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THE SAHARA CONFLICT IN ALGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

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THE SAHARA CONFLICT IN ALGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

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DEDICATION

*To whom I love dearly: My wonderful family, my mentors, and teachers.
For their endless love, support, and encouragement.*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- ALN:** Armée de Liberation Nationale/ National Liberation Army
- ANP:** Armée Nationale Populaire/ People's National Army
- AQIM:** Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
- AU:** African Unity
- CRUA:** Comité Révolution d'Unité et d'Action/ *Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action*
- DRS:** Department of Intelligence and Security
- FIS:** Front Islamique du Salut/ Islamic Salvation Front
- FLN:** Front de Liberation Nationale/ National Liberation Front
- GPRA:** *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne/ Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic*
- HCE:** High State Council
- HCR:** High Commission of Refugees
- HCS:** High Security Council
- ICJ:** International Court of Justice
- MALG:** Ministry of Armament and General Liaison
- MINURSO:** The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
- MOREHOB:** Mouvement Révolutionnaire des Hommes bleus
- MTLD:** Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques/ *Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties*
- NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- OAU:** Organization of African Unity
- OS:** Organisation Speciale/ Special Organization
- PLS:** Parti de Libération et du Socialisme/ Party for Socialism and Liberation
- POLISARIO:** Frente Popular Para la Liberacion de Sagiet el Hamra y Rio de Oro/
Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el Hamra and Rio de Oro
- PRC:** People's Republic of China
- SADR:** Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
- SM:** Sécurité Militaire/ Military Security
- SWAPO:** South West Africa People's Organisation
- UDMA:** Union Démocratiques du Manifeste Algérien/ Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto.
- UNFP:** The National Union for Popular Forces
- UNGA:** United Nations General Assembly
- UNSC:** United Nations Security Council
- USSR:** *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*

ABSTRACT

THE SAHARA CONFLICT IN ALGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY:

This study investigates the extent of continuity and/or change in Algeria's foreign policy regarding the Sahara Conflict following Algerian independence in 1962. Morocco's diplomatic discourse has been clear—and, over the last decade, more visible, asserting that Algeria's direct involvement in the Sahara conflict is the main reason for its perpetuation. Algeria, on the other hand, denies categorically such accusations, claiming instead that the Sahara conflict is a UN matter and labelling Morocco as the last colonizing power on the African continent.

In order to verify the validity of these contradictory allegations, the present study will assess the major factors influencing the creation and implementation of Algerian foreign policy with respect to the Sahara conflict. The aim is to test the following assumption that: Contrary to Algeria's denial that it has not been directly involved with the Sahara conflict, facts reveal that it has played a pre-eminent and dominant role in the conflict.

The study adopts a qualitative approach and makes use of interviews as the main research instruments used as an evidence in the chapters' analyses. Interviews and discussions have been carried out in Morocco and overseas with experts in the field as well as officials and politicians, who participated in the negotiation process on both the Moroccan and Algerian sides.

This research essentially confirmed the validity of the hypothesis—that the Sahara question became the central pillar of Algeria's foreign policy over the last four decades, leading to Algeria's forceful involvement in the perpetuation of the Sahara conflict. In addition, this study also sheds light on the current atmosphere of the Algerian-Moroccan relations, the role of the Sahara conflict, and its consequences related to failing to achieve a full Maghreb Integration.

Key words: Algeria, Morocco, Polisario, "Western Sahara," Sahara conflict, United Nations, referendum, self-determination, involvement, independence, foreign policy, history, Maghreb.

RESUME

LE CONFLIT DU SAHARA DANS LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE ALGÉRIENNE

Cette étude examine l'ampleur de la continuité et/ou de changement de la politique étrangère de l'Algérie concernant le conflit du Sahara depuis l'indépendance de l'Algérie en 1962. Le discours diplomatique du Maroc a été clair - et plus visible au cours de la dernière décennie, affirmant que l'implication directe de l'Algérie dans le conflit du Sahara est la principale raison de sa perpétuation. L'Algérie, quant à elle, nie catégoriquement de telles accusations, affirmant au contraire que le conflit du Sahara relève de l'ONU et qualifiant le Maroc de dernière puissance colonisatrice sur le continent africain.

Afin de vérifier la validité de ces accusations contradictoires, cette thèse évaluera les principaux facteurs influençant l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre de la politique étrangère algérienne dans le cadre du conflit du Sahara. L'objectif sera de valider l'hypothèse de recherche suivante : contrairement à l'argument de l'Algérie selon lequel elle n'a pas été directement impliquée dans le conflit du Sahara, elle a, en fait, joué un rôle prééminent et dominant dans ce conflit.

Cette étude est basée sur des entretiens au Maroc et à l'étranger et sur des conversations avec des experts dans ce domaine ainsi qu'avec des hauts fonctionnaires et des hommes politiques qui ont participé au processus de négociation tant du côté marocain qu'algérien.

Cette recherche a essentiellement confirmé la validité de l'hypothèse selon laquelle la question du Sahara est devenue le pilier central de la politique étrangère de l'Algérie au cours des quatre dernières décennies, ce qui a conduit l'Algérie à s'engager avec force dans la perpétuation du conflit du Sahara. En outre, cette étude apporte des éclaircissements sur le climat actuel des relations algéro-marocaines, le rôle du conflit du Sahara et ses conséquences liées à l'échec de l'intégration du Maghreb.

Mots clés : Algérie, Maroc, Polisario, "Sahara occidental", conflit du Sahara, Nations Unies, référendum, auto-détermination, implication, indépendance, politique étrangère, histoire, Maghreb.

ملخص

صراع الصحراء في السياسة الخارجية الجزائرية:

تبحث هذه الأطروحة مدى الاستمرارية و / أو التغيير في السياسة الخارجية الجزائرية بخصوص صراع الصحراء منذ حصول الجزائر على استقلالها في سنة 1962. لقد كان الخطاب الدبلوماسي المغربي واضحاً وأكثر وضوحاً خلال العقد الماضي، مؤكداً على أن التدخل الجزائري المباشر في صراع الصحراء هي السبب الرئيسي في استمراره. من جهة أخرى، تنفي الجزائر هذه الاتهامات بشكل قاطع، مدعيةً عكس ذلك أن نزاع الصحراء هو مسألة تخص الأمم المتحدة واصفة المغرب بأخر قوة استعمارية في القارة الأفريقية.

من أجل التحقق من صحة تلك الاتهامات المتناقضة، تقوم هذه الأطروحة بتقييم العوامل الرئيسية المؤثرة في إنشاء وتنفيذ السياسة الخارجية الجزائرية فيما يتعلق بصراع الصحراء. وسيكون الهدف هو التحقق من صحة الافتراضات البحثية التالية: خلافاً لحجة الجزائر بأنها لم تتورط مباشرة في نزاع الصحراء، فإنها قد لعبت في الواقع دوراً بارزاً ومهيماً في هذا الصراع.

تستند هذه الدراسة إلى مقابلات في المغرب والخارج، ومحادثات مع خبراء في هذا المجال، بالإضافة إلى مسؤولين وسياسيين شاركوا في عملية التفاوض على المستويين المغربي والجزائري. تتمثل النتيجة المركزية لهذه الأطروحة في أن "الاستمرارية" هي المصطلح الذي يميز السياسة الخارجية الجزائرية بشكل أفضل في ظل قيادة ما بعد 1975 .

يؤكد هذا البحث بشكل أساسي على صحة الفرضية. أن مسألة الصحراء أصبحت الدعامة الأساسية للسياسة الخارجية الجزائرية على مدى العقود الأربعة الماضية، مما أدى إلى مشاركة الجزائر القوية في استمرار نزاع الصحراء. إضافة إلى ذلك ، تسلط هذه الأطروحة الضوء على المناخ الحالي للعلاقات الجزائرية المغربية ، ودور نزاع الصحراء ، وعواقبه المتعلقة بعدم تحقيق وحدة مغاربية شاملة.

الكلمات الرئيسية: الجزائر، المغرب، البوليساريو، "الصحراء الغربية"، نزاع الصحراء، الأمم المتحدة، استفتاء، تقرير المصير، إشراك، استقلال، السياسة الخارجية، تاريخ، المغرب العربي.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The present study explores the role of Algeria's post-independence foreign policy in the Sahara conflict. Morocco's diplomatic discourse has been clear—and, over the last decade, more visible, asserting that Algeria's direct involvement in the Sahara conflict is the main reason for its perpetuation. Algeria, on the other hand, rejects categorically such claims, arguing instead that the Sahara conflict is a UN matter and qualifying Morocco of being the last colonizing power on the African continent.

In order to test the validity of these contradictory accusations, the study will try to assess the major factors influencing the creation and implementation of Algerian foreign policy with respect to the Sahara conflict. The aim is to confirm or disconfirm the research assumption that stipulates that: Contrary to Algeria's denial of its being directly involved with the Sahara conflict, facts reveal that it has played a pre-eminent and dominant role in this conflict. Therefore, though the research seeks to investigate the validity of this claim, examination of Algeria's continuous involvement in the Sahara conflict and its vested interest in a continued stalemate.

The study builds upon the foreign policy analysis approach of James Roseneau, who identified a series of analytic levels, beginning at the system level, shifting to the state level, and wrapping up with the role of the individual leaders in foreign policy decision-making. Roseneau's analytic framework contends that all factors capable of influencing a nation's foreign policy can be placed into five major source categories, namely, the societal environment of the nation, the governmental structure, the individual characteristics of the policy-making elites of that country, the roles performed by the decision-makers, and the influence of the international system in the conflict that is taking place.

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one adopts a qualitative approach based on Rosenau's theory and the major factors that influence foreign policy making, setting forth the foundation for the suggested analytic framework. Chapter one also includes a critical review of the literature available and the major studies completed on Algerian foreign policy—a policy that was molded within the framework of a revolutionary ideology and that shaped Algeria's (post-independence) leaders' mindset in the formulation of Algeria's foreign policy.

Chapters two and three analyze the foreign policy at the state level, seeking to explain the Algerian decision-making process with respect to its domestic affairs and highlighting the ideological influences on Algeria's domestic policies. These chapters also trace the origins of and developments within Algeria's foreign policy.

Chapter four examines Algeria's role in the Sahara conflict through its successive governments over the last four decades. As such, these chapters illustrate how this conflict subsequently became transcribed into Algerian foreign policy. This chapter is dedicated to the historical background of the nature of pre-independent Algeria and Morocco—a period that has had a lasting impact on Algerian-Moroccan relations to this day. Undeniably, the French perception of Algeria as a French entity and Morocco as a protectorate has engrained terrible scars on the geography of the region, which, in turn, fan the flames of the feud between the two countries in the post-independence era.

The examination of Algeria's role parses out the validity of the hypothesis mentioned earlier—that, over the last four decades, the Sahara question became the central pillar of Algeria's foreign policy, ensuring Algeria's forceful involvement in the perpetuation of the Sahara conflict. Clearly chapter four will shed light on the current mood

in the Algerian-Moroccan relations, the role of the Sahara conflict, and the consequences of not achieving a full Maghreb integration.

Finally, chapter five dissects the dynamics underlying the United Nations' (UN) take on the Sahara conflict as well as the UN's role in managing this conflict. This chapter also explores the UN's efforts to find meaningful instruments for encouraging rapprochement between the two countries and to resolve the longest and costliest border conflict in Africa's history. We have made use of the available literature in Arabic, French, and English, and supplemented this literature with a number of interviews with personalities deeply knowledgeable about the conflict.

CHAPTER ONE: MAJOR FACTORS IN THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY AND THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

Introduction

This chapter will evaluate the state of academic scholarship in the relevant field and will shed light on the methods and means used to study foreign policy. Moreover, the chapter will present a theoretical context in which to position the subject matter of the study. This will help to formulate a critical appraisal of foreign policy decision-making and its impact in the world of foreign affairs, leading the formulation of the research hypothesis underlying the present study.

I.1. Introduction to Foreign Policy Theories

Foreign policy is the strategy or approach adopted by a national government to fulfill its goals in its relation to external entities. The definition of foreign policy encompasses the following four key components:

1. Foreign policy is one of the vehicles through which the course of international politics proceeds.
2. Foreign policy is not dissociated from the national policy, it is part of it. It combines national interests, which are to be developed in relation to other countries.
3. Most, if not all, of the states establish the course of their foreign policies based on components from their external environments.

4. Foreign policy behavior encapsulates the visible components of foreign policy.

In other words, it involves the noticeable aspects of foreign policy such as the ways in which particular measures and words are employed to impact others in the area of foreign policy.

Examining the history, conceptual breadth, and recent trends present in the world and among nations cannot be done without a thorough analysis of foreign policy. Many foreign policy experts consider foreign policy analysis as the best conceptual connection to the empirical ground upon which all international relations theories are based. It is examined via an actor-specific focus, founded upon the argument that all that happens between and throughout nations is grounded in human decision-makers acting individually or in concert. Foreign policy analysis has existed as long as historians and experts have desired to uncover why national governments make the choices they do regarding interstate relations. According to Valerie M. Hudson (2008), three paradigmatic works, described below, essentially established the basis of foreign policy analysis.

1. *Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* by Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (1996). The work of Richard Snyder and his colleagues encouraged researchers to look below the nation-state level of analysis toward implicated players. As they described, “We adhere to the nation-state as the fundamental level of analysis, yet we have discarded the state as a metaphysical abstraction” (Hudson, 2008: 14).

Professor Snyder and his colleagues assumed that the basic determinants of decision-makers are spheres of competence, communication, information, and motivation. Though these determinants are connected, each can be used separately as an independent tool of analysis. “Spheres of competence” refers

to the activities of the decision-maker necessary for the achievement of the organization's objective. The core of this analytic approach is familiar to political scientists. The communication and information analysis points to the fact that the decision-maker is a member of a community—that his meanings, values, and preferences are learned and communicated. But it is in their application of the motivation determinant that the authors have been most suggestive. Here, they describe the importance of objectives, socially defined norms, material needs, values, as well as the role of personality from the standpoint of social psychology. All in all, this work played an important part not only in foreign policy achievements but also in the decision-making process.

2. Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy by Emmanuel Amadiffe (1999).

In this book chapter, the author encouraged scholars to systematically and scientifically tease out cross-nationally applicable generalization about nation-state behavior. Roseau outlined five sets of variables that he considered determinative of foreign policy (Amadiffe 129):

- 1) The individual variables, which incorporate those qualities considered significant to the decision makers, who decide on and implement a nation's foreign policies. Among these features are 1) skills, 2) personalities, and 3) beliefs, which outline the kind of individuals they are and the type of behaviors they depict. Roseau defines individual determinants as “all those aspects of decision-maker—his values, talents, and prior experience—that distinguish his

foreign policy choices, or behavior from those of every other decision-maker.”

2) The role variables that pertain to the external role behavior played by officials arising from the role they occupy. Roseneau argues that decision makers’ actions in tailoring foreign policy are greatly influenced by the positions and the roles they occupy by “virtue of the demands and expectation that others place on them in a given circumstance.”

3) Governmental variables apply to those areas of a government’s structure that prevent or enhance foreign policy options made by decision-makers.

4) The fourth category of level of analysis variables, the societal, includes non-governmental aspects of a nation that affect the way a state behaves beyond its territorial boundaries. These include, the political culture, geographical size, the degree of economic development, and any other noticeable variable including public opinion, mass media, and interest groups.

5) As far as external variables are concerned, Roseneau defines them as the “nonhuman aspects of a society’s external environment, or any actions occurring abroad, that condition or otherwise influence the choices made by its officials.”

3. *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics* by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956: 112). Harold and Margaret Sprout contributed to the field of foreign policy by investigating, within the context of

international politics, “several general hypotheses regarding the relations between human behavior, and other states of human affairs, on the one hand, and the environment, or milieu, in which these occur” (1956: 68). The goal of this examination was to establish Foreign Policy Analysis hypotheses as analytical tools for evaluating the capabilities of states and defining as well as predicting state actions and reactions. In other words, the authors argue that, although there is a general accord that foreign policy and military strategies, among other things, are connected with their environment, little has been done within the field of political science to determine the character and mechanisms of this connection.

The Sprouts (1956) suggest that in order to understand foreign policy undertakings (strategies, decision, and intentions), one must take into consideration two frameworks: the “psychological milieu” or “psycho-milieu” “the environment as perceived by the decision maker and upon which he/she bases his/her reaction”(18), on the one hand, and the “operational environment” “the true environment in which the chosen policy is executed”(18) on the other hand. The Sprouts’ findings had important impacts on the study of international relations. If one is trying to analyze how decisions are made in foreign policy, then one should try to probe the “psychological environment” of the decision maker. However, if one is more interested in the “operational results” of an explicit decision, then one should explain the “operational (or geographical) environment” (21).

The findings of these three works were important to many scholars in the field of international relations and international politics as human behavior and its influence on national foreign policy-making were critical for understanding foreign policy decision-making. As further explained by Valerie M. Hudson (2008):

Such particularities and behaviors should not remain undigested idiosyncrasies (as in traditional single-country studies), but rather be incorporated as instances of larger categories of variation in the process of cross-national middle range theory—ideally integrated in the service of such theory. The stores of knowledge of all the social sciences must be drawn upon this endeavor (17).

Indeed, the process of foreign policy making was at least as crucial, if not more important, than foreign policy as an achievement. The substance of this message was and continues to be the core of foreign policy analysis. This encompasses the following: 1) cognitive process; 2) leader personality and orientation; 3) small- group dynamic; 4) organization process; 5) bureaucratic politics; 6) culture and foreign policy; 7) domestic political contestation; 8) national attributes and foreign policy; 9) system effects on foreign policy. (Smith et al, 2008: 17). The second wave of theorizing revolves around the fundamental's paradigmatic works. In other words, between 1974 and 1993, foreign policy analysis evolved on a number of parallel research pathways. This included the following: 1) small-group decision making; 2) organizational process and bureaucratic politics; 3) comparative foreign policy; 4) psychological influences on foreign decision making; 5) societal milieu. (Smith et al, 2008: 19). Other sides of the message were more temporally bound. Certain methodological attitudes which perhaps appeared self-evident in the early 1960s would not stand the test of time. These would lead to distressing paradoxes, which would affect the field and engender a temporary decline in some areas in the mid- to late-1980s until they were adequately resolved. Despite the existence of these contradictions, the first sprout of

Foreign Policy Analysis, enduring from the late 1960s to the aforementioned decline, was an opportunity of great intellectual effort and excitement.

It is important to clarify that the goal at this chapter is not to investigate all the theories, as studies on that topic already exist in the foreign policy field, instead, the goal is to focus on the methods and ways to study foreign policy in relation to their spheres of influence on the field. Attention will also be paid to the categories of the states under study.

I.1.1. Major Factors in the Making of Foreign Policy

The study of foreign policy is considered empirical work, bending the boundary between the internal and external levels of a state. Such policies that are implemented in internal and international environments are considered complex for the following reasons: they arise out of coalitions of active actors and groups located both inside and outside state boundaries; their substance derives from issues related to both national and international politics; and they involve processes of bargaining and compromise with trade-offs, which affect the interests of both domestic and international groups (Neack, 2003: 8-11).

In his book, *Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*, Christopher Hill (2012) indicated that the “double-edged” nature of foreign diplomacy (encompassing the domestic and international variables) involves “a complex process of interaction between many actors, differentially embedded in a wide range of different structures. Their interaction is a dynamic process leading to the constant evolution of both actors and structures” (2003: 28). That is to say, in foreign policy decision-making, there exist several actors, both domestic and international, which are closely implicated in the decision-making process. Similarly, we find a number of structures (both domestic and international) that significantly influence these actors in many different ways.

In his work on *Foreign Policy and the Political Process*, William Wallace (1971) indicated that a foreign policy maker's prerogative is to be knowledgeable and informed about his country's concerns and matters by taking into account some selective criteria and construing the incoming information in accordance with his nation's values and beliefs. It is commonly understood that countries differ in their geographic, social, economic, and political structures and features; thus, policy makers need to consider the interference of such components in the foreign policy-making process (Wallace, 1971: 27). That is to say that foreign policy-making falls within both a conceptual and practical scheme. Professors William Wallace and James Rosenau have outlined foreign policy decision-making factors, both internal and external, considered to be key elements in the analysis of a country's foreign policy. Some of these factors are deemed permanent, such that they are unlikely to change fundamentally; however, there are other characteristics that change over time, such as population and capabilities. These factors are characterized as constants and variables, respectively.

I.1.1.1. Constants

A. **Decision makers' conceptual framework and the bureaucratic needs**

Decision makers in foreign policy, especially the heads of governments, have to play a two-level game between international and domestic politics. Individual variables contain those qualities specific to the decision-makers who determine and implement the foreign policy of a state. These characteristics include the skills, personalities, and beliefs that define who they are and how they behave as individuals. Rosenau (1974) defines individual determinants as “[a]ll those aspects of a decision-maker, his values, talents, and prior experience that distinguish his foreign policy choices or behavior from those of every

other decision-maker” (1974: 128). He argues that decision-makers’ actions in making foreign policy are influenced fundamentally by the roles they occupy and the socially determined attitudes and legally acceptable standards identifiable with a given position.

When studying foreign policy, scholars in foreign policy and international relations should consider the way decision makers achieve objectives as well as the manners in which they assess situations and defend their interests. Decision makers’ situational perceptions can influence the entire course of action in their decision-making. For example, the international scene consists of actors, states, and non-states, each with their particular set of interests, objectives, and priorities—this does not have to fall within the scope of conflict, yet most of the time it is different from one another. Hence, for all but the most prominent and influential actors, a level of resistance is expected to come into the process of acquiring one’s own way in the system with the goal to come up with intended results. (Brighi & Hill, 2012: 149).

However, even the most powerful decision makers and players in foreign policy may not successfully manipulate the environment surrounding them due to failures of judgment or disadvantageous asymmetries in other important dimensions besides power, e.g., information or legitimacy (Brighi& Hill, 2012).

In the same vein, K. Holsti indicated that reality is different from the policy makers’ perceptions of reality for a variety of reasons including physical impediments from fluctuating information, flawed communication, censorship, incompetent advisors, lack of intelligence sources, or because of beliefs, values, attitudes, or faulty expectations (Brighi& Hill, 1995: 271). When there is a disparity between policy makers in terms of attitudes and beliefs, this can automatically lead to a disagreement in facts and claims. However, given the ranging types of relationships countries have with each other—be they hostile, friendly,

trustworthy, or dangerous, it is important for statesmen to assess their neighbor states' and counterparts' goals and purposes before undertaking any step.

Besides attitudes, values are also important factors in implementing any country's foreign policy. Such values that decision makers possess—be they tacit or explicit (i.e., wealth, power, prestige, happiness, isolation)—should be regarded as reasons and justifications for their goals, actions, and decisions. K. Holsti (1995) went further by pointing that in western societies, the values of individual freedom, civil liberties, national self-determination, justice, independence, and economic progress are usually referred as motives that are behind policy objectives, and turned toward directed actions. In several developing countries the values of rapid economic development, national unity, freedom from foreign control, and national prestige function as a central criterion against which to judge one's own policies and those of other states. In socialist societies, the significance of working-class solidarity, the struggle against imperialism as well as the endorsement for national liberal movements were frequently incorporated in policy statements (p.273).

Ergo, such beliefs regarding social and economic issues, for example, are often the basis for the choices made by decision makers. There are beliefs—common in some societies—that are revealed in the behavior of foreign policy makers who assert that a particular state or nation is superior to the other, that political or economic order is predominant to others, that communism is unavoidable, or that a specific country is a threat. Yet other policy makers base their beliefs on the fact that a country's conflict can be resolved through negotiations, emphasizing threat avoidance and supporting foreign aid as important factors for stability and democracy. Beliefs like these are the foundation of national myths and ideologies, and in some instances, if they are subject to questioning and disagreement, can be met with exclusion and hostility.

A doctrine is a belief system and statement made by a foreign policy maker that is typically employed to establish goals for a particular political action. For instance, Richard Nixon's justification for the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam was ultimately deemed "The Nixon Doctrine." The goal of a foreign policy doctrine is to set general rules for foreign policy conduct through decision-making.

A set of doctrines is known as an ideology. Mullins (1972) describes ideology as a logically consistent structure of symbols which, within a more or less sophisticated conception of history, brings together the cognitive and evaluative approach of one's social condition—specifically its long-term outlook—to a program of joint action for the sustenance, change, or transformation of society (p.498).

This definition is similar to Hunt's as provided in his distinguished work on ideology and foreign policy. Hunt states that "[i]deologies are an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduce the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms, and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality" (1987: 567).

Together, doctrines and ideologies establish the long-term goals and objectives of a state's external behavior that is to be advocated through diplomatic work, propaganda, revolution, or force. Furthermore, they serve as a rationale for policy makers. For instance, in some countries (Western countries, in particular), foreign policy actions are often legitimized because they defend the popular values of freedom preservation, while in Russia and China, foreign policy decision-making aligns with the values that support and enhance communist ideology. Overall, ideologies tend to frame states' policies; however, as subsequently described, the ideologies are rarely determinative when other values are at risk. Similarly, Holsti (1992) emphasizes on the idea that "Liberal principles can be, and

have been sacrificed when other values such as national security are at risk. Similarly, no Soviet leader failed to compromise Marxist-Leninist principles of socialist solidarity, if critical Russian national interests were threatened. (K. Holsti, 1995: 276).

It is important to bear in mind that policy-makers also tend to analyze a particular problem or issue by comparing it to an analogous prior event in an effort to determine the correct course of action to resolve the current problem. To do this properly, foreign policy makers must have current information to best contextualize the analogy.

According to Rosenau (1980), politicians and policymakers through their historical analogy selection, often reveal more about their foreign policy worldview, than do conventional partisan or ideological labels. What tells us even more about how a foreign policy maker conceives a particular situation is how often he falls back on historical analogies. For example, many U.S. policymakers have used the supposed lessons from the 1938 Munich Agreement¹ to justify hardline policies because per that agreement France and England followed a policy of appeasement toward the Nazis, choosing to bring peace and not interfere with Hitler's takeover of Czechoslovakia. This policy was applied in the hope that German military aggression toward neighboring states would stop at the Czech border and that war in Europe could be avoided. However, this agreement failed to stop the outbreak of World War II, thus, giving the Munich Agreement the reputation of being a disastrous diplomatic exercise. The "lesson" learned from the Munich Agreement has affected the American political world ever since. Following the strike on Libya, Ronald

¹This settlement reached on September 30, 1938, by Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy permitted German annexation of the Sudetenland in western Czechoslovakia. After his success in absorbing Austria into Germany proper in March 1938, Adolf Hitler looked covetously at Czechoslovakia, where about three million people in the Sudeten area were of German origin. The Soviet Union also had a treaty with Czechoslovakia, and it indicated willingness to cooperate with France and Great Britain if they decided to come to Czechoslovakia's defense, but the Soviet Union and its potential services were ignored throughout the crisis.

Reagan argued, “Europeans who remember their history understand better than most that there is no security, no safety, in the appeasement of evil” (Beck, 1989: 161). This famous historical incident, however, cannot be taken for granted and should not be used as a go-to justification whereby actions are undertaken. A few examples that demonstrate how the application of the Munich Agreement “lesson” led to incredibly chaotic outcomes when applying the same logic to different circumstances include the U.S. wars against Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. All in all, even though some foreign policy-related historical analogies may sound convincing and might depict a convincing reality, they might be wrong as mentioned earlier; thus, foreign policy makers need to be careful when applying such “lessons” as they could jeopardize their reputations and the soundness of their decisions.

In the realm of foreign policy analysis, Jensen Llyod (1982) describes the role of personality in foreign policy decision-making involves cognitive processes, background, personal characteristics, motives, and beliefs, and presumes that decision-making is the result of individual “human agency”—meaning, ultimately, it is the individual, not the state, who makes decisions (a concept which Jensen describes as a “legal abstraction”) (L. Jensen, 1982: 50).

Personality is a crucial factor in understanding foreign policy behavior, yet its relevance is associated with international system factors and constraints as well as internal political structures. K. Holsti suggests three different meanings for the term *personality*: (1) policy-making skills; (2) character traits that predispose individuals to behave in certain ways in given conditions; and (3) pathological traits. Each of these characteristics has a significant effect on foreign policy makers’ decision-making processes and, ultimately, the decisions they reach (1995: 278). In other words, the way a foreign policy maker behaves in a particular situation, i.e., being tolerant/intolerant of diverging views,

possessing/lacking a capacity to memorize, being capable/incapable of sorting through trivial matters to get to the essential information, or being able/unable to think clearly in conditions of high stress, influences the way that foreign policy maker reaches a decision (K. Holsti, 1995: 279).

Policy-makers should also view bureaucracy as an important element in the outcome of their decision-making. As noted by Smith, “[n]ational bureaucracies have been at the heart of foreign policy analysis” (2008: 91-105). Bureaucracies exist in both small and large states in order to defend the national interest of any country. They involve ministries, departments, agencies, and organizations. Though bureaucracies are considered to be important institutions of the state whose primary role is policy implementation, there are times that these bureaucracies go beyond this role, permeating through the formulation of policies. In other words, not only do bureaucracies implement foreign policy actions, they also get involved in the making of foreign policy through dialogue, debate, conflict, and compromise. Nevertheless, countries may ignore and shun the bureaucratic process when they see that a particular country represents a potential danger.

Algerian foreign policy is an excellent example of how different factors influence a country’s foreign policy—under its Algerian presidential legacy, foreign policy was designed to serve, at times, the values of national independence, cooperation, and national identity in accordance with Algeria’s national interest. Since its independence in 1962, the country has faced destabilizing domestic challenges that have affected its foreign policy-making, which has made Algerian decision-makers’ beliefs, attitudes, and realities influential in the restructuring of Algerian foreign policy.

B. Geographic characteristics

The geography of a state is another important factor in foreign policy-making. As described by Nicholas Spykman, “In such a world, the geographic area of the state is the territorial base from which it operates in times of war, and the strategic position which it occupies during the temporary armistice called peace” (1938: 29).

One reason geography is a fundamental factor in the formation of domestic policy is because it is the most permanent: “Ministers come and ministers go, even dictators die, but mountain ranges stand unperturbed” (Spykman, 1938: 30). For example, Alexander I, Czar of Russia, ceded to Joseph Stalin, an ordinary member of the Communist party, not only his power but also all his endeavor to find access to the sea. Similarly, Clemenceau shared with Caesar and Louis XIV their apprehension over the opening of the German frontier.

That is to say that the quest of the great powers is to have an indirect foothold in countries located in interesting geopolitical areas, especially when such countries enjoy geographic features that have an important socio-economic impact, be they in the medium- or long-term. As further illustrated by Spykman:

“Because the geographic characteristics of states are to some extent unchanging and unchangeable, the geographic claims of those states might remain for centuries, and because the world has not yet reached that happy state where the wants of no man conflict with those of another, those demands will cause friction” (1938: 30).

In that vein, Algeria has utilized its relationship with the Polisario to undermine Morocco; specifically, Algeria has regional hegemonic ambitions and is utilizing the Polisario to challenge Morocco for hegemonic supremacy in the Maghreb. Based on these efforts, it appears that size plays a crucial role in the strength of a state and the desire for

power. Natural resources, for instance, affect populations' density and economic configuration and structure, which in themselves are means and methods for framing the policy. Location as regards to the equator and to oceans and land masses concludes closeness to centers of power, areas of conflict, and routes for transit and communication, while location in relation to immediate neighbors establishes position with respect to potential enemies, revealing the real problems of territorial security.

The topography and the location of a country also play crucial roles in the international system. Given their permanent nature, they constitute motives for invasions, exerting a manifold influence on foreign policy. To cite but a few examples, Morocco's geopolitical location was important in the colonial relation with many European countries, which has had a prolonged effect on the country. Furthermore, Algeria's foreign policy towards its neighboring countries is designed for border expansion and influence within the Maghreb regions, using calls for greater national unity—reminding its people of the victims who succumbed to the bloody years of the war for independence—as a means to rally support for Algeria's cause. For instance, Algeria did not relinquish the Moroccan territory that it inherited from the colonial period, as it was important for Algeria to maintain the size of the territory left by colonial France in order to impose its hegemony across the Maghreb. Among the reasons for Algeria's decision was to support “Western Saharan” independence because a simpatico or proxy state in “Western Sahara” would provide Algeria a route to the Atlantic for natural resource exportation.

To sum up, geography is the first element that will determine the foreign policy of a country. Every nation's geography affects its view of itself and its view of the world. Geography also gives insights into the political dynamics. Geography is a permanent feature that has impact on human interactions. One cannot exclude geography to

understand international relations and foreign policy, modern geography is not longer only physical aspect, it is also about human organization of the earth surface, and there is still more situations left that can explain the relationship of geography and foreign policy and its important role in this field. Indeed, foreign policy has been influenced by geographical features like: human immigration, population growth and social as well as domestic and economic components. These are variables which will be analysed in the following section.

I.1.1.2. Variables

A. The demographic and social variables

Population and social level of analysis variables are interrelated factors that can be of great importance with regards to how foreign policy is outlined. The population, as a defining factor in a state's size, represents a state's primary resource. Thus, the larger the state, the greater its population and the more powerful it is perceived to be when compared with smaller states. As stated by Peter Calvert, "Gross population size is one of the major marks of a great power" (1986: 100). Great powers are more likely to use military force as a means to defend their interests and pursue their goals because their large populations offer a reliable pool of military resources. Nevertheless, these great powers must acquire superior capabilities to be recognized as stronger and more powerful. The Republic of China, for instance, is viewed as an important superpower, primarily for its overwhelming population as well as its significant economic structure, production capabilities, and technological savoir-faire (Frankerl, 1979: 31). Similarly, when arms capabilities are substantially important, there is a rough link between population size and political influence both internally and externally. States with weak capabilities tend to forge ambitious objectives, although, as stated by K. Holsti,

“The actions of Egypt under Nasser, Libya under Ghaddafi, Iran under the clerics, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein show that lack of capabilities (compared with the great powers) does not necessarily inhibit a regime from pursuing broad revolutionary objectives, at least at the regional level⁴”(1995: 257).

These national attributes—the population and social characteristics—along with the level of capabilities a state can acquire help formulate foreign policy.

Algeria’s social structure has been affected by colonizers. The French dismembered entire communities by transplanting some to distant areas, taking the best lands, and imposing their own network of officials onto the largely segmented Algerian social structure. Colonial rule in Algeria effectively destroyed some of the tribal communities, while leaving others in place, compelling their internal cohesion. It was, therefore, very important for this new state to re-establish itself immediately after independence, especially given its increased population of young people. However, advancing the country after those long bloody years of war was not an easy task for the Algerian regime as will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

B. The domestic environment

It has become an axiomatic truth, agreed to by many foreign policy scholars and diplomats, that the foreign policy of a country is—to a large extent—determined by its domestic environment. Further endorsed by Nweke (1986) who advanced the idea that the numerous constituent aspects in the political system—the government, the political parties, pressure groups, the civil service, the political and bureaucratic elites, public opinion, and the press—serving within the democratic process provided by the constitution apply explicit or indirect influence in forming and building a country’s foreign policy (p.25).

According to Alden and Aran (2012), there are three fundamental approaches to understanding the impact of domestic factors on a country's foreign policy. The first approach perceives the institutions and regimes of a country to be the primary domestic influencers. The second perceives the economy and the "interests of [the] narrow elite" acting in the national interest to be the primary domestic influencers. The third believes that the "interplay between interest groups, and state decision makers and structures" most significantly influences a country's foreign policy.

By and large, domestic politics forms the foundation of any decision-making for foreign policy makers. Indeed, many other factors, which may affect the direction of the decisions, come into play.

Due to the fact that Algeria is a relatively new state that gained its independence after a long period of colonization, the formulation of its foreign policy has been deeply affected by its domestic affairs. Algeria has been impacted by strong domestic instability, which weakened the long-term sustainability of the state. Many foreign policy experts like Henry Kissinger, claim that domestic instability is typically considered a source of foreign conflict—meaning that politicians and decision makers tend to create international conflict or concoct an issue of international dimension through which they divert the population's attention away from the domestic internal problems. Taking note from Henry Kissinger, "many leaders of new nations make use of foreign policy to escape intractable internal difficulties, and use it as a device to guarantee domestic cohesion" (1977: 41). For instance, under President Houari Boumedienne and even in the modern era, Algeria's relations with the West and other Arab countries have been underscored by anti-imperialist dispositions—in fact, even some anti-monarchical sentiments have been expressed. As the subsequent chapter will discuss, this foreign policy approach was designed to unify the

nation in its anti-imperialist struggle. In this section, variables will be determined from within the territorial limits or frontiers of the state that affect and influence decision makers.

C. The influence of economics

Economic policy plays a key role in foreign policy. Financial crises bring about tension among states as well as between the interests of principal global players, such that the economic power of a country can indeed be used to influence other nations.

Upon gaining its independence from France, Algeria inherited from its former colonizer a completely dismembered and dependent economy. Algeria has spent nearly half of the last fifty years constructing a model of socialist development. Between 1962 and 1963, the early years of independence, Algeria suffered a mass exodus of European settlers, including big landlords, greedy entrepreneurs, highly skilled workers, doctors, and administrators; their departure severely hampered the development of the Algerian economy.

The Algerian leaders had to learn everything from scratch—from how to govern the country to how to revive the economy. President Ben Bella's alarming speech before the national assembly in 1962 illustrates how dire Algeria's economic situation was at that time. Ben Bella stated that some 4,500,000 Algerians were impoverished; only about 10 percent of the available labor force was employed full time; industrial enterprises were working at 15 to 20 percent of their capacities; hundreds of thousands of acres of the best farmland were left unseeded or had been inadequately cultivated; and, in big cities, such as Algiers and Oran, about half of the stores were closed or shuttered, their owners having left for France (Joestan, 1964: 213-14).

Under President Houari Boumedienne, Algeria implemented an economic strategy based on the soviet socialist model, which privileged the upstream sector and was schematically supported by the following elements (Teulon & Fernandez, 2014):

- ◆ A single political party (The Front de Liberation Nationale, FLN);
- ◆ Difficulty in correcting any errors (strong ideology and weak opposition) and a lack of appraisal of public policies;
- ◆ Protectionism, state monopoly over international trade, absence of export support mechanisms (desire for autarchy);
- ◆ Centralized planning (the first quadrennial plan was launched in 1970) and centrally administered economy;
- ◆ Priority given to heavy industry (collective farming); and
- ◆ Transfer of agricultural resources to industry.

Accordingly, Boumedienne's top priority was to develop the "industrializing industries" model that was designed by Destanne de Bernis and financed by its own resources. From 1965 to 1972, a series of nationalizations took place in Algeria. The Algerian government took possession of banks and insurance companies as well as an important portion of both the mining and oil sectors. Despite the fact that the four-year plans (1970-73 and 1973-77), which dealt with the nationalization of the Algerian industry helped the Algerian economy breakthrough its slump, Boumedienne deeply neglected the agricultural sector, making things worse for the majority of farmers. As further explained by James de La Sueur,(2012):

"During these years, Boumedienne's Algeria enjoyed unprecedented economic development in specific areas, such as heavy industries, construction, mining, and hydrocarbons. At the same time, the agricultural sector deteriorated to the point that it would soon become Algeria's Achilles' heel" (2012: 21).

Boumedienne's neglect of agriculture is explained by his ideological and autarchic concept of a government invested in heavy industries, which proved to be ill-conceived as it sacrificed agriculture, consumer goods, and housing.

When Chadli Bendjedid was given the post of President of the Republic, he was faced with mounting social and economic strains, particularly those caused by Boumedienne's inability to create new jobs within the Algerian economy. Thus, President Chadli began to liberalize the economy. He shifted his strategy to light industries and decentralized state economic enterprises, agriculture, and housing, and prioritized the private sector. Nevertheless, since only 27 percent of Algeria's industrial workforce was in the private sector, Bendjedid faced great confrontations as the availability of jobs lagged behind the soaring population and housing shortages became a permanent problem of the Algerian society (Amnesty International, 2009).

The economic shift under President Bouteflika, which involved restructuring the public sector enterprises and financial liberalization, strained the country due to the absence of positive outcomes within the Algerian society. Unemployment rates increased as over 120,000 jobs were lost during 1998 and a further 180,000 shed in 1999 as a result of the economic reform process (International Group Crisis Report, 2000). In addition, the Algerian Market functioned via a post-hoc "zoning" process used by generals and clans through various business affiliations, business cleavages, and corruption that hampered market access and price stability.

Today, almost 50 years after independence, the Algerian economy is a service-based rentier economy. As stated by the national office of statistics, 83% of the economic fabric is based on trade and small-scale services. Over 90% of the industrial fabric is made

of family based SMI/SME structures, and despite the fact that the country owns the third largest oil reserves in Africa and a third of the continent's gas resources, it is still unable to construct a modern economy outside the oil and gas sectors (Bahia, 2014).

Despite the Algerian presidents' economic failures, their control of the Algerian national economy was considered an important element in Algeria's foreign policy decision making as stated in one of Boumedienne's speeches:

"To have an efficacious foreign policy, it is first of all crucial to have a healthy economy, as the task of development will lead us to a well-defined foreign policy not only with regard to the struggle for freedom but also for just causes in the world"(President Houari Boumedienne speech 1978).

Through this very statement, Boumedienne sought to explain the degree of connectivity between economic policy and foreign policy. In fact, the perception of the Algerian leaders, and their views that the country's underdevelopment stemmed from capitalist influence, fostered the implementation of an external policy. It also greatly impacted these leaders' internal economic visions. From Ben Bella to Chadli Bendjedid, the leaders of Algeria have relentlessly endorsed and called for a policy of Third World mobilization to revamp the international economic system. It is, however, relevant to state that to mention that despite the fact that Algeria was calling for and inciting the adoption by developing states of an extreme policy in their economic relations with developed countries, and renouncing the established international economic order, development considerations such as the lack of advanced technology and financial liquidity had, nevertheless, restrained the Algerian government into acting pragmatically. Hence, practically, the leaders showed their flexibility whenever the national economic interest arose. Between 1973 and 1979, for example, the percentage of Algeria's trade with the

West rose from 87.1 per cent to 83 per cent, while the percentage with the Eastern bloc declined from 6.2 to 4.75 per cent. (Entelis, 1986: 45)

D. Public opinion

The issue of public opinion and its influence on foreign policy making was a platform of disagreement between realists and liberalists in the post-Cold War era. On the one hand, realists like Lippmann (1925) and Gabriel Almond (1950) perceived public opinion as volatile, emotional, lacking coherence and structure, and having only a minor impact on foreign affairs (Foyle, 1999). On the other hand, liberalists identified public opinion regarding international affairs as stable, sensibly structured, consistent, and having significant effects on foreign policy-making in a “reciprocal relationship” (Katz, 1997; Soroka, 2003: 27-48). Accordingly, given the debate, there are some leaders who take public opinion into account when making crucial decisions, while others ignore it. According to the former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger:

“Statespersons are constrained by two sets of influences: politics, power, and actions of other states; and domestic constraints, ranging from public opinion to the attitudes of the government and bureaucracy. [Therefore,] a foreign policymaker must understand these constraints, master them, and transcend them, bending them to his or her will” (Russett et al, 2000: 116-17).

The question of public opinion and its impact on foreign policy-making has been a subject of debate between realists and liberals both during and after the Cold War. Arguments in support of the realist view date back to the 18th century—as Edmund Burke (1854), a political philosopher, contended:

“[A representative’s] unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living . . . Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion” (1vol. 1, ch. 13, doc. 7).

Lippmann further contended that unresponsive public reaction to venues and the absence of information causes the foreign policy decision-maker to react too late. This is because the opinion deals with a situation that no longer exists (Lippmann, 1955: 21). Further illustrating his argument, Lippmann opined that countries who value public opinion—letting it influence government decision making—do so to the detriment of the nation as the decisions of the masses are often “too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiation” (1955: 21).

Lippmann feared that mass opinion is volatile—lacking in structure and coherence. Thus, its role in the conduct of foreign affairs is irrelevant; suggesting that public influence in foreign policy-making should be limited. According to Lippmann, the public is a dangerous and irrational force. The public can elect the government, he argued, and they can remove it; they can approve or disapprove its performance, but they cannot administer the government. In other words, a mass cannot govern (1955: 20).

Going further, Morgenthau (1972) argued that the government is the “leader” of public opinion, not its “slave.” According to him, the clear-sighted preconditions of good foreign policy need not rely on the support of public opinion, as public inclinations are based on emotions, rather than rationality. This is particularly true of a foreign policy, which usually involves two desirable but incompatible features (Morgenthau, 1972: 104).

Neorealists such as Mearsheimer (2001) have similar assertions. In fact, Mearsheimer opines that when it comes to national security issues, public opinion is “notoriously fickle and responsive to elite manipulation and world events” (Foyle, 1999:5). In the U.S. in particular, Mearsheimer says that foreign policy-makers employ “liberal talk,

realist thinking” (2001: 50); meaning that while American public dialogue is more often than not formulated in the language of liberalism, the U.S. takes its actions in the international system in relation to the dictates of realist logic. Despite the fact that foreign policy can sometimes be influenced by public opinion and has occasionally created obstacles for the policy makers, realists concluded that elites either manipulate the public into endorsing their policies or overlook their preferences completely.

However, not everyone agrees with the realist stance. The evidence indicates that public opinion is characterized by consistency, structure, and influence on foreign policy-making in a “reciprocal relationship” (Katz, 1997). In addition, the research conducted since the 1970s supports the conclusion that public opinion on foreign affairs is often stable, sensibly structured, and rational (Soroka, 2003: 27). Wilsonian Liberals, for instance, contend that foreign policy-making should be influenced by public opinion due to “democratic norms and the public’s moderating affect on possibly adventurous and overambitious elites” (Guraziu, 2008: 7). Woodrow Wilson assumed that through popular opinion a wise foreign policy could be developed given that “only free peoples can hold their purpose, and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own” (Guraziu, 2008: 7). According to Foyle, the impact of public opinion on foreign policy outcomes is conditioned by interrelated actions between a decision maker’s viewpoints about the genuine role of public opinion in foreign policy conception and the state of affairs in which a foreign policy must be made (1999: 50). Historically, public opinion has undeniably played a significant role in certain foreign policies. A prime example is the American public’s opposition to the Vietnam War. The U.S. Congress voted unanimously to allow President Lyndon Johnson to dispatch military forces to Vietnam in 1964. That congressional vote revolved around public opinion, which

endorsed the troop development, to stop the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. However, beginning in 1967, vast protests against the war began breaking out—mainly on college campuses, and by 1968, public opinion had shifted drastically as support for the war within Johnson’s Democratic Party had eroded. As a result, Johnson decided to forego an attempt at a second term as President, admitting his defeat within the party. Such side-effects show that public opinion impacted every aspect of that conflict significantly—playing a huge role in changing government policy. Similar actions took place in 2006, when many voters expressed their discontent over the U.S. war in Iraq, resulting in meaningful overturns for the ruling Republican Party.

Public opinion can be similarly significant in bringing about change in economic policy. In Mexico, for example, changing directions in public opinion, which held Mexico out to be a “developed” rather than a “developing” country, made President Vicente Fox initiate a free trade policy after his election in 2000.

From a different perspective, the public may tend to be passive and indifferent about most foreign policy issues at times. Under such circumstances, public opinion might have a concealed effect. However, research findings have supported the notion that public opinion is significant when disagreements occur between leaders (D’Anieri, 2009: 142-43). Specifically, D’Anierie emphasizes on the fact that ‘‘Where there is debate within a government or among the broader foreign policy elites that includes experts and nongovernmental research institutions, the opposing sides are likely to turn to the public to gain support for their positions’’ (p.143). In this regard, this can happen even in authoritarian and other developing societies. D’Anieri (2009) gives the example of Iran where there has been a public discord between “hardliners” and “liberals” concerning, among other things, the country’s policies toward nuclear weapons and towards the West.

Similarly, in the Soviet Union, foreign policy debates, including debates over the possibility of winning a nuclear war, surfaced in public on several occasions (2009: 150).

E. Military capabilities

One of the most important factors in the making of foreign policy is military capability, as it determines the strength or weakness of a country. It illustrates whether a country could enter a war and win it or if the country should be reluctant to take part in any kind of conflict. Thusly, foreign policy is structured partly with regard to the military vessel. Either the country is weak and should opt for a cooperative foreign policy, or it is strong enough to set its own rules.

Born in a bloody revolution out of French colonial rule, Algeria became independent in 1962. The involvement of the ANP (Armée Nationale de Liberation) in the state's affairs dates back to the early days of the revolution. During this period, there was no separation between the ALN (Armée de Liberation Nationale) and other revolutionary institutions of the FLN. The politico-military aspects of the revolution and the political background of its commander made the ALN an important institution that was invariably involved in the decision-making process (Bensaada, 1992: 30-32, 94-104).

This historical importance became stronger on the eve of independence when the Army, unlike the FLN, was able to overcome its internal divisions and emerge as the only revolutionary institution capable of influencing the political events of the early days of the new state. The Army's determination not to restrain itself merely to its classical role of providing defense and security against threats of an external kind became evident when it gave its full support to Ahmed Ben Bella in his claim for the office of president despite the opposition of many political leaders.

The desire on the part of the military institution to become more involved in Algeria's domestic political affairs was discernable in 1965 when it took overt command of the direction of the state. In fact, and ironically, among the reasons behind the 1965 *coup d'état* were Ben Bella's maneuvers to reduce the Army's temptations to flirt with political power.

In alluding to Ben Bella's attempts to foster army factionalism, Boumedienne argued that:

By stealthy methods of diversion and division, a large number of reactionary and exploitative elements within the political and administrative machinery of the country sow disorder and trouble in order to raise up the people against their leaders and the revolutionary forces among them (the Army) (Zartman, *L'Armee*, 1967: 270).

In another statement, he stressed that Ben Bella wanted to overshadow his comrades and raise up problems against each other's in order to climb onto the top of the heap (Zartman, 1967: 270).

After the coup, the new nation was governed for more than 25 years by two military figures—Houari Boumedienne from 1965 until 1978, and Chadli Bendjedid from 1979 until early 1992. Although both presidents relied upon the armed forces for support, their regimes were by no means military dictatorships. The military, however, was heavily represented in the FLN—the single party that controlled Algeria's socialist state until 1989. Nonetheless, under Boumedienne and Bendjedid, civilian government institutions developed, and, in 1989, a multiparty parliamentary system emerged.

Following the coup in June 1965, the military became directly involved in the management of the state's policy. This power was exercised through the Council of the

Revolution, which represented the highest decision-making body, as the 26-member body was made up of 22 military officers.

This pattern of military centrality in domestic politics was not altered by Boumedienne's death in 1978. Once again, the Army used all its influence to maintain its position at the top of the state's hierarchy. It succeeded, through a peaceful transition, in bringing about the appointment of a Colonel from its ranks to replace the deceased President. This successor, Bendjedid, directed the country for an additional 13 years without radically altering the established system. Indeed, apart from a few changes that affected the military personnel by the appointment of some new commanding officers, who were largely believed to be more professional and loyal to the President, the military institution continued to play its traditional decision-making role within the state's apparatuses (Zartman, *L'Elite*, 1984: 46-48).

