Gender Work: A Sequential-Categorical Analysis of Moroccan Mundane Conversations and Calls to Phone-in Programs

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the doctorate degree in English studies

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Supervised by Dr. Fatima Mouaid

Academic year: 2017-2018
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CEDoc: Esthétiques et Sciences de L’homme  
Formation doctorale: Langages et Formes Symboliques  
Spécialité: Langue et littérature anglaises

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تتعلق هذه الدراسة من حيث ينتهي البحث حول النوع الاجتماعي واختلافات اللغة، حيث تقر بالأزمة التي يعيشها أفراد الدراسة، هذا كونها تعرض لمجموعة من الانتقادات حول طبيعة مهجة وأشكاله النظرية. فقد اعتير عدد من الدراسات على الأطروحة الماهية للحقول التي تتجلى في اعتبار النوع الاجتماعي ميزة طبيعية عند الرجال والنساء، وفي تركيزه على الفروق اللغوية الناتجة عن هاته العينة وأيضاً في إهمال قضايا أخرى تتعلق في الأهمية. يضاف لهذه الانتقادات بروز النظرية البنائية في العلوم الإنسانية عامة وعلم الاجتماع خاصة. فالإطار الذي تقدمه النظرية البنائية يمهد دراسة النوع الاجتماعي كعملية تفاعلية متصلة في الكلام أو الحوارات اليومية. يهدف تحليل النوع الاجتماعي من منظور بنائي، عند عدد متزايد من الباحثين على مبادئ تحليل الحوار وتحليل العضوية التصنيفية. تقدم أدوات التحليل في هاته المقترحين مدخلاً لدراسة الهوية من حيث كونها ممارسة في سياق المحادثات اليومية، على اعتبار أن هاته الأخيرة تمثل تجسيداً لمختلف التظ颧يمات التحليلية والتصنيفية، والتي يدورها تسمى بتجسيد الهوية بشكل روائي. وتخذ كلاً هاتين التقدمتين الإثنيولوجيا والنقدية التفاعلية مرحلة نظرياً لها. تعرف الإثنيولوجيا خصوصاً تركزها على دراسة المؤسسات الاجتماعية كأشكال تتنتج عن قاعدة سياقية، موضوعية، وفاعلية. وبهذا، فالإثنيولوجيا تشتهر برفض أصحابها الإسقدر على البنية الاجتماعية كليات لتفسير الفعل الاجتماعي واعتباره أن هاته البنية تحقق في الأساليب والطرق العملية المحددة بالحسن العام، أو المنطقة العام، المشترك بين أفراد المجتمع وليس العكس.

تتمحور هاته الدراسة حول النوع الاجتماعي كإحدى هاته الطرق، إذ تُستنبتع بالتحليل وبحث العمل التفاعلي في الحوارات اليومية في شقي التحليلي والتصنيفي، وذلك من أجل استقصاء مختلف العمليات التي من خلالها يمكن المتحدثين من بناء النوع الاجتماعي، وجعل هذا البناء عملية قابلة للتفاوض ورغم أو الدعم داخل الفضاء الحواري. ويتقدم هذا البحث على التسجيلات الصوتية للمحادثات الاعتيادية بين الأفراد وكلاً المحادثات الهادفة التي تنتمى بعض البرامج الإذاعية والتي قام الباحث ببنفسها. يهدف تحليل خصائصها التحليلية والتصنيفية في ما يتعلق منها بالنوع الاجتماعي. يُخْصَص تحليل المضمنات رسمياً. أولى أن أعضاء المجتمع الغربي يستندون في تصنيفاتهم للهيكلية على ما يمكن أن يسمى الفئات الثقافية للنوع الاجتماعي، أي تلك التي تدخل في المنطقة العام المشترك، بهدف تحقيق هوية مرجعية داخل تفاعل حواري. ما أن هذه الفئات ليست ساكنة، بل يُشَتَّكْها أفراد المجتمع بهدف تنظيم التسلسل الحواري والحصول على نتائج جزء من تشكيل العادات من المحادثة. لهذا فإن الهوية التي يُشَكَّلُها النوع الاجتماعي تُشَكِّلُ في المحادثات اليومية. كخلاصة، يعتبر هذا البحث النوع الاجتماعي أنجزاً على مستوى الخطاب. ثاني، أن المحادثة هي أن المتحدثين يعذرون تصنيفات النوع الاجتماعي لحل مشكلات أخلاقيات تواجههم في حياتهم اليومية. إذ فعال الطريق التصنيفي داخل المحادثات إذاً يُشكِّلُهُم الهوية فهو في نفس الوقت يستغل هذا التشكيل من أجل فهم واستيعاب القضايا الأخلاقية في المجتمع. يحل هذا البحث إذناً تشكيل النوع الاجتماعي ويَفْقَى على تفصيلاته داخل المحادثات اليومية والمكالمات الهادفة.

النوع الاجتماعي، الهوية، قضايا أخلاقيات، تحليل الحوار، العضوية التصنيفية، المكالمات الهادفة،

الإثنيولوجيا
Abstract

Research on gender and language has been through a recent crisis. The study of ‘difference’ has no longer any appeal since its drawbacks were exposed. In fact, many scholars attacked its inherent essentialism and its unjustified focus on ‘differences’ to the exclusion of other interesting phenomena. Added to this attack is the wider currency of constructionism: constructionists argue for the centrality of the performative qualities of language for the situated construction of gender identities. The framework allows an investigation of gender as a responsive and intersubjective process in talk. In order to study societal members’ orientation to the intersubjective character of gender, researchers have recently drawn on the principles of Conversation Analysis and Membership Categorization Analysis, especially as their tools pay close attention to the local and performative character of identities in situ in the immediate context offered by talk as the site of multiple forms of sequential and categorial organizations. Both approaches take Ethnomethodology other stands of interactionism as their theoretical foundation. The former particularly goes to great length in insisting on the situated, local, and interactional basis of all forms of social institutions. Ethnomethodology is especially known for its reluctance to draw on external social structures, seeing these as brought off by social members’ common sense practical methods rather than vice versa.

One such aspect of common sense practices is taken up here. The sequential and categorial aspects of Moroccan members’ work in talk are traced in order to see how gender gets constructed, negotiated and sustained; and what the consequences are for such work. Recordings of naturally occurring data in the form of mundane talk and calls to radio-phone programs are used. The recordings were transcribed and their sequential and categorial aspects investigated. Two results of the investigation stand out. First, Moroccans draw on default gender categories, i.e., common sense, to achieve a particular type of gender identity. However; common sense gender categories are not static, but can be used to organize members’ conversational moves to bring off particular outcomes. Gender identity work is inextricably tied to the performative nature of talk. It is, in short, a discursive achievement. Second, and relatedly, Moroccan societal members bring gender categorization to bear on everyday moral dilemmas they face in ordinary life. Their categorial work reflexively constructs gender identities as well as exploits these to make sense of moral issues. The details of gender work are discussed, its nuisances and implications are listed, and its applications are then considered.

**Key words**: gender construction, identity, morality, conversation analysis, membership categorization, telephone calls, Ethnomethodology.
Acknowledgment

I would like to express my sincere appreciation and gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Fatima Mouaid, for her academic rigor, but more so, for her humane sense all through the process of writing this research. I thank her for her efforts in supervising, reading, re-reading, correcting, improving the writing of the present thesis, but I cannot thank her enough for her patience, understanding, and encouragement in the face of many difficulties I encountered, as I know every Ph.D. student does, during four years over which the writing of this dissertation spanned. I was lucky and honored to have her as my supervisor.

I also would like to thank two authors that answered my questions when I needed answers, and contributed materials when there were none to be found. Professor Celia Kitzinger, of York University, has shown enthusiasm and willingness to discuss parts of this work with me through the many correspondences we had by email. Professor Elizabeth Stokoe was especially helpful when I was puzzled by some aspects of sequential and categorial analysis.

I would like to thank people behind Manny Schegloff’s archives and those behind John Heritage’s. Finding seminal articles by founders of conversation analysis has never been easy. I ticked what articles I wanted, and they supplied them instantly; I am really grateful to them.

I came in contact with the field of gender and language during my third year as an undergraduate student. This contact turned into some form of specialization during my two years Master studies in Applied Language Studies and Issues in Higher education at the faculty of the human sciences, USMBA. I would like thank all the professors who taught me during those two years. They are the ones I nostalgically look back to when I really and truly miss formal education inside a classroom.
Dedication

I refrained from dedicating any previous ‘project de fin d’étude’ to my mother Hadda and father Driss, fearing the work unworthy of being dedicated to them. ‘Let it be for another time, I said, when the project is more serious in tenor and more perfect in writing’.

I realize now that no work is perfect. If anything, whether a BA, MA, or a PhD project, writing only has made me want to learn more, as I feel more ignorant the more I read or write. There simply can be no perfection and no end to it; but this should not prevent me from being grateful, not without pride, to the source of my each and every achievement in life. And this source is my mother’s love and my father’s belief that I can always do better. To them I say a very big thank you.

I started my PhD journey at my dad and mom’s place and I ended it up in my own, and my wife’s. My life within a family, as a husband and a father, has opened my eyes to the injustices, I sadly admit, that wives suffer from in our society. Often a time, and desperate for some time to read a book or finish a chapter, I would get all the time I needed by taking privilege of my identity as a man and as father. I remember those times when my wife needed my help with, then, our newly born daughter Joudy, but I could easily ‘silence’ her solicitations by a simple categorial move: “but, you’re her mother not I”, I let our culture do the rest, and I run away with it all too easily. I very sincerely apologize to my wife, Fatima, and I offer her this work as a placatory token; although, I know she is only happy to see me through.

To my mother- and my father-in-law Drissia and Aziz I also offer this work. They were in a very literal sense more like a second mother and father than in-laws- with their encouragement, support and all.
Key to phonological symbols

The phonological symbols used in this work are based on IPA and Sadiqi (2003). Where capital letters are used to transcribe pharyngealization in Sadiqi (2003), superscripts (dot above the symbol) are used here. Gemination is denoted by consonant doubling. Where French words are used, writing the words has been chosen over transcribing them in order not to clutter the text with additional phonetic symbols.

**Consonants**

b: ب  
t: ث  
r: ر  
z: ز  
�: ج  
k: ك  
h: ح  
d: د  
f: ف  
s: س  
ʃ: ش  
g: گ  
x: خ  
ʕ: ع  
m: م  
ɡ: ق  
ш: ض

**Vowels**

a: /maðahir/ appearances  
o: /doktor/ doctor  
e: /semana/ a week  
i: /simana/ a week  
u: /ʃkuːn/ who  
ə: /rrazə:l/ husband
Key to transcription symbols

The symbols employed and their use are a simpler version of the elaborated symbols used in much work in Conversation Analysis. The conventions are those in Jefferson (2004).

. End of a turn.

[ The onset of overlap.

= No gap between line, either by same speaker or different speakers.

(0.4) Time elapsed in silence in tenths of seconds.

(.) Short gap, no more than one tenth of a second.

: Vowel length. Exp. “ʃku:n” (who)

Capital Loud sounds.

Underline Extra stress on a syllable, word, etc.

hh Outbreath.

.hh Inbreath.

hhhhh laughter. Time estimated is indicated by the number of h’s.

