the West to consolidate its intervention campaigns against countries in Asia and Africa, using a destructive and heavily hegemonic media industry that call for a culture of violence and an open battle against terrorism; it a Western war on a product (terrorism) made by the West itself⁷³⁶. Terrorism is the most efficient discourse of American and Western media which have immorally legitimized and given cover for western foreign policies ; this is what Robert Fisk calls the "West's new religion"⁷³⁷. The effort of some depoliticized and rational explanation of terrorism is challenged by rhetoric about terrorism as unexplicable evil.

For Joseba Zulaika and William Douglass in their study *Terror and Taboo*, terrorism is a methodologically constructed concept. It is indistinguishably used by governments, academics, perpetrators and media. Terrorists use fantasy to create that shock image, media and governments deploy myth and exaggeration about the danger to legitimize its counter violence and overgeneralized image of the terrorist; they contribute to what they call "the crafting of narrative", fictionalization or mystification of terrorism. Terrorism discourse is "type of fictionalization – representation by the media, political manipulation academic definitions, the imaginary archetype in forming the thriller".⁷³⁸

Terrorism in recent French cinema has played a part in reorienting the tone of French cinematic discourse about Maghrebi immigrants and somewhat restructured the dominant body of films produced on the theme by French filmmakers. Spectacular terrorist attacks in America, Spain, Britain and Belgium and France led many European filmmakers to explore the very nature

⁷³³Arun Kundnani quoted in Alex Schmid, op.cit.

⁷³⁴Lisa Stampanzy, op. cit, p. 14.

⁷³⁵Ibid., p. 16.

⁷³⁶Mahmoud Haydar (2013), "Aaqidato al-Gharb al-Mostahdatha," retrieved on 23/08/2017 from, <https://www.albayane.ae/opinions/articles/2013-04-1-1.1852960>

⁷³⁷Robert Fisk, (2014) "War on Terror is the West's New Religion," retrieved on 23/08/2017 from, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/war-on-terror-is-the-west's-new-religion>

⁷³⁸Jaseba Zulaika and William Douglas cited in Micheal C. Frank and Eva Gruber, (2012) "Literature and Terrorism: Introduction," in *Literature and Terrorism: Comparative Perspectives*. ed. Michael C. Frank 2012. http://nbn-resolving.de/urg:de_bsz:352-220019

of this violence and the motives that drove French born and socialized youth to resort to terrorism. A valuable body of Beur cinema has largely constructed North Africans from the perspective of family dysfunction, illegality and generational conflict, but recent French cinema had to respond to the contemporary transformations in Muslim diasporic communities in Europe and the consequences of disintegration and frustration among young North Africans in globalized contexts of victimhood and symbolic loyalties.

La Desintegration is French movie by Phillipe Faucon about terrorism and homegrown radicalization. The film features Maghrebi third and second generation immigrants, who choose the path of terrorism despite their birth and education in France. Ali (Rachid debbouze), Nasser (Mohamed Nachit) and convert Hamza (Yamano Peset) are disillusioned youth from the outskirts of Northern France, who turns to violence and 'Jihad' after losing trust in the host country economic and social institution. Ali has a degree in Mechanical system maintenance and faces difficulties in finding internship/ Job because of his ethnicity and Maghrebi descent. This is clearly alluded to when he is writing one of 60 CVS. He asked his sister what to change in his CV, she says sarcastically "your name". Ali lives with his mother, a cleaning woman at hotel, who is portrayed a peaceful, hardworking and devout Muslim. Both his older brother and sister have no problem of integration. They are fully assimilated to the French system. Nasser is having a history of prison and is experiencing family dysfunction. He lives with his sister and takes things violently, which appears at the beginning of the film when he beats a French man because he calls some Maghrebi children "salle Arabes". Hamza is French convert with no information about his family or back story of his conversion to Islam except he insists on being called Hamza and becomes angry when he is called by his original name, Nico; foregrounding a fact that many European converts seek meaning in the form of religious ideology or sense of excitement.

Djamel (Yassine Azzoz) is the terrorist cell recruiter, he is like Hamza, the viewer has no access to information about his educational, social and family background. He is sharp-looking and intense young extremist of North African extraction, who takes advantage of conditions that surround his recruits to tell them that "liberty, equality and fraternity is only for French and zero Muslim" in one of his many indoctrinating speeches.

Djamel starts his terrorist cell around the mosque of the neighbourhood, where they, with other moderate Muslims, pray the Aid and Friday prayer and where he gradually tries to demonize the official discourse of Imam and the 'racist' French society, using generalized discourse about the victimization of Muslims all over the world, leading them to a total refusal of moderate Islam and community values. After convincing his recruits of the futility of engaging with the intolerable nature of society in France, Djamel assigns them the mission of bombarding

the NATO headquarters in Brussels, bearing resemblance to the Tamil Tigers terrorists, in the Indian film *Madras Café* 2013 by Shojit Sircar, who target political symbols and institutions. At the end, both Ali and Hamza accomplished their mission successfully by blasting their cars at the NATO's, while Nasser gets scared and run away without being able to blast his car.

Faucon seems to posit that the negative influence of discrimination and exclusion play a role in compelling Maghrebi youth to resort to terrorism with invocation of the classical Arab stereotypes, which contradictionally may not be the case. This causal logic between racism and integration is reflected equally in computer studies class when Ali angrily outbursts over the absence of inequalities for Muslims and Africans to get access to Job Market. He violently states addressing his white teacher "I have done my best... but in vain the only conclusion I come to is nothing... you are excluded in advance because of racists...fucking racist France"

However, Faucon used a convincing counter argument to break or undermine this narrative of racism as cause of non-integration and extremism by involving the family members in the matter. Ali's brother and sister are made to represent fully assimilated non-white French nationals with westernized mode of life and whose thinking patterns freely prefer French liberal values over Islamic values. This is frequently demonstrated in constant confrontation between Ali and his brother, who is married to French woman. When she was invited to family house in the celebration of el Aid, Ali, who is in process of indoctrination under the influence of Djamel, refuses to shake hands with her warning "staying away from, don't you ever touch my hands". As result, he is violently rebuked and criticized by his brother. On the other hand, Ali's mother (Zahra Addiouï) represents neither the silent first generation matriarch nor the extremely indoctrinated / dominated female since the father is absent at a hospital suffering a killing cancer. The mother embodies the paradoxical mother figure, who refuses racial abuse and unequal treatment from her white boss by refusing to be exploited at work. She is a patient, hardworking and devout Muslim, who deliberately speaks Arabic, gets dressed in moderate Islamic outfit and represents traditional way of thinking. She speaks French, but when her older son's French fiancée is invited home, she deliberately addressed her in Arabic before her son convinces her to talk in French, doing so in nervous manner and polite indifference although she accepts his engagement to a Westerner. In another scene, when they were preparing the cake-tea feast of El Aid to welcome the fiancée, the mother strongly criticizes her assimilated daughter for not respecting the religious and community values of her culture (the way she dresses, her defense of western French culture) by saying "do not forget your roots, where you came from, your family's traditions..."



Figure 5. Disintegration versus Assimilation in *la Désintégration*

Yet, the daughter is fully convinced of her assimilation because France, as host country, according to her, is the reason behind her education and integration. The mother always orders Ali, politely, to behave religiously by not drinking alcohol and smoking, but she deplores the way he treats his brother's fiancée and defends her daughter when he calls her a 'whore' for not wearing hijab and being too westernized. She sits face to face with him and explained that the ultimate purpose of Islam is peace, respect and sharing "If you have one potatoe, you have to share it with your neighbour...", she says.

Nasser's history of prison, family dysfunction and personal failure of Ali, who in turn blames exclusion, with the murderous religious ideology of Islamism are the justified grounds which Faucon's narrative tries to defend in *la Désintégration*. If marginalization in *La Haine* by Mathieu Kassovitz is overt and spatially structured since the multiethnic protagonists are kicked out of every place they want to access (art gallery, the night club...), exclusion and vulnerability is subcultural, social (inability to get internship) and subtle, which lead the protagonists to develop a sense of victimization and assimilate the feeling of marginalization and revenge or anger, which nurture their transformation to terrorists under the guidance of Djamel, who cleverly plays on the crisis and emotional-social circumstances of his underprivileged recruits. *La Désintégration* belongs to a genre of cinematic representation that focuses on radicalization narratives and socio-political contexts by giving a significant space to terrorist engagement with extremist ideology both in space and time.

Unlike Hollywood's heroic narratives, which highlight stories of rescuers, victims and FBA agents as *Kingdom* by Peter Berg and *True Lies* by James Cameron, *La Désintégration* tells the story of suicide bombers who are taken advantage of by dangerous terrorist networks, using falsehood of violent ideology and discourse of social injustice. The protagonists of *la désintégration* operate in radicalization milieu similar to that of Wasim, the protagonist of

Rendition (2007) by Gavin Hood because they are indoctrinated softly and discreetly around mosque by their recruiter who raises their consciousness and condition them to susceptible extremism gradually by invoking complex web of justifications ranging from cultural, religious and political injustices. Djamel, as young orthodox and fierce Islamist, conveys his ideological discourse with perinence to the candidates' personal backgrounds, justifying Ali's failure to get an intership with the subtle discrimination of European social and economic institutions.

The seeming objectivity of Phillipe Faucon in *La Désintégration* which is symbolically based on convergence of personal factors and political conditions produce religious violence among marginalized population in the periphery of France is devulged by the preponderance of Djamel's capacity of infiltrating the potential perpetrator of the terrorist cell in the making by pushing the growing frustration in the character minds. Djamel, as the master mind of the group, is dangerous and charismatic leader, who masters rhetorical use of language, persuasive tone and soft syrupy voice⁷³⁹. He does not use violence or aggressivity in adresssing his 'brothers' and his charisma stems from his ability to a peaceful preacher and skilful listener. Besides Ali's self-exclusion and feeling of alloofness, Djamel is able to gradually feed his increasing resentment at the French society and interprets his feeling frustration by convincing him that he is like other Muslim, a victim of discrimination. Djamel is not powerful in physical and verbal violence like Said and Hurbert in *La Haine*, rather, he represents much more dangerous version of violence, which is ideological, less spectacular and more destructive.⁷⁴⁰ "Only the imptious are afraid of death because if they lose their life, they lose every thing.", he says to his recruits. He skilfully and selectively uses language with manipulative tone and equation of question – hinted answer to justify Ali inability to find a job in a long convincing conversation.⁷⁴¹ The place is a Maghrebi Café and Djamel appartment:

Djamel: did you really think you could find one with your family name?

Ali: Why...?

Djamel: you are so-called educated, but you have access to nothing because they think you are nothing... you Arab... you are Muslim (39 min).

The scene in Djamel's appartment:

Djamel: I myself experienced discrimination in the past it was overt – it manifests in different forms... now, it is subtle and undeclared ... but it is always the same.

⁷³⁹Thomas Ricard (2017), "Instant Mindshots__la Désintégration," retrieved on 21 July, 2017, from Downloads/Instant%20Mindshots_%20_La%20Désintégration_.html

⁷⁴⁰Annie Jouan-Westlund (2015), "Can Films Speak the Truth? Mathieu Kassovits'la Haine and Phillipe Faucon's la Désintégration," Abstracts, retrieved on 18 March, 2017, from Downloads/Can%20Films%20Speak%20Truth

⁷⁴¹Thomas Ricard (2017), "Instant Mind Shots__la Désintégration,"

Ali's: that's why I am angry... I studied hard because of my mother's sacrifice, working as cleaning woman.

Djamel: well, the result of your sacrifice is zero job... zero internship... hypocrisy behind smiles... empty slogans about citizenship, republic... bla... bla...

The apparent critique of the republic's ideals (equality, fraternity, liberty) in this sense is interpreted in unrealizable grounds because social injustice and racial discrimination as seen here are not the real reason for disintegration, but Ali's self-exclusion, Nasser's loss and their lack of initiative is what Faucon defends as causes of non-integration. Analogically, the failure narrative of North African protagonists overlaps with the wider successful stories with Rachid's (Ali's older brother) professional and cultural assimilation to the French social and economic life as well as stories of multi-ethnic colleagues who are practically engaged in negotiating the changing face of 'plural' France. As result, Although Faucon overtly invokes causal relationship between radicalization and social injustice, he immediately seems to refute it with reference to other's protagonists internalization of silence in changing France, proving that Ali and his terrorist 'brothers' is a matter of subcultural exclusion and personal failure. Consequently, he undermines the hypothesis of racism and marginalization as the cause of integration, which Faucon does not prefer because he seems to favour assimilation as he positively displays Ali's brother and sister full fledged acceptance of French liberal values.

In fact, the transnationalization of terrorism and the post 9/11 identity –based displacement have stirred a great number of students and young Muslims in diaspora to reconsider the way they see the frequent western intervention in Iraq, Palestine, Syria and Afghanistan; a context that had a lasting impact on some Muslim youth in Europe, particularly France, which resulted in a feeling of conflictual belonging and identity. The global economic crisis, increased unemployment and the cultural rejection of Islamic community values (the Burkini affair 2016 and Stasi law of 2004 about ostentatious display of religious signs) prepare a climate of growing loyalty to pluralistic ethnic religious and identity – based confrontations. This increasing tension can be exemplified by the riot of 2005 in the Parisian banlieue when two Muslims were electrocuted in a police chase. The confrontation with the police lasted for two weeks with 2600 arrests and the destruction of 8400 vehicles in the “festival of torched cars”⁷⁴². For many young diasporics, problematization of the French identity becomes the ugly truth that brings feeling of fragmentation and intensification of conflict culminated in the terrorist attacks by Mohamed Mehra, a second generation immigrant, who killed 4 people in Jewish school in

⁷⁴²Chantal Tetreault and Paul Silverstein (2005), “Urban Violence in France,” retrieved on 11 May 2017, from <https://merip.org/2005/11/urban-violence-in-france/>

Toulouse, followed by the Kaouachi brothers attack on French satirist paper Charlie Hebdo in 2015. Then, attacks intensified in Lille, Paris, Brussels, Stockholm, London, Barcelona.

La Desintegration stresses the increasing radicalization of young North Africans in diaspora despite the belief in the ineffective influence of integration and the futility of generational transmission of 'correct' cultural values. As an inefficiently integrated, immigrant are educated and socialized in Europe are still represented as the anti-thesis to first generation parents, who are silent, apolitical and unassimilable. The complex personality of Ali's mother represents a bit of this silent generation despite her personal confrontation with her white boss about unequal treatment, she accepts the extra hours of work. She knows French, but deliberately expresses herself in Arabic when her son Rachid introduced his fiancée. Although her ambivalent representation, the mother still invokes that first generation figure who is neither fully constant advice to Ali (about smoking, staying out, drinking) she violently addresses her daughter, who is too much westernized and assimilated, to respect family and community values : "don't forget where you came from... don't forget your mother who wears the hijab" .

In her film *Memoires d'Immigrée*, Yemimah Benguigui points out to the salient characteristic of first generation immigrants, which is they do not express themselves, they are passive and silent about their rights, experiences and particularly their indifference to xenophobia and intolerance. However, the post 1973 oil crisis, which contributed to rising unemployment among foreigners and nationals, forced immigrants to organize in association and combat inequalities. In comparison to their parents, second and third generation North Africans are unable to remain silent or accept the mistreatment and violation of their rights by post colonial France. They always break 'rules of engagement' and negotiate new ones by not accepting the same (neo)colonial practices and the difficult manual to be stigmatized, marginalized and forced to occupy the periphery of the metropole that looks for eclipsing their threatening visibility and their belief in change by whatever means. This is how Ali addresses his 'disabled' and silent father who is on deathbed (cancer) as an archetype of impotence:

Ali: I see what is going on in France... when you were the only manouever of France... nobody respects you... they used to call you 'salles arabes...

Father: ... um ... um

Ali: but this situation is going to change... the situation is going to change.

Father: um... it's going to change.

Ali: we are going to change it.

French decision-making tries to exclude immigrants from the civil liberties of postcolonial France by outright silencing and continuous minimization of legal opportunities and

religious cultural illegalization as the notorious case of Hijab and Burkini. The reislamization of second and third generation Maghrebis⁷⁴³ finds breeding grounds in anti-West sentiments and indoctrination contexts that tempt them to join extremist organizations under the leadership of charismatic preachers who fulfil their quest for identity, revenge and can turn their disillusionment to meaning. Like the perpetrator of *Hamberg's Cell*, Ali, Hamza and Nasser are converted and radicalized around the mosque where Muslim minority prays. Here, the filmmaker makes reference to mosques as the primary radical milieu that terrorist networks depend on as hubs for injecting vulnerable category of people with violent terrorist import and orthodox falsification of religious faith. Djamel criticizes the preaches of the neighbourhood mosque's Imam, who after the killing of some Palestinians by Israeli army, recommends Muslims of France to stay calm and not to solve violence with counter-violence. He says that the Imam "Receives orders to say that ... this is not real Islam, not Islam of origins... it is Islam of municipality... but don't do anything... don't torch cars... don't go on riot... you have to canalize... save your energy... now you are soldiers of God."

With this introducing scene of indoctrination, Djamel will initiate one dimensional preach about the obligation of jihad and orients the attention of his recruiters to being a part of wider grievances of Islamic Ummah, suffering under the intervention of the West. In addition to the individual factors like identity problem, failed integration, rejection, terrorist groups look for or create supportive context and enabling environment or, what is called radical milieu that depends on social relations and reference group that support the existence of the network. Radical milieu is:

Most terrorist groups remain connected to radical milieu to recruit new members and because they depend on shelter and assistance given by this supportive milieu, without which they are unable to evade persecution and carry out violent attacks... sharing one element of the terrorist's perspective and political experiences, the radical milieu provides moral and political support.⁷⁴⁴

This feeling of collectivity and belonging to wider context of victimization does not only exist around mosques and prisons, but it effectively use internet and social media to make them identify that Muslim under unjustified invasion, which socializes them to take action and defend their compatriots at home and abroad. This is clarified in the film in a scene when Ali is browsing the internet and downloading pictures of murdered Palestinian children just before his mother walks in his room to give him the tie she bought to his job interview. Ideologically, Faucon's

⁷⁴³Fadela Amara, *Breaking the Silence* cited in Heather Bigley, "Muslim Mothers and French Daughters: Women Caught between Religion and Secularity in a Post-9/11 Film Culture," p. 118.

⁷⁴⁴Peter Waldman and Stefan Malthaner quoted in Alex Schmid.

narrative talks about three versions of Islam, which vary in content, objectives and ideologies. The most destructive and dangerous of the three, which constitutes a immanent threat to multi-ethnic France, Europe and humanity, is the salafi-takfiri Islam, which represents the most violent forms of terrorist sleeper cell networks like BokoHaram, Al Qaeda and ISIS...

Takfiri salafism strongly believes in revenge, suicide bombing, the establishment of the caliphate state and the Takfir / exnomination of others, who are seen as Kufar “infidels, impures and sinners”, like official Islam in Europe and the moderate Maliki Islam in North Africa. Djamel is the official spokesman of this model of Islam in the film. If other forms of radicalization and extremism in Europe in the 19th and 20th century encouraged liberal, pro-democratic and progressive political positions, salafi extremism is anti-democratic, anti-liberal and regressive despite the fact that the pioneers of Daawa like Hassan El Benna and Sayed Qutb were influenced by the vanguard (Taalia) philosophy of communism and fascism in terms of organization, mobilization and indoctrination.⁷⁴⁵ It develops among recruits an ideology of essentialism that classifies the world into the ‘believers’ and the ‘infidels’ and adopts global context of violence and conflict between the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’, by addressing who are emotionally moved by the shocking imagery of wars in Iraq, Syria... and where Jihad and religion become the explanation for everything, breaking ties with family members, practising combat sport. In this scene, charismatic Djamel anchors his recruits’ metamorphosis to “*soldiers of God*” by summerizing what they ought to and ought not to be:

From now on... you are neither Algerians, nor Moroccan, nor Tunisians ... you are Muslims, you belong to one and only one community... a community of true believers... you no longer belong to the French society as you have never been... your brothers are not the corrupt and opportunist regime of the Maghreb, your brothers are the Mujahedeen, the one who fight for Islam, those who suffer in Palestine and Afghanistan. Your brothers are those who Izrael massacres at the moment in Ghaza.

The second version of Islam in the film is the old school Islam, peaceful and traditional, so to say. It is usually associated with first generation immigrants who are conjured up as devout and silent practitioners. Ali’s mother is the perfect embodiment of this Maliki practice, whose principles are mercy, peace, responsibility, tolerance and sharing. This is what Ali’s mother is trying to teach her children, but she fails forcefully in front of the orthodoxy of extremist ideology (Ali) and the influence of tempting moternity of the French assimilatory value (rachid and his sister). The last component of Faucon discourse about Islam in *La Désintégration* is that official Islam of mosques and Muslim councils in Europe. It represents the official voice that

⁷⁴⁵Jeffrey M. Bole quoted in Alex Schmid.

moderately calls for tolerance and coexistence with religious minorities and is symbolically, in truce with provincial and central governments. It is equally a platform of communication and an intermediary between Muslims in diaspora and policy makers abroad.

Aesthetically speaking, with a polemically demonstrative artistry, Faucon convincingly avoids falling in the trap disarranging and misusing the contents and the concepts related to any of those models of Islam by ranging visual and textual tractics of what to say before and after, what to start with and what to close with, and of what to denounce and of what to...

Although *La Désintégration* unfolds with a shot of Ali's mother looking at the courtyard of the mosque where Muslims perform the Aid prayer, which hints to the idea that the story will be told through the eyes of the mother and from the perspective of her son Ali, the film does not close with the same peaceful version of Islam represented by the mother as the suicide bombers the film ends with violent blast of their cars in the NATO head quarters to leave the audience with crying figure of the Maghrebi mother on symbol of victimization, symbolic violence and domination.

In contrast to most literary and cinematic representation of terrorist, which mostly portrayed as merciless violent human being blood thirsty or narratives that celebrate heroic stories of rescuers and apocalyptic vision of the attack, *La Désintégration* tries to foreground, relatively, a perception of terrorism motives from the perspective of the perpetrator (Ali), but it does not concretize the acts historically and temporarily. Faucon adds a slight humanization of terrorists experience in selective manner. First, to make his hypothesis look different from classical French Beur cinema and, somewhat, from Hollywood victim-centred perspective. Second, Terrorism is fashionable theme and is one of few choices left for him because Faucon has exhausted themes related to North Africans and immigration in previous experiences (*Samia*, *Traïhson*). The film does not humanize the terrorist protagonists to make their motives comprehensible as the case of Alice in *the Good Terrorist*, a novel by Dorris Lessing,⁷⁴⁶ but it tries to contextualize or give a social back story of the terrorist in order to divulge the violent ideology of Takfiri Salafism despite the fact that the viewer develops an identificatory stance towards Ali not as a victim of subtle discriminatory system, but for his repeated attempts to get access to internship. Humanization of terrorism in *La Désintégration* exhibits an incomplete perception of historical and cultural contexts, lacking the tracing back of distant historical causes and political environment associated with past conflict and victimization. In the *Essentiali*

⁷⁴⁶Martin Elaine (2007), "The Global Phenomenon of 'Humanizing' Terrorism in Literature and Cinema," in *Representing Humanity in an Age of Terror*. Eds. Sophia A. McClennen et al. CLC web: comparative Literature and culture 9. 1 (2007). <http://dx.doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.1023>.

Terrorist, Edward Said argues, in critiquing the ideological use of terrorism in American and Western discourse:

As a word and concept, terrorism has acquired an extra ordinary status in American public discourse. It has displaced communism as public enemy number one, although there are frequent efforts to tie the two together...it serves the purpose here of institutionalizing the denial and avoidance of history.⁷⁴⁷

Although the film, as radicalization or perpetrator narrative, humanizes the protagonists, it deprives them from complete sympathy as the story unfolds, the terrorists do not show any doubt or repentance except Nasser who is overcome by fear at the end. Faucon deprives the four terrorists from any excuses or any justice to their case, except for Ali, who is humanized, while the other three terrorists are given no excuses for their anti-west feeling, unwarranted revenge and their murderous ideology. Ali, the essential terrorist who experiences indirect discrimination, does not have that strong convincing motive to strike violently by suicide bombing because his story does not exhibit a significant similarity to famously victimized protagonists like Michael Kohlhaas, the terrorist of Heinrich Von Kleist novella, who becomes not a terrorist, but a hero for people because his cause is just.⁷⁴⁸ A growing feeling of frustrations and sleeping rage in the protagonist mind is about to explode which emphasizes the dramatic transformation from passive and disillusioned individuals to violent terrorists with murderous group agenda the scene, when Ali visits his father in the hospital represents a decisive moment or countdown of the protagonist change followed by close-up and extreme close-up shot on his face, which does not humanize him as would be a terrorist, but tracks his moment of becoming.

Djamel's speeches, manipulative effects, which facilitate Ali's interpretation of his resentment, assert his transformation with context and content, by relating his failure to external factors of racist economic and cultural system as well as a defect in international relation. Although Faucon of North African immigrants, *La Desintegration* still takes hold of that clichéd turn of Beur cinema because the dramatic ending of the film tells more about the cultural threat brought by religious terrorism in the banlieues inhabited by Muslim minorities, rather than a perception of social, racial and economic roots of exclusion and rejection.

The film keeps that fine thread with previous Beur narratives by reiterating, though differently, the stereotypical nature of North African identity as a source of problems not as vandalism, delinquency, theft, but as breeding hub for identity problem, religious violence and extremism. Still, like their first generation parents, second and third generation Maghrebi

⁷⁴⁷Edward Said, "The Essential Terrorist," *Blaming the Victim, Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question*, eds. Edward Said et al (London: Verso, 1999), p. 149.

⁷⁴⁸Martine Elaine, op. cit, p. 4.

struggle in housing projects in the urban periphery looking forward to be employed and secured like other French nationals in society which do not accept its diversity and transformation to multi-religious France and failed integration by presenting exclusion and marginalization as vertical and economic. Faucon avoids talking orthodox extremists and individual factors of Maghrebi. Commenting on homegrown terrorist attack, Angelena Merkel acknowledged that European integration has "failed, utterly failed" .

However, the film presents exceptional cases of assimilation, not integration, in the success story of Ali's sister. Although the viewer does not know what is her job or what is the cause of her total assimilation, she represents a free will female agency as anti-thesis to other Beur North African females. She is an assertive female who believes in personal freedom and the principles of French liberal values, never navigating or code-switching her identity like Koubra in *Le noir te va si Bien* or Amina in *El Nino*. She prefers to speak French instead of Arabic, refuses to wear hijab and presents herself as a fully integrated French female and defends herself intensely. However, the mother still represents that repressed dominated and victimized if not by the husband it is by the symbolic violence of her children (failed socialization) despite she is positively portrayed as caring and responsible mother. As for the representation of masculinity, in Beur tradition of Maghrebi protagonists were associated with violence and frequent altercation between them and the police as expression of male power and rough masculinity. In *La Désintégration*, except the scene when Nasser beats the white male, violence associated with Maghrebi is not physical, it is more dangerous because it is ideological and collateral. Males of *La Désintégration* exhibit a weakened or castrated masculinity. Their importance and weakness is the product of two destructive forces. First, they are deprived of equal opportunities in socio-economic system that does not acknowledge difference and alterity. Second, they have few choices and deprived of free will by violent and regressive indoctrinating regime, which castrates individual choices in favour of collectivity and group ideology.

With similar approach to *La Désintégration*, *Made in France* (2014) a film by Nicolas Boukhrief is a tentative attempt to the explanation of increasing radicalization among a group of Maghrebi youth and French converts, who are about to launch a series of violent simultaneous attacks on the French capital under the leadership and indoctrination of dangerous ex-Al Qaeda militant, who just returned home after years of training and expertise in Wizeristan and Al Qaeda's battlefields. With a well-researched topic and body of intensely documented literary discourse about terrorism, N. Boukhrief traces back the path to violent radicalization of French born North Africans and nationals from the perspective of undercover journalist who soberingly infiltrates the cell to write a well-documented book about radical movements in Islam.

Made in France -or *Inside the Cell*- is also perpetrator or radicalization narrative with the upsetting reality of homegrown terrorism –taking into account the fact that was shot months before Charlie Hebdo attacks- That has forced intellectual and cultural discourse about minorities and integration to undergo transformation in terms of political, civil and cultural belonging or identification. With terrorism next door, growing cultural uncertainties dominated the questioning of old interpretations or positions about the efficiency of assimilation processes and diversification patterns. Questionable representation of Muslim identity and growing anti-immigrant sentiment justified resurging discourse of condemnation and cultural paronia about difference and alterity that questionably treat every Muslim immigrants as potential terrorist and where “every potential terrorist is a terrorist” as a Russian dealer tells a FBI agent, Tom Cruise, in *Mission Impossible : Ghost Protocol*,⁷⁴⁹ hinting to the biased and exaggerated questionable and politicized American discourse of war on terror.

The opening sequence of the film foregrounds a long speech by digny and radical Imam in clandestine garage mosque, who supercritically explains to the audience the ‘morbidity’ of western values and its permissive liberal practices of a community, that encourages its subjects to immorality and free access to fornication, pornography and excessive consumerism. This credit or perlude to the film puts the viewer on track of a rising discourse with narrative taken by exploring the propagandist and deceptive image of Jihadist ideology that emotionally influences young recruits regardless of their class, nationality and education. The Imam condemnation of Western civil and individual liberties reflects part of extremist ideology that uses anti-western agenda to create supportive base for its cause. This is how the Imam rises the consciousness of his audience by attacking Western societies, their pro-sexual, laic and with loose value-system:

Here in France and the west... Pornography is everywhere, in the minds of all... why? because pornography is promoted by all means of communication: commercials, TV, films... is this freedom ? Yet, the worst of all is internet... is purist site of all vices... it is sign of decadence... men and women meet, see and touch each other... everywhere... this is degradation... this is zena... fornication and adultery, (00 : 34-).

Hassan or Abu Hassan, who is a fanatic and orthodox Alqaeda terrorist, claims that he has just returned from years of training in Jihadist camps in the Middle East and he is back home- France- because he is assigned a mission by Alqaeda leaders to strike at the heart of Europe. To make better use of his knowledge and expertise, he connects with a group of young immigrants and nationals telling them they are chosen by the network to carry out terrorist attacks and start the process of their radicalization and recruitment. Driss (Nassim Si Ahmed) is

⁷⁴⁹Box office, MBC 2, 23 July, 2017.

an aggressive Maghrebi immigrant with a history of Prison which he shares with his recruiter Hassan. The second recruit is Christophe or Abuyoussef (Francois Civil) is a French convert, a son of wealthy catholic family. The third is Sidi (Ahmed Drane) is an African immigrant who joins the cell for personal reasons. The last recruit is Sam (Malik Zizi) a French Algerian Journalist who joins the cell as undercover journalist and turns an informer or collaborator with the police with the purpose of infiltrating the terrorist group from the inside. *Inside the Cell* which is the other title of the film, projects the story of Jihadists from the perspective of professional Sam to cast an eye on how the cell works, what are its targets, tactics and, most importantly who are the master mind leaders behind the cell from the inside.