However, if it is easy to assess the degree of the Army's internal involvement, it is more complex when it comes to discerning and identifying its practical role in terms of foreign policy-making. The Algerian leadership's insight into the external world as well as its perceptions on what represented a risk or threat at the national level have—over the long term—been highly influenced by ideology. The War of Independence was instrumental for establishing a set of beliefs that emphasized Algeria's identity along with the newly independent, third world countries.

Algerian leaders were totally opposed to the ideals of imperialism, Zionism, colonialism, and economic domination by the former colonial powers. As a matter of fact, this frame of mind included a measure of suspicion and hatred toward the capitalist states of Europe and North America, and support for liberation groups whose struggles for independence mirrored Algeria's foreign policy.

By the early 1990s, Algeria's previously consistent guiding principles began to change. The perceptions formed during the war of independence were strengthened through President Chadli Bendjedid, who was known for his wary, officious style, and the more than two decades of experience as a sovereign state. Under Bendjedid's rule, Algeria embraced the role of mediator when disputes arose between Western nations and other radical states of the Arab world.

There was, of course, a scope within which the Army could wield an indirect influence, as corroborated through the following observations:

- 1) Between 1965 and 1978, the military dominated the Revolutionary Council, the highest decision-making body.
- 2) Except for the first three years following independence, the presidential function was continuously held by an Army officer.
- 3) For 13 years, Bouteflika, a former officer and close friend of President Boumedienne, held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs. There was a significant presence within the presidential administrations of officers assuming the function of presidential advisers during both Boumedienne's and Bendjedid's presidency, especially after the appointment of the then Lieutenant-Colonel Larbi Belkheir as Director of the Presidential Cabinet in 1982 and Secretary General to the president the following year. As a matter of fact, Belkheir had direct involvement in issues related to Algeria's relationships with both France and Morocco (Bougherira, 1999).
- 4) Military opinions/decisions reigned supreme with respect to issues of national security.

With regard to "Western Sahara"², for example, the opinion of the Army's senior

²The author has used the term "Western Sahara," following the nomenclature given by the United Nations in all the official UN documents.

officers had been decisive in Boumedienne's decision to take a tough stand against Morocco's claim over this territory. This issue also became one of the top priorities for Algeria's military intelligence service. Algeria gradually acquired a quantitative military superiority over Morocco with the introduction of large amounts of modern weaponry acquired mainly from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Algerians avoided direct confrontation with the more experienced Moroccan troops. In January 1976, however, the Moroccans seriously defeated two battalions of Algerian troops and took prisoners in clashes inside the "Western Sahara." Following that episode, Algerian contingents did not undertake any course of action into the "Western Sahara" regardless of Moroccan claims to the contrary. Similarly, the Moroccans withheld from going after troops in Algerian territory.

F. The influence of ideology on foreign policy-making

The main goal of this section is to discuss the role of ideology in the implementation of foreign policy by foreign policy makers. This topic was tackled from several angles, coming up with a variety of perspectives concerning the ways ideologies affect the implementation of foreign policy. Before studying the implications of ideology in foreign policy making, we shall examine the significance of ideology and offer a definition for the term.

It is very difficult to attribute one meaning or usage to the term of ideology, considering the different competing connotations the term has accumulated. It hence becomes most necessary to investigate the roots of the word and the development of its different usages, to try to account for the environment within which it developed, so as to understand not only its linguistic usage but also its conceptual use and the semantic

meaning it acquired. Kellner stated that “[i]deology was used to describe a science of ideas” that would analyze the origins, nature, and social functions of ideas (1978: 32). The concept was influenced by the Enlightenment Project that was engineered to provide a rational foundation for human knowledge and to analyze the source and nature of error and delusion. De Tracy (B.W. Head: 2002) followed the Enlightenment Project of seeking—through reason—liberation from the yoke of prejudice, false beliefs, and superstition, and he thought that this “purifying of the mind” would make possible a rational social order (34). Accordingly, the concept of ideology developed from the enlightened attack on the existing feudal powers and was a product of the “bourgeois revolution movement” (Kellner, 1978: 39).

Bendix (1964) on the other hand stated that the term ideology has been used as a political weapon—a tool with which to denounce or incriminate rival sets of ideas or belief systems. Not until the second half of the twentieth century did the term become widely used and accepted as an objective, neutral concept; nevertheless, disagreements remained over the social role and political significance of ideology. The meanings that have been attributed to ideology include the following:

- A political belief system;
- A practical-oriented set of political ideas;
- The mind sets of the ruling class;
- The perception of a distinct social class or social group;
- Political ideas that embrace or form class or social interests;
- Ideas that generate false consciousness among the exploited or repressed;
- Ideas that incorporate the individual into a social context and bring about a sense of collective belonging;

- An accepted set of ideas whose goal is to give legitimacy to a political system or regime;
- An all-accepted political doctrine that asserts an exclusive control of truth;
- A complex and highly systematic set of political ideas.

Certain scholars explained that ideology emerged when, in an age of modernization and increased literacy, many people were called upon to champion the movements and policies implemented in Europe that appeared around the time of the French Revolution (Herz, 1972: 17).

In his 1963 publication, “Ideology and Utopia,” Mannheim explained ideology in a new dimension: “Every real decision (such as one’s evaluation of other persons or how society should be organized) implies a judgment concerning good evil” (17). Moreover, many new perceptions of ideology came to conceptualize ideology to some extent. In other words, ideology was believed to be a cognitive system that allowed people to distinguish their worlds and to organize their attitudes towards various issues, or “a type of goal orientation, a special aspect of teleology that is characteristic of all human action” (Bendix, 1964: 297).

Ideologies are sets of values and beliefs. They are existing, ready, and available in the minds of people. Many values and beliefs composing an ideology are considered generalized and evaluative. In a way, they tend not to be distinct in nature from specific needs and wants as they do not, as a rule, stimulate or originate wants and needs. Some behavior may come directly from an ideological value as certain values and beliefs positively demand action, such as to be charitable or to pray for salvation. But, generally, values and beliefs enter the scene as wants and needs arise to judge or shape such wants and needs.

Elinor Scarbrough further explained that these kinds of beliefs determine the types of behavior that ought to be considered within the domain of action in keeping with the goals of the ideology. That is to say that the values of an ideology establish its moral character (Scarbrough, 1984: 28). From another perspective, Carlsnaes (1986) outlined a different set of beliefs in every ideology. Certain ideas and ideologies influence political life. They establish a perspective through which the political system is understood and explained, and through which the world is perceived. Most of the time, people do not see the world as it is, but rather see it through a layer of established beliefs, opinions, and assumptions. Be it directly or indirectly, everyone follows a set of political beliefs and values that affect their behaviors and attitudes. Therefore, political ideas and ideologies set forth goals that influence political activities (p.138).

Ideologies also encompass social beliefs, which are based on the concepts of how a society should be built, as well as economic beliefs through which the nature of the economic system is determined whereby the notion of the state's external economic relationships is provided. Feldman (1988) focused on three core beliefs that make up an economic ideology. These core beliefs consist of 1) equality of opportunity, 2) economic individualism, and 3) support for free enterprise. These beliefs are the basis of how an individual believes economic and business matters should be handled by the government.

Overall, the term ideology aims to characterize or explain the world as it is by establishing assertions or assumptions about human nature, historical events, present realities, and future possibilities. In addition, the term aims to conceive the world as it should be, designating suitable ways of reaching the social, economic, and political ideal.

With a general definition of ideology explained, a definition of foreign policy ideology is also presented. Foreign policy ideology is an individual's perception of how

the international system works and how governments should act within this international system. In foreign policy, ideology plays two roles: (1) legitimizing the roles of foreign policy-makers and (2) guiding the policies of those policy-makers (Hunt, 1987:57). A policy maker's main concern is to achieve his goals, and ideology is used to guide his decision-making in regards to his nation and others. Nevertheless, one could argue that ideology is a way of approving and legitimizing the regime's legal status within the political sphere; decision makers and statesmen can, in the name of ideological principals, embark on certain actions even if they may be considered unethical and wrong. This leads us to Andrew Heywood's contextualization of ideology as "an official set of ideas used to legitimize a political system or regime" (1998: 6).

Ideology, in fact, contributes to the strengthening of decision makers' positions. In other words, leaders often adopt ideologies in order to secure their citizens' support and satisfaction. Morgenthau (1972) underscored how important it is for all nations to frame a clear ideology in order to prevent issues post-decision-making while drawing up their policies at the international level.

All ideologies, be they imperialistic, conservative, liberal, or social, fulfill their respective regimes' objectives. The goal is to convince the public that such practices and actions are the result of implementing legitimate beliefs and values. Similarly, in some instances, ideologies tend to hold a crucial place with policy makers in order to legitimize their decisions and actions within the whole political system. Heywood (1998) stated that: "Ideologies take the form of broad political movements, engaged in popular mobilization and the struggle for power" (p.4).

At the end of the 1950s, political theorists like Harold Laski debated over the collapse, decline, and demise of ideology in the West (Lipset, 1960: 403; Bell, 1960: 45).

This collapse grew out of a developing agreement regarding the general political and economic strategies promoted by European and American political parties as well as intellectual congresses. This change in western political life was a result of the rise of a post-industrial society, where science and technology play a pivotal role. In such a society, most of the important political problems relating to the industrial revolution had been resolved—workers achieved industrial and political citizenship; the conservatives generally accepted the welfare state; and the democratic left recognized that an increase in over-all state power carries with it more dangers to freedom than solutions for economic problems. All in all, the widespread economic prosperity that came to exemplify the west was characterized by a lesser degree of discontent.

While studies have demonstrated that ideology has been less pertinent in the West because of the economic and political achievements, the contrary has been apparent in developing nations where the struggle for independence has only more recently been fought and won. In other words, where modernization has only recently taken root, ideologies remain significant. In developing countries, the big internal concerns of the nature and intention of government, the structure of the social order, the place of religion in society—issues that have already been resolved in the West—are only just beginning to unfold. As countries develop, foundational components are largely in transition—geographic mobility strains loyalties to family and locality; modern education must break ties from a weakening of religious authority; and new economic systems arise as old economic orders lose their prominence and significance. Individuals often struggle with these changes; as such, the masses seek out ideas, symbols, and leaders that can provide some meaning to their world.

Instability, insecurity, and transition make up the foundation upon which ideology develops. Social difficulties, in particular, generate an environment that is favorable to the

evolution of ideologies. For instance, Johnson cites five origins of stress, all of which contribute to the development of ideology: “(1) social strain, (2) vested interests and prospective gains, (3) bitterness about social change that has already occurred, (4) limited perspective due to social position, and (5) the persistence of outmoded traditions of thought” (1968: 79).

Apter agrees with Johnson's assessment; he perceives discontent and resentment in the Third World as an acknowledgment of an understanding of new, more fulfilling ways of life. In addition, people in developing communities feel a dissatisfaction with being non-modern. This creates a willingness to embrace a new set of values, which are likely to stress economic development toward compliance with the social consequences of economic change (Apter, 1963: 319).

Spokesmen have appeared in ever-growing numbers to express ideologies for the developing nations. Thus, it is apparent that the writers of the last decade who predicted the end of ideology were referring to the West and its phase of development, while in the Third World, ideology's significance was reaching its peak.

Ideology becomes crucial to nations facing instability and change as it is perceived as a remedy to the growing pains of statehood, providing some safety and security for new nations. In fact, ideology has been portrayed as serving a number of stabilizing functions. As enumerated by William Zartman:

- 1) It can create solidarity among the elite and in the nation as a whole. In the latter case, it serves to develop a sense of national identity. It can also create a sense of solidarity between nations.
- 2) A primary function of ideology is legitimization; it can sanction leaders whom the people might not otherwise support; and, in describing a goal

toward which society should move, it can legitimize a policy.

3) Ideology can be regarded as interpretive. It can explain the present through its reassessment of history and can identify enemies and problems.

4) Ideology is a framework for action. It can prescribe a course of action and legitimize choices, and it tends to outline a new order or political culture for the future (*National Interest*, 1966: 25-54).

During the war of independence in Algeria, the mandatory pre-conditions for the evolution of ideology existed. Colonialism had disturbed the traditional cultural, economic, and political balances of the country. The results of these disturbances included a population surge, widespread urbanization, and the start of a contemporary educational system that challenged the Arabo-Islamic cultural traditions. The economic crisis of the 1930s and the World War of the 1940s had left their marks. Insecurity and mutations were well known to all Algerians. Moreover, a visible enemy arrived in the form of colonizers—Europeans who firmly declined to give political rights to Muslim Algerians. The terrorism, torture, and movement of large numbers of people from their homes during the war of independence brought war into the lives of large numbers of Algerians.

Ideology played a significant role in the establishment of a common consensus among militants in Algeria during the war of independence. Moreover, ideology was one of the three vital instruments (along with the single party system and the self-management experiment) that the Ben Bella regime attempted to use to eliminate division among the Algerian elite.

The wartime FLN created an official ideology that generated unity and a sense of belonging as it outlined a future for Algeria. This ideology emphasized the idea of the Algerian revolution as a link between Algeria and other nations in its struggle against

colonialism. In addition, it stressed the transformation of the personalities of the participants in the struggle, contributing to the development of new revolutionary identities. Algerians viewed the war as an important step in the worldwide struggle for self-determination; thus, Algerians were not engaged in the war for independence for themselves but rather for the overall revolutionary movement that would finally put an end to colonial power.

The ideology sought to form international solidarity by establishing the concept of a brotherhood-in-arms to include the Algerian activists and other freedom fighters. This concept was supported by the help provided to the FLN by the United Arab Republic. This connection with other guerrilla movements who were fighting similar anti-colonialist causes brought together the brotherhood of Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam, the United Arab Republic (particularly true during the Suez War), and the colonies fighting for independence in Portuguese Africa as well as the Blacks of South Africa (El-Moudjahid 38). Solidarity with others was at the heart of the ideology of other crucial revolutionary groups (i.e., in the American and French revolutions as well as in the “workers of the world” concept in Marxist Revolutions).

The ideology of the war of independence provided guerrillas with a new character, allowing them to create new personalities and roles, which were filled by non-combatant civilians who joined the cause to endorse the militants. There were three main categories of revolutionary fighters: (1) the Moudjahid who were “characterized by . . . idealism, . . . enthusiasm, and . . . great hope for the future” as they fought for their religion; (2) the Fidayine (members of the National Liberation Army) who lived lives of “solitude [and] austerity” as they took the revolution to the enemy-occupied cities; and (3) the Mousselbine—the rural poor “who were known for their courage and knowledge of the

terrain” (Revere, 1973: 477-88).

These ideal types, in their similitude, assisted in the growth of the FLN’s wartime ideology. Though the war of independence started as a fight for freedom from French colonialism, the FLN ideology prioritized not just freedom in a political sense (although political as well as economic freedom were obvious objectives of the FLN) but also freedom for Muslim Algerians from the colonial system.

The FLN’s revolutionary ideology appears to have helped support the militants during the long periods of struggle, which included the longer periods of resentment in desert camps in Tunisia and Morocco and the time spent in exile in Europe while waiting for French colonialism to end. The ideology even helped sustain the FLN during the conflicts that erupted between the FLN leaders themselves. When the war ended, the ideological focus shifted toward development and modernization; legitimizing the victorious regime, the FLN, was a significant priority in the post-war era. A rapprochement had to be implemented to ease the tensions that existed in the country, arising particularly out of the universalism and the messianism that pervaded the wartime ideology.

The first two years after the war were marked by ideological creativity. Early on, Algerians were readily mobilized. Three highly crucial ideological elements were born during this stage: (1) The Tripoli Program (1962), which outlined the position of the radicals who had taken power and put in place the theoretical foundations for a secular, socialist state; (2) The Charter of Algiers (1964), which curtailed secularism and established the role of the party within the state; and (3) The Constitution of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (1963), which developed a political system that sought to combine the party, the economy, and the government. Large portions of the most significant components of these documents were either ineffective or were carried out with

inadequate planning.

It is worth noting that the socialist alternative in Algeria became more specific and was officially identified as the new state's political ideology in the 1963 Constitution of the Republic of Algeria. In 1964, it was consolidated by the adoption of the Algiers Charter—a socialist doctrinal document *par Excellence*.

The new regime selected many of the same ideas found in the old ideology and tailored them into an official ideology. For nearly two years, this regime went on to play a leadership role in developing countries and diverted the Algerians' attention away from the dire economic issues at home with meetings, congresses, and posturing upon the world stage.

Socialism in Algeria was based on an idea of self-management that developed into an agricultural experiment taken from the Yugoslavian experience. Priority was also given to education, mainly the re-education of the nation following the Arabo-Islamic heritage. Accordingly, all subjects and majors were taught in Arabic, and all media were broadcast in Arabic.

The Algerians' sense of self-identity was reinforced by their pride in their revolution and was strengthened by the understanding that they, along with the North Vietnamese, had victoriously combated and defeated French colonialism. Overall, the involvement of Algeria's diplomacy in a comprehensive variety of international issues, like the endorsement of liberation and opposition guerrillas who shared common ideological ways of thinking, aligned with the sympathy formed towards other socialist countries. These latter regimes were seen as innate partners, specifically during the 1960s and the 1970s. This Algerian socialist leaning illustrates the significance of the ideology in Algeria's foreign policy profile.

After the 1965 Boumedienne coup d'état, creativity in Algeria halted. Nevertheless, several of the former ideas established during the war retained their importance within the ideology of independent Algeria.

I.1.1.3. The external environment

In general, a country's external environment involves a different set of inputs into foreign policy decision-making (Benamia, 1986: 42). In her book on Algeria's foreign policy, Nicole Grimaud divided the external environment of Algeria in three categories (1984: 45):

- 1) The imposed environment by which Algeria sees the importance of maintaining solid and balanced relations with France, the U.S.S.R, the U.S., Great Britain, and Germany—even when such relations were difficult to preserve due to Algeria's ideological orientations marked by anti-imperialism.

- 2) The fraternal environment, which consists of the Arab World (Mashreq and Maghreb). Algeria was marked by 130 years of French occupation, and upon its independence, Algeria struggled to maintain peaceful relations with its neighbors. As victor against colonialism, Algeria felt superior to and more progressive than other Third World countries. It was actively engaged on the international stage and championed the Palestinian cause. However, its efforts to impose an ideology and instruct other nations ignited friction amongst neighboring countries, as vividly apparent in the border disputes in the Maghreb (1984: 30-31).

- 3) The desired environment where Grimaud explains the voluntarism of Algeria's African policy and its leadership role in Third World diplomacy and the non-aligned movement.

Nicole Grimaud's (1984) work is an excellent survey that could be the basis for any studies on Algeria's foreign policy.

On the other hand, Bruno Etienne categorized the external environment into six axes depending on the degree of importance of Algeria's foreign policy: the international environment, the third world, Africa, the Islamic world, the Arab World, and the Maghreb (Bougherira, 1999: 47). This marked the period up to the end of 1970s during which Algeria's external environment underwent some changes. The transformations that happened in the 80's, including the rise of Reaganism, Thatcherism, the fall of oil prices, the failure of Third World strategies, and the collapse of the Eastern bloc, greatly affected the Algerian external environment. These changes caused the Algerian government to adjust its foreign policy. Thus, Algeria's external environment took the following new configuration as discussed by Mohamed Bougherira in his doctoral research on Algeria's foreign policy (1999: 49).

I.1.1.4. The proximate environment and the distant environment

The proximate environment consisted of the Arab World (Maghreb and Mashreq), which has remained unchanged. At that time, special attention was focused toward the Maghreb region because of the newly-advocated good neighbour policy (*bon -voisinage*) and dialogue intended to settle unresolved concerns and issues, such as the Sahara conflict and border disputes. Second, the new feature in this environment is the inclusion of France, resulting from the desire of each state to put aside their past differences and base their relations on mutual interests

As far as the distant environment is concerned, despite the fact that this factor has not witnessed apparent changes, it did provide the incentive for Algeria to modify its

priorities slightly. This has been illustrated through its reduced role in the non-aligned movements, in Algeria's efforts to improve its relations with the U.S and keeping the same level of relations with the Russia.

I.2. Methodology and Data Collection

I.2.1 Introduction

This section outlines the formulation of a research design and the methodology adopted to achieve the objectives of this study. This thesis aimed to: (1) shed light on the general and particular roles of Algeria's decision-making in the Sahara conflict; (2) scrutinize the role of Algeria at the domestic, systematic, international, and individual levels; (3) analyze the extent to which Algerian ideology—with all its components—has impacted the Sahara question.

The research methodology, in this thesis, covers a number of elements, including the research objectives, research problem, research design that aims to address the means and procedures adopted to collect and analyse the data, and the influences which serve as limitations and shortcomings that the researcher could not control in the course of the field work.

I.2.2. Research questions

According to Denzin and Lincoln (2005) a research methodology or strategy is determined by the nature of the research question and the subject being investigated. As a result, the research format used in an investigation should be seen as a tool to answer the research question.

By drawing on James Rosenau who identified a series of analytic levels, beginning at the system level, shifting to the state level, and wrapping up with the role of the individual leaders in foreign policy decision-making. Rosenau's analytic framework contends that all factors capable of influencing a nation's foreign policy can be placed into five major source categories, namely, the societal environment of the nation, the governmental structure, the individual characteristics of the policy-making elites of that country, the role performance of the decision-makers, and the influence of the international system in the conflict that is taking place.

In this context, through James Roseneau theory system of analyzing foreign policy, this study will systematically analyze the major factors that influence Algeria's foreign policy making in the Sahara Conflict, setting forth the foundation for the author's suggested research questions.

Building on Roseneau's analytical framework and theory, the aims of the research in this thesis were to: (1) shed further light on the general and particular roles of Algeria's decision-making in the Sahara conflict; (2) scrutinize the role of Algeria at the domestic, systematic, international, and individual levels; (3) analyze the extent to which Algerian ideology—with all its components—has impacted the Sahara issue. Drawing upon the background of the study, this thesis poses three guiding questions :

- 1) What are the roles of Algeria's decision-makers in the Sahara conflict?
- 2) To what extent Algeria's ideology has impacted the sahara issue peace process?
- 3) Has Algeria's been the main cause in the perpetuation of the Sahara conflict?

Thus, the thesis seeks to assess the major factors influencing the creation and implementation of Algerian foreign policy with respect to the Sahara conflict. It will aim to analyze the motives behind such rhetoric being employed, and how these motives relate to recent outcomes in the Maghreb region. As such, this research will develop through reasoned qualitative analysis and application of theory, and will lead to a conclusion on the research questions.

I.2.3. Research Design

To facilitate validation of data, this research seeks to adopt a mixed method approach, using both the quantitative and qualitative methods. The present study builds on the results of the existing quantitative studies and literature, on Algeria's foreign policy in the Sahara conflict. First, the examination of the result of these studies was presented. Second, further investigations were implemented through the qualitative method; in-depth key informants' interviews and the life story interviews.

There was more focus on the qualitative approach in this research for several reasons. First of all, the qualitative approach uses a practice approach that seeks to understand phenomena in context-specific settings, such as "real world setting [where] the researcher does not attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest" (Patton, 2001: 39). Unlike quantitative researchers who seek causal determination, prediction, and generalization of findings, qualitative researchers seek instead illumination, understanding, and extrapolation to similar situations (Hoepfl, 1997). Studying a particular conflict in international relations or in history via quantitative methods, such as surveys, measuring networks by simplifying social relations into numerical data and depicting ties as either absent or present, does not address the complex processes of human interaction in

networks. Qualitative methods, on the other hand, allow researchers to focus on the creation, reproduction, and dynamics of social networks (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Edwards, 2010). The major objectives of qualitative research method are to describe and analyze both the processes through which social realities are constructed, and the social relationships through which people are connected to one another (Miller and Dingwall, 1997). Therefore, and in order to answer the research questions and to better understand Algeria's role in the Sahara Conflict, a qualitative, analytical approach have been chosen and conducted in 'the case study setting' using the 'life story' approach, and the 'in-depth interviews'.

The case study method is "an empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon (e.g., a "case"), set within its real-world context—especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2009, p. 18). Patton (1990) stressed on the importance of selecting "information-rich cases" for the study the author is to investigate on. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research. Indeed, the case study approach has the ability to investigate important topics not easily addressed by other methods, especially when the research involves either a descriptive question such as 'What happened?' 'What is the purpose behind such an action' or an explanatory question such as 'How or why did something happen?' (Shavelson & Townes, 2002).

The strength of the case study methodology is its ability to examine in-depth, a case within its real-life context (Yin, 2004). The case study approach also illuminates a particular situation and helps to make direct observations and collect data in natural settings (Bromley, 1986). Therefore, the case study of Algeria's foreign policy in the Sahara

Conflict is informative and capable of analyzing the extent to which Algerian ideology—with all its components—has impacted the Sahara question. Researchers could analyze the data of a case study from a critical science perspective, or obtain one person’s “story,” hence combining narrative with case study (Merriam, 2002). In this sense, and within the study of ‘Algeria’s foreign policy in the Sahara Conflict, the life story and the key informants’ in-depth interview qualitative methods are applied.

I.2.4. Research Instruments

Qualitative designs typically employ semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and/or participant observation to collect data (Remenyi et al 2002). The collected data is analysed using qualitative methods e.g. grounded theory, in order to obtain in-depth subjective interpretations of the subject of interest (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Qualitative designs are useful in exploring how users interact with interventions, including complexities of actions and social processes undertaken in response to the intervention (Bryman 2001; Walsham 1995; Klein and Myers 1999; Husserl 1946). This is vital for understanding social and organizational contexts including perceptions and values that users attach to an intervention (Kaplan and Duchon 1988). In this research, a qualitative research design was used to understand stakeholder meanings and behaviors concerning the role of Algeria in the Sahara conflict, and to investigate stakeholder perceptions of mediating influences on the intervention implementation process. There were two major objectives: (1) to obtain deep insights into the impacts of the intervention Algerian officials in dealing with Sahara conflict, their knowledge, attitudes and self-efficacy; (2) to obtain rich insights of Algerian decision makers roles in the Sahara Conflict.

The guidelines from the Grounded Theory were adopted. Coming to recognize the grounded theory as the suitable approach to conduct the current research. As Charmaz explained, “the grounded theory researcher deriv[es]... analytical categories directly from the data, not from preconceived concepts or hypotheses” (336-37). Therefore, a case on which the author could test a theory, instead the author sought an analytical lens and conceptual language to explain phenomena observed and read about for many years. Both patterns and themes emerged from the data. The analytical strategies evolved concurrent with ongoing observations, interviews, and interpretations of preliminary findings, mirroring the grounded theorist’s “simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis phases of research” (Charmaz 336). Most of the analysis provided by the personalities interviewed were crosschecked, verified, and analyzed. Other information collected from these personalities and diplomats who were interviewed were narrations of their lives during their work as diplomats and negotiators. These testimonials involved anecdotes, secret discussions, etc.

1.2.5. Data Collection and Analysis

Since a part of this study on Algeria’s foreign policy role in the ‘‘Western Sahara’’ conflict was more based on qualitative methods to gather data, qualitative data will be reached by means of interviews with experts, officials as well as university professors both in Morocco and overseas. The interviewees are used in this study in the qualitative part to examine how Algeria’s role in the Sahara conflict affects its resolution. This is a special type of interviewing that is employed when interpretive knowledge, “know why”, or procedural knowledge, “know-how”, is central to the research (Littig 2009,

Bogner and Menz 2009). It is not the experts themselves that are the research objects, but rather their knowledge and interpretations (Bogner and Menz 2009: 72).

Nineteen in-depth interviews with officials, experts as well as academics are used. This fieldwork was conducted through self-sponsored trips in Morocco, the United States, Spain and Switzerland between 2013 and 2015. The interviewees were purposely selected based on their knowledge of the ‘‘ Western Sahara’’ Conflict, the Algerian and Moroccan foreign relations as well as the Algerian political system. These actors were from different sides of the political spectrum, people who are (or have been) involved in politics and the peace process, as well as people who analyze politics and conflict from a more distant perspective. All of the interviews are semi-structured. This diverges from structured and unstructured interviews in that it provides for flexibility, but still has some fixed topics to be discussed and questions to be asked. Richards (1996) and Littig (2009) argue that the flexibility that is allowed in semi-structured interviews is particularly important when interviewing experts. Experts have varying time available for interviews, as well as different fields of expertise, which require questions to be adjusted (Richards 1996: 202-203, Littig 2009: 105). Therefore, the interviews were approached with a number of broad themes instead of ‘‘a rigid set of formal questions’’, as recommended by Richards (1996: 202).

Open-ended questions were also asked in the interviews. This provides the interviewees with adequate space to express their views and lets them introduce topics that they consider to be relevant. It also makes it easier to avoid the concern of putting ‘‘words in the mouth of respondents’’ (Rathbun 2008: 693). The interviewees were asked to share

their perspectives on the causes of the ‘western sahara’ conflict endurance, and if and how Algerian political institutions have contributed to prolonging it. More specific statements were also inquired when necessary.

The interviews were held in English, French and Arabic and were mostly about one to two hours long. Tape recorder was used, yet at some interview meetings recording was not used to let the respondents speak more freely and make the interview situation more natural. At some instances, the interviewees preferred not to be recorded due to their current position with the government. This was also done because of the delicacy of the Algerian and Moroccan unstable relations due to the ‘Western Sahara’ issue where nearly all words and topics are regarded as political and controversial. Detailed notes were nevertheless taken during the interviews, and these have been transcribed systematically afterwards in order to ensure reliability.

The transcribed material consists of about 1000-2000 words per interview. The consent to use the interviews was given by the interviewees by email. It is important to note that before using the interviews in this study, the author first sent the transcribed interviews to the interviewees for validation and possible editing. Both consents and transcripts are available upon request.

These interviews were of paramount importance and did help in the investigation process on Algeria’s role in the Sahara conflict. Furthermore, these interviews allowed direct questions to be asked to people with essential knowledge about the theme of study. As Rathbun (Rathbun 2008: 691) also states, other methods require more “interpretation, raising the reliability issue to a greater degree than in interviewing. Interviewing has the

advantage of being perhaps the most directed and targeted method in the qualitative arsenal. King (2010: 112) highlights, answers from interviews “must be interpreted as the interviewee’s response to the researcher’s question, not necessarily as the correct answer”. Richards (Richards 1996: 201) also stresses that the information which interviewees supply is often very subjective, and that elite interviews, by their nature, provide subjective accounts. This does not harm this study, however, as opinions and perspectives, not facts or correct answers, are of primary interest. The interviews serve to support or weaken, illustrate, and nuance, the findings in the general quantitative analysis. They are not intended to establish “the objective truth” or to prove any causal relationship. Since subjects’ points of view are of interest, the potential problem of not getting totally neutral facts “doesn’t loom as large” (Berry2002: 680). Elite members’ opinions, perspectives, and understandings, are perhaps especially valuable since these might also have influenced political developments to some extent.

A list of interviewees is shown in Table 1, and a short description of their background, and why they are relevant to this study, is given in the following text. This information is useful to keep in mind when turning to the qualitative analysis. All respondents were aware of the purpose of the interviews and accepted that their statements would be used in the study thesis.

Table 1: Interviews Conducted in Morocco and overseas between 2013 and 2016

Full name	Function	Date	Location
1- Mr. M'hamedBoucetta	Former Minister of Foreign Affairs	January 2013	At his house- Rabat
2- Mr. CheikhMalainaineLabarass	Member of CORCAS	January 2013	At his house -Rabat
3- Mr. Khalil Haddaoui	Former Ambassador to Morocco in Monrovia, he also held several positions at the Moroccan Embassy in Algiers and the UN in New York.	February 2014	At his house-Rabat
4- Dr. HassanAourid	Former Palace Spokesman in Morocco. He currently teaches at Mundiapolis University	February 2014	At his house-Rabat
5- Mr. Mohamed El Yazghi	Former Minister of State-Morocco	February 2014	At his House- Rabat
6- Dr. WilliamZartman	Senior Scholar at John Hopkins University, Washington DC	March 2014	John Hopkins University Washington DC, USA
7- Dr. Marina Ottaway	Senior Scholar in the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center, Washington DC	March 2014	Wilson Center- Washington DC, USA
8-Representative from the FLN Party (who requested to be stay anonymous)	FLN Party	February 2014	Conference Call(Rabat-Algiers)
9- Dr. Peter Pham	Director of Africa Center at the Atlantic Council Washington DC, USA	March 2014	Atlantic Council Washington DC, USA
10- Mr. JeanAbinader	Executive Director at the Moroccan Center for Policy, Washington DC	March 2014	Moroccan Center for Policy-Washington DC
11- Dr. Lawrence Velte	Former Army officer and Department of Defense civilian. He also served as Deputy Chief of the Middle East Division in the Joint Staff's Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Washington DC	March 2014	Coffee Shop – Massachusetts Avenue- Washington DC
12-Dr. Anna Theophilopoulou	Former UN official and member of James Baker's negotiating team covering the Western Sahara	March 2014	Coffee shop- Manhattan New York
13- Mr. BachirEdkhill	Former Polisario co-founder. Researcher on the Sahara Conflict	August 2014	Coffee shop in Mahaj Riad- Rabat

14- Mr.NasserBourita	Current Minister of Foreign Affairs-Morocco	September 2014	Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Rabat
15- Dr. Yahia Zoubir	Algerian-American scholar of International Relations Specialized in Algeria and Morocco relations	October 2014	Skype Interview
16- Dr. Stephen Zunes	Professor of Politics and Coordinator of Middle Eastern StudiesUniversity of San Francisco	October 2014	Skype Interview
17- Dr. John Entelis	Professor of Political Science, Chair of Political Science Department, and Director of the Middle East Studies Program	October 2014	Telephone Interview
18- Mr.Mohamed Laghdaf El Abadila	Former representative of the Polisario in the UK	November 2014	In his house. Rabat
19- A representative from the Algerian Embassy in Morocco (who requested to be anonymous)	Political Advisor	November 2016	Embassy of People's Democratic Republic of Algeria. Rabat

M'hamed Boucetta held several positions within the Moroccan government. He held positions as a Secretary of State in 1958 and Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1979 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. M'hamed Boucetta also served as Minister of Public Administration and Minister of Justice in 1979. In 1983, he became secretary of state. M'hamed Boucetta is known to have been the advocates of the Sahara questions at the African Union and the United Nations. For many Moroccans, M'Hamed Boucetta left a legacy of exceptional achievements in the world's affairs.

Cheikh Malainain Larabass is the head of the Moroccan Council of Religious scholars in Laayoune, Morocco. His father Cheikh Mohammed Laghdaf fought the French and Spanish colonizers in the late 50s in ' Western Sahara''. Cheikh Malainain Larabass continued his father's journey within his tribe thanks to his nationalist positions towards

the Sahara issue. He was described by his close associates as one of the staunch defenders of the Moroccan Sahara. Cheikh Malainain Larabass gained respect among political actors who hailed his religious and nationalist achievements. Cheikh Malainain Larabass is a member of the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs.

Khalil Haddaoui is a graduate from the Institute of International Relations in Paris. Mr. Khalil Haddaoui has a prominent career in diplomacy. He served as the economic Advisor at the Embassy of Rome, Minister Counselor in Algiers, Minister Counselor in Madrid, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco to Sierra Leon and Liberia, Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN (New York), Director of International Organizations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Director of European and American Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Kingdom.

Dr. Hassan Aourid is a Moroccan political scientist, a scholar, and a writer. He is a University Professor of Political Science at Mundiapolis University in Casablanca. Prior to this, he worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. In 1999, he was appointed Spokesperson of the Royal Palace until 2005 when he was appointed Governor of the region Meknes-Tafilalet. From 2009 to 2010 he served as historiographer of Morocco. Dr. Aourid is the author of several essays, novels and poems. He is active at academic and grassroots levels lecturing extensively nationally and internationally on theology, ethics, social justice, politics and interfaith as well intercultural dialogue.

Mr. Mohamed El Yazghi who was born in 1939 is a Moroccan politician and former head of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces party. He held several positions within the Moroccan government; a former Minister of state, Minister in charge of Urban

Development and Environment. Mohamed El Yazghi is among the few Moroccan politicians who master the Sahara issue file.

Dr. William Zartman, Jacob Blaustein Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Organization and Conflict Resolution and former Director of the Conflict Management and African Studies Programs, at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC. Dr. Zartman received his MA from Johns Hopkins University in 1952, a diploma from the University of Copenhagen on a Fulbright Scholarship in 1953, and his PhD from Yale in International Relations in 1956. He was on the faculty of International Studies at the University of South Carolina (1960-65), and then Professor of Politics at New York University (1965-80). Dr. Zartman is the author of a number of works on North Africa: Government and Politics in North Africa. He is a Commander of the Moroccan Alawite Order.

Dr. Marina Ottaway researches at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. Her research interests include the politics of development, with particular reference to Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Before she joined the Wilson Center, she spent 14 years at the Carnegie Endowment, where she helped start up the Middle East Program. She has also taught at Georgetown University, the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, the American University in Cairo, and three other universities, all in Africa. Ottaway has a doctorate from Columbia University.

Dr. J. Peter Pham is the United States Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Dr. Pham also serves as Vice- President and Director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council. Dr. Pham was previously Senior Vice President of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and Editor of its bimonthly journal, American

Foreign Policy Interests. From 2008 to 2017, Dr. Pham was Vice President of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA), an academic organization which represents more than 1,300 scholars of Middle Eastern and African Studies at more than 300 colleges and universities in the United States and overseas. Dr. Pham holds a B.A. in economics from the University of Chicago and a doctorate from the Gregorian University, as well as postgraduate degrees in history, law, international relations, and theology.

Mr. Jean Abinader brings more than 30 years of experience in international relations. -Mr. Abinader is the executive Director of the Moroccan American Trade & Investment Center (MATIC), and is a founding board member of the Arab American Institute. He is also the principal of Jean AbiNader International Advisory Services based in Bethesda, Maryland, and has extensive experience in advocacy, strategic communications, intercultural training, and international business development.

Dr. Lawrence Velte was appointed Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia Center in 2005 following a 37-year career as an Army officer and Department of Defense civilian. Between 1992 and 2005, Mr. Velte served as Deputy Chief of the Middle East Division in the Joint Staff's Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5). His duties included providing information, analysis, and policy recommendations concerning the Middle East and North Africa to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior military leadership. In that role, Mr. Velte dealt with key Defense-related issues including strategy and policy toward Iraq and Iran, regional counter-terrorism action plans, Syrian-Israeli negotiations over the Golan Heights, and the development of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. He was also responsible for Washington Interagency

coordination of military cooperative programs with important regional partners such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria.

Anna Theofilopoulou covered Western Sahara and North Africa in the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations from 1994 to 2006. She worked closely with former US Secretary of State, James A. Baker, III throughout his appointment as Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General on Western Sahara.

Bachir Edkhal is one of the co-founders of the Polisario, who defected to Morocco in 1990. As a former Polisario leader, Mr. Edkhal held several encounters with the Algerian military as well as the former Algerian President Houari Boumediene regarding the ‘‘Western Sahara’’ conflict.

Mr. Nasser Bourita is the current Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. In 2002, Mr. Bourita held the post of Head of the UN Main Bodies Department, before being appointed Adviser to the Mission of Morocco to the European Communities in Brussels (2002-2003). From December 2003 to 2006, he was appointed Head of Division of the United Nations and between 2006-2009 he was appointed Director of the United Nations and International Organizations within the same Ministry.

Subsequently, Mr. Bourita successively assumed the functions of Head of Cabinet . From 2011 to 2016, he served as Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Mr. Bourita holds a Bachelor’s degree in Public Law (International Relations) from the Faculty of Legal, Economic and Social Sciences in Rabat, a Graduate Certificate in International Relations, and a Master’s Degree in Public International Law.

Dr. Yahia H. Zoubir is a Professor of International Relations and International Management at Euromed Marseill, School of Management, where he is also in charge of developing a Center for Euro-Mediterranean Geopolitics. He has been the Editor-in-Chief of the refereed *Thunderbird International Business Review* (since 1996). He is now the *Editor-in Chief of Global Business and Organizational Excellence*, published by John Wiley & Sons, in the USA. He is also the Editor and main contributor of *North Africa in Transition-State, Society & Economic Transformation in the 1990s* (University Press of Florida, 1999); Co-editor of *L'Islamisme Politique dans les Rapports entre l'Europe et le Maghreb*, (Lisbon, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1996); and, Coeditor and main contributor of *International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict* (Praeger Publisher, 1993).

Dr. Stephen Zunes has been at the University of San Fransisco since 1995, teaching courses on the politics of Middle East and other regions, nonviolence, conflict resolution, U.S. foreign policy, and globalization. He received his PhD from Cornell University. Prior to coming to USF, Prof. Zunes served on the faculty at Ithaca College, Whitman College and the University of Puget Sound. A prominent specialist on U.S. Middle East policy has traveled frequently to the Middle East and other conflict regions, meeting with prominent government officials, scholars and dissidents. He co authored a book with Professor Jacob Mundy entitled « *Western Sahara : War, Nationalism and Conflict Irresolution* ».

Dr. John P. Entelis is a professor of political science and associate director of the Middle East Studies program at Fordham University. The recipient of several Fulbright awards, including a U.S. Department of Education Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship to conduct research in Lebanon, a Senior Fulbright

Professorship at the University of Algiers and one at the University of Tunis, and a Fulbright Regional Research Award to Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. He has also directed three National Endowment for the Humanities summer institutes and seminars. Dr. Entelis is the author or coauthor of numerous scholarly publications on the comparative and international politics of the Middle East and North Africa, including *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized*; *State and Society in Algeria*; and *Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa*. Dr. Entelis is past president of the American Institute for Maghrib Studies, the premier scholarly professional association engaged in North African studies.

Mohamed Laghdaf El Abadila is the former representative of the Polisario in the UK. He was imprisoned and sentenced to death by the Algerian Military when they knew about his intentions of joining Morocco . It was the former Algerian President Boudiaf who released him.

As previously mentioned, these interviewees were selected due to their expertise and knowledge of the ‘ ‘ Western Sahara ‘ ‘ conflict and the Algerian foreign policy. As a matter of fact, these interviews serve to broaden the understanding the Algerian foreign policy role in the ‘ ‘ Western Sahara’ ’ conflict and the general causes of its perpetuation.

Furthermore, these interviewees expressed a wide range of perceptions of Algeria’s Morocco relations and Algeria’s involvement in the Sahara crisis. There were certain key politicians and leaders, specifically Algerian political parties, who could not be reached either because of security reasons or their own reticence. Thus, their comments to international media and before the UN as well as their writings in books and memoirs to supplement my extensive interviews.

It must be noted that for personal and research purposes the pre-academic field experiences played crucial roles in the genesis of this dissertation. The parameters of this study are therefore informed by experience and observation—having lived both in Morocco and the United States—and active participation in online correspondence, debates, conferences, forums, and social interactions with experts and individuals who work in the field. Conclusions are gained entirely from extensive, post-practice data collection, systematic, regular one-on-one meetings with experts in the field, and theoretically informed analysis.

1.2.6. Difficulties and Limitations of the Study

Given the nature of the topic, the present study has a number of limitations due to the difficulties faced in the data collection process. Political sensitivity of the Sahara issue brings about challenges for many researchers, due to the fact that the Sahara dossier has been a taboo for many years, let alone of the opacity of the Algerian regime, especially when it is related to the Sahara conflict. Only a limited number of experts from Algerian side were interviewed and who some wished to stay anonymous, because of the innate difficulties involved in interviewing active duty officers and current Algerian politicians, which stemmed from the sensitive and cold political relations between Morocco and Algeria. It is important to mention that the trip to Algeria to conduct the interviews *in situ* was cancelled because it was highly recommended not to go for security reasons and several foreign experts on Algeria like Frederic Pons stated that due to the opacity of the Algerian regime, there is a lack of deliverables that the author can bring back.

The interviews lasted between one and two hours, were semi-structured and recorded using a Dictaphone. Though a set of questions was prepared, given the sensitivity of the

subject, the interviewees were only asked one or two basic questions (Does Algeria have a role in the stalemate of the Sahara conflict? Why or why not?) to put them at ease in their answers. There were instances where some personalities, given their status, could not tell everything they knew about Algeria's role in the Sahara. However, through discussions there were questions asked which were developed in the questionnaire.

CHAPTER TWO: IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCES ON ALGERIA'S POLITICS AND ITS IMPACT ON ALGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

L'Algérie, horrible constellation dans le ciel des utopies, sans nations soeurs et sans pays amis, seule mais vaillante jusqu'à la grossièreté... Elle a tant pleuré ses morts qu'il ne reste plus d'eau dans ses rivières.
- Yasmina Khadra *l'Imposture des mots*

Introduction

Foreign policy is formulated and implemented within the executive branch. The state institutions are the groups that typically affect and influence foreign policy-making of any state. Therefore, it is important to assess the role of such institutions on foreign policy formulation and implementation in order to understand the different factors relevant to a state's foreign policy decision-making. Accordingly, this chapter will focus on the formation of Algeria and its bureaucracies.

In the case of Algeria, there are three principal governmental actors or institutions that formulate its foreign policy. The first is the President, whose role and powers are determined by the Constitution. Second comes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, third, the Army and its mighty secret services. The Algerian Army, known as the National Liberation Front (FLN), is considered the architect of the established political system in

Algeria. The Ministry of Armament and General Liaison (MALG), the Military Security (SM), and the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS) are the pillars of the original Algerian regime that was established in 1962. Though the leaders have changed, the security values that were defined and determined by the Algerian colonels in secrecy during the war of independence have remained essentially the same. In the midst of all these institutions lies public opinion emanating from an electorate that has either been defended or abandoned depending on the period, and informed or uninformed by a myriad of media tools and intellectual figures. The different Algerian government actors are presented in this Chapter. This chapter also examines how foreign policy evolved in Algeria, and how the ideology of the Algerian leaders impacted the Algerian foreign policy. Subsequently; this chapter sections focus on the influential role of Algeria's foreign policy principles beginning with the founding revolutionary era of the Algerian state. This will help, at a later stage, assess the degree of Algeria's main role in the Sahara conflict, since the succeeding elites belonged unequivocally to the traditions of Algeria's pre-and post-independence regime and possessed the same political background and legacy.

II.1. The Role of the President

France's departure from Algeria left a gaping hole in the country demarcated by a lack of skilled labor in the fields of education, medicine, and law. Benjamin Stora (2001) remarked that those who remained in Algeria after 1962 found themselves in a unique situation:

“They didn't have [any] point of reference during the years of revolution and combat that might have helped them to develop and improve upon their ethos, or to change their behavior. Thus, they had a sense that they were living in an unpredictable and arbitrary situation. Many of them had apparently begun to think primarily about their personal

interests, having been “uprooted” with painful memories of their past, with their anxieties exacerbated by the loss of identity. To comprehend what is happening in Algeria today, one must consider the historical and ideological foundations of the state, as it emerged from the War of Independence”’. (2001: 63).

Most of the Algerians who fought the French were, along with the FLN leaders, uneducated. Moreover, they lacked essential leadership skills for the decision-making required to build an independent state from the ground up. Those who possessed political experience in pre-and post-independent Algeria were either arrested by the French, or shunned or killed by their Algerian allies. Those who avoided those fates opted for exile, and some of those were assassinated, including Abane Ramdan, a political activist of the Algerian revolution, assassinated in Morocco in 1957 by his friend Boussouf the founder of the Algerian secret services; Colonel Mohamed Chabaani, who was executed by President Boumedienne and Ben Bella in 1964 ; and Mohamed Khider, who was shot in Madrid in 1967 by the Algerian special services.

This new wave of violence that arose after and before the Algerian independence was characterized by internal and fraternal conflicts that surfaced among the FLN members in a brutal competition for power. When the Army took power in 1962, it established itself as the state command and gave itself the historical legitimacy of being the only institution that brought glory to the Algerian people during the revolution. Ahmed Ben Bella, a well-known resistance figure, backed by Colonel Houari Boumedienne, then chief of the Army of General staff, became the first elected president of Algeria. This election was far from democratic, but the result was legitimized by his support from the FLN and the Algerian army military as well as his established position of influence.

In 1963, in order to maintain his position, President Ben Bella introduced a constitution that significantly reinforced the personal power of the president. This constitution was influenced heavily by ideological beliefs and highlighted the interventionist role played by the state. According to the constitution, Ben Bella had the power to designate all high civil and military officials. He encouraged and completed the installation of a one-party political system, approving only the FLN and prohibiting all other parties. Many Western powers like the United States assumed that those actions would likely lead to a dictatorship or, quite possibly, communism. The Algerian population did not really oppose the idea of a one-party political system; in fact, many of them perceived it as a symbol of unity, failing to envisage the negative outcomes that the West anticipated.

Under Article 42 of the Algerian first made Constitution in 1963, the President was given the exclusive power to create and implement both internal and external policy. In other words, the President of the Republic defines the policy of the government and directs it. He conducts and coordinates the internal and external policy of the Nation through the will of the people.

President Ben Bella continued to reinforce his power as president, initiating the establishment of a centralized power through an authoritarian style, which was centered on the presidential seat. He used various methods to achieve this power including elimination—by force—of any political opposition to his power. Even those whom Ben Bella merely suspected of opposition efforts were intimidated and/or arrested by the Algerian Army (Merle, 1967: 34).

Ben Bella's ever-increasing power and influence, compounded with economic and intra-elite divisions, led to his overthrow in a bloodless coup on June 19, 1965, that was led by Colonel Houari Boumedienne, his former friend and comrade in the Army. Ben

Bella was imprisoned for eight months before being taken to an isolated villa in Birtouta in the outskirts of Algiers, where he was kept under house arrest for 14 years.

After the *coup d'état*, Boumedienne took power in an unprecedented way. Boumedienne, who was from a poor peasant family from Guelma, was known as having an authoritarian temperament—being both charismatic and stern. He ruled for 13 years, from June 19, 1965, until his premature death from a rare disease on December 27, 1978. Boumedienne made several calculations to make sure he possessed all the executive power. To avoid falling victim to the same trap he afflicted on his predecessor, Boumedienne waited to appoint a head of the Army. Instead, he established a new military structure out of the following three groups: Revolutionaries who had supported him and assisted him in the *coup d'état* against GPRA in 1962; the French Officers-Deserters whose base was stationed in the East and outside Algeria during the revolutionary war; and, finally, the Algerian youth who enlisted in the military immediately after independence.

President Boumedienne retained the post of Minister of Defense for himself and created the “Revolutionary Council”. He presided over this collective body, considered the ultimate backbone of national sovereignty and historical legitimacy. In creating this public institution, Boumedienne was able to maintain and impose his power. He avoided accusations of pursuing personal ambitions by using the Council as a cover and evaded accountability for crucial decision-making by using the Council as a shield. In this respect, Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (2002) pointed out that the subtle fiction of collectivism was doubly advantageous. On one hand, it institutionalized historical legitimacy by detaching it from the military hierarchy, and on the other hand, it allowed Boumedienne, as President of the Revolutionary Council and Head of State, to keep a firm hold simultaneously on legitimate and executive power (p.183).

As for the economic sector, Boumedienne rapidly accelerated Algeria's rate of growth, particularly in key economic sectors—like education and health—that provided basic societal needs. He strengthened his power by implementing a state-centered socialist system in which nationalized industries, labor, and religion dominated.