( ) Unclear talk.

(( )) Description rather than transcription.

— Cut off or self-interruption.

○ ○ Quite or soft talk

> text< Rushed or compressed talk.

<text > Slow talk.

↓ downward intonation

↑ upward intonation.
List of Abbreviations

**MCA**: Membership Categorization Analysis.

**CA**: Conversation Analysis.

**MA**: Moroccan Arabic.

**CDA**: Critical Discourse Analysis.

**SA**: Speech Act.

**FCA**: Feminist Conversation Analysis

**SRP**: Standardized Relational Pair.

**MCD**: Membership Categorization Device.

**FPP**: First Pair Part.

**SPP**: Second Pair Part.

**CARM**: Conversation Analysis Role-play Method.

Tables

Table 1: Time length of recordings of mundane conversations.

Table 2: Radio programs selected for analysis
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Chapter IV: The interactional relevance of gender to talk and its moral character

Introduction

1. Linguistic and interactional relevance of gender categories
2. The moral character of gender categories
Summary

Chapter V: Gender-work, conclusions and implications

Introduction

1. Gender work: Summaries
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General introduction

That language is now a basic component in the study of all, or almost all, human conduct is hardly new for social scientists. Scholars who contributed to the inception and subsequent development of the many cross-disciplines of Sociolinguistics (Fasold, 1990; Labov, 1972; Wardhaugh and Fuller, 2015), Interactional Linguistics (Gumpertz, 1982; Tannen, 1993), Ethnography of Communication (Hymes, 1964; Saville-Troike, 2002), Discursive Psychology (Billig, 2009), and the body of work that now go under the umbrella term of ‘Discourse Analysis’ (Burr, 1995) argue very strongly for the focal place of language in the construction of the self and the social reality of its users and the maintenance as well as the transmission of the cultural patterns in any society. So much was the power of language recognized that for some scholars its grip on the social, psychological and cognitive realities of its users was deterministic, as embodied, for example, in the Whorfian linguistic determinism.

Recognizing the centrality of language to the maintenance of social and psychological realities was indeed the starting point for the interdisciplinary field that related language to the situations of women. As a research arena, ‘gender and language’ undertook the study of the various facets of interaction between the two; and, since its inception, it found the tools of Sociolinguistics, Interactional Linguistics, Ethnography and Discourse Analysis handy in order to explore those facets, and even to propose change in some. For its most part, the analysis has for decades burgeoned within a paradigm characterized by a focus on ‘difference’; that is, discrepancies of form and usage were linked to gender as one element in a long list of social, psychological and contextual features — features that are said to affect how people use language. Inherent in this view of linguistic difference is an assumed stability of gender. Whether conceived in biological or social terms, gender was considered a ‘once and for all’, unchanging and unchangeable entity, or identity, that is, naturally enough, located within the psychological makeup of people.

However, no sooner had this conception of human beings been established, than the field came under attack. Most criticism centered on what were seen as essentialist claims made by scholars who use gender as an innate feature to explain behavioral differences. Essentialists claimed that gender explains, even predicts, differences in language use between men and women. It was treated all along as a variable along with other psychological entities endowed with an explanatory power, just like motivation, attitudes, drives, etc. In sociolinguistics, it was more akin to social features such as class, ethnicity, and age. In short, and given its
in institutional character in almost all known societies, gender was considered a structure with its own dictates.

In order to avoid the essentialist fallacy and its many shortcomings (Sadiqi, 2003; Burr, 1995), scholars have reached for alternative frameworks. The latter came in the form of an embracement of a sort of constructionism where gender was not seen as a personal trait but a social construction enabled by the performative quality of language. The starting point for the new paradigm was a focus on language to see how gender identities are constructed, carried through, and enacted — rather than reflected in — language. In this line of inquiry it was in discourse, not in the psyche, nor in social structure, that researchers investigated the gender relationships, women’s subordinate situation, gender roles, gender divisions, sexism, etc.

Gender performance, in other words, was recognized for what it is, as primarily a discursive phenomenon played out in discursive performance with consequences on the social situation of social actors. The study of discourse has thus opened the door for the study of gender as a process lived out principally in the linguistic arena.

Dynamic as it was, however, Discourse Analysis have failed to appropriately engage with language in its most basic manifestation in conversational form. This is true of major constructionist approaches to discourse analysis like Communities of Practice (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 2003, 1992), Interactional Sociolinguistics (Tannen, 1993), or even Postmodernist Discourse Analysis (Lazar, 2008). Instead of bringing their views on language to their logical conclusion, which means here a detailed attention to conversational practices, discourse analysts have instead chosen to take gender out of individuals and place it within a discursive realm (Bozatzis, 2011). The realities described were consequently far more abstract, and no less essentialist, than the notions constructionists attacked in the first place. In Foucauldian Discourse Analysis, for example, discourse has a real existence independent of its users (Burr, 1995; Bouzatzis, 2011, Wetherell, 1998). Taken to the extreme, this view has resulted, in Burr’s view, in considering individuals as “spoken by discourse” (1995, p. 61). Thus, a focus on ‘discourse’ has ultimately led to the obliteration of its most basic facet in conversation.

The present dissertation aims essentially at addressing this lacuna in much social constructionist work by drawing on an entirely different theoretical framework and methodology. If gender is indeed a social and discursive practice, then one must look for it in the details of social actors’ everyday practices to see how these enable gender patterns to
emerge out of the variable, varied, ever changing, and ever evolving social contexts people find themselves in, and of which they try to make sense. Gender, accordingly, becomes both an everyday performance and a sense making device, both in the sense of Garfinkel (1967, see also Heritage, 1984b). More than this, and since much of everyday life is interactive, it is but one small step to see how gender is a collaboratively joint practice and a shared resource for members to organize their daily lives (Kessler and McKenna, 1978). In short, gender is not subjective but is rather, to adopt Heritage’s widely known idea (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984; Heritage, 2007) words, an intersubjective achievement.

As a consequence to this view, and given the centrality of language in the performance of everyday social practices, it is sensible to look for gender not in a discursive realm abstractly conceived, but in the daily situations of social life; specifically in everyday conversations, or what Schegloff terms “talk-in-interaction” ((1987, p. 207)).

This view of gender emanates from the theoretical principles of Ethnomethodology (Heritage, 1984b, Kessler and McKenna, 1985). Their conversion into a research program is enabled by the methodological and analytical tools of Conversation Analysis (CA) and Membership Categorization analysis (MCA), the former being concerned with sequential organization of talk-interaction (Schegloff, 2007a) and the latter with the organization of resources of person description and categorization. Both kinds of organization are motivated by the action aspects of talk; hence both methods share in the view that language has primarily a performative character. In short, gender is here seen as an intersubjectively organized action in talk.

Obviously, this conception of language and gender requires asking different sort of questions than those traditionally asked within the ‘difference’ tradition, or even within a discourse analytic paradigm widely conceived. The present work is designed to answer two overarching questions. Both questions take the ways social actors orient to gender in talk as their starting point each comprises a subset of other questions.

The first question is: What are the social and cultural linguistic resources exploited by members to interactionally achieve, display, or ratify their gender identities? A brief answer to this question is that genderized membership categories in talk are the cultural building blocks out of which social interactants carve their gender identities in situ, not only for themselves but for other people as well. Categorial work is used as a practice that relies on shared and common sense properties of membership categories to do the work of gendering social life so as to make it understandable.
This said, it is important to stress that, for the most part for social actors, gendering the social sphere is done only in passing in the categorial work of interactants. For, in invoking membership categories, other more local and more concrete activities get done as well. The analysis of these locally interactional activities is therefore the right way to glimpse at the how gendering Moroccan social life is achieved cumulatively. Given the inherent complexity of the subject matter, the research question above can therefore be split into other sub-questions:

- How are gender expectations and orientations built out of categories?
- How are gender roles and identity boundaries constructed via properties of membership categories?
- How and why is ‘working mothers’ still a marked category in the Moroccan society?
- How does categorial work by interactants contribute to the construction of versions of accounts designed to display specific versions of social problems related to gender identities?
- How are specific versions of gender-related social problems ratified and negotiated in interactions?
- How are reformulation and repair of categories embedded in the negotiations of accounts, gender problems and gender relations in interaction?

It will be seen that, in answering these questions in the body of the dissertation, the aims is to focus on gender categories as a sense making resource capable of both invoking a social and cultural order and realizing it at the same time at the interactional level.

The second overarching question aims to look into gender performance in interaction. Its component set of questions relates specifically to one kind of work gender does, and this is the moral work. Analyzing the moral work of gender categorization is carried here not along the lines of Gillian’s theory of gender differences in moral judgments, but in an ethnomethodological sense in which categories are tied to specific moral expectations embodied in their use (Jayyusi, 1984; Stokoe and Edwards, 2009, 2012; Watson, 1978; Wowk, 1984). The question of what differences might exist between the moral judgments of men and women has consequently no place here, since it reflects the same essentialist claims that an analysis motivated by social constructionism tries to eschew. In its place, a more pertinent set of questions runs along the following lines:
- When and how does gender become consequential to the moral outcome of interaction?
- How do gender categories perform moral judgments, evaluations, blame; in short, moral work in interaction?

It will quickly be seen that the entire project for this dissertation is descriptive in nature. Heritage argues rather cogently that Ethnomethodology sees social life as carried mostly through description (1984b, p. 137) and that social science can only begin with the description of everyday common sense methods as organizing patterns of social life if a scientific account of them is to be had.

One merit, then, in phrasing the above research questions in the ‘how-interrogative’ is a full commitment to a descriptive enterprise ‘pre-required’ for any discourse analytic work (Schegloff, 1997); otherwise, researchers, as Schegloff warns in many articles (1987a, 1991, 1997), will end up glossing that which they take as their object of study. That is, instead of a painstaking engagement with data, researchers’ exit them early on in the form of coding, either quantitatively as in much feature-count research; or qualitatively, as in the ‘thematizing’ tradition of interactionism (Tannen, 1990; Sadiqi, 2003). In both kinds of work, the raw intricacies of everyday talk-in-interaction are lost in favor of a tendency to gloss them, as patterns, styles, or as discourse. As an alternative, the present work seeks to describe the ways societal members achieve gender identities and the ways gendered cultural patterns reside in talk.

The objectives of the study are achieved through examining recordings of mundane conversations and recording of calls to phone-in radio programs. The opening accounts in calls to the programs selected for analysis show callers drawing on categorial knowledge to construct accounts geared towards specific goals. Notwithstanding the institutional character of radio-phone programs as media talk (Fitzgerald and Housley, 2002; Hutchby, 1992, 1996, 2008), or perhaps thanks to it, much categorial work in phone-in program draws on the same patterns as in mundane situations in a way that justifies a disregard for its institutional character. As will be seen, the institutional aspect of the talk is manifest mainly in its sequential organization in the telephone calls episodes and not in the categorial work callers do. Details of the techniques used for the recordings figure in the methodology chapter; a glimpse at the sequential organization of phone-in calls opens up the analysis part.
The body of the present dissertation is then conveniently organized around the above two sets of questions, their theoretical and methodological underpinnings, their implications and their applications in the field of gender and discourse analysis in general. It opens with a review of the literature, in chapter one, which ranges over issues central to the study of gender and language in the last four decades or so. Given that the interrelation of gender and language was a serious undertaking of pioneering sociolinguists, the review opens with a brief account, as well as criticism, of work done within that field. It then goes on to document the beginning of theorizing on gender and language in Lakoff’s work and the subsequent surge of writings in response to her claims. The discussion focuses specifically on some linguistic aspects which epitomize the study of difference: tags, hedges, interruption as well as other aspects. The centrality of those features for the difference paradigm justifies a somewhat detailed uptake of them in the review, even if to show the inconsistency that marked the analytic findings that marked the field.