As the story develops, Abu Hassan/ Hassan with his sophisticated and violent style, gets the members close to each other by praying together in local garage mosque and meet at night in Abu Youssef's grand mother home, where they form real chatroom to discuss religion practice, watch DVDs of Al Qaeda preachers and Hassan is the primary inspirer, preacher and indoctrinator, who with suspense and sporadic opposition from Sam, gives them a countdown of what they will do, pretending to wait the greenlight and orders of his leaders whom nobody see or know who they are. Sam, as silent and manipulative observer, stays alert to detect the terrorist method and modus operandi trying to locate who the head of the cell could be and how he could have access to their targets. Although he exposes his wife and child to dangerous consequences, Sam melts down in the group, unwilling to partake their views, makes suspicious comments and participates in their first task of buying/ confiscating smuggled weapons from grey market smugglers, who are North Africans as well. The scene ends with cold-blooded killing of the smugglers for misunderstanding. In the course of preparing for their big mission and waiting for orders from the unknown leaders, the group gets involved in killing the security guard of chemical store and policeman, but when the time comes to carry out the attacks on the Champ-Elysée as the first assignment before engaging in other car bombing across France, Driss and Sidi refuses to kill innocent people like women and children.

By the time, it is very difficult for every member to retreat as Hassan starts threatening and forcing them to accomplish what they have started. After that, the cell begins to fall apart. However, infiltrating the cell is not that easy as Sam alerts the police, who turns his involvement from a choice to obligation by blackmailing him to provide them with the necessary operations and help them preventing the planned attack.

As the story develops, Sam is compelled to complete a dangerous task by searching the phones of his comrades, installing spying bug on their laptops and spying on their calls. Meanwhile, police officers with whom Sam cooperates, starts field procedural measures to foil

the potential attacks by gathering information, visiting suspicious places like mosques and using video surveillance. Sam, who infiltrates the cell with the intention of taking insight into the Islamist group modus operandi from the inside, becomes trapped in dilemma as Sidi dies in an assault and when the cell starts preparation for the attack, making bombs planing target places, characters are overcome by doubts and hesitation. After twists and turns in the script, the film arrives where protagonists are ordered to carry out the attack, Abu Youssef refuses to kill innocent children at the school, but he is punished by Hassan, who himself engages in violent fight with Sam, who effortfully manages to stop him from blasting the school, where his Sam's son study after he failed to target the Champ-Élysée, in bloody scene which ends with the death of Hassan with the intervention of police.



Figure 6. *Made in France* : Indoctrination and Religious Falsehood

As the painter of his character stems from knowledge of terrorism literature and metadiscourse that constitutes the enabling backgroup for the development of the narrative sometimes the viewers feel that protagonists are giving lectures and analyses of the working, the modus operandi and the ideology of terrorist networks. The performances of the protagonists though, are carefully drawn to appear pertinent to the sayable and unsayable of the story embodying that coherent assemble of terrorists with the arrangement of group dynamic, leadership and subordination. After befriending the members of his cell and gain their trust and respect, Hassan launches an ideologically loaded indoctrination by asking them to undergo Tuqya (art of pretending) as the first step in their transformation into the doctrine of true believers. Tuqya or pretending necessitates both physical and psychological change that depends on discontinuity with former practices, relations and habits, be it religious or secular. Simply put, pretending, as abu Hamza explains, is the art of being invisible, deceptive and unsuspecting:

From now on, we will apply Takya (dissimulation / pretending) ... shave your beard, melt down in the crowd, become invisible, always check if you are surveilled... avoid visiting mosques... keep moderate discourse... smoke, drink, defend USA and Izrael if you want... if you date a woman leave her (12 : 43).

With this rule of obsessive invisibility, Bokhrief's message implies that the threat of Islamist terrorists comes from the intracibility of the cells, their ability to change, commonflage, make you feel they are like you and bearing resemblance to their enemies. Looking westerns or ordinary people by removing visible signs like beards and Islamic outfit and allowing smoking, drinking and shaving beards makes the threat immanent and unidentifiable. It is a threat from within or the potential nature of rising homegrown Islamist fundamentalism demonstrating that not all Muslims are terrorists and not all terrorists are Muslims. Any one could be a sleeper cell member and potential terrorist like the catholic convert, Abu Youssef. The filmmaker portrays the Islamic faith with positive tone. First, he recruits protagonists with different cultural backgrounds (nationals and immigrants). Sam as journalist working on terrorism is depicted as caring husband and true believer who devoutly and moderately practises his Islamic faith with a strong feeling of patriotism that leads him help foiling the terrorist acts, a fact that makes him a symbol of true citizenship and Frenchness. In contrast, Abu Hassan is white national who pretend to be trained in Wizeristan, the residence of late Oussama Bin Laden, is portrayed as fanatic, who loves violence and holds a grudge or resentment at his havoc without justified cause. Second, the portrayal of Islam as religion in the film is quite objective, has reconstructive tone and free of rhetorical discourse that relates it to historical and national conflict. As Franco-Algerian Muslim, Sam is the narrator of the story and kind of extradiegetic voice of the filmamker by proxy. The following statement is clear illustration of what Sam represents, explains and criticizes "apart from two or three surahs, they know nothing about Coran". In an other scene, Sam questions Driss about his motive to reach a broad view of infiltrating the cell: "Islam has nothing to do with vengeance".

This is logical because he has to establish juxtaposition between a correct doctrine and falshood of an ideology that instils fanaticism and violence. If radicalization in *La Désintégration* seems to be the product false feeling of social injustice and strong feeling of exclusion, the path to extremist violence in *Made in France* seems to be composed of invariably diverse individual motives and causes that bring choas to the group's constituency, which gives the impression that each role is a kind of abstract conceptual framework of metadiscourse about terrorism and Islam, a fact that contrasts the pedaogical and the sociological approach in *La Désintégration*. If the fanatical leader (Hassan) is driven by a love for violence and choas, not true faith, terrorism is a

source of inspiration for Yousef to depart from his boring life with his catholic family. Like Hamza the convert of *La Désintégration*, terrorism is a way to achieve a meaningful existence and revolutionary model that see Islam as religion of the poor and the underprivileged which grants access to social rebellion.

Most converts and radicalized young members view themselves as new born who undergo total change from their meaningless former lives. Terrorists belong to diversity of political, social and educational contexts, they are vanguard, conservative, ex-prisoners, criminals, wealthy, poor, which implies a reference to the new trend of terrorism in Europe which are mainly homegrown and hybrid terrorisms; these new trends are driven by revenge not by strong religious orthodoxy or ideology. However, each terrorist has discriminate radicalization trajectory: role models, ideologues, seekers of community and camaradship, victims of marginalizations, recognition, martyrdom. Ideology is an influential source of radicalization, but there are major individual and collective pull and push factors as summerized by Alex schmid in the following extract:

Individuals join as result of perceived injustice and in need of some form of political activism. They join to meet socio-cultural needs and the desire for social bounding stemming for identity issue. They are looking for meaning, which these groups provide in the form of ideology and high narrative... thrill seeking for those looking for excitement, or redemption from previous misdemeaning.⁷⁵⁰

Both Abu Yousef and Abu Hassan join the group neither for social injustice like Ali in *La Désintégration*, nor for revenge from local authorities as Samia the protagonist of the film *Samia* by... who is radicalized because police has killed her brother and tortured her father, they join for vague reasons. Abu Hassan, with a violent personality, embraces Jihad for personal advantage; he has access to terrorist networks to meet his thirst for blood, choas and violence, partaking with Youssef a love for excitement and “thrill seeking” of violence and queer meanings in the name of ideology under the cover of higher narrative like combating Kufar in Dar El Kufr. Hassan is violent guy with fanatic fervour, not driven by faith or belief in group ideology, but by hatred and empty anarchism, embodying the violent methodology of the ape fighter protagonist who says to his fellow apes “no mercy, no peace; this is war” in the last film of *War for the Planet of Apes*.⁷⁵¹ This is demonstrated by his recourse to solve problem and conflict resolution by violent means. He killed his comrade Sidi using both a gun and a knife because the latter expresses refusal to kill innocent people. He abhorrently killed his wife Zohra,

⁷⁵⁰Alex Schmid. op. cit, p. 22.

⁷⁵¹Box office, MBC 2. op. cit.

who pretend marrying her to save her from “a family of Kufar” in Marseille, because she turns to be a traitor as she collaborates with Sam to convince Hassan discover who are his superiors, are they in France or abroad...

Before gets involved in the matter, she was silent looking and submissive, but Hassan tells Sam he joins jihad for martyrdom and true martyr is the one who must lose something valuable, he has to sacrifice his wealth, children or wife in order to achieve that sacred or sublime goal. Except for the African who is portrayed as revenge seeker terrorist, who wants to pay back for the brutal killing of his cousin by a French cop, who “puts a bullet fully into his head even though he has nothing to do with terrorist network”, Driss says. *Inside the Cell* is not only a treatment of terrorism from the perspective of an infiltrator to divulge the working of a threat from within, but represents a metaphor for looking at terrorism from very close angle ; what they look like, how they live, what drives them to embrace such recourse to violence and so on. Despite its roughly different approach, technical and spatial, Jimia Boutouba states that *Made in France* is counter narrative to mainstream terrorist films because it disrupts the notion of terrorism as outside networked transnational phenomenon, arguing that the film “ challenges conventional understanding of terrorism as a networked, transnational conspiracy, suggesting rather terrorism can have local roots and can be attributed to everyday grievances, malaise, discontent, anger or hatred.”⁷⁵²

However, Nicholas Bekhrief does not only represent the narrative completely from the threat plot that is homegrown and next door, but also from rupture inside the group instilling fragmentation within the integrity of the cell members, who are either killed in the process of radicalization (Sidi) as a mistake, or killed by the fanatical leader for refusing orders because they are not convinced enough ; a narrative evolutionary mechanism which tends to bring equilibrium/ juxtaposition between two rising conflictual discourse : the murderous, abnormal ideological doctrine of Hassan, who uses violence in the name of religion and the opposing narrative of Sam, who represents the doctrine of peaceful human's discourse is dismantled or fragmented, first, by choosing to provide members of the cell by dissimilar motives, convictions and personalities, which is itself a source of conflict that threatens the unity of the group. This is what definitely happens when Sidi (N. Africans) refuses to obey Hassan's orders to carry out the attack which targets ordinary people like children. This is how he justified his setback to the group:

⁷⁵²Jimia Boutouba(2018), “through the Lens of Terror: Re-imagining Terrorist Violence in Boukhrief's *Made in France*,” retrieved on 17 February, 2019, from Studies in French Cinema <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsfc20>

Hassan: we received an order.

Sidi: I don't want... we are not barbarians, we are soldiers... we have to target symbols of French state... our true enemies... a police station, a ministry... but not children and women... I refuse to kill innocent people.

Hassan: Our war is holy, you have to respect the will of God.

Sidi: do you think killing of children is obeying God's will. (01: 03: 16).

This tendency to dismantle terrorist narratives by implanting fear, doubt and uncertainty in protagonist minds appears sporadically in post 9/11 literature and cinema with focus on perpetrators. One of the protagonists of Hany Abu Saad's *Paradise Now* hesitates and does not carry out the suicide bombing. In *the Repentant*, a film by Merzak Alouache, the protagonist flees terrorist network in the forest to join his family home. Second, by constructing the role of Sam, a true Muslim whose infiltration is meant to shake the plot from the inside by "cowardly" reaction to the murder scene when they killed the smuggler, who are North Africans by the way, and partly in avoiding to kill the policeman who attacks them in the gate of the chemical product store, where they stole products to construct home made bomb. At the end, it is Sam's sacrifice that contributes to foil the planned terrorist attacks by exposing himself to jeopardy and brutality. Consequently, the film seems to attribute Sam and Islam a positive role by helping to build the plurality of France and belief in the functionality of its multi-ethnic and religious fabric. *Made in France* tries to address the issue of identity and immigration from different angle by avoiding generalizations on Arabs and Muslims since a Muslim journalist infiltrates the group and saves Paris from a series of attacks.

However, N. Bakhrief points out to a dangerous and neglected phenomenon which is changing the character of terrorism, where perpetrators are not only young third generation, but European coverts and white nationals who lack any noble or justified cause or clear political purpose driven by a sort of despair or rebellion. This "expressive terrorism" or personalization of terrorist acts, as Nacos calls it,⁷⁵³ is represented by Hamza in *La Désintégration*, Abu Yousef and Hassan in *Made in France*, who is the most fantasized terrorist of the cell drawn to rage and disillusioned outlook at society which he sees as corrupt, irreligious, unjust and Kafir. Yet, the majority of characters in both films are depicted in a bond of motivations, some are vague, empathetic and humanized, while others are trapped in the margins of other protagonists with intense and engaging shifts of both suspense and equilibrium among the group.

More than that, Maghrebi immigrants and French converts are representing autobiographies of lost and existentialist anxieties. Frustrated, disillusioned and disordered. This

⁷⁵³Nacos cited in Martin Elaine, op. cit, 8.

young people seem to exhibit crisis consciousness of lost generation, built on a counter-culture- or subculture-, politics of self-destruction and unjustified revolt against the existing social and political system. Protagonists are provided with frustration, passive resistance and silent contemplation to follow the development of inner tension and despair that seems without cause or purpose. Ali, Hassan, Hamza and Yousef are portrayed as terrorist stuck in vicious circle of meaningfulness and self destruction (Ali and Hassan). This anti-subjectivity of terrorist narrative identity manifests a mode of narration development that turns protagonists to anti-heroes or anti-subjects with tragic weakness that hinders their full integrity with the cause they defend or the ensemble they represents, some seeking futile revenge and unjustified violence, while others are driven by fake social rebellion and self-destruction in the absence of genuine cause as the film tries to demonstrate. This goes hand in hand with Boutouba's idea that tries to explain the causes of adopting violence and dissatisfaction among young generations⁷⁵⁴. White nationals and second generation terrorists are represented as heroes without glory, as Fouad Laaroui's characters in his novel '*Heroes San Gloire*' who are involved in coup d'état without necessary tools, favourable environment and supportive consensus among target population.

However, the most prominent identity of the terrorist in the two films is that of inglorious Prophets or rebels without cause who are mobilized by romanticized vision of personal failure and fantasy of self-destruction that find inspiration in beautiful language of violent ideology that loses authenticity because it does not represent the principle of Islamic faith / religion which is about mercy, love, tolerance, coexistence and life. N. Bokhrief says in an interview that he wants to represent his terrorists in that inglorious image:

Made in France offers an inglorious image of the terrorists, they are cowards, liars and stuck in the past. Films generally present villains as charismatic characters, the ones in my film have nothing virile or iconic about them whatever... Jihadism is nothing more than a death wish, an ultramorbidity, romanticized fantasy.⁷⁵⁵

In comparison to the terrorists of *La Désintégration*, particularly Djamel, who is presented as charismatic and manipulative leader, the leader of the cell in *Made in France* is anti-thesis to Djamel because, in part, he is not ascribed justification for what he is doing and, in other part, he does not possess the skill or power of an iconic manipulator who can achieve his objectives without the use of violence and aggression against the members of his cell. At a moment in the film, the viewer feels that the true target of Hassan is not France and the West, but the battle is against his Comrades who start to doubt, question and resist his terrorist plots.

⁷⁵⁴Jimia Boutouba, "through the Lens of Terror,"

⁷⁵⁵Elise Quinio, "Made in France: the Cursed Film is Released in the United States," *France – Amérique*. Trans. Alexander UTT. December 15th, 2016.

The “*romanticized fantasy*” and the “*pathetic*” leadership or anti-hero consciousness do not prefigure the diegetic failure of the plot in the film, but it symbolically points out to an extradiegetic literary explanation which the filmmaker wants to reveal. Bokhreif is putting to test Mark Sagan’s notion of “leaderless terrorism”, which do not mean literally terrorist group without leader, but foregrounds new category of radicals, which may include lone wolf terrorists, who do not have a long history of radicalization to become suicide bombers, stubbers or car blasters. This mode of terrorism stresses that recruitment comes first, then radicalization later. In both films, terrorist or cell leaders keep connected to the radical milieu to recruit new members as supportive basis for carrying the attacks, without knowing the financial sources or their superior leaders, who are behind the whole *modus operandi* of the network because there is no network. This is, also, exemplified in Hassan’s answer to Sam when he asked “who are your chiefs?” replying that “there are no chefs...”.

As result, the failure of terrorist attacks in *Made in France* that has nothing to do with French society or its European model of integration or any presumable injustice. The film is also an attempt to subvert the binary discourse of ‘cowards and braves’ as protagonist/ terrorist ideology is represented in kind of battle of ideas, statement and counter-statement in global media. While ISIS spokesman in *Amaq agency* portrays the terrorists, who carried out attacks in Paris, Brussels and Stockholm as brave soldiers or supporters of the organization, government officials and Western media depict the extremist as criminals and ‘cowards’ that threatens peace and human existence. This discourse and counter –discourse of terrorism in the media about losers, cowards, braves and heroes represents a battle of arguments between the two sides of the game claiming legitimacy and justification of positions and power.

This discourse of condemnation and counter-condemnation is an old tradition of classifying dissent group or defining ways of seeing cultures, politics and social progress from an interchangeability of positions ; those who were ‘braves’ have become ‘cowards’ and those who were ‘winners’ have become ‘losers’ or the vice versa. In the past, vanguardism 1968 student and worker movements were threat and enemy number one for emerging democracies and even powerful national states not only in the West, but also in third world countries like Morocco, where, in the eighties and seventies, extremism was not the orthodox / evangelic religious feeling, but danger was associated with the cultural puritanism of communist thinking and belonging to the Eastern block. Authorities were chasing down citizens who show sympathy / solidarity to communism and members of leftist movement like *March the third* and the *Democratic Method*, seen as national enemies for the threat they brought to conservative values of Moroccan society.

However, this position on culture and identity underwent a light transformation in the nineties with redefinition of politics and society as old sensibilities become subject to new cultural tendencies determined by historicity and subjectivity of the century and Casablanca's terrorist attack marked a rupture with old paradigms of thought, where former 'braves' conservative views of society become the new 'cowards'. Globally, classical enemies of the world and the must (communist, nationalist, Nazis...) turned outdate and the choice of the enemy or fair rival marked an era of identity problematization with dissolution of old orthodoxies and emergence of new cultural climate characterized by loss and value-indeterminacy and complicated loyalties that irresolubly blur the boundaries between 'heroes' and 'traitors', 'brave' and 'cowards' with the transnationalization of religious extremism, Islam becomes the alternative enemy, positions switched and the metamorphosis of discourse about identity and immigration forcibly filtered the new paradigm which becomes the product of subjective and selective "war on terror" narrative. In the *Essential Terrorist*, Edward Said states:

'We' are never terrorists no matter what may have done; 'they' are always are and will be terrorists... it – discourse – obliterates history and indeed temporality itself. For the main thing is to isolate your enemy from time, from casuality, from prior action....⁷⁵⁶

So, this is no exception to long tradition of European and Western cinema, which partakes the construction of discourse coherent to the ideology of war on terror, transfiguring the poetics of terrorism and migration from the perspective of micropolitics to more universal macropolitics. Terrorism invokes a symbiotic relationship between cinematic representation and media discourse about the successive waves of young immigrants crossing the Mediterranean to Europe, which some nationalist and radical right politicians see as an invasion of the continent with young, unemployed, educated and 'angry' immigrants/ terrorists, who one day may become 'Trojan horses', armed and ready to bring havoc not only to national identity but to international security.

In addition to the linear narration and the structural similarity of the two films, which can be partially explained by the shared Maghrebi heritage of the filmmakers (N. Bokhrief has Algerian mother and Fillipe Faucon was born in Morocco), the choice of radical violence is featured in disruptive rhetoric. In *Made in France*, protagonists's radicalization is homegrown, mistaken, has no excuse and underplayed as social rebellion, while anti-hero consciousness of *La Désintégration* is the product of character's desire for self-destruction and nihilism. The protagonist's vulnerability to radicaliation and failure of intergration is not due to social exclusion or discrimination, but to their conflicted personalities and inability to negotiate their

⁷⁵⁶Edward Said, "The Essential Terrorist," p. 154.

environment. As result, radicalization in French cinema suggests a sort of causeless phenomenon, which exists outside not only social context, but also without historical and temporal roots since both filmmakers do not mention or hint to historical encounters between North Africans and Europeans in the form of colonial invasion of Africa by the French, Spanish... or shared history of fighting Nazism in WWII, not traced at all.

Equally, the two movies make a juxtaposition between distinct versions of Islam to provide their narratives with a sense of conflict. Indeed, Bokhreïf contrasts the psychopathic, violent and fanatical personality of Hassan with Sam as a symbol of devout and peaceful Islam devoid of ideology and violence. By doing so, the filmmaker proposes a reformist approach to migration and identity, introducing a relative rupture of old tradition of representing Maghrebis as culpable, thieves, deviants, with conflicted identities and without families. Sam is normal Muslim, praying everyday, a caring husband and an educated man conducting a research on homegrown terrorism, which is not the case of Ali, who does not show any sign of religiosity before being radicalized by Djamel. The terrorist of *La désintégration* seem to echo Richard Rubenstein concept of failed communication between the perpetrator and the target receiver. Terrorists in this film are not allowed to speak their views and communicate their experience, which reflects Rubenstein idea that terrorism is originated in language and communication. It is the product of terrorist's feeling of being wronged and their voice is not heard enough. He argues that "Terrorists start out attempting to communicate their programs in speeches and manifestos yet when their words go unheeded, they turn to action meant to speak louder".⁷⁵⁷

European cinema, in general, does (relatively)not present Islamist extremists as social rebels or freedom fighter as has been the case of European/ western extremist movements and youth subcultures, which were celebrated as emancipatory movements and given contexts of resistance and liberation. Maghrebi young immigrants and protagonist terrorists are cinematically represented as unclassified category of youth, who seek violence and adventure at any cost. They are like the kidnappers in *Four Days in September* (1997) by Bruno Barrato who are depicted by Henrique, the secret agent, as bunch of kids⁷⁵⁸ who do not represent any revolutionary ends. The representation of terrorists in *La Désintégration* and *Made in France* features them as children, immature and easily manipulated, which undermine the power and the legitimacy of their cause, excluded from the right to belong and identify with what they represent. This Maghrebi youth represent neither a legitimate outcry against social injustice, nor

⁷⁵⁷Martin Elaine, op. cit, p. 8.

⁷⁵⁸Elaine Martin, "Films about Terrorism, Cinema Studies and the Academy," in *Terror, theory and the Humanities*. eds. R. Di Leo et al. Downloads (Terror % 20 and %20 the Humanities. html

be rebels with with true cause. This how Mark Sedwick criticizes radicalization discourse after 9/11 attacks:

The concept of radicalization emphasizes the individual and, to some extent, the ideology and the group, and significantly deemphasizes the wider circumstances.... So long as the circumstances that produce Islmaist radicales declared grievances are not taken into account, it is inevitable that the Islamist radicals will often appears as “rebels without a cause.”⁷⁵⁹

2-(Mis)representation and Beyond: North African Migrant Cinema, Self-perception and Diasporic Identity

A-Migrant Transnational Cinema, Diasporic Consciousness and Self-Representation

As it has been discussed in the previous chapters, people’s identity was essentially determined by locality and sense of familiarity, which situate people, as Arjun Apparcurai, argues, in stable network of belonging defined by geographical boundaries and fised body of social and cultural norms. The production of local territory and people’s sense of immediate physical space is only made accessible by transparent structure of community values, whether they are sartorial, culinary or ritual. Appadurai states “the product of locality reliably local subjects as well as... reliably local neighbourhoods, within which such subjects can be recognized”⁷⁶⁰ inside a system of traditions, ceremonies and practices. In fact, the notion of locality, as geographical and symbolic phenomenon, underwent various intententional shifts because of the changing global contexts as meaning become subject to deterritorialization and transnationalization processes in globalized flow of information, images and mobility of people. Stable form of identities and territories are no longer available in the present contexts of immigration and crossborder traffic, which produce mobile landscapes with negotiable, plural and hybrid connotations. Belonging and attachement to traditional loyalties is ascribed a new aspect of transnationality, which renders traditional spaces to a shared conjunction of meaning construction, involving complicated variables of physical, symbolic and virtual dimensions, what Ulf Hanners calls “Habitats of meaning”, which “are not just the places that we live in or travel

⁷⁵⁹Mark Sedwick cited in Arum Kundnani.

⁷⁶⁰Arjun Apadurai quoted in Daniela Berghahn, *Far-Flung Families in Films: the Diasporic Family in Contemporary European Cinema* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University press, 2013), p. 12.

to in physical sense but also the virtual spaces that we access through zapping television channels or browsing the internet.⁷⁶¹

This movement from intracultural level of negotiating identity to intercultural context, which suggests a state of liminality and rootlessness, does not go without problematization of the spatial and the cultural experience, generated forcefully by a growing sense of anxiety, loss, and uncertainty, which may reflect a questioning of displacement and alterity itself. In fact, Migration and mobility in the form of diaspora involves a process of alienation for those immigrants who belong to former colonies and experienced immigration for economic reasons, defining their identity in terms of the collective memory and the shared heritage they bring with them to host societies. This attachment to lost motherlands' shared memory does not only entail a subjective perception of mobility, but it traces immigrant's negotiation of encounters with a second part, the host society, which remains decisive player in determining the construction of difference in term of ethnicity, religion, gender and sexuality with powerful ideological context.⁷⁶² The perceived clashes with hegemonic European discourse, in the context of Maghrebi Muslim diaspora, is particularly driven by the visible irreconcilability of Muslim community values to the European model of identity as laic, liberal and modern. Female Muslim dress code (veil and headscarf), religious rituals and patriarchal traditions represent spectacular sings of conflict that enhances European greivances about Muslim female opression and individual liberties.

Although it have been an option for many groups like Palestinians, who have been forced to seek refuge in Jordan, Lebanon and elsewhere, and political violence or economic necessity for Africans, transnational mobility was encouraged by the flexibility of migration measures, which facilitated a selective flow of educated, skilled and professional people following the new climate of global intensification of connectivity, interactions between different people, expansion of international corporate and growth of new managerial politics.⁷⁶³ The new mobility patterns created by the globalization of capital, technology and information created opportunities for new diasporas like Chinese and North Africans, which contribute more importantly to the advantage of diaspora as a seed against intensible particularism.⁷⁶⁴

However, the progressive and the universal nature of transnational mobility resulted in renewed and complex forms of conflicts rooted in the omnipresent cultural and religious conventions of "localism". In his book, *Global Diaspora: an Introduction*, Robin Cohen states:

⁷⁶¹Ibid., p. 132.

⁷⁶²Iain Chambers cited in Daniella Berghahn. p. 225.

⁷⁶³Robin Cohen, *Global Diaporas: an Introduction* (New York: Roueledge, 2006), p. 141.

⁷⁶⁴Ibid., p. 144.

There is, however, a much more visible counter – tendency to cosmopolitanism, namely nationalism, racism, sexism and other forms of social exclusion, all of which seem to be on the increase, despite globalization. To simplify a more complicated picture, let us call this a narrowing tendency to ‘localism’.⁷⁶⁵

Conflicts stem not solely from adherence to local values and cultural affiliation, but also from power relations produced by relativity of integration, which turns diasporic communities to fragmented constituency based on class divisions and socioeconomic incongruity as unskilled working class experience the negative aspect of global competitiveness in the form of unemployment and inaccessibility to privileges enjoyed by the highly qualified and skilled immigrants bringing potential for failure of solidarity and identification among diaspora community⁷⁶⁶.

Attachment to community values and collective system of identification constitutes an important quality of transnational migrants complicates the notion of boundaries, the foreign and the native, tradition and modernity, "us" and "them", as it is coercively shaped by shifting politics of encounters that transcend the desire of continuity and loyalty to the premigration sense of the self. Conceptualization of diasporic identities positively render encounter spaces positive contact zones and disjunctive "ethnoscapes" where identities can dissolve conflictual conditions and emphasizes the fluid, complex and hybrid aspects of becoming and being. It is not only defined by:

The old, the imperializing, the homogenizing, form of ‘ethnicity’. (...) The diaspora experience or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by conception of ‘identity’ which lives with and through, not despite, difference, by hybridity. Diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves a new, through transformation and difference.⁷⁶⁷

Stuart Hall foregrounds not only the hybrid notion of identity and diaspora, but also an explicit reference to the original definition of diaspora concept as political conditions ethnic and religious groups like the Jews, the Palestinians the Armenians and the Africans, who historically and widely dispersed to many destinations as direct consequences of slavery, occupation, ethnic and religious cleansing and regional conflict in Soviet Union, The Gulf region and Africa. The original use of diaspora is associated with the religious history of Jewish persecution and dispersal and brought to the front by the Greek translation of the bible, which, later embodied all sort of images about Jews scattering like “wandering Jew” and “victim diaspora” with reference

⁷⁶⁵Robin Cohen, op. cit, p. 147.

⁷⁶⁶Ibid.,p. 148.

⁷⁶⁷Stuart Hall, op. cit, p. 244.

to the curse that condemned them because of their participation in the murder of Jesus Christ⁷⁶⁸ as well as other contemporary religious groups, who experience exile and persecution. In the seventies and the sixties the classical connotation of diaspora was associated with the dispersion of Africans, Americans and Irish. In the eighties, diaspora has been redefined to designate racial minorities 'immigrants' 'political refugees' 'expels'. From the 1990s onwards, the term has become synonymous with people or groups who live outside national boundaries.⁷⁶⁹

Theoretically, Safran associates the term with condition of expatriation, where immigrants or their ancestors were subject to exile and displacement from their homeland to other locations, retaining a feeling of uncertainty and rootlessness.⁷⁷⁰ This conditions force expatriates to develop strong feeling of their lost homeland with collective imaginary that celebrate its historical achievement and ritual practices in mythical and idealized manner. Besides keeping the dream of return and solidarity with co-ethnics in other places, the group equally develops a conflictual attitude toward host societies, which is seen from incompatible measures. What is given precedence in both Safran and Cohen's analyses is strong attachment to the past by sustaining and strengthening diaspora consciousness, which relies on the group loyalty to the transmission of cultural knowledge and religious heritage and, thereby, breeding a sense of cultural and historical distinctiveness.⁷⁷¹

In addition, Cohen goes further to give variety of diaspora typologies like labour, victim, colonial... However, Diaspora is a flexible and complex concept as it has been theoretically adopted by a great number of scholars from different perspectives that put it in state of complicated spatial, cultural, religious and colonial condition/ causation. Cohen points out to the condition which implants diasporic consciousness among members of religious or ethnic groups. While economic migrants are seen within context of voluntary departure, other conditions like exclusion and discrimination may be enabling environments that lead to the intensification of sense of exile and discontent, which is not the case of deterritorialized diaspora of the , Caribbean, whose displacement remains open to other possibilities.⁷⁷²

More particularly, the question of identity as polemical and controversial concept takes a significant importance in diaspora because of the multi-faceted interpretation that calls upon other associative patterns like hybridity, displacement and mobility. The problematization of identity, in terms of identity crisis, as it has been discussed in previous chapters, emanates substantially

⁷⁶⁸Roben Cohen, op. cit, pp. 24-25.

⁷⁶⁹Ibid., p. 9.

⁷⁷⁰William Safran cited in Cohen. op. cit, p.16.

⁷⁷¹R. Cohen, op. cit, p. 17.

⁷⁷²James Clifford, "Diaspora," *Anthropology*, 9:3 (1994), p. 314.

from shifting tendencies of transformatinality and global influences which brought communities, a challenge to fixed localism and cultural stability. The growing transformation introduced by the globalization of cultures, services and human mobility has changed the traditional notion of identity as safe, coherent and homogenous. Stuart Hall's notion of 'becoming', as quoted before, encompasses a liminal position of identity as reflecting a national collective of unquestionable self as well as the transformatory vision of culture and history that submit to an unfinished negotiation of meaning with a pace of disclosure and deferral. Diasporic identity keeps people entrenched in Dialectic of "here" and "there" as both imaginative and physical space, generating a navigation between territoriality and virtuality, and producing them as agents of third position, an inbetweeness that connotes multi-layered patterns of ambivalent belonging, spirituality, nostalgia and confinement.