Politically, Boumedienne's autocratic and dictatorial politics tipped the Algerian society into chaos, eventually leading the country into political breakdown. The suspension of free press and increased censorship precipitated this breakdown. Through the Algerian Military Security, Boumedienne persecuted his political opponents mercilessly, including those who were close to him like Mohamed Khider, Ahmed Medeghri, and Colonel Chaabani. Some, like Belkacem, were forced to live in exile, while others were brutally tortured (Akher Saa, 2002).

In his Ph.D. dissertation, *“Military Regimes, Political Power, and Human Rights Violations in Postcolonial Algeria,”* Yassine Belkamel (2014) mentions that “Boumedienne also made deals with French officers to help them gain legitimate involvement with the revolutionaries even when they had been refused by most of the regional military base leaders, including Brahimi” (2014: 112). Such approaches squashed any hope for democratic reform in Algeria for many years and consequently made the country prone to volatile internal challengers who divided Algeria, making it all the more difficult for Algeria to maintain relations with its North African neighbors.

Following his death, Boumedienne was succeeded by Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, who was nominated by the FLN party congress and won 94 percent of votes in a referendum on February 7, 1979. Bendjedid remained in office until 1992, and despite the fact that economic and political liberalization took place in many sectors following independence, Algeria remained a dictatorship under the auspices of the Army. Under

President Chadli, however, the Army prevented the revival of the Revolutionary Council, believing that the existence of the Council was not in the Army's best interest.

Many of his former colleagues describe Bendjedid as someone who lacked sufficient charisma to confront his comrades or establish his legitimacy, clearly suffering from a character flaw that played against him. As further explained by Koonings and Kruijt (2002), “[t]he newly appointed President was unable to impose himself on his peers, and lacked the charisma needed to embody legitimacy. The regime thus entered a period of crisis and paralysis, which would work to the benefit of the Islamists” (2002: 187).

Following these regime changes, the FLN worried about being discredited. The fatal undoing of the Army had been to refuse charismatic leadership and free elections, instead preferring political leaders—with limited abilities—installed as president. Examples of such presidents include Bendjedid, Ali Kafi, Zérroual, and Bouteflika. One of the few exceptions was Mohamed Boudiaf, who was eliminated because of his anti-corruption stance and his closeness to Morocco—a closeness that influenced the “Western Sahara” conflict.

Generally speaking, Bendjedid's term of office came at a particularly difficult time as the model put in place by his predecessor reached the end of its useful life just in time for the 1985-86 collapse of the world's oil prices. The government initiated reforms that were intended to improve the productivity of the economy, but the reforms were squashed by the Army for being too liberal, as it feared that the free market would undermine the political capacity of the populist project. As described by Hassan Mourabit in his book, “My country experience[d] a wreck under Boumedienne to another wreck under Chadli” (1976: 45).

Indeed, at that time, the lack of real leadership within the regime created an intense division that the Islamists took advantage of by succeeding in the polls. As a result to this, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was one of the 39 parties which was considered as the dominant competitor to the FLN. The first test of the new system came in local elections in June 1990 during which the FLN was easily defeated. The FIS took over the majority of the parliamentary seats. The government accepted the result, however in March 1991, three months before the country's first free general election, introduced primitive new electoral rules that appeared little short of blatant gerrymandering (echorouk online: Oct, 2012). Following this turmoil, Bendjedid forcefully removed the FIS. After a bloody battle against the FIS, Bendjedid enforced a state of siege, which prohibited opposition strikes, demonstrations, and publications. In October 1991, a second electoral law was enacted that gave further legitimacy to his regime.

In the face of all this, the elections, which had been delayed, finally took place on December 26, 1991, resulting in an overwhelming victory for the Islamists of the FIS. The second round of voting, planned for January 16, 1992, never took place. On the verge of collapse, the Algerian Army prepared all the instruments necessary to keep it alive. In December 1991, two secret conclaves met with Army leadership at the Land Force Command Headquarters. On January 1992, Nezzar, Belkheir, and Lamari forced Bendjedid to resign.

The new junta named Sid Ahmed Ghozali as acting president and head of the high military council. Ultimately, Army leaders recalled Mohamed Boudiaf, a historic leader of the Algerian war of liberation who had been exiled in Morocco since 1963 after his disagreement with Ben Bella, to serve as head of state. President Boudiaf was seen as an

actor who tried to achieve a degree of autonomy from the system. In addition to his pro-Moroccan position in the resolution of the Sahara question, he held firm positions both with respect to the Islamic extremists by his rejection of compromise and to the corrupt civilian and military technocrats, who took advantage of the system.

In one of Khaled Nezzar interviews, he stated overtly, “The support of Mohamed Boudiaf in the Sahara dispute was among the causes of his assassination, on 29 June 1992 in Annaba, by the Department of Intelligence and Security Officer (DRS, the Algerian intelligence)” (Lounès, 2016). The assassination of Boudiaf, transmitted live while he was delivering a speech, represented an emblematic moment in Algeria’s national identity crisis. “It’s the merciless moment where Algerians underst[oo]d that the curse has fallen onto them[,]” wrote El-Kadi Uhsane in the *Quotidien d’Oran* on June 27, 2002.

For many Algerians, President Boudiaf represented the only chance to remove Algeria from the grips of military dictatorship and islamic theocracy. Right after this tragedy, the Algerian civil war escalated between radical Islamist groups, who were vying for the “Arabization” and “Islamization” of the country, and the military-backed government, which exerted its power to maintain the secular status quo. For many analysts, these hostilities stemmed mainly from an ideological predicament where both sides wanted to impose their own perceptions of an Algerian national identity.

After the assassination, General Zeroual was called back from retirement to serve as interim President. He was later elected president in 1995. As soon as he stepped into the presidency, Zeroual avoided the opinions of the DRS and political establishment in Algeria when it came to decision-making. He started to reshuffle positions and roles within the DRS to place his trusted men such as General Betchine and General Fodil Saidi in key positions (Ghettas, 2010).

The Algerian DRS did not like Zeroual's abrupt decision-making, which, as described by Ghetas, caused *a bras de fer* within the Army. As further described by Ghetas:

It started with a campaign of smear and corruption allegations against Betchine, and then escalated with the killing of General Saidi. When it appeared that Zeroual was not impressed at all, and that he was not backing down, summer 1997 saw [an] unprecedented surge in terrorist massacres in remote villages and rural communities (2010).

Aware of total failure and death threats, Zeroual knew that he was risking his life, so he demanded for the anticipated presidential election of 1999, which was won by Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

Bouteflika enjoyed a requisite quality—luck; he was the military's favorite candidate. He took office in 1999—a time when Algeria shifted out of civil war, state failure, and moral decay toward stability. Under Bouteflika, the Algerian system improved. His period of leadership witnessed, on one hand, the wane of the Islamist rising (which was due in part to the vote on “civil harmony” in 2000 and the renunciation of many Jihadists of their terrorist acts), and on the other hand, a period of relative financial prosperity that began to decrease in the summer 2014, following the global oil price collapse.

Under Bouteflika's leadership, despite the fact that he was wishy-washy with France and Morocco, the country re-established relations with France and the U.S. as well as countries in Africa (Pons, 2013: 204). However, as far as internal reforms are concerned, they remained opaque and controversial. Bouteflika opted to live within this pluralist system while working around it. The Islamist parties—who were part of the political system—remained legal, although their scope of power was intentionally limited.

Bouteflika succeeded in acquiring a solid image as a reformer, which positioned him against a blocked system. Outspoken and knowledgeable about gaining popularity, Bouteflika's main objective had been to re-establish unity within the executive branch of the state by restoring the presidency—rather than the Army high command—as the supreme arbiter of policy debates and conflicts of interest (Roberts, 2007). Bouteflika negotiated with the Army to limit its role in civilian political affairs so as to strengthen the President's personal prestige, increase the executive branch's influence, and foster more checks and balances on other power brokers.

Roberts Hughes (2007) describes in his essay on Demilitarizing Algeria that these changes in the political system took some autonomy from the military power. For instance, Bouteflika has been taking on the vested interests of the coterie of senior generals who became a law unto themselves during the 1990s. He started his maneuvers to shun them from the political arena. The main issue is whether his success in this endeavor proved to be permanent—and thereby initiate the possibility of a progressive and eventually definitive demilitarization of the state—or whether this would be temporary. This has, until now, never been the case. The Military stayed at the forefront of the political as well as the diplomatic scenes. Despite these changes, the President's loyalty to the Army remained in effect in the successive presidential administrations. In an interview with the Financial Times, Bouteflika once described this firm attachment in the following manner: “I once said that before touching the Army, one has to pass on my body. I know exactly what this means. The Army knows exactly what this means too. It trusts me and I trust it” (Pons, 2013: 204).

By the time Bouteflika entered his fourth term, his health began to decline, leading to a severe disability caused by an unspecified illness. As Algeria is now in the midst of the Algerian presidential elections and with what the country is now facing in mass demonstrations asking for the regime change, Bouteflika faced mounting pressure to step down as President. Still in that regard, most Algerian citizens feel that the Bouteflika era has not yet ended, as Algeria is still run by an opaque military and political collective, while the executive office remains deeply influenced by the military.

With that said, the real control over Algeria is managed by the “deep state,” a mixture of the Army and the security services, known as “le pouvoir” or “the power,” in which those unaccountable and largely unidentified figures make decisions behind the scenes through a system of consensus.

II.2. The Role of the National Liberation Front

After World War I, France offered more freedoms to the Algerian people, and, taking advantage of those freedoms, Algerian nationalists began to establish their own political organizations. These groups were known to have regular disagreements because of their opposing ideologies, debating, for example, the importance of violence and the inclusion of religious reformation. However, these groups shared at least one common desire, the end of French colonialism to bring about an independent Algeria.

Before the Algerian revolution, there were three main political organizations in Algeria that were closely watched by the French government; the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD) led by Massali Hadj; the Ulama founded by Sheikh Ben Badis, a religious leader; and the Union Démocratiques du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA), led by Ferhat Abbas. Dissidents from within the original MTLD and

the OS were the predecessors of the FLN. The original leaders were divided into two categories: those who worked from within Algeria and those who operated overseas, in locales such as Cairo, Tunis, and Morocco. The original leaders included: Hocine Aït Ahmed, Ahmed Bella, Mostefa Ben Boulaid, Larbi Ben M'hidi, Rabah Bitat, Mohamed Didouche, Mohamed Khider, Ali Mahsas, Omar Ourmrane, Lakhdar Ben Tobbal, and Belkacem Krim. The overseas leaders included Ben Bella, Aït Ahmed, and Khider (Horne, 1977: 75-77).

Inside the FLN, there were organizations specifically dedicated to the military and politics. The Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) was the military branch of the FLN. The Comité Révolution d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA) was created for political purposes; it had a hand in determining the final decisions concerning the revolution issues.

From the outset of the country's struggle for liberation, the FLN had very close links to the Algerian intelligence services and the military—this proximity aided the military's control over political institutions. Boumedienne insisted that the party was the backbone of the state and that the state was the executive mechanism used to implement the party's policy. The FLN's original ideology presumed that unity and integrity among the Algerian people was paramount to achieving independence. To establish such unity, the FLN employed a rather bloody policy, eliminating many organizations and individuals considered competitive. In keeping with this attitude, the FLN ideology extolled the virtues of violence (Hutchinson, 1978: 23). The essential tone of the FLN concerned that of an Algerian identity as well as Islamic unity (Jackson, 1977: 24-25).

The Tripoli program set forth the FLN as a single party immediately after Algeria gained its independence from France. Since then, the FLN has ruled Algeria, despite the fact that the country technically adheres to a multiparty system.

Despite the united vision to win the war against France and gain independence, the FLN was characterized by factionalism that could be seen in its political appointees, the state's hierarchy, and the absence of well-structured political precepts. As John Entelis (1986) stated, “[t]he quality of the FLN leadership declined, and individual party officials seemed in many cases more intent on promoting their personal interest, than in building up the party as an effective peacetime political organization” (p.173). Among many instances that led to regional factionalism and increased rivalries was the post-independence decision to differentiate Berber and Arabic identities based on ethnicity and other characteristics in the Berber effort to voice their fundamentalist opposition.

There was also a lack of unity amongst the external and internal leaders, especially with regard to agreeing on political goals (Jackson, 1977:210). This was due mainly to the Army's interference in the state's affairs and the increasing role of the technocrats, both of which reduced the significance of FLN's role. According to Bougherira, “[t]he party has neither the influence to formulate policy nor execute it. Most of the time party elites simply had no power. Their role was rather to propagate others' policies, defend others' candidates, and to make sure which leader to follow” (1999: 46).

At the international level, the FLN no longer exerts influence in Algeria's foreign policy. Its involvement is limited to formal encounters with the other state political parties or liberation movements. Despite all this, the FLN party still exists and is still dominant in the field; many Algerians view it as the party that chased the colonizing power out of their country and brought back dignity to the Algerian people. Thus, affiliations with this party are often sentimental; this is especially the case for the common militant.

II.3. The Role of the Army

The involvement of the Army, the ANP (Armée Nationale Populaire) in particular, in Algeria's internal and external affairs dates back to the early days of the Revolution. Despite the fact that the Army asserted its sovereignty and considered itself to be Algeria's supreme authority (with the Council of Ministers alone handling the government administration), it is not a single entity. Instead, the Army is divided into several different entities—including the national police, the military security force, and various military districts—that are all formally subordinate to the general staff while preserving some individual autonomy.

The Army's legitimacy through the FLN has rested specifically on historical ground due to its role during the war of independence. The Army enhanced its reputation and popularity by providing social programs, like free education, healthcare, and subsidized housing (which were paid for using oil revenues) to the population. While these efforts can be viewed as worthy causes, there were dark elements within the regime's policies including those that violated civil liberties and political rights.

Others view the Algerian Army as less of a hegemonic body than described above. Elias Boukraa, the Director of the National Institute of Strategic Global Studies in Algiers, clarifies this opposing view by identifying the military system as follows:

‘‘It is a kind of exaggeration to identify Algeria's political system as military . . . it (the military system) needs to fulfill five conditions. The first is the full presence of the military as a leading power; second is the full subordination of political power to the military; third is the complete domination of military ideology; fourth is the use of military intervention to control the country's affairs, and its full control over the political space; fifth is the full independence of the military in managing themselves in their own bases (2001: 6).’’

In Boukraa's (2001) opinion the Algerian military regime fulfilled only two of those requirements: the independence of the military and its control over the political spaces. Therefore, it is an overstatement to describe Algeria as a military power. The military does not have a hand on the political positions and does not hold to an ideology, which leads to a hegemony of power.

Lahouari Addi (2009) an Algerian sociologist, on the other hand, opposes the above view, stating that although Algeria is not a military regime in an overt way, such as the military dictatorships in Latin America in the mid-to-late twentieth century, it is an authoritarian regime that procures its legitimacy from the Army. Notwithstanding the fact that Algeria is now a multi-party system, the elections of the president, *de facto*, stem from the military approval. Lahouari (2009) considers the military in Algeria to be a hegemonic political party, exerting power over civilian political parties much the same as the communist party of the Soviet Union in the past. He explains that the military regime assigns authority to the civilian elites, but does not allow them to exert real political power because "the Army is the source of power" (Addi, *L'Armme, La Nation*, 1999: 39-46).

The military was tailored by Houari Boumedienne and endorsed the perpetuation of the French Officer positions. According to Salah-Eddine Sidhoum³, (Belkamel:2014) a surgeon and defender of human rights in Algeria who witnessed that most of the ALN officers were killed or jailed, and the survivors were later excluded from the military. Boumedienne forced them to retire, albeit with some privileges, such as permitting them to own small businesses, such as coffee shops.

³Salah-Eddine Sidhoum decided after nine years of clandestine writing, a period during which he was the subject of a smear campaign, an attempt on his life by a death squad, and a court sentence of twenty years in prison in absentia in Vichyist, to come out of hiding and present himself before the court. Assisted by an international collective of lawyers, he contested the judgment openly.

While violence was exercised against political parties in the transition from “authoritarianism,” the Army, acting in the capacity of a political regime, exerted more brutal means of liquidation, assassination, and even massacres of civilians and revolutionaries in many regions of the country, principally to keep elites in power. After the independence, in the early 1960s, and after 132 years of colonialism, Algeria as a new state employed the military *coup d'état*³ so often that it was recognized as a legitimate way to transfer power. Though Algeria has experienced weaknesses in its formal political life with the presence of several political regimes, only one single *coup* was truly successful after Independence. Other individuals who launched *coups d'états* (1966, 1967) were unsuccessful and easily thwarted by the Military Security⁴.

In his book “Chroniques des années de sang,” Colonel Samraoui recounts the role of the Army, the mess it caused after Independence, and the political crisis of the 1990s (2003: 3-7). The author describes the consequences of the Sécurité Militaire (SM), which he points out as “the heart of the Algerian power” and “a state inside the state.” In his discussion about the SM, Colonel Samraoui explains how this powerful machine caused so much damage and murdered thousands of civilians during the 1990s under the guise of rescuing the Algerians from the “fundamentalist peril,” while its real objective was to plunder the country’s wealth (2003).

In May 1992, the then head of counter-intelligence, Colonel Smaïn Lamari, reportedly told his deputies, “I am ready and determined to eliminate three million Algerians if necessary to maintain the order that the Islamists threaten” (as reported by

⁴In 1966, a *coup d'état* was launched by Colonel Zbiri against Colonel Boukharouba. Violent clashes took place in El Affroun. Nearly a thousand died, including many civilians.

Samraoui in 2003) (Beaugé& Tuquoi, 2003).⁵ The main reason the Algerian Army was so eager to be influential in the political arena (through the Military Security) was to weaken the credibility of the civilian opposition and the autonomy of civil society. It was also a way for the Algerian Army to limit the influence of competent, capable, autonomous political elite who had the capacity to form and mold a civil society. The military in Algeria continues even today to select the people who run the state administration. Ergo, more than forty years after Independence, Algerian political culture is still dominated by this view of historical legitimacy. The military still views itself as the sole source of state authority that is distilled through the civilian politicians (provided, of course, that these politicians abide by the “uninscribed law” that the Army is the main source of power of the Algerian political scheme). Below is a summary of the various characterizations of the Algerian Army’s involvement at the international level.

- 1) The military domination of the Revolutionary Council; the highest decision-making body, throughout the 1965-1978 period.
- 2) The presidential function has continuously been held by an Army officer, except for the first three years of independence.
- 3) The tenure of the Foreign Affairs Ministry for 13 years by Bouteflika, a former officer and close friend of President Boumedienne.
- 4) The presence, within the presidency, of officers assuming the function of the presidential advisers during both Boumedienne’s and Bendjedid’s presidency, especially after the appointment of the then Lieutenant-Colonel Larbi Belkheir as

⁵Three million, being roughly the number of Algerians who voted for the FIS in December 1991. In his testimony during the Souaïdia-Nezzar trial in 2002, Samraoui claimed that high officers within the security elite were already planning “total war” against the Islamists in the late 1980s and worked to create the conditions for the violent confrontation that followed.

- Director of the Presidential Cabinet in 1982, and Secretary General to the Presidency the following year. Illustratively, as a matter of fact, Belkheir had direct involvement on issues related to Algeria's relation with both France and Morocco.
- 5) The supremacy of the military opinions/decisions on issues of national security. In the case of the Sahara question, for example, the opinion of the Army's senior officers had been decisive in Boumedienne's decision to take a tough stance against Morocco's claim over this territory. This issue also became one of the top priorities of Algeria's military intelligence service.

II.4. The Role of the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS)

Another pillar of the current regime is the Algerian secret service, known as the DRS. Algeria's secret services started with the MALG (Ministère de l'Armement, des Liaisons générales et des Communications), which was founded in 1958 and later became the Sécurité Militaire (SM). Then, in 1990, the SM was renamed the Département de Recherche et de Sécurité (DRS). The DRS was subsequently replaced by the Department of Surveillance and Security (DSS) when President Abdelaziz Bouteflika took control of Algeria's security and intelligence services. Along with the military, the DRS possesses *de facto* authority over decision-making on key issues such as public expenditure, defense, and security policy.

Though the names have changed, the main features of these entities have remained the same—they all encompassed a control mechanism with which they infiltrated all sections of the administrative, political, and military life, both inside and outside Algeria. When the secret service was reshuffled, the powerful former head of the DRS, Mohamed Mediène, and Smain Lamari, former head of counter-espionage, took over the relevant

security sectors. Mediene reigned for more than 25 years as an invisible boss. As further illustrated by Addi (2001) that the Military Security took the role of organizing the elections, and shunned any candidate who did not follow the Military lines' objectives or any other candidate that uses public pressure against the army and military security. The latter also encouraged a non-violent and loyal oppositions to present themselves for election. That way elections would look credible (2001: 159-78).

The dissolution of the Department of Research and Security and its subsequent replacement by DRS under the leadership of General Tartag was intended by Bouteflika, particularly in the more recent years, to decrease the security organization's influence on Algeria's politics. As mentioned, the country had been controlled by the military and the intelligence service, each of which had an important role in Bouteflika's election victory for his first term in 1999. However, as time passed, relations between the current President and the DRS had become fractious. Bouteflika did not forget the year when the DRS, along with the military, did not endorse his ascension to the presidency after the death of President Boumediene. "[Bouteflika] never forgave the Army, and especially the military security led by Kasdi Merbah [also former Prime Minister], to have eliminated his election, and have preferred the Colonel [and former president] Chadli," said Goumiri Mourad, President of the Association of Algerian University for the Promotion of National Security Studies (Meddi, 2015).

Bouteflika wished to have a tight grip on this powerful machine during his presidency. Over the last two years, the procedures have intensified. Senior security staff were removed from their influential positions; others were put under the Army leadership or the government, and important personalities were forced to retire and replaced by Bouteflika followers.

II.5. The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

During Boumedienne's tenure, the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs was crucial and predominant due to the close connections and direct rapport with the President. At that time, Abdelaziz Bouteflika held this position; he was one of the closest allies to Boumedienne during the war of independence as they were both considered architects of the *coup d'état* that toppled Ben Bella in 1965. They worked together to make Algeria's voice heard at the international level. As a result, Algeria became a leading voice of the Non-Aligned Movement, providing unprecedented support to a variety of radical or revolutionary groups and independence movements. Under President Boumedienne, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was enhanced and given more decision-making power. Accordingly, Bouteflika, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, took the liberty to propose solutions, then submit them to the President for approval and implementation.

A pivotal moment occurred in the '80s, after occupying the position for 15 years, Bouteflika's privileges and power as foreign affairs minister were reduced. Before this shift, Bouteflika was often called upon due to his intermittent affinities with the king of Morocco, Hassan II. However, after Boumedienne's death, the role of the Ministry was no longer influential. The President's advisors and close associate's views influenced the President's thoughts on the Ministry. General Larbi Belkheir, former Secretary General of the presidential office, was one of those advisors; he exerted an unprecedented supremacy in Algeria's decision-making, playing an important role in Algerian foreign policy related to France and Morocco specifically.

II.2. Principles of Algeria's Foreign Policy

Introduction

Algeria's foreign policy principles were put in place before the country gained independence from France. Such principles were engrained in the military and political struggle of the Algerian revolutionaries against French colonial rule. Therefore, it is important to refer to Algeria's pre-independence era and the early diplomatic moves of the FLN in order to have a global understanding of the fundamental principles of Algeria's foreign policy.

In point of fact, the FLN did not limit itself to the military war as it also carried out an intense diplomatic effort in order to campaign for the Algerian cause at the international level despite the fact that France categorically objects. In a nutshell, Algeria put its struggle for independence as an action priority at the international level; it developed intense diplomatic activities designed to undermine the French argument (Meynier, 2002: 812; Connelly, 2002: 400).

The fundamentals principles of the Algerian foreign policy were mainly put forth in the Tripoli Program proposed in June 1962, by The National Council of the Algerian Revolution, and which claims the struggle against colonialism and the support of the liberation movements. Additionally, the 1976 Constitution and the 1989 have added the principles of non-alignment and non- interference outside the borders of Algeria.

It was through this context that the internalization of the Algerian cause became a paramount objective of the revolution in the FLN proclamation of November 1, 1954. Through this proclamation the FLN representatives made their appearance on the

international stage, campaigning against colonialism and imperialism, and campaigning for self-determination while also seeking financial support from the United Nations, the Non-Alignment movement, and the Soviet Block.

II.2.1 The Revolution and Anti-Imperialistic Rhetoric

The history of Algeria's nationalist movement has been marked by its refusal to accept imperialism and colonialism. At the eve of the Algerian revolution in 1954, a growing nationalist resentment towards France arose. This sentiment not only targeted the colonial power but also encapsulated the United States because of its indifference to the FLN's calls for help and support. Dwight Eisenhower, Kennedy's predecessor, adhered to a noncommittal policy whereby France got arms from the NATO, while secret operations with the FLN were conducted by the CIA. Eisenhower could not support Algeria publicly because of NATO's exception that the NATO alliance with France be honored and protected (Lefebvre, 1999: 64). This indifference pushed the FLN to deem the West's behavior as complicit in France's colonialist efforts. As noted by the FLN's journal *El Moudjahid* (1958):

“It is the massive support granted by the government of the United States to France in Algeria that makes the Algerian people move away from the West... [I]t is the West and particularly the United States which are accountable for the war of reconquest conducted by France in Algeria. The anti-colonialism directed towards France is also aimed at the West, and if there has been a gap between the Algerian people and France, another one is being created between the Algerian people and the West.”(*El Moudjahid*, August 22nd, 1958)

Furthermore, the FLN championed revolutionary actions within their global anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle. At one time, the FLN was seen as the leader of revolutionaries all over the world, from Vietnam to Southern Africa, who desired to bring

down the imperialist and colonial order. As clearly argued by the FLN party that the struggle of the Algerian people is not a confined battle, neither is it an uncommon in its way; it is only like a universal struggle of the peoples of Africa and Asia against its European colonizers. The war led by France is considered as one phase from the struggle done by different imperialists to continue their political and economic dominance in the colonized countries (*L'Algérie à l'ère de Bandoeng*, El Moudjahid, January 1st, 1958).

It could be stated that these principles were established well before Algeria's independence, having originated in the struggle against the colonizer. The FLN continued to apply these principles after independence as indicated in its first official post-war document, the 1962 Tripoli Program, which defined the political, social, cultural, and economic future of Algeria. In the section related to Algerian foreign policy, the Tripoli Program emphasized:

The big lesson of our war of liberation is this: faced by the irresistible pressure of the peoples, the rivalries among imperialist states reduced and were replaced by a solidarity. Our struggle evoked a favorable response among the masses in these countries, but was exposed to the hostility of their governments. Our determination to push the Revolution forward will encounter more obstacles. This should in no case prevent us from exerting maximum effort to preserve in our anti-imperialist activity. Therefore, Algeria foreign policy, within the neutral bloc, should be oriented towards alliances with countries that have succeeded in consolidating their independence and that have shaken off the grip of imperialism (Tripoli program 1962. See Appendix 1).

These revolutionary actions were radically incarnated within the Algerian Presidents' agendas. The first President, Ahmed Ben Bella, who throughout his presidency remained radically anti-imperialist, even flew to Cuba from New York after a United Nations' General Assembly meeting in deliberate violation of the U.S. embargo. Moreover,

the first Algerian President was a strong supporter of the Non-Aligned Movement and made Algeria a base for the world's liberation fighters and military factions, including Nelson Mandela, who benefited from Algerian guerrilla training; Che Guevara, who spent several months there in 1963; and Corsicans, Basques, Uruguayans, Chileans, and the Namibian South West Africa People's Organisation (Swapo), who were all invited to learn combat and resistance techniques from hardened Algerian maquisards. This openness to and support of revolutionary groups⁶ was emulated by subsequent Algerian presidents, such that Algeria became known as the capital of many African, Asian, and Latin American liberation and military factions.

All the ideologically descriptive documents produced after Algerian independence carried elements of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, and were considered irrevocable principles of Algeria's foreign policy. These principles were institutionalized at the 1964 National Charter which states that the cornerstone of Algeria's foreign policy is to make "the Algerian Revolution a center of a Revolutionary attraction in the Maghreb, the Arab world[,] and in Africa, and it has to conduct a firm struggle against the imperialism and the Zionism and to preserve the initiative that tends to the formation of a vast anti-imperialist alliance composed of the entire Asian, African, and Latin American " (FLN, 1964: 46).

In the mid-1960s and early 1970s, the Algerian regime dedicated most of its time to consolidating its legitimacy and championing certain international causes. It participated in many international events, fought to implement an ambitious external policy, and

⁶The following is a non-exhaustive list of the Liberation movements and military factions that Algeria supported: the ANC (African National Congress), the ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union), the ZANu (Zimbabwe African National Union), the SWAPO (South West African People Organisation), The Polisario Front (a military fraction that claims independence from Morocco), and the FLNA (Angolian Front for National Liberation).

concentrated its efforts on building relationships with Third World countries via the Non-Alignment movement as a way to promote its vision.

In addition, ideological documents produced under the reign of President Boumedienne revealed Algeria's regimes' orientations and molded the principles of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism into a pillar of Algerian foreign policy, as stated in Section 5 from the 1976 Charter :

Algeria works for the reinforcement of solidarity against imperialism and colonialism, the old and new one. The solidarity of Algeria with the Third World countries, in their liberation struggle, results from the supreme ideals of the Algerian revolution, those of freedom, independence and struggle against imperialism (FLN, 1967: 157).

These principles, however, were sometimes used by the Algerian regime in the wrong context. As far as the Moroccan-Algerian relations are concerned, when Morocco asserted its claim over the southern and western territories that had been under Moroccan sovereignty before the French gained control in the nineteenth century, Algeria moved from the logic of anti-colonialism to defending the colonial legacy under the guise of the principle of "the inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism." It is no doubt that Algeria was a loyal defender of this principle, having championed it at the Organization of African Unity, now known as the African Union. In seeking to maintain colonial borders, Algeria was a staunch defender of its ownership of large swathes of lands inherited from France. Ben Bella did not feel honor-bound to respect the promises made to Morocco before independence. Thus, in this instance, Algeria shifted from an anti-colonial policy to a territorial acquisition policy to the detriment of its neighbors.

By the same token, Algeria's support of the Polisario Front was not seen by many analysts as genuine. Analysts claim that Algeria's motivation for backing Polisario related

to its stake in the Sahara conflict and involves both idealistic and regional balances of power dimensions (Mundy, 2010). Algeria's support the Polisario Front has been part of Algeria's struggle to become and remain the regional hegemony in North Africa. This will be discussed further Chapter seven.

II.6.2. National Independence

National independence is another crucial principle in the history of the Algerian national movement. National independence became the backbone of the political and military objectives of the FLN leadership, as summed up and stressed upon in the first declaration that proclaimed the founding of the FLN that the struggle of the Algerian people is mainly directed against all forms of colonialism. The first proclamation of the the National Liberation Front in November 1954 clearly stressed on the fact of continuity of the struggle until the achievement of independence and the restoration of sovereignty and implementing the principles of democracy through a social Algerian state and within the framework of the principles of Islam.(Algerian Proclamation of November 1st 1954,President Houari Boumedienne Speech. See Appendix 2.)

Algerian diplomacy, which ushered in the birth of the state, was a product of war; a war that justified the country's military and ideological nature before and after independence and brought about the rise of a political structure of hostility revolving around the Army.

Algerian officers, heirs of the anti-colonial struggle, were deeply attached to the nationalist culture that supported a centralizing state. In addition, they possessed a keen sense of sovereignty and supported Algeria's categorical refusal to collaborate with the Western counterpart (the U.S. in particular) that threw its support behind the colonizer (France). The FLN's newspaper, El Moudjahid, was, in this regard, very clear when it

stated in 1961, “. . . the elementary principles of self-defense oblige [Algeria] to practice the old adage which says: ‘The friends of our enemies are our enemies’ and to condemn publicly the powers which insist on supporting the French Policy, whatever bloc they belong to” (*La révolution Algérienne*, 1961). It was therefore within this vision that Algeria avoided being associated with the antagonistic blocs, especially at the outbreak of the revolution. However, it should be mentioned that the FLN leaders had developed a very close relation with the Eastern Bloc, and was particularly critical towards the West and its allies. This approach was motivated by the FLN’s diplomatic policy to gain maximum support for its cause. Moreover, this close collaboration came as a competition in regard to the close relationships that some Arab countries maintained with the West.

Among other examples, the continual financial and military support provided to Morocco by the U.S. was seen by Algiers as direct support of the Monarchy’s claim over Algeria’s illegally inherited Moroccan territories and the “Western Sahara.” Algeria perceived this unprecedented support as evidence of the “imperialist” American policy to undermine Algerian nationalism. The FLN's journal, *El Moudjahid*, was, in this context, very explicit at the beginning of 1958 when it stated :

“ The Algerian people want the friendship of all peoples, without any exclusion, provided that it is frank and disinterested ; the war of extermination which they have endured daily, for three years, does not permit it to be selective in its choices of friends. More than that, the elementary principles of self-defence obliged it to practise the old adage which says : "the friends of our enemies are our enemies" and to condemn, publicly, the powers which insist on supporting the French policy whatever the bloc they belong to. ‘ (ELMoudjahid : August, 29th, 1961).

It was, therefore, with this vision, and the wish to protect the revolutionary legacy from the slightest foreign influence, that the post-independence leaders of Algeria conceived and implemented the country's external policy.

Conclusion

By and large, the making of Algeria's foreign policy was moulded by the combination of a set of characteristics and aspects whose influence changed over time, following their significance and priority for Algeria's national interest. This was to have profound implications for the way the country's external policy was to be conducted. Subsequently, it becomes understandable why, for instance, significant attention was given by Algerian in 1970s to the establishment of a New International Economic Order. And it also reveals the reason why Algeria had initiated a joint economic relationship with countries viewed as partners in its economic development, despite of the existence in some contexts of divergent or apparently incongruous ideological orientations.

Significantly, the analysis of Algeria's underlying foreign policy principles indicates that the making and implementation of Algeria's external policy is derived, in significant part, from the nationalist revolutionary tenets and beliefs. In a nutshell, during Algeria's war for independence, the Algerian military developed an unprecedented degree of nationalistic fervor, which was imposed on civilians and revolutionaries. In addition to the internal encouragement of nationalistic sentiments, nationalism also became an important characteristic in Algeria's external behavior, which prevented any deviation from the agenda put in place by the Algerian generals. Some Algerian officials and diplomats like Chadli Bendjedid and Bouteflika were brought to task when they tried to mend relations with the Kingdom of Morocco. Some who attempted to resolve the

“Western Sahara” problem, like President Mohamed Boudiaf, were assassinated. The prominence of Algerian nationalism was clearly expressed by Aida Ammour who stressed on the fact that nationalism and the narrative of a nation that belongs exclusively to the military realm rule out any possibility for an alternative narrative and prevent any deviation from the roadmap imposed by the military hierarchy. For instance, when President Chadli Bendjedid wanted to mend relations with Morocco in 1985, the Army staunchly opposed his efforts on the “Western Sahara” issue and the border dispute as Morocco was regarded by the Algerian military as ceding sovereignty (Boukhars & Roussellier, 2014: 99).

This shows how Algerian presidents along with the Algerian Military offices were pursuing their ideology of the Algerian revolution which encompasses the right of peoples to self-determination as well as the denunciation of imperialism that Algeria used a unifying project for all developing countries. It was, thus, through this background that Algeria's leaders established the main axes of the state's external policy and selected its guiding line towards the various areas and issues which faced post-1962 Algeria as a nation-state.

Having discussed the ideological influences on Algeria's internal politics as well as the principles of Algerian foreign policy and their influence on the country's decision-making with regard to external policy, subsequent sections of chapter two shed light on the most important elements that dominated Algerian foreign policy within international institutions and among Algeria's state allies. As far as the institutional mechanism of foreign policy formulation are concerned, it can be argued that the Algerian foreign policy,

like most of the external policies of the Third World countries, was shaped in a context where the president enjoyed wider privileges and attributions. Inasmuch as the bureaucratic apparatus in charge was in place (the Foreign Ministry), its leadership remained inconsequential, with the exception of the individual predominant role of Bouteflika when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, which emanated from past loyalty and clanship. The military institution, in practice, was considered to be the most crucial player in a state theoretically and officially run by the FLN. All in all, these bureaucratic components helped shape Algeria's foreign policy principals and were part and parcel of the evolution and developments of the Algerian foreign policy. These elements shall be tackled in the following chapter.

CHAPTER THREE: THE EVOLUTION OF ALGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE INDEPENDENCE

Introduction

When assessing the development of Algeria's foreign policy, one must become aware of Algeria's external policy implementation during the early years of independence. This chapter will not examine the period thoroughly, for such an endeavor would be a separate study in itself. Therefore, without diverting much from the core theme of the study, this chapter will present the most important issues that prevailed over Algeria's foreign policy. Hence, chapter three will be divided into three main sections.

As mentioned in Chapter two, Algeria's foreign policy decision-making was characterized by two main determinants—the diplomatic undertakings by the FLN during the war for independence and the requirements of state-building in independent Algeria. Within this context, Algerian leaders built their foreign policy decisions with certain states in mind. That is to say, Algeria's relations were not limited solely to its proximate neighboring states (Maghreb-Middle East-Africa), instead Algeria took a wider geographical scope to include, for example, the Non-Aligned Movement, regional and international organizations, communist and capitalist countries, and liberation movements. Section one of this chapter will review the highlights of the Algerian relations

with the Arab World (Maghreb/ Mashreq), Africa, France, and the super powers (the U.S. and Russia) that played a significant role in its foreign policy.

Section two will delve into the colonial history of Algeria and its surrounding nations, examining significant policies and treaties that fundamentally impacted the shifting geo-political boundaries and each country's perspective on those boundaries.

In order to understand the origin of Algeria's involvement in the Sahara conflict it is important to determine what the significant sources of the conflict are and how issues related to borders (boundaries), sovereignty, and national security are handled. As in other parts of Africa, post-colonial inter-state relations have been dominated by power politics: nation-states acting in ways to save their territorial unity, secure their supremacy, and ensure their existence. Short of war, they react to a perception of threats against those values by joining alliances—even though temporary—to maintain power, which prevents any attempt by one unit to control the system. Unlike what happened in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century following the establishment of Italian and German state building, the Maghribi balance of power involved states that were still working toward national establishment and reinforcement. In other words, the way in which nation-states are built impacts the presence of and complexity of inter-state disputes.

Among the Maghrebi states, there are significant contrasts in the political, economic and ideological levels. These differences were supported by the nature of French colonial rule in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The implementation of the colonial system in north-west Africa was instituted, in part, by demolishing prior interactions between various entities. The development of colonial rule sped up the practice of national distinction that had already commenced before the European colonization.

France's decision to colonize Algeria involved many factors, including human and environmental elements as well as varying approaches by administrators and military commanders. These factors led France to make the—now criticized as irresponsible and illogical—decision to enlarge the Algerian territory by annexing Moroccan territory. To put the matter in focus, it is important to consider the *de jure* frontiers as they were initially set and simultaneously acknowledge that these frontiers, or perhaps ideally—demarcation lines—were of French and Spanish origins; the legal status of which arises from their approval by Morocco during the pre-Protectorate period. These *de jure* boundaries were not primarily destined to fixed separations between administrative bodies. They, on the contrary, were intended to be more than limitations that separated areas of political hegemony. The settlement of areas of political influence was set before any powerful political control over the territory in question, and therefore came as priority over the needs of local administrations in those areas.

Finally, section three of this chapter describes—in detail—the history and effect of Algeria's border dispute with Morocco.

Border stabilization remains a significant concern throughout the Maghreb as it continues to be a burden on Maghreb relations, hindering all endeavors for union and collaboration. These land conflicts stem from the geographic unevenness among Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia that emerged as a result of French rule. The “Western Sahara” conflict applies to the broader issue of the territorial settlement of the Maghreb countries, where distinct territorial differences prevail over geopolitics.

Unlike the borders of Morocco, Algeria's political borders were established before the emergence of the state. This encouraged Algeria to apply its influence within a

preexisting territorial structure in the post-colonial historical context, where national territories were still in flux. Algeria became preoccupied with thwarting any attempt to modify the geopolitical framework it acquired upon independence—such attempts were perceived in Algeria as a strategy to surround and attack the nation.

Aware of the fact that its land is rich and vast, Algeria has been led by a central idea of territorial hegemony regarding its position on the Sahara as a whole and “Western Sahara” in particular. Its advantageous geographic position caused the newly created state to overestimate the value of the Saharan territory, both ideologically and politically. Having acquired an advantageous land base, Algerian diplomacy shifted its focus away from anti-colonialism toward a territorial policy that would ultimately penalize its neighbors. To this day, the issue of geopolitical imbalance continues to permeate inter-Maghreb relations.

III.1. Algeria’s Foreign Policy- Main Priorities After Independence

III.1.1 The Maghreb

The current relations between the Maghreb and Algeria stem from both an existentialist and essentialist nature. Historically, the region was never fully united as a single political unit except for once in the 11th and 12th centuries under the Moroccan Al-Moravid and Al-Mohad dynasties (Zartman, *Why the Maghreb Matters*, 2006: 65). These regions, however, were unified for extended periods as neighboring administrations governed by the Romans for five centuries, the Ottomans (with the exception of Morocco) for four centuries, and the French (except for Libya) for more than a century.

Although the three liberation movements in French areas—Algeria as a “constituent” of France and Tunisia and Morocco as protectorates—achieved independence in differing ways and on different dates (1956 for the protectorates, 1962 for

Algeria), the groups worked collaboratively. Their differing methods of revolution set them on isolated courses marked by distinguished identities and distinct interests. The Maghreb attempted to set forth on a cooperative path post-independence but to no avail. Regarding such efforts, William Zartman (2006) emphasized that there were numerous attempts that took place to establish cooperation after independence. The nationalist movements met in 1958, and the states set up a loose international organization in 1964, but none succeeded to overcome divisive politics. Alternatively, Morocco and Algeria frequently had troubled relations and fought border wars in 1963 and a battle in 1975. Tunisia and Algeria fought border wars in 1963, and Algeria and Libya had border skirmishes in 1985. Algeria and Tunisia (and Mauritania) in 1983 joined in alliance against Morocco and Libya, who made a counter alliance in 1984; Algeria created an anti-terrorist military alliance with three Saharan neighbors in 2010, purposely excluding Morocco (*Why the Maghreb Matters*, p. 69).

Once the political independence of the region was achieved following Algeria's independence in 1962, the countries of the Maghreb found themselves growing more distant due to a series of events, which fluctuated from disagreement to consensus and vice-versa. The independent states of the Maghreb found themselves divided over border disputes, mutually contradictory economic interests, and divergent political systems and alliances as well as ideological differences (For more information see Brownlie, 1979; Martek, 1965). These conflicts emerged out of the conflicting nature of the political structures that were adopted by each state following independence. Algeria played an important role in the Maghreb inter-relations. The contradictory revolutionary ideologies adopted by the Algerian presidents were among the first obstacles in achieving a full coalition in the region.

The main stumbling block that put the Maghribi-Union in a stalemate in the '70s was the stubbornness of decision makers to reach a common ground that could pave the way towards a united Great Arab Maghreb. Policy makers had to maintain a coherent set of policies with a mandatory requirement of “decompartmentalizing”⁷ borders between the five countries of the Arab Maghreb and establish a persistent infrastructure for its edification.

The main dispute arose out of Algeria’s post-independence claim over the Moroccan and Tunisian territories that were annexed by France into the colonized Algerian territory. This dispute led to a military confrontation between Morocco and Algeria, referred to as the Sand War, in which Morocco fought to regain its territorial claims. When President Boumedienne’s took power in June 1965, he made sure not to relinquish even one centimeter of the annexed territories. In fact, among the accusations against Ben Bella by Boumedienne was his willingness to cede part of these contested territories to put an end to the disputes.

By 1975, the Sahara question came into the fore, placing the notion of Maghreb Unity on the back burner. President Boumedienne initiated his ideological concept of the “Maghreb of peoples” to invoke a revolutionary union that would involve overthrowing the monarchy in Morocco along with the establishment in Tunisia and replacing them with socialist entities comparable to the Algerian model (Chtatou, 2003:273).

Despite several attempts of rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria through reconciliatory agreements, the Sahara question plunged the two states into intermittent

⁷Decompartamentalize was a term used by Michael Webb at a conference in 1995 entitled, the Barcelona Process. It means not to regard the Maghreb Union as a set of compartments but rather view it as one unity.

bilateral hostilities that hampered the establishment of the Maghreb Union that was proclaimed in Marrakech in 1989.

On the Eastern front, Tunisian-Algerian relations were at their lowest after Ben Bella colluded with Egypt to endorse Salah Ben Youssef in his pursuit for power against the then President Habib Bourguiba and vehemently declined to deport Tunisians accused of plotting to eliminate their President. Relations worsened when oil was discovered under the border in 1964.

Furthermore, the border disputes were a source of continuous friction until a resolution was reached in April 1968 to demarcate common frontiers (Rondot, 1984-85: 52). Moreover, because of Bourguiba's unwavering support of the historical facts of the Marocanity of the Sahara, President Bourguiba irritated Algeria by his pro-Moroccan pronouncement in the fall of 1975 in which he stated, "I personally advised King Hassan and President Mokhtar Ould Dada (Mauritania), neither to implement a referendum nor to establish an independent state in the Sahara, which will be under the influence of Spain or another Maghreban state" (*Le Monde Diplomatique*, 1974:16). Bourguiba was also very critical about the fact that Algeria was endorsing the referendum over the Sahara conflict. In response to Bourguiba, Algeria retaliated, harshly criticizing him in the Algerian Press Service: "The Judgments are anti-Algerian with a tone of old unsatisfied enmity. Without realizing that if nourished from the same oil he drops, fire will spread in the region, then Tunisia cannot escape it" (Algérie Press Service, Nov 9-10-1975).

Then on January 27, 1980, came the Gafsa incident in which commandos trained in Libya entered Algeria to destabilize Bourguiba's regime. The commandos' arms were apparently delivered by the Polisario guerrillas through Northern Mali and South-East

Algeria (Toumi, 1980: 158-64). Following this period, Tunisian relations with Algeria tended to ebb and flow, though remaining overall less volatile than before.

III.1.2. The Middle East

After the independence in 1962, Algeria became an official member of the Arab League. This happened at a tense time in inter-Arab relations as their discord over Arab leadership intensified the ideological rivalry between two main factions of the Arab family: the supposedly “liberated” and “non-liberated” Arab nations. The Algerian state, known to be a staunch defender of the “liberated” group, saw fit to establish a cautious Arab policy, as summarized below by the Algerian Foreign Minister, Mohamed Khmisti:

“Inside the Arab world our policy is based on the principles of non-interference in internal affairs. . . . because we are Arabs and this world is Arab, whether it is good or bad, we are part of it. It is, however, in the interest of Algeria to see all the Arabs agreed. . . . Algeria has decided to do whatever it can to unite the Arabs, and to participate in all positive and effective initiatives to liberate Palestine” (Grimaud, 1984: 226).

Algeria's historical and ideological dedication to national revolution and self-determination resulted in a strong affinity for the Palestinians in Israel, one of the Arab League's most compelling causes. Though the policy claims to subscribe to a non-interference platform, it did not fully respect this non-involvement approach with certain sovereign countries, like the Kingdom of Morocco's internal affairs regarding the Sahara conflict.

Nevertheless, Algeria's foreign policy often focuses on the Arab world, Africa, and multilateral fora, and it continues to be defined by a residual suspicion of Western motives. Algeria was critical of NATO's role in the regime change in Libya and has urged a non-interventionist approach, led by the Arab League, to the situation in Syria. As far as the

Palestinian cause is concerned, unlike the first Algerian President Ben Bella who was neglectful to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Boumedienne, the second Algerian President, framed this question into a primary priority in Algeria's Arab policy due to the monopolization of Jamal Abdenasser. For President Boumedienne, the Palestinian cause was a unique issue that could resolve ideological disputes between Arab states and improve their unity (Slomim, 1970: 128). The same unwavering policy support to the Palestinians was championed by the succeeding Algerian presidents.

Algeria's behavior under President Boumedienne undoubtedly initiated animosity towards the imperialist specter, stemming from its long years of war against France. It is through this ideological context of a revolutionary approach towards imperialism that Algeria enrolled into the revolutionary clan of Arab states, even in their imperialist fights with neighboring countries that helped Algeria obtain its independence.

It is important to acknowledge the other factors like oil and ideological tendencies that provoked Algeria's disputes with some Arab countries. Algeria's decision to raise the price of oil and Boumedienne's grand design to employ it as a weapon against the West contradicted Saudi Arabia's strategy to serve U.S. interests. As a matter of fact, the '70s were characterized by the use of Arab oil as an important stabilizer to the balance of the Arab world. Arab oil was significant to the economy during this period as it replaced the Suez Canal income and contributed financially to the countries affected by the June War. Fortunately, the June War happened the same year that Algeria initiated its oil nationalization strategy—resulting in complete Algerian authority over its oil, which allowed the country to act freely in the oil battle against the West.

The disagreement between Saudi Arabia and Algeria was not limited to the oil issue ; it was also related to the Moroccan–Algerian dispute where Algeria accused Saudi Arabia

of providing financial assistance to Morocco. Tensions increased over the Saudi-Egyptian stances on the Yemeni issue, which dates back to the 1962 declaration of the establishment of the new Republic. While Egypt endorsed the concept of a republican state, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia favored the existing religious state. As far as Algeria was concerned, backing Yemen was not an issue for the country—it showed its willingness to assist Yemen in its economic, social, and political endeavors.⁹

Thus, at that point, Algeria collaborated with its neighboring states (Morocco and Tunisia) in peace process initiatives intended to reduce inter-Arab tension. However, Algeria's participation was often minimal due to some of its radical stances. What characterized the period after 1975 was Algeria's absence and its rare interference in the Middle East political interaction, which arose out of its dispute with Morocco over the borders and the Sahara conflict. Accordingly, one can deduce that Algerian foreign policy toward the Arab world was highly motivated by ideological motivations, particularly its unwavering support for anti-imperialism and liberation movements.

III.1.3. The Eastern Bloc

The outbreak of the Algerian War of Independence in November 1954 was a significant development in the international history of the Cold War. The Algerian conflict helped strengthen national liberation forces throughout the colonial world. The Soviet and other communist groups engaged in world revolution, specifically guiding proletarian internationalism. For them, the Third World represented great opportunities to implement

⁹The Algerian-Yemeni Communiqué was issued following the visit of a Yemeni delegation, from October 16 to 20, 1965, headed by the Prime Minister, General Hassan El Amri, and composed of M. Abderahmane El-Iriani, member of the Consultative Council, and Hassan Mekki, Minister of the State's economic affairs. The delegation was received by the President of the Council of Revolution, Houari Boumedienne. El Moudjahid, October 21, 1965.

their objectives, which included the neutralization of American and other Western imperialistic ambitions. Furthermore, the deep division between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union lead to a competitive aid-giving between the two communist states that Algeria took advantage of. Another factor that piqued Kremlin interest in Algeria was its desire to set up bases in Algeria to expand its naval presence in the Mediterranean and increase the Soviet fleet's operational facilities.