Following that, the three major theories proposed to account for gender differences in language are discussed. Shortly after that, Conversation Analysis is introduced as an alternative framework; its relationships to Goffman’s work on the one hand, and to Garfinkel’s on the other are briefly discussed, and its distinctive characterization of ‘action’ as sequentially organized is briefly introduced. Conversation analysis is then contrasted to other approaches to the study of talk-in-interaction, namely Pragmatics and Critical Discourse Analysis. Finally, a brief consideration is given to the conversation analytic study of gender.

Based on the discussion of Conversation Analysis, the review moves to discussing its twin-sister, namely, Membership Categorization Analysis. It reviews its major principles and then considers its relation to Conversation Analysis. It ends with a capsule review of work done on gender using Membership Categorization Analysis as a methodological framework.

Chapter two details the major methodological principles of CA and MCA. It includes as well a thorough description of, and rationale for, data collection techniques, data transcription, and data analysis steps used. Other methodological issues are also discussed here, such as the stricture against using ethnographic in analysis and the choice of translation techniques. Given the recent adoption of sequential and categorial analysis by scholars of gender, a brief consideration is given to how gender categories might be fruitfully incorporated in the general analytic framework.
Subsequent to methodology are two chapters that make up the body of analysis in this work. To begin with, chapter three addresses the first set of questions introduced above. It answers each of them separately but the answers hang together by the overall principles, introduced earlier, of CA and MCA with regards to the study of gender. Chapter four then examines how moral principles are built out of the raw materials of gender categorization. Prior to that, the chapter draws a distinction between linguistic gender and interactional gender. The issues implicated by the division are empirically tackled there; but anticipating the discussion somewhat, the distinction cautions against taking the linguistic inflection of Moroccan Arabic for gender as synonymous with its interactional relevance for Moroccan social actors. Even if marked for gender, categories cannot be said to ‘index’ gender interactionally once and for all unless members index them in talk-in-interaction (Ochs, 1992).

Chapter five briefly summarizes the major findings of the analytical chapters, discusses some of their implications for the study of gender, and considers possible venues where the findings can be applied to effect social change. And, last, a general conclusion closes up the discussion in the current work.

In reading the present dissertation, one might perhaps get the feeling that its overall general message is seemingly a redundant one, for it is not research news, and indeed it is a common sense notion, that social life in Morocco is deeply divided across gender lines. With this division, spatial organization, moral entitlements, social resources, rights and obligations ensue from being a man or woman, a mother or a father, a son or daughter, etc., in short, all the well known and much studied dichotomies that are part of the linguistic repertoire of Moroccan Arabic users (Sadiqi, 2003).

Such redundancy is, however, possible and even conceivable if conversational language is taken to really and literally represent the structural organization of the Moroccan society; that is, to represent truths about it ‘described’ by ordinary actors and recognized, collected and explicated by social researchers. Throughout much of the history of gender and language, the latter has been treated as a passive reflect of social facts about the former. Such a view stems from what Heritage refers to as ‘a referential view of language’ (1984b, 135-141), where “the meaning of a word is what it references, corresponds with, or 'stands for' in the real world” (1984b, p. 137). The essentialist conception of gender, coupled with the representative view of language, contributed to the rise to prominence of a program that focused on hypothesized differences, asymmetries, and inequities in language use along gender lines. Thus, such
program contributed even more to the reification of language use and gender, so much so that the findings themselves became more like clichéd stereotypes rather than the results of robust analyses. The wider currency of the results of such program drained their novelty from any academic credibility (the contradictions in the results were baffling), or any political power (i.e., the power to challenge the status quo). To exacerbate the matter further, people descriptions and accounts (in interviews and questionnaires for example) were given a factual status. Descriptions, accounts, and talk in general ‘refer’ to what is actually ‘there in the world’.

It is this conception of language and gender that is attacked in constructionist and ethnomethodological work. In Ethnomethodology, the view that both gender and language are socially constructed phenomena safeguards against turning analysis to a sort of repetitive task, aimed either to corroborate or discredit any hypothesized ‘nature’ of gender or language, whatever that might be. Both Burr (1995) and Heritage (1984b) (see also Speer, 2005) recognize people’s descriptions and accounts of conduct as choices among many other possible and alternative descriptions. Burr stresses the fact that descriptions are discursive practices which result in a person being one sort of person rather than another.

The person you are, your experience, your identity, your ‘personality’ are all the effects of language. This means that we can only represent our experiences to ourselves and to/others by using the concepts embedded in our language, so that our thoughts, our feelings and how we represent our behaviour are all ‘prepackaged’ by language” (1995, p. 26-27).

The linguistic element is thus a crucial one, but language itself, as Heritage argues, is far from being a clear and reliable medium of description since much of language is indexical in nature. In discussing the ethnomethodological conception of language, Heritage (1984b), first treats the range of descriptive practices in everyday conduct on a par with other social conduct — i.e., he treats them as social actions selected from a pool of choices and designed as a means to an end. Descriptions are, thus, not faithful representations of a world existing prior to, and independently of, the doer and receiver of them, but require active contribution on the part of the doer and the receiver of descriptive accounts to establish their meaning(s) in any given context. For Heritage, indexicality is not the property of only some expressions in language but is a major characteristic of all of it. Quoting him at length,
Garfinkel approaches the topic by stressing that understanding language is not to be regarded as a matter of ’cracking a code’ which contains a set of pre-established descriptive terms combined, by the rules of grammar, to yield sentence meanings which express propositions about the world. Understanding language is not, in the first instance, a matter of understanding sentences but of understanding actions - utterances - which are constructively interpreted in relation to their contexts. This involves viewing an utterance against a background of who said it, where and when, what was/ being accomplished by saying it and in the light of what possible consideration and in virtue of what motives it was said. An utterance is that the starting point for a complicated process of interpretative inference rather than something which can be treated as self-subsistently intelligible (1984b, p. 139-140) (emphasis the author’s).

Consequently, and far from treating ordinary talk, descriptions, or accounts as reflective of some state of affairs and therefore symptomatic of problems in Moroccan social life organization, the present work treats such talk as action, designed to implement gender identities for whatever outcomes societal members want to achieve, and which preoccupy them in a specific interactional episode. The action implementation and the identity work in ordinary talk are here subject to analytic investigation in order to see how they are done.

Although it is this line of inquiry that is taken up here, the present dissertation does not aim to question the veracity of the previous findings, being both the result of sociological work on the Moroccan society and a common sense view in it. Nor does it aim to be just another piece of evidence that adds to its facticity. In addition to the focal status given to conversational details, what is novel here is that the analysis of the gendered nature of the social life of Moroccans is not seen as an artifact of overarching social forces or structures, the way Sadiqi (2003) for example argues, but as intersubjective patterns realized in situ each time talk in used to ‘carry out’ the social and cultural structures Moroccans live by. Gender relations, divisions, roles, etc. do not reside in a cultural sphere outside individuals, but are realized each time talk among members takes place.

Briefly then, gender categorization in talk is one concrete vehicle of culture. The present dissertation is an endeavor to carefully take apart that vehicle in order to see how it sets to motion the social forms of gender relations that are, for researchers as well for lay members, recognizably Moroccan.
Chapter I: A review of the literature

Introduction

Chomsky’s linguistics, with its emphasis on the competence of the ideal language speaker in the ideal speech community as the legitimate object of linguistic study, called for reaction from scholars working within socially-oriented linguistic frameworks (Hymes, 1964). The search for autonomy for the field of linguistics, Hymes explains, “joined with other intellectual currents, has led some linguists to divorce the structural study of language from meaning in its broader sense and from social context.” (1964, p. 5). To re-institute the social context to the study of language, the reaction turned instead to the investigation of the ‘communicative competence’ of speakers — a social ability which is influenced by cognitive and social factors and which merits empirical investigation (Rickeit, Strohner and Vorwerg 2008; Hymes 1972).

Broader in its sense, then, communicative competence can be defined as the ability of speakers to communicate in an effective and appropriate manner. For Hymes, speakers learn not only the linguistic code of their community but also how to use it. They learn “when to speak, when not, and also what to talk about, with whom, when, where, in what manner” (1972, p. 277). The inclusion of contextual factors was therefore one major step towards a more socially inclined linguistics. A step that decisively paved the way for the rise of Sociolinguistics,

Within sociolinguistic research itself, the study of communicative competence has concurrently bifurcated into the study of its acquisition, especially by children and second language learners, and the investigation of language variation across context, the latter being comprised of all the factors, linguistic and social, that bear on the verbal performance of speakers (Edelslsky, 1976). Work within the first tradition abounds (Canale and Swain 1980, Keenan 1974, Thompson 1997, Saville-Ttoike 2002). However, concerning the differential acquisition of communicative competence, Edelsky notes that

(d)espite the interest in the two areas of language acquisition and of communicative competence, surprisingly little research combines the two, to deal with the acquisition by children of the sociolinguistic rules shared by adult members of a speech community or interpretation of language that varies with such speech event factors as participants, settings, or topics. (1976, p. 47)
In other words, although socialization was a very well recognized factor affecting how children learn to communicate (Saville-Troike 2002, Zhan 2010), scholars did not consider what effects contextually bound adult language had on its acquisition neither by children nor by second language learners. In short, the effect of variation on acquisition was simply disregarded.

This separation seemed to stem from a research practice that kept apart language ‘form’ and language ‘use’ (Canale and Swain 1980, p. 5). The study of variation in the latter did not call for a similar study in the former.

Sociolinguistics, as an emergent field in the 1960s, took impetus from the then recent recognition that linguistic variation, far from being random, is socially structured. Hymes asserted that “(w)hat seems deviation from the standpoint of a single linguistic code emerges as structure and pattern from the standpoint of the communicative economy of the group in whose habits the code exists.” (1964, p. 3). Among others, Labov (2006) was a pioneer in taking the relation of language and society as the major subject matter of sociolinguistic research. His work extended the notion of ‘patterned variation’ to a complete theory of social stratification of language. Reminiscent of Hymes’ words, Labov considers that when an individual idiolect is studied within the larger speech community, “it is seen as an element in a highly systematic structure of social and stylistic stratification” (2006, p. viii). For Labov, social stratification is the outcome of the twin mechanisms of ‘differentiation’ and ‘evaluation’ of linguistic items that mirror differences in the social world. (ibid., p. 129).