The new space of diaspora keeps redefining their identity as they are caught up with ambivalent experience of reconstructing rootedness and rootlessness, where they have to reconcile national narrative (of nation state) and myth of collective "imagined community" to politics of identification with transnational borders, which maintain alternative cultural forms that reach outside the community consciousness of the nation state. This does not mean that diaspora discourses articulates anti-nationalist feeling or separatist stance, but a form of resistance or struggle to achieve distinctiveness in "historical contexts of displacement",⁷⁷³ which may turn to a kind of antagonism in a climate of discrimination and exclusion:

Whatever their ideologies of purity, diasporic cultural forms can never in practice, be exclusively nationalist. They are deployed in traditional networks built from multiple attachemements...Diaspora discourse articulates to contrast what Gilroy describes as alternate public spheres (1987), forms of community consciousness and solidarity that maintain identifications outside the national time / space in order to live inside, with difference.⁷⁷⁴

These "forms of community consciousness and solidarity" among diaporic population point to dominant components of conceptualization about immigration and transnationl mobility, which is diaspora consciousness. Diaspora consciousness embodies expatriates and emigrants experience of reconstructing locality and identity, invoking both difference and sameness, which extends the notion of belonging to controversial and vague conntations. It conveys a strong sense of ambivalent construction of difference by trencending the status of ethnic group to a state of being with mental physical duality between the here and the there. Diasporic populations

⁷⁷³Ibid., p. 307-308.

⁷⁷⁴Ibid., p. 307-308.

develop awareness of entangled and intricate positions of eschatological desire for connecting with homelands and historical roots that make them outside the temporal/ spatial circuit of host countries.⁷⁷⁵

By demonstrating a strong sense of difference in questioning old forms of identifications and developing an inclusive mental attachment to other co-ethnic, who share historical and cultural condition, diaspora consciousness represents an amalgamation of symbolic and physical specialities, routes and roots, memory and discontinuity with the past, which may produce contradiction, refusal or negation of diaspora itself.⁷⁷⁶

Immigrant sensibility within context of diaspora is seen from constant emotional continuum of alienation and entrapment as result of dispersal from homelands and because of traumatic experiences of cultural shock, which is fortified by potential failure to fit in the new environment. The imaginary connection with homelands as it is constructed with a sense of utopia, as Safran argues, complicates not only diasporic perception of themselves as they become stuck in conflictual search for identity, but also leads nostalgia and incessant desire for return.⁷⁷⁷

Diasporic communities are always in perpetual conflict of maintaining cultural distinctiveness by resisting complete incorporation of dominant discourses as they keep in touch with distant origins. Attachment to historical and spatial grand / supranarratives (as the case of Islam and Pilgrimage for diasporic North African communities) and identifications with other members of diaspora strengthens diasporic consciousness politics of dual connotations that confusingly involve both concretization of longing to economic and social solidarity with home population and translation of feeling of alienation, in host countries into consolidation of cosmopolitan group identity. The nuanced formation of Diaspora consciousness, as James Clifford proposes, is the product of both positive and negative articulation. Positively, diaspora consciousness feeds on an identificatory attitude toward shared historical achievement and cultural celebration of cultural legacy of homelands and national glory with significant emotional involvement, which inspires them to participate in the concrete development of 'homes'.⁷⁷⁸ Economic exclusion and discrimination discourses, on the other hand, are constitutively supportive environment for the formation of diasporic consciousness. Nationalist European discourse and anti-immigrant feelings increase diasporic solidarity, transnational coalition and

⁷⁷⁵Ibid., p. 311

⁷⁷⁶Ibid., p. 308.

⁷⁷⁷Safran cited in Cohen, op. cit, p. 4.

⁷⁷⁸James Clifford, p. cit, p. 312.

mental attachment to homlands to temper the forces of racialized discourse.⁷⁷⁹ Cohen shares, with Clifford, The same enabling environment for the rise of diasporic consciousness by emphasizing the unfortunate confrontation aspects that drive the majority to be mobilized, persuaded and perceived, not as immigrant, nor as social movement, as transnational community. In a critique of Martin, Cohen says:

This diaporas need (a) an opportunity structures like enhanced means of communication and permissive political and legal environment ; mobilizing practices like neighbourhood associations, demonstrations and fund-raising events and (b) frames that allude to ideas like ‘roots’ and ‘home’ and the importance of memory in history ... (c) significant levels of social exclusion in the destination societies.⁷⁸⁰

In addition to sharing historical heritage, diasporic communities develop a collective adherence to global religious proclivity towards survival of faith practices and rituals, maintaining contact with the epicentre of their faith in form of pilgrimage to the Wailing Wall of Jerusalem for the Jews, the Gangs for the Hindus and Mekka/ Kaaba for Muslim immigrants.⁷⁸¹ This religious mobility in the context of diaspora is interpreted with concerns about favorable environments for the growth of extremist interpretation of religion, particularly of Muslims who are under an unprecetended culpability since the fall of Berlin wall and the rise of civilization clash theories and Francis Faucoyama’s prophecies about a possible threat of Muslim immigrants to Europe , “European Muslims represent a threat to the west because Europe multiculturalism failed to truly integrate them. This failure is itself a contribution to the growth of terrorism”.⁷⁸²

The distinctive experience of North Africans in Europe, particularly in France, in the context of long history of identity – related confrontation and subordinate status of Maghrebi immigrants in the socioeconomic institution of the metropole consolidates a strong sense of solidarity and unity among its members, which stems not only from this common history (colonization/ resistance) and geographical sharedness, but also from spiritual ties represented by Islam. Moreover, the negative influence of islamophobia in Europe puts Muslim communities face to face with hostile reactions and anti-immigrant discourse based on both symbolic networks of stereotypes, racial prejudices and satirical (mis)representation of Islam in the media, and physical populist xenophobic violence which remarkably targeted Arabs and Muslims. Equally, Muslims are frequently victims of radical right politics and anti-integration discourses

⁷⁷⁹Ibid., p. 313.

⁷⁸⁰Cohen, op. cit, pp. 13-61.

⁷⁸¹Ibid., p. 151-152.

⁷⁸²Francis Foukoyama, “Identity and Migration,” *prospect*. Feb. 25, 2007, p. 16.

that not only reject their ubiquity in Europe, but prejudicially because of the incompatibility of Muslim culture to Europe liberal values and disintegrability of Muslim immigrant due to the different aspects of Islamic religious practices like polygamy, circumcision and, particularly, the headscarf of Muslim woman (burqa and Burqini). These different cultural rituals of Muslims in Europe are taken advantage of by right wing politicians to rise fear of Europe and its national identity being invaded by dangerous barbarians. Jean Marie Le Pan says that European identity "represents the unified destiny, purpose, history, culture and race. It must be protected against the invaders and outsiders who threaten our national identity and family ties, and who constitute a real danger to European civilization because of their barbarian attack".⁷⁸³

With the shadows of terrorist attacks in Europe and the prevailing discourse of Islamophobia, North African diaspora becomes associated with religious visibility and threat to the laicite of French Republican principles, which, also, rises the threat of Islamization of liberal and secular French society reflected in the recurrent banning of hijab in public sphere (1993, 2003, 2006, 2015) and successive waves of demonstrations/ protests by immigrants, students and women veiled and unveiled. The wearing of the veil and burqa is not only seen as threat to the neutrality of public space, but also as signs of oppression and subordination of Muslim female by muscultanist and patriarchal discourses. This increasing tensions of cultural conflicts can be interpreted in wider political and social climate that frame immigrant with growing restrictive migration policies, assimilation – oriented models and excersive incompatibility between Islamic and European values. Challenging the integrity of public space and the homogeneous environment, headscarf represents a certain interpretaion of Islam, which is explained as rejection of integration of assimilation, but as symbol of resistance, identity affirmation and religious freedom.⁷⁸⁴ This is why it should be fought and expelled as an intensive cultural model. Gabriel Murranci talks about a schizophrenic Islamophobic European discourse about the headscarf and Muslim minority:

Muslim immigrants have to deal with schizophrenic language and political behavior on the one hand, Europe asks them to become part of it, in other words to become, if not "fully" Europeans, at least Muslims of Europe ; in other words, Muslims that rel-elaborate their cultural and religious identity to become citizens of a new Europe, which also include Islam. But, at the same time, Europe acts in a way that Muslims only

⁷⁸³Douriya Shafik Bassyouni, "France and Party system in 50 Years: Analytical Comparative Study to the Electoral Process", Cairo: Center of Reasearch and Political Studies, 1995, p. 37 pdf.

⁷⁸⁴Gabriele Narranci (2007), "Multiculturalism, Islam and the Clash of Civilization Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia," retrieved on 5 June 2018 from [marranci_culture_and_religion_multiculturalism.pdf](#)

remains, Muslims in Europe; in other words, aliens in christocentric European environment to whom tolerance might be only granted in case of!!.. It is islamophobia and, in particular, what could be called institutional islamophobia that prevents Muslims to become of Europe.⁷⁸⁵

In context of global mobility and cosmopolitan citizenship, Beur Diaspora develop resistance against inequalities of social institution and injustices of economic system, in a form of frequent and recurrent protests against racial discrimination and biased implementation of law that control the visibility of Muslim diaspora.

The *Marche des Beurs* in 1993⁷⁸⁶ in Paris and Lyon against institutional violence and economic segregation marked significant signs of rising consciousness among second and third generation Maghrebi. The suburb protest of 2005, known as ‘the festival of vehicules brulee’, is another outcome of belief in Maghrebi migrant fight against economic and cultural rejection.

Different aspect of North African diaspora is marked by transition from economic minority to transnational cultural group connected with other Muslims in all parts of the world. This can be exemplified by the massive protest across Europe and the world against the satirical images of the prophet in the Dannish cartoons in 2006, which is an other signs of how North Africans come to sustain and reconfigure their identities with assertive and somewhat defensive ways despite the hostile economic and cultural environment.

However, the reconstruction of North African diaspora and the struggle to carve out a collective identity from cultural or religious perspective in an in hospitable environment is impliatly challenged by multiplicity of channels that control both the visibility and accessibility of its members to equal treatment in educational system, which doesnot only obliterate French clonial past, as shared feature of North African diaspora, but deliberately does not take into account religious distinctiveness and cultural particularities of Maghrebi immigrants,⁷⁸⁷ affecting the performance and integration of their children. Maintaining a collective and homogeneous identity is a difficult task. Internal division and heterogeneous nature of Maghrebi diaspora play a part in the weakening of collectivity of the group because Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians differs because of the economic and the political relationship between their goverments in North Africa and because of interagroup stereotypes which influence their solidarities.

⁷⁸⁵Ibid., p. 112.

⁷⁸⁶Cadet Andrea Walton, (2007) “Migration sans Assimilation: Muslim Immigration in France,” in *New Horizons Online*. April 2007, retrieved on February 13 2014, from <http://www.uni.edu/workArea/Download/Asset.aspx?4294971371>

⁷⁸⁷Elaiza Vladescu, (2006) “the Assimilation of Immigrant Groups in France: Myth of Reality?” Jean Mannet/ Robert Showman Paper Series, 5: 39. 2006, retrieved on March 4. 2015 from <http://www.miami.edu/eucenter/vladesc4wp%20french%immigration.pdf>

Although being united by the same colonial history and the sting of marginalization, Franco-Maghrebi Diaspora displays a typical form of diaspora because of variety of avenues of identification (religious, cultural, historical, political, geographical) and different interpretation of Islam as shared belief, which does not make the same appeal for all generations, social classes and original nationalities⁷⁸⁸. Hybridity of North Africans, which captures an ambivalent reference (European –French –Muslim – Franco – Maghrebi –Arab) and conflicts related to the intergration of its population, who belong to different enthnice backgrounds (berber) ; fact that, complicate the sufficiency of Islam and tradition as the only source of identification. That is to say, ambiguity of diasporic identity of North Africans springs from divergences of belonging as it is made of community within community, advocates of assimilation and defenders of retention to tradition, hyper-conformists and frenzy extremist (terrorism), multi-culturalists and mono-culturalist, which operates outside the framework of singular image or pure position.

The tendency among Maghrebi immigrants to establish a middle bridge between home and host society, neither favoring absolute continuity with home, nor assuming discontinuity with all aspects of life abroad, just seek to preserve that relative negotiated sense of difference and belonging:

Although all have felt the sting of exclusion and racism, Franco-Maghrebis have no thought of leaving, but instead are trying to create a space for themselves with French society, but not through total assimilation and the total abandonement of their Arab identities. They seek to negotiate integration on their own terms while maintaining their right to be different.⁷⁸⁹

Discussion of North African Diaspora neccessites analysis of Maghrebi artists and filmmakers, who contribute substantially to the translation of diasporic identity and representation of diasporic discourses and voices, Maghrebi expatriate writers and flimakers tend to reflect conditions displacement, trauma and exile; and recontruct state of ambivalence and alienation that entrap the life immigrant who have to reconcile a conflictual politics of identity torn between multiple forms of identifications.

Transnational conception of culture and identity led to the rise of diasporic cinema with a growing body of international film festivals and co-production corporations, which open new channels for transnational and intercultural representation of diasporic identity from perspective different from dominant Eurocentric views. The increasing growth of transnational cinema is

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁹ Joan Gross et al.,(1994), “Arab Noise and Ramadan Nights ; Rai, Rap, and Franco-Maghrebi Identity” retrieved on 06/09/2016, from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236716277>

related to a turn that proposes an emphasis on transculturality and alternative discourse that relatively breaks with old traditions of mainstream European and migrant cinema.

In an accented cinema, Hamid Naficy argues that exilic, diasporic and ethnicity filmmakers tend to define their displacement, voluntary or involuntary, in both hybridization and ambiguity forms, which take into account connection with homelands and dependency on maintaining complex relationship with host countries. In “*interstitial spaces*”, exilic filmmakers and migrant subjects come to terms with negotiating pattern of identity performance that demand continuity of belonging to both new and old worlds despite the imperfection and anxiety that define the displaced experience of liminality.⁷⁹⁰ As fragmented and multiple subjects, Naficy argues, those filmmakers can be capable of producing ambiguity and doubts about the taken-for-granted value of the home and host societies. They can also transcend and transform themselves to produce hybridized, syncretic, performed or virtual identities.⁷⁹¹ However, diasporic filmmakers are defined by horizontal and multi-spatial diaspora consciousness, which involve both home and other territories where co-ethnics and compatriots reside, unlike exilic filmmakers who emphasize vertical representation of homelands. While exilic accented character springs from particular binarism and a sense of retrospection, diasporic filmmakers’ accent is defined by multiplicity and hybridity.⁷⁹²

Moreover, postcolonial ethnic and identity filmmakers are different from the former by contestatory politics and take the accent or the hyphen as a marker of resistance to the dominant form of identity, which entails a sense of becoming as result of looking at identity from the ‘exigencies’ of “here and now”⁷⁹³ of the country where the filmmaker resides.

Naficy proposes that third world and postcolonial displaced filmmakers turn the experience of exile, diaspora and immigration to an “accented mode” of production, using “accented style” of filmmaking. He relates the historicity with authorship of “deterritorialized people”, which is determined either by bounds to the host country, ethnic community or the homeland. Naficy associates accented cinema with a variety of stylistic features, a kind of old school of formalist techniques, ranges from collective mode of production, epistolary narrative, chronotypes of homeland and liminal position.⁷⁹⁴ While he stresses the volatile venues of accented cinema as response to the displaced conditions of its people, Naficy associates

⁷⁹⁰Hamid Naficy, op. cit, p. 12.

⁷⁹¹Ibid., p. 13.

⁷⁹²Ibid., p. 14.

⁷⁹³Ibid., p. 15.

⁷⁹⁴Ibid., p. 12-13.

accented mode of production with “double consciousness”⁷⁹⁵ which signifies not only traditions of continuity, but also a disruptive mode that undermines dominant articulation of temporal and spatial realistic tradition. As result, the creation of accented films with this sort of awareness inscribes an implicit criticism to mainstream cinema. Accented films:

Are created with an awareness of the vast histories of the prevailing cinematic modes. They are also created in a new mode that is constituted both by the structures of filmmakers’ feelings themselves as displaced subjects and the traditions of exilic and diasporic cultural productions that preceded them... This double consciousness constitutes the accented style that... signifies upon cinematic traditions by its artisanal and collective modes of production, which undermines the dominant production mode, and by narrative strategies, which subvert that’s mode realistic treatment of time, space and causality.⁷⁹⁶

Or in Khatibi’s “double criticism” with deconstruction that necessitates (first)an autocriticism of diasporic knowledge by liberating it from dominant traditions of the centre ; and (second) decolonization of thought and dominant discourse of the mainstream European cinema from logocentrism and Eurocentrism by questioning its inherited assumptions⁷⁹⁷. By remarkably focusing on European diasporic communities, Naficy displays similarities among German – Turkish, Franco-Maghrebi and Asian British accented filmmakers, invoking hybrid and transnational tendencies of this emergent cinemas, which started to gain space among mainstream and national cinemas since the 1990s with feature movies that transpose the personal experience of exile, alienation and exclusion. With the rise of second generation Maghrebi filmmakers as new diaspora subjects, the situation of exile and emigration witnesses a transition from temporary immigration to diasporic settler communities and transformation from dominated and silent subcategory to postcolonial subjects that have access to symbolic and intellectual means to change the overgeneralized status about and carve out a politics of identification that subvert negative, cliched and totalizing approach to immigrant issues on the whole.⁷⁹⁸ The successive waves with transnational and international mode of production and distribution, diasporic North African cinema in Europe doesnot only fortify the visibility of Muslim immigrants, but aesthetically and thematically reconfigured the aesthetics of European cinema, which become plural site of multicultural discourse and postcolonial encounters with

⁷⁹⁵Ibid., p. 22.

⁷⁹⁶Ibid., p. 22.

⁷⁹⁷Abdelkebir Khatibi, “Double Criticism: the Decolonization of Arab Sociology,” in *Contemporary North Africa*, ed. Halim Barakat (Washington: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1985), pp.9-10.

⁷⁹⁸Daniela Berghman, *Far-Flung Families in Film: the Diasporic Family in Contemporary European Cinema* (Edinburgh: Edubburgh University press, 2013), p. 6.

decomposed texture of linguistic, geographical, and political features. With self-conscious treatment of identity and engagement with diasporic politics:

... Ethnic otherness has become part a booming "alterity industry", making marginality (...) a valuable intellectual commodity (...) diasporic filmmakers such as Mira Nair, Gurinder Chadh, Fatih Akin, Yamina Benguigui or Abdellatif Kechiche play an important role as brokers of cultural difference, trading the minoritarian experience as a praised commodity. On the international festival circuit, these transnational auteurs are now vying with their established European counter-parts for attention and awards. Their 'double occupancy' as hyphenated identity subjects (El Saesser, 2005), their 'double consciousness' (Gilroy 1993 a) and 'diasporic optic' (Morti, 2003) can even give them a competitive advantage because they invigorate and renew the traditions of European cinema by drawing on multi-sited impulses and inspirations.⁷⁹⁹

With technological revolution and transnationalization of culture industry, accented and interstitial mode of production have an influential effect on emigré and diasporic filmmakers by widening funding chances beyond national states through various channels like coproduction, foundation support, broadcasting channels⁸⁰⁰. Beside the supportive environment of world cinema industry, diasporic filmmakers benefit from varied sources of fund raising from two or three coproducers in Europe and the country of origin as well substantial aid comes from international and national festivals and its sponsoring agencies like Berlin (the Berlin coproduction market) Toronto (Planet Africa) Dubai (Doha film institute) as well as other production modes, which give assistance to start film project (script writing) like Vision Sud East in Switzerland, Hubert Bals in the Netherlands and Fond Image Afrique.⁸⁰¹ With collective pattern, other non-profit modes of production participate in raising funds, promoting and facilitating distribution market for films like the Mohamed Collective in France. Bouchareb's *Days of Glory* profits from Moroccan, Algerian and French funding. Nouri Bouzeid's *Making of* has also benefited from the sponsoring of the Tunisian, Algerian and Moroccan cinematographic centres, while *Devines*, a film by Houda Benyamina won the coproduction of French broadcasting network and the Doha film institute and distribution by the international company Netflix.

The emergence of second and third generation filmmakers established recognition in context of politically engaged and inclusive cultural vision, which offer new space for alternative

⁷⁹⁹Ibid., p. 7.

⁸⁰⁰Mariagiulia Grassilli, op.cit, 1243.

⁸⁰¹Mariagiulia Grassilli, "Migrant cinema: Transnational and Guerrilla practices of Film Production and Representation," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration studies*, 34: 8 (2008), p. 1244.

and independent made of filmmaking by facilitating entry to varied structures of funding and broadcasting. Maghrebi filmmakers born or with French citizenship receive assistance not only from home's public cinematic institutions and national broadcasters, but from broadcast and cable television industry like ZDF in Germany, Canal Plus in France, and ARTE channels network in Europe which has become the voice so many independent African, Asian and Maghrebi filmmakers,⁸⁰² who established favourable reputation among both European and minority audiences due to the participatory attitude of this post-colonial means of communication. Postcolonial and displaced filmmaking is also partially reinforced by the advent of digital Camera, High definition (HD) technology and internet related accessibilities which both enable filmmakers to overcome financial constraint in term of photography and editing ; and provides postproduction and distribution with global reach.⁸⁰³

The experience of expatriation and displacement among diasporic filmmakers is conditionally united by thematic and stylistic similarities, which emphasizes not only stories of alienation and exclusion, but also narratives of homecoming, nostalgia and identity problematization with development of Multilingual and plural means of articulation and self-representation that stress the authorship and the auto-biographical agency against the postmodern seed (death of author), "by putting the author back into authorship, I counter a prevailing postmodernist tendency, which either celebrate the death of the author or multiplies the authoring effect to the point of de-authoring the text".⁸⁰⁴ In the following extract Naficy comments on the stylistic and the thematic aesthetic as well as the production mode of accented filmmaking:

An other aspect of the accent is the style characterizing these films, whose ... are open form and closed form styles, fragmented, multilingual, epistolary, self-reflexive... amphibolic, doubled, crossed, and lost characters ; subject matter and themes that involve journeying, historicity, identity, and displacement ; dysphoric, euphoric, nostalgic synesthetic, liminal and politicized structures of feeling ; interestial and collective mode of production.... Consequently, they are simultaneously local and global, and they resonate against the prevailing cinematic production at the same time they benefit from them.⁸⁰⁵

Consequently, diasporic cinema and émigre filmmaking challenge old conventions and trespass boundaries of national states and identities by typically heterogenizing sources of

⁸⁰²Ibid., p. 44.

⁸⁰³Mariagiulia Grassilli, op. cit, p. 1245.

⁸⁰⁴Naficy, op. cit, p. 4.

⁸⁰⁵Ibid, p. 4.

identification and adopting a language along lines of multiple negotiated convergences of space, nationality, gender, class and ethnicity.⁸⁰⁶ For Naficy, North African diasporic filmmaking has contributed significantly to the dissolution of traditional boundaries of identity by, benefiting, first, from the mode of generic and narrative European cinema, and, second, by focusing stylistic conventions of world cinema to come out with a fluid, hybrid and innovative texture of cinematic consciousness. This is not about the emergence of new minoritarian cinema of filmmakers with migration background, rather, it moves conventional Beur and German-Turkish cinema from the margin to the centre by adopting “multiplex accent” or “multiplex cinema” with a variety of multi-lingual texts, multi-diegetic voice and multicultural protagonists,⁸⁰⁷ who embody diasporic consciousness or experience which valorizes hybrid identities and negate the constraints of dominant homogeneous narratives. However, the foundation of diasporic emigre cinema as strong voice for North African minority wouldn’t have been achieved without the globalization of intercultural encounters and impact of immigration generations, which resulted in the arrival of second-generation immigrant filmmakers, who gradually complicated cultural representation and switched the degree of visibility of North Africans in post colonial Europe.

In addition to the axis of Turkish German cinema, Franco-Maghrebi cinema represents a dominant minority filmmaking, which mainly springs from the fact that significant number of North African immigrants, who originate from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and constitute a majority of non-European population in Europe. These Turkish and Maghrebi filmmakers have not only capture the transformation of postwar immigrant/ questworker communities into permanent diasporic ones, but challenges the homogenizing cultural reproduction of North Africans by modifying (correcting) the long traditions of prejudicial practices and by reappropriating cinematic representation of diasporic experiences from the perspective of the immigrant him/ herself. North African emigré and contemporary diasporic filmmakers in Europe have gained access to the negotiation of diasporic experience and relative control of production, particularly with the recent scholarly attention⁸⁰⁸ and volatile space generated by cultural and postcolonial studies which reconfigured old traditions of scholarship and research, enabling Turkish and North African cinemas in Europe to conjure up positive stories of migrant and reach out beyond ethnic identity by giving universal appeal to their cinematic sensibilities.

North African diasporic languages are carving out new spaces of cultural identities by actively engaging in perpetual modification and negotiation of meanings and by transcending the fixed and restrictive borders of nation, ethnicity and culture. Their partial break with traditional

⁸⁰⁶Daniella Berghahn, op. cit, p. 8.

⁸⁰⁷Hamid Naficy, Cited in Daniella Berghahn, op. cit, p. 6.

⁸⁰⁸Daniella Berghahn. op. cit, p. 7.

Maghrebi Beur filmmaking, which identity cultural encounters from the sense of preserving religious and cultural heritage by attachment to national cultures and depiction of émigré protagonists from two major approaches, some films generate a cinematic iconography that portray immigrant protagonist as victim of claustrophobic alienation of oppressive dominant culture, that silences and marginalizes foreignness for difference. The second discourse, which dominates early migrant self-representation, is the submissive female protagonist, who is the victim of both patriarchal male traditions and restrictive religious discourse with references to protagonist's disidentification with host countries' liberal values as a cause of disintegration. Moreover, 'cinema of duty' is always preoccupied by contrasting immigrant cultures with host community systems by emphasizing differences rather than similarities despite the fact that several movies end with the rescue of the oppressed female by her western lover. "Cinema of duty" was formulated by the Turkish film critic Deniz Gokturk as distinctive feature of first generation Turkish migrant in Germany and Great Britain with referential set of duties.⁸⁰⁹ For filmmakers to transpose to the migratory experience to host society, expected to make movies showing the negative aspect of immigrants or about the problems of their people to receive funding. "Cinema of duty" was applied to movies of first generation filmmaker Tevik Baser, who made three films in West Germany: *Farwell to False Paradise* (1989), *Good bye Strange Land* (1991) and *40² Germany* (1986), but the latter was the most circulated film in West Germany, projecting archetypal image of Turkish woman who is victimized by Patriarchy and traditions.⁸¹⁰ However, the cinematic landscape of self-representation changes with the emergence of counter-discourse. A number of films directed and written by well-educated second and third generation immigrants, transgressing the victimization of first generation and claiming transnational and deterritorialized politics of encounter, which is interested in mobility and hybridity rather than entrapment and claustrophobia. This shift from entrapment narrative to transnationalized identities in migrant cinema in Europe, by associating identity with complex subjectivities and stressing the syncreticity and rhizomaticity of belonging theoretically reflect Deniz Gokturk "pleasures of hybridity",⁸¹¹ which traces parameters of the cosmopolitan space as it breaks down conventional geographies of confinements. Despite the exclusionary politics of Europe, accented and North African filmmakers have given a new quality to national identities. Hyphenated belonging has contributed to the diversification of European cultures which embrace global and heterogeneous tendencies. Yet, North African diasporic filmmakers felt they

⁸⁰⁹Barbara Mennel, "The Politics of Space in the Cinema of Migration," *Golf-Journal*, 3 (2010), p. 41.

⁸¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁸¹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 42-44.

are not fully accepted as European citizen. They are still subject to generalized and simplified (mis) representation, which they have to counter, or at least to resist, by using their empowered cinematic gaze and change by addressing critical hegemonic position with corrective self-representative approach. Many Maghrebi diaporic films in France, (like *le Thé au Harem d'Archimède* by Mehdi Charef and *Cheb* by Rachid Bouchareb) *Cheb* is not about exclusion it is about westernized Algerian return (reversed exile in Algeria), focuses on the migratory experience of migrants and the daily struggle against all forms of exclusion, alienation and discrimination. The filmmakers don't only translate the effects of fragmentation and displacement in their movies but they also make of their expatriatory discourse an experimentation of an auto-reflective tactic, reconstructing their stigmatized identities in more empowered and positive Rhetoric. *Inch'allah Dimanche* by Yamena Benguigui represents first generation classical cinema of North African émigré, which depicts the climate of family reunification postwar Algerian migration to France. The film articulates political and social critique of North African patriarchy and religious practices that restrict the freedom of female character, based on interpretation of culture and community values that contribute to the disintegration of migrants in hope for return. First generation immigrants are portrayed silent immigrants who completely identify with original homeland's cultures because they saw themselves as temporary settlers and they would return home one day, while second and third generation do not think of return or glorify homecoming because they never see or visit their parents' home. In Allal Bourqiba's novel *Ahwal a-Safsaf al-Bakki*, Amin, the protagonist experience negative uprootedness, feelings of hesitance and melancholic depression in diaspora (Belgium) because of loss and absence of definite home (non-belonging); a situation that leads him to exile-induced madness and even to amnesia⁸¹². This self perception of diaspora among North Africans was defined by a feeling of indifference,⁸¹³ which springs from a conviction that they come to France as guestworkers, they have come to work and return home despite mistreatment and injustices. *Inch'llah Dimanche* Focuses on Zwina's struggle against patriarchal domination and resistance to male imposed rules, which do not impede the film from referring to economic marginalization and unemployment among young Maghrebi Protagonists. After the "March for Equality and against Exclusion" in 1983, new waves of films called Beur cinema dominated migrant cinema production directed and written by second generation filmmaker who grew up in the banlieue / margins of Paris and Marseilles like Rachid Bouchareb (*Bâton Rouge*

⁸¹²Allal Bourqiba, "Ahwal a-Safsaf al-Bakki" in *Hadihi Laysat Haqiba: Surrod Arabiya tahta Samae Baljikia*, ed. Taha Adnan (Casablanca: Manshurat Multqa a-Torruq, 2016), pp. 40-44.

⁸¹³Azoz Begag, *Ethnicity and Equality: France in the Balance*, Trans. Allec G. Hargreaves (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2007), p. 39.

1985), Mehdi Charef (*Le Thé au Harem d'Archimède*, 1985), Abdelkarim Bahloul (*Le Thé à la Menthe* 1984) Merzak Alouache, 1986). This group of North African filmmakers represents the pioneers of Beur cinema and culture, which adopted questions of cultural identification and restore voice to French Maghrebi diaspora by establishing connection along ethnic lines that position North African in sort of empowered post colonial subjects in dominant cultural system⁸¹⁴. Carrie Tar proposes that the power of beur filmmaking stems “primarily from the shift it operates in the position of enunciation from the dominant majority is addressed, focussing on minority perspectives which bring with them the potential for new strategies of identification and cultural contestation”.⁸¹⁵

The diasporic consciousness and feeling of solidarity among second generation was filled by the growth of economic and social climate of immigrants who become identified with banlieues, poverty, unemployment and crime as result of the frequent economic crisis in the eighties and the nineties and identity becomes a source of discomfort because members of French born Maghrebi become torn between with dual identifications ; they are neither able to get full French citizenship, nor are they able to connect with the country because they don't speak its language, or they may never seen /visited it. *Le Thé au Harem d'Archimède* (1985) addresses the dilemma of young Beurs who are disaffected and dispaired at the political and economic system which doesn't recognize them as normal citizen like white French. The film depicts the life of beur Majid of An Algerian descent, who failed to get a Job because he does not get French citizenship. Although he was born in the suburb of Paris and never seen North Africa before, his mother insists on preserving his North African cultural identity by urging him not to be like French.