The most important steps undertaken by the Soviets in regards to Algeria took place right after Algeria's independence. In September 1963, the U.S.S.R. loaned the Algerian government 100 million dollars to purchase military munitions. This was the start of an operation that made Moscow the central supplier of military equipment to the Algerian Republic. Soviet weaponry was used in the Sand War against Morocco and was also supplied to the Polisario Front. The Soviet Union has responded quickly to Algeria's request by furnishing an amount of 500 million dollars deal of weapons in late 1975. Damis (2015: 148) highlighted that these arms supply was set in a five-year military sales agreement between between the U.S.S.R. and Algeria and was worth an estimated three billion dollars.

Algeria's interest in preserving close relations with the U.S.S.R. was articulated further in December 1965 when Boumedienne's first visited Moscow. During this visit, Boumedienne was assured of the continued Soviet social, economic, and military aid—which the Soviets subsequently delivered (Ottaway, 1970: 233).

When Algeria's international affairs efforts were acknowledged in the international arena, Algeria's ties with the Soviet Union were often influenced by three core variables: (1) the degree of Soviet support for the Arab cause, (2) the Soviet contribution to stabilizing

relations between Algeria and the West, and (3) Soviet efforts to prevent the appearance of a non-aligned movement (Zaki, 1985: 130).

When Boumedienne died in 1978, the U.S.S.R.'s condolence message to Algeria noted the close relationship between the two states, but also mentioned its concerns over Algeria's future political choices. The message clearly stated that "Boumedienne was a great friend of the Soviet Union" and the "Algerian Constitution affirmed the Socialist orientation in the country's development" (Zoubir, 1999:405).

During the '90s, however, mutual relations between the two countries practically came to an end due to Algeria's internal crisis, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the resulting economic and political troubles in Russia. By the end of the mid-90s, both countries resumed their collaboration and cooperation through shared strategic interests like natural resources, particularly gas and military equipment and munitions, as well as geographic proximity to Europe.

III.1.4. France

"Relations between Algeria and France are always important. When they are bad, they are important. When they are good, they are also important." - Abdelaziz Bouteflika

Algeria's negotiated agreement (the "Evian Accords" Appendix) for its independence led to an exclusive cooperation between France and Algeria. The formal agreement declared, "[t]he vote on self-determination will enable the electors to make known whether they wish Algeria should be independent and, in that case, whether they wish France and Algeria to cooperate under the conditions defined by the present Declaration" (Holl, 1983: 14). Consequently, even if France's intentions were to cede its control to Algeria, under the provisions of the Evian Accords, it made sure to hold a special

status in the newly-independent republic. In other words, “[t]he Evian Agreement covered President De Gaulle’s intention of securing for France another form of control, over the economy of Algeria and, by extension, over its political destiny” (*Africa Diary* 904; Zartman, *Les Relations*, 1964: 1088-89). However, Algeria did not let this happen. On the contrary, the country took revolutionary steps toward its political and economic interests, despite the fact that this was a difficult undertaking given the multitude of economic and social problems Algeria inherited by its colonizer. In an interview with Aljazeera Qatari TV Channel, President Ben Bella stated:

“Right after independence, France left Algeria with eight million Algerians and 6 billion francs in the Algerian banks, barely enough to feed the nation for five days. The departing French officials had left nothing but emptiness. . . . There would be no bread, perhaps no water . . . and no more than 120 doctors for the whole country. . . . Algeria was in total chaos (Al Jazeera Qatari TV Channel Interview by Ahmed Mansour, 2002).”

Since the election of the first president of the Algerian Republic, the political bond between Ben Bella and Boumedienne centered on their disapproval of the Evian Accords and France. In an interview with the French TV channel Ina France, Ben Bella clearly contradicted the Evian Accord, stating that “the Evian Accords constituted a compromise in certain regards incompatible with the socialist perspectives of Algeria” (Viorst, 1992). For President Ben Bella and his elite, the Accords acted as a solution to a political problem, thus, they should be taken more in spirit rather than by the letter.

In March 1963, the Government nationalized all the French companies as well as the lands still held by French settlers. Through these efforts, Algeria quickly managed to change, unilaterally, several provisions of the Evian Accords to the disadvantage of France. In 1976, Algeria started to recover its energy resources and began to nationalize all British

and American oil companies in the Algerian desert.¹⁰ Then, in April 1970, France asked Algeria for compensation for the nationalized French companies. Negotiations over this request failed, leading to a French campaign for the international boycott of Algeria's gas and oil, even threatening to sue any foreign company buying Algerian oil. As a result, France managed to obtain greater compensation for its companies.¹¹ This, however, did not prevent Algeria from taking control of its oil resources and reinforcing its national independence. As stated by Boumedienne in June 1971:

‘‘We must explain here one historical fact. In 1962, the Algerian war of liberation was terminated by the Evian Agreements. These accords were not to the advantage of our country. . . [N]o one at this time believed that those accords would last. . . [I]t was therefore necessary to re-orient the revolution of 1 November 1954, to its normal path in order to achieve its noble objectives. Thus, the biggest battle of the socialist revolution was the battle over the oil. . . We have conducted our war of liberation to its end. Today, we pursue our economic revolution, especially in the field of hydrocarbons, in order to make the Algerian people the owner of this wealth.’’(Speech of Boumedienne, June 19th,1971)

As a result of these policies, relations between the two countries have been and remain strained. Moreover, President Georges Pompidou did not follow De Gaulle's Algerian foreign policies based on privileged relations; instead, he declared that France would not prioritize Algeria, but neither would it exclude Algeria from the number of states with which France cooperates (Interview of President Pompidou for the French Television, June 24th, 1971, *Le Monde*, June 26th,1971).

¹⁰The first practical action that signaled Algeria's intentions came after the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967. Following the allegations of the Egyptian positions, Algeria placed all American firms that held minority interests in various Algerian ventures under state control.

¹¹Algeria agreed to pay 54 Million Dollars as compensation to the French to guarantee the 7 million tons of crude a year at a price of around 2.75 US Dollars a barrel and to allow them to share in the development of the Saharan oil fields on economically viable terms.

The first official French visit to Algeria was made in 1974 by President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing—a visit that was meant to establish cycles of mutual understanding and genuine collaboration. However, in late 1975, a new source of discontent arose, due to the French position towards and endorsement of Morocco regarding the “Western Sahara” conflict, which made the Algerian-French rapprochement impossible. Boumedienne voiced his discontent with the French stance: “Paris accelerates its arms supply to Morocco. We consider this as an unfriendly act” (Jean Daniel interview of Boumedienne, November 1975).

What made the relations even worse is that President Giscard d'Estaing openly supported the Madrid Treaty and disapproved of the proliferation of “micro states,” like the creation of an independent state in the “Western Sahara” (le Nouvel Observateur, 1986). According to Grimaud, Algeria viewed France negatively—as a puppet of its allies—the United States and Europe—due to its support of the Washington Policy and its endeavors to protect North Africa from the revolutionary forces in Algeria (Grimaud 1984 :160).

In 1974, President Boumedienne, wishing that France and Algeria could find a basis for reconciliation, stated, hopefully, that “[r]elations between France and Algeria may be good or bad, but in no way can they be trivial” (Zoubir,2011: 6). At the appointment of President Bouteflika in 1999, he highlighted Boumedienne’s legacy, declaring that “Algeria seeks to have extraordinary, non-trivial, not normal, [but] exemplary and exceptional relations with France” (Zoubir, 2011:6). Despite this goodwill intended to help leave these disagreements behind, relations between the two countries continued in their intermittent misunderstandings, conflicts, and mutual suspicions.

III.1.5. The United States

The U.S. was among the countries that endorsed Algeria's independence. In 1957, John F. Kennedy, then Senator and member of the Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, overtly pleaded for the independence of Algeria before the United States Senate. The relations between the two countries declined in 1962 following two particular events: Algeria's President Ben Bella visit to Cuba—as Fidel Castro was one of the most despised enemies to the Americans; and Ben Bella's support of Fidel Castro's declaration calling for the removal of the U.S. from Guantanamo Naval Base. In fact, after Ben Bella's public support for Castro's declaration, the U.S. deemed Algeria a radical nation. This event was perceived as a false start in U.S.-Algerian relations; which came on the eve of what was to become the Cuban-Missile Crisis. Relations which were further aggravated by Algeria's continuous condemnation of U.S. foreign policy in its interference in Congo and in the Dominican Republic as well as its stance on the Vietnam War and its endorsement of Israel.

Several incidents that occurred over a short period during Ben Bella's presidency as well as Ben Bella's continued criticisms of America's imperialism and Algeria's close ties to the Soviet Union led the U.S. State Department to describe Algeria in its annual report in April 1964 as a "cold war danger point" in Africa and to raise concern over "the pro-communist influence." Under President Boumedienne's watch, U.S.-Algerian relations maintained the same tone as he criticized U.S. foreign policy towards Vietnam to the point that in January 1967, the former Ambassador to the U.S., John D. Jernegan, wrote a strong toned letter to the Algerian Newspaper El Moudjahid, where he harshly criticized Algeria's heinous campaign against America, decrying the worsening atmosphere of the U.S.-Algerian relations.

Another aspect of Algerian foreign policy towards the U.S. that has remained relatively constant is the fact that the U.S. maintained a close and special relationship with Morocco that Algeria considered hostile to its interests. Problems between the two countries erupted again as a result of the role played by the U.S. in the Algerian-Moroccan conflict, the Sands War. Decision makers in Algeria perceived this move as a threat to their interests.

Nevertheless, there was a period of appeasement immediately after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, when Algeria turned its interests to the American market and added technology to its economic and social development strategy. Since 1968, the economic sector between the two countries expanded, especially in the fields of gas and hydrocarbons as well as in the fields of education and light industries. Therefore, U.S.-Algerian relations have, by and large, been characterized by practically continuous conflict in the politico-ideological and strategic arena, yet have maintained beneficial cooperation concerning economic and commercial affairs (Aït-Chaalal, 2003: 13).

III.1.6. Conclusion

Based on the facts repeated on this chapter, it appears that Algeria's foreign policy immediately after independence did not radically change with regards to the main international issues such as border disputes, liberations movements, relations to superpowers, or continuous support to the SADR movement and the Palestinians. The driver of Algeria's foreign policy was to assert itself in the international arena right after gaining its independence through its founding principles—non-alignment, nationalism, and support for Palestinian and other Arab and third world causes, like the Sahara conflict considered as the main priority issues in the Algerian foreign policy. The last two sections

of this chapter will tackle the core subject of the thesis, that is the Algerian foreign policy role in the “Western Sahara” Conflict. In fact, after independence, the territorial question appeared prominent in the newly created state’s international relations as an important part of the process of nation-building aimed at reinforcing the sovereignty of the young state over an Algeria defined by the borders inherited from the French colonial period. Indeed, territorial disputes originated from the first conflict between Morocco and Algeria. Through this climate of rivalry and distrust, the question of “Western Sahara” and the support of the Polisario by the Algerian regime greatly affected the Moroccan-Algerian relations at multilevel stances.

III.2. Algeria-Morocco Border Demarcation: A review of colonial history.

III.2.1. The Treaty of Lalla Marnia and the Protocol of 1901-1902

During the Ottoman period, the Kingdom of Morocco controlled the Touat, Saoura, and Tidikelt tribes. In effect, the domination of the Alaouite dynasty of the Tafilelt region in these areas dates back to the sixteenth century (Author 2013 interview with M’hamed Boucetta, see list of interviewees Appendix 6/ See interviewee biography at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1). Beginning in the nineteenth century, Sultan Moulay Sliman encountered continuing insurgencies during his reign and was unable to pursue the administration of these far distant Saharan Oases. Thus, in 1800, he granted these areas their internal autonomy (Terrasse, 1949-50: 246). It was ninety years later that the Moroccans tried to take back control over these areas, at which point they were facing the threat of an impending French occupation of the Sahara.

The map of 1848 cannot be considered . . . a misconception of what was then the extent of the Moroccan Empire. . . . It recognized that Morocco had historical ties and rights with Blad-Es-Siba. One will see that throughout the entire period until the establishment of the French Protectorate over Morocco in 1912, the French Government frequently was to act and react as if it perceived and respected the limits of the ill-defined Blad-Es-Siba (Trout, 1969: 25).

When France occupied Algeria in 1830, the first Franco-Moroccan boundary agreement, the Treaty of Lalla Marnia, defined French borders with Morocco in the coastal zone bordering the Mediterranean. A demarcation line was traced from the coast as far south as Teniet Sassi, the Southern limit of the Tell, the zone of the unirrigated area. Beyond the Tell, no precise demarcation was made of the respective areas of Algerian and Moroccan control. The treaty outlines:

Art. 4 - In the Sahara [Desert] there is no territorial limit to be established between the two countries since the land cannot be tilled, and can only be used in order to find the pasture and water that they need. . . . If one of the two Sovereigns should have to take measures against his subjects, at a time when the latter may be intermingled with those of the other state, he shall take whatever measures he pleases against his subjects, but he shall abstain from touching of the subjects of the other government. Art. 5- The Kessour, which belong to Morocco are those of Yiche and Figuigue. The Kessour which belong to Algeria are Aïn Séfra, S'fissifa, Assla, Tiout, Chellala, El-Abiad, and Bou-Semghoune.

Regarding the desert South and South-West of Teniet-Sass, the Treaty attempted to define the sovereignties by particular tribes rather than by demarcating their respective zones. In addition, the treaty of 1845 set up a frontier zone rather than establishing a boundary line. This settlement proved impractical at the end of the nineteenth century, when France extended southward—a move that conflicted with tribes from Morocco.

In this respect, the Treaty of Lalla Maghnia was incomplete with regard to the demarcation of the entire length of the Algero-Moroccan frontiers; the Treaty did, however, serve the goals for which it was meant. In support of this argument, Trout notes:

“Beyond Teniet El Sassi there was no immediate need for a boundary delimitation for not only were neither of the two governments then in a position to enforce their authority on the High Plateaux but it was also recognized that a territorial division in that region was complicated by the existence of “intermingled” nomadic tribes. Though it is difficult to conceive that both governments were not fully aware of the presence of Oases peoples beyond the zones of the High Plateaux, it is nonetheless true that the proximity of the dunes of the Erg Occidental the Ksour of the Saharan Atlas made it for all purposes unnecessary to consider it of any importance as to who was to have control of the desert regions (1969:23)”.

Having later expanded the Algerian authority southward into the Sahara region that was inhabited by tribes from Morocco, the French set in motion conflicts centered on these unsettled borders that were further complicated by the inconsistent location of the administrative boundary line (Hussein, 1975: 211-12). Eventually, the French government signed a Protocol in Paris in 1901 extending the border between Algeria and Morocco from Teniet-el-Sassi to the Hammada du Guir (Brownlie, 1979: 59)—a policy that was reinforced by the installation of military and customs posts in the limited area of territory controlled by French-Algeria and Morocco. These borders, however, were never considered official international boundaries; instead, they were established for the people of this zone, not for the territory in which they lived (Trout, 1969: 54). Further Moroccan concessions were made in a second agreement in Algiers in 1902 when the Moroccan commissioner Mohamed Guebass and General Cauchemez, representing Algeria, drew up an accord that prohibited the Algerians from occupying Beni Ounif, but granted them the authority to cross into a basin area that was West of the Zousfana line.

III.2.2. Varnier Line

Well before the establishment of the French protectorate, the French took control of several posts in Eastern Morocco that governed the tribes of the Colomb Bechar, Kenadza, and Abadla (*Revue générale*, 1992: 43). Varnier, the French High Commissioner at Oujda, was in charge of executing this arrangement; he put forward a demarcation line that was to divide the administrative competencies of the Territory of Ain Sefra and the areas that were to be under his jurisdiction in Eastern Morocco (Varnier, Year: 4-5). Considering the problems posed by the use of tribal limits as boundaries of Colomb Bechar and Figuigue zones, Varnier suggested a line that the French Ministerial Decree considered and accepted in 1912. With this line, Algeria was enlarged by several hundred square miles. Unfortunately, Varnier wrongly assumed many tribes, like the Amors tribe (who in reality were considered Moroccans by the Treaty of Lalla Marnia), to be Algerian. Varnier was known to favor Algerian interests and clearly ignored the former protocols. He was endorsing the Algerian interests, despite the fact that he was not really aware of what Algeria's interests were. Inevitably, the Algerian Government and at least certain members of the military command in Algeria started pressing for a portion—if not all—of the Moroccan frontier region which bordered on the territory of Ain Sefra (Trout, 1969:112).

III.2.3. The Question of Tindouf

The question of Tindouf is a sticking point in the realm of Maghreb geopolitics as it relates to Algerian-Moroccan relations and the Sahara question. The region is an ultra-sensitive subject—though Tindouf was taken from Morocco and integrated into the Algeria territory, since its independence, Morocco has insisted on the "moroccanity" of the oasis.

France was interested in Tindouf, a small oasis located in the interior of the Sahara, revealed to Europe by the visits of Oskar Lenz (1880) and Camille Douls (1887). When Touat was colonized, every officer from the Algerian Saharan companies was eager to discover Tindouf. Several tried in vain in 1904, then twice in 1914. Finally, in 1925 and 1928, the companies reached Tindouf, but it was not until 1934 that Tindouf was colonized by the French.

The years between 1930 and 1934 were marked by the establishment of several French decrees through which Algeria benefited. In March 1934, General Giraud, commander of the Confins Algéro-Marocains, requested from General Huré, Commander in Chief of the Protectorate's forces, authorization to occupy Tindouf (Arlabosse, 1935: 27-28). The occupation of Tindouf was instigated by Colonel Trinquet, who utilized a contingent of troops from France, Algeria, Senegal, and the foreign legion. In the summer of 1934, the French transferred a big part of the Saharan Company of the Saoura to Tindouf (Bentzmann, 1935: 282).

It was previously decided by the French that Tindouf would be given to Algeria immediately after the pacification of the Anti-Atlas and the lower Valley of the Draa (Catroux, Charbonneau, 1952: 704). This decision is explained by the fact that Algeria was a French territory and Morocco was a foreign territory under the French protectorate.

The North African Conferences agreements represented powerful elements that motivated Paris to officially recognize the territorial expansion of the Annex of Touat in the far "Western Sahara," which had made it easier for the French to give Tindouf to Algeria. With respect to this decision, Trout stated:

"Thus, while the decision giving Tindouf to Algeria may have only been made in March 1934, the decree of August 5, 1933, by stipulating that the territory of the Annex of the

Touat extended west of [the] Mdakane-Chenachane line, made such a decision a forgone conclusion (1969: 323). ‘

That said, the Trinquet Line takes into consideration the extreme limits of the Moroccan tribes but was never recognized as an official line.

III.2.4. Trinquet Line

By 1956 the administrative border for Morocco became a line that was an agreement between the extremes limits of the Moroccan tribes as stated above, despite the fact that the starting point had been at Ighli and the western limit established by the Protectorate. Consequently, France provided this administrative border with a historical pedigree reaching back to the 1930s by suggesting that the true border was the so-called “Trinquet” line to which the 1956 border conformed. This move was clearly made to set a territorial limit for the newly independent state of Morocco.

Trout notes, however, that the Trinquet Line’s purpose was to boost the authenticity of the demarcation line that was first established on the Protectorate’s administrative map in 1953 and 1956:

‘[I]t may well have been that it was decided to call the Trinquet Line simply to give it some sort of historical basis. In 1956, just at the moment of Moroccan independence and only few months after the return to the Throne of Sidi Mohamed, it would have been impossible to have given that line any validity if it had been admitted that the delimitation dated only from 1953 (1969: 414). ‘

III.2.5. The French Operational Limit on the Border Zone

The fabricated Trinquet Line was not a *de facto* demarcation between French Algeria and independent Morocco. One of the most important factors in the border demarcation occurred in February 1956—at that time, the outcome of a Residential arrêté clearly delineated the extent of the administrative and territorial jurisdiction of the

Moroccan post of Taouz. The arrêté's goal, which was issued some weeks after the decision that Algeria would have control along the Saharan border, was to clearly demonstrate that Morocco possessed only limited territorial control along the valley of Daoura.

The Moroccan-French relations reached the height of disagreement over Morocco's Saharan boundaries. Among the important factors relevant to this issue was that the French believed that Morocco claimed all of "Western Sahara," including zones in Algeria, notably, the Guir-zousfana basin, the Oases of the Oued Saoura, the Tindouf Region, the Gourara-Touat complex, and all of Mauritania as well as Rio de Oro and the Saquia El Hamra (Ministère des affaires étrangères de la République Française, 1960: 44-51). Although a commission was established to resolve the Saharan frontier conflict, it never met (J. O. de la République Française sess. 1958-59, first legisl.).

The Moroccan Liberation Army attacked the frontier zone in June and July 1956. Military attacks were coordinated on Ain Zemoul, Ain Chair, and Beni Ounif, and terrorist attacks were perpetrated at Colomb Bechar and Tindouf (Le Monde, June 20-21, 1956). Following these intermittent skirmishes, the French reinforced their control in these zones. By July 1956, a "line" came into existence "stretching from Figuigue to Tarfaya, a line that in most respects has remained the *de facto* Algero-Moroccan boundary right up to the present time" (J. O. de la République Française 2nd sess. Dec. 1957).

In 1956, the Reguibat Lagouacem pledged allegiance to the Moroccan Sultan. Many joined the Army of Liberation (Mousset, 1959: 198-99), fought the French, and lost. Despite this failure, this force along with its nomadic followers succeeded in entering the Spanish Saharan territories. Smara, Bir Nzara, and Aousserd were relinquished, and the Spanish were pushed to the coast (Garnier 1960: 96-102). This resulted in a Franco-Spanish joint military action against the Army of Liberation, in which they planned the secret

“Operation Mop Up” in February 1958. The defeat of the Lagouacem Tribe and the Liberation Army was colossal, causing the Reguibat Lgouacem to return to Tindouf and surrender to the French.

After Algeria gained independence in 1962, the inhabitants of Tindouf openly pledged their allegiance to the new king of Morocco, Moulay Hassan II (Le Figaro, Oct. 17, 1962, 9; Le Monde, October 18, 1962, 4). This act of allegiance was made by the Tadjakant of Tindouf as well as the Reguibat Lgouacem. The following October, both tribes rebelled against the Algerian Government.

It was even reported that the Moroccan flag was raised twice in Tindouf, which led to grave hostilities with the Algerian Military and resulted in the killing of 130 tribesmen. Consequently, the Lgouacem tribe abandoned Tindouf and spread into the neighboring areas of Morocco as well as the former Spanish Sahara territories of Saquia, El Hamra, the Rio de Oro, Mauritania, and Mali (Lessourd, 1964: 9).

III.2.6. Conclusion

When Sultan Sidi Mohamed Ben Youssef achieved independence on February 15, 1956, he insisted on the inviolability and the respect of the territorial integrity of Morocco. He stated that this integrity is “formally guaranteed by France and the signatory powers of the Act of Algeciras and by other international treaties” (Le Monde, February 16, 1956, 2). It is important to recall that well before this act was established, the French government had extended its jurisdiction to the Algerian border areas. This led to intermittent skirmishes that first erupted in June 1956. Moreover, contrary to the unequivocal claims of the Moroccan governments to the “Western Sahara,” this French jurisdictional claim has made the settlement between Algeria and Morocco a very complicated issue to resolve.

When the French left Morocco, they took with them nearly all the Protectorate's archives and as confirmed by Trout:

“Morocco was unable to ascertain what happened during the forty-four years of the French Protectorate. It was not aware that the Protectorate's administration had repeatedly made a defense of Morocco's right to a position of the Sahara, and it had no idea of the circumstances by which this Saharan territory came to be ceded to Algeria (1969: 432).”

Despite the fact that Algeria and Spain did not feel bound by any international agreement, there were important grounds upon which Morocco justified its claim to the annexed territories:

- 1) The signatory powers of the Act of Algericas, particularly France, did not honor their obligation to guarantee the territorial integrity of the Moroccan Empire;
- 2) Spain's control of the Saquia El Hamra was illegal and could not be justified in the light of the international recognition of Morocco's rights to that area ;
- 3) In 1962, the Algerian government took possession of territory from France that France had recognized to be legitimately Moroccan (Trout, 1969: 432).

The justifiable boundaries of Morocco stretched from the Djebel Grouz down to the Oued Talzaza and the Lower Guir as well as the oasis of Tabelbala and the area of Hamdas between Tabelbala and the Tafilelt, the Oasis of Tindouf and its adjacent lands, and the Saquia El Hamra as far as the northern limit of Rio de Oro (Author 2013 interview with M'hamed Boucetta, see list of interviewees Appendix 6/ See interviewee biography at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1).

Settling the border issue in Algeria has—to this day—been challenging. According to Trout (1969), Algeria did not feel any moral duty to relinquish the territory issue it controls to satisfy the demands of Morocco. Among the reasons Algeria vehemently opposed any negotiation over these territories was the Moroccan military action on the

Saharan borders in July 1962. Successive disputes occurred between the two countries that only amplified the uncompromising Algerian attitude to resolve the borders issue. Algerian diplomacy was born out of the struggle against colonial occupation and has therefore been overly focused on territorial issues, leading its representatives to pursue a strategy that was both hegemonic and systematically opposed to Morocco's strategy.

Any recommendation regarding the settlement of the Algerian-Moroccan border disputes in the "Western Sahara" recognizes that if an important amount of territory in this region were left to Morocco, Algeria would have no other choice than to give up Tindouf, which had been used as a headquarters for the Polisario. Moreover, the "Western Sahara" dispute cannot be understood without exploring the unresolved border dispute between Morocco and Algeria. This will be presented and addressed in the following section.

III.3. Algeria's post-colonial border dispute with Morocco

III.3.1. Ben Bella's Double Political Game over the Border Settlement

The situation in the Algero-Moroccan Saharan frontier zone was, to some extent, peaceful during the years before Algeria's independence. M'hamed Boucetta who was then head of cabinet of the former Moroccan foreign affairs minister, Mr. Balafrej, discussed the borders's issue with the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (G.P.R.A) members who clearly conveyed their request to Morocco not to broach up the issue with the French until Algeria gets its independence ; else it will be like a "stabbing on the back" if Morocco starts the borders' talk with France (Author Interview with M'hamed Boucetta,2014). For Boucetta, France wanted to solve the borders problem, as it was aware that Algeria will eventually gain its independence and the borders litigation would burst

out with Morocco. “We have always refused to bring up the question of borders with France as long as our Algerian brothers have not gained independence” (Author Interview with M’hamed Boucetta, Rabat 2014).

It was not until a year before the end of Algeria’s war for independence, on July 6, 1961, that the border issue was considered by Ferhat Abbas, the President of G.P.R.A, and Hassan II during an official meeting in Dar Essalam, Rabat. An agreement was drafted by the former Moroccan foreign affairs Minister, M’Hamed Boucetta and Saad Dahleb considered as the most important Algerian leaders. The two parties signed an agreement that stipulated (Trout, 1969 : 426):

1. Morocco would continue to give its unconditional support to the Algerian independence movement.
2. Morocco would give its unreserved support to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (G.P.R.A) position in its negotiations with France—that the territorial integrity of Algeria must be respected. Morocco would oppose any attempt to partition or reduce Algerian territory.
3. The G.P.R.A. agreed that the Algero-Moroccan border limits arbitrarily imposed by France would be studied by an Algero-Moroccan commission, and negotiations between the two countries would be held as soon as possible after Algerian independence.

The G.P.R.A. affirmed that the results of the Franco-Algerian negotiations would not be binding for Morocco, insofar as they might relate to the problem of the Algero-Moroccan territorial delimitation.

Ferhat Abbas signed the agreement to discourage Morocco from negotiating any border agreement with France before Algeria’s independence. However, this treaty was

never enforced as the FLN cut Abbas out of its circle when Algeria gained independence. Algeria's first President Ben Bella, an Algerian of Moroccan origins, did not object to the idea of discussing the border issue as set forth in the agreement with Morocco. In his memoir, former Moroccan Ambassador to Tunisia and Lebanon Ahmed Tazi recalled that in March 1963, King Hassan II sent a delegation to Algeria presided by Prince Moulay Abdellah. The meeting resulted in a signature of sixteen partnership agreements between the two countries. President Ben Bella asserted in one of the meetings with Prince Moulay Abdellah that Algeria will happily cede Tindouf to Morocco, in the king's next visit to Algeria (2000: 24).

In the summer of 1963, when King Hassan II visited Algiers, he generously offered a great amount of artillery ammunitions to the Algerian military. In one of the closed meetings with King Hassan II and President Ben Bella, Ben Bella told Hassan that he could not discuss the border issue until he established new institutions in Algeria—"I ask your Majesty to leave me time to establish Algeria's new institutions" (Hassan II, *Le défi*, 1976:91). It is worth mentioning that at that time Ben Bella used the frontier dispute to secure control over the troubled mountain region of Kabylia.

The FLN leaders were irritated by the fact that Morocco brought up the border issue. Ben Bella sent an Algerian representative to Egypt to meet with President Jamal Abdenasser to inform him of the matter and seek his help. The core of the message stated that "Morocco is planning to create internal problems with Algeria by bringing up the borders issue, and Algeria is not obligated to accept what Morocco signed with the former Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA)" (Tazi, 2000: 26).

Ben Bella's sudden unjustified and unwise move led the Moroccans to become resentful insofar as they allowed the FLN to use Moroccan territory as a military base

during the war of independence. Morocco also permitted the FLN to use Oujda as the headquarters of the Algerian external delegation, which included the Algerian political leaders in exile, Ben Bella and Bouteflika among them. Last but not least, as declared by Mohamed EL Yazghi, former head of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces party in Morocco:

‘‘Morocco’s help to Algeria during France’s occupation period in the 50s[was] unprecedented, the Kingdom helped the Algerian revolutionaries logistically, financially, and even host[ed] more than 300,000 Algerian immigrants during the war in Algeria. Besides that, the FLN was authorized to lead its training in Oujda and Nador ‘’(Author 2014 interview with Mohamed Yazghi, see list of interviewees Appendix 6/See interviewee biography at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1). Accordingly, the Algerian leadership’s adamant refusal to consider talking about the border dispute remained an open wound for many Moroccans (*Western Sahara: The Cost of the Conflict* 3).

III.3.2. The Sand War: A Sore Spot in Post-Independent Moroccan-Algerian Relations

During the referendum on the independence of Algeria on July 1, 1962, the population of Tindouf went to the ballots saying ‘‘YES for Algerian Independence, BUT we are Moroccans’’ (Zartman, *International Conciliation* 48). In light of the unsettled border problem, in October 1963, skirmishes occurred between Algerian and Moroccan troops. The Algerians attacked small Moroccan garrisons at Hassi Beida and Tinjoub. Clashes occurred along the entire length of the Saharan Frontier zone from Figuig to Tarfaya. Tensions escalated when Algeria required Moroccans to go through a rigid passport control in Tindouf (Le Monde, Aug. 21, 1963, 5; Aug. 22, 1963, 5; Sept. 1-2, 1963, 4). Algeria sent troops to take control of Zegdou and Meridja on the West bank of Guir.

In mid-October, fighting continued in Figuig and Ich; to the North of Djebel Grouz; around Zgdou, specifically in the lower valley of Dra at Hassi Beida, Tinjoub, and Hassi Sidi El Mounir; and at Oum El Achar. It was reported that Egyptian troops were helping Algeria on the ground while Cuba provided heavy artillery. According to a former Moroccan Ambassador, who was part of the emergency meeting on that matter, it was Cuba and Egypt's actions that led Hassan II to break diplomatic relations with Cuba and recall the Moroccan Ambassador to Egypt (Tazi, 2000: 29).

The Moroccan government asserted that it was the Algerian troops that attacked the disputed border posts of Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub, while the Algerian military claimed the contrary—that the attack was launched by Moroccan armed forces at Colomb-Bechar.

Months after this incident, the Algerian and Moroccan governments showed their willingness to reduce the tension. The Moroccan and Algerian foreign ministers, Ahmed Reda Guedira and Bouteflika, respectively, met in Oujda for a peaceful negotiation to no avail. The Algerian delegation argued that the new borders between Morocco and Algeria should be legalized following the maps of the French general staff, which clearly demonstrated Moroccan territory inside Algeria.

A war of words, filled with accusations, between the two protagonists commenced. “In a broadcast through Radio Maroc, Moroccan spokesmen accused President Ben Bella of having initiated the hostilities in an effort to secure his dictatorship while spreading fascism in Africa” (Le Monde, Oct. 19, 1963, 2). In contrast, “President Ben Bella accused Morocco of having violated the Charters of the United Nations, the Arab League, and the OAU, declared that King Hassan II was a tyrant who was attempting to liquidate Algerian socialism, and ordered general mobilization in Algeria” (Algerian Ministry of National Orientation: 2002). While Algeria kept accusing Morocco of violating the above clauses,

many specialists, namely Dr. Abdelhadi Boutaled, argued that these clauses did not apply to Morocco and Algeria's borders disputes. He explained that:

‘Starting from Figuig, there are no borders between Morocco and Algeria. We can't do anything about it. It is a fact. It is not just a question of respecting the borders, because they do not exist. The shared administrative line between the Moroccan protectorate and the Algerian French departments have changed fifty times in fifty years, and it was always at the expense of Morocco. What is needed now, more than ever, is to agree on a line which should be respected by both parties: Morocco and Algeria (Chahed Ala Asr interview of Boutaleb withb Ahmed Mansour : 2008).

Arbitration attempts led by the Arab League failed as the organization was said not to be neutral in its position as it appeared biased in support of the Algerian claims (New York Times, Oct. 23, 1963, 3).

Amid this diplomatic confusion, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) intervened to mediate the issue. The Algerian-Moroccan border conflict provided the OAU with the first application of its mechanisms and methods for dispute settlement and the implementation of peacekeeping operations. Between October 16th and 25th 1963, Emperor Haile Selassie visited Algeria and Morocco in the hope of arranging a summit between Hassan II and Ben Bella. The two statesmen finally met at Bamako in Mali on October 29th and agreed to a cease-fire (Boutros-Ghali, 1966: 42). They also agreed that a commission composed of Algerian, Moroccan, Ethiopian, and Malian officers should establish a demilitarized zone, and that officers from Mali and Ethiopia should be in place to monitor the demilitarization operations. Moreover, the OAU was requested to organize a conference of African Foreign Ministers to establish a commission that will study the border problem and come up with a definitive solution. The outcome was the creation of the OAU Council of Ministers, who successfully established the suggested arbitration

commission, convening for the first time between December 3-5, 1963, in Abidjan and then again from January 23rd to 27th , 1964, in Bamako.

Despite these efforts and repeated arbitration sessions between 1963 and 1967, the fundamental frontier problem persisted. Both governments explained their positions and viewpoints to the commission, but no one was able to come up with a satisfactory compromise. Morocco relied on a number of treaties, including the July 1961 agreement between the Moroccan government and the G.P.R.A., to support its territorial claims, arguing that the border was essentially nonexistent and, as such, should be delineated as soon as possible, and blaming Algeria for Africa's involvement in the Cold War through its use of Soviet Arms (Wild, 1996: 29-30). Algeria rebuffed this argument, explaining that its long-standing military agreement with the supplier of the Soviet Arms made the arms purchase legal and holding Morocco responsible for all incidents along the border that—according to Algeria—promoted expansionist aims and “contravened the principles of international law” (Wild, 1996: 29-30).

A normalization of relations between Algeria and Morocco occurred in May 1964; however, the border problem persisted. Algeria was unwilling to open Pandora's Box, having made Morocco abandon the territory it reintegrated in the autumn of 1963. Ben Bella confidently refused to make any concessions regarding the Moroccan territories it had inherited from France and vehemently renounced the agreement signed by Ferhat Abbas.

This incident marked the end of the genuine fraternity that used to bring together and unite the two neighbors. In his memoir, “*le Défi*,” Hassan II described this situation as unfortunate for both the people of Algeria and the people of Morocco, stating that though Algerian hostility towards Morocco was strong, Morocco opted to live with the border as

it stood rather than running the risk of a civil war that would have impacted the entire Maghreb (1976: 84).

Tensions persisted between Algeria and Morocco after the ousting of Ben Bella in a military coup perpetrated by Boumedienne in June 1965. Boumedienne turned out to be much less predisposed to fulfill the G.P.R.A. agreement with Morocco, bluntly declaring that “Algeria’s frontiers are not negotiable” (Thompson& Adloff, 1980: 234). Boumedienne intensified his position by stationing troops along the militarized zone in May 1966. He even took the unequivocal decision to nationalize all mineral resources, including those in the disputed border areas—like the iron ore in Gara Djebilet near Tindouf. At the same time, Morocco vehemently protested, deeming Boumedienne’s move a provocation against stability. Indeed, this move provoked a bitter verbal exchange, and both countries ventured into a perilous arms race. As the tension grew, King Hassan II solicited arbitration by the OAU.

The *ad hoc* committee convened for its ninth session on July 25th, 1966 at Addis Ababa to meet with both parties. Despite those efforts, Morocco and Algeria clashed again in the vicinity of Aich Chair near Bechar on January 22, 1967 (Abdellah 42). Hassan II wrote to the then UN Secretary General, U. Thant, to protest against Algeria for its unwillingness to collaborate and abide by the G.P.R.A. regarding Morocco’s territorial claims. In addition, the king of Morocco took steps to engage in the arms buildup. Boumedienne quickly responded by consolidating ties with Mokhtar Ould Dadda, President of Mauritania. The latter was invited to Algiers where he denounced “Moroccan expansionism” (Abdellah 43).

There were Moroccan political parties that sided with Algeria’s claim over the borders inherited by France. One such party that opposed the Greater Morocco ideology

was the National Union for Popular Forces (UNFP)—a party formed by the left wing of the Istiqlal party in November 1959. The UNFP leader, Mehdi Ben Berka, made a bold declaration on the border issue in May 1960, describing “the government’s territorial demands . . . as an ‘an operation of diversion and camouflage’” (Hodges, 1983: 96). Then on May 25, 1962, the UNFP declared that it supported the principles of independence and self-determination . . . [and] [w]hen . . . in exile, Mehdi Ben Berka made an impassioned antiwar appeal about the border war with Morocco and Algeria. “This armed conflict which began several days ago in the Algerian-Moroccan borderlands, constitutes a veritable betrayal not only of the dynamic Algerian revolution but, in a general sense, of the whole Arab revolution for liberty, socialism and union, and of the entire world movement of national liberation” (Hodges, 1983:96).

It was known that the UNFP party, which won the sympathy and endorsement of many followers of the Army of Liberation after it separated from the Istiqlal party, was very critical of Morocco’s King’s policy. The UNFP staunchly defended the self-determination of Mauritania and was opposed to the war with Algeria in 1963.

Though the Sands War was relatively short-lived and resulted in only a few hundred casualties on both sides, the conflict was significant as it generated an enduring sense of mistrust and rivalry between the two parties that only deepened over the years, resulting in a long-term political impact.

III.3.3. Boumedienne and Hassan II Rapprochement: Treaty of Solidarity and Cooperation and Border Demarcation

In the late sixties, King Hassan II relinquished Mauritania territorial claims and looked for a mutual solution with Algeria regarding the border issue. For Hassan II, it had

become necessary to engage cooperatively with the new military regime in Algeria, which was headed by Boumedienne. Among King Hassan's efforts towards reconciliation with the neighbor was his trip to Algiers in September 1968 to take part at the AOU summit conference. During this trip, he stated to Boumedienne:

“We are certain, that the talks we have had with your Excellency on the subject of the Moroccan-Algerian questions have opened wide perspectives before our two peoples and new ways to resolve what has not been settled and confirm what is in the process of being carried out (Maroc-Documents 41, 1970).”

This was an occasion for the two statesmen to resolve their disagreements over the territorial dispute and initiate a dialogue that had been in a stalemate for two years. King Hassan II took another step towards reconciliation; he came up with the idea of organizing another summit, which took place on January 11, 1969, in Ifrane. This summit culminated with the signing of a 20-year treaty that engaged the two states to “submit all the questions in abeyance between them to bilateral commissions” (Traité de Fraternité, No. 11, 1969 : 82-84).

The most important aspects that highlighted the joint Algerian-Moroccan communiqué in this meeting were as follows:

“The first recognized the *de facto* Moroccan-Algerian frontier as the legal boundary; the second called for the joint exploitation of the world biggest iron ore deposits at Gara Djebilet, through a Moroccan port on the Atlantic; and the third called for the setting up of a joint cement company in Oujda to cater to the need of the north-east of Morocco and the north-west of Algeria (Bahajjoub, 2010: 169).”

The treaty was agreed to in principle on June 15, 1972, and Algeria ratified it on May 17, 1973; Morocco, however, did not ratify it as elections for a new parliament were to be held the following year. The conclusion of the Ifrane treaty noticeably improved relations between Algeria and Morocco.

Four months later, the two statesmen met again in Tlemcen to coordinate a Saharan strategy and work to solve the common border issue. Indeed, the two parties agreed that in accordance with article 6 of the Treaty of Ifrane to form a joint commission to begin the demarcation of the borderline between Algeria and Morocco. At the economic level, the two states agreed to create an Algerian-Moroccan company for the development of the Gara-Djebilet mine (Communiqué Commun Algéro-Marocain, June 1, 1970).

Thus, Hassan II, along with Boumedienne, agreed to fix the border lines between their respective countries. At that point, Morocco was to renounce all claims to any colonial territories inherited by Algeria, and, in return, Morocco would share in the exploitation the Gara Djebilet Mine, which is 128 km southeast of Tindouf, where iron ore had been discovered in 1952.

The Istiqlal Party in Morocco perceived this initiative as an insult to Morocco's legitimate borders. The party's executive committee announced that "Nothing has changed with regard to Morocco's sovereignty over its despoiled territories in the north, south[,] and east" (Reuters, June 3, 1970). Another political party, the Parti de Libération et du Socialisme (PLS), shared the same view, staunchly denouncing the initiative in a press conference in Paris in March 1971 through its secretary general, Ali Yata: "Tindouf and Bechar had been purely and simply abandoned, and our southeast finds itself deprived of its mineral wealth, in particular the iron ore at Gara Djebilet" (Yata 286). Nevertheless, King Hassan II continued his policy of détente.

The first meeting of the joint Moroccan-Algerian commission in charge of the border demarcation took place right after the Tlemcen summit in Rabat. The then Moroccan Minister of Interior, General Oufkir, and the former secretary-general of the Algerian Defense Ministry, Colonel Abdelkader Chabou, led the two delegations (Author 2014

interview with Elyazghi, see list of interviewees Appendix 6/ See interviewee biography at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1). As detailed by Hodges, negotiations and studies of the border issue were carried out for many months . In other words, topographical studies were undertaken in June-July1972 in coordination with the Institut Nationale Géographique de Paris. In the meantime, another commission started to conduct investigation on the Gara Djebilet project. After conferring with the Algerian foreign minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, King Hassan II announced on May 28, 1972, that the two parties reached an agreement to construct a railway from Gara Djebilet to Tarfaya. Lastly, in June 1972, during the closing session of an AOU summit conference in Rabat, the Algerian-Moroccan foreign Ministers, Bouteflika and Ahmed Taibi Benhima, signed two conventions, one formally demarcating the Moroccan-Algerian border, the other setting out the basis for Moroccan-Algerian cooperation in the Gara-Djebilet project, while Hassan II and Boumedienne signed a joint declaration affirming their intention to establish a permanent borderfor centuries to come (Hodges, 1983: 115).

This détente with Algeria motivated Hassan II to break the icy relations with Mauritania. He invited President Mokhtar Ould Daddah to the Summit of Islamic Nations, which was convened in Rabat in September 1969, during which Morocco recognized Mauritania. One year later, on February 2, 1970, Hassan II appointed Kacem Khiri as the first Moroccan ambassador to Mauritania, and, in response, Mauritania appointed an ambassador to Morocco.

III.3.4.Conclusion

Despite the fact that the French government considered “the départements” (Algeria) more favorably than the protectorates (Morocco and Tunisia), Algerians should

have been more thoughtful when they gained their independence, whereby this independence should have resulted in a fairer distribution of land.

Moroccan officials were well aware that Algeria had gained its regional hegemony to Morocco's disadvantage and wanted Algeria to pay—what they believed to be—a debt owed to them. Trying to negotiate the border as a way of compensation, they experienced straightforward refusal from Algeria, the sole country that shares a border with Mauritania, “Western Sahara,” Tunisia, and Libya. Algeria was the biggest beneficiary of the colonial division of land, which it has never questioned.

The Sand War may have ended, but its socio-psychological legacy has been strong enough to initiate a long and difficult period of tension between the two countries, aborting all attempts to foster regional harmony. These hostilities later evolved with the “Western Sahara” issue and each Algerian President had a level of stake of interference in this conflict resolution. The next chapter investigates Algeria's presidents' roles in the Sahara conflict, identifying the domestic and foreign drivers for change and or continuity in historical perspective and in the current situation.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE ALGERIAN PRESIDENTS' ROLE IN THE SAHARA CONFLICT

Introduction

This chapter offers a chronological discussion of each Algerian President's Role in the Sahara conflict, from Ben Bella to Bouteflika.

The ousting of Ben Bella in 1969 did not change the fundamental orientations of Algerian foreign policy, instead, what changed was how these orientations were carried out. While continuing to preach its anti-colonial policy filled with revolutionary pronouncements, Algeria took concrete measures to enact these policies by endorsing and helping many of the African liberation movements financially and militarily, often ignoring some of the real purposes behind these movements. Beginning with Boumedienne's presidency, Algerian foreign policy became increasingly revolutionary. Moreover, it was during Boumedienne's time in office that Algeria put the "Western Sahara" conflict at the top of its external priorities—a policy that continues today under President Bouteflika.

After Morocco claimed its historic rights over the former Spanish Sahara colony, Algeria took a bitter stand towards its neighbor. Fearing that the Kingdom of Morocco would reintegrate the "Western Sahara," Algeria led a fierce diplomatic blitzkrieg at the international level through the endorsement of the Polisario and the staunch support of self-determination. Algeria had consistently supported Western Saharan rights for self-determination and voted for all the UN resolutions that advocated for a referendum, hoping that this territory would be freed from Morocco's control.

Morocco's reintegration of "Western Sahara" represented for Algeria a threat to its national security. As John Damis pointed out: "Algerians fear that the absorption of the

Sahara by their neighbors would only encourage Moroccan expansionist tendencies, and whet the Moroccan's appetite for pursuing their unfulfilled and frequently articulated irredentist claim to the territory in Western Algeria" (*The Western Sahara*, 2003:139-40). It is within this context—among others like the Sand War and Green March move—that Algeria exercised its power within a preexisting territorial framework in the postcolonial historical context, where national territories were still in flux.

IV.1. Houari Boumedienne: The Foundation of the Conflict's Stalemate

IV.1.1. The Polisario Front and its Connection with Houari Boumedienne

In the mid-1960s, Morocco was a country in turmoil. The University became the hub of protests against Morocco's policy set forth by King Hassan II. The Kingdom of Morocco was prey to sudden disputes within the political parties. Several students belonging to the UNFP movements were arrested in 1963, forcing their leader Mehdi Ben Berka into exile. A state of emergency was established in March 1965, following uprisings of students bloodily repressed under General Oufkir.

A true republican project began to form on the benches of Mohamed V University in Rabat. Among these students were several of Sahraoui origins. El Ouali Mustapha Sayed, a young Sahraoui from the Hammada, who played a major role in the birth of a new Saharawi Liberation movement. Other Sahraoui students joined him, among them were Mohamed Lamine Ould Ahmed, who later became the Minister of Polisario's Saharan Democratic Republic (SADR); Mohamed Ali Ould El-Ouali, who later became an influential member of the Polisario ruling executive committee; and Mohamed Ahmed Ould Salek and Mohamed Ould Sidati, both who became members of the SADR Government (all of the above were enrolled at the same University); and El Ouali's brother,

Bashir Mustapha Sayed, who was at the time a high school student in Agadir and later became Polisario's Deputy Secretary General in 1976 (Hodges, 1983: 54, 232-33, 236-37, 239-41).

These students were well acquainted with the Sahara conflict and also aware of the UN resolutions concerning this issue. It is important to point out that the advocacy by these students was not, at first, intended to rally voices to establish an independent "Western Sahara" micro-state. Their main priority and concern were to counteract Spain's imperialist agenda in their Saharan provinces. It is also important to remember that this dimension of nationalist growth in "Western Sahara" evolved from Moroccan nationalism as it disputed French and Spanish colonialism in the 1950s in an effort to fight for the independence of "Western Sahara."

The early Sahraoui movements did not aim to separate "Western Sahara" from Morocco, instead they wanted to fight the French and the Spanish alongside opposition parties from Rabat. Stephen J. King and Al. explicitly stated that "[t]he Basiri-led independence movement hoped for a 'Western Sahara' integration with Morocco. He had studied in Morocco and, in 1966, briefly published a periodical in Morocco called *Al-Shihab* (The Torch), which espoused Moroccan claims to 'Western Sahara'" (2013: 74).

The El Ouali Mustapha Sayed led-movement sought help from political parties. The group met with Allal El Fassi, the UNFP, the PLS, and the trade *Marocaine du Travail* to seek support, but the Moroccan authorities did not respond to their request. Accordingly, these Sahraoui students "lost patience with the Moroccan opposition parties, who, despite their verbal anti-Spanish militancy, were not prepared to provide any practical support" (Hodges, 1983: 159). Lacking the necessary support from the Moroccan government, the group started to consider itself a more autonomous entity and began to think about the

notion of an independent Sahraoui state, especially after Morocco began to oppress protesters who took to the streets to protest against Spanish colonization (Pazzanita, 2006: 159).

The Polisario's first move was to seek support from external bodies. They connected with Sahraoui people of the Diasporas and solicited aid from foreign governments. Letters requesting support were sent between March and June 1972 to Colonel Qadhafi, President Mokhtar Ould Daddah, and President Houari Boumedienne as well as to Iraqi officials. The Polisario Front was formally established on May 10, 1973, during a secret congress held somewhere in the Western Saharan Mauritanian borders. El Ouali was elected Secretary General and assigned an executive committee. This committee announced a manifesto on the Polisario Front's main objective that did not explicitly set forth "Western Sahara" independence as a goal, but clearly expressed intentions to use violence and armed struggle to achieve "total liberty" and freedom from Spain (Political Manifesto of May 10, 1973).

Hodges (1983) stressed that the phrase "total liberty" was not used to mean independence from Morocco. In fact, at the end of 1973, El Ouali drafted a memorandum to the UNFP exiles in Algiers endorsing the idea of the integration of "Western Sahara" with Morocco and highlighting the fact that those who migrated in and out of the region were "integrally linked at most times with the existing authorities in Morocco" making the region akin to a Moroccan province (No.19, October 1977: 7).¹³

¹³The memorandum became a six part series produced by Alikhtiar Athaouri in the Journal of the Moroccan left-wing Basrists, in Nos.19-23, October, November, and December 1977, and January and February 1978, and No.25, April 1978.