Since social differentiation involves a complex set of different social dimensions, it follows that language variation reflects this complexity. For example, findings from Labov (1972) show how differences in geographic areas, occupation, age and attitudes, correlate with phonological variations in the pronunciation of some vowel sounds in the case of Martha Vineyard study, and how the pronunciation of the a single sound (r) follows class stratification in the case of New York city. In his analysis of social stratification of language, Labov focused on vowels, on the linguistic side, and the socio-economic class, on the social side, as ideal models of correlational studies (Coates, 2004), although he introduced valuable insights that bore on gender as well. Also, Trudgill (1972) investigated language variation across social class and gender lines in the urban British English of Norwich. He borrowed the notions of ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ prestige as well as ‘linguistic insecurity’ from Labov to explain gender differences on phonetic variables. Trudgill’s findings concurred with those of
Labov concerning the effect of social class and gender on linguistic variation, and similar studies (Newbrooks, 1982) followed what Coates referred to as “the standard paradigm of classic sociolinguistic research” (2004, p. 47), i.e. co-relational studies of language and social variables.

Though it grounded linguistic study into a sociological framework, early work focused almost exclusively on phonological variation, to the exclusion of all other linguistic variables that can appropriately be studied using techniques of sociolinguistics. The choice was a response to methodological considerations rather than a theoretical necessity. On the one hand, there was the need to establish the field on a scientific basis (Le Page, 1998). For example, Labov (2006) explained that phonological variables were desirable because they satisfied a number of criteria. They are “high in frequency, have a certain immunity from conscious suppressing, are integral units of larger structures, and may be easily quantified on a linear scale.” (2006 p. 32) (author’s emphasis). The early bias towards sound variation led many authors to call work within that paradigm “sociophonology” (Honey 1998, Wodak and Benke 1998) or, alternatively “sociophonetics” (Preston and Niedzielski 2010). Within this framework, a researcher “studies only those differences of pronunciation which are perceived as socially significant” (Honey, 1998, p. 65).

Summarizing the findings of classic studies, Coates reports that they revealed clear social stratification, and gave rise to the related concepts of prestige and stigma. Prestige is said to be attached to those linguistic forms normally used by the social group with the highest social status….Conversely, stigma is attached to non-standard forms. This stigma may be overt...or it may be beneath the level of public consciousness (2004, p. 47);

With regard to gender, women’s use of standard forms mirrors their orientation towards ‘overt prestige’ (ibid, p. 50). Men employ vernacular speech forms because of the masculinity connotations such forms carry. The connotations formed part of the ‘covert prestige’ (ibid, p. 64).

With regard to gender studies, Sociolinguistics’ outstanding achievement was its ability to produce powerful descriptive generalizations that elucidate the role of gender in language variation. Meyroff (2006) refers to three principles definitely established by variationist work in Sociolinguistics. The first sates that women use the standard form related to overt prestige
for stable sociolinguistic variables. The two other principles relate to sound changes in progress. The second principle stipulates that, for sound changes taking place, and of which people are conscious (above the level of consciousness), women use the standard form more than men. The third principle says that women use the vernacular variant for variants below the level of consciousness.

Notwithstanding its achievements, the early sociolinguistic program came under criticism on different grounds. Theoretically, Cameron (1990) contended that Sociolinguistics suffered from what she called an “explanatory void” because, “in the absence of a well-thought-out theory of the relation of language and society, sociolinguists tend to fall back on a number of unsatisfactory positions” (1990, p. 81). In the same vein, Wodak and Benke (1998) mentioned the crude acceptance of the notion of ‘gender’ as equivalent to the notion of ‘sex’, as well as the lack of sophisticated sociological concepts. According to them, “the studies either aim at the description and explanation of mechanisms of language change as such, or they want to describe an observed language variation and find sociological reason for it” (1998, p. 95). Gender/sex was treated as “one factor of a set”, besides class and age as the most prominent (bidi.). The Labovian paradigm has thus been accused of being “too static to capture the dynamic nature of language use in its social context” (Kauhanen, n.d. p. 7). In short then, what had started as a plea for the study of language in its social context was subsequently accused of excluding it. Both linguistic complexity and social agency were reduced to quantitative variables in an elegant analytical model of bars and pie charts.

Overall then, it can be said that gender as a variable received a cursory, though important, share of investigation. In an important sense, this was because, as Wodak and Benke (1998) recognized, the ‘sex’ of participants was a noticeable variable. For this reason —merging the social with the biological— sociolinguistics alone cannot be credited with ‘causing’ the interest in gender in the study of language. The establishment of gender and language studies, as a coherent field, is in fact linked more to the rising of feminism, with its declared purpose of re-thinking the impact of the ‘man-made’ language, in the words of Spender (1980), on the situation of women in society. Even more importantly, the rise to prominence of gender in language studies came from the interest of feminists in the possibility of social change through language study and language reform (Lakoff, 1975).
1. The legacy of Robin Lakoff

1.1. The beginning of ‘difference’

The year 1975 was seminal in the history of language and gender studies with the appearance of two publications that systematically grounded gender differences in language in the network of social interaction (Key 1975, Lakoff 1975). Key’s text is a much broader survey of gender differences that drew on written and oral material—newspapers, radio talks, literary works and conversations. Lakoff’s work is much more important in that it explicitly tried to explain how women use language and the implications of that use for their social conditions.

Lakoff was the first to explore the dynamics of gender with reference to gender practices, themselves embedded in the wider web of social, especially patriarchal, practices. For her, the discrimination against women is manifested “in the way they are taught to use language, and in the way general language use treats them” (1975, p. 4). She documented women’s use of language by analyzing features she claimed were exclusive to women. She also discussed the descriptively sexist language used to talk about them. Lakoff’s work, according to Cameron (1998), defined the gender and language agenda for many years.

For Lakoff, women’s language was manifested in many of its phonological, grammatical, semantic and pragmatic facets. She introduced a number of features she claimed were characteristic of women’s speech, as well as offered social explanations for their occurrence. Briefly, these are:

1) Women use weak expletives and men use strong ones because they -women- are not allowed to express strong emotions except mildly (anger for example).

2) women use an exclusive range of adjectives like ‘adorable’, ‘charming’, ‘sweet’, ‘lovely’ etc., that connote “approval of the trivial”, not related to “the world of male influence and power” (ibid, p. 13).

3) Tag-questions, which are neither statements nor questions but are something in-between, render the speaker unaccountable for the statement, hence unassertive in their claims. Yet, women use tags when they express their personal feelings. Such use explains why men perceive women as unsure of themselves.

4) Women use yes-no intonation patterns for declarative statements with the consequence of being perceived as hesitant.
5) Women use more super polite language than men, which is one consequence of being socialized as a ‘lady’.

Concerning sexist language, Lakoff discusses the case of semantic derogation (Fontecha and Catalan 2003, Hellinger and Baumann 2003, Romaine 2000), which refers to pair-words like lady/sir, man/woman, widow/widower, bachelor/spinster, and Mr./Mrs./Miss. Words related to women go through a specific kind of meaning-change, the replacement of originally neutral senses by pejorative ones which, “[p]laced in the context of language and gender, they conjure up other terms such as loaded language or sexist language” (Fontecha and Catalan, 2003, p. 772). For example, ‘master’ and ‘mistress’ were once equivalent words; but the word ‘mistress’, on the other hand, refers now only to a sexual partner, usually outside marital relationship (Lakoff 1975, p. 29). Another example is the pair ‘bachelor/spinster’. Whereas ‘bachelor’ connotes choice to marry or not, ‘spinster’ implies a girl beyond the age of marriage, basically through her failure to appeal to men (ibid.).

Both Key (1975) and Lakoff (1975) concurred in their conclusions with regard to differences in language use across gender lines. They saw them as reflecting a form of social organization that favors men over women. As such, they were the pioneering proponents of what came to be known later as the “dominance approach” (Hall and Bucholtz 1995). Before discussing this and other related approaches and reviewing the research literature the work of Lakoff stimulated, it is fit to look at problems that critics identified with her methodology as well as her findings. Of course, the criticism her work received did not mean that it was short-sighted, or its appeal short-lived. Quite the opposite, for a long time, Lakoff’s work was to students of language and gender what Plato’s work was for students of philosophy. It set the agenda for subsequent research and was responsible for the tumult in the field, so much so that it can be claimed that the field emerged only in an attempt to test empirically the ‘Lakoff’s hypothesis’ (Cameron McAlinden and O’Leary, 1988).

1.2. Criticism of the difference hypothesis

Critics of Lakoff challenged her work basically because of the introspective method she used as well as her methodological approach to analyzing data (Aries, 1996; Cameron, McAlinden and O’Leary, 1988). Dubois and Crouch (1975) accused her of fabricating data, in the sense of making up examples, and that her examples run counter to their empirically based findings. Aries (1996) pointed to the fact that Lakoff assigned meaning to structures on a one-
to-one basis while in fact a structure like a tag question which, Lakoff claimed, indicates unassertiveness, can have more than one meaning (see also Coates 2004, Holmes 1984a, 1984b, 1995).

For example, Holmes (1984b) divided tags in ‘modal’ and ‘affective’ tags. The first type, she claimed, are used to request information or confirmation of information of which the speaker is uncertain, while the second type is used to show concern for the addressee. She further indentified four types of tag questions and classified them based on their functions (epistemic modal tags, facilitative tags, softening tags, and challenging tags). According to this view, Lakoff failed to recognize that “a single language form can serve a variety of functions depending on its context” (Aries, 1996, p. 104), what Cameron McaAlinden and O’Leary call “the form and function problem” in Lakoff’s analysis (1988, p. 76).

In addition to the form-function problem, other scholars criticized Lakoff, and early research in general, for wrongly neglecting variables which might have offered better explanations for differences in language across gender (Gerristen and De Hann, 1979; Steil and Hilman, 1993). For Simkins-Bullock and Widman (1991), gender is just one of a set of variables. They state that, “in addition to cultural background [on which their study focused], other variables that could individually or in combination play important roles in determining how one uses language include age, race, socioeconomic status, education, social status, gender roles and situational context” (1991, p. 150). Crosby and Nyquist (1977) argue that the ‘female register’ which Lakoff identified, reflected gender roles and not gender per se. As such, it could be used by both females and males depending on the situation. In their words, “the distinguishing feature of the female register is not…that it is used exclusively by women but rather that it embodies the female role in society” (1977, p. 314) (emphasis the authors’). The importance of other contextual variables besides gender is similarly discussed by others. For example, Bilou and Krauss (1988) maintained that accommodation to the ‘gender’ of one’s partners in conversation was more important than one’s gender in explaining differences. For yet other researchers, the dimension of power was paramount (Kollock, Plumstein and Schwartz, 1985; O’Bar and Atkins 1980).

Considering the plethora of variables, besides gender, introduced to explain linguistic differences between men and women in language use, Aries consented to the significance of other variables but pointed to the failure of analysts, especially in quantitative studies, to produce “the baseline” on which comparisons of verbal differences could be made (1996, p.
In her view, “generally less than 10% of the variance in social behavior is accounted for by gender; and typically less than 5%” (1996, p. 7).

Lakoff’s work, therefore, forced researchers to take gender seriously, but also to look beyond it for better explicators of linguistic differences between men and women. However, the race towards finding linguistic differences and correlate them to social variables had consequences.

One consequence bore on the view of difference in terms of either/or. Early research conceptualized differences in language as ‘exclusive’ rather than ‘preferential’ (Coates 2004, Meyroff 2006, Talbot 2010). Exclusive features, according to Meyroff, “are those which are used by (or to) speakers of a particular sex” (2006, p. 202). On the other hand, Talbot mentions that “sex-preferential differences are not absolute; they are a matter of degree” (2010, p. 6).