Majid represents a generation of immigrants that hopelessly failed to establish reconciliatory position between two conflictual identities. The film comments on the unevenness of citizenship where racialized North Africans may have access to nationality, but they can not enjoy the privileges and benefits of real citizenship because they are non-European nationals and children of immigrants.

This echoes what Rosenberg states: “Algerian Muslims endured the burdens of nationality without any of the benefits of citizenship, which remains virtually impossible for them

⁸¹⁴Arne Saeys, “Imag (in) ed Diversity: Migration in European Cinema,” in *beyond Tradition and McWorld Neoliberalism*, eds. Brian Michael et al (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), p. 36.

⁸¹⁵Carrie Tar, op. cit, p. 14.

for foreign nationals “.⁸¹⁶ If Beur filmmaking is some what associated with ‘cinema of duty’ and the ghettoization of youth Maghrebi in Parisian suburb, Banlieue cinema Universalizes diasporic experience and take it beyond Paris to other cities in France, where not only Maghrebi Muslims, but all other disadvantaged immigrants and ethnicities share marginalization and exclusion in the housing project. Abdelkarim Bahloul’s film *Un Vampire au Paradise*, which won the Grand prix of Paris film festival 1992, Portrays Paris as multiethnic space, where boundaries are constructed to separate les Francaise de souche (the Belfonds) in siezieme arrondissement from other non-European French in the cite. The film is about Nosfer Arbi, the North African vampire who has exaped psychotic hospital to attack Paris and terrorizes its people. Moreover, this misinformation of the mainstream media report associates him with a criminal misconduct as it announces he is running from police. The filmmaker refers to the wider context of French xenophobia and stereotypical discourse that is mistankingly associated with the majority of North African, who are deprived full access to citizenship, problematization of transpolitial space of identity, belonging and mobility.⁸¹⁷ In adressing the question of national identity and racism in France, the vampire of paradise parodizes the French version of nationality and deconstruct its dominant configuartion of post colonial citizenship, in comic way.

If Bahloul’s film is a critique of post colonial rejection of transnational identities, Smael Ferroukh’s *Le Grand voyage* is about diaporic homecoming and transnational mobility, where multiple borders, geographical and symbolic, are crossed with prevailing focus on generational, intracultural and cultural sensibilities of the protagonist. The film is the story of third generation Reda and his father, who drive him to Mekka to perform pilgrimage along 3000 miles journey from France through Italy, Slovenia, Croitia, Serbia, Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in his old blue car. Although travel and migration are sometimes associated with an escape from forces of misery and absurdity in road movies⁸¹⁸, the spiritual journey is not only about fullfiling the fifth pillar of Islam, Haj, but it is a journey of cultural encounters, generational negotiation and symbolic homecoming, where the physical travel takes a symbolic return to the spiritual and religious knowledge⁸¹⁹. As fully integrated third generation immigrant, Reda represents anti-thesis to his father, who is a devout Muslim and conservative person. As such, the journey is an

⁸¹⁶Resenberg Cited in Dale Hudson “Political Spaces in Transnational French cinema: Vampires and the Illusions of National Borders and Universal Citizenship,” *French cultural studies* 22: 2 (2011), p. 116.

⁸¹⁷Dale Hudson, op. cit, p. 121.

⁸¹⁸Hamid Thbato, *Huwiyyat as-Sinima al-Maghrebia* (Rabat: Manshurat Itihad Kutab al-Maghreb, 2014), p. 113.

⁸¹⁹Boushta Farqzayd, “Ramziyat al-Aawda fi Sinima al-Maghrebia,” *Majalat Afaq*, 85/86 (2014), p.105.

insighful trip to the tolerant, rich, and spiritual aspect of Islam which Reda ignores as he fully embraces the liberal values and the secular lifestyle of Europe. In contrast to conflicted generational conflict, the journey east is liberting for both the father and the son, who is introduced to different transnationalized and heterogeneous view of the world; and for the father because it disentrap him from the imposed exile he experiences in France as western country. Moreover, the film equally foregrounds diasporic consciousness and solidarity among Muslim fellow, who prepare for his arrival compassionately:

The arrival in Mekka marks the father's liberation and homecoming. Fellow hajjis have 'reserved' a space for his car. Welcome him with hand shake or embrace, and invite him and Reda to share a meal with them. At last, the father is amongst his kind-no longer part of a marginalized minority but part of the Global Ummah.⁸²⁰

Indigenes or Days of Glory (2006) by Rachid Bouchareb is one of the most successful masterpieces of North African diaspora and transnational filmmaking with multisourced mode of production (France, Morocco, Belgium and Algeria) which relatively changes cultural and cinematic climate associated with immigrants of Maghrebi descent. The film was not only nominated for Oscar and achieved universal vieurship estimated over 3 Millions,⁸²¹ but it also contributed significantly to reforming French legislation concerning the pensions of war veterans from North Africa. Bouchareb's *Days of Glory* is about a group of soldiers from ex-colonies who plays a part in the fight against Nazis in world war two in Europe. The participation of soldiers from North Africa in the liberation of Europe doesn't save them from indignified and indecent treatement from post colonial France as a victim of multiple faces of injustice.

Returning for Naficy, displaced filmmakers and deteritorialized immigrants living in the west shares, in addition to exile, a variety of common features like experience of claustrophobia, exile, collective modes of production, formalist techniques and mobility accross borders, which negatively constructs them as homeless subject of exile and the ultimate rootless figure for concretized forms of identity. Their accented form of being is determined by liminal and interstial experience of subjectivity, which a fragmented experience transposing exilic banishment which does not take into account the diasporic filmmakers routes stories.⁸²² Moreover, accented cinema and its hyphenated politics associates filmmakers with subordinate positions vis as vis dominant European and American cinema. Naficy still classifies postcolonial

⁸²⁰Daniella Berghahn. op. cit, p. 79.

⁸²¹Arne Saeys (2012), "European Cinema in Motion: Migrant and Diasporic Film in Contemporary Europe," the *Journal of Ethnic and Migraion Studies*, 38: 8 (July 2012) retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.64518>

⁸²²Ibid.

and diasporic filmmaking as sub-category of cinema, which is economically and aesthetically occupies the periphery of mainstream cinema, failing to abandon binary positions of the self and the other, dominant and marginal. Moreover, ‘I believe that labelling filmmakers as ‘accented’ reinforces the othering of immigrant filmmakers by film critics, academics and professionals. In fact, the ‘accented cinema’ puts the filmmakers into a new discursive ghetto’.⁸²³

Naficy’s conception of migrant cinema as a subcultural genre in comparison to mainstream cinema⁸²⁴ is underscored as by the success of Iranian exilic cinema, Turkish migrant cinema and Maghrebi filmmakers, which /who were critically acclaimed at regional and international film festivals and box offices, achieving access both to worldwide audience and distribution markets. Filmmakers like Merzak Alouache, Bouchareb, Fatih Akin, Leila Marrakeshi...become a part of mainstream corpus with the advantage of representing transnational mode of production and mobile/ hybrid version of identities that challenged Hamid Naficy’s assumption of accented cinema’s inability to become a dominant form of cinema in Europe.

B-Broken (im)Mobilities and Transgressive Identity Politics in *Devines* by Houda Benyamina: Multi-ethnic Solidarities and the Politics of Interrupted Hyper-Femininity

The empowerment of North African diasporic community came across a range of political events and access to the symbolic space of the image as an influential form of communication which offers means of cultural expression, becoming representative of a change in North African identity like Rai Music, Rap and Beur writing. With both challenging and reconciling views to the dominant perception of North Africans, and other minorities, as the new underclass or new Roma of Europe, second generation banlieue cinema aims exclusively to bring sharper shift in the constraints of oppressive dominant tradition that strips immigrant from a sense of North Africanity, historical consciousness and geographical particularity, significantly influencing the birth of social realist cinema with innovative engagement with multiplicity of urban disadvantaged and an appeal to international audience and markets. Departure from notion of identity and parochial perception of the self are perceived as essential precondition for embracing transnational solidarity and understanding of diaspority with pluralist and polyphonic inclusion of the self and the other, forcing divergent world views that go beyond monovocal interpretation of geographies, ethnicities and cultures.

⁸²³Ibid.

⁸²⁴Ibid.

Banlieue cinema starts thinking about a changing concept of identity by transcending the reductive notion of belonging as it depicts characters with transnational and hybrid sensibilities, cutting through the duty of representation as intra-cultural process of identification which significantly explores the negative construction of North African as atomized subject with inherent stereotypical value. This cinematic approach to second and third generation abyss in postcolonial Europe reaffirms the centrality of hegemonic cultural paradigms with its imperial and social systems in the marginalization and the positive codage of the migrant figure with complex inter-cultural visualization of diasporic identity and cause. Cinematic representation of identity, in away, challenges existing structures of perceiving difference and, ultimately, proposes a parity of respect and recognition among postcolonial subjects in Europe despite the fact that some filmic accented banlieue narratives still project the same claustrophobic, victimized and isolated protagonists of early French beur cinema. The possibility of moving from an ethnic based perception to the negotiation of connections drawn on convergent and fluid formations of belonging enable banlieue diasporic cinema to reconstruct socially marginalized subject types with focus on questioning not only social justice and economic inequality, but also the emergence of female characters, socially excluded and symptomatic of anti-subjectivity sharing with male characters the underprivilege of underclass (*Devines* by Houda Benyamina).

Partially, banlieue cinema came as kind of response to the frequent association of suburban France with images of immigrant criminality, unemployment and disorder, which become a source of cultural anxiety and threat to national identity in Europe. Immigrant cinematic representation contributes to the interrogation of dominant perception of banlieue youth and entrapment in spatial power relation which share the boundaries of belonging and fragmentary and divisionary politics of the centre and the periphery, where the latter has become a metaphor of stigmatization and objection from cultural viewpoints. The stigmatization of banlieues and suburbanization⁸²⁵ of minorities is not a new mapping and reconfiguring of cultural and social boundaries,⁸²⁶ but it is rooted in historical anxiety for French policy making and colonial mentality that keeps expulsing underclasses and minorities to the outskirts of culture and geography; a practice inherited from the nineteenth century Haussmanian mapping of the city geometry:

The conventional assumptions of the banlieue as stigmatized space can be traced back as far back as the nineteenth century, where, banlieues marked the peripheral space one league from the centre of the city and the term urban meant to be excluded from a group

⁸²⁵Amy Siciliana, “la Haine: Framing the ‘Urban Outcast’,” *International Journal for Critical Geographies*.ed. Jim Craine, 6: 2 (2007), p. 213.

⁸²⁶Balibar cited in Amy Siciliana, p. 213.

of by proclamation (viellard, Baron, 1996). The 19th century Hausmanian projects inaugurated under Napoleon III led to a massive dispersal of the urban poor, contributing to the formation of historic working class red belt bordering Paris by early the next century.

This excluding politics fuelled by feeling of insecurity and economic prosperity in post colonial era and the post economic crisis of 1974 continues to define migrants as French citizens and started thinking to overcome the stigmatization of banlieues by building banlieue 89 and Mitterand's socialist government with the aim of alleviating the economic crisis of 1993 and within the context of universal equality and citizenship of the French revolution⁸²⁷. However, the ambitious project of 89 banlieue and its fair cultural content was fragmented with the apparthied of French economic institution and systematic discrimination that turned the plan upside down with intensive unemployment rates and exclusion ratio among young Maghrebis, who become the source of discontent and fear for French white people. Even with the Marshallan plan of Jacques Chirac for integrating immigrants in the banlieue on national scale, the housing project becomes synonymous with social fracture⁸²⁸ and objected Maghrebi migrants who themselves become represented by second generation youth, who are seen as homogeneous social group with criminal profiling and referential background of riot and vandalism.

As Muslim migrant to Europe, young Maghrebi cultural otherness become an integral player in the construction of European identity, which was previously built not on subjective factors, but on objective adoption of social justice, human rights and democracy as salient principles of Europeaness. The supposed negative incorporation of European identity turned the question of immigration to security related phenomenon as young Muslims are perceived as threat and danger to the European secular and liberal citizenship; this danger does not spring from the migrant as citizen, but from his identity and culture as a Muslim.⁸²⁹ Failing to meet Europe's secular expectations, assimilating systems and institutionalizing processes, young generations adopt a hybridized and changing politics of identity and faith, even resistant to the patriarchal imported Islam of first generation and parents. Against the official institutionalization of Islam, young Maghrebis instrumentalize Muslim identity through individualization sources (like social media) which offer them more liberating, even secular, interpretation of religious identity.⁸³⁰ This is an association of North African youth with a threatening form of Islam as

⁸²⁷ Amy Siciliani, p. 216.

⁸²⁸ Ibid., p. 218.

⁸²⁹ Gabrielle Marranci, "the Clash of Civilizations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia". In *Culture and Religion*, 5:1 (2007), p. 114.

⁸³⁰ Alec Hargreaves, Migration, Race and Ethnicity cited in Ayhan Kaya, (2006) "The Beur Uprising: Poverty and Muslim Atheists in France," retrieved 16-07-2016 from <http://www.eurozine.com/the-beur-uprising/>

publically constructed discourse, which problematizes the authenticity of their integration. They are held responsible for disintegration and blamed for violent altercation with riot police in 1983, 1991, 2005. As result, the notorious banlieue in Paris, Marseille, Lyon are spatial references to all sort of social and cultural anxieties as the mainstream media symbolic categorizes:

The symbolic ghettoization of these neighbours particularly in regard to the younger generation has only grown stronger in both political discourse and the media. On regular basis, suburban youth are referred to as a threat: dangerous social class made up of people who do little but steal and engaged in all sorts of illegal activity. In the past five years, the teenagers of the suburbs have been portrayed as budding terrorist, as rapists (with the gang – rape controversies of the past ten years), and, after the debates over the headscarf, as their sisters’ oppressors.⁸³¹

Consequently, second and third generation Beurs were chosen between "assimilation or apartheid" become the previously hospitable French society manifest a changeable politics of encounter, blaming young Muslims for exclusion, inequalities and terrorism, calibrating different procedures across generations. For Taher Benjelloun, If the first generation Maghrebis were victimized, silenced and forced to hide their identity,⁸³² second generation do not accept to be treated the same way as their silent parents and react to exclusion and rejection by protest and resort to formation of new identities or “*fluid solidarities*”, as Mohamed Bameyeh calls it, based on cultural expression of ray, Rap and cinema.⁸³³ The notoriety of migrant cité in Europe patterned poor estate brands its popularity with socio-economic sense of difference which covers symptoms of profound cultural perception of an otherness that encodes the subjects of banlieue as disenfranchised category of ethnic / religious underclass with vulnerability or lure to fractured, misfitted and abnormal engagement with diaporic urban marginality. Banlieue migrant cinema was the protuct of such moment of fractured spatial existence and outcry against all forms of essentialism which are forcibly engendered by discernable power structures of dominant cultural discourses (ex, French beur cinema) and the hegemonic hierarchies of control that ascribe immigrant as neocolonized subjects in poscolonial politics and cultures. Yet Mohamed Bakrim distinguishes between èmigrè or immigration cinema (first generation) and beur cinema (second generation); the first one is kind of cinema of return where identity and culture are real and holistic and boundaries should be broken to regain origin and return and

⁸³¹Martin Walker, “Europe’s Mosque Hysteria,” in *Wilson quarterly*, 30: 2 (2006), p. 14.

⁸³²Taher Benjelloun, *French Hospitality*. Trans. Babara Bray. 2nd ed. (New York: Colombia up, 1997), p. 67.

⁸³³Mohamed Bamyeh, “Fluid solidarities: Affiliation beyond the Nation” in *Nationalism and Global Solidarities*, eds. James Goodman et al (London: Routeledge, 2007), 155-167. p.156.

where the immigrant “est un autre venu d’ailleurs” like in *les Ambassadeurs*(1975) by Naceur Ktari⁸³⁴ or the struggle of immigrants under the pressures of everyday life in France as in *Mektoub*(1970) by Ali Ghalem, *les Uns, les Autres* Belgium(1972) by Mohamed ben Salah and *Ali in Wonderland*(1979) by Rachedi⁸³⁵. However, beur cinema “est etre d’ici”, with non-nostalgic, syncretic⁸³⁶ and hybrid tone and more attached to the “here and not there”. This cinema is best exemplified by Karim Dridi’s *Bye Bye*, Abdelkarim Bahloul’s *Mint Tea*, Merzak Allouache’s *Salut Cousin* and Rachid Bouchareb’s *Cheb*, where Maghrebi protagonists express compassion and significance to their neighbourhoods in diaspora and experience exile when forced to return home in North Africa. Whereas other films like *Traversée* by Mohamed Ben Mahmoud is in between because exile is both virtual/psychological and geographical and drives them not only to “prendre conscience de son identité et de son être”, but also “de passer de la violence au besoin conscient d’unité”. Xenophobia and racism played a role in returning to identity, solidarity and unity because, as North Africans, they are united by a collective “imaginaire culturel”⁸³⁷. *Tenja*(2004) by Lgzouli, *Once upon Time in the Oud*(2005), *le Grande Voyage* and *Exposé* by Smael Faroukhi and *un si Beau Voyage* by Khalid Ghorbal present an intercultural approach and reconciliation between home and exile

Basing their diverse body of films on multiple sources of affiliation like culture, religion, history and the intersection of cultural confluences like transnational positions and belonging to the metropole (language, education, nationality), North African filmmakers in diaspora critically reevaluate Beur culture and identity by subverting association of beur with variety of negative racial and cultural imports and by allowing access to an authentic self-image. The translocality of North African diaporic filmmaking enable a construction of identity that traces divergent interpretation of exilic experience to counter systematic forms of conservative and neocolonial domination and reconfigure the old structure of traditional perception by borrowing from and resisting them at the same time. In other context, transnational and diaporic filmmaking in Europe and France has questioned the borders of European, national cinema which represent a homogeneous image of aesthetic and thematic properties that address the mythical and heroic history of universal France. What is important about this cinema is that it

⁸³⁴Mohamed Bakrim, “A Propos de L’Exposé d’Ismael Farroukhi: Identité de l’Ecriture/Ecriture de l’Identité”, *Cinéma et Immigration* (Rencontres Cinématographiques de Tetouan), eds. Ahmed Housni et al (Tetouan: Faculte de Tetouan Publications,1997), p. 35.

⁸³⁵Roy Armes, *Postcolonial Images* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005), p. 35.

⁸³⁶Barbara Mennel (2010), “the Politics of Space in the Cinema of Migration,” retrieved 6 March, 2017, from Mennel.pdf

⁸³⁷Roy Armes, *Dictionnaires de Cinéastes Maghrèbin* in “A Propos de L’Exposé d’Ismael Farroukhi,” p. 36.

explores the uncertainties of postcolonial relations by critiquing the unprivileged monolithic positioning of immigrant by state-sponsored art cinema and media as dominant forms of cultural expression which structures migrants in a web of racial hierarchies and denies them permeability to universal citizenship.⁸³⁸

Banlieue transnational filmmaking works as antidote to the conventional expectation of mainstream culture(or origin culture) by taking part in opening borders of representation and reconstructing (multi)ethnic difference from transnational view, that reject cultural categorization and ethnicization of the creative experience of the filmmaker against this ethnic stain, banlieue cinema by North African directors declared a departure from traditional cinema by freeing its aesthetics and contents from ethnic essentialism:

Although beur cinema definitely gave voice to ethnic groups in French society, many of its auteurs rejected the label of beur filmmaker. In order to counter the ethnicization of their films, several directors foregrounded multi-ethnic gangs in their films and redirected the attention to the socio-economic exclusion of all the disadvantaged people living in the social housing projects on the outskirts of large cities. This new series of films was named banlieue cinema, with banlieue referring to the spatial setting of these films on the outskirts of large cities, echoing the black independent 'hood films' from New York to Los Angeles.⁸³⁹

This multi-ethnicization of banlieue cinema distances filmmakers from ethnically laden cinema by including or adopting the social cause of disadvantaged of young immigrant regardless of their culture, ethnicity, religion or race with stylistic and thematic reference to violent exclusion and urban ghettoization with global tones. What is specific about this cinema is the translationalization of national cultures to its filmic representation. Banlieue cinema reappropriates and reevaluates youth banlieue subculture and self expression by encompassing influences from globalized forms of music and urban black American music like rap, hip-hop, styles of dress and the use of 'teci' or beur slang as expressive components of subversive resistant youth subculture that, in a way, disrupt the normative and conformative French white culture. In addition to other forms of cultural expression, like Beur radios, music and literature, Banlieue cinema of second and third generations represents a sort of assertive means of cultural expression for a marginalized minority to reconstruct new landscapes of identity in the complexities of post colonial France and inhospitable and intolerable climate of discrimination and islamophobia as banlieue cinema incorporates youth gangster subculture of beur slang, rap

⁸³⁸Dale Hudson, op. cit, pp. 112-113.

⁸³⁹Arne Saeys, op. cit, p. 37.

and tagging to locate an intercultural consciousness with interracial and multi ethnic solidarities that shape its vigorous anti-racist discourse with reference to black Afro-American experience in south Los Angeles and the Bronx.⁸⁴⁰ This counter – banlieue cultures of suburban ghetto of Maghrebis is interpreted within broad context of French media and radical right discourse which creates that threatening face of the cultures coming from the banlieue:

The media were again focusing on the menacing youth of the banlieues... what had become visible to the media, in part due to a wave of riots in ‘banlieue chades’ like vaulx en-verlin and Sartorville and in the wake of banlieussard organized lycée strikes and demonstration in fall 1990, were the gangs (bands) and their associated practices: "tagging" or graffiti, involvement in drugs and petty crime, and rap music. The right wing press in particular raised the alarm, taking the occasion to luridly link banlieue youth to crack, Aids, gang warfare, scrouning all the press suggested, inhering in immigrant culture.⁸⁴¹

So, a defining quality of Maghrebi transnational and accented filmmaking reside in the incorporation of heterogenous matrices of discourses with transvergent hybridized spaces of representation that transcend the hegemonic character of French culture and recreate or “widen the margins”⁸⁴² Unbound by the constraints of diasporic experience to speak from a reaffirmative perspective of previously condemned and stigmatized minority.

Although new banlieue filmmaking inaugurated by the famous movie *La Haine* by the French Jewish filmmaker Mathieu Kassovitz, this cinema was the outcome of urban protest consciousness of the 1990s and the collective political action of Beur generations of Maghrebi filmmakers, who proposed a different identity politics with protagonist experiencing complex identification, questioning immutable sense of belonging and developing non-conformative views of historical and national consciousness. Banlieue cinema becomes an agent of constructing migrant subjectivity with a complex position that challenges dominant stigmatization of ethnic difference and problematize established perception of belonging that are open to diverse interpretation of rejection or negotiation, where identification or disidentification are challenging, painful and altering. The protagonists of *le Grand Voyage* by Smael Farroukhi, *By bye* (1995) by Karim Dridi, *Exils* (2001) by Gatlif, *Tenja* (2004) by Laghzouli, *Cheb* (1991) by Rachid Bouchared, *Image* (2014) by Billal Fallah and Adil el Arbi, *Salut Cousin* (1997) by

⁸⁴⁰Joan Gross and Ted Swedenburg, (1994) “Arab Noise and Ramadan Nights: Rai, Rap, and Franco-Maghrebi identity,” retrieved on 06/09/2016, from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236716277>

⁸⁴¹Ibid.

⁸⁴²Shamas cited in Joan Gross et al.

Alouache, *Douce France* (1995) by Malak Chibane, *Foreign Body* by Raja Amari invoke references to stories of disidentification and negotiating identity across transnational and diasporic mobility between the global and the local, homelands and foreign lands, Europe and the Maghreb, where intercultural exchange, possible reconciliation and transgressive politics take place with the expression of urban marginalization to include characters from other ethnicities, who share the same condition of disenfranchisement and exclusion a variety of thematic and aesthetic content that lend this cinema a space out of traditional generation conflict between children and parents, and preoccupation with first generation narratives of return. Instead, there is a growing consciousness among recent banlieue filmmakers to project the marginalized visibility of Muslim and North African diasporic subjects in the spatial economic and social configuration trans/postcolonial France with a view that focalizes interrogation of hegemonic power, negotiation of belonging and ambivalent synthesis of inclusive diasporic consciousness.

In the following analysis, I will look at the way Maghrebi protagonists in recent banlieue movie entitled *Devines* (2016) by French Moroccan filmmaker, Houda Benyamina, translates the diasporic experience in the reconfiguration of spatial identities and female agency on the margins of postcolonial France in Multie-ethnic banlieue space where both old Roma and the new Romas of Europe negotiates suburban exclusion, ethnic solidarity, ambivalent identification and feminine resistance under the shadow of “social fracture”. Despite the slight difference between beur and banlieue cinema, most second and third generation filmmakers consciously or unconsciously combine structures and narrative content from the two categories, because beur generation becomes emblematic of North African migrant culture, lifestyle and identity expression associated with poor housing projects in Major French cities. *Devines* is a film about disaffected young generation and French born North Africans, growing up in the violent Parisian housing project without a privilege/opportunity or chance to assert their existence, except their excessive ambition and erratic agency.

The film opens up with a shot from the perspective of Dounia, the main female protagonist, who calls her friend Maimona and text messages her from a grate on the wall. Her African friend is attending preach/ prayer given by her father, who is the imam of the slum mosque. This opening is followed by credits with vertical aspect footage of camera phone selfie showing both protagonists self-portrait in an open tennage joyful larking about, posing and dancing in Roma camp near the housing project and which is populated by multi-ethnic immigrants: North Africans, Japanese, Eastern Europeans, white French and black Africans. Having left with few choices, Dounia, Oulaya Amamra, and Maimouna, Deberah Lukumuera,

lead a revolutionary conduct, raising pocket money though shoplifting from supermarkets, wearing burqa to hide their identities and sell the stolen items to their colleagues at school.

In a hustle and chaotic lifestyle, the two girls present a backstage or underground perspective of space by creating unfamiliar rat-run routes⁸⁴³ to remain invisible and outside the confines of the dominant gaze. They have a secret location in the cat walk of local theatre of dance studio, where they hide their stolen goods and a place where they spy on dancers's rehearsal from above. It is there that Dounia encounters Gjigui (Kevin Mischel); a handsome, ambitious and shapely dancer, who falls in love after he chases her down on the roof of the theatre because she spit on him while training.

The scene ends up with Dounia saving him from falling down from the cat walk. At the vocational school, where Dounia and her multi-ethnic colleagues train for receptionist Job, She makes fun of her teacher and violently criticizes her in the midst of role-play session as well as challenging her by vowing to gain a lot of money much better than the teacher's poor income, shooting "money, money, money" with choral help of her friends before leaving the classroom. Dounia's dream of power and ambition for rich life style drives her, with Maimouna, first to impress Rebecca and gain her trust to work for her. Rebecca (Jisca Kalvanka) is banlieue dangerous drug-dealer, who, in turn, dreams of expanding her business by investing in sex tourism in Thailand. Dounia and Maimouna, start working for Rebecca by stealing fuel from vehicles, selling drugs and doing dirty things for Rebecca, who eventually, gives a dangerous mission which is to restore her money from Reda, big dealer of drug, who is known for his deviant taste for minor teens. Before embarking in the mission, Dounia is arrested after torching Samir's car, another drug -dealer working for Rebecca, because he sleeps with her mother, Zohra (Majdoline Idrissi). Zohra is represented as failed symbol of motherhood and alcoholic bar hostess with permissive sexual life. So, after tempting Reda in the discobar, he takes her to his apartment, where he discovers her plan to steal him. He violently brutalizes and attempts to rape her, but she knocks him down, takes the money which she does not give to Rebecca, but she gives a part to her mother, Maimouna and keeps part for her tour with Djigui, who is hired as principle role for the show.

However, Rebecca has plan B. she takes Maimouna as hostage and sends Dounia a footage from her cell phone threatening her to bring money or to kill her best friend Maimouna. Dounia arrives to Rebecca enclave, where she imprisons her friend, with money, but Rebecca notices some money was missing. In final fight scene, Rebecca douses Dounia with gasoline in

⁸⁴³Isabel Stevens (2017), "Devines Review: an Exuberant Young Female Buddy Thriller," retrieved on 09 August, 2017, from Film Forever www.bfi.org.uk

violent threat to burn her with a lighter, after a furious fight between them, Rebecca throw the lighter, the fire set in the room, which is locked from the outside by Samir, who goes to Dounia's mother to restore part of the money. The room is burning and they are locked inside. Rebecca and Dounia were able to make it through a vent but Maimouna would not go through it because she is too big. Although the firemen arrive on time, but they do not extinguish the fire because they can not do it without the presence of riot police despite Dounia's begging to save her friend from being burnt. When the police arrive, it was too late because the room where Maimouna is locked has already burnt and exploded, which stirs the neighbourhood population rage which starts a fight against the police in scene similar to the festival of torched cars in 2005⁸⁴⁴.

Houda Benyamina's first feature film, which won caméra d'or in Canne film festival (2016) and Cesar awards for the most promising and best supporting actresses,⁸⁴⁵ *Devines* can be classified as referential banlieue movie or cinema de banlieue, with essential focus on the visibility and invisibility of marginalised female protagonists, who engage in persistent fight to transgress incompatible and exclusionary social and economic violence of imprisonment in the roma slum. Living in a shared basis as outsiders with other ethnicities, North Africans characters reflect the intolerable climate of the banlieue, which still symbolizes that site of poverty, unemployment and marginalization force that put to its subjects on track of violence and crime as the only way out to self-affirmation and independence. Not only Dounia and Maimouna, but also Samir, Reda and Rebecca resort to illegitimate gangster practice as an alternative life style to assure survival and break the imposing social and physical walls that separates North African protagonists from being normal French citizen enjoying the privileges of universal principles even through transgressing social rules, normal expectations and norms of civility because necessity justifies protagonists' misconduct.

This is clearly stated in Rebecca's recommendation for Dounia who is being trained to work for her. She addresses Dounia "why stay poor? Dare to be rich?". An expression is reminiscent of famous gangsta rap singer Fifty Cent, who says in one of his successful song "live rich or die trying". Social exclusion, poverty and overwhelming delusions which challenge protagonist desire of mobility and change become synonymous with the banlieue of multicolored community of various immigrant with distinctly long tradition of urban segregation "HTM housing complexes had now existed long enough that they now constituted communities of sorts,

⁸⁴⁴Ibid.

⁸⁴⁵*Devines*.Wikipedia. Download/Divines%20(film)%20-%20

meaning that la cité now began to be seen as constituting its own type of socioeconomic on French landscape, with spectors of marginality, poverty, and low-income status”.⁸⁴⁶

Houda Benyamina’s criticism of French citizenship in regard to the foreignness of some multi-ethnic protagonists is interpreted in the incorporation of banlieue cultural traditions, where loyalty to Beur generation is seen in the graffiti tags on the wall of the slum, which promotes solidarity among its members and embodies protest messages against the claustrophobic space of the micro-community in addition to graffiti, the film refers intentionally to the question of riot and violence in the banlieues with a sort of political and social import. The first scene of riot starts when Dounia tries to take revenge from Samir because she does not want him to have sex with her mother. She torched his car and other vehicules in the parking lot outside the slum with the help of Maimouna and the participation of neighbourhood population. After the policemen and the firemen, the scene turned to riot, fight and chase down by the police after a number of young immigrants join the party. The second incident takes place at the end of the film when firemen refuse to extinguish the burning of the building where Maimouna is locked. The crowd starts throwing stones and glasses on policemen. The film represents violence in the banlieue in broader context of frustration and indifference of the French political system to the rights and privileges of young generation, who wants to break the silent character of first generation immigrant and refuse to be treated as citizens on the margin of society and economy well as outside the law.