Initially, the Polisario gained support from Libya. Colonel Qadhafi helped the movement overtly by furnishing them with arms and allowed them to establish their headquarters for an external-relations committee in Tripoli. The former Mauritanian president, Ould Daddah, also helped Polisario's main leaders establish themselves in Mauritania; though he never provided any military aid. Algeria, on the other hand, remained suspicious of the Movement's motivations until the end of 1974. During an interview conducted by Hodges, Mohammed Ali Ould el-Ouali, a member of the Polisario Front's executive committee, expressed that Algeria's suspicions involved a refusal to allow the transit of Libyan arms across the Algerian territory and the arrest and deportation of El Ouali during his visit to Algiers in 1973 (Hodges, 1983: 163).

To no one's surprise, the Polisario became irritated and disappointed over the silence of the Maghreb countries, Morocco's in particular, with respect to the colonization by Spain and its cruel repression of the people. It was not until the second Polisario congress, held on August 25-31, 1974, that the Front officially declared its wish for "Western Sahara" to be an independent state. The congress culminated in a manifesto which declared: "The Saharawi people have no alternative but to struggle until wresting independence, their wealth, and their full sovereignty over their land" (Polisario Front, 1975: 50).

In exile, without consulting the Saharaoui population who were living in "Western Sahara" and under Spanish occupation, the Polisario Front adopted a radical position of struggle. They considered themselves the sole representatives of all Saharaoui. Hodges summed up the Front's position: "The Front saw itself as the voice of all Saharawis, wherever they lived. . . . [T]he Front also abhorred all forms of kinship loyalty, to the point that its members denied tribal affiliation together" (1983: 134).

The Polisario Front also advocated for respecting the artificiality of the colonial borders in order to avoid breaking the established AOU doctrine with regard to the African frontiers and to gain diplomatic endorsement. President Boumedienne's government at first categorically opposed the endorsement of the Polisario, as Boumedienne doubted the movement's credibility and political maturity. As further asserted by the historian Dr. Hassan Aourid:

'There was a time when Houari Boumedienne was very suspect of the Polisario ambitions, and the Algerian leaders went even further to think that the Polisario was created by Morocco to manipulate Algeria, so the latter wanted to fix the Saharan Problem with only Morocco, so they shun[ned] the Polisario leaders. For Algeria, there was nothing called "the Saharaoui People" (Author 2014 interview of Dr. Hassan Aourid, see list of interviewees Appendix 6 /See interviewee biography at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1)'

On the other hand, President Boumedienne did endorse King's Hassan's II quest in recovering the territory. On October 10, 1974, during the UN General Assembly, Algeria's UN Ambassador, Abdelatif Rahal, testified with satisfaction that Mauritania had joined Morocco in seeking from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) a judicial opinion on the historical aspects of the Saharan conflict, so as to come up with a final solution.

It was not until early 1975, when Hassan II launched what he called the Green March to recover "Western Sahara" that President Boumedienne swung Algerian support unequivocally behind the Polisario Front in defiance of Hassan II's claims to "Western Sahara" as well as out of fear that Morocco would redraw Morocco's frontiers in opposition to the Algerian will (Hodges, 1983: 190).

For President Boumedienne, Hassan II's organization of the Green March was similar to the Moroccan army's attempt to recover Tindouf in 1963—when Boumedienne was head of the Algerian Armée de Libération National (ALN). So, in order to prevent

King Hassan's willingness to rally "Western Sahara" as well as for hegemonic purposes and the Algerian's memory of their defeat during the Sand War, President Boumedienne's regime decided to halt any precedent setting in "Western Sahara." He ordered his Generals to begin arming and training the Polisario Guerillas, while Spain was campaigning to conduct self-determination in the territories.

IV.1.2. Hassan II, Houari Boumedienne, and the Green March

The "Western Sahara" conflict broke out during a rivalry between Morocco and Algeria that had been dormant since the treaty of Ifrane in 1969. President Boumedienne's attitude toward Morocco became hostile following King Hassan II's announcement of his desire to launch the Green March to recover what the Kingdom of Morocco considered the Southern Provinces colonized by Spain.

On September 30, 1974, Morocco and Mauritania sponsored a UNGA resolution calling on the ICJ to come up with an advisory opinion on the pre-colonial legal ties of the "Western Sahara" to the Kingdom of Morocco and to Mauritanian. Whether it was a lucky strike or skillful maneuverings in diplomatic terms, King Hassan II's initiative hit a nerve with both Boumedienne and General Franco. Neither expected such a move, and both unequivocally rejected it. It was at that time that Algeria's double-dealing game began to surface, and the Franco-Boumedienne union began to break.

President Boumedienne's attitude changed completely from being a leader who once endorsed King Hassan II in an effort to find a solution to the conflict, to becoming a leader who thwarted any political solution that might benefit either Mauritania or Morocco. Moroccan expert on International Relations and former President of the London Press Association, Ali Bahaijoub described Boumedienne's attitude stating that:

“From that time, Algeria’s attitude towards Morocco experienced a profound change that was unexpected in Maghrebi circles, and the Polisario was brought by Boumedienne to the forefront in an attempt to pressurize Morocco, and gain time to elaborate a new strategy that would favor Algeria’s interest in the region, and leave Morocco in the cold” (2010: 115).

In fact, Algeria, which had claimed publicly that it had no claims on the Atlantic and had been very supportive of both Hassan II and Ould Dadda in regaining “Western Sahara,” not only protracted the disputed territory at the diplomatic and juridical levels but also showed to the world that any development in the Maghreb must start from Algiers, or else it will never be accepted.

Boumedienne’s repetitive, non-hostile claims over the “Western Sahara” by Morocco were marked by the following events. During a meeting held in Agadir on July 23, 1973, there were no apparent strains on relations between Morocco and Algeria regarding “Western Sahara.” Boumedienne disclaimed any interest and showed his endorsement in helping the two antagonists, Mauritania and Morocco, decolonize the area from Spain. Boumedienne even welcomed a joint agreement between Hassan II and Ould Dadda in September 1974 to share the territory and to dismiss any rumors of Moroccan territorial claims and ambitions over Mauritania. Boumedienne asserted:

“ From now on the matter rests with Morocco and Mauritania. I can say that I am in agreement and there is no problem. . . .[I]f our brother Presidents and Kings endorse this form of agreements between the two countries to decide the liberation and demarcation of what is to be the Moroccan zone, and what is to be the Mauritanian one, then I will be among those who subscribe to this formula” (Author 2014 interview of Aourid, see list of interviewees Appendix 6/See interviewee biography at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1).”

Boumedienne's expressions were not genuine, as his real hostile attitude towards Morocco was demonstrated when Hassan II embarked on the Green March project to recover the "Western Sahara."

The proposal submitted by Morocco and Mauritania to the ICJ requested an advisory opinion on the following questions: 1) Was "Western Sahara" (Rio de Oro and Sakia El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (*terra nullius*)? If no, 2) What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?¹⁴ Algeria participated before the court as a party opposing the claims, despite its stated non-territorial claims, indicating that self-determination of peoples, set in the General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV), is the central principle ruling decolonization.¹⁵ Such a claim of self-determination as maintained by Algeria was sacrosanct; however, it was troubling that the Algerian republic did not apply the principle of self-determination across the board to the Sahraouis claims in Southern Algeria and to the Eritreans. The ICJ advisory opinion, issued in October 1975, stated:

The ICJ recognized legal ties between the Saharaoui tribes and the Sherifian Empire but judged them insufficient for current claims of territorial sovereignty; self-determination, not history or society, was the only acceptable basis for territorial decolonization, as [the] UN Resolution had declared since 1966 (King et al, 2013: 60).

King Hassan II seized on the first part of the opinion, issued the justification, and within hours of the Advisory opinion's publication, the Moroccan government issued a communiqué that reiterated ICJ's vindication of Morocco's claim. The radio interrupted

¹⁴The Secretary General of the UN asked the President of the ICJ on December 17, 1974, to give an advisory opinion without prejudice to the application of the principles embodied in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960.

¹⁵²³⁰ See details ICJ reports of judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975, No.414, The Hague, 1975, p.30.

normal broadcasting to play martial music, Morocco's cities were filled with flags and nationalist banners, and workers were sent home from their work to listen to Hassan II's historic speech on the radio and watch the launch of the Green March on television as 350,000 civilians along with the military guard marched to recover the "Western Sahara."

Hassan II's stated in his speech:

"Dear People, tomorrow, you will cross the frontier. Tomorrow, you will tread soil which is yours, and touch sand which is yours. Tomorrow you will embrace earth which is an integral part of your beloved country. First as soon as you have crossed the frontier, you must make your devotion. Turn towards Mecca, and give praise to the Most High. . . Greet any Spaniard you may meet, and if by chance he fires on you, continue your march, armed only with your faith, which nothing can shake (Rhodes, 1978: 159-60)."

General Franco fell to Morocco's pressure and agreed to negotiate Morocco's irredentist cause. Morocco, Mauritania, and Spain reached a Tripartite Agreement on November 14, 1975, relinquishing administration of the territories to Morocco and Mauritania. On December 22, 1975, 72 members of the legislative assembly of the Spanish Sahara, the *Jemaa*, approved and hailed the announcement of Tripartite Agreement. The Algerian Government was in a total disagreement with the accords :

"The Algerian Government does not recognize any right of the Government of Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania to dispose of the territory of the Sahara and the density of its population[;] it therefore regards null and void the "declaration of principles" presented by Spain and accords no validity to the provisions contained therein (Position of the Algerian Government, November 19, 1975)."

The Algerian authorities considered the Green March a coup. Jean Daniel, a journalist from *le Nouvel Observateur* was interviewing President Boumedienne on October 16, 1975, coinciding with Hassan II's speech about the launch of the Green March. The journalist described Boumedienne's state of mind when he heard Hassan's address:

‘‘We talked about the Green March, and President Boumedienne did not hide his anger, it was a brutal anger. He kept his self-control until at this very moment when he saw the images of Hassan II on the screen addressing the world about the launching of the Green March. Houari Boumedienne’s face changed. A mixture of an incredulous smiles and rage covered his face. At a moment, King Hassan spoke about Algeria on a conciliatory and amicable tone. Houari Boumedienne replied with a curse and insults. He got off his chair and started jumping in a strange way, almost hysterically. He completely lost control of himself and his personality. Angry insults were showered towards Hassan II. I have never seen a statesman in such mood. His anger pursued, and he said ‘‘he won’t take the Sahara with him to Paradise, he does not know what to expect; Algeria won’t be hoodwinked’’ (Daniel interview of Boumedienne, 1975).

This hysterical reaction by the President of Algeria erupted into a diplomatic battle. In Algiers, Boumedienne united the Council of Ministers into a session on November 6th and gathered the ambassadors of the five permanent member countries of the UN Security Council to his palace. Algerian UN representative, Abdelatif Rahal, blamed the Security Council’s reaction to the Green March launch, calling it ‘‘timid.’’ ‘‘If the Security Council cannot or will not act in keeping with its responsibilities, my Government will be compelled to meet its responsibilities,’’ he warned. ‘‘This is neither a threat nor a provocation. It is the clearest possible expression of the strongest possible determination’’ (UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 1854th meeting).

IV.1.3. Battle of Amgala

When both Morocco and Mauritania chose to approach the ICJ, relations between Morocco and Algeria over the Sahara conflict were at the heart of Boumedienne’s concerns. In his *mémoire* President Chadli Bendjedid asserted that the ‘‘Western Sahara’’ was on the agenda of every meeting of the Council of Revolution. ‘‘Houari Boumedienne talked to me about it during every visit in regions I supervised. It was merely an obsession rather than a question of honor. Boumedienne said repeatedly that he will

never let Hassan II take over the “Western Sahara” territory (Bendjedid, *Mémoire*, 2012: 297). ‘

In the first open hostilities between Morocco and Algeria over the “Western Sahara” conflict, troops from the two countries as well as Polisario guerrillas engaged in heavy fighting between January 27 and 29, 1976, around the Amgala Oasis.

Before the fighting erupted, Morocco had gained control of the majority of the cities because Spain had relinquished the Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. Algeria was irritated by this development and, in reaction, Algerian battalions infiltrated Morocco and northern Mauritania in support of the Polisario. These maneuvers displeased Rabat.

In his book “Le Sahara Occidental, enjeu Maghrébin,” Abdelkhalek Berramdane described the infiltration of the Algerian troops: “The Algerian government concentrated its troops on the Algerian-Moroccan border to keep the region under tension. Eventually, Algeria infiltrated its army in ‘Western Sahara’ in order to support the Polisario Front that lost ground in front [of] the Moroccan and the Mauritanian armies” (Berramdane, 1992: 90).

According to Berramdane, there were two opposing objectives of the Algerian military operations to disavow the international community’s Madrid agreement and to convince the international community to bring the UN to “stop this dangerous degradation process through a return to international legality”—a sentiment that Algeria still voices today to evoke the “inalienable right of the Saharawi people to self-determination” (1992: 93).

On the evening of January 27, 1976, after receiving the order to intervene, the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces attacked the Algerian Army. King Hassan II explained reasons of

the attack is because the Algerian troops were disguised as Polisario forces from Amgala, Tifariti, Bir Lahlou, Guelta Zemmour and Mahbess :

“[W]e had not the slightest intention of attacking the Algerians. I repeat—our principle [was] not to interfere in the affairs of others. In return, we expect them not to interfere in ours. But here was President Boumedienne making a statement [in] the newspaper *l’Humanité* to the effect that “the return of the Sahara to Morocco constitutes a threat to the Algerian revolution” (Rhodes, 1978: 166).”

President Boumedienne withdrew all the Algerian troops from Amgala within 36 hours. Thereafter, Algeria was less discreet in its direct interference in the conflict, and its help was limited to military support to the Polisario through the provision of arms, bases, and training.

In his memoir, Bendjedid described this defeat as a slap in the face for the Algerian Army, “anger escalated in the Algerian Army, while some members of the Revolutionary Council bore the responsibility of this defeat and humiliation to Houari Boumedienne, and accused him of tarnishing the Algerian Army’s reputation” (Bendjedid, *Mémoire*, 2012: 298). Hassan II blamed Algeria immediately; in fact, on February 15, 1967, Hassan II wrote Boumedienne a letter accusing the Algerian Army of killing dozens of Moroccan soldiers (Hodges, 1983:232).

In the spring of 1976, four historical leaders of the Algerian Revolution, including Ferhat Abbas, demanded that Boumedienne cease his hostility towards Morocco and reminded him of the crucial role played by Morocco during the Algerian Revolution against France. They called on him to contain this conflict and leave room for more cooperation and collaboration within the framework of a United Maghreb (Thompson & Adloff, 1980: 29). Boumedienne was not concerned about their appeal; instead, he did all he could to impede Morocco’s claims over “Western Sahara” and look for ways to weaken Rabat.

Algeria was not able to launch an armed conflict due to its lack of ammunitions and the ill-preparation of its army against Morocco, so instead, as retaliation against Hassan II's initiative to recover the "Western Sahara," Boumedienne decided to lead a diplomatic offensive (Author 2013 interview of Aourid, see list of interviewees Appendix 6/ See interviewee biography at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1).

On February 14, 1976, in an act of vengeance, Algeria set a trap for the FAR troops. Following this attack, the Polisario took control of Amgala until May 1977, when the Moroccan Army reclaimed it.

IV.1.4. Expulsion of Moroccan Residents in Algeria in Response to the Green March Initiative

In response to the Green March initiative launched by King Hassan, Boumedienne, the chairman of Algeria's Revolutionary Council, ordered the deportation of 45,000 Moroccan families who lived legally in Algeria. The decree prepared by the Algerian Generals ordered that even Moroccans living in Algeria for generations had to leave the country at extremely short notice. Making it more painful was the fact that it was issued during the most important holiday of the year for Muslims, the Feast of Sacrifice, which was meant to be celebrated in a spirit of solidarity and brotherhood.

Many Moroccan communities were uprooted in their entirety from their dwellings in Algiers, Oran, Tlemcen, Annaba, and Constantine. Most of the expelled Moroccan families were very well established in Algeria. Many ran businesses, held good jobs, owned homes, and had family ties throughout Algeria. Through no fault of their own and due to pure political posturing, their lives were demolished when all their belongings and properties were seized and their businesses closed. But perhaps the most tragic

consequence of the expulsion were the emotional and mental scars left on innocent men, women, and children.

Many families were also separated as a result of this tragic event. In cases of mixed marriages, children were made to stay with Algerian parents. Many were also reported missing. In 2017, at the meeting of the UN Human Rights Council, the author met a Moroccan victim named Miloud. He stated, “I was walking back from school and when I arrived home I found my family in a small Police van and was thrown on the borders of Morocco” (Chouach, 1975). As with Miloud, many Moroccans still carry this bitterness of suffering and the brutal separation from their families and relatives.

Despite *ad hoc* meetings held between the Foreign Ministers of both countries, during which this issue was brought to the table of discussion, Algeria never offered the victims a satisfactory explanation for its inhumane actions. Mohamed Charfaoui, one of the expelled Moroccans from Algeria, explained the reasons of this arbitrary expulsion from his own perspective:

“I tried to understand the reasons behind our expulsion from Algeria. It was a question that constantly came up to my mind for more than thirty years now; I tried to understand this unfair injustice. We were expelled without prior notice. I tried to look for the reasons, and I concluded that it was first because of the Green March. Secondly, the expulsion occurred as a sign of resentment by the Algerian military who did not forget their defeat during the “Sand War.” The Algerian Government was put on the spot following the tripartite agreement between Morocco [and] Mauritania as well as Spain. This is not, however, a reason to consider the Moroccan residents in Algeria as scapegoat[s], and expel them arbitrarily (Libération interview of Charfaoui, 2014).”

Depending on a hypothetical normalization of relations with Algeria, the record of the expelled pays a heavy toll. The dream—of 40,000 families—to recover their lost property is on the verge of dissolving. They continue however to hope they retain the

"housing allowance" granted to the fathers the day after the expulsion from Algeria, even if it would likely only be a consolation prize.

IV.1.5. Notion of self-determination by Houari Boumedienne

Unlike Morocco, Algeria has historically never been a unitary state. On the contrary, Algeria was originally made up of French provinces and was subsequently born out of the national liberation struggle against the French. As further explained by Dr. Peter Pham that Algeria started seeking its legitimacy not in history and the organic growth but in a revolutionary identity as these people who self-liberated themselves—and there is much to be admired in the Algerian liberation from the French; but it was a revolutionary identity and one that has to be kept alive because it is not an identity which was born out of time and history. (Author interview of Pham, Washington DC : 2013, see list of interviewees Appendix 6 / See interviewee biography at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1).

Indeed, immediately after independence, Algerian leaders continued their own liberation struggle, endorsed many liberation movements, and defended staunchly the principle of self-determination. However, they applied self-determination in very contradictory ways, failing to respond to some liberation movements' right to self-determination.

Moreover, Algeria's position has always been based on the inviolability of frontiers inherited from the colonial powers (Shelley, 2004: 12). At the United Nations, Morocco has always voiced its concern about the question of territorial dismemberment of independent states, having led a fierce campaign defending Algeria's irredentist claims of its oil-rich Saharan territory, while also lobbying for its own claims over the Atlantic

Sahara. Morocco called upon the respect of paragraph 6 of the UN Declaration on granting independence to peoples and countries still under colonial rule that granted the right of dismembered states, in this case, Morocco and Algeria, to achieve national territorial integrity. This principle was later denied by Algeria as it instead held on to the OAU principle of the sanctity of the colonial frontier. But Algeria's own Saharan frontiers were also artificial ("Western Sahara": *Out of the Impasse*, 2007: 12). Colonial rule deprived Morocco of "its Saharan hinterland, but bequeathed to Algeria a share of the Sahara that greatly exceeds the territory to which the pre-colonial Algerian state, the Ottoman Regency of Algiers, ever laid claim" ("Western Sahara": *Out of the Impasse*, 2007: 12). Boumedienne's reliance on the self-determination principle for the Sahraoui population had always been accompanied by "independence" in every document presented by Algeria in international scenes. If Boumedienne's goal was genuine in the sense that he would push for the Saharaoui's rights to decide on their political future under the UN auspices, the independence option would not have been the only notion stressed upon at every occasion.

Boumedienne would only have been satisfied with an independent Sahraoui state under his influence, otherwise, the prevailing tension in the area would linger as long as Algeria could afford the exorbitant cost. Boumedienne was always at the forefront in backing several worldwide movements, with exceptions, based solely on ideological differences and political self-interests. As a matter of fact, when Bangladesh was pleading for the right to self-determination, Boumedienne opposed it. Additionally, Eritrea was a clear reminder of Algeria's contradictory Policy. The UN charged Ethiopia solely with a mandate over the former Italian colony whose people pleaded to decide on their political future through the UN-supervised referendum. The Eritreans had been fighting for more than thirty years to exercise their right to self-determination; however, Algeria decided to

endorse the Marxist Ethiopian regime despite the Eritreans' claim of "brotherhood" in Islam. Eritrea was recognized by the UN long before the OAU was even established, but the pan-African Organisation had never looked into the issue simply because Somalia and Eritrea's backers did not have the financial muscle, or the diplomatic clout available to Algeria and Libya to bring the matter to the attention of African leaders (Ali Bahaijoub 2010: 180).

Boumedienne's endorsement for Mengistu Haile Mariam's Marxist regime gave Ethiopia renewed vigor against the Ogaden, the Tigrayan, and the Eritrean independence movements whose claims had far more solid foundations than those of the Polisario; the Movement for the Self-Determination and Independence of the Canary Archipelago (MPAIAC), or even the Basque separatist ETA. Indeed, the ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic dimensions of the Eritreans were noticeably different from those in power in Addis Ababa. Despite these aspects, the Algerian regime snubbed the Eritrean claims to endorse the Marxist regime in Ethiopia. In this case, Boumedienne was so keen to support the notion of self-determination claimed by the Sahraoui, and not do the same for the Bangladeshis, the Eritreans, the people of Ogden and Tigray, or even the Algerian Sahraouis. In the words of Dr. Stephen Zunes: "Algeria, like any other government, can have double standards despite the fact that they defend the Polisario, they can deny the right of minorities in their own country" (Author 2014 interview of Zunes, Conference Call :see list of interviewees Appendix 6. See interviewee biography at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1).

Sahraoui self-determination, for Boumedienne, meant independence, which did not necessarily express the population's choice. On one occasion, in a letter to the Non-Alignment Movement, dated January 28, 1976, Boumedienne declared, "The Algerian

Government's Policy rested upon a complete devotion to the right of the Saharan people to self-determination, which also complied with the international community policy with regards to the liquidation of colonialism" (Author 2014 interview of Zunes, Conference Call: see list of interviewees Appendix 6/ See interviewee biography at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1).

Boumedienne's staunch support of the Sahraoui cause and the principle of self-determination, specifically with the Saharaoui, was connected mainly with the Algerian leader's desire to dominate the political arena in the Maghreb region. Endorsing the Saharaoui cause and championing self-determination that would lead to the independence of "Western Sahara" was not a genuine sign of support from Boumedienne to the Sahraoui. Instead, Boumedienne's foreign policy behavior regarding this matter was a sign of a deficit of trust between Morocco and Algeria. Whenever King Hassan II took an initiative regarding the "Western Sahara" that displeased Boumedienne, the latter reacted in a way to thwart Hassan II undertakings, because Boumedienne, as did many Algerian leaders, remained fearful that Morocco would, one day, claim the annexed territories of Tindouf and the whole Touat. Boumedienne's reactions towards "Western Sahara" as described by Dr. Hassan Aourid were a sign of distrust: "The Sahara conflict is only an expression of trust deficit, in other words, the Sahara conflict is among other elements of the Moroccan-Algerian tense relations" (Author 2013 interview of Aourid, see list of interviewees Appendix 4/ See interviewee biography at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1).

Accordingly, ideology backed President Boumedienne's policy actions towards the Sahara conflict and Morocco in such conflict-ridden times. In fact, Boumedienne's ideology, which enshrined his contradictory use of the principle of self-determination and his international appeal of the Maghreb unification, served, to some extent, his national

state-building expectations. This also reinforced his position within the Algerian state and his people. That is to say, the self-determination ideology put forth by Boumedienne had a triple function in disguising the president's aims to power and national interests as well as foreign policy behavior. The latter, which is described as a revolutionary behavior, was used by Algerian leaders whenever they felt an external threat.

IV.1.6. Houari Boumedienne's Endorsement of the Polisario

President Boumedienne did not initially endorse the Polisario because they lacked experience in political activism; however, he supported Edouard Moha, leader of the liberation movement MOREHOB in establishing an office in Algiers in March 1973. Moha left Rabat disappointed with the continuous tension between King Hassan II and opposition parties. Despite the fact that El Ouali and the UNFP exiles in Algiers advised Boumedienne to be cautious of Moha's intentions and warned he might be sent by the Moroccan regime as an agent, the net result of Moha's success is that Algeria continued to turn a blind eye to El-Ouali's demand for aid (Miske, 1978: 157-59).

However, in the summer of 1974, Moha was confronted with the Polisario and the Algerian military decided to deport him out of Algiers. Hodges described this face-to-face encounter between Moha and El-Ouali:

“During the summer, when El-Ouali returned to Algiers shortly after Polisario[s] founding, they apparently called Moha's bluff by bringing him face-to-face with the Polisario leader, in the company of Jelloul Malaika, the FLN official responsible for relations with liberation movements. In the course of their verbal confrontations, it became obvious that Moha had never set foot in the Sahara. He was deported *illico-presto*, and went to live in Brussels (1983: 163).”

Edouard Moha also left the impression that the Sahraoui liberation movement was weak and full of factionalism. Nevertheless, with all this breakthrough, Boumedienne was

very cautious about supporting El-Ouali until the summer of 1974, during which Algiers felt perturbed by Hassan's II decision to launch his strategy of the recovering of Morocco's amputated Saharan provinces. To Boumedienne and his Generals, as Dessens observes:

“It not only looked as if the king had renounced his former commitment to the principle of self-determination, and was deliberately conjuring back to life the old demons of Greater Morocco, and was putting a fear in within the Algerian military that Hassan's goal would be to prolong his expansionism and revive the 1963 sand war bitter defeat (Dessens,1976 : 47).”

At the second congress held by the Polisario in August 25-31, 1974, in a small village in Tebaza close to Algeria, the Front came out overtly in favor of independence. El Ouali was re-elected Secretary-General. This is when Algeria started to help the Polisario in its actions against Spain and Morocco. Boumedienne attended the congress and met with the Polisario. Bachir Edkhil, one of the former Polisario co-founders, was 18 years old at that time and recalled his encounter with Boumedienne: “Boumedienne met with us during the second congress and looked at us very closely and said ‘you are all young, but now that you got into politics, you will not be able to get out of it, it will be a long process’” (Author 2016 interview of Bachir Edkhil : Rabat, see list of interviewees Appendix 6. See interviewee biography at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1).

Following this, the second congress adopted the following action program:

“The Polisario Front will fight for national liberation from all forms of colonialism and the achievement of complete independence and the creation of a republican, national regime, with the effective participation of the masses. The Front saw itself as the voice of all Sahraouis, wherever they lived, and abhorred all forms of kinship loyalty, to the point that its members denied tribal affiliation together. Caste status, which had often been closely associated with tribal membership, was renounced with equal resolve (Hodges, 1983: 163-64). “

When it comes to the Polisario's legitimacy as the sole representative of the Sahraoui, the big question was as Pricec(1975) argues that whether the Polisario was representative of the Sahraouis or, no more representative of the territory than the Algerian Sahara, as the bulk of its forces comprised Mauritians, Algerian Touareg, Reguibats, and Chaambas from neighboring Mali and Niger who had abandoned their usual pastures driven by hardship as a consequence of the chronic drought that ravaged the Sahel region (1977: 5-7).

In 1975, Boumedienne began to explicitly aid the Polisario and voice staunch opposition to Moroccan policy. In February 1975, the Algerian military provided training for 500 Polisario guerillas. Boumedienne made his diplomats attend every forum related to the question of "Western Sahara," and insisted on them endorsing the notion of self-determination. Boumedienne used every action to undercut Hassan's II campaign to recover the territory. As confirmed by Stephen Zunes that Houari Boumedienne sent Mohammed Bedjaoui, Algerian Ambassador to Paris, to represent Algeria at the ICJ's session about "Western Sahara" at the Hague. On June 1975, the FLN invited two main Moroccan opposition parties, the UNFP as well as the Istiqlal party to take part to an interparty conference on the Sahara issue, but the Moroccan parties declined the invitation. Meanwhile the Algerian Ambassador to Spain, started to lobby the Spanish government to stay faithful to its adherence, and commitment to the notion of self-determination (Author interview of Stephen Zunes, Conference Call : 2014 see list of interviewees Appendix 6 / See interviewee biography at Data Collection & Analysis: Chapter 1).

Algeria sought to advance the efforts to legitimize the SADR in international forums. This spurred a virulent anger from Morocco, and the latter accused Algeria of intentional interference in its affairs. Within the UN body, Algeria continued to lobby for

the case of self-determination that would lead to the independence of the territory, while Rabat accused the Algerian diplomats and generals of sending mercenaries into “Western Sahara” (“Western Sahara,” 1979 UN Yearbook 1046-51).

IV.1.7. Conclusion

To sum up, it is undeniable that in order to understand Algerian-Moroccan relations and more specifically Boumedienne’s foreign policy in the Sahara conflict, one has to understand the choices adopted by the two neighbors. Boumedienne, commander of Algeria’s revolutionary council and indisputable leader of the country after leading the 1965 coup, transformed Algeria into an authoritarian, socialist, Soviet-oriented state. Boumedienne, as one Algerian official described, was against the monarchical system in Morocco (Author 2016 interview of an Algerian Official who requested anonymity, see list of interviewees Appendix 6).

Morocco was a conservative, traditional monarchy while Algeria was a reactionary republic. The two states were always staunch political and cultural rivals. The Cold War only exacerbated the conflict, as did the “Sand War,” a 1963 skirmish sparked by Morocco’s attempt to reclaim territory around Tindouf, which French colonial authorities had transferred from Morocco to Algeria when France controlled both. This dichotomy between the two presidents was present and not so overt, such that, at times, Hassan II and Boumedienne opted for Real Politik. This can be traced to the treaty of Ifrane and other gatherings and summits during which Boumedienne showed his full support for Morocco’s recovery of the “Western Sahara.” There was, in a way, a normalization of relations between the two countries.

This normalization ended in 1971, at the second tentative putsch against Hassan II, during which Boumedienne allegedly endorsed the coup. As one analyst, who once held a prominent position within the Moroccan government, witnessed:

“Houari Boumedienne encouraged and advised the Moroccan opposition that nothing can be achieved in the Maghreb without the army[;] it is very important, Boumedienne insisted, to overthrow the Monarchy. Another alleged element, is that just [a] few weeks before the second putsch against Hassan II, the General Oufkir, who maintained good relations with Boumedienne, went to Algeria and was accompanied with all the army staff and welcomed with great fanfare. . . .”(Author 2013 interview of Dr. Hassan Aourid : Rabat see list of interviewees Appendix 6 / See interviewee biography at Data Collection & Analysis: Chapter 1).

As far as Boumedienne’s management of the “Western Sahara” issue, he took this issue personally following the Green March, from 1975-1978, during which he refused categorically to let Morocco recover the territory with the blessing of the international community, the UN, and the OAU. When Hassan II described Boumedienne, he mentioned that the Algerian leader could have been a great asset in resolving the “Western Sahara” conflict because he could have resolved the conflict if he wanted to. However, the many elements that bothered Boumedienne and the Algerian Generals—the Sand War, the nature of the regime, the Green March move—inculcated a deficit of trust within the Algerian regime. The fact that Boumedienne switched from endorsing Hassan II in his policy to recover the “Western Sahara” to completely impeding every step the Monarch undertook was simply an expression and was among the causes of deficit of trust between the two neighbors. Furthermore, Boumedienne’s change of policy from shunning the Polisario leaders to endorsing them diplomatically, financially, and militarily was a strategy by Algeria to become the sole regional hegemony in the Maghreb. As a matter of fact, the contradiction in Boumedienne’s foreign policy management regarding the “Western

Sahara” as well as his multiplicity in his foreign policy behavior could explain his intent to occupy the forefront of power politics during his time to guarantee that the balance of power would always lean on his side.

John P. Entelis emphasized the fact that Algeria’s desire for regional hegemony and supremacy was further empowered by Algeria’s regime through connections and integration with the global capitalist system. He also stated that Boumedienne feared Moroccan annexation of the former Spanish Sahara as a competitive danger to Algeria, potentially jeopardizing Algeria’s economic equal. Entelis further explained that the conflict in the “Western Sahara” between Morocco and Algerian-supported guerrilla movement in early seventies, highlights the conflicts and contradictions in North African relations. Yet, even if there were no Saharan problem, Algeria and Morocco would still be very much at odds. Both countries will long remain in a competitive struggle to achieve political and economic dominance in the Maghreb that reflects the “natural” pattern of internal development being pursued by each state-industrialization, militarization, etc. (Author 2014 interview of Dr. John Entelis : Conference /see list of interviewees Appendix 6/ See interviewee biography at Data Collection & Analysis: Chapter 1).

In practice, beneath the posturing and aggressive rhetoric, both President Boumedienne and King Hassan II showed an important amount of flexibility to settle this contentious matter through dialogue. The last attempts in this sense took place a few months before Boumedienne’s death when Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, a former Boumedienne adviser, took part in talks with Moroccan officials regarding the “Western Sahara” conflict. This initiative was followed by another secret encounter on July 2, 1977, in Geneva, between the Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Hassan II’s adviser Reda Guedira. During this meeting, both parties agreed to hold a summit between Hassan II and

Boumedienne. However, the sudden death of Boumedienne on January 27, 1978, prevented the meeting from taking place. During President Boumedienne's funeral, Algeria refused to permit a Moroccan delegation sent by King Hassan II to attend. In reality, had the meeting happened, the outcome would not have changed the status quo. At that time, neither leader was willing to compromise on the issue that had become a top priority for each of them as well as their respective nations' public opinion.

WikiLeaks reported that a report from the U.S. Embassy in Algeria stated that at the beginning Morocco misjudged the ambitions of the Algerian regime regarding the "Western Sahara" and did not adequately calculate the plans made by the Algerian Generals in its endorsement of the Polisario during Boumedienne's tenure. According to the same source, Hassan II was adamant about Algeria's wrongful interference into this conflict as he bluntly stated:

If Algeria intends to create an independent state in the Sahara, it has to take into consideration the countries which will recognize this entity will not be the big states, but rather small communist countries, as Albania and Vietnam, and Morocco will never accept the creation of a communist state on its borders (Hespress Magazine, 2013: 30).

All in all, the death of Boumedienne and the Sahara affair left an unresolved legacy, which would subsequently become prioritized by the Algerian Army as well as the military intelligence services. The opinion of the Army's senior officers had been decisive in Boumedienne's decision to take a tough stand against Morocco's claim over the territory.

IV.2. Chadli Bendjedid: The Artificial Détente

IV.2.1. Introduction

One month after Boumedienne's death, the FLN's congress, having met in January 1979, explicitly reiterated Algeria's unequivocal position towards the "Western Sahara"

dispute. In a clear cut message to the Moroccan officials, the congressional decision on Algeria's foreign policy toward the Sahara conflict clearly reiterated that the question of the "Western Sahara" is a problem of decolonization and national liberation of people whose territory was invaded. The congress proclaims its unbreakable solidarity with the people of "Western Sahara," its vanguard, the Polisario Front, and its combatants, as well as the support of the Algerian people for its fair cause until it can exercise its right for self-determination, the achievement of its legitimate rights for national sovereignty and independence of its territory (Résolution de Politique Extérieure, 1979: 64).

Despite the FLN position regarding their policy towards "Western Sahara," Bendjedid was less willing to pursue his predecessor's *cause célèbre* following the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Libya and Morocco. One of the diplomatic moderation signs featured in his state-of-the-nation speech of December 20, 1981, which he presented before Algeria's National Assembly, was that he sought a "good neighbor policy" and indirectly extended a hand of reconciliation to the Kingdom of Morocco. A series of diplomatic meetings between Moroccan and Algerian high officials took place during Bendjedid's term and were described as an indication of Algeria's willingness to collaborate, in a softening manner, with Morocco regarding this first national cause.

In the mid-1980s, in a sudden turnabout—reminiscent of Boumedienne's abrupt policy reversal, Bendjedid, under pressure from the military, made no concessions whatsoever on Algeria's position concerning "Western Sahara." President Bendjedid aggressively pushed through SADR's admission into the OAU; this effort was a diplomatic demarche Morocco had been working to disallow.

At the international level, the African Union was not the only organization to witness important developments over "Western Sahara" as the Arab Maghreb Union and

the United Nations were witness to the shaping of the complex development of this conflict due to the important role President Bendjedid played. The SADR made important gains, especially at the OAU and the UN. This is was due in large part to Algeria's diplomatic, logistic, and political support.

Prior to the signing in Algiers on August 10, 1979, of the peace agreement (Mauritano-Sahraoui Agreement), which brought an end to Mauritania's involvement in the "Western Sahara" conflict, Morocco had hoped that Bendjedid would be more amenable to Morocco's irredentist claims. Morocco's hope went unfulfilled. Unwilling to wage war, Algeria and Morocco sought to convince their friends and opponents of the righteousness of their respective positions. Hassan II did not give up hope of meeting the Algerian President. He tried to convince President Giscard D'Estaing during a trip to Paris to pass on his request for a summit with the Algerian Leadership (AFP, Feb. 16, 1979). Nothing, however, came of such a move. The former foreign minister Bouteflika notified his Moroccan counterpart, M'hamed Boucetta, on February 15, 1979, that statements by the highest authorities of "Western Sahara," of the "Western Saharan" people itself and its national rights, and of the Polisario Front-recognized by the international community as that people's sole legitimate representative, and without whose participation no just and durable peace seems possible—clearly shows that the decision of President Houari Boumedienne to postpone the planned meeting was indisputably sound. There was no point organizing the meeting until Morocco showed a real desire to attack the causes of the crisis without making futile efforts to deal with its effects.

When the former president of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, came forward on August 22 to host the summit in Tunis, the initiative was once again brushed off by President Bendjedid. The official Algerian News Agency came out with a statement regarding the

summit: “Do not ask Algeria to play the same role with regard to the Saharaoui people, driven from their homes and persecuted, as the role played by the Egyptian regime with respect to the Palestinian people.” The Algerian officials were very unequivocal about not taking part in the summit, and they kept accusing their neighbor, Morocco, of breaching the international law by not giving independence to the Polisario fraction. Nevertheless, Morocco kept pushing for it. As summarized by Hodges:

‘From time to time, there were exploratory “talks about talks.” Ahmed Reda Guedira, for example, met Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi in Geneva in January 1980, but, since he had nothing really new to offer to the Algerians, he failed once again to convince them about the value of the summit (1983: 330).’

A few weeks later, Maati Bouabid a Moroccan official and former Prime Minister made it clear that “there will not be a solution which stipulates that we give up the slightest portion of our territory, Morocco would never talk to the Polisario because the problem basically pits Morocco against Algeria, but against no one else” (Le Monde, June 11, 1980).

To contain the military pressure from the Moroccan side, Rabat engaged in a new strategy regarding “Western Sahara.” For King Hassan II, it had become clear that Algeria would stick to its firm position and unconditional commitment to the national liberation struggle of the Sahraoui despite its past promises that its goal was not to interfere in this matter. Thus, instead of pursuing a costly military campaign, Morocco committed itself to the construction of a 2,500 kilometers-long sophisticated sand-and-stone wall known as “the berm,” designed to protect “Western Sahara” territory from smugglers and Polisario guerrillas.

Parallel to these moves, Algeria maintained its position and diplomatic battle against its neighbor Morocco to ensure and secure support for the Polisario and to restrict Hassan II to accepting the principle of a referendum that would lead to independence of

the “Western Sahara” as Algeria hoped. For these reasons, the OAU as well as the UN, in addition to the Non-Aligned movement continued to be the most promising international premises for Bendjedid and the Algerian military to achieve their objectives.

IV.2.2. Diplomatic Maneuvering of Algeria at the African Union

During King Hassan II’s reign, the “Western Sahara” conflict was defined and directed personally by the King of Morocco. During this period, Morocco faced the unfavorable circumstances of having the OAU be a great supporter of the Polisario and the independence of the “Western Sahara.” The main parties that helped the SADR take lead within this organization were Algeria and Libya. In 1979, in order to resolve the “Western Sahara” conflict, the OAU adopted a decision that called for a cease-fire and the holding of a free referendum during which the voters would decide between total independence and preservation of the status quo (Resolution on the question of “Western Sahara”). The following year, the question of the SADR’s admission as a member of the OAU was broached. In June 1981, King Hassan II proposed a referendum in conformity with the OAU *ad-hoc* committee recommendations.¹⁶ King Hassan II presented what he suggested as a referendum that would consider “Morocco’s historical rights to the territory” (The Times, June 27, 1981, 1; The Guardian, June 30, 1981, 7; Damis, *The Western Sahara*, 2003: 99-101; Barbier, 1999: 335-41).

Bendjedid came to the first session of the OAU Implementation Committee in Nairobi during the same month holding a 91-page memorandum citing King Hassan II Referendum pledge as no more than “a glimmer of hope, as yet a tenuous one,” and

¹⁶King Hassan said the offer of a referendum was made at the request of several African, Arab, and Western states. National Archives, London, September 4, 1981, p.31054.

enumerating the conditions which would have to be abided by to allow the committee to conduct its mandate in order to “guarantee the exercise of a general and regular referendum of self-determination” (Referendum of Self-Determination for the People of the “Western Sahara,” 1981: 1,5). Algeria’s conditions clearly included universal adult suffrage, the return of all refugees to “Western Sahara”, the holding of the referendum throughout the territory , the Moroccan authorities should be excluded from conducting the referendum,” Polisario’s right to enter the territory freely to campaign before the poll, the establishment of an international, interim administration headed by a senior UN official, the stationing of a UN peace-keeping force, and the “substantial withdrawal of Moroccan troops, together with a negotiated confinement to barracks of the remainder of the Moroccan forces (Hodges, 1983 :331).

The Algerian statement that the withdrawal of Moroccan forces and administration was mandatory was simply rejected by the Moroccan argument that the very referendum that led to Algeria’s independence was carried out in the presence of French troops and administration. Morocco also argued that a similar operation was applied to a number of African states and their respective colonial rulers.

As per the Polisario, they categorically rejected the OAU Implementation Committee’s resolution and turned down the cease fire and referendum proposals without the withdrawal of Moroccan troops as well as the administration from the territory (Damis, *The Western Sahara*, 2003: 101). Hassan II, on the other hand, refused to negotiate directly with the Polisario. This led the Algerian government in connivance with the Polisario Guerrillas to tighten military pressure on Morocco by staging the attack on Guelta Zemmour in October 1982. On January 29, 1982, Hassan II expressed at a press conference

held in Paris that “a rapprochement with Algeria remained a pious wish” (Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens).

Inside Algeria, public support for Algeria’s foreign policy on the “Western Sahara” was seldom more than lukewarm. The Saharan conflict seemed a rather irrelevant, almost unnecessary to the average Algerian, even though there was an acknowledgement of the Saharawi right to independence. To many Algerians, providing the Polisario with diplomatic, financial, and military support was merely a diversion of resources from domestic priorities. Some also regretted to see the Algerian officials supporting the Polisario, instead of pushing for close collaboration and cooperation between the countries of the Maghreb.¹⁷ However to the Algerian leadership, mainly the military, it was *sine qua non* for it to use the Polisario as a trump card to put pressure on Morocco and try to weaken its supremacy as much as possible, because, for Algeria, Morocco represented a threat to its national security, as much as it also feared territorial hegemony.

With Algeria’s colossal help and support, the Polisario became arguably the most potent guerrilla movement in Africa. Militarily, it attained far more than the SWAPO movement in Namibia or even the Frelimo in Portuguese-ruled Mozambique (Hodges, 1983: 101).

At the OAU, Algeria had a hand in every decision made by the Polisario; it was indeed the most important party dictating and guiding SADR’s moves. The second session of the Nairobi summit on February 8-9, 1982, culminated in the decision that stipulates

¹⁷The small opposition groups in exile, such as Mohamed Boudiaf’s Parti de la Révolution Socialiste and Ait Ahmed’s Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS), were particularly vocal in opposing the Algerian government’s Saharan policy. One can also cite the four former leaders of the FLN, Ferhat Abbas, Youssef Ben Khedda, Husain Lahoul, and Mohammed Kheiredden, who issued a manifesto, urging a “halt to the war against our Moroccan brothers” and democratic reforms within Algeria, on March 9, 1976.

inter alia that the committee and the Chairman would set up a date for the cease-fire and a peace-keeping force and/or a military observer group would supervise the confinement of troops to their bases. An interim administration lead by a Commissioner was in charge of the legislative and administrative powers necessary for the implementation of the referendum in the presence of the Moroccan administration; the latter would be invited to cooperate whenever it was needed (OAU Doc. AHG/IMP.C/WS/Dec.2).

The damaging blast to the OAU's effort occurred during the 38th ordinary session of the Council of Ministers that took place on February 23-28, 1982, in Addis Ababa. During this session, there was an extreme push from Algeria to have the SADR admitted as a member of the organization. As a matter of fact, when the Secretary General of the OAU Edem Kodjo made the unilateral decision to allow the SADR to take part in the deliberations as a member state without consulting with the Implementation Committee or the OAU chairman, confusion arose, and 19 states left angrily staunchly protesting at the Secretary General's ignorance for the ongoing efforts by the Chairman, and the Implementation Committee to resolve this matter. Even further more, Edem Kodjo allowed the proceedings to pursue in the presence of the SADR's representatives despite the absence of the quorum (Ali Bahaijoub, 2010: 351).

This unexpected act pushed the OAU into chaos and threatened not only the end of the Implementation Committee's mandate but also the advancement of its work (Shelley, 2004 : 36). Kodjo's move was intended to bring the work of the Committee to a halt. In actual fact, the motives behind Kodjo's act were that his term of office was coming to an end with no hope of reelection, Gaddafi made him an irresistible offer to change the course of events. His diplomatic coup was masterminded by skillful Algerian and Libyan lobbying

within the OAU and arm-twisting of some African heads of state dependent upon aid from Algeria and Libya (Bahaijoub,2010: 352).

One may even deduce the reasons behind this *coup de force* as being ascribed to the fact that Libya and Bendjedid, in particular, were rather dissatisfied about the outcome of the referendum. Indeed, if the results of the referendum were in favor of Morocco, this would have jeopardized all of Algeria's longstanding efforts in helping the Polisario in its fight against Morocco. Thus, President Bendjedid would have found himself in a complicated and embarrassing position.

Furthemore, Algeria's endorsed the diplomatic coup of Edem Kodjo, and the intensification of armed attacks against Moroccan forces in the Saharan territory in the expectation that they would ultimately lead to King Hassan II surrender and compel him to give up the territory altogether or at least part of it (Bahaijoub, 2010: 353).

Algeria and Libya were capable at the time of such policies due to the two countries' extensive wealth from oil income, whereas, their neighbor, Morocco, endured a difficult complex economic period that witnessed chronic drought.

It is important to understand why Morocco staunchly refused Kodjo's decision to have the SADR admitted as an official member of the Pan-African Organization. It was commonly known that the SADR existed only in Algeria and did not exert any sovereignty or control over the population in the territory that Algeria provided for it. For Morocco, it was inadmissible to have this entity admitted as a state that existed only in name. Morocco pleaded this case within the OAU. The Angolan case was a vivid reminder, as put by Raoul Westeen:

“When the fighting broke out in Angola on the eve of independence in 1976 between Agostinho Neto, on the one hand, and Dr. Jonas Savimbi's UNITA and the FNLA, on the

other, many African states were opposed to the recognition of Neto's government. However, Neto's control of part of the country including the capital city, Luanda, made it eventually possible for Angola to be recognized as an OAU member. The difference, however, between Neto's Angola and the SADR was the fact that the latter's flag flutters in Algeria and not in any significant part of the "Western Sahara" (1980: 365).

Libya and Algeria did all they could to have the SADR's admission secured and were not bothered about the division in the OAU. Indeed, by this time, the Pan-African Organization was almost split by country leaders—led by Algeria and Libya on one hand, and, led by Morocco on the other. The OAU was almost so equally divided that it was unable to simply hold a summit meeting, let alone to come up to terms with issues on the Agenda regarding the Saharan question. Eventually, the summit took place without the participation of the SADR or Gaddafi. The Algerian officials were present and consistently lobbied behind the scenes, succeeding in having the Polisario mentioned by name in an OAU resolution. One of the former Moroccan Ministers, M'Hammed Boucetta, witnessed this lobbying at the African Union and remarked at how much the Algerian military spent on the African States to take the Polisario's side. At the OAU, there was always a struggle, even physical sometimes, between the Moroccan officials, the Polisario, and the Algerians, the latter did all they could to have the SADR admitted. There was even once, Algeria donated 50 Mercedes cars and two planes loads of food to Sierra Leone. This goodwill gesture was duly reciprocated in the form of recognition of the SADR. The reason why Algeria interfered in such way and did all it could to support the Polisario was because there was mainly a sensitivity of the defeat in the Sand War, there was the problem of territorial hegemony, because the Algerian military always wanted to gain the leadership in the region and they did not hide it (Author 2014 interview of Boucetta, Rabat/see list of

interviewees Appendix 6/ See interviewee biography at Data Collection & Analysis: Chapter 1).

In June 1983, a resolution from the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government exhorted Morocco and the Polisario, as the two parties to the conflict, ‘to undertake direct negotiations with a view to bringing about a cease-fire to create the necessary conditions for a peaceful and fair referendum of self-determination of the people of “Western Sahara,” a referendum without any administrative or military constraints, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations’ (Resolution on Western Sahara : AHG/Res.104(XIX), 1983). The date of the referendum was fixed to December 1983.

Just four months before the OAU resolution was adopted, there was a Saudi-led mediation, a first tête à tête meeting took place between Bendjedid and King Hassan II on May 4, 1987, on the Algerian-Moroccan borders. The major topics of discussion between the two statesmen were renewed diplomatic relations and possible peace talks on the Saharan conflict. Saudi Arabia's King Fahd was present at the meeting and shuttled between the separate tents of Hassan II and Bendjedid before bringing them into a face-to-face session for 75 minutes.

During the meeting, Bendjedid showed his utmost willingness to help the Kingdom resolve the “Western Sahara” conflict and personally offered his services as an intermediary. The greater affinity between the two leaders generated a good atmosphere, but did little to resolve the conflict. Though the meeting did not produce an agreement on the Saharan conflict, both leaders pledged their wish to hold future talks to resolve current issues.

King Hassan II argued that the Pan-African notion of a referendum for self-determination had no future; he asked Bendjedid to urge the Polisario to meet with pro-

Moroccan Sahraoui to consider the idea of a “Saharan entity” that would keep only the Moroccan flag and stamp. Paul Balta (1990) reported that with regard to King Hassan II’s statement, “Optimism was very high,” for the King was said to have hinted in the conversation “Leave the stamp and the flag for me and everything else is negotiable” (1990:X181). In turn, President Bendjedid recommended that the solution should be within a Maghreban framework. Bendjedid’s suggestions made Hassan II think that the Algerians were seeking to use regional integration as a stratagem to impose the SADR as the sixth Maghrebi state (Mortimer, 1988: 169-85). According to William Zartman(1989), the deal was that Morocco would agree to have direct meeting with Polisario representatives, and in exchange, Algeria would enjoin Polisario not to seek OAU membership, but to push instead for an early referendum; Autonomy, federation, and other outcomes less than independence were discussed (*Pre negotiation*, 1989:57).