Using this distinction, it was possible to criticize Lakoff of exaggerating gender differences to the extent that they lead researchers to think of some linguistic items as exclusive in their use to women. However, it is now common knowledge that gender differences in language are a matter of ‘more-than’ or ‘less-than’ features. As such, Lakoff’s claim to the existence of a ‘women’s language’ has been later altered to mean the existence of gender-preferential patterns used more by women than by men.

A second and related consequence was reflected in methodology choices. The methodological procedures followed to establish gender patterns were clear and relatively easy to follow. Generally, as a first step, researchers set out to establish gender differences in language on the basis of feature-count: how many of a specific feature (questions, number of words, tag questions, talk-time, etc.) were found in women’s speech compared to those in men’s? A second step was to correlate the observed differences in the use of specific features to macro-social variables, usually power dynamics, socialization processes, situational variables or gender variables under study (group composition, gender composition, status, etc.). Another line of investigation that did not diverge much from feature-count procedures was the study of pragmatic differences. Researchers reported on differences in speech acts then discussed their social significance.

Therefore, a review of gender differences in language is necessarily a review of specific linguistic and pragmatic features with relation to gender. It is to those features that the
discussion now turns. It is appropriate to mention right at the beginning that the number of these features is large; what it reviewed here is only a specimen to illustrate the points made above. Specifically, the subsections below consider tag questions and hedges, interruption, in addition other differences subsumed in one section.

2. Differences in male-female language

2.1. Tags

Many scholars reported greater use of tag questions by women (Cameron et al. 1988, Hartman 1976, Holmes 1984b, 1985 and 1990, Mulac et al. 1986, 1988). As part of a broader anthropological program, Hartman (1976) conducted interviews with twenty eight men and women born in Maine (USA) at the beginning of the 20th century and found that women used more tag questions than men. McMillan et al. (1977) also reported asymmetry in the use of tag questions. In their study, however, women used more tags in the presence of men than in all-female groups. They suggested that “women use more linguistic categories that connote uncertainty when men are present than when men are absent” (1977, p. 545). The resultant differences were in turn a reflection of the power-differentials in mixed-sex groups. Also, Carli (1990) related tag questions to status differences between men and women. According to her, “status may be an important determinant of gender differences in language. However, status is clearly not the only determinant.” (1990, p. 949). Other studies related the greater use of tags not to power differences in mixed-sex groups, but rather to the facilitative speech style used by women especially when they interacted with men (Hannah and Murachver, p. 2007).

Other studies reported gender differences in tag questions in the opposite direction –men used more tags, while still others reported no significant differences or no differences at all. Dubois and Crouch (1975) tape-recorded after-presentation discussions in formal settings and found that men used more tag questions than women. Among the many variables studied by Grob et al (1997) (see also Grob and Mike 1996), tag questions were infrequent in the conversations of the thirteen groups studied, although, as the authors argued, significant gender differences concerning their use existed.

In explaining the contradictory results reported in the literature, Aries (1996) specified that empirical studies differed about a large number of factors that affected the results achieved. Among these factors were the sex, status of the participants, and content of speech. She goes on to say that
[t]aken together, these studies suggest that there is no simple answer to the question of which sex uses tag questions more frequently. Research may be more meaningful if it were reframed away from a research for the presence or absence of gender differences in tag questions and framed instead from a larger perspective that considers gender differences in the function of tag questions in particular situational contexts” (1996, p. 109)

Aries therefore urged a movement away from feature-count toward a functional analysis of their use. Such analysis would take into consideration what a linguistic item does in context rather than how many is there in data.

Concerning function, Lakoff identified the use of tags with reluctance and unassertiveness when used by women. In her view, there are legitimate uses of tags as “when the speaker is stating a claim, but lacks full confidence in the truth of that claim”, or when “the speaker is making ‘small talk,’ trying to elicit conversation from the addressee” (1975, p. 54). But one use of tags characteristic of women is when they express opinions, perceptions and feelings and qualify their statement with a tag. To use a tag to question one’s personal feelings is meaningless and can only lead to the perception of women as reluctant and unassertive (Lakoff 1975, see also Holmes 1990).

Also related to unassertiveness are hedges, qualifiers, intensifiers and rising intonation in declarative statements. This cluster of conversational features was termed ‘tentative language’ by Leaper and Robnett (2011, p. 130), and was claimed by Lakoff to constitute part of women’s language.

2.2. Hedges


Research on hedging and influence suggested that a greater use of hedges may lower the perceived power and effectiveness of the speaker regardless of gender (Bradac and Mulac, 1984; Bradac et al., 1995; Hosman 1989). Hosman and Wright (1987) simulated courtroom
contexts in their study and found that both hesitation and hedging expressions had negative effects on their users regardless of the impression they left on participants. In a subsequent study, Hosman (1989) found that the perceived authoritativeness of hedges’ users decreased as the rate of hesitations and hedges increased. Bradac et al. (1995) found a link between low evaluation on the dimensions of status and dynamism and the use of particular hedges (‘kind of’ and ‘fairly’). In short, those studies linked the use of hedges to powerless speech which, although it could be used by either males or females, was in Lakoff’s view part of women’s language. In line with this view, Bradac et al. (ibid.) suggested that it may be the case that women used more hedges when talking to men than when talking to women (similar to the results McMillan et al. (1977) found for tags).

Whereas a number of studies found that women signal uncertainty by the frequent use of hedges, qualifiers and pause fillers (Carli 1990, Crosby and Nyquist 1977, McMillan et al. 1977, O’barr and Atkins 1980), they rejected the implied restriction of uncertainty to women and emphasized the multi-functionality of hedging expressions. To give an example, O’Barr (1982) study found that, in general, females used more hedging than males; but he attributed this to power differentials in courtroom (the site of the study) which related more to status rather than to gender. According to him, hedging expressions were characteristic of the powerless, be it a male of a female (ibid.). However, McFadyen writes that “in other contexts, ‘powerless speech’ (e.g. qualifiers) is used alongside powerful actions such as initiations, in a manner that makes the attainment of control appear indirect” (1996, p. 362). McFadyen paired students with either students (same status) or with lecturers (higher status) in same-sex and mixed-sex dyadic conversations. In addition to the above results, his analysis revealed no differences in the use of qualifiers as long as the gender of the participants was concerned.

Broader in scope, Bradac et al. (1995) built on the multi-functionality of hedges and intensifiers in problem-solving conversations and found the frequency of hedges higher in the speech of men than women with particular expressions. In contrast to the claims of Lakoff, men had a wider repertoire of hedging expressions, what the authors called ‘diversity’, and, surprisingly, “the finding for diversity may indicate that men have a richer and more precise knowledge of hedging, that is, this form of qualification is relatively familiar to them” (1995, p. 111). The authors concluded that hedges “constitute a category with a decidedly masculine bias” (ibid, p. 112). However, in a study of criticism giving in organizational settings by managers, Mulac, Seilbod, and Farris (2000) found hedging expressions to be more indicative of women’s speech than men’s.
But again, in contrast to the findings of Mulac, Seilbod and Farris (2000), other researchers found no significant gender differences. For instance, Acosta (2009) studied the amount of talk and the number of hedges in the debate sessions of Colombian Senate and found that male senators were responsible for more than 62% of the hedges in the total amount of talk whereas female senators used slightly more than 37%. Considering the amount of talk, which was reported as 65.9% for males and 34.1%, Acosta interpreted the results as indicating no differences in the rate of hedges used. Grob et al (1997) also found no significant gender differences in hedging expressions; although hedging was frequent in group interactions. Similar to research on tags, what results that emerged from the study of hedging were at best inconsistent and at worst meaningless.

Reflecting on this state of affairs, Murphy (2010) suggested that the conflation of different expressions under the heading ‘hedges’ may be responsible for eclipsing any differences that may correctly be ascribed to gender. Features categorized under ‘hedging’, Murphy explains, were linguistic structures that vary both syntactically and semantically (2010, p. 50). Examples include: modals, formulaic expressions (‘I think’, ‘I mean’), degree adverbs (‘quite’, ‘relatively’, ‘necessarily’), restrictive adverbs (‘only’, ‘just’), stance adverbs (‘of course’, ‘kind of’, ‘sort of’), double negatives, and tag questions.

In front of this amalgam of features, Murphy (ibid.) reasoned that the study of specific expressions may thus clear up some of the contradictory conclusions previous studies have reached. The analysis of individual features may also reveal complex functional meanings of hedges that, like tags, vary across situational contexts. Within this framework, Holmes’ (1985, 1986, 1988a, 1988b) studies were exemplar of the functional study of a single expression or a small group of similar expressions.

Taking prosodic analysis and position-in-utterance as her starting point, Holmes (1986) initially classified ‘you know’ in two broad categories. The first is speaker-oriented, which expresses certainty and confidence, of various kinds, in “addressee’s background knowledge and experience, attitudes and anticipated response” (1986, p. 7). The second category comprised instances of ‘you know’ that express addressee-oriented-uncertainty and message-oriented-uncertainty. This categorization allowed Holmes to ground her analysis in Brown and Levinson’s (1978, 1987) model of politeness, claiming that the speaker-oriented-certainty ‘you know’ instances are strategies of positive politeness; while addressee- and message-oriented uncertainty instances are negative-politeness strategies. At a further level of analysis,
Holmes identified within the speaker-oriented-certainty category three functions of ‘you know’.

1) Conjoint knowledge: the speaker uses ‘you know “to introduce what they regard uncontestable mutual knowledge” (ibid., p. 8). This use assumes a common ground knowledge that is shared by speaker and addressee and, in this case, ‘you know’ typically precedes the introduced statement.

2) Emphatic: ‘you know’ is used to strengthen the force of the statement leaving no doubt in the mind of the speaker as of the validity of the utterance. Holmes suggested that this use of ‘you know’ can be paraphrased as “let me assure you” (1986, p. 8). In this instance, ‘you know’ is typically used in utterance-final positions with a falling intonation.

3) Attributive: This function shares properties of the two previous ones. Here, the speaker expresses confidence in the validity of the proposition being delivered and his confidence that the addressee, though he/she do not know the particular instance expressed in the proposition, knows the general state-of-affairs of which the particular instance is an example. ‘you know’ in this function can be paraphrased as “I’m confident you know the kind of thing I mean” (1986, p. 9). ‘you know’ in this function is always utterance-final with a falling intonation and a pause precedes and follows it.

Turning to examples of ‘you know’ which express uncertainty and which are addressee- and message-oriented, Holmes identified four functions as follows: (the last three signal linguistic imprecision and hence are message-oriented-uncertainty type).

1) Appealing: The speaker may lack confidence in the proposition and calls for validation. He/she may call for agreement in the case a negative comment is issued; or may use it to soften the impact of a negative remark or call for sympathetic response. Holmes remarked that it is the only function that Lakoff recognized for ‘you know’; and on the basis of which women were said to use hedges to express powerless uncertainty (1986, p. 10).

2) Signaling lexical imprecision: the speaker expresses their uncertainty concerning the choice of the next word(s).

3) Introducing qualifying information: the speaker uses this function between two propositions to mark their awareness that the first proposition needed precision which is given in the second proposition.