Devines makes reference to second and third generation migrant’s revolt (2005) by contextualizing the historical and social roots of migrant disaffection and anger against institutional violence, economic racism and lack of recognition. This reference to extra-diegetic content gives *Devine* distinctive identity that differentiates her from other banlieues although it develop an intertextual connections with *la Haine* and *Taxi Driver*. What is relevent is this protest identity or protest life style of their characters, which undermines coherence with first generation culture and develop conflictual stance towards the condition that breeds vulnerable fragmentation, uncertainty and destruction as result of being torn between two conflicting cultures that grant no space for feeling secured and balanced. In an interview with Steve Rose, a journalist in the Guardian, Houda Benyamena says:

I think it is an absence of spirituality, of understanding and knowledge of the culture these young people come from. That ignorance, that lack of belonging creates monsters.

Because that society in which they live, what they consider their country, they feel like

⁸⁴⁶Doran Meredith quoted in M. Allen, “Generational Differences between North African Francophone Literatures: the New Stories of Immigrants in France” (2009). Undergraduate Honors theses paper 6, p. 36.

they have been rejected from it. So, they create this new identity. It's like protest identity I would compare it to the punk movement.⁸⁴⁷

This protest or punk nature of the protagonists' life style makes the film partakes preoccupation of banlieue cinema with issues of violence, exclusion and racism. *Devines* sets up a parallel with other banlieue films like *La Haine* by Mathieu Kassovitz⁸⁴⁸, which contributes to Benyamina's narrative construction of protagonist profiles and contexts. If *La Haine* depends on Vinz, Hubert and Said as the lead characters, *Devines* drives its distinctiveness from strong friendship between Dounia and Maimouna and their commitment to popular solidarities, street gangster style, by adopting street wear with tied long hair, roaming the streets, selling drugs and provoking troubles. The script of the film incorporates intertexts and slang from *La Haine* as Dounia focuses her gaze on the camera phone when she is making self portrait at the beginning of the film posing her finger as a gun and saying "what are you looking at?"⁸⁴⁹ in a reproduction of a scene in *La Haine*, where Vinz imitates Bickle, the protagonist of *Taxi Driver* by Martin Scorsese. Equally, *Devines* shares the trope of rejection from public places with *La Haine* (the trio of *La Haine* is kicked out of club, art gallery, Paris apartment). Dounia and Maimouna are not allowed access to the supermarket where Djigui works as security guard. Dounia's mother is kicked out of the disco bar by her boss not for racist reason but for discipline. However, rejection in *La Haine* is structured, institutionalized and represents the violent character of spatial evacuation of immigrants from shared public space because they are culturally and ethnically different "others".

Although the physical encounters between police and young migrants in *Devines* is not as violent as the ones in *La Haine* and other beur cinematic representation because the filmmaker reconstructs a different form of violence which is symbolic and dangerous. While the protagonists of *La Haine* suffer direct expulsion from public space, Benyamina's protagonists exhibit a spatial invisibility which shapes the reality of their everyday life. Dounia and Maimouna live in a poor Roma slum or encampment outside the cité, where they have to steal and hide away from their parents, the police and, eventually, from the oppressive surveilling systems of the French institutional discourse (police, supermarket, vocational school). Dounia and Maimouna's play with identity contributes to their symbolic expulsion/ evacuation from the dominant space and offers them, even, an escape from the entrapment of roma slum as the perfect embodiment of symbolic violence and adjustment or fit in to the local milieu of a beaten

⁸⁴⁷Houda Benyamina in Steve Rose, "Devines Director Houda Benyamina: It's Better to Make a Film than a Bomb". The Guardian, 10 November, 2016.

⁸⁴⁸Ibid.

⁸⁴⁹Isabel Stevens (2017), "Devines Review,"

multi-ethnic community. The complicated network of relations and the curse of imposed poverty make the members of underclass turn against each other. The victimization of Dounia by co-ethnics like Reda, Samir and others reinforces the impression that disadvantaged minorities are engaged in intra-group violence to dominate the drugtrade and to make better use of spatial power; yet, this violent encounters among young population in the banlieue is figuratively and symbolically driven by an absent and invisible force that undermines solidarity among ingroups and manipulate the (im)mobility, destiny and imprisonment of characters.

It is the real force responsible for stimulating conflicts and generating cultural margins, economic inequalities and absence of recognition. Unlike the protagonists of Kassovitz, who openly transit or commute between the banlieue and the metropolitan space, the protagonists of Benyamina are shot in tight cadres of camera which restrict their movement in a very narrow space as symbol of broken mobilities across class and space. they are entrapped in the banlieue from vertical perception since their movement is projected from inside shot and rare outside views. No shots from distance or large panoramic shots except in cases of fantasies or domination. The space of Roma camp is represented as narrow, suffocating and marginalized that echoes the trope of place as siege, where protagonists are hostages to its violent claustrophobic enclosure and imprisonment which is not the case in Rajae Amari's *Foreign Body* (2016) where Samia freely has an access to space despite her illegal status. The space of *Devines* is geographically and socially closed, contained, tight and suffocating. Protagonists encounter with horizontal space is only from low reverse angle which turns them to minimized creatures in front of the clossality and the giantness of the building. There is no departure Journey from the banlieue, nor return one, of the protagonists. We see them in the disco, in the supermarket, police station but we do not know how they get there. Private spaces capture an embodiment of imprisonment and invisibility, while public space turn to a trap for protagonists like Dounia who is chased down by police and victimized by drug addict.

However, invisibility and the hidden spaces of Dounia and Maimouna give them shelter against surveillance and dysfunction the effect of the dominant gaze of the public space. Using the roofs and alters of the theatre as well as other underground roates offers both protective and liberating views of the world and things from an individual view point. This position offers protagonists and oppositional gaze, a way of subverting, remapping and seeing the dominant paradigm (world, Paris, banlieue) from an invisible subaltern perspective. So, the film is kind of representing invisibility as empowering and liberating force for Dounia and Maimouna to cope with the claustrophobic realities of the slum as they have a few choices to break the walls of their sieging and start their mobilities. Consequently, Benyamina seems to resist the tradition of beur/

banlieue cinema through the feminization of the public space and empowerment of female agency by giving them choice and ability to decide how to shape their forms of survival and protest. *Devines* manifests different modes of gendered identities and distinct experience of masculinity and femininity by reshaping male and female positions through alternative structures. If *La Haine* defines migrant struggle against exclusion and rejection from the stand point of aggressive and powerful virile masculinity, *Devines* seems to counter such paradigm as patriarchal culture and display a protest paradigm that foreground a strong sense of female agency, independence and mobility although it is narratively disrupted at the end because of economic reasons.

How does this gendered paradigm work? First, In *Devines* masculinity is associated with unwarranted inter-group violence and deviant sexuality. Drug addict and dealer Reda's taste for young girls and his violent attack (rape attempt) of Dounia are example of deviant male behavior. Second, Masculinity equally echoes connotation of weakness, absence, disempowerment and, to some extent, disability. Countering the patriarchal traditions of both Maghrebi Beur and French banlieue cinema, the filmmaker reverses gendered position by constructing the concept of the absent father figure. In addition to associating males with weakness, disempowerment, she deprives male parents from being oppressive and omnipresent in the life of their children. Doing so, the filmmaker tends to walk away from falling in generational conflict perpetuating the trope of patriarchy as it is foregrounded in many diasporic and migrant movies. The viewer does not know who is the father of Donia, nor the father of Samir, of Reda or Rebecca. Even when the father figure is present, he does not have a name or big influence on the linearity or the divergence of the filmic narrative. Female migrants from the third world or the south were usually subject to the tradition of subjective disempowerment and submissiveness in European and early Beur cinema; females in diaspora are either represented as scapegoat of patriarchy, where they are submissive and victims of male (father, brother, husband) oppression or embodiment of repressive cultural system of claustrophobic spaces, in both cases, she becomes a source of identification from western male who is there to save her.

Instead of celebrating masculine disruptive force or disidentificatory status, *Devines* offers non-conformative gender politics by constructing femininity as potential rival/ equal to masculinity because the latter is represented as silent and disempowered sometimes. Over-turning expected roles by challenging mainstream male positions, the filmmaker does not project cinematic discourse that postulates females as traditional female figure, silent, submissive and powerless. We can see that in Rebecca the powerful drug dealer which represents role model for males and females of the neighbourhood. The narrative visibility of female protagonists is not

only about the feminization of role models, but also about the feminization of space and protest. In contrast to *La Haine*, *Devines* challenges traditional forms of identity with feminine reappropriation of space and the power of female gaze. “You’ve clitoris, I like that”. This is what Rebecca tells Dounia when she proves her ability to work for her. An expression that signifies banlieue girls new identity and hyper-femininity that restore much power to female voice, which encompasses the courage and the grit to abandon the trap of poverty and the exclusion of Roma slum. Dounia does not only refuse to be a victim of intolerable social circumstances, but also dreams of transgressive masculinized femininity that dismantles discourses of hegemonic subordination and the destructive tendencies of social apparatuses like vocational school that shapes its subjects to keep their head down and to behave submissively in order to secure poorly paid Jobs like their ancestors as it is the case of the teacher, but Dounia ravaging desire for power and freedom refuses to be captive to a discourse that denies subjects change and upward mobility. She is assertive enough, though naive, to propose in confrontation with her teacher “why play by rules when the rules are rigged against you” and challenges her “what have you achieved?”, referring directly to the impoverished and vulnerable situation of first generation immigrants and pointing to the vulnerable income and status of minorities in France and refusing to belong to the category of underclass because her “hands are made for gold” and she is “the queen of the world” and her loggo “money, money, money”. Dounia is an embodiment of girl power and hyperfeminized agency in space that forces teenagers and immigrants to follow gangster life style, to leave school and embrace a life of crime.



Figure 7. Dounia's Siege/Immobility and Broken Dreams of power

Moreover, Dounia’s revolt and protest agency is structured under delineation and reversal of cinematic gaze which transgressively displaces the traditional male as the agent of gazing. The film introduces its narrative through the eyes of Dounia, which is followed by powerful images of sequence shot of camera phone self-portrait or selfie, alluding to the female

enunciative position which shapes and controls the development of the story. The empowering content of the cinematic gaze reveals the dominant feature of female agency through the sequences of the film which submit male characters to the controlling and surveilling politics of female characters. Dounia and Maimouna do not assert their femaleness by transgressing boundaries of gender space by accessing the risky drug dealing trade (which was typical male domain), but also by getting around traditional system of gendered authority and reversal hierarchies of gender. This is exemplified in the fact that most females of the film are under observation and even the voyeuristic gaze of female protagonist Dounia gets to the network of drug dealing by spying on Samir and discovers where he hides the drug and reports that to Rebecca. Rebecca, herself, keeps an eye on males who work for her and does not hesitate to send Dounia to Reda's apartment.

However, the most captivating form of female agency is the moment when Dounia saves Djigui from dangerous falling from the rafters of the dance theatre, where she voyeuristically watches his muscled body stretching and follow every detail of steps, movements and tates with scopophilic pleasures, where Dounia gives him instruction and tips to get out of the situation by stretching her hands to him and telling him not to look down for fear of dizziness with the camera from high angle or top down shot tracking Djigui sweat and tension, but when the camera records the moment from low angle (*contre-plongé*), it foregrounds Dounia's self-composure and female superiority. Consequently, Benyamina's turned the game of gazing upside down as female characters inverted the dynamics of observing and gazing. Dounia becomes the hero / rescuer of Djigui and Rebecca is the supervisor agent of both males and females who works for her. Here Benyamina tries to negotiate the gazing game by introducing a gendered role redistribution in a double access to male territory; (first) transgressing the male politics of panopticism/voyourism by subjecting the males of the film to female surveillance, (second) appropriating the symbolic power of speech and (third) invading male public space (work) and social perceptions of gender. This reversal of gaze agency is not only found in *Devines*, but in Raja Amari's *Red Satin* (2002) where Lilia returns the gaze at the gazers in a kind of shot/reverse shot pattern and Moufida Tlati's *Season of Men* (2000) where most women of the film gazes secretly at their husband watching shows⁸⁵⁰. This does not mean that females do not go without resistance, particularly on the part of Djigui who turns the disruptive gaze Dounia, first by discovering / sensing her presence "I know you are there. I can smell you"; and second, by

⁸⁵⁰Florence Martin, *Screens and Veils: Maghrebi Women's Cinema* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011), p. 120.

taking, for a while, the money she earns from working for Rebecca from hidden box she keeps in the cat walk of the theatre.

Dounia shares a rebellious feminist bent with Dounia the protagonist of *kiffe kiffe Domain* by the Algerian novelist Faïza Guène, who criticizes cities of transit where she lives in an impoverished isolated space of the banlieue which symbolically and physically makes North African protagonists aware of their difference and otherness.⁸⁵¹ Similarly, Dounia seems aware, from the very beginning, of her otherness and the cultural economic barriers imposed by the dominant French integration system, which offers the minimum chances for immigrant children (poor vocational education) to be qualified against poverty and exclusion despite the fact that Benyamina and Guène differs completely on how to empower North African protagonists. Dounia's empowerment comes from an ability to bear up with an overdosed consciousness of difference and her rebellious streak by breaking the traditional silence of first generation immigrants, transgressing boundaries of space and behavior unlike Amina and Sayyida in Sabiha alKhemir's *Waiting in the Future for the Past to Come*, who transgresses "socially determined spaces" in disguise⁸⁵². The need for power and recognition instrumentalizes her access to drug trade, symbolically a male speciality in beur film like *Chouf Chouf*, *Rai* and feminization of clashes with riot police is unprecedented tradition in banlieue filmmaking. Empowerment of Dounia springs from an enunciative position of self-portrait montage of individualized images at the beginning of the film which preludes Dounia's access to power through preludatory speech effects. Dounia stares at the transvergent audience (young, adult, French, maghrebi) and from footage of her camera phone and challengingly says in bilingual structure and poised her finger like gun "what are you looking at... wallaadin... stop staring at..." and later "I am the queen of the world" reenacting subvertly a speech by vinz in *La Haine*.

The interruptive and resistant quality of speech is reappropriation of symbolic power of speech and female agency, which has been absent from the tradition of beur culture and diaporic family. Maimouna, and Dounia, are ironically commenting on the dancing techniques of Djigui in this quote "ca manque de technique tous ca, tu pas d'émotions... c'est mécanique c'est Robotique... je sens pas la danse". This is memisis and sarcastic translation of male intellectual speech and dominant voice of masculine intellegensia, which represents socialization and truth from male hegemony and domination. So, access to speech is automatically an access to power, which enables protagonists to disrupt and redefine gender hierarchies of cinematic perceptions.

⁸⁵¹ Allen Christen, op. cit, p. 6.

⁸⁵² Mohamed-Salah Omri, "Voicing a Culture: Metropolitan Location and Identity in the literature and Art of Sabiha al Khemir", in *the Arab Diaspora, Voices of an Anguished Scream*, eds. Zahia S.Salhi et al (London and NewYork: Routledge, 2006), p. 59.

The construction of female gender roles does not configure third generation females as submissive, silent and passive, but it manifests an alternative mode of gendered identities, overturning expected roles and expressing an assertive agency, independence and mobility.

Although speech is, sometimes, is unrealizable or unconcretizable in reality, or does not have roots in real life, the hyperfeminine agency represents resistance and threat to underrepresentation of females in migrant beur, banlieue cinema. However, protagonists' sieging in the roma slum and containment in the imprisoned nature of the banlieue strengthen their yearning to space of freedom and dream through the force of fantasizing their escape. Like Alia, the protagonist of *Silence of the Palace*, who constantly dreams of being free outside the wall of the place, Dounia and Maimouna vent/ escape from the repressive system of space is visualized through an imaginary ride (fig 8) on an invisible Ferrari gliding through the banlieue in concrete landscape, shooting, drinking champagne, qualifying the physical beauties of males before asking them to take ride and distributing imaginary "money, money, money", referring to the song of Snoop Dog with the same lyrics "let's make money, money, money" in the film *Old School* (2003) by Todd Phillips. Although it is a moment of childlike joy, it is fantasy of ambition and vision or "*attitude regard*" typical of female agency as Dounia declares in the self-portrait, that resists the experience of subordination and marginalization which always exclude the desiring subject from visibility and recognition, rendering the desired space of mobility and freedom as transcendental and unrealizable.

Despite *Devines* is a narrative of survival, dreams and broken mobilities or an attempt to go beyond one's imprisonment, the intolerable climate of the banlieue suburb forces protagonists to engage in futile attempt to overcome the rigidity of economic barriers and break through the walls of cultural stigmatization, using alternative means of survival and protest. However, the protagonists' social and spatial traps are set up to prevent them from moving upward and to interrupt their depoliticized process of becoming. Dounia's becoming in the form of upward social mobility and emancipation from spatial/ cultural sieging is interrupted first, by the burning of Maimouna and disrupted, in personal level, when she takes money from Reda, she went to the airport to leave with Djigui, but she has to retreat back to help Maimouna as it is taken hostage by Rebecca.



Figure 8. Dounia and Maimouna's Imaginary Ride: Fantasies of Mobility and Escape

In fact, *Devines* does not only celebrate the feminization of urban marginality and the visibilization of feminine protest, but it exhibits fluid take on traditional boundaries of identity and ethnicity. Identification with the multi-ethnic community in the slum takes the form of positive solidarity with its national members. In the opening sequence the cameraphone introduces Dounia and Maimouna in consecutive shots of indulgent and ambient activities (playing football, dancing, riding bicycle) with the population of the slum which is made of Europeans, Japanese, North Africans and Subsaharan. The audience is exposed to the generous side of Dounia as she offers a bottle of chocolate or peanut, she stole from the supermarket, to their neighbour in the slum. The slum multi-ethnic population keeps taking care of each other by doing favours like the scene where Rebecca shaves the beard of silent aged man. However, group solidarity is best exemplified by the collective action of diasporics against law enforcement. The presence of police in the banlieue provokes a collective disobedience and stand up against metropolitan violence. There are recurrent scenes where we see the banlieue

join Dounia to confront riot police, first when she torches cars in the parking lot, and, second when Maimouna dies at the end of the film. Economic disprivilege and partial entrapment of multi-ethnic society structure strong source of identification and communities among members. Dounia and Maimouna are ready to do everything for each other although they are constructed to stick to no fixed or stable form of belonging.

The claustrophobic sieging or ghettoization of protagonists increases their commitment to resistant cultural forms and transition of boundaries becomes the reductive reality of both girls through illegitimate enforcement of personal values of revolt and protest. As matter of fact, Dounia and Maimouna display a sort of codeswitching of identity and a form of hybridization which makes them prone to fluid negotiation of spatial configuration from invisible and visible negotiation, they reexplore the meaning of being in space. Sacred places like mosque and the church have been displaced and used for profane purposes (the church is the place where Dounia exchange Hashish for money and mosque is where she spies on Samir hidden drug).

The protagonist switching and mix of different dress style, also, makes them play with different identities, street wear, disco club wear. Islamic veil outfit semiotically signifies their attachment to changing and shifting poetics of self perception which does not submit to conventional sources of identification (religion, home culture). When Dounia and Maimouna went to Rebecca's house, they are shocked, stunned and impressed at seeing her with handsome half-naked white man, as a reference to a perfect symbol of power and status that the majority of young immigrant would like to possess. This young generation challenges conventional expectations by choosing to experience identity outside generational preferences of their father. Maimouna and Dounia use the hijab / veil to steal food and other items from the supermarket, which is quite weird and non-conventional practice in regard to its religious symbolism. The subcultural connotation of the veil in *Devines* is resistant adoption and subversion of meanings attached to generational cultural heritage.

In *Devines*, the veil is depoliticized, neutralized and emptied out of its religiously laden value to give it a destabilising and disruptive function that works against the surveillance of economic dominant structures, helping the disadvantaged characters to enact performative sense of identity. If the veil takes its performativity from the invisibility of protagonist experiences, it also affirms the filmmaker's intention to challenge the prejudicial meaning of the veil as dangerous religious garment associated with new radical thinking and terrorism. Hijab, here, is synonymous with resistance and hyperagency of female protagonists, with feminine fantasies of empowerment, their emancipatory spirit and their protest against rules that restrict their mobility and ability to set free from conventional banlieue space. *Devines* challenges the essentialized

perception of the hijab as an oppression and confinement, signifying national disidentification and threat to public space, particularly after the terrorist attacks in Europe and America. Hijab is a matter choice and flexibility of female visibility and invisibility. The flexibility of the veil use in the film is a subversion of de-subjectification and voicelessness.⁸⁵³ It embodies and implants image of conscious code switching of dressing and behaving that enforce female agency, rather than undermines its sources of identification.

Despite the fact that protagonist of *Devines* exhibits similar negotiatory politics of identity and space to previous beur banlieue cinematic experience like *Nacera*, the protagonist of *Hexagone* by Malik Chibane, representing a liberal stance of identity, they also represent a critique to power relations of France's postcolonial social and spatial order, where hyphenated identities are seen outside the legal provision of universal citizenship and national identity which has been once claimed to be *blanc*, black and *beur*. *Devines* may be an autocriticism of migrant's self image, but it is certainly a protest against the marginalization of accented difference and against exclusion / evacuation from the privileges and rights of belonging to metropolitan majority. It is, also, a condemnation of misrecognition, indifference and neglect. This is how Dounia answers Maimouna when she contemplatively wonders "when you are God, you have to watch over your children" "but he has not acknowledged us" not only socially and politically, but also cinematically as Benyamina declares that "French cinema is white, bourgeois and racist".⁸⁵⁴

C-Outsider's inside Narratives and the Politics of Self-representation in *Image* by Adil el Arbi and Billal Fallah: Identity, Inclusive Generational Consciousness and Hybridized Cultural Forms

With a slightly identical preoccupation, *Image* (2014), a film by the Moroccan-Belgian filmmakers, Adil El Arbi and Billal Fallah, offers a social documentary look at the margins of Europe, from an insider third generation perspective set in the most notorious 21 century neighbourhoods in Brussels which are Scharbeeck and Molenbeek.

Like *Devines*, which is set in the typical immigrant suburbs of Brussels, *Image* unveils the intolerable ghettoization or the social fracture in the suburban poor neighbourhood of Brussels which overwhelmingly populated by North African immigrants, who represent the first foreign Muslim minority in Belgium. Muslim and north African migration to Belgium came as result or response to labour shortage after the second world war as many European countries

⁸⁵³ Ahmed Al-Saji, "the Racialization of Muslim Veils: A Philosophical Analysis", *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 36: 8 (2010), p. 878.

⁸⁵⁴ Houda Benyamina, *the Guardian*, op. cit.

adopted migration bilateral agreements, which Belgium signed with Morocco (1964), Turkey (1964) tunisia (1969) and Algeria (1967)⁸⁵⁵ encouraging waves of immigration from North Africa, Belgium has reached (in 2003) 125, 000 Moroccans, 70.000 turks, 8.500 Algerians and 4.000 Tunisians⁸⁵⁶ and by 2014 the Muslim poplation in Belgium was estimated 65.000 comprising 8% of the country population. North African migration keeps growing for a number of reasons, pressures and patterns, concentrating in major cities of the countries, particularly Brussels and Antwerp with 50% of Moroccans in Brussels.⁸⁵⁷ However, the unskilled background of North African migrants and their childddren contributes to the context of poverty, unemployment and lower school achievements. Consequently, the vulnerable social environment and the inhospitable Flemish xenophobia makes young generation subject to structural exclusion, injustice and despair.⁸⁵⁸, "The generation coming of age in 2010 faces high unemployment and precarious Job situation, hampering their effort to build a future and raising the risk of social unrest".⁸⁵⁹

Moreover, the depressive economic downturn of 2008 has played substantial role in shrinking opportunities for young people to secure decent jobs as result of labour market stagnation, leading to deepening inequalities between Belgian nationals and North African immigrants:

With the economic and financial crisis starting in 2008, job prospects became even dimmer for individuals with few qualifications, who have to wait much longer before finding a job than their peers with diplomas. Again, Non-European in Belgium carry the heaviest burdens: they are overpresented in vulnerable and ill paid temporary jobs.⁸⁶⁰

It is this overrepresentation in economic and social vulnerability of unemployment, housing and education that dramatically create breeding sources of frustration and identification with alternative forms of manifesting refusal of the status quo, which may include an amalgamation of ethnic, religious and economic factors to choose different patterns of shelter. Not enjoying the recognition/ acceptance of normal citizens and being ghettoized in the poor banlieues of Brussels, North Africans in Belgium, feel they are targetted for their ethnic

⁸⁵⁵Marco Martinielle and Andea, (2003) "Belgium Immigration Policy Brings Renewal and Challenges". Migration Policy Institute, retrieved on 04-07-2017 from, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/belgiums-immigration-policy-brings-renewal-and-challenges>

⁸⁵⁶"Islam in Belgium," euro-Islam.info, <http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/Belgium/>

⁸⁵⁷Sorein Kern, (2014) "the Islamization of Belgium and the Netherlands in 2013," retrieved on, 13-08-2016from, <http://gatestoneinstitute.org/4129/islamization-belgium-netherlands>

⁸⁵⁸Islam in Belgium. op. cit. p. 2.

⁸⁵⁹Global risks (2014), Geneva, world economic Forum 2014, p. 10.

⁸⁶⁰Rik Coolsaet (2016), "Facing the Forth Foreign Fighers Wave: What Drives European to Syria, and Islamic State? Insights from the Belgium Case," retrieved on 12 June 2018, from egmont.papers.81_online-versie.

difference and religious visibility hence, they start to look for new channels of recognition by mobilizing collective forms of protest and revolt. Confrontation between police and young immigrants of North African descent in Brussels and Antwerp in 1991, 1997 and 2001 has different contexts of anti-migrant feeling from Flemish Belang, criminalization by justice and law enforcement, Islamophobia and media prejudice urban protest and violence was largely explained by the involvement of extreme right Vlaam block, which encourages anti-difference sentiment and influences young Flemish to adopt racial violence those who are ethnically and religiously different as the case of the Moroccan family who was killed by Vlaamblock supporters and the young professor who was, equally, killed by a racist Belgian neighbour in Antwerp in 2001.⁸⁶¹ Racial violence and socio-economic advantage are perfect motives for channelling counter feeling of resentment and disidentification against the prevailing inequalities.

The lack of balance among Belgium white nationals and North African immigrants seems to be the overriding motive of the following film content that does not only foreground the precarious life of young generation of Muslim immigrants in urban peripheries, but also interrogates the Belgian media construction of North African community with disidentificatory attitude toward its members who are singled out from a variety of other expatriates like the Africans, the Jews and the Chinese. Molenbeek and sharbeek immigrants of North African descent are constructed as having hostile attitude towards police and resentment at authorities without profound explanation of where the anger and frustration come from. *Image* is an attempt to decode the dominant portrait of North Africans created by local mainstream media and Flemish alarmist news industry, by offering a different or at least neutral, representation of their economic and social identity.

In intolerable urban banlieue, Eva Hendricks (Laura Verlindeu), is an ambitious female journalist from the rich neighbourhood of Ghent, works for a news show in mainstream TV channel and she is making a documentary about the thug life of hardened criminal from North Africa living in the banlieue of Molenbeek. Eva has a week to deliver her documentary giving a different image of the banlieue with in-depth and unprecedented perspective of North African immigrants, driven by personal social incentives to make a name in the Belgian media society, but in her own rules. While Eva enforces her way through the banlieue with her crew, she meets Lahbib Farraji (Nabil Mallat) Francophone Moroccan second generation migrant. Lahbib is a charismatic and respected member of the Muslim community, who is feared and respected by the

⁸⁶¹Hassan Boussetta, Sonia Gsir and Dirk Jacobs (2006), "Active Civic participation of Immigrants in Belgium," In Politis-a European Research Project (European commission). www.uni.aldenburg.de/politis-europe

majority for his notorious reputation. Eva, the courageous young journalist, is able to access the 'Jungle' of Molenbeek and infiltrates "behind enemy lines", as one character says, by gaining the trust of Farraji, who shows them the neighbourhood from an insider view point. Lahbib introduces Eva to an alternative world view of events and gives her access to direct contact with young immigrants violence context, their daily struggle against unemployment, protest, poor housing conditions, causes of anger and consequences of marginalization ;yet, Eva's infiltration of the banlieue and her friendship with Lahbib is always interrupted and disrupted by the imposed and rude interventions of her boss, Herman Verbeek (Gene Benevoets) an arrogant TV presenter who represents that solid bound between hegemonic politics and media.

Herman Verbeek is falling and aging TV star, who is faced by losing popularity and registering lower rankings in viewership bill board of Belgian media because of changing politics of viewership and lower budget affected by the loss of advertisers. Peter says to Verbeek "we are making a loss, the big advertisers do not want to be near your show". As result, he fights to keep his position as essential news anchor no matter what it takes, even if he counterfeits fact, stresses his journalists to report only "hot news" and focus only on cliched aspects of news making. On the other side, Eva struggles and fight to finish her documentary. She even attends a street rap party with Lahbib and experienced confrontation with riot police who tries to stop young immigrant's party. In another scene, Eva does not take the permission of her boss to shot in Molenbeek, particularly her night ride with the police woman, which ends in smashing of her car glass, an incident that angers Herman Verbeek who accuses her of exhausting his resources "what the hell were you doing in Brussels? Wasting my resources" (50 mn 58 s) and other times for being unable to portray her interviewees from an objective view point "you had lost your objectivity, you could not step back from subject" (1h ; 17m) and, other times, for taking too much time. All these make Eva subject to a specific discourse of news making by partially mixing the personal and strong pressure on the part of her boss to submit the film as soon as possible because he is about to be replaced by young anchor as Peter the financial monitor of the news network keeps telling him. This excessive manipulation of Eva and intrusive character of his frequent intervention (he uses footage about riot in Molenbeek from her unfinished documentary without taking permission) culminates the conflict and pushes the narrative development to a decisive moment in the diegetic life of Eva, who violently murders him at the inaugural party of her documentary release because he stole her work, gives credibility to himself and finally (in montage of the documentary) he uses footages that undermine the impartiality and the scientificity of Eva's professional and objective principles.

The opening sequence of the film displays a panoramic images of Brussels with a montage of documentary images of police riot confrontation and press headlines, successive captions and footages of North African young immigrant's involvement in petty crimes, violence and vandalism, reflecting an overgeneralized hysteria of Flemish dominant discourse of media about ethnic difference and anchoring the audience to a potential decoding of the dominant 'image' by ascribing the narrative a certain regard to balance the rise of an alternative subjectivity of narration though it alludes to an inbetween positioning of the film as Jean Rachid, a supporting character, opens the script with "in Brussels, good things happen here, bad things too".

The credit sequence includes samples of news discourse from local press like "most criminals come from poor neighbourhoods where foreigners live", "the suspect is of Moroccan extraction carried out the stabbing", "a group of Moroccan youth attacked a police car" "North African criminals smuggled drugs via Belgium", "most prisoners are migrants", "the greater threat to our safety is the increasing number of Muslim youth", "The perpetrator thought to be a number of North African gang", demonstrating the ability of media and imported interpretation of the news to influence public opinion and viewership by adopting biased approach and manipulatory language "'thought to be', 'most criminals', probably, 'where foreigners live'". The filmmaker makes a reference to how North African Muslims have to face the deadly combination of partial news production and the xenophobic violence of anti-immigrant radical right discourse, which deepen both divide between the Flemish and the Arabs and facilitate immigrant access to a politics of self-perception/ self-defense which may include resistance, protest or even rejection of national policies and defiance of existing norms.