When Bendjedid returned to Algiers, high-ranking military officials criticized Bendjedid’s soft policy toward Morocco and accused him of being in favor of Morocco and opposed to a Moroccan military defeat. The Algerian military was reportedly willing to either intervene directly against Morocco or allow an all-out offensive by Polisario forces with important Algerian help in order to break the deadlock and to prevent Morocco from achieving a *fait accompli* in the “Western Sahara” (Author 2014 call with Zoubir, see list of interviewees Appendix 4). Right after the encounter between the two leaders, Algeria’s foreign ministry released a communiqué that stated that Algeria has always emphasized its complete readiness to work to bring our “Western Saharan” brothers and Moroccan brothers closer together in order to find a solution conforming to the “Western Sahara” people’s inalienable right to self-determination and independence. Algeria is convinced that, while reestablishing peace in our region, such a solution will open the way

to cooperation in keeping with the ideal of constructing the Maghreb. It is in this spirit that President Chadli Bendjedid, President of the Republic and Secretary-General of the FLN, met King Hassan II on Saturday, February 26, 1987, in the Algerian-Moroccan border (Le Monde, March 1, 1983).

Reflecting on this later, however, Algeria felt that it was leaning too much toward Morocco's side. In order to avoid any such feeling that the Polisario might perceive, Bendjedid stated on September 19, 1998: "We have been clear from the start in no way will Algeria ever renounce its fundamental principles regarding just causes and peoples' right to self-determination. This was understood by our Moroccan brothers. We believe that the Sahrawi question is a just cause" (El Moudjahid, Sept. 21, 1988).

Nothing more occurred until the OAU summit, which took place in Addis Ababa on November 12-15, 1984. Most African state leaders had become intensely confused over the Saharan issue; for many, it jeopardized OAU progress and resulted in a split of opinions within the organization. The SADR delegation was eventually seated in the Conference Hall in Addis Ababa. Moroccan officials left without asking their supporters to join them. Before the Moroccan delegation left the conference, King Hassan's advisor, Guedira, delivered a message from King Hassan to OAU members that SADR's presence was unacceptable and left Morocco no choice but to resign from the Pan-African Organization.

Under Bendjedid's term, given the pressure from the Algerian Military toward the Republic President, the OAU witnessed a staunch push by Algerian diplomacy for self-determination of "Western Sahara" and to have the SADR admitted within the organization through Algerian-sponsored resolutions. By permitting the Polisario to secure its seat as the 51st member of the organization, Algeria jeopardized the unity of the OAU over this particular issue. Indeed, this episode ended the OAU's authority to handle the "Western

Sahara” conflict by the OAU, as the problem was then handed off to the United Nations, which will be addressed in the following section

IV.2.3. The United Nations and Chadli Bendjedid

As of early 1986, the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, sought to accommodate the parties concerned with the conflict by offering space to arrange for indirect talks between Polisario and Morocco. When handling this particular conflict, the UN secretary-general dealt with the Polisario leaders as party members only and not representatives of the government. Pérez de Cuellar (1997) clarified this: “The UN General Assembly has never recognized the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a state although it recognized Polisario as the legitimate representative of the Sahraoui people.”(339)

Morocco, on the other hand, refused to deal and negotiate with the Polisario directly. Rabat argued that if the Polisario leadership was convinced they represented the Sahraoui, the only way to prove it was through participation in a referendum conducted under UN auspices, as King Hassan II had repeatedly vowed (*The Times* 1987 interview of Hassan). Thus, a series of indirect talks took place in New York from April 9-15, 1986 and from May 5-9, 1986 (de Cuellar, 1997: 336). The UN Secretary-General handed the two parties a detailed questionnaire that included six points regarding different aspects of the process of the planned referendum (de Cuellar, 1997: 337). Morocco had a number of reasons it vehemently opposed negotiations with the Polisario; such reasons included the way Algeria interfered with the dossier and the apparent divisions within the Algerian regime on “Western Sahara.”

The referendum was to take place during Bendjedid's presidency. When dealing with the conflict under UN auspices, the Bendjedid was cooperative, but maintained his defense for the independence of "Western Sahara." Perez De-Cuellar described his encounters with Bendjedid regarding the "Western Sahara":

"President Bendjedid was genuinely committed to the concept of peaceful community of Maghreb states. While he was consistent in his support of "Western Sahara" independence and was critical of Morocco for resisting bilateral talks with Polisario, he clearly was not motivated by personal hostility toward King Hassan II" (1997: 336).

This opinion supports the notion that during Bendjedid's presidency, the "Western Sahara" conflict divided the country into two leadership factions: one that pushed to make concessions in favor of Morocco to the detriment of the Polisario, whereas the other stuck to its traditional manner of handling the conflict by being inflexible to this issue. Furthermore, the good personal relations between Bendjedid and Hassan II opened a new era in Algerian-Moroccan relations in spite of the absence of diplomatic relations.

After the UN took charge of organizing the referendum, Perez de Cuellar dispatched a technical team to the "Western Sahara" to collect first-hand information required to hold the referendum. Algeria and the Polisario rejected the UN Secretary General's initiative, claiming that by going to "Western Sahara," the UN may be prejudiced by the Moroccan administration. Perez de Cuellar responded to these allegations by inviting the Polisario Secretary General to meet in Geneva. There, the UN Secretary General, bluntly explained to the Polisario that the United Nations was not requesting permission of the parties to send the mission. Were one or the other to be in position to dictate the mediators their course of action, this would negate our role. Reiterating that the

United Nations had wished only to inform the parties of our intention and request their cooperation, particularly with regard to security (Perez de Cuellar, 1997: 339).

Encouraged by the re-establishment of the diplomatic relations between Morocco and Algeria on May 16, 1988, de Cuellar introduced a peace plan on August 11, 1988, to both Morocco and the Polisario, asking them to respond to him by September 1st. The Settlement Plan comprised that the referendum, would seek two choices: independence or integration in Morocco. All Sahraouis over 18 who were listed in the census taken by the Spanish colonial administration in 1974 would have the right to vote. A new census of refugees outside the territory would be taken with the assistance of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Prior to the initiation of the electoral campaign, the Special Representative would ensure the release of all political prisoners and detainees. All refugees who had been identified as legitimate Sahraouis would be free to return to the territory. The Settlement Plan also proposed the setting up of an international peace-keeping force referred to as “MINURSO” to monitor the cease-fire and the planning and the organization of a referendum (Perez de Cuellar, 1997: 341).

During a four-year period of consultation between the concerned parties, Perez de Cuellar had 182 bilateral conversations with Algerian authorities, 132 with those of Morocco, 33 with representatives of Polisario, and 50 with representatives of the OAU, all devoted to the “Western Sahara” issue (Perezde Cuellar, 1997: 341). During a tête-à-tête conversation between de Cuellar and King Hassan II, the latter confidentially proposed that “he had an idea that could facilitate a settlement.” The idea was to offer the Saharaoui, within the Framework of the referendum, a third path—that of a territory “integrated federally with Morocco” (Perez de Cuellar, 1997: 237). When Bendjedid heard about Hassan II’s third path solution, he did not disagree with the idea. He, on the contrary,

confessed to de Cuellar, that “he expected Morocco to win the referendum mainly because of the large amount of money that the Moroccan government had spent to improve conditions and encourage development in the territory” (Perez de Cuellar, 1997: 342). Javier Pérez de Cuellar always relied on Bendjedid to get things moving from the Polisario side. He was convinced that Algeria was easily able to exert influence on Polisario leadership.

In one of his last UN Security Council reports regarding the implementation of the settlement plan, de Cuellar concluded there should be continuous and serious efforts undertaken by Morocco and the Polisario at the political and technical levels in order to keep the peace process going. Pérez de Cuellar described the task of implementing the settlement plan as “unfinished and frustrating” due to both parties’ unwillingness to compromise on a fair and just solution. However, de Cuellar noted and believed that granting independence to “Western Sahara” was an unrealistic solution. He asserted,

“I was never convinced that independence promised the best future for the inhabitants of the Western Sahara. . . . Such political leadership as exists is not impressive and, in some cases, not Sahraoui in origin. A reasonable political solution under which the Western Sahara would be integrated as an autonomous region in the Maghreb state would have spared many lives and a great deal of money” (Perez de Cuellar, 1997: 352).

For de Cuellar, Algeria was in the best position to convince the Polisario to accept such solution because this faction was heavily dependent on Algeria’s revenues. However, Bendjedid would not support a resolution that involved a territorial integration of “Western Sahara” into the Moroccan regional system.

IV.2.4. Conclusion

Despite the fact that the Algerian-Moroccan relationship remained tense following Algeria's independence due to the negative influence of the "Western Sahara" conflict, it is important to note that Algeria's foreign policy toward this issue was marked by a *détente* under Chadli Bendjedid. This *détente*, however, entailed the existence of divisions within the Algerian leadership between radical and moderate factions. The radical faction, represented by the Algerian Generals and high-ranking military officials, was pro-Sahrawi and was thought to be inflexible on the "Western Sahara" issue. The control of Boumedienne's group over key decision-making positions made it difficult for the New Algerian leadership to change or come up with a win-win solution. The most startling evidence of influence of this group was that whenever Bendjedid showed his sympathy towards Morocco's claims, the Boumedienne group reversed any of his preceding strategies, being opposed to improving ties with Morocco.

Nonetheless, it would be too simplistic to suggest that omitting the question of "Western Sahara" from the forefront of Algerian-Moroccan relations would have ended the Algerian relationship with the Polisario. As noted by an Algerian official, "The Algerian reconciliation with Morocco solicited and wanted by Chadli Bendjedid was just a move towards a resolution of the dispute in the 'Western Sahara'" (Author 2016 interview of an Algerian official, see list of interviewees Appendix 4).

As it appears from the accounts and facts presented in this chapter, it is clear that during Bendjedid's tenure the Algerian government did not depart from the central orientations of Algeria's foreign policy. Instead, the government was able to reshape some of the features of Algeria foreign policy towards this conflict, whilst cloaking the modifications in a language of continuity. "Western Sahara" proved to be, as usual, at the

core of Algeria's foreign policy, and this can be deduced from Algeria's actions before the UN and the OAU. After 1986 and despite the success of Algeria's diplomacy aimed at isolating Rabat in the Arab Maghreb and the OAU, several internal and external factors intertwined.

These factors led indirectly to an obvious readjustment in Algeria's strategy over the "Western Sahara" conflict. Firstly, there were factors that were directly related to the changing domestic situation in Algeria; Algeria could not simply maintain a prolonged conflict of attrition against Morocco in the context of the serious economic downfall that coincided with the oil price collapse in 1985-1986. Furthermore, Bendjedid's regimes were known, at a point, to be more powerful than before as he was able to secure support for key positions in the state apparatus, which set himself up to carry out a regional policy of his choice. Secondly, another readjusting factor was the success of the Moroccan Army in procuring new defense techniques, which reduced the military capacities of the Polisario Front and, in turn, lessened Algeria's military option to block Morocco in its claim of the territory. This, however, did not end Algeria's support of the Polisario. What indeed, marked the era of Bendjedid, was the fact that Algeria opted to omit the strategy of confrontation between the two neighbors, as it became apparent that it would not achieve its objectives. Indeed, Bendjedid reoriented his approach towards the "Western Sahara" conflict and did all he could to reach his predecessors goals in a tactful way at the UN and the OAU.

In 1990, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) had the upper hand, winning both the local election in June 1990 and the December 1991 parliamentary elections. Bendjedid was ready to attempt a period of "political cohabitation" with the Islamists, but was met with a veto from the military officers. A petition signed by 184 officers forced Bendjedid to

resign. It was delivered to him by Defense Minister Khaled Nizar during a stormy meeting in the presence of Generals Lamari, Ghozeil, and Khalid Nezzar. After Bendjedid's resignation, Mohammed Boudiaf became President in 1992. Boudiaf's presidential tenure led to his assassination as many of his positions, including his position towards the "Western Sahara" conflict, which displeased the high-ranking Algerian military.

IV.3. Mohamed Boudiaf: The Ephemeral Rapprochement

IV.3.1. Introduction

In the subsequent national elections of December 1991, even though its main leaders, Abbassi Madani and Ahmed Belhadj, were in jail, the FIS experienced a strong win. To prevent the second-stage run-off elections scheduled for mid-January 1992, the Minister of Defense General Khaled Nezzar engineered a *coup d'état*. Martial law was re-imposed, and, as mentioned above, Bendjedid was forced to resign.

By precipitating the departure of Bendjedid, Khaled Nezzar and his ilk were confronted by an unprecedented dilemma—a constitutional vacuum. The *coup d'état* of 1992 opened a new chapter of violence against civilians, leaving thousands of civilians dead. Massive arrests took place, opening the door to 10 years of lawlessness and armed violence. The resurrection of an internal armed conflict between the Algerian Army and the Islamists, and the creation of temporary institutions—like the High Committee of State—gave the impression that the country was led by decrees, rather than by elected bodies or institutions.

The High Security Council (HCS) brought in Mohamed Boudiaf, the historic leader of the Algerian war of liberation, who had been exiled to Morocco since 1963 following his disagreement with Ben Bella, to lead the High State Council (HCE), which was

Algeria's transitional collegial ruling body. Boudiaf repressed radical Islamists, banned the FIS, and set out to reestablish trust between the state and the civil society. To rebuild the credibility of the state, Boudiaf initiated a campaign to fight corruption in the country. Boudiaf's ambitions included fighting corruption that existed within the Army, encompassing even the generals' assets overseas.

Given Boudiaf's desire to wipeout high level corruption, the relationship between the generals and the new president soured. Given that the generals were the main beneficiaries of that corruption, a clash was predictable. Suddenly, most of the competent people investigating matters of corruption under Boudiaf's orders were mysteriously assassinated.

At the international level, Boudiaf saw the importance of reviving Moroccan-Algerian relations. For Boudiaf, there was no reason that the "Western Sahara" conflict existed—in fact, he disagreed with supporting the Polisario Front. This position was viewed by the Generals as pro-Moroccan and as a preparation to settle in favor of Morocco. Just few weeks after his nomination, Boudiaf had made powerful secular enemies among the Algerian Army. His actions and positions led to his assassination by a military officer during a public speech at the opening of a cultural center in Annaba in 1992.

IV.3.2. Too close to Morocco

On January 12, 1992, one day after the forced resignation of Bendjedid, General Mohamed Touati, Colonel Smâin Lamari, and Ali Haroun flew to Morocco to meet with Boudiaf to persuade him to go back to Algiers to lead the country. Hassan II and the Moroccan Secret Services were aware of the situation. Hassan II, King of Morocco, who maintained good relations with Boudiaf was alerted by Boudiaf of the Algerian regime's

proposal. Colonel Smain Lamari, among the most powerful men in the Algerian Secret Services, was in charge of informing his Moroccan counterparts in order to prepare the first trip for the soon-to-be president of Algeria (Hachlefi, 2018: 45).

Thus, after 30 years of exile in Morocco, Boudiaf was called to head the High Council of State in the wake of the 1992 coup. Rabat believed that a favorable solution to the “Western Sahara” conflict was perhaps finally in sight. During his brief mandate, Boudiaf showed his willingness to find a bilateral solution to the conflict between Algeria and Morocco regarding the “Western Sahara” issue, going further than his predecessor, President Bendjedid. The Algerian leader distanced himself from the dominant stance taken by the country’s top military officials, whose support of the Polisario Front was not merely political but also psychological, fueled by fear of Moroccan irredentism towards Algerian territory.

Boudiaf’s early moderate stances on the question of the “Western Sahara” conflict originated during his time with the Algerian opposition. In Boudiaf’s own words:

“To build North Africa, we must resolve this issue. This is not a simple problem. I had a stance when I was a free man in the opposition. I condemned the policy led by Houari Boumedienne, because I considered that it was not a benefit to Algeria that the “Western Sahara” conflict lasts, in that of Morocco or the Maghreb (*Algérie Actualité*, 1992).”

When Boudiaf became president, he did not hesitate to announce his standpoint whenever the question of “Western Sahara” arose. According to the Algerian journalist and author Anouar Malek (Hespress, August 11, 2008)¹⁸, Boudiaf once clashed with the Algerian Generals Larbi Belkheir, Khaled Nezzar, Touati, and Ganizi regarding the “Western Sahara” conflict. Mohamed Boudiaf indicated and stressed on the fact that the Algerian

¹⁸<https://www.hespress.com/international/7961.html>

authorities need to review their strategy regarding this conflict, because Algeria cannot afford to support the Sahraoui due to the internal crises Algeria endures. Besides this, Boudiaf stressed that Algeria should not hold any hostility towards its neighbor, Morocco. By the time he uttered those words, the Algerian Generals were so furious that they vehemently rejected his position and strongly considered that what Boudiaf said was against the official position that Algeria had undertaken since 1975 and they will, in that case, not change it. For the Algerian Generals, Boudiaf simply cannot cross the red line, especially that of “Western Sahara.

At this stage, it is worth considering the risks implicit in Boudiaf’s stance regarding the resolution of the “Western Sahara” conflict.

Further evidence of the Algerian Generals’ interference with any possible settlement of the “Western Sahara” conflict is seen in the way they dealt with Boudiaf when he wanted to attend his son’s wedding in Kenitra, Morocco. This trip to Morocco was not well received by the decision makers of the Algerian Committee of State. They fiercely opposed Boudiaf’s trip, fearing that he would meet with Moroccan officials and make promises against their will.

Despite the Algerian Army’s pressure, President Boudiaf attended his son’s wedding in Morocco. According to Anouar Maleke, the President had a heated debate with the Army over his trip: “Suddenly General Larbi Belkheir asked General Nezzar to discuss the purpose of this trip to Morocco with President Boudiaf. An excerpt of the exchange is provided below:

“General Nezzar: Mr. President, we must see the matter of your visit to Morocco. This requires preparations at the highest level.

President Boudiaf: General, I will go and visit my children and my house. It's not an official visit.

General Nezzar: Whatever the nature of your visit, it is considered a visit of a President of State to the Kingdom of Morocco.

President Boudiaf: I have to visit my family and my business.

Belkheir, noticing that Boudiaf insisted: I understand you want to visit your family, but we want your safety, especially because you are threatened by the Islamists.

Boudiaf listened to Belkheir's nonsense talk about the fundamentalist danger and the intention to discuss the Sahara issue with Moroccan officials. When the general concluded his speech, Boudiaf replied: I do not want my family to be involved in political affairs and conflicts between the two countries.

The general then proposed to visit Morocco secretly. Boudiaf seemed not to fall into this logic of clandestinity. Kahled Nezar's speech became more and more explicit. He insisted that Boudiaf cut the bridges with Morocco by "proposing" to him to repatriate his family and to dissolve his company through the services of the Algerian embassy in Morocco and with the price and conditions that he considered himself. Boudiaf, exasperated, categorically declined the offer. He seemed determined to go to Morocco. Belkheir intervened again to unblock the situation. Unwillingly, he gave him the green light to go, but with conditions difficult to hold.

Belkheir: You can go, but on condition of not meeting the King.

Boudiaf: What if he invites me? Will I insult him?

Belkheir: In this case, there is no reason to refuse the invitation, but we should not talk with him about Algeria and the Sahara.

Boudiaf: What if he tells me about it? Will I remain silent?" (*Sahara: l'affaire qui a mis a mort Boudia* Hespess, August 11, 2008).''

Regrettably, this dialogue reported by Anouar Malek is very instructive regarding the red lines concerning the Sahara question imposed by the Algerian military institution on everyone, including the highest state authority. The "Western Sahara" was the major topic in which Algeria felt duty-bound to maintain involvement.

Once in Rabat, Boudiaf nevertheless spoke with King Hassan II. Algerian sources even argued that Boudiaf promised the King a solution to the "Western Sahara" conflict that would benefit the Kingdom. Taeib Dekkar, who was the correspondent of the Moroccan Maghreb Arab Press in Algiers, in his book "Morocco-Algeria: Reciprocal Mistrust," reported that King Hassan II officially received the Algerian President at the

Royal Palace in the presence of the Algerian Ambassador, Abdelmajid Allahoum. Boudiaf revealed to Hassan II that the Algerian military harassed him because of the Moroccan-Algerian border treaty that Morocco had not ratified. Hassan II replied that he would do it before the president would leave. The treaty was promulgated at the official bulletin. Morocco's action on this ratification, made the Algerian military criticize Hassan II's act by stating that what Morocco has done is against the normal procedures because the treaty should have been ratified many years ago (2013: 119).

When Boudiaf returned to Algiers, the Algerian Army asked him what the Algerian counterpart of such an act of border ratification by King Hassan II would be and accused Boudiaf of betrayal (Dekkar, 2013: 119). It was clear the Algerian Army was hostile to President Boudiaf's undertakings, nicknaming him "the Wali of the Algerian Province" to describe his links with Morocco, which they consider as suspect. Many who knew President Boudiaf described him as a person who genuinely wanted to solve the "Western Sahara" conflict that, to him, poisoned relations between the two neighbors. Although he could proffer no logical reason for the conflict to exist, he understood it was too late to intervene as Algeria has been actively involved in the "Western Sahara" conflict for many years. In Boudiaf's words:

'But this is already late, Algeria has been involved for 17 years in a policy of recognition of the Saharaoui state. The Sahraoui have taken refuge with us. We must see to what extent we can find a solution to this problem in order to provide a basis for the Maghreb. The will is here. We must agree with our Sahraouis and Moroccan brothers before the referendum. Because after that, either they opt for the Sahara as Moroccan, and then Algeria will find itself in a difficult situation, because these people have weapons. Or opting for independence and it will be a bone of contention. What is the solution? I do not know, but is there a willingness on the part of these countries to get through? We have to end it. What did it bring to Algeria? If we could figure out all the money that was spent, and on the other

side, Morocco has the territories. If one wants to impose this state, it is necessary as a power, to make a war? That's all. Or you have to make peace” (*Algérie Actualité*, 1992).

Accordingly, in a matter of a few months, President Boudiaf made enemies of all the members of the black cabinet: General Lamari, who was removed from office; General Nezzar, whose business was affected; General Mediene and Smain Lamari who were about to lose their positions through Kasdi Merbah; General Belkheir who was accused of badly managing the file of the FSI; and General Toufik. Furthermore, Boudiaf’s moderate and peaceful involvement in “Western Sahara” conflict seriously bothered the Algerian military.

These politically disagreements precipitated his assassination when he returned to Algeria after his visit to Morocco. On June 29, 1992, while speaking in a conference with youth associations in Annaba, one of Boudiaf’s guards fired several bullets at his body. He died on the spot. His presidency lasted only five months and 13 days.

IV.4. Abdelaziz Bouteflika: Boumedienne’s Legacy

IV.4.1. Introduction

Since Bouteflika came to power in 1999, Algeria has in some ways acted like the Russia of the Southern Mediterranean (Darbouche, 2008: 371–89). While Algeria is of course much smaller than Russia and lacks the level of international influence that Russia maintains, it sees itself as a regional power not just in the Maghreb but also in Africa and the broader Arab world and expects to be treated as such by its partners. This has been the case particularly after Bouteflika reinvigorated Algeria’s foreign policy, following almost a decade of international isolation. As far as Algeria’s foreign policy on the “Western Sahara” conflict is concerned, during President Bouteflika’s tenure it was shaped by ups

and downs. For the most part, President Bouteflika transformed Algerian-Moroccan relations into an environment of complex tensions built on a series of mutual accusations. Many analysts interviewed by the author, believe that President Bouteflika insisted on making relations between the two countries impossible as seen through his full endorsement of the Polisario, which included his agreement to equip them with arms (Author 2014-15 interviews of Pham, Ottaway, Zoubir, see list of interviewees Appendix 6/ See interviewees biographies at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1).

In order to understand how Bouteflika dealt with the “Western Sahara” conflict, it is of paramount importance to examine how the personal relations between the Moroccan Kings—Hassan II and Mohamed VI—and President Bouteflika were characterized. Bouteflika was born in Morocco, and it was suspected that he, as Foreign Minister in 1975, had favored a border agreement with Hassan II over support for Polisario. The policy effects of this misplaced optimism were soon felt by the Algerian Generals who set him straight on his position. The Algerian journalist Mohamed Siffaoui (2011 :70), exiled in France, described Bouteflika’s relationship with Morocco, specifically with respect to Hassan II and later King Mohamed VI as an attitude filled with attraction-repulsion or love-hatred with regard to things or people. Abdelaziz Bouteflika incarnated this attitude on several cases; namely Morocco. Bouteflika is more Moroccan than the other Moroccans and yet he despised Hassan II, it was rather a relationship of love-hate. In his letters addressed to Hassan II, Bouteflika ended them with the sentence “your devoted subject Abdelaziz Bouteflika.” In fact, Bouteflika considered himself a subject of Hassan II, he did not consider himself an Algerian citizen. Siffaoui believes that there is something that the psychologists should explore; during Hassan II’s funeral, Bouteflika was clinging to the coffin of Hassan II. This gesture is of a high degree of diplomatic acumen, at first sight,

with this gesture, one casually reconciles two countries (one sees, of course, a president suffering before the death of the monarch, against whom he has never ceased to carry out offensives). Furthermore, Bouteflika has always dreamed of speaking equal to equal to Hassan II and in fact when he becomes president of Algeria in April 1999, the first thing he does is to request a meeting with Hassan II that for September 1991; unfortunately, Hassan II dies in July. So somewhere, Bouteflika was crying about his own fate, he was crying over the fact of this meeting was missed, this situation that he always wanted and that was not given to him.

With the death of King Hassan II in Morocco only a few months later and a series of initially positive gestures between the new King and the new President, a new era in Moroccan-Algerian relations were thought to be at hand. At the earliest opportunity (February 2000), the Security Council, under pressure from France and the U.S., effectively abandoned the long-awaited referendum on independence being organized by the UN mission in “Western Sahara.”

After King Hassan II death, the international community still found it difficult to bring Morocco and Polisario together to talk about simple “confidence building measures.” Instead of reconciliation, Moroccan-Algerian relations under Bouteflika and Mohamed VI have remained strained. An important aspect of this is Algeria’s international rehabilitation under Bouteflika after nearly a decade of being confined to the pariah status.

Algeria’s vicious intra-national armed conflict of the 1990s, which fed off and compounded an already dire economic crisis, had severely weakened the government. However, rising hydrocarbon prices in the late 1990s helped re-inflate the Algerian state, making it possible to consolidate its victory over armed Islamist groups. The re-centralization of political power in the executive branch has been punctuated by the

retirement of several key figures in the military following Bouteflika's reelection in 2004 (Werenfels, 1995: 125). Stronger civilian control over the state did not translate into less support for Polisario. Contrary to the predictions made in 1999, Algeria has become more, not less, strident in its support for "Western Saharan" nationalism. Bouteflika has shown little interest in normalizing relations with Morocco. As Algeria positions itself as the regional powerhouse in North Africa, Polisario remains central to that strategy.

Given this background, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate or rather demonstrate how Bouteflika's presidency has shown that the Boumedienne model is, for better or worse, alive and well. In other words, the following sections will shed light on how Algeria's foreign policy under President Bouteflika regarding the "Western Sahara" conflict has interfered in every step undertaken by Morocco at the United Nations, which has tried to end the deadlock of this protracted conflict.

IV.4.2. At the UN: Hampering the Political Progress

Following the death of King Hassan II and the introduction of a new Algerian President, a new optimism for the future grew. Unfortunately, the policy effects of this misplaced optimism were soon felt, namely under the auspices of the UN.

With the abandonment of the long-awaited referendum on independence that was being organized by the UN Mission in "Western Sahara," the Security Council, in effect, scrapped the only agreement ever signed between the Polisario and Morocco—the 1997 Houston Accords, which was negotiated by the UN Secretary-General Personal Envoy James Baker. The December 1999 UN Mission to identify voters in the prospective referendum ended with an impasse because of the identification process. As witnessed by Anna Theophilopoulou, the former UN official who covered the "Western Sahara" conflict

from 1994 to 2006 and one of the crucial members of James Baker's team, explained the reasons for the impasse. She insisted on the fact that the settlement plan was not going to be implemented as the United Nations team couldn't get out of the identification. The settlement plan had various aspects; the identifications of voters was the key. Because of the logistical reasons, the United Nations decided to have the parties bring the candidates for the identification; they gave a big role out of necessity. From the beginning, both parties (Morocco and the Polisario with the help of Algeria) were very clear, they wanted an electoral body who would vote for what they wanted, and that is why it went on and on. It started in 1994 and then we had a lot of breaks. In 1996, the team lead by James Baker and Anna Theophilopoulou stopped totally, because at that time, as asserted by Theophilopoulou, both sides were playing games about the identification because the Polisario was feeling more insecure about what was happening. Overall, the United Nations was not handling the process very well. Anna Theophilopoulou confirmed in her interview with the author that within the United Nations, there was a lot of disagreement, and for her, nothing came to a solution because simply because the Security Council was playing sides. The "Western Sahara" was one of the toxic subjects at the Council, depending on who was the member. Anna Theophilopoulou witnessed the following facts :

"You had countries like Gabon; there were discussions-internal-going on and you had the Ambassador of Gabon the Moroccan Ambassador, then you had countries like Namibia and South Africa doing the same thing with Algeria and then you would have Germany who had an officer at that time, who was very much close to Algeria. So, there was this constant upheaval which led the work not to be done properly" (Author interview of Theophilopoulou, New York : 2014 see list of interviewees Appendix 6/See interviewee

biography at Data Collection & Analysis: Chapter 1).

From Theofilopoulou's statements, it is apparent that Algeria did have an influence on the UN's decision regarding the "Western Sahara" conflict by urging their state allies to accept what Algeria dictated to the Polisario Front. Similar situations have been witnessed in other negotiation attempts between Morocco and the Polisario.

Adding to that, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former UN Secretary General, who held out no hope that the referendum would happen due to the inequities of the settlement plan, stated: "I never believed that the referendum was going to happen but I was hoping that by keeping the parties engaged, then we [could] opt for another solution" (Author interview of Theofilopoulou, New York : 2014 see list of interviewees Appendix 6/ See interviewee biography at Data Collection & Analysis: Chapter 1).

Algeria and the Polisario were shocked by Boutros-Ghali's statements. As a matter of fact, the complex relations that existed between the Security Council members when dealing with the "Western Sahara" conflict made the resolution process very difficult to handle due to the members disagreements arising from Algeria's influence on the peace process. It should be clear though, that Bouteflika's foreign policy attitude towards the "Western Sahara" conflict under the guise of the UN portrayed a potentially rich range of radical and firm stances. Algerian diplomats went even further to either put pressure on some African, Asian, and East European countries to change their stances on resolutions that support Morocco's cause and endorse the Polisario's independence efforts (Author interviews of Moroccan Diplomat Khalil Haddiou, 2015 : Rabat / see list of interviewees Appendix 6// See interviewee biography at Data Collection & Analysis: Chapter 1).

IV.4.3. Baker Plan I & II

James Baker III stepped up to the plate to revive efforts to come up with a solution to the “Western Sahara” issue. Mr. Baker accepted this mission essentially for free—being paid only a dollar per year salary; in addition, he was nominated as a UN special envoy to “Western Sahara.”

The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, agreed with Baker’s special envoy—that it was crucial to move beyond the settlement plan, due to the high uncertainty of its implementation. Added to Baker’s report to the Security Council on June 20, 2001, was a “Framework Agreement on the Status of ‘Western Sahara’” that Baker developed. According to Erik Jensen, the Framework Agreement was unlike agreements whose goals is to address similar cases elsewhere where a distribution and delegation of power is given to the population of a non-self-governing territory is accorded with the final status of the territory to be set by a referendum’s Draft Framework Agreement presented to the population of “Western Sahara”. The Draft Framework Agreement encompasses the right to elect their own executive and legislative bodies and to have exclusive competence over local government administration, territorial budget and taxation, law enforcement, internal security, social welfare, culture, education, commerce, transportation, agriculture, mining, fisheries and industry, environmental policy, housing and urban development, water and electricity, roads, and other basic infrastructure. Morocco would have exclusive competence over foreign relations, national security, and external defense, and the flag, currency, customs, and postal communications systems of Morocco should be the same for “Western Sahara” (Jensen :2012: 96).

The plan as submitted to Polisario on May 5, 2001, was regarded as a carbon copy of the Moroccan views. Therefore, Polisario immediately rejected it. In a letter dated June

21, 2001, from the President of Algeria to the President of the Security Council, Algeria bluntly rejected the Framework proposal and accused the UN of having violated its neutrality in the conflict and Annan of blatantly championing the Moroccan option. Bouteflika expressed his concern about the content of the Framework Agreement, which for him presented certain weaknesses and imbalances, and requested that the UN review its Framework draft by endorsing self-determination, which would lead to independence for the Sahrawi people (Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning “Western Sahara,” 2002). Again, President Bouteflika saw this new step as a threat to Algeria’s ideological interests and orientations. The Algerian regime saw itself as an "important actor" in the conflict and officially supported the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. The efforts invested by Algeria in the “Western Sahara” conflict, especially given the level of its international relations, were comparable to the ones of an involved party such as Morocco.

Through Algerian pressure on many of the UN General Assembly members, the Security Council ultimately did agree to review the Framework Agreement and requested that James Baker develop another plan. President Bouteflika went even further by urging Algeria’s allied U.S. senators to contest the Framework Agreement. Indeed, in Washington, D.C., Senators Edward Kennedy, Patrick Leahy, and John Kerry expressed their concern to Secretary of State Colin Powell “that the United Nations would abandon the referendum and support a solution that proposes integrating the “Western Sahara” into Morocco against the will of the Sahraouis” (Letter to Colin Powell, June 22, 2001).

In January 2002, the personal envoy visited Morocco and was received twice by King Mohamed VI. The same month, he also met with President Bouteflika in Algiers and

the Polisario Secretary General, Mohamed Abdelaziz, near Tindouf. From these meetings, Baker deduced that:

”There is not a real chance that the parties will ultimately voluntarily agree to this approach to solve their dispute over the Western Sahara.” It therefore was pointless to pursue any more discussion on the draft framework agreement, as neither the Government of Algeria, nor the Frente Polisario is willing to engage in discussing it ‘’(E. Jensen, 2012; 97).

Following Algeria and the Polisario’s rejection of the draft Framework Agreement, Annan pointed out that one option for resolving this “bleak situation” could be to “explore with the parties one final time” whether or not they would now be willing to discuss a possible division of the Territory. Annan also acknowledged the possibility of putting an end to the mandate of MINURSO, as he saw that after more than 11 years, the UN could not solve the problem of “Western Sahara” “without requiring that one or the other or both of the parties do something that they do not wish to voluntarily agree to do” (Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning “Western Sahara,” 2002).

If Kofi Annan represented Algerian plans correctly, his statement contradicted the Algerian proposal of May 2001, which Baker had rejected, to place “Western Sahara” under UN administration in order to conduct the referendum, following the example of East Timor. The apparent evolution in Algeria’s position is said to have been designed to serve U.S. interests—because the creation or partition of a Sahrawi state would allow Algeria to transport its oil to ports in the Atlantic Ocean. Furthermore, the exploitation of oil reserves of the region requires the stability of North Africa (Fisas, 2002).

In any event, Morocco reacted angrily to Annan’s suggestion, reaffirming that its "sovereignty" was inalienable in “Morocco’s southern provinces.” In January 2003, Baker conducted another mission to the region. He submitted the Peace Plan for Self-

Determination of the People of “Western Sahara,” which provided a more detailed proposal for self-government during the five-year transition period preceding the referendum. On July 31, 2003, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1495, which endorsed the latest version of Baker's plan and established the enforceable character of the settlement plan on Moroccans and Sahraouis.

To everyone's surprise, the Polisario, despite its initial rejection of the plan, eventually accepted Baker's new proposal, better known as Baker Plan II. It was Algeria who made the Polisario leader agree to accept the plan, as they knew that Morocco would reject it. Theofilopoulou narrated the situation as she witnessed it:

‘Algeria was afraid that the Polisario could blow during the transition period. So, in order to cover them, they want to make sure that the United Nations is there. When the Polisario was really boiling about the Baker Plan II, the Algerians told them to “cool it” and not to say a word about it, because Bouteflika knew about Morocco’s reaction, so in July 2003, we received a letter from the Polisario accepting the plan, then we managed the security council to accept and approve the plan.’ (Author 2014 interview of Theofilopoulou, 2014 : New York see list of interviewees Appendix 6/see interviewee biography at Data Collection & Analysis section : Chapter 1).

It is important at this particular point to mention that many Algerian scholars, like Dr. Yahia Zoubir and officials expressed a commonly held assumption that the main reason Morocco refused to go with Baker Plan II was is that despite the superior number of Moroccans in “Western Sahara,” the monarchy still opposes the holding of a referendum. Apparently, it fears that Moroccan settlers would vote for an independent, democratic Sahrawi republic rather than for the annexation of the territory into the kingdom. The other question, of course, is why Algerians and Sahraouis, who initially rejected it in March 2003, accepted Baker Plan II four months later.

Undoubtedly, Sahraouis accepted the plan because of nudging from their allies. Algeria has not withdrawn backing for the Sahraouis, as subsequent events and statements of high officials, including President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, have demonstrated. The most likely explanation is that Algeria used acceptance of the plan as a maneuver to prove Morocco's bad faith; based on past experience, Algerians were persuaded that Morocco would reject it. It was also a way to demonstrate that Morocco, not Algeria, was the true obstacle to a peaceful settlement of the conflict. (Author interview of the Algerian scholar Dr. Yahia Zoubir, 2014: conference call/ see list of interviewees Appendix 6/See interviewee biography at Data Collection & Analysis: Chapter 1).

If this statement is correct, one can assume that such intentions from Morocco have been well concealed behind ideological proclamations. Nevertheless, there is no smoke without fire and there is no reason to discredit the UN's former envoys to "Western Sahara" who clearly stated that the referendum that would lead to independence was unrealistic. Besides this assumption, Mr. Baker reintroduced in the settlement plan the organization of a referendum that would return to the initial options and would commit more than 12 years for implementation, which would ultimately cause the settlement of the "Western Sahara" question to fail. More notably, this plan granted a minority of the population considerable prerogatives, while overlooking the sociological, tribal, and ethnic structure of the populations of the "Western Sahara," as well as the need for a sincere and convincing incorporation of all the populations to the status which is given to them.

In short, the Baker II proposal was a synthesis of the components of the Settlement Plan and the proposed Framework Agreement. For the Algerian regime, acceptance of this proposal implied attachment to the self-determination element as well as their staunch desire for Morocco not to get what they want regarding their progress in the peace process.

Algeria pursued its goal by pushing the Polisario to negotiate a possible division of the territory. It is clearly evident that Algeria won another of its diplomatic *tours de force* by exerting its pressure for the implementation of the Peace Plan for Self-Determination of “Western Sahara.” Algeria's support for the Polisario must be perceived through the optic of regional and international politics. That endorsement is an expression, not a cause, of Algerian-Moroccan rivalry for hegemonic purposes in the Arab Maghreb.

On an unexpected declaration, earlier in 2003, a former member of the Algerian military, Khalid Nezzar, stated that the “Western Sahara” should no longer be the main obstacle that sets apart “the two brother countries.” In an age of great regional blocs, it was necessary to create “our own Maghrebian space.” Adopting a language that had displayed the failure of the UN Settlement Plan and its replacement by Baker's plan, Nezzar declared that a solution “would be to go towards the thesis of no winner, no loser.” Nezzar’s comments were not void of criticism from his Generals’ peers who accused him of wanting to sell the “Western Sahara” to the opponent.

IV.4.4. Mediation of talks

Approaching the final year of his tenure, on 25 July 2005, Secretary General Annan nominated Peter Van Walsum as his new personal envoy to Western Sahara. Van Walsum started his mission by visiting the region from October 11 to 17, 2005. During this trip, he concluded that the two protagonists, Morocco and the Polisario are “quasi-irreconcilable”—a blunt diplomatic and realistic conclusion. The new personal envoy noted however that the Security Council resolutions had borne no fruit and have shown no renewed support for the plan. Similarly, allies, the U.S. and France in particular, urged Morocco to reconsider its position towards a referendum.

Kofi Annan and his personal envoy described the “Western Sahara” as an incongruous issue, determining that a new plan would be hopeless from the start because Morocco would never accept it if the referendum did not offer independence as an option. Therefore, the UN could only expect either a “different political reality” or “direct negotiations between the protagonists.” For Van Walsum, the former was deemed a “recipe for violence,” and the latter was seen as the only reasonable option. Direct negotiations without preconditions, it was argued, should “work out a compromise between international legality and political reality. . . which would provide for the self-determination of the people of ‘Western Sahara’” (Van Walsum Blog, 2013).

IV.4.4.1. Algeria’s leadership’s reaction to the Autonomy Plan

In his November 2005 speech marking the Green March, King Mohammed VI had already revealed that he would enter into a national dialogue with Morocco’s political parties regarding the Autonomy Plan Project of “Western Sahara.” Rabat submitted its proposal to the new UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, on April 11, 2007. This happened a day after Polisario submitted—without notice to the UN Secretariat—several dramatic bridging proposals to revive the 2003 Peace Plan. However, the long anticipated Moroccan proposal received far more attention than Polisario’s desperate attempt to steal the spotlight.

Morocco proposed the creation of a “Saharan Autonomous Region” (SAR) with locally elected government elements (executive, judicial, and legislative) granted for specific competencies. The autonomy plan was presented as an alternative to the Moroccan blockade to the “Baker Plan.” This initiative received high praises from many North American, French, and Spanish officials. In June 2007, the U.S. State Department’s

Undersecretary for Political Affairs William Burns called it “a serious and credible proposal to provide real autonomy for the ‘Western Sahara,’” a phrase later repeated before the U.S. House of Foreign Relations Committee by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welch. From an international law perspective, the Moroccan “initiative” constituted a turning point in foreign policy on the “Western Sahara” question and was described as a new serious basis of negotiation. Welch went on to insist that the “Western Sahara” conflict needed to be resolved quickly as he saw that the “Polisario administered refugee camps present a potentially attractive safe haven for terrorist planning or activity” (Author interview of the Algerian scholar Dr. Yahia Zoubir, 2014 : conference call/ see list of interviewees Appendix 6/ See interviewee biography at Data Collection & Analysis: Chapter 1).

By the same token, the Security Council’s response to the Moroccan proposal (Resolution 1754) was welcoming, borrowing the exact language—“serious and credible”—of Washington and Paris. Though it also took note of Polisario’s concessions and reiterated the Council’s support for a “mutually acceptable political solution” that “will provide for the self-determination of the people of “Western Sahara,” its most important aspect was its call for direct negotiations, which had been abandoned in 2000.

On February 26 and 27, 2008, a meeting took place with the U.S. State Department Near Eastern Assistant Secretary C. David Welch, President Bouteflika, and Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem in attendance. Bouteflika and Belkhadem insisted on their usual direction of self-determination for “Western Sahara” and discussed the need to find a solution that would permit Algeria to avoid embarrassment due to its direct involvement in the blockade of the peace process.

Bouteflika conveyed to the officials that relations with Morocco were "brotherly" and that "Western Sahara" was the only concern between them. Bouteflika did not hesitate to declare that Morocco felt threatened by the possibility that "Western Sahara" could gain independence, and he blamed Rabat for the ongoing situation due to the "clumsy" manner in which it handed the issue. Welch drew the Algerian president and his delegation's attention to the fact that the U.S. was looking for a pragmatic solution that could lift the blockade and help negotiate the peace process and that the Autonomy Plan provided such a possibility. Bouteflika responded that the Autonomy Plan was considered an empty shell as it would merely delay the problem without offering any alternative solution. He insisted, however, that the Framework Agreement of the former secretary James Baker presented a serious alternative to the conflict.

As reported by Wikileaks, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika explained to David Welch that if another option was necessary, "self-determination is that alternative" and the Baker Plan should be discussed. Welch replied that the Baker Plan is dead because it, too, failed to generate progress. In Bouteflika's view, Baker failed because it was not given a chance, and he blamed the U.S. for "not taking its UN Security Council responsibilities seriously" (WikiLeaks, Algerian Leadership Tows Western Sahara Line with A/S Welch, March 2008).

Bouteflika reiterated that the Moroccan proposal offered less autonomy for "Western Sahara" than an Algerian province currently enjoys. During his conversation with the American diplomat, he admitted that Algeria does have influence in "Western Sahara," but he allegedly promised that he would not utilize it to breach what he conceived as international law. Notably, the Algerian President, as always, held Morocco responsible

for thwarting the peace process, and this time he went even further to blame Morocco's "clumsiness," while reiterating the importance of reviving Baker's plan.

As the Wikileaks documents revealed, Bouteflika started giving examples of countries that Morocco could follow in order to get out from the impasse. "Bouteflika explained, saying that Morocco could have easily used a more 'elegant' approach to produce a 'Western Sahara' independence that could be controlled or supervised." Instead, he said, "they want Anschluss like Saddam Hussein with Kuwait." Bouteflika said he easily could have imagined an outcome in which "Western Sahara" chose to remain a part of Morocco after seeing the benefits of Moroccan rule, in much the same way "as Puerto Rico chose to remain part of the U.S." According to Bouteflika, Morocco needed to offer the Polisario something, since "you cannot ask concessions from people who have nothing in their pockets." Had it not been for Morocco's "clumsy" approach, Bouteflika said the Morocco "could have gotten what [it] wanted." (WikiLeaks, Algerian Leadership Tows Western Sahara Line with A/S Welch, March 2008)

In addition, Bouteflika strongly and bluntly blamed France for supporting Morocco's new proposal and described it as a powerless player—unable to adopt a constructive role in resolving the "Western Sahara" dispute. According to Bouteflika, France "has never really accepted Algerian independence." Moreover, he claimed that France was trying to "settle scores with Algeria by interfering in 'Western Sahara' in support of Morocco" (WikiLeaks, Algerian Leadership Tows Western Sahara Line with A/S Welch, March 2008).

Bouteflika's Prime Minister, Belkhadem further escalated the discussion with Welsch by trying to persuade the U.S. to emulate the endorsement it gave to the independence of East Timor and Kosovo. He bluntly stated:

"Why don't you share the same views on 'Western Sahara'?" asked Belkhadem, "it leaves us wondering what our U.S. friends want." Morocco? (WikiLeaks, Algerian Leadership Tows Western Sahara Line with A/S Welch, March2008).

As a response to Belkhadem's statement, U.S. Undersecretary of State David Welch reiterated that the U.S. goal was to seek practical alternatives that would help in the progress of negotiations. The Moroccan proposal, he indicated, was a possibility. At the end of the meeting, Bouteflika emphasized the fact that Algeria does not claim anything on this issue and that its main goal is to help find a solution to the impasse and looks forward to having good relations with its neighbor, Morocco.

In sum, Algeria's policy-making towards the new proposal, the Autonomy Plan, was driven by ideological motivations. Algeria has always claimed to have no interest in blocking the "Western Sahara" peace process progress, stating that it welcomes every proposal put forward by the concerned parties. However, this claim seems to be at odds with Algeria's reaction towards the Autonomy Plan proposed by Morocco, which the Algerian president condemned and described as an empty shell that would dramatically slow the peace process. Furthermore, the president portrayed Morocco as clumsy in dealing with the conflict; this hostile attitude toward Morocco on behalf of the Algerian leadership demonstrated that Algeria did not respect its status as an observer. Instead, its actions and statements clearly showed that it was a central part of the conflict, contrary to its claims of neutrality. Thus, the status of Algeria as observer of the "Western Sahara" conflict must be brought into question. Even the UN envoy to "Western Sahara," Peter Van Walsum, concluded that Algeria plays "a preeminent and dominant role" in the Western Sahara conflict, going further to say that "[t]here is hope if at last Algeria's role can be candidly discussed. The question of 'Western Sahara' does not stand a chance of ever being

understood as long as Algeria's deep involvement is not considered" (Van Walsum Blog, 2013).

With no foreseeable progress, Van Walsum bluntly stated that the option of an independent "Western Sahara" was unrealistic, and he urged the Security Council to acknowledge that. The Polisario along with Algeria refused to continue the negotiation process under Van Walsum's supervision and held no confidence in him as the Security General's personal envoy. A few weeks later, the UN Secretariat ended Van Walsum's contract and Christopher Ross took over .

IV.4.4.2. Christopher Ross: Too close to Algerian officials

The closing months of 2008 witnessed the end of one chapter and the opening of a new one in the "Western Sahara" conflict. Taking up where Van Walsum left off, the U.S. nominated Ambassador Christopher Ross—one of the US's leading Middle East diplomats—to mediate the four-decades-long conflict. Mr. Ross' mandate was to work with the parties and neighboring states on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 1813, which calls on the Council to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution. His first visit to Morocco and to the region from February 18-24, 2009, was a time for him to get in touch with the parties, to hear their views on the next rounds of negotiation, and to study the conditions of the preparation of the fifth round of the process, which was launched in 2007.

Morocco reaffirmed to the Personal Envoy its commitment to implement the Security Council Resolution 1813 within the framework of the continuation of the work done by Mr. Van Walsum and to enter into an intensive and substantial phase of negotiations, on the basis of the Moroccan autonomy initiative.

Before joining the UN, Christopher Ross served as U.S. Ambassador to Syria and Algeria. From 1988 to 1991, as the Ambassador to Algeria, Mr. Ross was successful in establishing personal ties with many Algerian officials and diplomats. Ross served for eight years trying to get the Moroccan government and the Polisario Front independence movement to settle the “Western Sahara” dispute. He was, however, unable to help the parties achieve any progress.

Upon his appointment, Ross adopted a new approach that incorporated informal meetings with both Moroccan officials and representatives of the Polisario. The 10 informal rounds that took place between the parties all ended in deadlock and failed to achieve any progress. Ross’ main failure was his closeness to Algerian officials, which made his declarations biased. He was more amenable to Algeria’s wishes, pushing for independence and implementation of a human rights monitoring component within the duties of the MINURSO. Ross was known to be a fastidious defender of human rights, who believed the solution to this conflict was to give “Western Sahara” its independence. Adding to that, Mr. Ross’s apparent mission was to kill the autonomy proposal presented by Morocco—making it all the more apparent that Algeria did have an influence on the UN envoy regarding Western Sahara’s decisions and outcomes. Morocco kept calling attention to Ross’ biased positions on the Western Sahara conflict—urging the UN to put a stop to it. Omar Hilal, a UN Ambassador to Morocco, described Ross as a diplomat that was too close to Algeria, stating that “Christopher Ross has been the best diplomat Algeria has ever had during the last forty years. . . . [Though he] had the mission to facilitate negotiations, [he] . . . unfortunately . . . has become the problem” (UN briefing, April 29, 2017).

IV.4.5. Bouteflika's Relation to the Polisario Living in Morocco

Algeria claimed that it funded the Polisario for self-determination purposes; however, these funds were typically used to destabilize the internal security of Morocco. The funds to Polisario were distributed in Tindouf, outside Algeria, and for the benefit of the Polisario living inside Morocco. Given the lack of transparency within the Algerian regime, it is difficult to track the large sum of money paid to Polisario by the Algerian Secret Services (DRS).