4) Indicating false start: A speaker uses ‘you know’ to indicate that an utterance needs reformulation. The reformulation is subsequently given.
Holmes used her analytical framework in an investigation of the use of ‘you know’ in spontaneous speech in both formal and informal conversations. She found that the overall rate of ‘you know’ in the speech of men and women did not differ. However, “there are differences in the functions for which ‘you know’ is used in female and male speech” (1986, p. 13). On the functional level, she reported that, surprisingly, women used instances of ‘you know’ more frequently to convey certainty (speaker-oriented). Men, on the other hand, used the addressee- and message-oriented types of ‘you know’ more frequently. Men in Holmes data were the ones who used hedging expressions as markers of uncertainty. This stood in contrast to the opposite view promulgated by Lakoff and others.


Holmes analysis of hedging expressions cast doubt on Lakoff’s claims regarding the use of hedges by women. Holmes (1995) in-depth functional analysis showed that hedges fulfill an affective function in addition to their grammatical meaning. On the affective level, they may function as negative politeness strategies to “attenuate or reduce the strength or directness, mitigate face-threatening acts, and avoid impositions on the addressee” (1995, p. 74), or as positive politeness strategies to “convey solidarity and to establish shared understanding with the addressee” (1995, p. 64).

Generally then, in politeness studies, Holmes concurred with other authors in their claim that hedges express politeness (which is a domain unrelated to the assertive-unassertive dimensions). That hedges are markers of politeness was supported by such studies as Brown and Levinson (1978), Dixon and Foster (1997), and Kasper (1990). But even here, the results are contradictory.

To illustrate, Brown and Levinson (1978) maintained that hedges are politeness strategies within ‘face-threatening acts’ whose use marks a desire to cooperate and avoid disagreement
(1978). On the other hand, Dixon and Foster (1997) adopted Holmes’ contrast between affective and epistemic (or grammatical) hedges to study dyadic conversations of South American students, but reached opposite conclusions. As they claimed, “the epistemic and affective functions of hedges are usually not mutually exclusive but coexist within particular utterances” (1997, p. 97).

2.3. Interruption

The pragmatic category of ‘interruption’ is also among the most extensively studied features within gender and language studies. It is also a feature among the least understood. The complication surrounding the study of interruption has come as a natural consequence to disagreements with regards to its definition, use, functions as well as its relation to gender.

Zimmerman and West (1975) and West and Zimmerman (1977) define interruption as an instance of simultaneous speech that violates the right of the current speaker to complete their turn. Technically, an interruption “is seen as penetrating the boundaries of a unit-type prior to the last lexical constituent that could define a possible terminal boundary” (1975, p. 114). In a simpler way, Beattie (1981) says that an interruption occurs when the current speaker has not finished what he or she intended to say, causing his or her to ‘lose’ the floor. Still less formally, James and Clarke (1993) identify interruption as a conversational case where a next speaker starts talking while current speaker has not finished. However, and due to the complexity of conversational interactions, scholars further differentiated between interruption and overlap.

Overlaps according to West and Zimmerman are instances of “simultaneous speech where a speaker other than the current speaker begins to speak at, or at the very close to, a possible transition place in a current speaker’s utterance (i.e., within the boundaries of the last word)” (1975, p. 114). Based on the work of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974, the former authors hold that, unlike an interruption, which is intended, an overlap is an ‘error’ in the judgment of a transition relevance point (TPR). Focusing on the contribution of next speaker, Schegloff (1973) (cited in Bennett, 1981) characterizes the difference between an overlap and an interruption in the following words:

If [next speaker] starts in the environment of what could have been a completion point of the prior speaker’s turn, then we speak of it as an overlap. If it’s projected to begin in the middle of a point that is in no way a possible
completion point for the turn, then we speak of it as an interruption (1981, p. 172/173).

While the above identification are clearly formal, it is possible to say that, functionally speaking, an interruption is an act of intentional dominance that attempts to effect floor-taking, while an overlap does not constitute such an act; that is, it is free of negative connotations (Tannen, 1983).

Due to the difficulty in structurally assigning simultaneous speech to either an interruption or an overlap category, both Dindia (1987) and Kennedy and Camden (1983) considered interruption as a subclass of what they call ‘speech overlap’ by which they meant simultaneous speech in general. Their claim is that, at any rate, interruption always entails simultaneous speech. Others subsumed all instances of simultaneous speech to an interruption category (Wiens et al. 1965).

Disagreeing with these views, Murray and Covelli (1988) suggests that “simultaneous speech is neither necessary nor sufficient for the recognition of an interruption by interlocutors”. What this means is that interruption without speech overlap is possible. For these authors, it is perfectly possible to imagine a situation where an interrupter starts talking precisely near a completion point mid-turn, where turn exchange is possible, leading to interruptee stopping speaking. This is what Ferguson (1977) calls ‘silent interruption’.

Undoubtedly then, what emerged out of interruption studies was an abundance of definitions which had, naturally enough, affected both instances of interruption one ‘may find’ and their classification to either interruption or overlap. Also naturally enough, differences in the classification of simultaneous speech inevitably led to inconsistencies of research findings, and hence to inconsistencies of interpretation in terms of gender differences.

2.4. Classification of interruptions
Ferguson (1977, p. 296-297) identified four types of interruption, which according to him formed part of what he refers to a ‘speaker-switch non-fluency’. The latter referred to attempts to switch speaker which resulted in simultaneous speech as opposed to a perfect speaker-switch, i.e. the ‘no gap no overlap rule’ (Sacks et al, 1974).

The first type is ‘simple interruptions’, which leads current speaker to stop talking and results in interruptee taking the floor. The second type is called ‘overlaps’. The occurrence of overlap causes no break in the continuity of speech by current speaker and apparently no
intention to take the floor by the interruptor. This type corresponds to what is generally known as ‘overlap’. A third type is the ‘butting-in interruptions’, which involves a discontinuity of verbal utterance by both interruptee and interruptor but does not result in gaining the floor by the interruptee. Noticing a conflict, both interruptee and interruptor stop short of talking and interruptee takes up their turn. The forth type is what Ferguson called ‘silent interruption’ (referred to above). In it, current speaker stops at mid-sentence, at a TRP but without intending to relinquish speakership, but next speaker takes the floor with no noticeable simultaneous speech. Building on the latter category, Graig and Pitts (1990) added a fifth to Ferguson’s classification. They identified a ‘talk-over’ which refers to current speaker’s attempt to take back the floor. A talk-over is then simply an “unsuccessful interruption, as the second speaker fails to gain the floor” after a TRP not intended to terminate the first speaker’s turn (1990, p. 128).

On the successful-unsuccessful dimension, Roger and Schumacher (1983) talked of successful interruptions as those that lead to floor loss in contrast to unsuccessful interruptions with no floor loss by current speaker. Irish and Hall (1995) differentiated between successful interruption behavior that results in floor loss; partially successful interruptions where both participants continue speaking at the same time; and unsuccessful interruptions in which the interruptor causes the interruptee a moment’s silence but the interruptee finishes their utterance. Extending the classification to segments of conversation larger that the turn, Dindia (1987) indentified what she referred to as ‘an interruption sequence’. According to her, interruption sequences are composed of 1) the pre-interruption speech, or the speech that was interrupted; 2) the interruption; and 3) the post interruption speech, or the response to the interruption (1987, p. 353).

Against those structural classifications of interruption, other researchers called for a functional approach to their study. Bilous and Krauss (1988) for example, maintained that “interruptions do not constitute a homogenous class, and it is clear that different types of interruptions serve quite different sorts of functions” (1988, p. 184).

One prominent function of interruption was unanimously acknowledged by scholars. A conversational participant willing to speak next uses interruption as an interactional strategy to forfeit the right to an utterance of a current speaker. Given this function, it is no wonder, as hinted above, that most studies of interruption considered interruption as an index of dominance behavior (Brooks, 1982; Graig and Pitts, 1990; Itakura and Tsui, 2004; McCarrick
et al., 1981; Rhoades et al., 2001), the more so if current speaker was a female (Zimmerman and West, 1975; West, 1983).

2.5. Interruption and gender differences
The widely cited Zimmerman and West (1975) study reported findings from thirty one (31) conversational segments recorded in public places (coffee shops, campus, and drugstores). Their data included twenty (20) conversations between same-sex dyads and 11 between opposite-sex ones. The analysis revealed that same-sex dyads were characterized by symmetrical distribution of interruptions across gender lines while in opposite-sex dyads, interruptions were asymmetrically distributed. Men were responsible for 96% of the 48 interruptions recorded in interactions between men and women.

Building on this, West (1983) (in West and Zimmerman n.d.) analyzed dyadic conversations of ten (10) male and female students previously unacquainted and found the same pattern of male dominance in interruptions. Of twenty eight (28) instances of interruption indentified, 75% of them were initiated by men. This provided additional evidence, according to the authors, for the dominance pattern identified as characteristic of men when talking to women (see also West, 1884, 1990, West and Zimmerman 1977, 1983).

Other studies seemed to support West and Zimmerman’s conclusions. For example, Octigan and Niederman (1979) studied interruption in mixed-sex and same-sex dyads. Males in 12 mixed-sex dyads were responsible for 68% of interruptions and overlap in all dyads. The rate of interruption varied from 56% to 100%. In same-sex dyads, interruption was symmetrical in both all-male and all-female conversations. The authors remarked that “the same man who showed such respect to another man interrupted a woman freely and with ease”, which recalled, according to the authors the “deeply ingrained patterns of male superiority” (1979, p. 52). In a similar vein, Willis and Williams (1976) analyzed conversations in settings ranging from formal to informal. They concluded that “men are much more likely to talk simultaneously when women are speaking than when men are speaking” (1976, p. 1070). In addition, women tended to agree with men when interrupted and men tended to disagree with women four times more often than they agreed. This is similar to Shaw and Sadler (1965, p. 350) observation that females interrupted with “agreeing reinforcing comments” in their study of conversations between husbands and wives, dating couples, and unaffiliated male and female dyads. Also, McMillan et al. (1977) tested the hypothesis that men interrupt
women more than women interrupt men. They reported that “men interrupt women at least five times as frequently as women interrupt men” (1977, p. 553).

Other examples can be cited and all of them claimed the male interruptive behavior to be universal. For instance, Campbell et al. (1992) focused in their study on interruption patterns as related to sex of the speaker and feelings of social inadequacy in mixed-sex groups that consisted of 6 to 10 undergraduate students. They found that “interruptions from men were also more frequent than those from women” (1992, p. 420), which the authors attributed to men’s low feeling of social inadequacy.

Another set of studies focused on the interaction between gender and status. Stratford (1998), for instance, observed that male therapists interrupted female clients three times more than they did male clients. Female therapists, on the other hand, did not differentiate as to the sex of their interlocutors-client. Although they scored as high on the interruption scale as male therapists did, theirs was evenly distributed. For female therapists, in other words, the gender of clients did not influence their decision whether, when and how, to interruption. Likewise, Irish and Hall (1995) videotaped fifty (50) physicians during medical visits, each physician with a male and a female patient. Their analysis showed that while patients interrupted more with statements, physicians interrupted with questions, which they attributed to participants’ roles. However, physicians used less partially successful interruptions with male patients than with females. More tellingly, according to the authors, patients interrupted and overlapped female physicians more than they did male physicians.