Image is a remontage of conventional images of Flemish white bourgeois mass media, which questionably frames the mediated representation of ethnic difference with politicized reproduction of positioning between the centre and the periphery. This remontage of image from an insider perspective has a refutation character that erases the equation of North Africans with clichéd labels like drug smuggler, police haters and violent criminals. This type of images has to be explained in relation to the prevailing order of prejudices and stereotypes that feed on the enabling milieu of news coverage that influence public attitudes and management of stories that meet the expectations of white Belgian ruling class. *Image's* striking introductory montage of successive newspaper headlines/TV news and documentary style with black, white and archival photos at the beginning and the end of the film give prominence to the exaggerated dominant discourse of Belgian mass media about North Africans and the role of disinformation in constructing politically biased images. Eva is given an invitation to a party, where Verbeek tends

to introduce her to an elite class of politicians and policy-makers (high society). At the party, he tries to convince her of ‘*networking*’ as positive confluence between media and politics. She resistently refuses to mix up with “*rich pals*”. This conversation takes place in the party:

Eva: what’s the point of this reception, except to get drunk on champagne.

Herman: It’s called networking. Show your face, make connections, meeting important people. Everything helps your career.

Eva: so good work is less important than good connections?

Herman: no, they are equally important- if you want to make to the top.

Eva: why did you give me the invitation?

Herman: because I believe in you, Eva. But apparently it was wrong.

Eva: so I have to go and socialize with your rich pals.

Herman: Eva, your mum and dad belong to the Ghent high society don’t pretend. This is your world. (34mn: 36s).

In fact, networking is strong influence of politics on media symbolizing the concessions made by journalists to maintain good relations with policy makers. The filmmakers comment on the obscuring lines between professionalism and vulnerability to manipulation by losing objectivity and impartiality, media become unreliable source of truth. The mass media society in the film is corrupt and contaminated by the interplay of politics and interests. If media do not report facts objectively, then, they do not respect the moral and ethical contract with their viewer. Media always try to preserve their credibility but when they fails to do so, media become untrustworthy and news makers become consonant with decision – makers no matter how much rectitude and freedom puts to it:

The media are free, but it frequently someone else writes the rules... The media are free, free to be lured this way and that relationships tend to play a quite role in the game... you rarely get something for nothing... the less political power you represent, however indirectly, the ‘trickier’ you will have to be.⁸⁶²

Image adequately criticizes that networking or relationship between visual/ written media and the Flemish politics in Flanders and Brussels is carried out either through powerful lobbying of interests or through soft pressures (they come in handy). Moreover, Adil El Arbi and Bilal Fallah seem to reflect Ramonet’s “emotional shock” which is produced by the conversion of simple event to mass pictures by televisual signs, whose fascination and majestic influence tend to target the emotional effects and the reception of audience. This is clearly depicted in the

⁸⁶²William E. Biernatzki, (2002) “Terrorism and Mass Media,” in *Communication Research Trends*. <http://cscs.scu.edu>

scene (36m: 30s) where the whole managerial board of the TV station meet to discuss the falling viewership of the channel because of the fact that news coverage does not focus on "hot news" and "strong images, for all coverage and put more sensation to it", as karim, the Tunisian member of the TV crew, says. An other example is the scene (21m : 30s) where Herman Verbeek urges his crew to be more pertinent and selective scooping of news as powerful articulation of the channel discourse that gives harmony to the taste and the interest of the audience the journalist, discuss the assignment and top stories which will be covered like European farmers protest, the twitter murder, sexual harrassment. However, Herman Verbeek imposes on the crew to take the growth of salafist population in Brussels and Antwerp is the urgent and the major news topic of the day because as he says, "that's what bothers my viewer".



Figure 9. Lahbib Farraji is Blaming Flemish Media for Partiality and Bias

He seems to favour stereotypical construction of news content and attracted to negative representation of cultural difference and stigmatization of their image by stressing the importance of projecting pictures of riots, salafism and criminality as characteristic of Muslim minorities in Molenbeek and Shaarbeek. "strong images" are ensured by journalistic coverage of migrant tensions and transgressions in specific local to be able to represent mainstream public taste and common sense. Mass media's appeal to audience is shaped by ideological or discursive omissions (or additions), change, selection and production of certain event to be the most shocking or sensational piece of information that gets priority in the chain of information:

Events which produce strong pictures... consequently go the top of the news hierarchy... even if in the absolute, their importance is secondary. The emotional shock that those pictures produce... is altogether on different scale which the other media can bring.⁸⁶³

⁸⁶³Ignacio Ramonet quoted in William E. Beratzki.

Image puts into a question the system of media credibility and ethical responsibility of reportage in regard to the motives and contexts driving journalists to achieve a quality of professional and personal accessibility to build truth. Herman Verbeek as popular media figure fears the loss of his status and influence in the channel because of age, competition and deteriorating popularity among young generations. This is why he uses whatever means to "shine", as he says, and be always on "the top" of staff and media hierarchy even if he uses illegal practices like plagiaristic adoption of other's journalist work (steals footage from Eva's documentary and gives credit to himself), distortion of objective truth by succumbing to pressures from VIP circles in order to "make it to the top" and attributes his personal failure to others. Equally, it seems to be all about big advertisers, ratings and budgets which divert focus from presenting the news from scientific perspective to profit motives that drive journalists to seek a variety of subjective interpretations. So, money and monopoly can replace objectivity and distort the notion of free media:

To growing extent, Media means money- a lot of money... as long as the reporters score, the media are free, as long as... they get their scoops, reporters are free... there is very little the men and the women of the press would not do to "score" to be "number one", and to get "prime time". Facts are sometimes distorted, sometimes, invented. Enormous risks are often involved, and humiliations... it is all part of the game...⁸⁶⁴

"May be because of you. You the media" Farraji (fig 8) addresses Eva's shooting crew who are filming in the neighbourhood and accuses mainstream Flemish media of distorting the image of North Africans by adopting special temporal and spatial politics of representing issues related to cultural difference and Muslim minorities. Lahbib Farraji adds: "when we make it into the screen? When riots occur, robberies... no wonder we have a terrible image". This "terrible image" is a by product of biased Flemish media discourse which selectively and partially construct immigrant identities from crisis perspective and from ideological standpoint that show them as unassimilable to the Belgian society. This points to the fact that second and third generations are target of media attacks and anti-immigrant sentiment, from the politicians and the threat of far-right Vlaams skinheads as well as vulnerability to devastating poverty and unemployment. Frustration and anger of young migrants which are let out through various forms like riot, confrontation with police and involvement in crimes is only identification with street life style that grant escape from geometry of isolated, packed and ghettoized concentration of post colonial migrant subjectivity. The media fail to look at the vulnerable contexts that give birth to crime and violence by denying youth the right to have access to complete self-image by

⁸⁶⁴Mark Blaisse quoted in William E. Bernatzki.

deciphering the taxonomy of intolerable economic exclusion, hostile xenophobia and systematic abandonment (geographical in the banlieue, on the part of host government, on both geographical and symbolic contexts).

North Africans are associated with illegality and Muslim youth are singled out by Flemish Vlaams block and targetted on racial and religious grounds, particularly after the frequent terrorist attacks on Brussels and its national symbols. The party chairman of Vlaams block, acknowledges that anti-migration policies contributes to run successful elections "our big wins have not just come from people confronted by immigration and crime problems we have kept all those voters and we have added socialist voters, ex-voters from the liberal party and business people".⁸⁶⁵ This is not only a tactic of electoral compains for radical Vlaams in Belgium, but the issue of migration as threat to security and welfare of Europe was used to the advantage of labour party and Chris Brown to compaign for the Brexit referendum in Great Britain to heavily raise crisis consciouness among young British people. Anti-European union compaign succeeded because people were convinced with the threat of invasion from polish, Pakistani and other minorities by using statistics of raising percentages of immigrant coming to Britain and showing pictures of polish people in crowds.

However, the film's influential moment is its final sequence, where Eva Hendrex kills out of anger her boss Herman Verbeek because he stole her documentary and erases its identity by introducing various modifications to her footages that completely shifted its objective and impartial content, which is enough reason for Eva to smash the brain of Herman in moment of unstoppable rage. Lahbib Farraji is given an invitation for his principle role, as the Moroccan Johnny Depp as he calls himself in the documentary, but when arrives to the party, he is surprised by a call from Eva telling him to come to the second flat of the building, where she has murdered her boss out of revenge. Although he does not believe what he sees, Faraji and Eva escape the scene of the crime, which Eva is responsible for, an incident that has stirred a hysterical outbreak of news and series of unwarranted accusation of lahbib connecting him to previous criminal records and declared guilty of violently murdering Herman Verbeek without evidence or witness. These are some captions / headlines from Belgian news from Belgian news hytserian commenting on the incident: "Hardened criminal Lahbib Farraji has numerous convinctions for violene", "Journalist Eva Hendricks has been kidnapped by Lahbib Farraji", "Has Hendricks been brainwashed by the criminal", "the man suspected of the murder of Herman verbeek is of Moroccan extraction. Lahbib Farraji".

⁸⁶⁵Frank Vanhecke, the Chairman of the Vlaams Blok Party in Alexandra Fouché (2004), "Belgium's Far Right Builds up Strenght," retrieved on 10 August 2018, from [news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/3870681.stm](https://www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/3870681.stm)

The fact that filmmakers ends the film with the same press and media headlines about the culpability and the guiltiness of Muslim North Africans as the starting credit of the film refers to the unchanging and immutable nature of subjective experience of representation and disidentification. Driving away Eva from the scene of Murder is sufficient evidence for Flemish white press to convict a North African repentent 'criminal' who is the only reason for Eva to change her previous attitude towards cultural difference. Lahbib Farraji is able to introduce her to the daily life of North Africans in the peripheries of Brussels, where they have to face neglect, misfit and marginalisation. As Arab ex-criminal with a "good heart", Lahbib Farraji is represented as the key of identification and sympathy that characterize the encounter of Eva with difference, which opens her eyes on how she can build a counter-proof or resist a dominant perception of stigmatized group that is perpetually associated with violence, crime and extremism. The film makes clear that hysterical discourse of mass media about otherness can not go without ideological interpretation and explained by discursive superiority of dominant cultural paradigms of representation which do not give contexts and conditions to the majority of misconduct related to Muslim migrants.

Identificatory construction of Lahbib in the film does not only guarantee Eva the white journalist, access to roots of disappointment and the prejudicization of North Africans, but also a fascination with the world of Lahbib who completely and 'innocently' opens his heart for Eva ; and the more time they spend with each other, the more she identifies with his survival techniques, intolerable circumstances and the story of his struggle in its vulnerable version, experiencing a parentless childhood and forced to take charge of his younger brother at an early age. Although a notorious and hardened criminal Lahbib Farraj is a role model and "legend" to many young migrants in the neighbourhood because he is a symbol of strength, honour and bravery (Lahbib becomes that symbol when he attacked a police station...). Besides, Lahbib's popularity comes also, from his respect social norms and family ethnics as the police woman tells Eva "he has a good heart. He wouldn't hurt a child or a woman".

He is portrayed, sometimes, as committed human right activist or as defender of victim when it comes to matters like child molesting or power abuse. He violently attacked and hospitalized Patrick, who is known for (pedophilic) taste for children.

The audience identify with Lahbib for his charismatic personality, modesty and popularity among the members of multicultural/ national society of Molenbeek for his flexible/ funny character in the Barcelona Café and for his human passion in the hairdresser's, where he makes an Iraqi child overcome his fears of using trimmer to hair cut in smooth and clever manner. In addition to this humanizing and sympathizing incidents that solidify audience's

identification, there are other incidents which enhances positive image. He sometimes tries to comfort others by doing small favours like recording the famous of Bouchnaq brothers "*Lili twil*" for Eva because she likes it. Eva's openness to difference involves evaluation at its different cultural forms like music and aspect of social life that equal immigrants with natives in terms of genius, cultural rites and comparative human conditions.

Although Lahbib represented as disconnected with the tradition of Moroccan musical and artistic heritage because he favours world culture and globalized cultural form (like Rap music), the filmmakers tries to defend North African identity by involving that song and creating pretext for valorizing a an 'inferior' culture, at least, for Europeans. Yet, Lahbib stands for the new generational preferences and the new youth culture that favours belonging to a changing politics of globalized tendencies, where meanings, loyalties and identities are kept open, negotiated and in state of flux. This infiltration to the vulnerable life and intolerable conditions of Lahbib Farraji forcibly illicit the love and the sympathy of audience toward the protagonist and which is intentionally developped against the homogenizing force of the narrative to give voice to North African protagonists from inside his narration and outside the cliched /'terrible image' that refuses to provide the audience with the whole story or missing the full context.

Lahbib Farraji does not represent the traditional victimized image of North African second generation migrant, but rather a symbol of gangster subculture society and resistnt street life with different paradigm of survival and protest. Lahbib Farraji and the community of disaffected young generation stand for a growing youth minority with different personal and ethical values and antagonistic stance against society and rupture with conventional sources of identification. Malaise and discontent with the existing migratory condition and the hostile radical climate in Europe play substantial role in seeking alternative and revolutionary forms of belonging, which can offer power, shelter and support like drug mafia, gangster network and even supragang like terrorist group (ISIS). So, for some young immigrants, it has become a question of not feeling who they are, where they belong or what they want to be. Adil El Arbi, one of the filmmakers of image, states:

And when you are 15 and young, you want to have an identity. You want something clear. Blacks, Moroccans, they will never feel 100% Belgian. But drop them in Morocco or Congo, they will never be 100% either. So, a gang or an extremist organization can say. Come with us. You will have a name, you will be something. You are 1080 or black Bronx or ISIS.⁸⁶⁶

⁸⁶⁶Adil El Arbi interviewed by Steve Rose, "From Molenbeek to Hollywood – why Belgium Thriller Black is the New La Haine," the Guardian, 11 August 2016.

Here, El Arbi does not only refer to new experience of young North Africans in diaspora, but also to the rise of generation consciousness as mixture of class and age subcultures, which comes as reaction to the insufficiency of both origin and diaspora cultures to be resourceful meaning for them and to provide them with convincing forms of identification as well as an escape from the spectre of the new system of control and punishments. Equally, a pervasive sense of disillusionment and recurrent stigmatization changes youth feeling and the ways young migrant conforms to established system of perception by adhering to syncretic subcultural and transnational paradigms of belonging. Adoption of gangster street life and American Bronx rap forms is both revolt against old forces of hegemony and regenerative rupture of rampant presence of injustice and inequality. When Lahbib does not permit Eva to film him a romantic, Moroccan song with his guitar for her footage, she wonders if that "does not fit your image".

Lahbib agrees and says that music is only for "Moron", but he proudly states "I do gangsta rap" musical taste associated with empowered masculinity and male roughness; and if Eva can not understand the juxtaposition of gangsta rap to show Arab music, only because she is not from the BX). BX refers the Bronx, the famous for gangsta rap, hiphop and black revolutionary linguistic and subcultural forms. Rap represents solidarity, male power or powerful masculinity and a sense of freedom which ensure, at least, break down of dominant generational and social sources of identity (family, school). *Image* tries to capture the changing and the fluid perception of the banlieue and beur identity in Belgium by incorporating banlieue culture that is not linked to Parisian suburbs, but also expanded to encompass the disprivileged immigrants and urban minorities with symbolic struggle against poverty, unemployment and dissatisfaction with the racist climate of dominant discourses in diaspora.

The appropriation of American gangsta rap and the culture of BX attack great importance to universal multi-ethnicity and transnational urban background as strong sense of cultural gang-like group and neighbourhood community, that share disadvantage and underprivilege with other victimized groups across the world banlieues. The hiphop culture, street wear, dance and brotherhood among its members represent both the physical and symbolic awareness of universal subculture that unites not only migrants across Europe, but also their patterns of identification protest and rejection of all forms of repression and subordination. Although *Image* incorporates hiphop group culture and aspects of gangsta rap in the way protagonists dress, socialize, greet each other (beur slang), It focuses on juxtaposing Molenbeek and Shaarbeek as economic and cultural ghettoization with the prosperous neighbourhood of Ghent as social/ economic class that represents the superiority of intellectual bourgeoisie values. *Image* establishes physical difference

between North Africans and Flenish Belgians, but also a difference of destiny and interests. This is what a rap singer says in free style rap party, where Eva is present with Lahbib in the American Bronx of Belgian:

Neurotic worker, come close
look at the rich guy dying of an overdose
it's time to stop being pushed around
stir your conscience the world's in meltdown.

Defined by difference of culture and class to the rich neighbourhood of Brussels, the North African Bronx in Molenbeek with its rappers are associated with hardcore violence, use of drug and vulgar language of beur slang, which represents not only frustration and anger at the hegemonic Belgian system, but also associates gangsta rap with male power and masculine roughness. This gendered meaning of rap in *Image* refers to recurrent cultural phenomenon in European banlieue where males are identified as the only source of trouble riot, crimes and terrorism ; a fact can be extended to include image, where there is a complete absence of North African females (except the police women). Beside the only female, the viewers see in the banlieue is Eva the journalist. Yet, Rap remains the voice of discontent, protest and negotiated forms of cultural expression that softly outlet rage and frustration:

Hiphop is an idealized 'limited' community around which part of contemporary youth, both urban and multiethnic in nature, can identity itself, protest, contest, propose, act, and create. For these youth, the hiphop community allows them to leave the anonymity of a mass society, while at the same time finding a place for themselves within it.⁸⁶⁷

In slight resemblance to their blaxploitation movie *Black* (2015) where a romance of black gangster story between North African and Congolese female migrant is mapped on the style of American westside narrative of Afro-American rap culture, *Image* represents Global generational tendencies that give voice to inbetween position and hybridized cultural forms with a coming of consciousness and soft resistance through adoption of transnational forms of expression and redefinition of minorities from the perspective of the global disadvantaged.

Shaarbeek and Molenbeek as the most frequently employed space of the movie represent the frontier/border, where white characters have to stop the journey south because it is like warzone "in war you know the enemy. This is infiltrating behind enemylines" (one white character says). It is impossible to get close to final enemylines, it is uninfiltrable and untouchable. Here, space is intimidating because of the category of population inhabiting it.

⁸⁶⁷Alain-Phillipe Duan, *Black, Blanc, Beur Rap Music and Hiphop Culture in the Francophone world* (New York: the scarecrow, 2001), p. 69.

From the perspective of Flemish protagonists who work with Eva in the TV channel, undertaking interview in Antwerp and Brussels about Salafi Islam seems impossible because it is a difficult group to infiltrate and they "have tried before and had no luck". Molenbeek is also the untouchable zone, inaccessible because of potential emanent danger. It is the Jungle "look at those faces it's like Jurassic park... Jungle, man", this is how the camera man of Eva filming crew expresses his perception of Molenbeek when they first come there looking for a guide from within the neighbourhood, intertexting Vinz from *la Haine* when he says to the journalists go away "this is no a thoiry... safari park or zoo". This dominant view of Molenbeek as jungle and hub of crime and violence is out of order and even dangerous for the police. To prove this view point, Herman Verbeek informs Eva Hendric that he was about to "give the story to someone else" because "everyone was convinced you had better eaten alive out there".

Image captures that linguistc and cultural duality which configures the space of the banlieue in Juxtaposition to Ghent neighbourhood on class and culture consciousness, where the southern French speaking society stands for proletarean underclass and the nothern Dutch speaking Flemish society represents the rich high class. Ghent is the neighbourhood of political intellegensia and intellectual elite where media man like Herman Verbeek belongs. It is represented by Eva's parents and the politicians who attend the party, which Eva refuses to enjoy although Herman tries to convince her that is her world by telling her "Eva, your Mum and dad belong to Ghent's high society". Eva does not consent to her boss vision of socializing by not staying there for long time, instead she prefers to socialize in her own way. She accepts the invitation of Lahbib Farraji to the Bronx, where she really enjoys free style rap party and tesifies to the spontanieity of social relations that has nothing to do with the hypocrisy of Ghent's high society eva Hendrecks identification with and preference to North African community break that demonizing and stigmatizing sense of identity and space felt by Flemish protagonists (Verbeek, Joeri...). Eva Handrex is a white Flemish Journalist, who is able to step to the forbidden city an infiltrate behind enemy lines thanks to her trust, flexibility and recognition of ethnic/cultural difference Lahbib image as violent and hardened criminal is glass picture painted by racial discourse and it is broken down as soon as Eva is given access to the vulnerable side of the protagonist and the intolerable conditions of deprivation, poverty and exclusion that leave those category of citizens with no choice except sheltering in illegality and criminality.

However, the most telling moment of identification in the film is the one before last sequence of the movie which constitutes a moment of truth and sympathy that strongly pulls the viewer inside. With medium and close up shot, the camera frames Eva and Lahbib in panoramic view of the grey coloured Molenbeek buildings from the rooftop, where, in answering her

question about his best childhood memory, he tells her about his forced involvement in the life weapon and drug trafficking has context. The loss of his parent at an early life and becomes the only responsible for his little brothers, which make Lahbib vulnerable to the temptation of criminal network which ensures shelter, survival and power. This is how he tells his life story

Eva: Ok. I have one question. What's your strongest childhood memory?

Lahbib:... I never chose this life. But I had my little brothers, but no one else. No family, no parents. How were we going to survive? So we worked for a bigger guy. You do what he tells you –you're not scared of the cops. You're scared of the bigger guy. I sold shit, drugs, even guns.

Lahbib's moment of truth with Eva Hendrecks represents a cathartic process where confession about his crimes, adventures and violence contributes to a reconciliation with his past and acknowledgment of his mistakes. Lahbib Farraji is doomed to choose between prison or death although he refuses to be victim of street life, of conditions, of challenges, but the movie of life imposed on him that role. This is best described in the story he performs in the rap free style party. He says:

The street is no movie
And I didn't want to take
This ... between the deal
Or death and prison
I took care of my own.
You think it is easy at 16?
To be your own parents?
I have a lot of to handle.
I wound up in bad busness
To each his own method
Of healing. Weed saved me
My eyes can testify. When my smile breaks, we light up a fresh.
Joint. Tonight we party.

"*Weed saved me*" testifies to a counter youth culture of youth, which does not only represent the exile of North African young immigrants who are neither European nor Arabs nor Muslims per se, but they are part of global youth consciousness that revolves around alternative cultural forms and counter discourses against the conventional, religious moral and the homogenous. Although Maanheim relates this consciousness to specific group's attitudes and tendencies who share a social background, it has an appealing force that makes other youth

communities, identify with it and adopt its experiences and affinities.⁸⁶⁸ This identification with concrete group consciousness play role in widening its base to become global generational movement with resistant and oppositional tones against the established norms of class age and morality / religiousity which do not cherish a politics of return and does not privilege culture or *turath*, in al-Jabri's term, as a unifier⁸⁶⁹ among people sharing the same history, geography and belief or among diasporics. A regeneration of culture from the stand point of youth stems from an evaluation of consumption (drug), leisure, innovative cultural forms (rap) and a quest for supranarrative that will be a source of utopification and identification. Whether the supra narrative is a gang, music band or Daesh. Generational experience does not only map rejection against the confinement of class and hegemonic structure revives cultures, is also subcultural and vanguard view points which favour the changing and the transformatory paradigm of culture, devalorizing the sacred, the politically naturalized and the economically homogenous:

Subcultural styles are the product of selection and transformation though with available objects, symbols and activities are removed from their social context, stripped of some or all of their conventional connotation separation and youth equality remains very much available, offering and insistent framework for common sense understanding of social structure and social change... as part of the process involve appropriating the ostensibly classless artefacts and commodities of "teenage cultures" industry and investing them with class-based meanings and resonances.⁸⁷⁰

Eventually, both *Image* and *Devines* break the social and cultural conformity of their self-representation by stepping out of the return paradigm which is obsessed with constraining Maghrebi protagonists in their own cultural space as defensive stance against threat of assimilation. Both films complexly demonstrate reconstruction of the sociology of generational conflict. North African parents and their children are not reduced to victims of identity crisis or generational disparities where parents insist on socializing children according to conventional and traditional values, while children challenge them by appropriating more liberal and secular values. Identification is a complex process of construction and negotiation of cultural meaning and parent-children relation is seen from a context of generational preferences and tendencies. While first generation North African immigrants represent the traditional embodiment of religiousity and conservative thinking, Islam and religion, in general, do not meet the expectation

⁸⁶⁸Graham Murdock and Robin Miron, "Consciousness of Class and Consciousness of Generation," *Resistance through Rituals*, eds. Stuart Hall et al (New York and London: Routledge, 2000), p. 196.

⁸⁶⁹Mohamed Abed al-Jabri, *al-Mass'ala a-Taqafiya* (Beirut: Markaz al-Wahda al-Arabiya Lidirassat, 1994), p. 25-26.

⁸⁷⁰Ibid, p. 172.

of younger generation and do not provide strong sense of identification, at least, in *Devines* and *Image*. Yet, Islam could be the new counter-discourse or grand narrative of many European (immigrant) Muslim and white converts, who starts to see it as the new vanguard movement where killing, violence and destruction offer rebellious philosophy and justified logic of a counter hegemony. Constant reference to the duality of submissiveness and emancipation/liberation divides older and younger generation on the space of representation by attaching credibility to a specific gendered definition of identity and family solidarity.

However, before explaining the idea, it is indispensable to go back to generational preferences. In *Devines*, Maimouna tends to favour the emancipatory model of identity where she can, with Dounia, indulge in pleasures offered by global consumer culture and freedom of street life which is the anti-thesis of her veiled mother and devout father who represents the traditional religious figure, but with less powerful authority. Although lack of chemistry between Dounia and her mother in terms of work ethics, personality and aspiration, the relationship between them is generally positive. Dounia gives her mother money and sympathizes with her when she is sad or when she is kicked out off by her boss or when she is overcome by alcoholic drinking.

Auto-representation and self-perception of identity by Maghrebi filmmakers in diaspora slightly shifted its views about gender/ sexuality, while there is an inversion of Foucauldian gaze control in some films-*devines*-, where females possess symbolic authority and males are subject of female scopophilia, there is a reference to defect masculinity as some male protagonists are associated with criminal, addict and deviant tendencies. Generally, in recent beur/banlieue cinema, the figure of the father embodies silence, muteness and imotence which contrasts the traditional image of the father as patriarchal and repressive authority with allusion to mental and physical disability. Instead of the trope of childless immigrant male, *Devines* and *Image* quite a different discourse by demonstrating fatherless/parentless migrant youth, where the majority of protagonists are displayed without the appearance of their families or fathers but there is a reference to a changing politics of power among diasporic North African families where young females take hold of family matter, possession of counterscopholic force, female surveillance and economic authority. In *Image* there is a clear reference to the sisters as the new agents of parental power (the police woman threatens young North African teenagers in the street of Brussels to inform their sisters if they do not conform to civility). Equally, *Devines* is an implementation of social realist cinema with appropriation of Americanized gangster genre, which reconfigures the trope of hyperfemale agency that essentializes the gendered gaze of the

feminine discourse, tending to complicate the existing social and political certainties offered by the mainstream cultural paradigm (ex. internship school).

Yet, female mobility is constrained by the restrictive nature of the very system it keeps fighting. Although there is an inherent frequency of counter-narrative in the representation of immigrants in Maghrebi banlieue cinema dismantling a rigid system of stereotypes, self-representation of North African young generation seems, sometimes to archetype of Muslims as criminals and drug dealers. The association of North African protagonists, by North African filmmakers, with criminality and violence takes alternative dimensions by giving it a legitimate ground or taking the form of subcultural/ subaltern justice. Involvement of protagonists in illegal behaviour is justified and has roots or contexts of deprivation, exclusion and poverty. However, sometimes context is not sufficient to excuse transgressive or socially unacceptable conduct. Seen from the perspective of youth subculture, migrant identity is configured as flexible and changing experience, sharing transnationalized consumer culture, leisure and transgressive codes. This negotiation of cultural forms of identity presents itself as protest/ resistance against conventional forms of identifications and exclusionary economic paradigms.

Generational consciousness and new solidarities between members of underclass in Europe is reinterpreted from the transnationalization of slums and banlieues as space of economic injustices, whose members identify on multi-ethnic basis and united by underprivilege and disadvantage. Identity is defined by degrees of cultural difference and mapped through economic background of deprivation and exclusion, not cultural or ethnic. Second and third generation Maghrebis are mobilized by references to culture not as a fixed moral discourse that restricts the freedom of its subject, but look at identity from generational sensibility where meaning is taken from an ever changing self affirmation and feel comfortable in new cultural forms. There is a tendency to associate the representation of Islam and Maghrebi culture to older generation and religion is put at the margin of film discourse and protagonists are never put in dilemma in regard to choose between being a believer or disbeliever or punished for trespassing boundaries of faith. Recent banlieue cinema does not give much attention to the rectificatory meaning of self-representation. It seems to focus on quasi-objective account of issues of identity, migration and culture by adopting oblique or ambivalent position that excludes the duality of identification the filmmakers belongs to. The failure of integration of North African protagonist is a shared responsibility of both.

The representation of Lahbib Farraji as North African criminal with good heart and with a context that has compelled him to access a life of crime and violence is also a pretext to justify the protagonist's unwillingness to participate in the making of acceptable personal career. In this

conversation Lahbib criticizes the local authorities of the neighbourhood where he lives a place does not change or develop because of the neglect and misrecognition of policy-makers. Yet, He admits that the image of its population and their inability to be a part of active citizenship play a part in the deterioration of the status quo:

Eva: isn't there anyone who can change it?

Lahbib: You know... there are people who could.

Eva: Who...?

Lahbib: We could, ourselves, once we stop missing up, we'll get to it.

D-Unsettling Paradoxes of Transgressive Foreignness and the Complex Migrant Figure: Unfamiliar Feminine Territories of Survival, Samia's Multiple Fights and the Sensual Politics of Encounter in *Foreign Body* by Raja Amari

Raja Amari's *Foreign Body* is a story of survival and emancipation, but the version of survival adopted by the filmmaker in the person of Samia (Sara Hannachi) seems unprecedentedly unfamiliar and somewhat paradoxical since traditional survival paradigms in migrant cinema seems not to fully achieve a normative ground. Amari narrative displaces the political and cultural for sensual and personal encounters to give priority to the foreignness of human psychological identity of protagonists and their conflicted relations even though they have the same nationality, geography and culture⁸⁷¹. She frees the film and script from charges of traditional and overgeneralized frameworks, which historically determined the relationship between Maghrebi diasporic cinema and the phenomenon of migration whether belonging to first or second generation's filmography. In *Foreign Body*, the concept of survival is inseparably used with the deployment of feminine emancipation, which is a recurrent leitmotif in Amari's cinema (*Satin Rouge*) and which is mostly seen from the personal and the sensual since her protagonists - males and females – are subject to rebellious politics and sensory experience encounters, leading them to a sort of emancipation despite the heavy sovereignty of contradictory emotions, desires and inner turmoils. From the very beginning, Samia is presented a survivor of death (drowning), of violence (extremism) and of political instability after the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia, which ended up in mass migration and displacement of refugees across the Mediterranean.

⁸⁷¹Raja Amari, France 24, *Culture*, 2 May, 2017.

However, apart from surviving drowning, Samia seems to confront no real challenge on her way to exile and comfortably enjoys her stay in France not as refugee or as a migrant in crisis, but as a lucky teenager who roams the streets of Paris or Lyon, finding place where to stay, a job from the first shot and kind people who help her, without the harassment of police and local authorities. Amari embraces an experimental politics not only to identity and culture, but also to migration and diaspora by venturing to unforgotten spaces which many filmmakers dare not to explore because of their seeming futility or for being sensible territories of controversy. Hence forth, Amari is widening the negotiation capacity of diasporic space to absorb a myriad of perspectives and focalizations.