Demonstrations occurring inside “Western Sahara” by the Polisario were allegedly funded by the DRS. When the Gdeim Izik camp protest erupted in “Western Sahara” on October 9, 2010, the Polisario living inside Morocco were the instigators of the protest. The incident started when a group of Sahraouis erected the protest camp in Laayoune. The number of protesters increased rapidly in the first few weeks from a few hundred *khaimas* (traditional tents) to several thousand coming from other towns of “Western Sahara” and southern Morocco. The primary objective of the camp was to protest against ongoing discrimination, poverty, and human rights abuses against local citizens, but later many protesters began to demand independence for “Western Sahara”. News of this event spread fast as the stability of Morocco appeared to be in danger.

According to Salé's Appeals Court, the representative for the Public Prosecution, Khalid Kerdoudi argued that the Polisario members who were present in the camps were in constant contact with Algeria and “held a series of meetings to obtain funds to finance their crimes. . . They received various weapons, logistic materials, vehicles, communication devices, and agreed to detain citizens” (Igrouane, 2017). Asfari Naama, an active member of the Polisario who lives in Laayoune, had tried many times to build the camp in different

locations before managing to establish the Gdim Izik camp on October 10, 2010. The court's crown prosecutor asserted that "crossing the border from Morocco to Algeria was evidence that the time and circumstances that created the Gdim Izik camp were not coincidental," and that the defendants "were visiting a neighboring country hostile to Morocco in preparation for the establishment of the camp" (Igrouane, 2017).

During the trial of the protestors who committed the violent acts—many of whom were related to the Polisario, the court prosecutor spoke about the recordings of the calls the protestors made with Algeria-backed Polisario leaders during the deadly protest event. He asserted that the three major topics of conversation were the foundation of Gdim Izik camp; the absolute necessity not to agree with the public authorities' solutions to dismantle the camp; and to respond by making impossible demands in this framework. In addition, they influenced the population to stay in the camp by not telling them what solutions had been agreed upon with public authorities (Igrouane, 2017).

According to the same source, the Polisario present in the camps were in possession of international currency, among them Algerian Dinars. Although it is difficult to prove the source of money, evidence illustrated how the Polisario were in contact with the Algerian regimes through the call recordings as well as the short trips made to the Algiers and Tindouf camps just before establishing the protest camp.

Related events happening inside "Western Sahara" were allegedly funded and supported by the Algerian regime. Every year, Algeria hosts a summer university Congress in Boumerdes for the benefit of the Polisario under the strict supervision of the Algerian military intelligence services. The university activities involve more than 400 Polisario members who live in Algeria, Morocco, and overseas. More than 70 members of the Polisario who live in Morocco travel from Laayoune to Boumerdes with a Moroccan

passport. Among the activities held are workshops lead by Algerian University professors and other international experts, which encompass themes related to the decolonization of “Western Sahara,” the suffering of the Saharaouis in Tindouf and “Western Sahara,” and how Morocco illegally occupies this region. Lastly, the university urges the Polisario to use social media extensively to spread the message of independence (*Universite d’ete du Front Polisario; Boumerdes/Universite d’ete de la RASD*).

After the summer university was over, the Sahrawi invitees were driven to the Tindouf camps, where they were trained in how to handle Kalashnikovs and taught how to provoke Moroccan law enforcement agents and incite residents to riot in the major cities of the Sahara. Before leaving the Algiers airport, each group member was handed \$500 to \$1000 to cover the costs of the mission entrusted to him (Haidar, 2014).

The pro-Polisario activists who live in Morocco return to “Western Sahara” where they share with their peers what they learned back in Algeria. In a similar case, Aminatou Haidar, a pro-Polisario activist and advocate for “Western Sahara” independence, attracted international attention in 2009 when she staged a hunger strike in Lanzarote Airport after being denied re-entry into Moroccan “Western Sahara” because she declined to recognize Morocco's sovereignty over “Western Sahara.” Aminatou Haidar is known to be fully funded and supported by the Algerian regime as Algeria uses her to counter attack Morocco’s diplomatic success. According to the chairman of the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan affairs, Aminatou Haidar got involved in a plan made abroad, and particularly with the Polisario front, she belongs to as she says, and also Algeria, in order to embarrass Morocco and Spain, and create problems in the bilateral relations. This plan is meant for both Algeria to escape their responsibilities towards the UNSC resolutions, which call upon all parties to seek a quick solution to the Sahara issue on the basis of negotiations leading

to a solution based on peace, cooperation, and the building of the Arab Maghreb (*Corcas chairman invited by MBC*).

Indeed, Aminatou Haidar was prepped by the Polisario to be a human rights activist due to her imprisonment during the years of oppression that Morocco experienced in the '70s and '80s. Subsequently, with the help of Algerian intelligence, the Polisario gave millions of dollars to some human rights activists to recommend her for some prizes.

The case of Aminatou Haidar was the byproduct of the Algerian regime, which used her—a pro-Polisario living in “Western Sahara” —for its political agenda to unsettle Moroccan diplomatic efforts in its fight for regional supremacy. Furthermore, certain international NGO’s that are fully funded by Algeria aid in this process by embracing the Polisario’s cause. For example, the Robert Kennedy Foundation for Justice and Human Rights (RKF) is used as an Algerian lobbying firm to plead for the independence of “Western Sahara” while blaming Morocco for the plight of the Sahraouis living in Tindouf.

In the face of the emergence of new Sahraoui actors in “Western Sahara” and the refugee camps that claim independence, the Algerian regime adopted a single communication channel with the Polisario Front. However, some contacts have been established with Sahraoui civil organizations in “Western Sahara” such as the Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders (CODESA) and the Sahrawi Association of Victims of Gross Human Rights Violations Committed by the Moroccan State (ASDVH), which participated in public protests organized by Algerian groups and associations such as the National Committee of Solidarity with the Sahrawi People (CNASPS).

IV.4.6. Bouteflika's Speeches on the "Western Sahara" Conflict against Morocco

Despite some improvements in the Algerian-Moroccan relations in 2012 following President Bouteflika's visit with former Moroccan Foreign Affairs Minister Saadeddine El Otmani, the Algerian president committed himself to a raucous anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist, and anti-neo-colonialist fight, a pretext to impede the efforts of Morocco in its quest to find a solution to the conflict. In a meeting that took place in Abuja (Nigeria) in 2013 between trade unions from 28 mostly African states, the Algerian Minister of Justice Tayeb Louhi, addressing the conference participants, read on behalf of President Bouteflika in a speech in which he insisted on the "need" to expand the scope of the UN mission in "Western Sahara" (MINURSO). A strong demand was also raised regarding the acceleration of self-determination for "Western Sahara." In his speech, Bouteflika argued:

"The mission should take care of human rights monitoring in the former Spanish colony. . . . The massive and systematic violations of human rights there are aimed at repressing peaceful citizens who are fighting for the freedom of association, assembly, and expression, a situation over which the international community cannot be indifferent. . . . Algeria should be committed to the liberation struggle of people, we ask for a referendum on self-determination in "Western Sahara" to be held" (*Permanent tension between Morocco and Algeria*, 2013).

This speech was perceived by Rabat as a confirmation of Algeria's direct interference in the Sahara conflict and considered the ideas expressed in the speech as hostile towards Morocco. Experts felt that the Algerian president had gone too far in his new challenge—urging for the expansion of the mandate of MINURSO to monitor human rights in "Western Sahara" in an attempt to reopen a case closed by the Security Council

through Resolution 2099, which makes no reference to the change of the prerogatives of the UN mission but rather welcomes the steps taken by Morocco for the promotion of human rights in the region (Slimi, 2013).

One reason for Bouteflika's provocative speech against Morocco was that the country was undergoing an internal crisis and wanted to divert the crisis by bringing "Western Sahara" conflict back to the surface. In an interview, the former Secretary General of the Ministry Foreign Affairs of Morocco and currently Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Bourita, asserted that :

“ When Algeria goes through an intense internal crisis . . . [,] it chooses this moment to use its trump cards, which [is] the “Western Sahara” conflict[,] to deviate its people's attention. Currently, Algeria [is going] through a decisive period, as the country will witness the presidential elections[,] and the Algerian high-ranking officials work on having President Bouteflika winning a third mandate despite [his] deteriorating health conditions. The hostility that Algeria bears towards Morocco regarding the “Western Sahara” conflict is a strategic choice for Algeria whenever the latter feels that there is an interior threat, it uses this card as pretext to justify prejudicial decisions to the Algerian people (Author interview the Moroccan Foreign Affairs Minister Nasser Bourita, see list of interviewees Appendix 6 /See interviewee biography at Data Collection & Analysis: Chapter 1).

In short, the main feature of this speech reflects the tendency adopted in the Algerian foreign policy regarding the “Western Sahara” conflict that is highlighted by a gap between belief and actions. When it comes to belief, Algeria makes the international community believe that the “Western Sahara” conflict is an issue that is dealt with only under UN auspices and that it is merely an interested party. However, when it comes to actions, the reality is totally different as Algeria does interfere directly and has a significant influence on the progress of the conflict.

IV.4.7. DRS Manipulation of the Polisario in Tindouf Camps

As previously mentioned, Algeria took advantage of its domestic and regional problems to justify its narratives and advance its agendas. Once the global war on terrorism started, it was no surprise that the Algerian regime exploited the hunt for alQaeda to its benefit. Algeria capitalized on this moment in order to exit its international isolation, while Morocco focused on reinforcing its international support in “Western Sahara”; suspicious of one another, both countries accused the other of acting merely out of their respective self-interest. Nonetheless, when Morocco accused Algeria and the Polisario of being linked with terrorist groups, such an accusation was based on the alleged involvement of some members of the Polisario living in Tindouf in AQIM and MUJAO (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa) operations, in addition to their participation in the drug and weapon trade in the Sahel.

The issue stems from whether the Algerian regime was sponsoring the instability or if instead it was losing its grip on the security situation. International security services have long suspected Algerian military and DRS involvement in hostage taking and drug trafficking. However, Rabat’s claims connecting the DRS to AQIM received no attention until certain events happened in the Sahel and North Africa. One event, which occurred in December 2010, involved the arrest of six members of the Polisario in Mali in connection with cocaine trafficking. The key drug trafficker arrested was Sultan Ould Badi. Ould Badi was not a bit-part player: he was reportedly the head of the Polisario’s “special missions” and was believed to have also been involved in AQIM kidnappings. Upon capture, he threatened the authorities in Bamako, stating that he would “reveal the AQIM–DRS connection” (Keenan, 2009: 221). When President Bouteflika learned of his arrest, he

immediately sent General Rachid Laali, head of the DRS, to Bamako to secure Ould Badi's release on December 9, 2010 (Keenan, 2013: 222).

Since then, news sources, books, and intelligence reports have repeatedly demonstrated connections among the Polisario camps in Algeria with international organized crime, trafficking, and terrorism. The crimes and violence of the Sahel had previously taken a backseat to international security concerns. Recently, however, decision makers in the EU and the U.S. have placed the instability of North Africa and Sahel at the epicenter of their foreign-security policy. The Center for Naval Analysis Strategic Studies (CNA) warned in December 2012, for example, that "there is evidence that AQIM has infiltrated the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, as well as indications that Sahrawi from these camps have joined terrorist groups based in Mali" (Vogler, 2016 : 36).

In its assessment report from February 2013, the InterUniversity Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS) stated that AQIM "provided training, financial assistance, and weapons to its affiliates and had attracted an influx of recruits from the region including militants from the Polisario camps in Algeria, displaced refugees, and radicals from Western countries" (Alexander, 2013 : 45). International lawmakers have also publicly confirmed the collusion of the Polisario Front with AQIM and MUJAO. For instance, "[i]n February 2013, the Malian foreign minister confirmed the presence of Sahrawi combatants from the Tindouf camps among the groups that fled the French-led intervention, which was launched to counter an advance of insurgents from northern Mali toward the capital" (Wehrey&Boukhars, 2013).

Given these points, it appears that the DRS is not only aware of the organized crime in the Sahel and North Africa (often before it happens) but is also aware that is supported by the Polisario Front. Therefore, it can easily be deduced that the DRS, organized crime,

Polisario Front, and terrorist groups coordinate in one way or another, which means that the DRS is likely able to enlist any or all of its partners in its quest for power. In fact, it is largely documented that the AQIM kidnapping of three Western aid workers from Polisario-run camps in October 2011 was DRS work. Keenan's analysis in *The Dying Sahara* and *The Dark Sahara* concludes that these kidnappings arose out of Algeria's internal competition for power. More specifically, he believes the DRS orchestrated these high-profile crimes to discredit and undermine Bouteflika during the presidential elections (Keenan, 2013).

IV.4.8. Arms Race between Morocco and Algeria

Given its long-standing animosity toward Morocco, Algeria has historically formulated its strategic defense plans around a potential conflict. Some like William Thompson have argued that the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco "ended" in 1984 due to a failure of continued military action (2001: 577). However, Algeria and Morocco continue to arm and maintain their current policies. During Bouteflika's tenure, Algeria continued to strengthen its ties with Russia. Along with the Algerian Army, Bouteflika had two main objectives in the arms race against Morocco. The first was to possess adequate weapons to counter any unexpected popular uprising, particularly on the south-eastern border with Libya. The second goal was regional: Algeria wanted to utilize Russian arms against any Moroccan ambition to impose a *fait accompli* on the "Western Sahara." While neither country has yet to take up arms against the other, Algeria's continuous support of the Polisario offers them a political and military proxy in the ongoing conflict.

By 2009, Algeria had surpassed South Africa as the continent's largest defense market. In 2013, it became the first African country to spend more than \$10 billion on its military, an increase of 176 percent since 2004. Algeria now spends approximately \$10.5 billion a year on defense, more than three times as much as Morocco.(Batich, 2016)

In 2017, Algeria delivered new military equipment to the Polisario. This lot generously delivered to the Polisario included armored vehicles, ground-to-air missiles, and all-terrain vehicles. Bouteflika had always planned a far-reaching diplomatic and information campaign to accompany the Polisario Front's military initiative whenever he felt he was losing important political points at home over the "Western Sahara" conflict.

In 2013, General Toufik, the former head of DRS, ordered the Algerian Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal to allocate \$300 million to be used to finance arms purchases for the Polisario militia. This large sum of money was ordered by the Algerian government to provide the Polisario weapons to be used against the military deployed in "Western Sahara." According to an US official Lawrence Velte, the \$300 million taken from the Algerian public coffers would be used to buy anti-tank missiles as well as systems for anti-air defenses, which are located around Tindouf and Rabboni where the Polisario headquarters are situated in the Eastern Sahara (Author interview with Lawrence Velte, 2014 : Washinton DC/ See Appendix 6/See interviewee biography at Data Collection & Analysis : Chapter 1). Such military support to the

Polisario from Algeria has had significant economic consequences as Algeria's development program has been seriously compromised by the leaders' quest for "Western Sahara" self-governance. Indeed, President Bouteflika and the Algerian Generals in collusion with the Polisario Leadership to jeopardize the lives and fates of the Saharaouis in Tindouf Camps by enforcing them to stay in these camps and not allowing census for

two main reasons to endure the conflict from the Algerian Side and make the Polisario leadership gain from the international organization aids by not giving the exact numbers of inhabitants in Tindouf. This will be elaborated further in the following section.

IV.4.9. The President's Reasons for Not Allowing Census in Tindouf Camps: Another Impediment to Conflict Resolution

Nearly all refugee camps around the world maintain a population census. The only refugee camps where a census has not been conducted are the Tindouf camps in South West Algeria. According to international law, any population that seeks and takes place in a refuge due to a conflict should first be identified and registered before a solution to the problem at hand is sought.

As a reminder to the reader, tens of thousands of refugees have been sequestered in refugee camps in southwest Algeria near the town of Tindouf since 1975. The UNHCR bears the statutory obligation to conduct a census of the refugees as has been restated numerous times in resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly (Res. 58/149; Res. 59/172). These resolutions also state that it is incumbent on the receiving country firstly to preserve the civilian and humanitarian nature of the asylum[,] . . . to monitor and see that the civilian and humanitarian nature of the refugee camps is not compromised by the presence or activities of armed elements[, and] . . . to see that the camps are not used for purposes incompatible with their civilian nature.

The same is found in the recommendations of the Executive Committee of the HCR (Conclusions of the Executive Committee, 2014).

In effect, registration and the census are preliminary steps that enable the HCR to perform its mandate, which consists of delivering the humanitarian aid required by

populations in need. For many years, Algeria has displayed total disregard for the repeated requests of the HCR and has made an overall settlement of the conflict in the “Western Sahara” a precondition for carrying out the census. Meanwhile, in their capacity as the “receiving state” of the camps, the authorities in Algiers bear legal, political, and moral obligations vis-à-vis the Sahrawi population. These obligations include facilitating the execution of the HCR mandate and enabling it to ensure the protection of the population by authorizing it to carry out the registration and census of the population.

While the unjustifiable refusal of Algeria can be easily understood in the context of its relations with Morocco and its need for political propaganda with respect to the issue of refugees living on its soil, the refusal of the Polisario is primarily motivated by the profit that Polisario leaders gain by overestimating the number of refugees, resulting in larger amounts of humanitarian assistance. During Bouteflika’s tenure, many UNSC resolutions reiterated the call for the registration of refugees in the Tindouf camps and “invited” Algeria to make efforts in this regard.

Sahraoui refugees in the Tindouf camps depend on humanitarian aid donated by numerous UN organizations, in addition to international NGOs. It is believed and has even been proven that much of the humanitarian aid does not reach the refugees—instead it is—in most cases—sold on the black market in neighboring countries by the Polisario. In this respect the international community has demanded on numerous occasions for the implementation of a census and an audit system to ensure the transparency of humanitarian aid management. Important quantities of diverted international humanitarian aid sent for refugees in Tindouf camps have been found on the markets in Algeria and Mauritania as well as in Mali and Niger—some products still in their original packaging. The

sums acquired from these illegal sales would then be used to finance the Front, as well as its leader's lifestyle, at the expense of Sahraoui refugees.

According to the year 2000 U.S. Committee for Refugees report, "Humanitarian workers have reported that more than 30% of the children from 5 to 12 years old were underfed, more than 70% of the children of less than 5 years old suffered from anemia" (*What Future*, 2007). Furthermore, in its 2001 report the Committee announced "more than 15000 children are in need of shoes." In fact, the 2003 report stated that "some donors in private, have asked for a control of the distribution of food to make sure that the political and military leaders were not diverting the aid" (*What Future*, 2007). The embezzlement of humanitarian aid is not the only reason Algeria refuses to permit the census; the reality is that, in Tindouf, the refugees include not only Sahraouis originating from "Western Sahara" but also a significant number of Touareg coming from Algeria, Mauritania, and the Sahel countries. In that regard, Algeria pretends that the people seeking humanitarian aid are all Sahraouis from "Western Sahara," however the number of this population is falsely communicated to avoid claims from the international community that the number of Saharaoui existing in Tindouf is much lower than the one declared by the Algerian authorities.

In October 2017, the Moroccan Ambassador to the United Nations, Omar Hilale called on Algeria to conduct a refugee registration process backed by the UNHCR to acquire an accurate count of the camp population so aid supplies could be distributed accurately. The Moroccan diplomat challenged the Algerian government to refute the claim that there are 30,000 people in the Tindouf camps, adding that the only way to know the exact number is by allowing the UNHCR to conduct a census. Hilale stressed that the time had come for the world to know the accurate number of people in the Tindouf camps,

adding that refusing such census means the Algerian “is hiding the true number, which does not exceed 30,000 and hence making Algeria bear the responsibility for not allowing the census, hence impeding the resolution of the ‘Western Sahara’ conflict

IV.4.10. Conclusion

The arrival of President Bouteflika in April 1999 followed by the ascension of Mohamed VI to the throne in July 1999 did not alter the tense relations between Rabat and Algiers as the “Western Sahara” issue remained unresolved.

Under President Bouteflika, Algerian diplomacy was reactivated. Bouteflika along with the Generals tried to make up for the lost years by thwarting the UN’s efforts to quickly resolve the Sahara problem. President Bouteflika revived Algeria’s ‘African Diplomacy’. In 1999, Bouteflika gave a hate speech against Morocco in which he said, “I will not lose any blood drop from my Algerian soldiers in the Sahara, but I will do my utmost to make Morocco politically and diplomatically accountable at the human rights levels in the media and at the international level” (AL Mishaal Magazine, 2013: 29). This policy has been in implementation with the help of the Algerian Generals since Bouteflika became President.

The aggressiveness of Algerian diplomacy was particularly evident in the obstacles placed to impede the census that would enable full participation in the referendum as well as in President Bouteflika’s opposition to James Baker’s plan that advocated for broad autonomy of the Saharan provinces within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty.

The report that Kofi Annan submitted to the Security Council in June 2001, in which he sets out the details of the plan, refers to correspondence and interviews he had

personally or through his representative, Mr. Baker, with President Bouteflika, where Bouteflika showed a surprising aggressiveness by accusing Mr. Baker “of a lack of objectivity in this matter.”

In fact, as described by Mohamed Siffaoui, as far as the Moroccan-Algerian relations were concerned, Algerian President Bouteflika dealt with Algeria’s neighbors in a manner that stemmed from a special psychological complexity. Indeed, Bouteflika illustrates an attitude of attraction, repulsion, love, and hate towards things and people, which was manifested on two particular issues: the Moroccans and the “Western Sahara” conflict:

“Bouteflika is more Moroccan than any Moroccan, however, he hates Hassan II and now he despises Mohamed VI. There is also an important element that the therapists and the psychologists need to explore; the day of the funeral of Hassan II, we see Abdelaziz Bouteflika holding on to his coffin firmly. It was indeed a picture which marked the Moroccans and the Algerians given the tension which existed between the two countries. There is another aspect which needs to be stated. Bouteflika had always desired to be on equal footing with Hassan II. When Bouteflika became President in April 1999, the first step he made is to set up an official meeting with Hassan II in September 1999, but Hassan II passed away in July of the same year. Bouteflika bemoans his own fate for not being able to speak equal to equal with him. Now even the relations between the Algerian President and the current Moroccan king are despicable” (Siffaoui(2011 :70)

The Sahara problem could have been solved in 1974 if the Algerian authorities, including Mr. Bouteflika, had desired it because the “Polisario” is above-all a creation of Algeria; in fact, if not for Algerian support, the Polisario would not exist today. Never has a state in the world supported any movement—offering a part of its territory that belonged to another country in the past to found a “Republic,” as Algeria has supported Polisario. The President of a State has never visited another “President of State” and permanently installed a state in the territory of his own State.

With regard to Bouteflika's actions, questions arise surrounding the inconsistencies of his policies. For example, when Bouteflika was the Algerian Foreign Minister and that later became President, why did he not staunchly defend the rights of the Palestinians as he did the rights of the people of "Western Sahara"—whether inside Algeria or in the international arena? Why would Bouteflika address self-determination in the "Western Sahara" when the Kabyle people in Tizi-Ouzou are being denied their rights to self-governance?. Throughout Bouteflika's tenure it appears that some matters were ignored, while others, like the Touareg rebellion, were attended to be based on whether or not the issue was central to Algerian interests. For instance, the Algerian government worked tirelessly to push for a resolution for the Touareg rebellion based on the concept of local autonomy of the Azawad within Mali because the Algerian government was worried about the potential pitfalls of an independent Azawad on Algeria's Touareg.

This inconsistency brings the reader to suppose that it was not the principle of self-determination that Bouteflika defended but rather the creation of a micro-state that would be loyal to Algeria and doing all it could to cut off Morocco from its African roots to ensure its geostrategic hegemony. Thus, the problem of the Sahara is not a problem between Morocco and Algeria but rather a problem between the Moroccan people in all its components and some Algerian personalities, in particular President Bouteflika, whose goal was to execute an unfinished plan.

Today, the window is half open in any case. Following the ousting of Bouteflika the country is obliged to find a successor. Will the scheduled departure of the old FLN leaders signal the end of animosity between Morocco and Algeria? Nothing is less certain. The presidential elections are now open in Algeria. Miracles aside, the successor to

Bouteflika will be chosen by the military. The names that will be passed around for the office of president will be from the FLN, a party that has held power since 1962.

After discussing Algeria's internal and external roles in the "Western Sahara" conflict, it is important to highlight the international community's role namely the big organizations that deal with the issue, that is the United Nations, and its role in breaking the deadlock. The following Chapter will dissect the dynamics underlying the United Nations' (UN) take on the Sahara conflict as well as the UN's role in finding meaningful instruments for encouraging rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco and to resolve the longest and costliest border conflict in Africa's history.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE UN LEADERSHIP ROLE IN SOLVING THE ‘WESTERN SAHARA’ CONFLICT

V.0. Introduction

Chapter eight evaluates the UN’s involvement and efforts in “Western Sahara,” and assesses the organization’s actual and perceived effectiveness in settling this conflict in the post-Cold War international order. The following sections shed light on the different stages through which the UN managed this protracted conflict, while exploring the reasons and motives behind the current deadlock in the Sahara. These chapters also evaluate the UN’s efforts and analyze the negotiating perspectives of the concerned parties as well as the role of Algeria, which still regards itself as an informal player in the conflict despite its significant role in preserving the current impasse.

The dispute in Western Sahara is the longest, most protracted conflict in the history of the UN. Its settlement would provide a crucial platform for the progress of other unresolved conflicts under UN auspices. As a mediator and an intervening party, the UN has played a major role in the dispute, especially since the establishment of the UN Mission for Western Sahara, MINURSO.

V.1. UN-led Mediation in Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict: Genesis of UN Involvement Phases in Western Sahara Conflict

The UN involvement in the Western Sahara conflict has been ongoing for almost 40 years; 24 of those years supporting a deployed peacekeeping mission. Under UN auspices, the Western Sahara conflict witnessed four different, yet at times overlapping phases: statutory, norm setting, crisis management, and conflict resolution. Jacques Roussellier describes those four stages, discussing how they were frequently marked by different viewpoints, coded words, puzzlement, and diplomatic opacity (Boukhars & Roussellier, 2014: 99).

V.1.1 Statutory: Establishing the Legal Framework of the Conflict

It is important to remember that in 1962 it was Morocco that put the Western Sahara, then under Spanish occupation, on the UN agenda. This is why successive resolutions of the General Assembly called for negotiations between Morocco and Spain. Beginning in 1963, the UN was initially asked to view the Western Sahara dispute as an issue belonging to decolonization processes. This early period is referred to as *statutory* involvement during which the UN defined the legal and institutional structure of the dispute.

In 1965, the UN General Assembly issued a resolution accepting the provisions of a resolution released on October 16, 1964, of the UN “Special Committee on the situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to Ifni and Spanish Sahara,” which highly urged Spain to relinquish these regions from “colonial domination and, to this end, to enter into

negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by these two territories” (Res. 2072). A year later, another UNGA resolution included a decolonization call similar to the previous ones, urging “the return of exiles and the free exercise by the indigenous population of its right to self-determination” and for “the holding of a referendum under United Nations auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous population of the Territory to exercise freely its right to self-determination.” Resolutions that followed from 1967 to 1974 did not bring any new outcomes, as they urged the implementation of prior calls to “take all the necessary steps to ensure that only the indigenous people of the territory . . . participate in the referendum” (Res. 2591). In addition, the resolutions indirectly called on states to refrain from economic exploitation of the territory and its peoples, to include new investment (Declaration on Granting of Independence).

In the two-track approach adopted by the UN over the years on the Western Sahara conflict resolution, the decolonization issue and process have developed into a historically fixed and ideologically rooted narrative of the dispute. In the 1960s and 1970s, during the post-colonial, Cold War era, the UNGA envisioned full self-determination as a goal for all peoples subject to “alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation,” as well as intolerable political living conditions, which it identified as a denial of a people's fundamental human rights (Declaration on the Granting of Independence). This theory of self-determination presumed that the majority of inhabitants in any colony would be free to choose their future political status while the integrity of established national boundaries would continue to be respected. Thus, the Western Sahara territory has a defined indigenous population; the indigenous inhabitants of the territory have the exclusive right to self-determination and independence; and that right can only be achieved through a referendum of self-determination.

V.1.2. Normative: Crisis Management Approach

The UN shifted from laying the foundations of the legal framework of the conflict in the early 1960s and 1970s to a crisis management mode during which point the matter was taken over by the Security Council. The Security Council put forward options for the resolution of the conflict. Despite the fact that the Security Council was not in charge of resolving the Western Sahara conflict, its involvement in this crisis laid new and lasting norms for the settlement of the conflict.

It is worth mentioning that other external and political outcomes also interfered with the UN's and the ICJ's framing of the dispute settlement. Adding to that, Spain's obligation to carry out a referendum under the UN auspices was renewed with a goal to set out the status of the territory, leading to Morocco's protest against Spain's methods and activities.

Moroccan endorsement for self-determination was built on a well-grounded assumption that the population of Western Sahara, if given the opportunity, would opt to choose for reunification with the Moroccan motherland. The links between Morocco and Western Sahara were considered historically strong, having been divided merely by colonial rule.

Furthermore, due to a legal disagreement over the status of Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania, Morocco took the initiative to seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ, under the UNGA, regarding the legal status of Western Sahara before the colonization of Spain. The ICJ was asked to answer the following two questions: 1) Was the Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakia El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (*terra nullius*)? And 2) What were the legal ties between this Territory

and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity? While the ICJ was investigating the matter, Spain was asked by the UNGA to pause its planned plebiscite to give the ICJ time to reach an opinion.

On October 16, 1975, the ICJ submitted its Advisory Opinion, which unanimously recognized that Rio de Oro and Saguia el-Hamra were not *terra nullius* before their colonization by Spain. The Advisory Opinion further acknowledged the following:

“At the time of Spanish Colonization, there existed legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara. They equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between [the] Mauritania entity, as understood by the Court, and the territory of Western Sahara.”

In diplomatic terms, the ICJ Advisory Opinion was endorsed as a sharp compromise between the unquestionable right of self-determination and the convincing legal ties between Morocco (and Mauritania) and the Western Sahara Territory.

So, despite the fact that the court’s outcome opted for self-determination as an option for the people of the territory of Western Sahara, the fact of acknowledging “the existence of legal ties between the sultan of Morocco and some of the other tribes living in the territory” incentivized King Hassan II to take into consideration what he claimed regarding the sovereignty of Morocco in the region. A few hours after the ICJ opinion was released, Hassan II launched the Green March during which 350,000 Moroccans crossed into the Western Sahara urging the Spaniards to withdraw south by several kilometers. The Green March resulted in Spain submitting a petition to the UN Security Council to take actions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. At this moment the UN Security Council became deeply involved in the ‘‘Western Sahara’’ dispute.

V.1.3. Conflict Management

Despite the UNSC and UNGA resolutions and recommendations along with pressure from the U.S. calling on Morocco to renounce the Green March, Hassan II went ahead on November 6, 1975, with what he planned. On the same day, the Security Council submitted a strongly worded resolution that “deplored” the Green March and urged Morocco to “immediately withdraw from the territory of Western Sahara all the participants in the March” (UNSC Res. 380). On November 14, 1975, Spain relinquished the administration of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania, and later informed the UNSC that it had ended its presence in Western Sahara. Nevertheless, the transfer of the territory did not influence the status of the Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory under UN auspices.

Accordingly, the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion reestablished the framework of a future resolution in many important phases. First of all, it acknowledged Morocco’s and Mauritania’s historical and legal ties to Western Sahara. Secondly, it recognized Algeria’s role in the conflict. Finally, it extended the scope of the UN’s initial identification of the dispute as the right to self-determination and independence. The ICJ Advisory Opinion essentially reframed the conflict by altering it, in future resolutions, from a decolonization matter to a political dispute with defined interested parties, specifically, Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria.

In 1976, the Western Sahara issue was taken up by the UNGA—an organization that acknowledged the role of the OAU in finding a resolution to the dispute. The UNGA supported OAU Resolution 104 in which the organization provided—for the first time—some fundamental reviews of a settlement plan whereby the interested parties in the

conflict must enter into negotiation. It also urged the parties to the conflict, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front, to undertake direct negotiations in order to bring about a cease fire to create the necessary conditions for a peaceful and fair referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, under the auspices of the OAU and the UN (UNGA Res 29/40 para. 3).

This shift was in response to the failure of Morocco and the Polisario to achieve a political solution. The UNGA went further to pressure the concerned parties, under the auspices of the UNSC and the OAU, to “negotiate, in the shortest possible time and in conformity with resolution AHG/Res.104 (XIX) and the present resolution, the terms of a cease fire and the modalities for organizing the said referendum” (UNGA Res. 40/50 para. 5). This resolution offered a large mandate for the former UNSG de Cuellar to mediate the conflict between the parties, which were later referred to as the proximity talks that occurred in April 1986 (Author 2014 interview of Anna Theophilopoulou, see list of interviewees Appendix 6 /See interviewee biography at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1).

V.1.4. Conflict Resolution

V.1.4.1. The Settlement Plan: Inescapable failure

The UN Security Council “taking note of the agreement in principle” requested that the UNSG appoint a special representative who would work on the issue and report back to the council as soon as possible “on the holding of a referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara and on ways and means to ensure the organization and supervision of such a referendum by the United Nations in cooperation with the Organization of the African Unity” (UNSC Res. 621 para. 2).

The UN Settlement Proposal as set in the UNSG's report and as "accepted by the parties on 30 August 1988" were only seconded after two years by the UNSG (UNSC Res. 658 para. 1-2). Pérez de Cuellar affirmed the two concerned parties in the conflict: Morocco and the Polisario, without mentioning Algeria explicitly, despite the fact that the latter had a role in drafting the implementation plan. It is worth mentioning that at the UN, the task force in charge of drafting the implementation plan did not liaise with the UNSG and his team who were extensively implicated in the negotiations with the parties.

Successive UNGA Resolutions reiterated that the parties should enter into direct negotiations, urging them to implement the referendum on self-determination. Many experts claim that the UN Settlement Plan for the Western Sahara lacked a fundamental agreement on principles and processes for the envisioned self-determination referendum. The Plan was supposed to assist the parties in finding a basis of mutual interest on voter eligibility and voter lists. As a matter of fact, this agreement should have been established before the start of the transition period. According to Jacques Rousselier, the UN Settlement Plan witnessed overt challenges on identification of voters for the referendum, in particular. This was the cornerstone of the UNSC biannual resolutions—except in 1992, where the council did not take up the question of Western Sahara, and in 1996, when it issued four resolutions—taking a supportive stand on the UNSG's efforts at finding solutions and compromises on voter eligibility, and calling for the parties full cooperation with the UN Mission on the ground (Boukhars & Rousselier, 2014: 56).

The UN MINURSO was established by Security Council Resolution 690 of April 29, 1991, in accordance with settlement proposals accepted on August 30, 1988, by Morocco and the Polisario Front. The last two resolutions in 1996 included requests by the council to seek "alternative steps in the framework of the Settlement Plan, should there be

no meaningful progress towards removing obstacles to the implementation of the Plan” (Boukhars & Rousselier, 2014: 234). Clearly these puzzling appeals neglected the exploration for alternative ways, however, they are notable in addressing the impasses in the Plan and looking for solutions while being within the Settlement Plan system. As a matter of fact, on May 9, 1996, the UNSG recommended that the UN Mission’s Identification Commission postpone its work and that the civilian police and military personnel reduce their forces, while paving the way for a solution to voter identification.

However, the stalemate on the voter identification was noted on the UNSG report, which lead him to “remain at the full disposal of the parties, should they agree to hold talks in whatever format, in order to facilitate a settlement of their conflict” (Report of the Secretary General on the situation Concerning Western Sahara para. 36). What many observers overlook, whether purposefully or due to a lack of understanding, is that, from the start, the Settlement Plan had no chance of being implemented because it suffered a major procedural flaw. This weakness, which made the plan unworkable, is the way Morocco and the Polisario interpreted it, each from their own—differing—perspectives (E. Jensen, 2012).

Issa Diallo, a special assistant to de Cuellar’s task force with the overall responsibility of producing the details of the Settlement Plan, held separate secret meetings with both Morocco and the Polisario. Diallo did not share the reservation made by the concerned parties regarding the Plan with the other task force members nor the Security Council (Bergh, 2007). This explains both parties’ vehement opposition to and apparent frustrations with the many paragraphs contained in the draft plan.

Following former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III’s appointment to the post of UNSG’s personal envoy for Western Sahara, he resumed the voter identification

process in December 1997 and came up with resolutions for their disputable issues (to include a code of conduct for the referendum campaign, confinement of Polisario troops, reduction of Moroccan troops, refugees, prisoners of war, and political prisoners) under the Houston Agreements adopted in September 1997. After several attempts to resume the implementation of the Settlement Plan, the Secretary General and his personal envoy concluded that after nine years of UN operations in Western Sahara, as far as the issue of the voter identification process is concerned, “the cooperation of one or the other party with MINURSO has been predicated upon its perception of how the results might be favoring the other side.” As per the appeals, it deduced that the respective positions of the two parties do not augur well for an early resolution of the issue of admissibility of appeals for hearings. Under these circumstances, the timetable envisaged is no longer valid, as indicated in my previous report, and the date of the referendum, which has been repeatedly postponed since 1991, can still not be set with certainty at this juncture.

Finally, the report took note that “the experience has shown that each time the United Nations has proposed a technical solution to bridge the parties’ differing interpretation of a given provision of the settlement plan, a new difficulty, requiring yet another round of protracted consultations arises” (Report of the Secretary General on the situation Concerning Western Sahara para. 35).

On account of these conclusions, the UN envoy on Western Sahara held four meetings aiming to consider the call of the international community to have this question settled. For Baker, these meetings led him to believe that “it is much better to reach a political solution than seeing the process collapse as this could lead to the resumption of hostilities, which must be avoided at any cost” (*The Inapplicability of the Settlement Plan*). In sum, the way in which the Settlement Plan was adopted clearly reveals that the

UN's principal intent was to reach an agreement between the protagonists and call off the war at the earliest possible time, rather than developing a viable proposal that could materialize on the ground.

Since the adoption of the UN Settlement Plan in 1991, the UN has—for over a decade—focused on achieving a solution to the territorial question, which pits Morocco against the Algerian-backed Polisario, by means of a referendum with the option of independence among the envisaged outcomes. In his memoir entitled *Pilgrimage for Peace*, de Cuellar was clearly convinced that the Settlement Plan could not meet all the concerns of the two parties and that a compromise solution had to be sought. He further declared that “I was never convinced that independence promised the best future for the inhabitants of the Western Sahara” (de Cuellar, 1997: 250).

V.1.4.2. The Framework Agreement

In September 2000, Morocco came up with a new solution to the dispute for the Polisario Front, which was not in support of the Settlement Plan. Morocco's platform of negotiation was its plan to grant autonomy to Western Sahara; this initiative, however, did not provide precise proposals. This led James Baker to share with the UNSC the draft Framework Agreement on the status of Western Sahara, which was presented to the parties. The agreement provided a five-year period of autonomy followed by a referendum on the status of the territory. The Polisario and its regional backer Algeria rejected the draft Framework Agreement as they perceived it as yielding to Morocco's inspirations while providing too little to benefit their own claims.

Baker presented the draft Framework Agreement in a revised form as the Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara in 2003, which carried a

powerful endorsement from the Security Council. The plan offered a referendum on the final status of the territory for the population of Western Sahara and included the following: independence, integration with Morocco, and self-governance or autonomy. Despite the fact that Algeria provided a detailed written criticism on the draft in its written answer, it nevertheless accepted the plan and pushed the Polisario to accept it as well (Author 2014 interview of Anna Theophilopoulou : New York , see list of interviewees Appendix 6 / See interviewee biography at Data Collection&Analysis: Chapter 1).

Morocco, on the other hand, categorically rejected the plan, arguing that Baker's new proposal essentially mimicked the failed settlement Plan by reintroducing the holding of the referendum that would take the concerned parties to the initial options. As a matter of fact, this plan did not take into consideration the sociological, tribal, and ethnic composition of the population of the Western Sahara, nor the need for a genuine and convinced adhesion of all the populations to the status given to them.

After Morocco's official rejection of the plan, the UNSG's Personal Envoy James Baker resigned, resulting in a sudden end to the UN and U.S. mediation efforts. In 2006, after a two-year gap, the Secretary General appointed Peter van Walsum to the post. Morocco decided to bring its Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara back to the table on April 11, 2007

V.1.4.3. The Autonomy Plan

Van Walsum was appointed the next UNSG envoy to the Western Sahara. While Morocco presented its Autonomy Plan on April 11, 2007, the Polisario also presented its own proposal, which was to relaunch the discussion for holding the referendum that would offer a choice between independence, autonomy, or integration into Morocco.

The Autonomy Plan presented by Morocco asserted that it was based on internationally recognized norms and standards before spelling out, in some detail, the proposed powers of the Sahara autonomous region, the bodies of the region, and modalities for approval by the population concerned (E. Jensen, 2012: 111). Through U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, the U.S. was quick to welcome the proposal, characterizing it as “serious and credible” (Agence France Presse, April 11, 2007).

The Moroccan initiative was not a decisive solution, but it provided a platform of negotiation. Following this development, the UNSC decided to drop the five-year campaign for a referendum and urged the parties to engage in direct talks “in good faith and without preconditions” for a political solution. During the four talks held in Manhasset, New York in 2007 and 2008 under Van Walsum, the Polisario refused to discuss and consider the Autonomy Plan or anything else for that matter except independence.

The new envoy made no progress in bridging the disagreement between Morocco’s Autonomy Plan and the Polisario’s position that a referendum on independence must be an option. In 2008, Van Walsum briefed the Security Council that what the Polisario hoped for (independence) seemed unrealistic and coming to terms with reality would be in the Saharans’ best interest (El Pais, Aug. 8, 2008). After this remark, the Polisario stopped any further dealings with him. For them, he was a *persona non grata* until his contract came to end.

Christopher Ross, the former U.S. diplomat in Algeria, was appointed as personal envoy in 2009. From 2009 to 2016, Ross conducted 10 informal rounds of negotiations, which offered no progress given the fundamental differences between the parties’ positions; none of them were willing to make the slightest concession as to the type of compromise to be adopted. Furthermore, during Mr. Ross’s appointment, several

miscalculations by the UN secretariat under Ross and UNSG Ban Ki Moon impeded the negotiation process.

A few years later, the UNSG's personal envoy started to push for another alternative solution to the conflict. He indirectly started to ignore Morocco's proposal and instead developed a proposal that aimed to create a federation or commonwealth between Morocco and Western Sahara. What the UN again failed to take into consideration was the fact that this new proposal did not consider the specificities of the Western Sahara region; instead it incorrectly compared the region with foreign countries that applied commonwealth or federation systems, namely the U.S. and the British Government. Moreover, with the continuous impasse that was happening at the UN level, Morocco unequivocally decided not step back from the proposal of the autonomy plan and dismissed any negotiation that could lead to independence.

During Ross' tenure, the UNSG Ban Ki Moon made an undiplomatic move while visiting the Tindouf Camp in Algeria in March 2016. Following his meetings with Algerian officials, as well as with the Polisario leaders, Ban Ki-moon expressed his endorsement of the Polisario and intentionally described Morocco as an occupier of Western Sahara. Ban Ki Moon's controversial comments about the "occupation" of the Western Sahara generated a great deal of pushback from a broad spectrum of Moroccan circles—including the government's decision to cut the number of staffers and funding for the UN mission in the Sahara and global protests in different parts of the world.

As it currently stands, given the appointment of a new UNSG personal envoy and new UN chief, the possibility of bringing both parties back to the negotiating table raises questions about the utility and promise of international mediation of the long-standing conflict in North Africa.

V.2. The role relevant parties play in maintaining the status quo

The previous sections the role and actions of the the United Nations the ‘‘Western Sahara’’ Conflict. It is important to recall that the UN itself is an association in which countries, and more specifically, the Security Council , are charged with the maintenance of international peace. However some many of the conflict namely the Western Sahara is stagnating due to permanent Security Council Members having conflicting interests. This will be further explained in this section on the role the Security Council members in reaching a status quo in the ‘‘ Western Sahara’’ conflict. All these members possess veto power in the UN Security Council and they are thus capable to prevent the status quo to change and put pressure on parties like Algeria to be a real party in the conflict for its resolution. France plays a an important role in the ‘‘Western Sahara’’ Conflict. Morocco, which is a former French protectorate and maintains excellent bilateral relations with France, which also repeatedly reiterated its support for the Moroccan autonomy plan for the ‘‘ Western Sahara’’. Juridically, however, France considers itself neutral in the dispute and supports a negotiated political solution, by arguing that it has never formally recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the area or recognized the SADR. (Zoubir and Benabdallah: 10). Since the outbreak of the war in 1975, France supported Morocco politically, economically and militarily in relation to the dispute. In the UN, France is seen as Morocco’s number one supporter in the Western Sahara. A supporter which has, in contrast to other veto powers, a different understanding of how to solve the Western Sahara conflict France tries to limit the veto power in the UN and wishes to regulate the use of it in the Security Council. France has been accused by other SC council members of being too close to Morocco and not being neutral in its stances, especially in its use of the Veto. This applies, where France,

that denies the accusations, repeatedly threatened to use its veto power to block proposals to have MINURSO monitor the human rights situation in the area as it sees that the MINURSO role does not fall within the human rights mechanism.

The following Security Council member, the United States which supported regional and international actors to resolve the conflict. However, this was partially different before 1999, when Morocco experienced difficulties in their bilateral relations with the US because of the conflict and the referendum that was ought to be held. The US thought that the relevant actors needed to overcome difficulties and relied more on Morocco to do so. The US did not believe in the existence of a ‘winner takes all’ formula, because the loser would simply not accept this outcome and this would thus only worsen the outcome of the conflict. The talks that took place at the US Congress did not only on this conflict but also around peacekeeping in general and how the US should act in these types of conflicts. President Bush changed the US’ position on the ‘‘Western Sahara’’ completely, because, in part, of the war on terrorism and the fear that the ‘‘ Western Sahara’’ could be a potential hub for terroristic activities. President Bush endorsed Morocco’s effort to find a solution to the conflict because of the need to make sure Morocco would continue to be a safe and stable partner in the political, economic and military struggle against national and transitional Islamic militance. (Author 2014 interview of Anna Theophilopoulou : New York, see list of interviewees Appendix 6/ See interviewee biography at Data Collection & Analysis : Chapter 1).

President Obama, however, took a more neutral approach to the conflict in comparison to his predecessor. During his campaign for the presidential election, he did not take a clear stance in the ‘‘Western Sahara’’ conflict. The Obama administration pushed

for a more neutral stance in the conflict in which self-determination was fundamental. Whitehouse spokesperson Jay Carney pointed out that Obama took the Moroccan autonomy plan for the WS seriously. U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns described the autonomy plan as realistic and credible. The Obama administration did press Morocco on the before mentioned additional human rights mechanism for MINURSO, which, because of the help of France, was successfully prevented by the French outing of their displeasure. MINURSO does remain the only peacekeeping mission without such a mandate.

Under the administration of the new president of the US, Donald Trump, the stance towards the conflict is still unclear. Up until now there will not be any dramatic change in the position of the US in relation to the ‘‘Western Sahara’’ conflict, because the US is more focussed on Iran, North Korea and Russia and there are no big motivations to change the position. Russia and China in contrast to the conflict in Syria, where Russia takes a proactive stance in the UN Security Council, Russia does not actively involve itself in the ‘‘Western Sahara’’ conflict. Russia supports the process that is led by the UN Security Council. They abstained, however, in 2016 from voting in the UN SC vote over the renewing of the mandate of MINURSO. In 2018, Russia abstained again when the mandate for MINURSO was renewed for six months.

In comparison to Russia, China takes quite a similar stance in the ‘‘Western Sahar’’, it remains neutral in the conflict and continue to encourage all involved parties to reach a peaceful, political solution. They too abstained from the vote in 2016 and 2018 in the UN Security Council. Both countries currently have discussions about territories that

they control, namely Tibet and the Crimea. Positions that take a strong stance could harm their positions in their own countries and give the opposition arguments to oppose to them. Lastly the United Kingdom, just like France, the UK (United Kingdom) did not use their veto since 1989. The UK supports self-determination They voted in favour of the resolution to renew MINURSO and support the continuing work of the mission. The UK called upon the parties to engage in a political process in which realism is fundamental. In relation to the six-month renewal of MINURSO, the UK stated that it had provided an opportunity and indication of the importance the international community attaches to achieving progress. The UK reviews the way the UN functions around this conflict and stated that the UN process has the full support of the UK.

What becomes clear when reviewing the positions of the permanent members of the Security Council is that France fully supports Morocco to break the deadlock arguing that the country made a huge effort in proposing the Plan of Autonomy that serves as a serious platform of negotiation. The US had become more neutral during the reign of president Obama, however, it is not clear if Trump will continue Obama's position concerning this conflict. Trump tries to resolve many conflicts around the world and it is yet unknown how he will position the US in relation to Morocco. MINURSO has only been extended for six months and Köhler continues his efforts to bring the concerned parties to find a solution. It will be interesting to see how the Security council reacts and how France responds to his proposals and findings.

Overall, it looks like the Security Council members will not change their position if their interests do not align with a change in the status quo, which currently is not the case

and as long as there is no clear and straightforward push for Algeria to be part of the resolution process, the status quo will reign.

V.3. Algeria as an Important Party for Securing a Resolution

Since Morocco reintegrated Western Sahara, Algeria vehemently contested this move, and in retaliation, Algeria started to support the Polisario militarily, diplomatically, and financially. The Algerian Republic was determined that by challenging Morocco's claim to Western Sahara, it would prevent Morocco from strengthening and enriching its position in North Africa, thus paving the way for Algeria to become the pre-eminent power in the region. While Algeria has never claimed any official interest in the Saharan conflict, it has, *de facto*, been a major player in it. Since then, a geopolitical rivalry between Algeria and Morocco has existed as Algeria sought dominance over the Maghreb. Ideological differences between the monarchical, capitalist, conservative, and pro-Western Morocco have contrasted sharply with the revolutionary, single party, socialist, and anti-Western Algeria and have fueled the tension between the two countries.

Algeria was deeply involved with the UN, aiming to help the Polisario achieve independence in Western Sahara based on self-determination following a referendum. This UN involvement started with the second Algerian President, Boumedienne, who was staunchly in favor of Saharan self-determination. His agreement to provide the Polisario with weapons, political support, sanctuary, and information facilities caused intermittent tensions in Moroccan-Algerian relations that last to this day.

The efforts invested by Algeria in the Western Sahara conflict, especially at the UN level, are comparable to that of an involved party such as Morocco. Algeria's provided

input in the draft of the Framework Agreement, pushed to incorporate the human rights duties in the MINURSO's duties, and pursued a resolution that would create an independent Western. In addition, Algeria refused to deal with an appointed UNSG personal envoy who endorsed Morocco's efforts to reach a just and lasting political solution to this conflict, as in the case of De Soto and Van Walsum. In its official communication to the UN, Algeria has sometimes presented itself as "a concerned party" and other times, as an "important actor," or as a "party in the settlement of the dispute."