Similarly, Graig and Pitts (1990) studied tutorial groups and differentiated between interruptions made and those received. They reported that “tutors, male or female, dominate the discussion groups, as demonstrated by the frequencies of interruptions they use when taking the floor from students” (1990, p. 194), which suggested initially that female tutors, too, were power sensitive. However, female tutors’ interruptions were not as successful as those of men. A similar study is Brooks (1982), who studied interruption in male and female professors’ classes. She reported that “male dominance behavior was significantly greater in female professors’ classes than in male professors’ classes” (1982, p. 688), both with regard to duration and frequency of speech and frequency of interruptions. In addition, male students interrupted female students more than they did male professors. These findings marked, according to the author, the fact that “the ascribed secondary status of women takes cognitive precedence among male students over their achieved status” (1982, p. 688).
Even relatively recent studies confirmed the above conclusion to the effect of male ‘wallowing’ in interruptive behavior. One such study is Karakowsky, McBey and Miller’s (2004) who analyzed interruption patterns in groups that were one-gender dominant; that is, groups in which one gender outnumbered the opposite gender. They videotaped two hundred and sixteen (216) university students engaged in mix-sex discussion in task-oriented groups. Viewing interruption as a power display, the authors confirmed that “men in male dominated groups exhibited higher levels of power displays, in the form of verbal interruptions compared with women in female dominated groups” (2004, p. 429). Men engaged in higher interruption rates both in male-dominated and female-dominated groups; however, men decreased their interruption rates as they moved from female-dominated to male-dominated groups. This suggested that males used interruption behavior either in accordance with perceived gender male characteristics or to compensate for their perceived low status. For men, thus, interruptions seemed to be a ‘negotiative attitude’ (Irish and Hall, 1995). In spirit, this conclusion is also similar to Graig and Pitts’ (1990).

In other words, gender for men is more salient a feature than status in determining their behavior toward women. In female-dominated groups, men act in what they believe men-like verbal fashion. In male-dominated groups, where the belief is shared, interruption reflects relative status in the group.

At the other side of those studies that attributed male’s greater use of interruptions to the status-power differential existing between male and females, other scholars found no significant gender differences (Dindia 1986, Grob, Meyers and Schuh 1997). Some even attributed differences, if they found any, to factors other than gender (Bilous and Krauss, 1988; Campbell et al 1992; Crosby and Nyquist, 1977; Hannah and Murachver, 2007; Simkins-Bullock and Widman, 1991).

Stratford (1998), for example, reported that female therapists “did not differentiate to the same extent as male therapists in the gender of the client they choose to interrupt, and therefore appeared more even handed” (1998, p. 389). Stratford, however, admitted that the differential pattern observed may be dependent on other social and contextual variables (age, background, familiarity with clients, institutional power). In the same vein, Murray and Covelli (1988) analyzed interaction in four different settings- a white-people party, a black-people party, interviews and un-chaired meetings. They concluded that “interruption is within the behavioral repertoire of some women, both when speaking to other women and to men”
(1988, p. 108). In view of their results, and similar to Stratford’s (1998), the authors expressed the need to take the conversational context into account. LaFrance and Carmen (1980) reached a similar result; even if, functionally speaking, men in their study interrupted more with statements, which indicated assertiveness, while women interrupted more with questions, which the author argued were responsive in character.

Against these claims, Dindia (1987) found no gender differences in the interruption sequences she studied. Even more significant was her claim that “women did not have less assertive behavior interrupted, nor did they engage in less assertive types of interruptions, nor did they respond to interruptions less assertively” (1987, p. 365).

The analytical confusion that resulted from studies like the above led some scholars to criticize work on gender and interruption for mixing the variable ‘gender’ with ‘status’ and ‘sex roles’ traditionally, and collectively, linked to women. What for some counted as gender patterns might as well be the result of power and status independently of gender. The similarity of such critique to tags is clear enough.

Espousing the latter view, Thonus (1999) suggested that dominance patterns can be explained by the institutional role people embody in interactions in institutional settings. Accordingly, “dominance…resides in speech situations which confer status and authority on institutional representatives” (1999, p. 244). As well as contributing to the debate on exclusive-preferential gender patterns, Crosby and Nyquist’s ‘female register’ was, additionally, responsive to other dimensions they argued existed in females’ talk. They claimed that “the distinguishing feature of the female register is not…that it is used exclusively by women but rather that it embodies the female role in our society” (1977, p. 314). Thus, Crosby and Nyquist maintained that ‘sex roles’ may be a better explanatory factor for the preferential use of the female register.

Also, Campbell et al. (1992) focused on “interruptions as related to sex of subject, sex role orientation,…and feeling of social inadequacy” (1992, p. 420). Men-initiated interruptions were also more frequent than those initiated by women (ibid.). On the dimension of social inadequacy men scored less. However, regardless of sex, lower score on social inadequacy correlated with higher interruption rates and vice-versa. Consequently, for these authors, social inadequacy was a better explanatory factor than dominance (ibid, p. 421).
In an attempt to disentangle the effects of ‘gender’ and ‘power’, Kollock et al. (1985) analyzed mixed-sex dyadic conversations while controlling for power. For this, they studied couples where the man was powerful, couples where the woman was powerful, and couples where the man and the woman were both of equal power (power was measured by the status of their subjects). Overall, their study suggested that, with regard to interruption, it was more appropriate to correlate it to power and status irrespective of gender. They disagreed with West and Zimmerman’s gender-based explanations in that their findings “show that power dynamics by themselves can create a conversational division of labor parallel to the one originally associated with sexual differentiation” (1985, p. 42). Turner et al. (1995) also corroborated that finding by arguing that men and women in their study were sensitive to the power dimension when status was at stake.

Like Turner and his colleagues, Carli (1990) confirmed that “status may be an important determinant of gender differences in language” (1990, p. 949). She found no gender differences in interruption rates in mixed-sex dyads, but her study suggested that the degree of formality of the setting may be more important a factor than gender. More importantly, she claimed that tentativeness and unassertiveness may actually enhance women’s degree of ‘influenceability’ in some specific settings.

Overall then, the analysis of gender and tags, hedges, and interruptions, seems to point to a general conclusion— that gender affects language is acknowledged by all; but to what degree, in what way, and when are questions to which no conclusive answers have been given yet. The same conclusion holds even when scholars turned to the study of other features. To illustrate, the section below pulls together some studies concerned with gender differences in compliments, apologies, politeness, and voice qualities.

**2.6. Other gender differences**

Kharraki (2002) studied syntactic strategies in paying compliments in Morocco and reported that women used a specific rhetorical pattern identified by exclamation with rising intonation. This pattern oriented to the positive face of women’s interlocutors and was indicative of solidarity (e.g. what a lovely gown!). Men, on the other hand, used a minimal utterance of ‘adjective plus noun phrase’ (nice hat!). Kharraki showed that women complimented other women on their appearance whereas men on skill and performance in tasks. Overall, “men, more than women, perceive compliments as a token of social distance rather than an act of solidarity” (2002, p. 65), and this may be due to their higher level, compared to women, of
social awareness concerning status. Al-Harahsheh (2014) reached the same conclusion. He observed that even if both women and men avoided face threatening acts, especially in mixed-sex conversations, or in same-sex conversations where solidarity is low, “women tend to produce countless positive politeness devices for each other rather than men” (2014, p. 876).

Studying apology as another aspect of politeness, Chunlin (2013) found no significant gender differences in the production of apologies but he claimed that important differences in the choice of apology strategies existed. When women offend others they prefer to pay the damage for other [i.e. assume responsibility for damage done to other’s face]; when females are offended by other, they wish other pay their damage and they prefer to accept the payment” (2013, p. 271).

Males use the ‘I-am-sorry type’ when they offended one another and preferred others not to pay their damage. Overall then, the choice of apology strategies for females reflected the third premise in Lakoff’s (1975) theory of politeness (show sympathy), whereas men’s strategies reflected the first premise (keep aloof).

Also in gender and politeness, Brouwer et al. (1979) investigated a corpus of utterances produced by ticket buyers at a train station and observed that politeness strategies may be influenced by other factors besides the sex of the speaker; factors such as age, sex of the addressee, and time of the ticket purchase. They noted that utterances indicating insecurity and politeness were “often produced by both men and women when speaking to the male ticket seller” (1979, p. 47).

On the intersection of gender and voice qualities, Henton (1989) (see also Graddol and Swann, 1989) found no essential differences between the pitch range of males versus those of females. Based on her finding, she ascribed the socially perceived differences, and the consequent stigmatization of women voice, to the “persistence in androcentric societies to continue to mark women as an outgroup, to label their unacceptability” (1989, p. 308). Men, in the author’s view, developed derogative adjectives that describe not the way women actually speak, but the way their speech is socially judged be men, which is naturally a negative judgment because of androcentrism (ibid.)

To conclude this section, a comprehensive study is worth reporting. Based on a corpus of more than 14,000 written and spoken texts, Newman et al. (2008) used a computer-based
coding system to analyzing gender differences on a wide variety of linguistic items and their correlation with different social and psychological states, focusing mainly on the category of function words. According to them, function words “reflect differences in the ways that individuals think about and relate to the world” (2008, p. 216). Although the differences they found are small, they are nonetheless consistent:

Females’ language was more likely than men’s to include pronouns and social words, a wide variety of other psychological process references, and verbs. Negations and references to the home were also features of the female profile. Men exceeded women on a number of linguistic dimensions including word length, numbers, articles, and prepositions. Men also discussed various current concerns more frequently, and swore more often... Female language emphasized psychological processes, social processes, and verbs. Male language emphasized current concerns. Thus, the results are consistent with the idea that men and women employ language for different reasons. (2008, p. 223)

Overall, the study of language use along the dimension of gender extends well beyond tag questions, hedges and interruption behaviors politeness and other linguistic features. Those categories were chosen because they illustrate the heterogeneity of the fields concerned with language and gender in general and the resulting disagreement in both findings and explanatory frameworks that come as a natural consequence to that heterogeneity.

The sheer quantity of research into gender and language differences gives the impression that difference is an omnipresent fact continuously, consciously or unconsciously, affecting people’s everyday interactions. Aries (1996, p. 102-146) provided an overview of the literature on gender-related differences in language use, which, as said before, grew principally, as a response to Lakoff’s book. Aries reviewed studies on interruption, questions, tag questions, politeness, qualifiers and hedges, minimal responses, exaggerations, personal pronouns, topic initiation and change, as well as the sociolinguistic, social and psychological theories adduced by scholars to account for gender differences, to deny their existence or to downplay their significance. Aries observed that comparative work on men and women’s language are unlikely to settle questions that arose concerning gender and difference. Much comparative work, in Aries view, isolated linguistic features from their social context.

For a future research agenda, Aries urges that context should be the appropriate object of study, “rather than the relative use of language features independent of social situations”
because of the important fact that “gender cannot be understood apart from these contextual variables” (1996, p. 145). Interestingly, Aries is a forerunner of recent calls to see gender as dynamic, one element in a wider social web of discourses. Her call, in other words, is a plea to turn instead to gender construction in the varieties of social contexts wherein language use takes place. Since social activities are necessarily discursive and interactive activities, the call is meant to place gender and language research within the wider field of discourse studies. While Aries is not explicit enough on what sort of context studies she had in mind, it is possible to read her book, within reasonable boundaries, as a call for a discursive-constructionist turn (Sunderland, 2008; Weatherall, 2002b). Within this framework, gender is seen as an accomplishment (Coates, 2004), something that people do (West and Zimmerman, 1987), and as a social construct (Cameron, 1998; Holmes, 2006).