Samia is an illegal immigrant and a refugee of North African descent, who fled the aftermath of the Arab spring in Tunisia. She is not driven away just from the revolution, she runs away from an extremist brother who subjects her to physical violence and permanent threat as a reflection of his orthodox religious ideology. Crossing the Mediterranean on a fishing boat and being a lone survivor of the shipwreck does not protect her from escaping fear and threat. In addition to the complexity of the journey, arriving to France is the departure of a fluctuating experience full of complex expectations and constant change of events till the end of the movie, driving encounters and relations to contradictory edges of refusal and acceptance, betrayal and loyalty, trust and uncertainty. Samia, Sarah Hannachi, takes shelter in Imad's apartment, who is a childhood acquaintance and a friend to her brother despite his colleagues' refusal to accept a female roommate among them. Imad defends her, makes her life comfortable and provides her with money and advice of how to stay invisible from police and look like law-abiding citizen. However, Imad's history of having extremist Islamist ties with her radical brother makes her leave Imad's apartment as she fears to be tracked down by Fouad, whom she betrayed by informing him to authorities back in Tunisia. Despite her apparent vulnerability, Samia is being always rescued by encounters with/intervention of other characters who seem prepared to enable her survival and stability. After leaving Imad's apartment, she comes across a kind French brasserie owner while she was looking for a job in a rich neighbourhood, he offers her coffee for free and shows her job announcement in black board where she meets, in third encounter, Mrs. Berteau, who is looking for an assistant. Leila is recently widowed woman who is need of female employee to help manage the house, the belonging and the legacy of her deceased husband. She is rich and respected woman who lives in big apartment with luxurious lifestyle and belongs to the high society of the neighbourhood. Leila is not French, but a Muslim woman who was refused and deserted by her family because she got married to a Christian man. Sharing the same nature of exile (religious reasons), Leila adopts the cause of Samia (diasporic consciousness) and

opens her heart to Samia to show her sympathy as diasporic makes her feel comfortable and secure, but Samia herself has buried secrets of a past that is haunting her in terrible way.

Samia does not accept the way her brother thinks, acts and interprets religious belief, she says “he didn’t let me love him” when she shares the painful of experience with Leila, showing the scars of brutalization on her body and traces of violence inflicted by her extremist brother. Both Samia and Mrs. Berteaud are exiles of religious persecution and represent, as well, the feminization of diaspora/ exile despite age differentials and the diverged routes they have taken to expatriation. They are Eastern women from different generations who were deported for identical cultural reasons. Leila was exnominated from family for intercultural marriage on religious grounds, which is the same factor of religious extremism that forced Samia to cross the Mediterranean illegally.

Religion, migration and generational consciousness are treated unprecedentedly from the perspective of feminine identity and human complexity. The feminization of exile and illegal migration breaks the conventional horizon of expectations for a stereotypical audience who is used to narratives of migration from male perspectives. The opening of *Foreign Body* is quite shocking because it projects Samia, Tunisian refugee fighting a nightmarish drowning in messy scene where she makes her way out of dead migrants, their photos, passports and their belongings. The dramatic beginning of the film has tricked the audience, in a way, by alluding to the fact that it will be a political criticism of migration and European polices. However, the film takes unexpected switch of events by deploying extremism and illegal migration as an excuse to visualize exile and diaspora from the personal tensions, fears, uncertainties and conflicted encounters of protagonists with the inevitable complexity of each other. Amari argues

It was important for me not to direct the portrait in unexpected way of the strict political, social perspective but to look for the circulation of the desire between characters and how this circulation influence their evolution and their relationship with each other. It was important to stick with intimate view point and treat them as human beings in their complexity. They’re not only victims of the system but human being capable of passion, betrayal⁸⁷².

When Samia believed that she has made an end to her brother’s threat by migrating to France, she was overwhelmed by fear as she heard rumours about her brother’s freedom from prison. she, uncomfortably, feels sieged when she knows that Imad, his comrades and others are complicit of her brother; they are everywhere in Paris and she is not sure whether they know her

⁸⁷²Raja Amari (2016), “TIFF Interview: Director Raja Amari, Hiam Abbass and Sarra Hannachi on ‘FOREIGN BODY’” retrieved on 10 September, 2018 from <file:///c:/users/HP/Downloads/TIFF%20Interview%20%20Director20%Raja%20Amari>.

little secret. After leaving Imad's apartment and gets financially and emotionally sheltered in Leila's residence, Samia becomes subject to harassment from Imad, who seems to miss her company and does not accept her suspicious relations with Mrs Berteau by saying "you better stay with your mother instead of whoring your body for papers". Things turn worse particularly when Imad discovers that Samia's professional relation to her employer becomes abnormal and sensual. Imad's orthodox religiosity becomes fragile and starts fading away out of frustration, distrust and fascination with Samia, who leads him not only to a kind of destructive life style by resorting to alcoholic drinks, which was against his principles, but also to sex affair with Leila. Being torn between his religious values and the new temptation represent an aesthetic device used by Amari to convey how much confusion and undecision overcome characters, or a smart way to move them to a conflictual space by involving them in triangular sex affair with sinuous nature.

At first, Leila does not trust Imad and tries to weaken his contact with Samia, but, all of sudden, they become intimately acquainted and has sex with the knowledge of Samia in order take revenge or out of repression bearing in mind that she shows unreasonable hate towards him. Samia's involvement in sexual trio increases her emotional tensions and the stress of enmeshing her "foreign body" in a complex web of jealousy, doubts and fears makes her powerful enough to carve out a strong personality which offers her immunity against traditional patriarchal domination patterns not only back home (her brother), but also in exile (Imad) and against her saver (Leila). Samia's insistence, determination and stubbornness do not only convince Mrs. Berteaud to hire her, but it also signal that her escape of extremism and war is choice; a sense of strong self-perception and independence. Although the journey was distressing and frustrating, Samia's belief in independence forces her to challenge hard conditions, her friends and those who love her. However, when she heard, from her mother, that her brother died in the prison, she feels liberated, distressful and starts thinking of paying a visit to Tunisia with Leila; yet the audience does not know whether really decided to travel because the film keeps the chances of interpretation open by showing Samia, at the last sequence taking a prolonged gaze at the sea with contemplative depth.

In her three feature films, Amari seems to build a cinema of difference and disobedience which makes her the most rebellious and audacious among Maghrebi female filmmakers by resisting traditional gender roles and undermining identification with hegemonic forces that keep public space and consumer freedom out of reach of Muslim woman and makes prisoners to her husband's marital and social obligations. Although independence and feminine agency or empowerment at the social and the economic level by cutting vintage expectations and having

access to masculine professional space like Dounia in *Devines* and the Moroccan policewomen in *Image*, Amari constantly works on rupturing conventional horizon of expectations concerning man-woman symbolic conflict over possession of truth and power by constructing a cinematic discourse which positions females at the enunciative agency with alternative structures and resistance to domination and invisibility. The transgressive politics of Amari's femininity blurs the boundaries to find access to the right to the personal over the political and rupture the limits of gender visibility and invisibility in terms of counter discourse that gently situates males in space associated victimization and deviant sexuality as the case of Imad, the prototypical Muslim harem figure, who still embodies the legacy of lascivious, promiscuous and greedy oriental man. Amari is being portrayed as "epitomiz(ing) the daring spirit of younger generation of Maghrebi women directors unafraid of using cinema to test the limits of the permissible."⁸⁷³ and the infiltrable to the space of the forbidden in the Arab, Tunisian cinema and art which, in general, were under the hegemony and censorship of three major taboos: sex, politics and religion for a long period of time.

Amari is a feminine voice against the dominant current, representing a particular case of rebellion against cultural and cinematic traditions and branding or marking her work as a cinema of disobedience which challenges cultural/religious norms of sexuality, gender, identity and culture as well. If Tunisian and Maghrebi female filmmakers celebrate feminine emancipation in the limit of the acceptable and the uncontroversial, Amar's cinema is a cinema of disobedience and rebellion (different to other Tunisian women filmmakers against what M. Florence says that they are all alike) which shows an excessive transgressive import/ charge and mostly focalizes female sexuality with questionable morality, often involving a sort of sinuous love affairs between relatives or of lesbian tendencies mainly experimenting new territories of cinema to capture the complexity of human character. This interpretation of feminine identity and the bisexual behaviour of her female protagonists are not limited to *Foreign Body*; the sensual pleasures of triangular sexuality can also be found in her other films like *Buried Secrets (al-Dawaha)* 2009 and *Sed Satin (al-sitar al-ahmar)* 2002, where forbidden or incestuous sexual trios dominate encounters between protagonists whose sexual identity is defined consciously in mixture of taboo, revolt and permissive freedom; a fact that unprecedentedly changes the traditional image of (trans)national Arab cinematic traditions and expectations.

In *Buried Secrets*, female sexuality takes the form of triangular sex affair of three women who live in an abandoned house, left to their own means of survival and subject to deprivation, repression and abandonment. The *lullaby* or *the buried secret* of the three females

⁸⁷³Martin Florence, *Screens and Veils: Maghrebi Women's Cinema*, p. 113.

implies the mysterious reality of taboo sex meant to rehabilitate their sense of femininity/sexuality in front of an absent/deceased masculinity (death of husbands, fathers...). In *Satin Rouge*, triangular sexual politics of Amari's cinema involves protagonists in forbidden sex trio between a mother (Lilia), a daughter (Selma) and her fiancée. By sharing (sexually) a lover with her daughter sexually, the mother is not represented as fragile, but as powerful feminine figure who switches successfully between her domestic duties, dance and love affair at the bar where Chokri works as drummer. When Chokri decides to make an end for the affair to meet Selma's mother, whom he does not know yet, and arranges for marriage she accepts that as a responsible mother she celebrates their wedding dancing in red dress for them.

So, exploiting her daughter's fiancée and leading him to immoral sex practice is similar to the sinuous love affair between madame Berteau, Samia and Imad in *Foreign Body*; a fact that translate Amar's tendency to introduce a shift in the dynamics of Arab feminine identity, where the politics of forbidden sexuality transfers power and control from masculinity to femininity even through this empowerment is materialized in an unfamiliar politics and born out of fragility. The management of sexual encounters under the sovereignty of the feminine embodies a politics of transgression, experimentation and dislocation of the erotic from the patriarchs to the hands of transgressive and seductive matriarchs by insisting on empowering personal and sexual freedoms of females which have not been the case of so many years of masculinist dictation of intellectual and sexual rules of engagement. Talking about this shift of sexual power in Raja Amari's *Red Satin*, Martin Florence states:

The notion of a mother sharing a lover with her daughter establishes a new form of female power as it inverts the traditional masculine triangulation trope that haunts, say, classic French film: the older man who "steals" a younger female lover from his (proto) son is replaced an older woman stealing her daughter's lover. This transgression not only empowers woman but also locates desire and the erotic charge in the mother, thus highlighting (older) female desire rather than male desire⁸⁷⁴.

The focalization of feminine sexuality from a transgressive morality may represent an empowerment of woman's position and inversion of traditional gender roles in the form of suspicious sensual encounters; yet, this politics may run the challenge of fragility and inconsistency since it is flawed by how it is constructed and where it comes from. The looking reality of Imad as powerful stallion manipulating the two females in the sensual trio of *Foreign Body* In his Parisian harem is a deceptive form of power because the dominant players are females. Imad can only has access to Leila's life, company and apartment the time when she

⁸⁷⁴Ibid., p. 119.

wants in order to introduce a stimulant element to her relation with Samia, adds flavour to the routine of life by turning the love affair to triangle and unleashes or gains back her youth again, which may have been repressed since or before her husband's death. Imad was living comfortably with his comrades taking strong hold of his religious virtues and respect for others till his life is turned upside down with the arrival of Samia, particularly when she left the house which seems to hurt him so much because he has fallen in love with her and he does not the way she avoids him and leads him to frustration and self-destruction (alcohol, violence, sex).

Imad's disengagement from his previous virtuous life is inspired by the involvement of Samia and, later, with the seduction of Leila, who makes him "feel like gentleman" a way he is never treated before for a while and against the back drops of traditional approaches are behind both empowerment and disempowerment of Imad. The textual and narrative representation of Imad manifests one of the major paradoxes of *Foreign Body* with male identity as an amalgam of security and threat (at least to Samia), Kindness and cruelty, and the Western caring gentleman and the violent oriental patriarch. Amari's disclosure of Imad's real character is launched tactically with the departure of Samia to Leila's apartment. The fact that his radical change comes abruptly and unjustified reinforces the paradox of blurring the genuineness and artificiality of protagonist development. Imad is configured as dominant masculinity and abusive (uses violence) oriental man enjoying alternative sex encounters and leading a sort of polygamous life. Portraying Imad in this stereotypical manner may establish anti-feminist perception of femininity and gender on the part of the filmmaker who seems to go against mainstream feminism, but it seems quite subversive and with similar overtones of the Tunisian writer Amal Qarrami, in her book, *Women and Terrorism*. She says that Arab and Tunisian women join terrorist networks to discredit the traditional discourse of the Arab feminism in order to take revenge from it because its transcendence has nothing to do with reality; whereas, Western female terrorist's adoption of violent religious ideology is the outcome of modern man's bankruptcy, which exhibits weakness, submissiveness and passivity. They embrace terrorism because they are looking for something different, looking for the traditional female roles and lifestyle of the Islamic State under the protection of the figure of terrorist as embodying male traditional, dominant patriarchal figure⁸⁷⁵. Is that what Amari wants to prove? Those females are in need for the power and domination of traditional men against the bankruptcy of modern sexuality and the chaos of feminist discourse. Is this not anti-feminist discourse? However, by involving Imad's in triangular sex affair with other characters, Amari tries to associate him with defect masculinity and deviant male sexuality as Eastern man enjoying multiple sex encounters

⁸⁷⁵ Amal Qarrami, *Arab Women and Terrorism*, Mahawer, France24, 04 May, 2018.

(whether for revenge or pleasure) and, by extension, cultural misogyny, Amari criticizes the persistence of Muslim sexual traditions and patriarchal sexual mentalities of Eastern man which keeps immune to change and oblivion.

This auto-criticism and self-perception of both Muslim gender identity and masculine sexuality do not absolutely exclude females are constructed as being a complicit feminine sexuality and their identity as conflicted, permissive and with quasi-lesbian/queer nature by introducing oriental dance scenes and allowing, in one of the most controversial scene of the film, female character corporal sensation and tactile experience of the body similar to the Turkish hamam of orientalist paintings and photography, where female servants bath their master's mistresses. In the bath scene, Samia is enacting the role of the black female slave bathing her mistress in an intimate touching experience, where Leila confesses to her maid that "she loves to be touched" "she misses her husband touch" and Samia does not say no because she shares the same feeling or because she doing her job. Still another paradox or contradiction is Amari's sense of feminine empowerment takes an abnormal way and her concept of revolt and disobedience against politics is quite complicated. Perhaps, the filmmaker wants to say, again, that women are more open with each other and behaviour of female-female touching, sensing and sharing each other's secrets is not forbidden among women in Arab culture, particularly in intimate places like palaces, harems, villas, women's public hamam..., which may be another stereotype which Amari unconsciously foregrounds.

The projection of female identity with this sense of complexity and ambiguity is meant to take gender to new territories of woman empowerment, yet, it is made to lack originality and genuiness because of the recurrent frustration, loneliness, repression and recurrent absence of men (death) in the life of her female characters. This obsessive death of the husbands and absence of the fathers becomes a leitmotif in Amari's works. In contrast to *Foreign Body*, Houda Benyamina's sense of feminine, in *Devines*, allows her main and secondary female protagonists a counter gendered discourse. First, by falsification of parental values and, second, by adopting resistant tone and by questioning masculine sexuality, which configures males as violent, weak (drug) and with deviant sexual tendencies (rape, minor girl taste). Comparatively, if Benyamina's unfavourable representation of masculinity as a form of castrated sexuality, Amari's foreign body is an overrepresentation of feminine agency and push to the limit by exploring the repressed territories of migrant diasporic identity. Both feminine and masculine sexuality exhibits similar abnormalities, flaws, contradictions, fragilities and conflicts by accessing to taboo/queer sexuality and blurring the boundaries of gender and identity. The idea is

best explained in the scenes of the shower and the dance session of the trio in Leila's apartment where the females try to kiss each other in front of Imad, the master of the harem.

Accordingly, Imad is the violent, exploitative and dominant archetype Muslim man, while Samia and Leila's suspicious touching and sensual game seem to slip /drive their sense of feminine construction into fragile and abnormal territories, where ambiguous gender space has no clear boundaries between attraction to males or females. What a sense of self is this? Amari's feminine project does not reflect that convincing sense of empowerment and survival. Mrs Berteau becomes who she is now not because of her intelligence, hard work and fight, but she enjoys the material wealth and the symbolic legacy of her husband (although she sacrifices her family for marriage). She says "I was nothing before him". With no family documents or money, Samia gets empowered and survived because of unexpected kindness, generosity and help of others, who offer her shelter, work and quick integration.

However, both Leila (who betrayed her husband memory) and Samia are unable to show gratitude and indebtedness to those who love/ loved them. Samia displays an apparent fragility in the development of feminine sense of survival by choosing to act cowardly and not to face the threat of her extremist brother, escaping circumstances and transcendence of the cause of hardship, which makes her journey to exile less distressing, perfect and with no intellectual compromise or physical indignity/ defect. However, Samia as the lead feminine role in the film is not that cathartic or magnetic figure, of the screen, that the audience identify with, transforming her from simulacrum to lived experience, sensing and touching her in Deleuzian haptic politics of viewership because the dance scene and the sexual encounter in the bath do not touch the audience for being empty, causeless, artificial and lack dramatic push that serves the crescendo. The intradiegetic touches and intimacies between females do not stir emotionally any interaction or closeness and lead the gazer to slip out of shared intimacy because of its bisexual erotic content although the haptic experience does not necessitate identification with the object of the gaze/touch⁸⁷⁶.

Aesthetically, Amari's poetics of handheld camera or the sensual camera⁸⁷⁷ works against the traditional immobile aesthetics and counter the peripheral vision which searches for proximity and favours consistency to generate a complete and harmonious view of the world. Against the grain of the peripheral camera, Raja Amari constructs her stories by deploying the aesthetics of tracking sensual camera to feed the development of paradoxes and tensions that structure encounters among protagonists and to focus on conflicted growth of narration as well.

⁸⁷⁶Martin Florence, op, cit. 116.

⁸⁷⁷Pianzza, Pamela (2016), "Film Review: 'Foreign Body'" retrieved on 10 September, 2018, from Downloads/ 'foreign%body'%20review%20-%20Variety.htm

Introducing discontinuity with conventional narrative of migrant survival cinema both in poetics and politics (no marginalization or generational conflict stories), Amari's sensual camera turns to interrogate the inside of characters, to explore their inner tensions and track their response to outcomes of encounters like joy, frustration, failure, success....The sensual camera proximity to Leila, Samia and Imad, the trio of *Foreign Body*, functions as an exteriorizing mechanism that reveals the game of invisibility and traces their switch of emotions from love to hate, trust to mistrust and from comfort to restlessness. Yet, at the end, there is an overwhelming sense of ambiguity and complexity being played and shared in the sensual experience of the love triangle; the viewer does not know who loves who, who fears who and who hates who and why he/she feels so.

This sensual focalization enables the filmmaker to involve Samia in conflicted situations and follow her contradiction and interaction with her bother, characters and environments fostering confrontational encounters to test her liability to change, challenge and survival. Moreover, the changeability and growth of identity is a salient quality of the film. Characters' flexible construction makes them susceptible to temptation and unable to resist change; Imad was leading a peaceful and comfortable life with his co-ethnics and loyal to his religious beliefs, but at the end he experiences a frustration of distressing encounter that turns him to a violent person who finds pleasure in sex and drinking. For two years or more, Leila makes a halt to her life and stays a loyal to her husband's memory, but with a quick twist of events she seduced Imad to a sex affair out of frustration or jealousy and gets involved in suspicious sensual relation with Samia, undermining the human diasporic consciousness that generously defined their first encounter. This sympathy and diasporic consciousness among religious exiles (Imad evades his extremist past, Samia is a refugee of terrorism and Leila is an expatriate of religious nature as well) is gradually targeted by the divergence of narrative interests and disparities among protagonists' narrow down of encounter utility. In the opening sequences of the movie, Samia is presented as opening to all chances of identification and socialization by showing determination and will to survive and adapt. Unfortunately, exile and diasporic solidarity in *Foreign Body* seem to come out with unfavourable results that spoil and suspend the collective thinking and the unity of the group, which is intentional on the part of the filmmaker who states in interview with France 24 that she want to confirm that despite sharing the same culture, geography, nationality and exile, protagonists represent the psychological dispersal of human complexity, personal foreignness and fractured vision of the world. Samia changes by turning against the diasporic community that offers her help, kindness and teaches her rules of survival when she arrived to France Penniless and friendless.

Apparently, there is an ongoing growth of conflict and revolt that enhances the paradoxical nature of encounters and the structure of narration in a set of thesis and anti-thesis patterns. Most protagonists seem to embody a disruptive complexity and paradoxical force that range duet of antonyms of virtue against vice, love against jealousy, individuality against sharing, innocence against rebelliousness and restlessness against indulgence. While protagonists encounters and conditions of exile totally shift from favourable experience to negative or conflictual conduct, this experimentation and feelings celebrate the complexity of human nature, which is the inevitable outcome of contradictions, paradoxes and of good and evil. While Samia is configured through the love/hate paradox (she loves/hates Imad and Leila), Imad is constructed as embodying the double of compassion and menace (to Samia and Leila) and Leila can be able to show both sympathy and jealousy (at least to Samia). Protagonists' paradoxical identities and their susceptibility to change generates in an endless manner a density of horizons particularly for Samia, whose loyalty to independence and ambiguity lead her to develop multiple selves, different reactions and fit in mutable environments and encounters. Like Dounia the protagonist of *Devines*, Samia's self-determination and belief in fight for emancipation are not born out of choice, but out of necessity, and desire to survive.

Seemingly, the function of Amari's sensual camera is not inclusively limited to tracing protagonists' tension, fears and anxieties, but also to exteriorizing their buried sensations, tracking their liability to change and ultimately giving colourful twist to narration. The complication and the fragmentation of protagonists experience and subjectivities is an excuse/technique to make a sense of their identities despite its complexity and rehabilitate their composure to assure survival by whatever means it takes. Resistance in *Foreign Body* takes a roughly different dimension from the type demonstrated *Flower of Oblivion* by Selma Beccar where feminine resistance takes the form of madness and amnesia and the one in *Bedwan Hacker* by Nadia el Fani, in which takes deconstructive stance on migration and political approach to migration, European hegemonic ideology and resistance. El Fani does not propose a how to win at everything philosophy in so much as she reminds postcolonial dominant regimes of the North that the legacy of open imperialism and its complicit symbolic of domination is subject to interrogation and counter surveillance from The poor South. Kalt, the main protagonist of the film, is an intelligent hacker who attacks the apparatus of French media, its rigid system of disinformation and Western cultural hegemony by decolonizing and disrupting the ideological discourse of national TVs. Kalt's political resistance takes the form of cartoon camel which appears on the screen and interrupts live transmission of programs on national TV channels in Europe to displace its dominant discourse by commenting "we are here" and "I am real". The

camel jumps and inform the viewer “I am not a mirage... I am not an error”, dismantling the disinformation spread by French police and TV administration that the camel is a technical error.

However, the form of resistance represented by Samia in *Foreign Body* is associated with her sense of freedom, multiple fights and survival strategies. Samia’s major fight against death in the form of drowning in the Mediterranean is her first step toward survival and emancipation. Samia is a survivor of violence and terrorism as well. The whole film narrative is about Samia’s escape from her brother the terrorist, his way of thinking and the shadow of his menace through all the film. Although exile seems to offer her freedom or shelter, Samia does not suffer the aftermath her fights since Imad’s warm welcome turns to a threat and violence of patriarchal nature. Samia’s battle against patriarchy and hegemonic custody does not completely come to an end by crossing the Mediterranean, but she has to cope yet with the dictation of Imad’s rules and faces his violence and harassment particularly after strengthening her relation with Leila and shows indifference to his feeling toward her.

Samia’s multiple fights and confrontations offer her a negotiatory diasporic immunity and enable her to survive her brother’s death threat, drowning in the sea, police’s surveillance and Imad’s violence and domination. However, in comparison to Dounia in *Devines*, who has to fight exclusion, poverty and real co-ethnic violence, Samia’s survival politics seems to be soft and of a lesser degree since diasporic solidarity and encounters in exile foster favourable environments, where she gets protection, care, work and kindness from people she hardly knows. This is due to the fact that Amari associates exile with favourable tones and second chance for migrants to seek freedom and alternative forms of identity, depending on the performativity of open encounters. What is happening today in the external borders of Europe and the Mediterranean is an ant-thesis to Amari’s perception of exile and migration. Politics of refusal is currently shaping European political and popular discourse, where Malta, Italy, Spain... refuse to give entry to the *Acquarius* rescue ships (September 2018), where Bavarian government threatens to withdraw his support to the majority of Angela Merkel for her loose policy of refuge since 2015 and finally where radical right in Austria, Italy, Hungary and Sweden pressure to change migration policies to a stricter phase. This “falsification” of exile or falsified construction of refuge plays role in simplifying the measures of encounters and the survival discourse of Samia, which are rendered soft, artificial, but preserves efficiency by offering her access to diasporic solidarity, redemption and survival; whereas the parameters that rule Dounia’s encounters make her survival skills credible and painful, but doomed to fragility and failure.

Amari's construction of diaspora and femininity exhibits an elitist nature⁸⁷⁸ and is not based on real fight where females have to experience hardship, exclusion, refusal in order to achieve survival; however, both Dounia and Leila's presence are made realizable by other people or males. Leila leads comfortable life thanks to the wealth of her deceased husband, while Samia's survival reflects the intervention and the help of others like Imad, the French man and Leila; yet, on the symbolic level, feminine empowerment and emancipation come out of fight and resistance against hegemonic forces, traditional political oppression and patriarchal violence. Amari's narrative discourse focalizes a trilogy of feminine liberation. Emancipation from patriarchal injustice and violence (Imad and Fouad), which constitutes a threat to her independence. Secondly, liberation from totalitarian political regimes that caused Arab spring and its orthodox mentalities. Finally, freedom from hegemonic traditional forces of culture and religion (extremism) which castrate the female body and exclude it from the right to life. If Tunisian cinema is cinema of emancipation according to Martin Flerence in *Veils and Screens*, Amari's cinema is specifically a cinema of rebellion/disobedience, secularization of cinematic discourse and profanation of human body(at least in *Red Satin* and *Foreign Body*),where its experimental presence and the queerness of its new experiences lead the sensual and the physical to determine territories of identity construction and alternative vision to Arab sexuality and culture which see body and dance as taboos .



Figure 10. Sensuality, Foreignness and Profanation in *Foreign Body*

Amari seems to refuse the Foucauldian notion of the body as as site of cultural inscription and gender signification, which is subject to hegemonic values and discourses of traditions. For

⁸⁷⁸Makki Hillal in Mahmoud Majadla (2017), "*Jassad Gharib: Hijra wa Ghorba wa Jassad*," Arab 48/Anadol.

her, “any theory of the culturally constructed body, however, ought to question ‘the body’ as a construct of suspect generality when it is figured as passive and prior to discourse”. The body “can signify a profane void...to disrupt the regulating practices of cultural coherence imposed upon that body”⁸⁷⁹. Amari’s flexible and peaceful empowerment of protagonists by disinvolving them from tough physical crisis /confrontation (except Samia’s drowning) with dominant forces is an excuse for adopting new sensibilities of feminine survival in exile and experimenting new territories of identity by widening the gap with traditional parental discourse and community values, giving more space to physical language of female body which is still prisoner to hypocritical culture and tradition as well as celebrating the power choice and the right to decide, feel, think, belong, betray.... Of course, Raja Amari does not address religion and culture directly or openly and does not offensively attack religious symbols and references, but she abolishes cultural and moral constraints in the environments and encounters of her protagonists. She unleashes and frees them from the obligation of belonging and the necessity of showing loyalty to any cultural affiliation or insistence on being subject to the hegemony of culture, history and culture by constructing return narrative or nostalgic projection of homelands.

Breaking traditional gender roles and politics of encounters not only by freeing her characters from identifying with hegemonic forces and achieving advanced stages of emancipation, but by foregrounding the intimate and emotional aspects of characters as human beings allow the filmmaker to announce discontinuity with exclusion narratives and marginalization paradigms of migration cinema, which critique the political and cultural policies of European countries toward migrants. Henceforth, thematically and aesthetically, Amari avoid falling in the trap of copying experiences of other filmmakers and reiterating dominant narrative of forced migration with overtones of media overgeneralization by being experimental and taking alternative perception of identity. Immigrants, for Amari, have not always to be associated fictionally from reductive and exhaustive perspectives of illegality, crisis and exclusion, but have to be captured in the complexity of human nature, their needs, dreams, desires, flaws and imperfections. By working on protagonist’s intimate life and inner tensions, she gives more freedom and space to be at their own comfortable space and outside the reach of classical cultural paradigm and traditional narrative of identity where protagonists striped of agency for the sake of subjective identification with homeland over host societies and sometimes torn between dual system of belonging.

⁸⁷⁹Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York and London: Routledge, 1990). pp. 129-130.

Encounters define the way protagonists are biased to philosophy of impulsive bodily compromises and embody the instinctive experience of the human complexity. Representation of migration stories as political import is not always the determinant truth of encounters. Amari associates feminine and masculine identity with broader concept of identity which is humanity. This identity cannot always be that rational, superior, absolute and perfect; rather, it is flawed, relative and incomplete. In addition, *Foreign Body* is pioneering movie which celebrates the humanization and universalization of migration by fully treating migrant protagonists as human beings who have been subject to crisis and misfortunate situations/events (poverty, war, extremism) and forced to seek refuge or exile. Naturalization of human tragedy and denaturalization people's cultural boundaries and hegemonies participate in seeing undocumented migrants as "ordinary humans with their complexities, not just like they are presented in the media" Amari says in TIFF interview⁸⁸⁰. Universalization or humanization of refugees reflects growing cinematic tendencies among both diasporic and European filmmakers after the rise of global terrorism and jasmine revolution by adopting narratives of human survival, struggle and determination. *Retorno a Hansala* by Chus Gutierrez and *Fatima* by Phillipe Faucon are two European films that reflect a shift in representation of migration by focusing on the human character of the phenomenon and protagonists suffering, insistence and their defeat of circumstances. Henceforth, migration starts turn attention of both diasporic and European filmmakers to its unexplored territories and stirs favourable association of refugees and exiles with a politics of liberation from hegemonic forces of patriarchy, religion, war, and poverty.

Amari turns focus to the experimental approach to identity and encounters from different horizons of expectation, which is rebellious, shocking and nonreconciliatory. *Foreign Body* is not about traditional foreignness as a concept of alterity, otherness and opposition or foreignness of migrants' beautiful bodies to the dominant European identity or the abnormality of illegal immigration; rather, it is the complexity of human existence, it is the strange that resides inside our experiences as human and the unfamiliar that stems from our sensations. It is the complex patterns of intimacies and forms of encounters with those who resemble us- not those different from us – those with whom we share the same culture, dreams, flaws and contradictions. It is the complication of resemblance. Foreignness is not alterity, it is us, humanity. Foreignness is identity.