Another component that has hindered a resolution to this dispute has been Algeria's systematic refusal to allow the UNHCR to conduct an independent census to determine the population of the Saharaoui living in Tindouf Camps. The international community has pushed for an independent census to determine the population of Sahrawi refugees living in Algeria, but the effort has been met with considerable resistance. For more than 40 years, the UN has failed to persuade Algeria to comply with requests from the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to fulfill its mandate and to carry out a census of the Saharaoui population in Tindouf Camps in Southwest Algeria.

While Algeria's unjustified rejection can be easily explained in the context of its tense relations with Morocco and its need to have the Saharaoui on its soil for its political propaganda, the refusal of the Polisario leaders is driven essentially by the profit gained from an overestimation of the refugee population in order to request a greater quantity of humanitarian aid. Several reports published by UN agencies, such as the UNHCR and the World Food Programme, assert that Algeria's and the Polisario's have embezzled the humanitarian aid intended for the Saharaoui population in Tindouf (Morocco on The Move, 2014 Report). For Morocco, the solution of this conflict rises from a genuine

contribution of the Algerian regime that must show the necessary political will to break the deadlock over the process.

V.3. Conclusion

For more than 40 years now, the UN has been attempting to settle the Western Sahara dispute, balancing two main parties' concerns: autonomy/sovereignty and self-determination. The current status quo is the result of an unusually substantial and consistent set of factors: first, the interests of this dispute are small and, thus, insufficient international attention has been given to the conflict despite the continuing threats and development of terrorism in the Sahel region, where links between alQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Polisario Front have been revealed. Secondly, the persistence of the intermittent historical tensions between Algeria and Morocco as well as Algeria's lack of a genuine commitment to resolve this dispute, constitute a serious obstacle to the resolution of the conflict. Finally, the international community is unable to contribute genuinely to a solution for the simple reason that there is no international interest in the conflict.

Within the UN, the lack of political momentum clearly reveals the divergence of intentions between states within the UNSC or the UNGA or even the upcoming rounds of negotiations. Under James Baker, the conflict tested his imagination and patience from 1997 to 2004 when the proposed referendum did not lead anywhere. His follower, UN Secretary-General's personal envoy to Western Sahara, Peter Van Walsum resigned the post after three years because he believed that independence was not a viable solution. Then, he was replaced by Christopher Ross, who after several meetings to discuss new proposals brought up by the parties in 2007, failed to make any headway on the issue. The

new UNSG personal envoy to Western Sahara, Horst Kohler, proposed a relaunch of negotiating process with a new dynamic and spirit.

The appointment of the new UN chief, Antonio Gueterres, in January 2017, should initiate the development of a realistic vision for bringing an end to this conflict. Hopefully, new efforts can take the lessons learned from former UN diplomats' failed approaches and the UNSC's stubbornness that led to an unchanging reliance on the unworkable mechanisms of self-determination to develop a successful plan. In addition, the UN should examine whether or not self-determination is really a workable proposal given the chaos and instability that followed when such a principle was applied in South Sudan. Lastly, the UN mediation roles in this conflict should be redefined in light of current developments in the region and the threat that refugee camps pose on the stability and security of the region as well as Algeria's full-fledged role in the conflict.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The aim of this research was to explore Algeria's foreign policy with respect to the Sahara Conflict. Its primary objective was to investigate Algeria's continuous involvement in the Sahara conflict and its vested interest in the stalemate that has existed since Algeria's independence in 1962. Chapter one reviewed the important theoretical patterns involved in the study of foreign policy, specifically with respect to developing countries. One of the crucial lessons deduced in chapter one is that there is no completely suitable or persuasive model that can consistently be used to the investigation and analysis of these states, given their particular culture and the changes in the psychological mindsets of these two states' leaders.

In addition, chapter one described the factors and analytical frameworks that have been widely used by scholars for the study of foreign policy adopted by Third World countries. Elements found in both external and internal environments seemed to be the leading factors in the proper analysis of such countries' foreign policy. Nevertheless, the factors vary from one state to another, which is why scholars must identify these factors through thorough investigations to pinpoint those factors most important to the study of foreign policy for a particular Third World state.

Following the above-mentioned findings, specific attention was focused on pinpointing, categorizing, and analyzing the important factors in the conception and the implementation of Algeria's foreign policy. By setting up the relationship between the instrumental factors existing within Algeria's domestic environment and its foreign policy implementation, one can deduce that Algeria's foreign policy has been greatly influenced by the military power, the Presidency, and economic pragmatism. Obviously, as a fledgling

state in 1963, Algeria's foreign policy became closely associated with the duty of accomplishing national objectives. Iratni claimed that foreign policy in new states is not an independent variable but rather an element of internal and domestic considerations; as applied to Algeria, it was domestic expectations and needs that shaped Algeria's foreign policy.

Chapter two examined the roles of Algeria's institutional structures in the making of Algeria's foreign policy, bringing to the forefront the power of the military as well as the presidential centers. Essentially, foreign policy in Algeria was determined by those that happened to be within the privileged leader's circle—the military leaders. Nevertheless, when the foreign ministry achieved its institutional capacities, it did so because of the significant and special relationship between the president and the military apparatus.

Indeed, the role of the military institution in Algeria has been managed by the National Liberation Front in both a theoretical and official capacity. In addition to its typical military tasks, the military's role in the Algerian revolution as well as its connection with the historical-political upbringing of the ALN's leadership ensured the military's place as a fundamental part of Algeria's post-independence decision-making process. Equally important to the existence of the military within the highest institutions of the state, was the office of President, the Council of Revolution (1962-1978), and the FLN's supreme political institutions (Political Bureau and the Central Committee), which paved the way for the direct involvement of the military institution in decision-making concerning all aspects of national issues.

Additionally, in foreign policy matters, within the Presidents' administrations there was an ongoing presence of military officers who acted as the Presidents' personal

advisors. One result of this close connection was that Algeria's foreign policy orientations were impacted by the military's arms acquisitions from foreign national suppliers.

The analysis of Algeria's foreign policy principles offered proof that in addition to the relationship between state building and foreign policy, the vision of post-colonial Algeria and its responses to the international settings was to be influenced for years after 1962 by the colonial legacy and the strive for independence. This very specific stage resulted in a prominent and extremely advanced revolutionary interest within the Algerian leaders, which became the primary feature of Algeria's external behavior that was inculcated with a very specific ideology.

Furthermore, to understand Algerian foreign policy, it is important to recognize the complexity of the regime. While no one has a holistic picture of who was really in charge in Algiers, it is clear that Algeria's constitutional organizations were powerless. Since independence, the Algerian government has endured a silent struggle among three powerful forces: the FLN, the DRS, and the military. After the 1999 election, the Algerian presidency joined this trio to become the fourth major actor in domestic politics. Algerian decision makers belong to a select group of military elites, called *le pouvoir* (the power), that "holds the power behind the formal arrangements of government." The rules of engagement are simple: maximize control and weaken the adversary, by all the necessary means.

Algerian foreign policy was made, consequently, within the framework of revolutionary ideology, stemming from the belief of "the continuity of Revolution." This entailed a harsh fight against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, and insistent support of "specific" liberation movements. This ideological framework drove President Boumedienne's desire in the formulation of his foreign policy. Additionally, these ideological incentives molded his policies of Pan-Maghrebism, Pan-Arabism, and Pan-

Africanism. Most specifically, Algeria's foreign policy was guided by principles of self-determination. In this context, Algeria was staunchly committed to endorse liberation movements as well as guerillas factions, and supported them in their efforts to obtain independence. The latter motives were used as a way to undermine other countries, as in the case of Morocco when it desired the reintegration of "Western Sahara."

Bearing in mind the main research questions, the central point of chapters two and three consisted of the evolution of Algeria's foreign policy right after its independence. The study argues that Algerian foreign policy under Boumedienne was marked by a mixture of both ideology and pragmatism. Ideology was predominant in issues linked to self-determination and Third World concerns, and pragmatism concerned economic and national development policies. One should note that this started with Houari Boumedienne, who himself played an important role in developing Algeria's foreign policy with ideological rules and the prerequisites of national interest. He prioritized Algeria's interest and designed his foreign policy so as to respond to national development needs.

Furthermore, foreign policy was molded in accordance with international situations and in an environment of East-West rivalries. Algeria's foreign policy was also shaped by the shift in the world's economic situation, namely in the prices of oil, natural resources, and manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. Thus, the internal restrictions affecting the President's control of foreign policy were the constraints on the country's economic means, its development capabilities, and the more general foreign policy unanimity, which correlates with Rosenau's societal variable.

Algeria's national state policy represented a powerful platform around which foreign policy was formed. Consequently, Algeria's ideological overtures and public claims were, in retrospect, operated by domestic factors that ended up ensuring the

revolutionary principles and undergirding its internal nationalist and socialist policies. The major finding of these chapters demonstrates that “change within continuity” best portrays the foreign policy adopted by the other Algerian presidents.

Chapter four tackled the central research topic—the role of Algeria’s foreign policy in the Sahara conflict—and argued that, within the Maghreb region, the Sahara conflict proved to be, particularly after 1975, the central thrust of Algeria’s foreign policy. The conclusion of this research asserts that Algeria’s interference in the resolution is a partial cause of the conflict’s continuation. Algeria has been a staunch rival of Morocco over regional hegemony since its independence from France. Algeria is extremely leery of Morocco’s perceived ambition of expanding its borders into Algerian territory. Thus, Algeria’s foreign policy over the “Western Sahara” conflict is framed by historical, ideological, and geopolitical contexts that are all mixed with a hegemonic rivalry.

Despite the fact that the dossier in the agenda of Algeria’s foreign policy featured some changes, as far as the strategy taken on by the Algerian government to reach its goal has not significantly changed. Since the 1963 Sand War, due to Algeria’s loss and the legacy of suspicion felt by both sides, one of Algeria’s main desires has been to prevent Morocco from achieving primacy over Algeria in the region.

After Colonel Boumedienne ousted Ben Bella in 1965, Algeria became markedly non-aligned, while simultaneously playing a very active role in supporting national liberation movements. It provided strong support to the Polisario Front, and, in accordance with Boumedienne’s wishes, instigated the stalemate of a resolution to the “Western Sahara” conflict. Before he died, Boumedienne promised to make the Sahara issue a stone in “Morocco’s shoes”. His successors followed suit with the unequivocal planning of the Algerian military apparatus. Under President Bendjedid, the issue of “Western Sahara”

featured some changes regarding the strategy adopted by the Algerian government to achieve its objective.

Chronologically speaking, the post-1978 era involved two main periods—the period immediately after 1978 and the subsequent period through 1985. During these periods, Algeria’s main foreign policy goal was to bring an end to the *status quo* in the “Western Sahara” by preserving the policy of “indirect confrontation” initiated in 1975. Its plan consisted mostly of diplomatic pressure, particularly at the OAU, as well as military maneuvers in the Sahara, through the Polisario, with the aim to pressure Morocco towards a negotiated solution based on self-determination. Algeria’s involvement and attitude during the different summits of the OAU and the large-scale Polisario military operations, signaled the use of this twofold strategy to engage in its aim.

Furthermore, the Algerian government did not hesitate to shun Morocco within its sub-regional environment. Following 1968, Algeria’s diplomatic goal was to isolate Morocco in the Maghreb and the OAU—there were, however, a number of internal and external factors at play. These factors resulted in an apparent reorientation of Algeria’s strategy over the “Western Sahara” issue. Such factors included the fact that Algeria could not maintain a perpetual war against Morocco given the critical economic situation in the wake of the oil price collapse in 1985-1986; the fact that, during Bendjedid’s tenure, Morocco successfully acquired powerful defense techniques for its army (which reduced the military capabilities of the Polisario, and, in turn, reduced Algeria’s military alternative to counterbalance Rabat’s territorial claim).

This, however, did not mean the end of Algeria’s support for the Polisario. Though it was the case that Algiers estimated that the strategy of confrontation had proved not fully appropriate and could no longer achieve its objective, one can argue that Bendjedid’s

government was largely successful in accurately assessing the changing circumstances. Indeed, Bendjedid reoriented his approach and maneuvered accordingly to reach the same goal, namely, the implementation of a joint OAU/UN sponsored referendum in the ‘‘Western Sahara’’. With President Boudiaf, things would have been different given the President’s genuine desire to solve the ‘‘Western Sahara’’ dispute and diffuse the Moroccan-Algerian tenuous relations. His 1992 assassination was the government mafia’s response to his anticorruption reforms and his determination to solve the ‘‘Western Sahara’’ issue—actions which obviously threatened members of the military who decided to liquidate him.

President Bouteflika, ‘‘a longtime protégé of the DRS,’’ was simply a return to the Boumedienne military strategy in its interference in the ‘‘Western Sahara’’ conflict. Bouteflika was determined to do whatever the Algerian military and the DRS instructed him to do in order to fulfill the strategic objectives as set by the Algerian military apparatus, which had nothing to do with the interest of the Sahraouis or resolving the dispute. Ultimately, the stalled status of this conflict is due to the Algerian military’s and the secret services’ interference as it would have been very difficult for any Algerian politician to negotiate a resolution without the support of the military.

One piece of the puzzle in Algeria’s regular interference in the conflict was its decision to permit the Polisario to remain in Tindouf Camps. The Polisario leadership spent most of its time in Algiers, occasionally showing up in the camps. If the government was not welcoming them, they could have been sent on their way very quickly and would have been forced to curtail their activities. As almost all of the interviewees asserted, in Algeria one cannot operate if the government does not give you approval to do so. Significantly,

Algeria's position of principle with regard to 'Western Sahara' has taken the form of unquestioned economic, military and political support for the Polisario Front almost since it came into being. Algeria's significant stance on the Sahraoui's population's right to self-determination is constantly associated to unequivocal endorsement support for the Polisario and, nothing at this time suggests a turnaround in the Algerian position, or modify the terms of this heretofore uncontested alliance. Despite the Algerian continuous endorsement of the Polisario Front, the legitimacy of the latter and its monopoly of representativeness in its quest for self-determination leading to independence have been called into question.

Indeed, the Polisario Front is facing growing criticism in the camps where a new generation is demanding democratic reforms and more political participation for critical voices . Some members critical of the Polisario Front, such as the Khat al-Shahid, a member of the the Polisario Front continue to denounce the non-legitimate stance and representativity of the Polisario leadership. While limited, the March 2011 protest of "revolutionary youth" pinpointed the birth of a group of young people more inclined to challenge the legitimacy of the old guard. The Polisario Front has also been suspected of involvement in criminal networks. Some of its members were even accused of fighting alongside Muammar Qaddafi's troops against the rebel forces during the Libyan conflict in 2011.

Algerian civil society—whose influence over Algerian foreign policy is largely insignificant—has shown a degree of indifference towards the Western Sahara issue. Nevertheless, the Algerian government has successfully co-opted a segment of its civil

society, mobilizing the Algerian associations within its sphere of influence to defend the principle of self-determination leading to independence against Morocco in some regional and international forums. Algeria went further to endorse and finance other countries to take the lead to countering and hampering Morocco's efforts to solve the "Western Sahara" conflicts as the case of South Africa and Namibia.

Additionally, if one looks at the economic data, there is no rational basis for maintaining these camps other than their stubbornness with respect to Algeria's economic position. The camps result in lost money, lost jobs, and a weakened economy. Therefore, it appears that the Algerian regime's economic growth, which they desperately need, is actually hampered by and even negatively impacted by the maintenance of the camps. In other words, due to Algeria's prioritization of its ideological principles over its economic growth, the country is acting against its own rational interest. If geopolitical interests, like access to the Atlantic, were the root causes of this stalemate, such factors could be negotiated as countries can negotiate access to the sea for the trade. Instead, Algeria finds itself unable to negotiate or compromise because of its ideology, mistrust, and rivalry.

The upcoming 2019 elections in Algeria will have no effect on Algerian foreign policy regarding the Sahara question so long as the same military leaders stay in power; no president would be able to alter the status quo. A real change in foreign policy would require a complete overhaul of the government that would release the country from the grasp of the old ideologies and positions. For the time being, there is only slim hope for a solution in "Western Sahara" due to the Algerian government's incapacity to act arising from a mentality that goes beyond stubbornness. Algeria is indeed paralyzed by its generals and former presidents.

As a matter of fact, Algeria has tried to maintain the status quo, but it may be forced to modify the rationale or principles that have guided its foreign policy towards ‘‘Western Sahara’’ with a new reading of the economic and security challenges in the region that threaten its national project and its development. It is clear to all that security and the war on terrorism have become priorities for the international community and that the international position towards the ‘‘Western Sahara’’ conflict may change regarding the advisability of maintaining the status quo.

If the Algerian military was revamped, there could be a shift in the Algerian policy towards ‘‘Western Sahara’’ and, perhaps, an improvement in the Moroccan-Algerian relations. The military would have to possess a new mindset—prioritizing its own people over ideology or rivalries. To achieve this, there must be regime change; the leaders of the past 40 years must die off or simply cut off completely with the political scene so that new leaders, who are not embroiled in the same personal and ideological fights, can come to power. Perhaps what is most needed is an authentic democratic transformation from within. Until either of those things occur, Algeria is not going to change.

Finally, chapter five examined the UN’s role in resolving the dispute and Algeria’s role in every action undertaken by the UN in the peace process. The study also argues that the UN must recognize that Algeria is directly responsible for the Western Sahara stalemate in order for it to be able to successfully urge Algeria to take full responsibility of its diplomatic, political, and military interference in the search for a solution. Indeed within the security councils, there is an artificial attempt by its members to try to force the countries into compromise because of economic interests.

Lastly, another matter than must be addressed relates to the fact that for the last 20 or 30 years, Morocco has not been successful in shaping the discourse on the Sahara Conflict abroad. To Morocco's disadvantage, the other side has been better at providing, disseminating, and communicating their side of the story. In fact, many well-known scholars tended to sympathize with the people of the "Western Sahara", while those who published literature in favor of Morocco produced studies of questionable quality that included repetitive arguments and failed to engage fully in the controversy surrounding the issue. Accordingly, the other side ended up controlling the debate, especially in the English-speaking world. Despite the fact that the region has experienced change, there are only a couple of books and articles that are currently being published that support the Moroccan argument. Nevertheless, it will take time to undo 30 years of one-sided propaganda. The matter is now no longer a conflict; instead, it is a stalemate—a frozen controversy—that is hampering the prosperity of the entire Maghreb.

It is well-understood that this research is a never-ending process. Thus, additional investigations must be undertaken to examine more closely some of the issues raised in this thesis and to test the importance of the findings. This research, however, may bring about a useful nudge forward to help future researchers outline the course of their investigation.

In fact, much of the value of the current research and its significance must be examined from its impact on the direction of future research. It seems useful to conclude by offering recommendations for topics that could benefit from further investigation, especially if the issue of data accessibility in Algeria can be overcome. Such recommendations include:

1. Conducting an investigation of Algeria's foreign policy over the "Western Sahara" conflict since 1975—a subject that needs further examination given the lack of data from Algeria's side.

2. Researching the implications of domestic unrest on Algeria's foreign policy in regards to Moroccan relations and the Sahara conflict.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Tripoli Program

Le 30 août 1962

D É C L A R A T I O N P . C . A .

D O N N E R L A P A R O L E A U P E U P L E

Et lui faire connaître

Le projet de programme adopté à TRIPOLI

Le bureau politique du Parti communiste algérien déplore vivement le rebondissement de la crise du F.L.N. qui, en retardant l'élection d'une Assemblée nationale et d'un gouvernement algérien légal, prolonge le régime provisoire, avec les graves conséquences que cela comporte pour l'avenir de la nation à l'intérieur, et avec la dégradation du crédit de l'Algérie à l'extérieur.

Devant les périls qui menacent notre indépendance encore fragile, le Bureau politique du P.C.A. condamne solennellement tout recours à la force entre patriotes pour résoudre les difficultés actuelles du pays. Il adjure tous les Algériens, militants et responsables de renoncer aux polémiques stériles, de s'élever contre les luttes fratricides et de consacrer toutes leurs forces à l'union du peuple contre le néocolonialisme et ses alliés. De tous les graves dangers qui menacent en effet notre pays, aucun n'est aussi grand que celui du néocolonialisme et ce danger s'accroît considérablement avec la prolongation de la crise.

Bien qu'ayant été l'objet d'une injustifiable discrimination dans le choix des candidats à la première Assemblée constituante, bien que la classe ouvrière n'ait pas eu de véritable représentation sur les listes de candidats, le Parti communiste algérien avait quand même

appelé le peuple algérien à voter en masse le 2 septembre pour les listes présentées par le Bureau politique du F.L.N. En agissant ainsi, il était, et il demeure, guide par un souci essentiel : sortir du chaos et doter notre pays, dans les plus brefs délais, d'une Assemblée nationale, d'un gouvernement et d'institutions républicaines stables et le plus démocratique possible. En effet, tant que cette étape ne sera pas franchie, aucun des problèmes en suspens, siurgent soit-il, ne peut être valablement réglé.

Le P .C.A. a souligné le 31 Juillet dernier que la mise en fonction du Bureau politique du F.L.N. pouvait être un bon moyen d'avancer vers une solution politique durable de la crise. Le rebondissement de cette crise et l'examen des diverses déclarations montrent la fragilité d'un compromis réalisé entre les différentes tendances du Front sans que soit défini au préalable un programme minimum commun et sans que coït réalisé une forme démocratique d'union.

C'est pourquoi il est plus urgent que jamais de consulter notre peuple, il est plus urgent que jamais de lui faire connaître le projet de programme adopté à Tripoli.

Pour sortir rapidement de la grave situation issue de la crise du F.L .N., le Bureau politique du P .C.A. propose de donner la parole au peuple, pour élire librement et démocratiquement, à une Assemblée nationale constituante, des hommes et des femmes de son choix. Pour être véritablement démocratique, cette élection doit se faire avec un mode de scrutin assurant la représentation proportionnelle de toutes les tendances patriotiques qui peuvent se manifester sur la base d'un programme bien défini et avec l'entière liberté de vote, d'expression et d'association. Le Bureau politique du P.C.A. estime que, pour l'organisation de ces élections, une autorité centrale est indispensable.

Dans les circonstances actuelles, celle-ci ne peut être que le Bureau politique du F.L.N., dont l'autorité doit s'appuyer sur la consultation fraternelle des représentants de

toutes les tendances et organisations patriotiques. Le P.C.A. conscient de ses responsabilités nationales, soutiendra tout effort du Bureau politique du F.L.N. dans ce sens et poursuivra ses contacts avec les représentants des autres organisations nationales. A ce sujet, il se confirme qu'on ne peut résoudre valablement les problèmes qui se posent devant la nation sans le concours du parti de la classe ouvrière, le Parti Communiste Algérien et encore moins contre lui.

Le peuple étant la source de toute autorité valable, le Bureau politique du P.C.A. a préconisé, dès le 25 Juillet, la constitution de larges comités populaires pour l'union et la réconciliation. Cette idée de comités populaires a été reprise par divers organismes patriotiques. Aussi le P.C.A. appelle tous les communistes et tous les sympathisants de

notre parti à se joindre activement à tous les autres patriotes pour constituer rapidement ces comités dans nos villes et villages, dans les quartiers et les entreprises, dans les douars et les mechtas.

Ces comités œuvreront pour le respect de toutes les libertés démocratiques et de la dignité des Algériens ; pour la création de conditions favorables à des élections libres et démocratiques ; pour aider à la solution des problèmes économiques brûlants se posant aux masses populaires, enfin pour confronter les points de vue sur les objectifs de la Révolution algérienne.

VIVE LA SOUVERAINETÉ DU PEUPLE. VIVE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE
ET SOCIALE Alger, le 27 Août 1962 (Région d'Oran du P.C.A.)

COMMUNIQUÉ DU P.C.A. DU 30 AOÛT 1962

Source:

https://www.socialgerie.net/IMG/pdf/1962_08_30_declaration_du_PCA_Tripoli.pdf

Appendix 2: Proclamation du 1er Novembre 1954

PEUPLE ALGÉRIEN,

MILITANTS DE LA CAUSE NATIONALE,

A vous qui êtes appelés à nous juger (le premier d'une façon générale, les seconds tout particulièrement), notre souci en diffusant la présente proclamation est de vous éclairer sur les raisons profondes qui nous ont poussés à agir en vous exposant notre programme, le sens de notre action, le bien-fondé de nos vues dont le but demeure l'indépendance nationale dans le cadre nord-africain. Notre désir aussi est de vous éviter la confusion que pourraient entretenir l'impérialisme et ses agents administratifs et autres politiciailleurs véreux.

Nous considérons avant tout qu'après des décades de lutte, le mouvement national a atteint sa phase de réalisation. En effet, le but d'un mouvement révolutionnaire étant de créer toutes les conditions d'une action libératrice, nous estimons que, sous ses aspects internes, le peuple est uni derrière le mot d'ordre d'indépendance et d'action et, sous les aspects extérieurs, le climat de détente est favorable pour le règlement des problèmes mineurs, dont le nôtre, avec surtout l'appui diplomatique de nos frères arabo-musulmans. Les événements du Maroc et de Tunisie sont à ce sujet significatifs et marquent profondément le processus de la lutte de libération de l'Afrique du Nord. A noter dans ce domaine que nous avons depuis fort longtemps été les précurseurs de l'unité dans l'action, malheureusement jamais réalisée entre les trois pays.

Aujourd'hui, les uns et les autres sont engagés résolument dans cette voie, et nous, relégués à l'arrière, nous subissons le sort de ceux qui sont dépassés. C'est ainsi que notre mouvement national, terrassé par des années d'immobilisme et de routine, mal orienté, privé du soutien indispensable de l'opinion populaire, dépassé par les événements, se désagrège progressivement à la grande satisfaction du colonialisme qui croit avoir remporté la plus grande victoire de sa lutte contre l'avant-garde algérienne.

L'HEURE EST GRAVE !

Devant cette situation qui risque de devenir irréparable, une équipe de jeunes responsables et militants conscients, ralliant autour d'elle la majorité des éléments encore sains et décidés, a jugé le moment venu de sortir le mouvement national de l'impasse où l'ont acculé les luttes de personnes et d'influence, pour le lancer aux côtés des frères marocains et tunisiens dans la véritable lutte révolutionnaire.

Nous tenons à cet effet à préciser que nous sommes indépendants des deux clans qui se disputent le pouvoir. Plaçant l'intérêt national au-dessus de toutes les considérations mesquines et erronées de personnes et prestige, conformément aux principes

révolutionnaires, notre action est dirigée uniquement contre le colonialisme, seul ennemi et aveugle, qui s'est toujours refusé à accorder la moindre liberté par des moyens de lutte pacifique.

Ce sont là, nous pensons, des raisons suffisantes qui font que notre mouvement de rénovation se présente sous l'étiquette de FRONT DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE, se dégageant ainsi de toutes les compromissions possibles et offrant la possibilité à tous les patriotes algériens de toutes les couches sociales, de tous les partis et mouvements purement algériens, de s'intégrer dans la lutte de libération sans aucune autre considération.

Pour préciser, nous retraçons ci-après, les grandes lignes de notre programme politique :

BUT : L'Indépendance nationale par :

- 1) La restauration de l'Etat algérien souverain, démocratique et social dans le cadre des principes islamiques.
- 2) Le respect de toutes les libertés fondamentales sans distinction de races et de confessions.

OBJECTIFS INTÉRIEURS:

- 1) Assainissement politique par la remise du mouvement national révolutionnaire dans sa véritable voie et par l'anéantissement de tous les vestiges de corruption et de réformisme, cause de notre régression actuelle.
- 2) Rassemblement et organisation de toutes les énergies saines du peuple algérien pour la liquidation du système colonial.

OBJECTIFS EXTÉRIEURS:

- Internationalisation du problème algérien.
- Réalisation de l'Unité nord-africaine dans le cadre naturel arabo-musulman.
- Dans le cadre de la charte des Nations Unies, affirmation de notre sympathie à l'égard de toutes nations qui appuieraient notre action libératrice.

MOYENS DE LUTTE :

Conformément aux principes révolutionnaires et compte tenu des situations intérieure et extérieure, la continuation de la lutte par tous les moyens jusqu'à la réalisation de notre but. Pour parvenir à ces fins, le Front de libération nationale aura deux tâches essentielles à mener de front et simultanément : une action intérieure tant sur le plan politique que sur le plan de l'action propre, et une action extérieure en vue de faire du problème algérien une réalité pour le monde entier avec l'appui de tous nos alliés naturels. C'est là une tâche écrasante qui nécessite la mobilisation de toutes les énergies et toutes les ressources nationales. Il est vrai, la lutte sera longue mais l'issue est certaine.

En dernier lieu, afin d'éviter les fausses interprétations et les faux-fuyants, pour prouver notre désir de paix, limiter les pertes en vies humaines et les effusions de sang, nous avançons une plate-forme honorable de discussion aux autorités françaises si ces dernières

sont animées de bonne foi et reconnaissent une fois pour toutes aux peuples qu'elles subjuguent le droit de disposer d'eux-mêmes.

- 1) La reconnaissance de la nationalité algérienne par une déclaration officielle abrogeant les édits, décrets et lois faisant de l'Algérie une terre française en déni de l'histoire, de la géographie, de la langue, de la religion et des mœurs du peuple algérien.
- 2) l'ouverture des négociations avec les porte-parole autorisés du peuple algérien sur les bases de la reconnaissance de la souveraineté algérienne, une et indivisible.
- 3) La création d'un climat de confiance par la libération de tous les détenus politiques, la levée de toutes les mesures d'exception et l'arrêt de toute poursuite contre les forces combattantes.

EN CONTREPARTIE :

- 1) Les intérêts français, culturels et économiques, honnêtement acquis, seront respectés ainsi que les personnes et les familles.
- 2) Tous les français désirant rester en Algérie auront le choix entre leur nationalité et seront de ce fait considérés comme étrangers vis-à-vis des lois en vigueur ou opteront pour la nationalité algérienne et, dans ce cas, seront considérés comme tels en droits et en devoirs.
- 3) Les liens entre la France et l'Algérie seront définis et feront l'objet d'un accord entre les deux puissances sur la base de l'égalité et du respect de chacun.

Algérien ! nous t'invitons à méditer notre charte ci-dessus. Ton devoir est de t'y associer pour sauver notre pays et lui rendre sa liberté ; le Front de libération nationale est ton front, sa victoire est la tienne.

Quant à nous, résolus à poursuivre la lutte, sûrs de tes sentiments anti-impérialistes, nous donnons le meilleur de nous-mêmes à la patrie.

1er Novembre 1954

Le Secrétariat national

Source : Algerian Ministry of information and culture.

PROCLAMATION DU 1^{er} NOVEMBRE 1954.¹

**PEUPLE ALGERIEN,
MILITANTS DE LA CAUSE NATIONALE,**

A vous qui êtes appelés à nous juger (le premier d'une façon général, les seconds tout particulièrement), notre souci en diffusant la présente proclamation est de vous éclairer sur les raisons profondes qui nous ont poussées à agir en vous exposant notre programme, le sens de notre action, le bien fondé de nos vues dont le but demeure l'indépendance nationale dans le cadre nord-africain. Notre desir aussi est de vous éviter la confusion que pourraient entretenir l'impérialisme et ses agents administratifs et autres politicienneurs véreux.

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-L'heure est grave!

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Nous tenons à cet effet à préciser que nous sommes indépendants des deux clans

¹ Source: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, *Discours du Président Houari Boumediène. Du sang à la sueur*, (Alger: SNED, 1979) pp.7-8.

APPENDIX 3:EVIAN AGREEMENTS

18 mars 1962

Le texte des accords d'Évian comprend deux parties:

- 1) un accord de cessez-le-feu, dont l'application est fixée au lendemain 19 mars 1962;
- 2) des déclarations gouvernementales relatives à l'Algérie, qui portent notamment sur :
 - la période de transition jusqu'au référendum d'autodétermination. Pour cette période étaient mis en place un Exécutif provisoire et un Haut-Commissaire représentant l'État français.
 - la libération des prisonniers dans un délai de 20 jours et une mesure d'amnistie générale.
 - l'organisation d'un référendum d'autodétermination dans un délai minimum de trois mois et maximum de six mois.

Dans l'hypothèse où, à la suite du référendum; la solution d'indépendance serait retenue,

- des garanties prévues pour personnes conservant le statut civil de droit français ;
- la programmation du retrait des forces militaires françaises.

I - ACCORD DE CESSEZ-LE-FEU EN ALGÉRIE

ARTICLE PREMIER

Il sera mis fin aux opérations militaires et à toute action armée sur l'ensemble du territoire algérien le 19 mars 1962, à 12 heures.

ARTICLE 2

- Les deux parties s'engagent à interdire tout recours aux actes de violence collective et individuelle.
- Toute action clandestine et contraire à l'ordre public devra prendre fin.

ARTICLE 3

- Les forces combattantes du FLN, existant au jour du cessez-le-feu se stabiliseront à l'intérieur des régions correspondant à leur implantation actuelle.

- Les déplacements individuels des membres de ces forces en dehors de leur région de stationnement se feront sans armes.

ARTICLE 4

Les forces françaises stationnées aux frontières ne se retireront pas avant la proclamation des résultats de l'autodétermination.

ARTICLE 5

Les plans de stationnement de l'armée française en Algérie prévoient les mesures nécessaires pour éviter tout contact entre les forces.

ARTICLE 6

En vue de régler les problèmes relatifs à l'application du cessez-le-feu, il est créé une Commission mixte de cessez-le-feu.

ARTICLE 7

La Commission proposera les mesures à prendre aux instances des deux parties; notamment en ce qui concerne:

- la solution des incidents relevés, après avoir procédé à une enquête sur pièces;
- la résolution des difficultés qui n'auraient pu être réglées sur le plan local.

ARTICLE 8

Chacune des deux parties est représentée au sein de cette Commission par un officier supérieur et au maximum dix membres, personnel de secrétariat compris.

ARTICLE 9

Le siège de la Commission mixte du cessez-le-feu sera fixé à Rocher-Noir.

ARTICLE 10

Dans les départements, la Commission mixte du cessez-le-feu sera représentée, si les nécessités l'imposent, par des commissions locales composées de deux membres pour chacune des parties, qui fonctionneront selon les mêmes principes.

ARTICLE 11

Tous les prisonniers faits au combat détenus par chacune des parties au moment de l'entrée en vigueur du cessez-le-feu, seront libérés; ils seront remis dans les vingt jours à dater du cessez-le-feu aux autorités désignées à cet effet. Les deux parties informeront le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge du lieu du

stationnement de leurs prisonniers et de toutes les mesures prises en faveur de leur libération

II - DÉCLARATIONS GOUVERNEMENTALES DU 19 MARS 1961 RELATIVES À L'ALGÉRIE

A) DÉCLARATION GÉNÉRALE

Le peuple français a, par le référendum du 8 janvier 1961, reconnu aux Algériens le droit de choisir, par voie d'une consultation au suffrage direct et universel, leur destin politique par rapport à la République française.

Les pourparlers qui ont eu lieu à Evian, du 7 mars au 18 mars 1962 entre le gouvernement de la République et le FLN., ont abouti à la conclusion suivante.

Un cessez-le-feu est conclu. Il sera mis fin aux opérations militaires et à la lutte armée sur l'ensemble du territoire algérien le 19 mars 1962, à 12 heures.

Les garanties relatives à la mise en œuvre de l'autodétermination et l'organisation des Pouvoirs publics en Algérie pendant la période transitoire ont été définies d'un commun accord.

La formation, à l'issue de l'autodétermination d'un État indépendant et souverain paraissant conforme aux réalités algériennes et, dans ces conditions, la coopération de la France et de l'Algérie répondant aux intérêts des deux pays, le gouvernement français estime avec le FLN, que la solution de l'indépendance de l'Algérie en coopération avec la France est celle qui correspond à cette situation. Le gouvernement et le FLN ont donc défini d'un commun accord cette solution dans des déclarations qui seront soumises à l'approbation des électeurs lors du scrutin d'autodétermination.

CHAPITRE

PREMIER

De l'organisation des Pouvoirs publics pendant la période transitoire et des garanties de l'autodétermination

a) La consultation d'autodétermination permettra aux électeurs de faire savoir s'ils veulent que l'Algérie soit indépendante (la question ne sera pas posée lors du scrutin, le seul choix sera Indépendance associée à la France ou sécession) et, dans ce cas, s'ils veulent que la France et l'Algérie coopèrent dans les conditions définies par les présentes déclaration.

b) Cette consultation aura lieu sur l'ensemble du territoire algérien, c'est-à-dire dans les quinze départements suivants: Alger, Batna, Bône, Constantine, Médéa, Mostaganem, Oasis, Oran, Orléansville, Saida, Saoura, Sétif, Tiaret, Tizi-Ouzou, Tlemcen.

Les résultats des différents bureaux de vote seront totalisés et proclamés pour l'ensemble du territoire.

c) La liberté et la sincérité de la consultation seront garanties conformément au règlement fixant les conditions de la consultation d'autodétermination.

d) Jusqu'à l'accomplissement de l'autodétermination, l'organisation des Pouvoirs publics en Algérie sera établie conformément au règlement qui accompagne la présente déclaration. Il est institué un Exécutif provisoire et un Tribunal de l'ordre public. La République est représentée par un haut commissaire. Ces institutions et notamment l'Exécutif provisoire seront installées dès l'entrée en vigueur du cessez-le-feu.

e) Le haut commissaire sera dépositaire des pouvoirs de la République en Algérie, notamment en matière de défense, de sécurité et de maintien de l'ordre et en dernier ressort.

f) L'Exécutif provisoire sera chargé notamment:

- d'assurer la gestion des affaires publiques propres à l'Algérie. Il dirigera l'administration de l'Algérie et aura pour mission de faire accéder les Algériens aux emplois dans les différentes branches de cette administration;
- de maintenir l'ordre public. Il disposera, à cet effet, des services de police et d'une force d'ordre placée sous son autorité;
- de préparer et de mettre en œuvre l'autodétermination.

g) Le Tribunal de l'ordre public sera composé d'un nombre égal de juges européens et de juges musulmans.

h) Le plein exercice des libertés individuelles et des libertés publiques sera rétabli dans les plus brefs délais.

i) Le FLN, sera considéré comme une formation politique de caractère légal.

j) Les personnes internées tant en France qu'en Algérie seront libérées dans un délai maximum de vingt jours à compter du cessez-le-feu.

k) L'amnistie sera immédiatement proclamée. Les personnes détenues seront libérées.

l) Les personnes réfugiées à l'étranger pourront rentrer en Algérie. Des Commissions siégeant au Maroc et en Tunisie faciliteront ce retour. Les personnes regroupées pourront rejoindre leur lieu de résidence habituel. L'Exécutif provisoire prendra les premières mesures sociales, économiques et autres destinées à assurer le retour de ces populations à une vie normale.

m) Le scrutin d'autodétermination aura lieu dans un délai minimum de trois mois et dans un délai maximum de six mois. La date en sera fixée sur proposition de l'Exécutif provisoire dans les deux mois qui suivront l'installation de celui-ci.

CHAPITRE

II

De l'indépendance et de la coopération

Si la solution d'indépendance et de coopération est adoptée, Le contenu des présentes déclarations s'imposera à l'État algérien.

A) DE L'INDÉPENDANCE DE L'ALGÉRIE

I. - L'État algérien exercera sa souveraineté pleine et entière à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur.

Cette souveraineté s'exercera dans tous les domaines, notamment la défense nationale et les affaires étrangères.

L'État algérien se donnera librement ses propres institutions et choisira le régime politique et social qu'il jugera le plus conforme à ses intérêts.

Sur le plan international, il définira et appliquera en toute souveraineté la politique de son choix.

L'État algérien souscrira sans réserve à la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'Homme et fondera ses institutions sur les principes démocratiques et sur l'égalité des droits politiques entre tous les citoyens sans discrimination de race, d'origine ou de religion. Il appliquera, notamment, les garanties reconnues aux citoyens de statut civil français.

II - Des droits et libertés des personnes et de leurs garanties

Dispositions communes

Nul ne pourra faire l'objet de mesures de police ou de justice, de sanctions disciplinaires ou d'une discrimination quelconque en raison:

- d'opinions émises à l'occasion des événements survenus en Algérie avant le jour du scrutin d'autodétermination;
- d'actes commis à l'occasion des mêmes événements avant le jour de la proclamation du cessez-le-feu.
- Aucun Algérien ne pourra être contraint de quitter le territoire algérien ni empêché d'en sortir.

**Dispositions concernant les citoyens français de statut civil de droit commun
(Les Pieds noirs)**

a) Dans le cadre de la législation algérienne sur la nationalité, la situation légale des citoyens français de statut civil de droit commun est réglée selon les principes suivants. Pour une période de trois années à dater du jour de l'autodétermination, les citoyens français de statut civil de droit commun:

- nés en Algérie et justifiant de dix années de résidence habituelle et régulière sur le territoire algérien au jour de l'autodétermination;
- ou justifiant de dix années de résidence habituelle et régulière sur le territoire algérien au jour de l'autodétermination et dont le père ou la mère né en Algérie remplit, ou aurait pu remplir, les conditions pour exercer les droits civiques;
- ou justifiant de vingt années de résidence habituelle et régulière sur le territoire algérien au jour de l'autodétermination, bénéficieront, de plein droit, des droits civiques algériens et seront considérés, de ce fait, comme des nationaux français exerçant les droits civiques algériens.

Les nationaux français exerçant les droits civiques algériens ne peuvent exercer simultanément les droits civiques français. Au terme du délai de trois années susvisé, ils acquièrent la nationalité algérienne par une demande d'inscription ou de confirmation de leur inscription sur les listes électorales; à défaut de cette demande, ils sont admis au bénéfice de la convention d'établissement.

b) Afin d'assurer, pendant un délai de trois années, aux nationaux exerçant les droits civiques algériens et à l'issue de ce délai, de façon permanente, aux Algériens de statut civil français (Les Pieds Noirs), la protection de leur personne et de leurs biens, et leur participation régulière à la vie de l'Algérie, les mesures suivantes sont prévues :

Ils auront une juste et authentique participation aux affaires publiques. Dans les assemblées, leur représentation devra correspondre à leur importance effective. Dans les diverses branches de la fonction publique, ils seront assurés d'une équitable participation.

Leur participation à la vie municipale à Alger et à Oran fera l'objet de dispositions particulières.

Leurs droits de propriété seront respectés. Aucune mesure de dépossession ne sera prise à leur encontre sans l'octroi d'une indemnité équitable préalablement fixée.

Ils recevront les garanties appropriées à leurs particularismes culturel, linguistique et religieux. Ils conserveront leur statut personnel qui sera respecté et appliqué par des juridictions algériennes comprenant des magistrats de même statut. Ils utiliseront la langue française au sein des assemblées et dans leurs rapports avec les Pouvoirs publics. Une association de sauvegarde contribuera à la protection des droits qui leur sont garantis. Une Cour des garanties, institution de droit interne algérien, sera chargée de veiller au respect de ces droits.

B) DE LA COOPÉRATION ENTRE LA FRANCE ET L'ALGÉRIE

Les relations entre les deux pays seront fondées, dans le respect mutuel de leur indépendance, sur la réciprocité des avantages et l'intérêt des deux parties.

L'Algérie garantit les intérêts de la France et les droits acquis des personnes physiques et morales dans les conditions fixées par les présentes déclarations. en contrepartie, la France accordera à l'Algérie son assistance technique et culturelle et apportera à son développement économique et social une aide financière privilégiée.

1° Pour une période de trois ans renouvelable, l'aide de la France sera fixée dans des conditions comparables et à un niveau équivalent à ceux des programmes en cours.

Dans le respect de l'indépendance commerciale et douanière de l'Algérie, les deux pays détermineront les différents domaines où les échanges commerciaux bénéficieront d'un régime préférentiel. L'Algérie fera partie de la zone franc. Elle aura sa propre monnaie et ses propres avoirs en devises. Il y aura entre la France et l'Algérie liberté des transferts dans des conditions compatibles avec le développement économique et social de l'Algérie.

2° Dans les départements actuels des Oasis et de la Saoura, la mise en valeur des richesses du sous-sol aura lieu selon les principes suivants:

a) La coopération franco algérienne sera assurée par un organisme technique de coopération saharienne. Cet organisme aura un caractère paritaire. Son rôle sera notamment de développer l'infrastructure nécessaire à l'exploitation du sous-sol, de donner un avis sur les projets de loi et de règlements à caractère minier, d'instruire les demandes relatives à l'octroi des titres miniers : l'État algérien délivrera les titres miniers et édictera la législation minière en toute souveraineté

b) Les intérêts français seront assurés notamment par:

- l'exercice, suivant les règles du code pétrolier saharien, tel qu'il existe actuellement, des droits attachés aux titres miniers délivrés par la France;
- la préférence, à égalité d'offre, aux sociétés françaises dans l'octroi de nouveaux permis miniers, selon les modalités prévues par la législation minière algérienne;
- le paiement en francs français des hydrocarbures sahariens à concurrence des besoins d'approvisionnement de la France et des autres pays de la zone franc.

3° La France et l'Algérie développeront leurs relations culturelles.

Chaque pays pourra créer sur le territoire de l'autre un office universitaire et culturel, dont les établissements seront ouverts à tous.

La France apportera son aide à la formation de techniciens algériens.

Des personnels français, notamment des enseignants et des techniciens, seront mis à la disposition du gouvernement algérien par accord entre les deux pays.

III. DU RÈGLEMENT DES QUESTIONS MILITAIRES

Si la solution d'indépendance de l'Algérie et de coopération entre l'Algérie et la France est adoptée, les questions militaires seront réglées selon les principes suivants :

- Les forces françaises, dont les effectifs auront été progressivement réduits à partir du cessez-le-feu, se retireront des frontières de l'Algérie au moment de l'accomplissement de l'autodétermination ; leurs effectifs seront ramenés, dans un délai de douze mois à compter de l'autodétermination, à quatre-vingt mille hommes ; le rapatriement de ces effectifs devra avoir été réalisé à l'expiration d'un second délai de vingt-quatre mois. Des installations militaires seront corrélativement dégagées ;
- L'Algérie concède à bail à la France l'utilisation de la base de Mers El-Kébir pour une période de quinze ans, renouvelable par accord entre les deux pays ;
- L'Algérie concède également à la France l'utilisation de certains aérodromes, terrains, sites et installations militaires qui lui sont nécessaires.

IV. DU RÈGLEMENT DES LITIGES

La France et l'Algérie résoudront les différends qui viendraient à surgir entre elles par des moyens de règlement pacifique. Elles auront recours soit à la conciliation, soit à l'arbitrage. A défaut d'accord sur ces procédures, chacun des deux États pourra saisir directement la Cour internationale de justice.

V. DES CONSÉQUENCES DE L'AUTODÉTERMINATION

Dès l'annonce officielle prévue à l'article 27 du règlement de l'autodétermination, les actes correspondant à ces résultats seront établis.

Si la solution d'indépendance et de coopération est adoptée

- l'indépendance de l'Algérie sera immédiatement reconnue par la France
- les transferts de compétence seront aussitôt réalisés ;
- les règles énoncées par la présente déclaration générale et les déclarations jointes entreront en même temps en vigueur.

Appendix 4:Lalla Maghnia Treaty, le 18 mars 1845 (extraits)

A la suite du conflit armé franco-marocain de 1844, un traité de délimitation frontalière est conclu entre le représentant du gouvernement du roi Louis-Philippe et le représentant du sultan Moulay Abderrahman à Lalla Maghnia (en Algérie, à 26 kms d'Oujda). Au-delà du contexte propre aux relations franco-marocaines, ce texte permet de réfléchir aux modalités de tracé d'une frontière à l'époque contemporaine.

3. (...)

ARTICLE PREMIER

4. - Les deux plénipotentiaires sont convenus que les limites qui existaient autrefois entre le Maroc et la Turquie resteront les mêmes entre l'Algérie et le Maroc. (...)

ART. 2

5. - Les plénipotentiaires ont tracé la limite au moyen des lieux par lesquels elle passe et touchant lesquels ils sont tombés d'accord, en sorte que cette limite est devenue aussi claire et aussi évidente que le serait une ligne tracée.

6. Ce qui est à l'est de cette limite appartient à l'Algérie. Tout ce qui est à l'ouest appartient au Maroc.

ART. 3

7. - La désignation du commencement de la limite et des lieux par lesquels elle passe est ainsi qu'il suit : cette ligne commence à l'embouche de l'oued [...] Adjeroud dans la mer ; elle remonte avec ce cours d'eau jusqu'à la source nommée Ras-el-Aïoun, et qui se retrouve au pied de trois collines portant le nom de Menasseb-Kiss, (...) De là, elle prend la direction sud jusqu'à Kheneg-el-Hada, d'où elle marche sur Tenïet- el Sassi, col dont la jouissance appartient aux deux empires. Pour établir plus nettement la délimitation à partir de la mer jusqu'au commencement du désert, il ne faut point omettre de faire mention, et du terrain qui touche immédiatement à l'est la ligne susdésignée, et du nom des tribus qui y sont établies.

ART. 4

8. - Dans le Sahara (désert), il n'y a pas de limite territoriale à établir entre les deux pays, puisque la terre ne se laboure pas et qu'elle sert seulement de pacage aux Arabes des empires qui viennent y

camper pour y trouver les pâturages et les eaux qui leur sont nécessaires. Les deux souverains exerceront de la manière qu'ils l'entendront toute la plénitude de leurs droits sur leurs sujets respectifs dans le Sahara. (...)

ART. 5

9. - Cet article est relatif à la désignation des kessours (villages du désert) des deux empires.
10. Les Kessours qui appartiennent au Maroc sont ceux de Yiche et de Figuig.
11. Les Kessours qui appartiennent à l'Algérie sont : Aïn-Saffra, S'fissifa, Assla, Tiout, Chellala, El-Abiad et Bou-Semghoune.

12. ART. 6

13. - Quant au pays qui est au sud des kessours des deux gouvernements, comme il n'a pas d'eau, qu'il est inhabitable et que c'est le désert proprement dit, la délimitation en serait superflue.
14. Fait sur le territoire français voisin des limites,

15. Le 18 mars 1845 (9 de rabiâa-elouel, 1260 de l'hégyre)

16. (...) **Le général comité DE LA RUE, ALMIDA-BEN-ALI**

Source: <http://www.efmaroc.org/cea/pdf/dosh1.pdf>

APPENDIX 5: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

- 1- From your own perspective, what is your assessment about the relations between Morocco and Algeria ? And Algeria's foreign policy role in the Western Sahara Conflict?**
- 2- What do you say about the Military system and the state system Algeria?**
- 3- Do you think that it's genuine from the Algerian side what they are doing ; which the defense of self-determination?**
- 4- Why Algeria and Morocco have these intermittent tensions ? do you think that Algeria has a role in the Sahara Conflict ? How can this problembe solved?**
- 5- What are the real reasons of Algeria's welcoming the Polisario? If Algeria didn't exist what would bet he future of the Polisario? Can Algeria open these camps to them?**
- 6- And how do you see the Morocco-Algerians relations regarding the Sahara conflict, from your own perspective?**
- 7- What are the perspectives of these two countries, because of the Sahara conflict? How can Morocco and Algeria come together, sit and talk to solve these relations?**