In conclusion, Amari becomes the rebellious figure of Tunisian and Arab cinema, which interrogates dominant structures of thinking and diessentializes culture from the reductive hegemony of religion and morality. She stresses the human face of interpersonal relations and

⁸⁸⁰ Raja Amari, TIFF Interview.

opens up horizons of emancipation and strengthens tendencies to free protagonists from being prisoners to traditions and totalitarian ideologies. This politics of disclosure or disimprisonment represents anti-thesis to the symbolic repression and claustrophobic discourse of Tunisian cinema in the 1980s and 1990s which projected stories of females contained in suffocating private spaces and subject to deprivation and repression in films like *Season of Men* and *Silences of palaces*.

Amari's stories entirely feature principle characters as being allergic to domination and express distance from cultural hegemonic forces by favouring individual freedom and private life over community values. This disclosure is against the backdrop of enclosure politics which deprives individuals their will and eradicates "all forms of subjectivities and individual singularity",⁸⁸¹ which makes the disclosing of enclosed spaces by Raja Amari a counter-textuality to the 1990s Tunisian cinema in both poetics and politics. Amari liberates that cinema from gender inferiority complex and claustrophobias by celebrating transition from enclosed spaces of villas, palaces and prisons to much more open spaces of mobility and politics of emancipation and experimentation. The filmmaker captures that rebellious spirit of Tunisian art and Tunisian Society/politics, in general, as an anomaly; Tunisia was the only Arab country with Muslim majority which was able to adopt secularism or separation of the state and religion and establishment of open and pioneering educational system. It was the first and only Maghrebi country to abolish polygamy, religious divorce and establish equality between men and women in regard to many legal issues since 1956⁸⁸². Although *Foreign Body* is an audacious work of cinema and represents a powerful concept of feminine liberation and new take on migration, it still lacks that convincing strength to be accepted by and reach multiple audience, and misses philosophical depth of other successful films like *Caramel* which is an open saga of woman agency and power by the Lebanese Naddine Labki. This is also true for her politics and approach, where Amari starts to lose brilliance and originality because her reiterated stereotypical stories of permissiveness, forbidden love, sex triangle essentialize feminine ideology for its excessive enmity to masculinity, displacing an essentialism for another one. Although Amari approaches migration from new angle and celebrates Tunisian culture by using classical Tunisian music, *Foreign Body* seems to perpetuate orientalist perception of a *Thousand and one Night* where concubines entertain their master by dance and music. It seems to accentuate the stereotype of the Muslim man who is full with contradictions. Imad allows himself sex and alcohol, but becomes angry when Samia gets drunk and starts dancing in the

⁸⁸¹Martin Florence, op, cit.p. 150.

⁸⁸²Roy Armes, *Postcolonial Images*, p.159.

cafebar where he works. As if Amari is alluding and criticizing the oriental man who is desirous of the type of woman he left in Tunisia, mute, submissive, prisoner to traditions and have no say about her marriage, job, education and her life after all.

Conclusion

Cultural identity has become an exhausted, clichéd and complicated field of study, touching on an interdisciplinary continuum that is ranging from classical theorization about ethnicity, gender and geography to anthropology, philosophical research and economic development. Comprehensive interpretations of identity and its relation to other variables like immigration and cinema led many scholars and critics to the refostering and reappropriation of adaptive discourses to the ever changing nature of the concept: the interaction of cultural identity with historical, political and economic mobility has forced many scholars to divorce it from its traditional structure as a coherent and unified orthodoxy of cultural determinism and certainties of reductionist interpretism. With the emergence of global society and transnationalization, identity has become flexible, transitory and shifting notion, which is subject to questioning, problematization and redefinition by discourses of media, power relations, immigration, cinema and encounters between different ethnicities and people's ways of thinking.

Immigration of North Africans to the countries of the OCED and the influx of thousands of illegal immigrants from ex-colonies has created debates and controversies among politicians, sociologists, intellectuals and filmmakers about the tension and the diversification that immigration has brought about to cultural encounters. With the bulky body of immigrants crossing the Mediterranean to Europe a massive body of the subject matter related to the phenomenon has invaded European texts and screens. Imposed exile, violence of police, interracial romance, identity politics, search for identity, cultural conflicts, multicultural threats, rejection of others, acceptance of difference, identity crisis and discourses of diversity have become the categorical narratives of European cinema and literature about North Africans. In Spain alone a figure of immigrants constitutes 12% of its total population. In the United Kingdom, one million of illegal immigrants after 14 years of illegal residency claimed citizenship. More than 150 attacks on immigrants by racist groups recorded in Greece since the beginning of economic crisis. Residency laws and policies changed twice between 1982 and 2002 in Germany.

The very core of the thesis has tried to give insightful and scholarly access to the theoretical and conceptual basis of literature, criticism and studies that analyzed immigration, identity and cinema in Europe from a variety of perspectives. Part number one has been dedicated to descriptive analysis of cultural identity and immigration in conceptual framework that reviews the major theories and approaches to identity from classical scholarship to the present day philosophically, geographically, culturally and historically. It has captured the navigation of identity and its cognate concepts between different paradigms of research and

discourses of interdisciplinary politics across borders of internet virtuality, society, geography, religion and globalization. Classical, postcolonial, cultural studies and colonial discourse theories have been deployed to trace the construction of identity, representation and identity politics to confirm that discourses of diaspora, hybridity and resistance have changed the politics of otherness and brought identity to aesthetics of ambivalence and fragmentation.

Part II has highlight the phenomenon of North African to the countries of European Union in a broad overview of historical migration patterns, statistics, policies, integration processes, regularization campaigns and citizenship systems. It has concluded that North African migrants have influenced, in a way or another, the social, economic and demographic structures of European societies, generating a typical feeling of discontent and threat among Europeans not for pure objective factors, but for external contexts which feeds on the ravaging economic crisis, the anti-immigrant discourses of nationalist, intellectuals and radical right politicians.

Part III, which is partially theoretical and partially practical, has fully conceptualized the colonial discourse in travel writing, diaries of colonial administrators, painting and cinema by detecting the intertextuality of the stereotype and the metamorphosis of its knowledge by classical system of (mis) representation, juxtaposing the enlightened and superior Europe to a dark and savage Africa. Imperial adventures and travel writings have notoriously celebrated the persistence of geographical tropes and cultural metaphors of imperialism that feed on legitimatization and politicization of colonial intent. Renaissance drama and colonial cinema have equally produced the same truths of early colonialism about cultural difference and adopted the claims of imperialism that turned non-western geographies to minimized identities (desert, savage..). This geographical reductionism in the European cinematic traditions perpetuates foreign places as anti-thesis to Europe. While Europe represents the heart of discovery, enlightenment and fertility, Africa is associated with darkness, wilderness and bareness. In many colonial films, North Africans are portrayed as backward, submissive, enslavable and convertible.

This chapter has explored the questions of headscarf, Muslim woman and European media. Before terrorist attacks in Europe and America, Muslim women were portrayed as submissive, powerless and prisoners to traditions and patriarchy. Women with headscarves were represented as rural and ignorant. However, the absence of scarf associates them with modernity and adaptation. After terrorist attacks, Muslim women become visible agents and portrayed as rich with strange way, aggressive and threatening to democratic values. With the surge of homegrown terrorism and the blasting of Madrid, London and Brussels, Islamophobia has become the new form of racism and cultural refusal of Muslims on the basis of religion. Western

populist media have contributed to the consolidation of conservative attitudes towards Islam and accentuated a discourse of threat and discomfort among European nationals.

Based on content analysis of European cinema, the last part of the dissertation has focused on the questioning and deconstruction of North African immigrants in French, Spanish and German films, by questioning the colonial authority of tropes and stereotypes and by opening counter reading for detecting textual tensions, visual contradictions as well as capturing moments of subversion, mimesis and resistance, ambivalence that rupture the homogeneity of the allegedly claimed ideologies.

This dissertation comes to the conclusion that there is a relative departure from, not necessarily positive, the traditional regime of representation of recent European cinema by showing relative compliance to the racialized conventional images of Maghrebi immigrants. First, Maghrebi protagonists are given much more space, visibility and individuation by occupying the lead role in many productions, being represented in multiplicity of contents and being celebrated in terms of their cultures and arts in more favorable tones. Second, most Recent European narratives seem to narrate their stories from the perspective of the immigrants, sometimes in position of power other times from the position of an observer, using both European and Maghrebi languages or multilingual speech as well as moving from collective stories to giving little importance to individual agency. Third, empowerment of Maghrebi characters in European cinema is equally manifested in the use of camera aesthetics by shifting from the enclosed cadres and static camera sequence, which create a sense of imprisonment and containment and emphasis on cuts isolates the characters, to more open and mobile close-up shots to capture the complex character of their identity and existence as individuals not as crowds. New cinema in Europe stands half way from classical contents as it turns away from narratives of exotic traditions and ethnic conflicts to anxieties and threats felt by European national vis-à-vis North African immigrants; a fact that makes cultural encounters unreliable and untrustworthy.

This relative departure from old systems of knowledge has signaled (un)conscious turning from tropes of exoticism and superiority (because of its outdatedness) to a celebration of ambivalent/oblique conception of North Africans, mostly dominated by anxieties and discontents. That is to say, European cinema of migration is imperatively experiencing a transitional phase or a reconsideration of politics to rethink its moribund rhetoric of hegemonic power by removing the static deeply-rooted visionary knowledge of its imperial regimes, which treat others as inferior and uncivilized (under control) to fragmentary and uncertain discourse about this other who turns to be unanticipable, suspicious (out of control) and able to interrogate

hegemonic authority and complicates the rules of engagement in cultural encounters. This reconsideration of politics and aesthetics is a response to the imperatives of new spectatorship in Europe, where old knowledge gets outdated and no longer fulfil the changing nature of viewers in Europe. European cinema's relative twist is a refashioning of traditional discourse and recoding of archaic aesthetics to meet the new expectations and come to term with a transitional and hybrid sense of spectatorship. The reception aesthetics of European cinema reflects the (dis)continuity of political content and a framing of discourse of location and dislocation, identification and disidentification empowerment and disempowerment in accordance with the signified and chronotopes of narration and diegetic realities, addressing different idiosyncrasies to achieve transient margins of expectations and complex palettes of viewership.

Unlike European portrayals of North Africans and nonwesterners in early colonial encounters, which were seen as passive, enslaveable and unthreatening to the West, contemporary European cinema's ambivalent visions construct a discourse of doubts and fears, where the North African evokes feelings of threat and anxiety because filmmakers are unable to capture plural identities of third generation immigrants and gives clear image to the changeability of the subaltern to be undecipherable and threatening the west's authority. Some films show a lack of desire to bridge ethnic distance and cultural alterity, reproducing another transitory phase in the evolution of old traditions with new range of prejudices about Maghrebi protagonists as untraceable, disintegrable, unanticipable and with prejudicial and judgmental overtones and threatening the integrity of the European identity like the terrorists in *la Désintégration*, Koubra in the French film *le Noir tevasi Bien* and Muslim community in *Prophet*.

However, a variety of filmic approaches try to give voice to immigrants, at least, by identifying with their struggle against exclusion and marginalization like the Spanish movies *el Nino* and *Retorno a Hansala* and the French film *Fatima*. If the Italian film *Articolo 2* associates Maghrebi culture and geography with sex tourism, polygamy and patriarchal violence, Ahmed the Moroccan protagonist in *Las Cartas de Alou*, is represented in much better tone as humorous, not funny, multilingual, able to come to term with his fellow immigrants and Spanish people as well as an adaptive migrant figure who can make use of any condition to make a living.

While some films stress the humanity of immigrants by identifying with their vulnerable conditions, other films are unable to construct affinities with the nature of circumstances that forced them to embark in unknown quest for recognition and fail to cut off continuities with pre-established racial discourses about the inferiority of immigrants and the menacing character of cultural encounters. The thesis also relied on analyzing European cinema from the perspective of

pre and post 9/11 terrorist attacks and how this turning event changed the character of encounters between Muslims and other communities and the perceptions of North Africans by European cinema, working on films like *la Désintégration* by Phillipe Faucon and, particularly *Made in France* by Nicolas Bokhrief. Both French films give an ambivalent image of Islamophobic discourse, which launch a shifting paradigm of mirroring North Africans by giving them a better image, much more space, character and much more identification. There is metamorphosis of discourse about Islam and cultural identity of Maghrebis by avoiding overgeneralizations like in *Made in France* by displaying Islam in favorable tones (Sam) and by granting relative recognition and integration to North African protagonists in *el Nino* and *Prophet*. Postcolonial encounters in European cinema are still determined by fears and ambiguous discourses of difference.

Encounters between Maghrebi migrants and European nationals are failed projects, featuring displaced subjects, fractured identities, unresolved cultural anxieties and unachieved intercultural romances (*un Prophet, le Noir tevasi Bien*). Contemporary European cinema shows a relative discontinuity with dominant cinematic traditions in term of space and perspective by identifying with the conditions of migrants and humanizing their cause. In addition to identity codeswitching, the thesis contributed to the analysis of migration and cinema by relying on other new concepts, which are diasporacy, minimized narratives of survival and anxieties of corrosive conscience.

Humanization of North African protagonists is done by giving them much more space (use of Arabic and Berber languages with European languages) and by featuring migrants with families and children, that puts an end to the trope of parentless or childless migrant figure of classical cinema. Equally, there is a break with Beur cinema in term of terminology, empowerment and accessibility to visibility by narrating the protagonist experience of expatriation from the perspective and the gaze of the immigrant (el Jebena, Majid, ...) as well as preference to use Muslim as identifier for North Africans instead of calling them Arabs, Algerians... even when the word Arab is used it is meant for Muslim due to the contextual influence of terrorism. While there is different perception of migrant family, generational conflict is given an other dimension (problematization of identity) and representation of migrant children exclusion as an outcome of disintegration and false religious ideology, which is not the case in the past (marginalization was due to laziness).

As for family and gender relations, post-terrorist attack cinema shows a twist in hierarchies of roles and powers; the trilogy of father, mother, son is substituted by the son/daughter, mother, father; even when the father is the dominant figure, his power becomes

fruitless, disrupted and lead to the destruction of the family (the father of Koubra). Family representation alludes to the trope of absent and sick father who has lost his superior position as the decision maker of the family (the father in *la Désintégration*). However, the nature of visibility and empowerment granted to Maghrebi protagonists is incomplete, falsified and conditional. Majid, in *Hidden*, is granted visibility not to recompense for his traumatic past, but to guarantee his suicide. The suicide of Majid is not for coherence or redemption, but it is a symbol for refusal of reconciliation, death of spirituality and rejection of recognition on the part of postcolonial France. MalekelJebena, in *Prophet*, represents conditional case of visibility, where his empowerment and survival in the prison is granted on the condition that others guide him, dominate him, educate him and lead him to the discovery of his intelligences and abilities. The kindness, acceptance and tolerance of Italian co-workers towards the Maghrebi protagonist in *Articulo2* is suicidal/existential visibility hiding an excuse to vindicate the filmmaker from cultural bias and political import and to unjustify his death by accident at the end of the film . His death is refusal of cultural morbidity (polygamy). In *Said*, the Moroccan protagonist visibility contributes to his hospitalization and deportation; whereas, empowerment in *le Noir vatesi Bien* takes the form of excessive visibility and murderous codeswitching.

To a lesser extent, Koubra's integration seems ephemeral and her identity codeswitching is a form of emancipation for a while since it offers a margin of navigation between two models of identifications and a kind of freedom unlike the identity camouflage of EsteveZaragasa, which is compulsive. Though liberating and murderous at the same time, this identity bears the symptoms of violence and the curse of honor killing. Identification and empowerment of migrants is fake, falsified and misleading because they are given space and identity not for the sake of recognition or for their character or for their humanity, but it is a bribe or reward for protagonist sense of bias and assimilation to western cultural values. It is politicized form of emancipation granted for characters that show disengagement, revolt and disrespect to the culture of origin by celebrating their rebellion against parental cultural heritage and adoption of liberal Western culture which is a symbol of freedom and gender equality.

The visibility of North African protagonists is falsified spirituality and deviant emancipation because it is not granted for the sake of recognizing difference and accepting others as humans despite their cultural and religious alterity, but given to those with defect personalities and deviant sexual identities or show excessive loyalty to host culture and resistance to appropriate cultural forms. However, *Retorno a Hansla* and *el Nino* represent the shifting nature cultural identity of Moroccan protagonists and their ability to show flexible construction of the self and negotiation of borders.

Integration is subjective/ biased and lacks the factor of neutrality because it is associated with those who go against the current, those with a sense of permissiveness, opposition and aberrant tendencies. Moreover, for some protagonists, the problem is not distance from parental discourse and community values that bring them to expiry and collapse, but proximity to difference and erasure of cultural gaps with host communities in term of multiculturalism and integration like in *le Noir tevasi Bien*, *Lamerica*, *Journey to the Sun* and *Code Unknown*. In his article *Minority and immigrant Representation in Recent European Cinema*, Alex Lykidis says that “... the everyday traumas of multiculturalism for members of majority groups are a more function of increased social proximity to difference rather than a function of its complete erasure,” or vice versa.

Second and third generation cinema has marked a shift from classical national cinema to hybrid transnational filmic images and new cinematic language, which integrates the European, the North African and the transnational. This visual vocabulary does not, let's say, introduced a radically oppositional content with an extreme discontinuity with Beur traditions by moving from what DenizGorturk calls “cinema of duty” to “Pleasures of hybridity” when she comment on the work of Turkish-German filmmakers like Fatih Akin, Thomas Arsalan and SeyhanDerin in her article the *Politics of Space* as the new generation of Turkish-German migrant cinema. This shift is accompanied by an interest in movement from interior physical spaces to broader exterior symbolic mobility and entrapment, where tropes of visibility/invisibility and territorialization/deterritorialization play a part in cultural conflict, construction of identities, resistance and ambivalence.

However, the new filmic images of Maghrebi migrant cinema seems to offer a double decolonialization of representation from, first, the patriarchy of traditional migrant approaches and the “duty” of return cinema and, second, from the dominant aesthetics of imperial national cinemas in Europe and its politics of underrepresentation. Self-representation of diasporic North Africans in their cinema reflects a climate of changing politics and shifting identity, where filmmakers respond objectively to the coercive requirements of complex identification of diaspora and displacement. If films like *le Sac de Farine*, *Parfumed'Alger*, *WeshWesh* and *Cheb* prefigure protagonists' reversed exile and attachment to host culture by refusing to stay home (North Africa), Some other films celebrate the transnationalized sense of mobility and hybridized politics of identity of Maghrebi migrants, who believe in the mutable nature of cultural forms.

Departure from cinema of duty is signaled to stress the fact that exclusion and disrecognition have to do with economic conditions, not with cultural determinism since those films involve multi-ethnic communities experiencing the same vulnerable circumstances of

North Africans. This does not mean that Maghrebi characters have totally moved away from traditional hegemonic forces, rather, emancipation from patriarchy and dominant discourse put them face to face with another jeopardy, which is of predator capitalism and the unbalanced geometry of global encounters with new forms of exclusion. Some Maghrebi protagonists exhibit the same fears and the discontents of other diasporic minorities, sharing multiethnic dreams and exilic entrapment of postcolonial political and economic systems, but “correct” construction of identity and diasporic consciousness reflect a little belief in the state of inbetweenness as duality of identification and disidentification. *Image, Foreign Body* and *Devines* break with the social and cultural conformity of Beur self-representation by stepping out of the "return" paradigm, which is obsessed with constraining Maghrebi protagonists in their own cultural space as defensive stance against threat of assimilation. The films complexly demonstrate reconstruction of the sociology of generational conflict. North African parents and their children are not reduced to victims of identity crisis or generational disparities where parents insist on socializing children according to conventional and traditional values, while children challenge them by appropriating more liberal and secular values; yet, parents seem to experience a triple exile: geographical (feeling of alienation in the host country), cultural (failure to come to term with the new culture) and generational (generational preferences and failure to socialize children according to traditional values) like the father in *le Noir tevasi Bien* and the mother in *la désintégration*.

Little bit different from Gorkturk's notion of “Pleasures of Hybridity”, Maghrebi third space or hybridity or inbetweenness does not manifest as identity crisis or loss as in earlier filmography, rather, hyphenated construction of identity reflects a preoccupation with broader diasporic transnational contexts (*Tenja, le Grand Voyage, un si Beau Voyage*) and complex definition of identity heading towards a kind of split identity or identity problematization in search for transnational cosmopolitanism and liquid identity codeswitching (hybridity) that allow a questioning/interrogation of old borders, reductionism and monolithic/essential perception of identification. Hybridity or instrumental identity code switching, as I call it, is contested ground of identification where Maghrebi protagonists are pushed to the limit to navigate and come to term with two conflicting hegemonic cultural paradigms (home and host). So, instrumental identity codeswitching is a space of survival, a complex condition of building a sense of the self, not stories of homecoming and not of pleasure as it seems.

Besides, there is no reference to nation or longing to home except celebration of some heritage like the inclusion of classical songs in the music of films. While exilic and third space politics seem sometimes to forecast a sense of forcible and involuntary identification,

instrumental identity codeswitching symbolizes a margin of freedom and conscious widening of identification and negotiation of belonging, but it may lead to the collapse of agency at the end. There is a distancing from the trope of protagonists being prisoners to tradition, but there is focus on handling conflict, struggle for survival and visibility and share of diasporic space. The margin may not be that enabling site of power in Spivak's sense because the sense of resistance hampers mobility (*Devines*), instead, there is a widening of the margin, an inclusion of all the marginalized: the Roma, the African, the Japanese, the European, the North African regardless of nationality, race or religion...; A "Cosmopolitics" of marginalized community. Thus, the margins and banlieues acquire new spatial politics by turning to cosmopolitan fabric that regroups minorities of the same underclass, but of multiple backgrounds. This goes hand in hand with the idea of humanization and universalization of the illegal immigrant, where the latter is seen as human being in search of dignity and survival, not imbricated in a narrative of identification with local culture (*Foreign Body*, *Devines*).

However, *Devines and Image* are not only an interrogation of dominant discourse of host societies, they are also an auto-critic of Maghrebi immigrants by blaming them for the status quo and their inability to participate in the change of their image. *Image* criticizes postcolonial state policies of exclusion and political abandonment in Europe, but also refusal of lack of initiative and work ethics among immigrants. This may evoke another notion, which I call, diasporocracy which is a tendency and practice among diasporics and the marginalized to reproduce the hegemonic misuse of power and the dictatorship of the dominant discourse/regime by turning their victimhood and achieved privilege to abuse others from ingroup or outgroup (criminality and violence among immigrants in both films); a fact that makes both filmmakers avoid fighting essentialism by falling in the trap of anti-essentialism. Identification is a complex process of construction and negotiation of cultural meaning and parent-children relation is seen from a context of generational preferences and tendencies. While first generation North African immigrants represent the traditional embodiment of religiosity and conservative thinking, Islam and religion, in general, do not meet the expectations of younger generation and do not provide strong sense of identification, at least, in *Devines*, *Foreign body* and *Image*.

Yet, Islam could be the new counter-discourse or grand narrative of many European (immigrant) Muslims and white converts, who start to see it as the new vanguard movement where chaos, violence and destruction offer rebellious philosophy and justified logic of a counter hegemony. A constant reference to the duality of submissiveness and emancipation / liberation divides older and younger generation on the space of representation by attaching credibility to a specific gendered definition of identity and family solidarity. But, before explaining the idea, it is

indispensable to go back to generational preferences. In *Devines*, Maimouna tends to favor the emancipatory model of identity where she can, with Dounia, indulge in pleasures offered by global consumer culture and freedom of street life which is the anti-thesis of her veiled mother and devout father who represents the traditional religious figure, but with less powerful authority. Despite the lack of chemistry between Dounia and her mother in terms of work ethics, personality and aspiration, the relationship between them is generally positive. Dounia gives her mother money and sympathizes with her when she is sad or when she is kicked off by her boss or when she is overcome by alcoholic drinking.

Auto-representation and self-perception of identity by Maghrebi filmmakers in diaspora slightly shifted its views about gender/sexuality, while there is an inversion of Foucauldian gaze control in some films-*devines*-, where females possess symbolic authority and males are subject of female scopophilia, there is a reference to defect masculinity as some male protagonists are associated with criminal, addict and deviant tendencies. Generally, in recent beur/banlieue cinema, the figure of the father embodies silence, muteness and impotence which contrast the traditional image of the father as patriarchal and repressive authority with allusion to mental and physical disability. Instead of the trope of childless immigrant male, *Devines* and *Image* quite a different discourse by demonstrating fatherless/ parentless migrant youth, where the majority of protagonists are displayed without the appearance of their families or fathers, but there is a reference to a changing politics of power among diasporic North African families where young females take hold of family matter and economic authority.

In *Image*, there is a clear reference to the sisters as the new agents of parental power (the police woman threatens young North African teenagers in the street of Brussels to inform their sisters if they do not conform to civility). Equally, *Devines* is an implementation of social realist cinema with appropriation of Americanized gangster genre, which reconfigures the trope of hyperfemale agency that essentializes the gendered gaze of the feminine discourse, tending to complicate the existing social and political certainties offered by the mainstream cultural paradigm (ex. internship school). Yet, female mobility is constrained by the restrictive nature of the very system it keeps fighting. Although there is an inherent frequency of counter-narrative in the representation of immigrants in Maghrebi banlieue cinema dismantling a rigid system of stereotypes, self-representation of North African young generation seems, sometimes, to archetype Muslims as criminals and drug dealers.

The association of North African protagonists, by North African filmmaker with criminality and violence takes alternative dimensions by giving it a legitimate ground or taking the form of subcultural / subaltern justice. It is the justice of marginalized groups and minorities,

those who were left to their own means of survival. It is the justice of those who were deprived of the right to be legitimate or those whose cause was made illegitimate by dominant rival groups and forced to build a counter discourse of resistance: subculturals do not play by rules. Involvement of protagonists in illegal behavior is justified and has roots or context of deprivation, exclusion and poverty. However, sometimes context is not sufficient to excuse transgressive or socially unacceptable conduct. Seen from the perspective of youth subculture, migrant identity is configured as flexible and changing experience, sharing transnationalized consumer culture or “cosmopolitics”, leisure and transgressive codes. This negotiation of cultural forms of identity presents itself as protest/resistance against conventional forms of identifications and exclusionary economic paradigms. Generational consciousness and new solidarities among members of underclass in Europe is reinterpreted from the transnationalization of slums and banlieues as space of economic injustices, whose members identity is structured on multi-ethnic basis and united by underprivilege and disadvantage.

Methodological scope and constraints of research

No one can deny the fact that it is difficult to keep up with the latest developments in academic and scholarly literature produced everyday on issues related to immigration, cinema, identity, people's mobility and diaspora. First, this field of study keeps changing and updating because of the massive corpus of social science research, postcolonial scholarship and cultural studies criticism continue to innovate this interdisciplinary field of study unstoppably. Second, the statistical aspect of migration reveals another epistemological constraint which complicates the stability of research as it reflects the complexity and intractability of data collection and dependence of knowledge on continuously revolving dynamic system that is not identical to one model of scholarship, but subject to recurrent paradigm shift and mutable epistemology. In addition, consensus on data collection and access to unified statistical system as to the definite figure of North Africans entering or residing in Europe run the challenge of lacking the accuracy of a regular quantifying or determining basis for defining the patterns and nature of phenomenon per se.

The underlying assumptions which are ingrained within the different dimensions of the phenomenon have left this field of study under indecisive equation of gaps, indeterminacies and unanswered questions because it relies on methods inadequately separated by variables of subjectivity, objectivity, political contexts and sensitivity to cultural and economic politicization. Although literature and statistics about migrant is massively available, they lose a pragmatic ground and its utility to the researcher is incompatibly obscured by polyphonic trajectories of information / data patterns, which vary according to a variety of sources: official, unofficial,

academic, national, institutional data, governmental, non-governmental, United Nations, European database, human right organization.

Likewise, although audiovisual and film materials are available through some online portals and digital archive which offer streaming access to movies, documentaries and TV programs, the major obstacle is that they require subscription and pre-advanced pay, which is both financially insecure and expensive. Besides, the accessibility of movies is, most of the time, denied and their availability is mostly determined by the genre of cinema because films that are easily accessible in market disc stores and online streaming belong to the category of action, horror and romance while films of auteur, feature films and movies about minorities or of philosophical/ analytical content are exclusively found in film festivals, national TV stations, university seminar projections. Despite the fact that global digitalization of film viewership through the deployment of internet and advanced types of DVDS, VCRS videos format are hardly traceable and made difficult by the scarcity of viewing equipment and if they are available, they are irrelevant to the content of the thesis. Sometimes, the practical aspect of research leaves with the impression that some movies are too weak, because of their over simplicity or amateurship, to be analyzed through sophisticated theoretical frameworks of postcolonial and cultural studies, which filmmakers do not know about, and they resist the applicability of big philosophical concepts like mimesis, resistance, counter –narrative, oppositional gaze. The use of feminist, postcolonial and cultural studies theoretical paradigms in subversive and ruptural/ deconstructive politics, sometimes, may not serve the strength of the research and may result in the misplacement and the inaccuracy of applying those critical rubrics that could come, in turn, with oppositional conclusions.

As it has been stated in the introduction, my thesis has taken advantage of postcolonial theory, colonial discourse analysis, cultural studies, phenomenology and the symptomacity of reading (J. Fer) and draw on their methodologies for their practical, though abstract, and aesthetic rhetoric that counter the hegemonic conception of identity and culture and give voice to alternative/minority voice even though their efficiency remains enabling only on the symbolic and narrative levels. In addition to the fact these approaches offer a credible space for interdisciplinary fusion of content, aesthetic and discourse, the fluid continuum of these "mixed salad" theories allows, at least, the researcher to deploy a multiplicity of theoretical frameworks and concepts to avoid consensus and naturalization with dominant hegemonic discourses that accentuate superiority, monovocability and politicization of cultural encounters.

Immigration, identity and cinema: which future?

If this thesis has been about understanding and deconstructing the ways North Africans are being constructed and (mis)represented in European migrant cinema as well as how migrants themselves self-portrait themselves, there is no way that this paper couldn't suggest that more research is needed to deepen analysis of migrant multiple cultural references and enrich debates about the very consequences of cultural confrontation, which lead young generations to react to hostility towards difference by (dis)engagement from cultural encounters and seek for an alternative channels of identification like extremism and other orthodoxies. There is also a research potential for expanding the scope of study on migrant cinema in comparative analysis of Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian diasporic experience to better understanding of how young generation make a sense of their identity, education, racism and reconciliation between two conflicting cultural systems. In parallel, a significant research area needed to be explored a gendered approach to the perception of identities, masculinities and femininities from a challenging or confirmative perspective to explain disparities and diversities among expatriates themselves in the representation of diaspora, difference and homelands. A quasi-experimental analysis of immigrants shifting sense of the self, identity and religion should taken into account future in studies to track fragmentation of identification from both sides by close reflection on cultural sensitivities in European decision making to alleviate sources of tensions, conflict resolution, sharing of economic, social and cultural space and access to privilege and recognition of cultural rights despite difference as well as taking into account building proximities and accessibilities to privileged perceptions, inclusive of encounters, but exclusive of conflicts. Of course, this can not be translated without legitimate policy making that looks forward ensuring dignity, respect and freedom for all members of the multi-ethnic community. Another implication for policy is smart inclusion of migration to the achievement of cultural structure of society, economy and culture by getting closer to seeing the migration phenomenon as solution not as crisis. Finally, It may fruitful for future research to shedlight on narrative of identification with migrants in European cinema and the human face of movies that made a rupture with the classical discourse of power and knowledge. A comparison between pre and post 9/11 terrorist attacks cinematic narrative remains a fertile area of scholarship. This only possible with witnessed a great wave of films about terrorist, rescuers and victims of terrorism, but when it comes to European cinema it is hard to find films about terrorism since the *BaaderMeinhof complex*, and if there is some it is rarely preoccupied with North African terrorists except the recent French box office.

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