First, it is appropriate to review the theories used to account for language differences with relation to gender, and to discuss some of their inherent problems. Historically, two theoretical paradigms have been influential: Dominance Theory inaugurated by the work of Lakoff, and the Two-cultures Theory, known also as the Difference Theory, which initially drew on Maltz and Borker’s (1982) work and was fully fledged in the work of Tannen. Preceding these two is the Deficit Theory that is generally linked to work prior to Lakoff’s.

3. Theories of language and gender
3.1. The deficit theory
Although gender differences in language had been observed to operate for quite a long time, no systematic effort has been made to conceptualize them in one coherent account based on theoretical principles. What studies were there prior to the seventies either reported men’s and women’s use of language in primitive societies (Haas, 1979; see Coates 2004 for a review of early anthropological work) or, when the focus was on modern languages, they aimed to establish the (male) normative use of language, against which the non-standard forms can be studied (Jespersen, 1922). Haas’ work (1979) is exemplar of anthropological studies of language on whose findings the notion of gender-exclusive language differences advanced. Jespersen’s work is typical of analyses on which early gender and language studies were founded.

Jespersen (1922) devoted an entire chapter, entitled “The woman”, to the study of women’s language. The chapter presented what he considered distinctive characteristics of women’s language and ranged over historical factors that influenced its use. Viewed from a historical
angle, some authors argue that Jespersen’s work can indeed be appreciated for the adeptness with which the observed and discussed gender-based linguistic change. For example, his statement that “there can be no doubt that women exercise a great deal and universal influence on linguistic development” despite the flawed explanation the author advanced—i.e. “their distinctive shrinking from coarse and gross expressions and their preference for refined and veiled and indirect expressions” (1922, p. 246).

In addition to the issue of taboo language, Jespersen’s chapter also discussed syntactic differences, polite and assertive speech and the social status of women, issues that are still at the heart of gender and language studies today. It is even possible to credit Jespersen’s work for foreshadowing linguistic upheavals with relation to gender in his concluding remark that “great social changes are going on in our times which may eventually modify even the linguistic relations of the too sexes” (ibid, p. 254). The remark came at a time where serious theorizing on language and gender was still years ahead.

Jespersen’s work has come to represent what retrospectively came to be known as the Deficit Theory which, according to Sadiqi, “considered women’s language as an essentially ‘deficient’ version of men’s speech” (2003, p. 4) in that their communication ability were, according to Henley and Kramarae, “often evaluated as handicapped, maladaptive and needing remediation” (1994, p. 384).

Added to the linguistic deficiency of women’s language was a supposed social inferiority that placed them below the social rank of men (Talbot, 2010). Jespersen described how women “use only the lower stratum of speech” because their social status does not favor them to participate in what he called “higher culture” (1922, p. 242). Romaine best described the stance of the Deficit Theory as that which considered women the linguistic ‘second sex’ (2000, p. 105).

In addition to early work on gender and language, Coates (2004) mentioned Dialectology as one field in which the ideas of the Deficit Theory were reflected. Being concerned with gathering linguistic vestiges of ‘pure’ dialects from informants in rural areas, dialectologists were ambivalent on the inclusion of female respondents. Some dialectologists excluded them altogether; and some accepted them but only conditionally. Women were seen by the latter as better informants because of their conservatism while the former rejected them because they fail to speak the vernacular dialect of interest to dialectology.
However, as Coates remarks, “even dialectologists who see women as better informants on linguistic grounds (because of their conservatism) reject them for non-linguistic reasons” (ibid., p. 37). Women were said to be too busy or too timid, or embarrassed at being asked to speak in front of a researcher. Combined with this, was the fact that the questionnaires used in dialectology favored fields that were traditionally the prerogative of men. The fact that fieldworkers were predominantly males also discouraged women from full participation.

As such, it was no wonder that where women have been included, “it has been to supplement the fieldworker’s information, rather than as full member of the speech community. Dialectology, in other words, marginalized women speakers” (ibid., p. 41). They were indeed seen as ‘the second sex’.

Notwithstanding its impact, it is fair to say that the account the Deficit Theory presented was less a theory than a collection of assumptions researchers relied on when theorizing gender differences in language. The ideas the deficit world view incorporated were more a reflection of amateurish linguistics and social stereotypes rather than the result of rigorous methods of inquiry. Research was carried under the assumption of male’s speech as the standard against which the speech of females must be explained, presumably because it was seen to deviate from typical norms (i.e. male norms).

For this reason, many researchers criticized Jespersen’s work as being no more than ‘impressionistic’ explanations, culled mostly from anecdotal and literary sources, of an assumed linguistic deviance of women (Speer, 2005). In addition, Speer (2005) argued, Jespersen’s study was sexist, and based on folk-linguistic stereotypes disguised as academic research, since “it provides a purportedly ‘scientific’ account’ of an already assumed female inferiority” (2005, p. 21).

3.2. The dominance theory

Considering the above remarks, it is therefore more appropriate to document the beginning of ‘theory’ with the publication of Lakoff’s (1975) work, even though she was accused of perpetuating the assumptions of the Deficit Theory about gender and language (Speer, 2005). As seen above, Lakoff suggested that women lacked assertiveness and that men’s assertiveness was desirable. The many linguistic features she ascribed to women portrayed them as less assertive, unsure of themselves and the world around them, and that in contrast to the assertiveness and down-to-earth way men speak.
Notwithstanding her remarks, the explanations Lakoff proposed tallied more with the views of what came to be known as the Dominance Theory, especially her linking of women’s language to power inequalities that exist in society. Her claim that “linguistic imbalances are worthy of study because they bring into sharper focus real world imbalances and inequities” between men and women; as well as her evocation of the socialization processes as determinant factors in bringing about differential language uses, resonated well with the “differences perspective” that formed the basis of the Dominance, and later the Difference, theory, in gender and language (Speer, 2005; see also Smith, 1985).

According to the Dominance Theory, men not only dominate the public sphere, where they control the major institutions of economy, education military etc., but they also take hold of the private, more intimate sphere of the family (Weatherall, 2002b; West and Zimmerman, 1975). The division of labor that exists at the institutional level results, according to Fishman (1978), in a division at the conversational interactional level. Fishman proposed that “[p]eople who do the routine maintenance work, the women, are not the same people who either control or benefit from the process” (1978, p. 99). By this, she suggested that the power inequalities that favor men were also manifest in the conversational interactions between men and women.

Fishman analyzed conversations between married couples and indentified interactional strategies that men and women used differentially, and which reflected their social power asymmetries. In her study, women asked more questions to ensure an otherwise denied and minimal participation in interaction. They used twice as many attention beginners as men in order to be able to secure, single-handedly, the interest of the topic, a process that, in symmetrical relationships, is normally andconcertedly done by talk-participants. Also, women initiated topics more than men did, but failed to get them pursued.

Viewing conversational work as a process of reality production, Fishman proposed that

\[
\text{men control what will be produced by the interaction. They already have, and they continually establish and enforce, their rights to define what the interaction and reality will be about” (1978, p. 100).}
\]

Dominance was also proposed by Zimmerman and West (1975) to lie behind interactional asymmetries in mixed-sex conversations. They claimed that, in addition to their control of macro-institutions, men’s control “is also exhibited through control of at least part of one
micro-institution” and that is the turn-taking system in interaction (1975, p. 125). West and Zimmerman were pioneers in their attempt to study the operations of power in everyday talk. Especially important is their operationalization the notion of ‘dominance’ by situating it in the interruptive patterns in mixed-sex conversations.

Also important is their suggestion that asymmetries in power relations in mixed-sex conversations are similar to that found in parent-child conversations (West and Zimmerman, 1977). Accordingly to them, the patterned control by parents of child’s talk is similar to men’s systematic control of women’s talk in mixed-sex interactions. One aspect of men’s control is exhibited in interruption patterns. When used by males, it is, according to West and Zimmerman, “a display of dominance or control to the female…just as the parent’s interruption communicates an aspect of parental control to the child” (1977, p. 527) (emphasis the authors’). Much like the way parents are ‘in charge’ of their children’s behavior, then, men are the ones in charge of women’s behavior; interruption is one conversational tool to control the latter’s behavior.

West and Zimmerman’s claims —and Fishman’s also— are therefore far reaching in that, if true, men orient toward a controlling behavior that is meant to curb, discourage, and even silence (Spender, 1990), women from engaging in interactional work at all, except when it is needed by men..

In a later study, West (1979) analyzed post-interruption responses and addressed the claim that women’s speech invites interruption owing to their submissive post-interruption behavior; that is, their failure to fight for their conversational rights. West recorded and analyzed mixed-sex dyadic conversations staged between unacquainted university students, prior to a purported laboratory experiment. Her analysis showed that, beyond corroborating their earlier findings, submissive responses to interruptions, as one type of resolution to interruption in general, were characteristic of both males and females. However, “the only reason females appear to be more ‘submissive’ is that they are far more frequently interrupted in the first instance” (1979, p. 93). In other words, with greater use of interruptions by males comes greater use of submissive post-interruption. For women then, their post-interruption responses are more noticeable only because they are interrupted more. This means that linking submissive post-interruption resolutions to women is more of a stereotype than a fact. Stereotypically, the causative relation between men’s interruption and women’s post interruption is therefore reversed and women are seen as “asking for interruption”.
Even when no gender difference is apparent, cultural stereotypes assure an asymmetrical treatment of conversational features across gender lines. Thus, according to West,

> Given the fact that males interrupt females more frequently than the reverse in the first instance, speakers engaging in cross-sex conversations may come to orient to those repeated infractions as ‘more’ than independent violations of turn space and in fact, ‘more’ than isolated violations of speaker’s rights to be engaged in speaking: female resolutions of deep interruption…may themselves come to color the conversational definition of the situation (1979, p. 93).

### 3.3. The two-cultures theory

Especially for feminist researchers who sought to redress the imbalance in gender studies with regard to power and dominance, the pursuit of Lakoff’s line of enquiry and reasoning disadvantaged, more than benefited, women. To take one example, her work, as well as that of Fishman, West and Zimmerman, led to the emergence of assertiveness training programs (Frith and Kizinger, 1997; Talbot, 2010), with the explicit aim of training women how to be assertive just like men. The assumption behind such training reflected the bias in favor of male’s mode of interaction. Thus, men’s assertiveness was considered a desired quality to be acquired. Women’s lack of it was somehow deficient. Their lack of an assertive character was claimed to be behind women’s loss of personal as well a social power (Talbot 2010). Consequently, rather than elevating women’s forms of talk, the application of The Dominance and The Deficit theories contributed further to their stigmatization.

Against that background, the difference model emerged as an attempt to leverage the negative view of women’s language echoed in deficient and dominance accounts. For the critics of these two theories, where men and women were found to differ, the differences were grounds to establish men’s and women’s language as equally valid, neither is compared negatively to the other nor is it superior.

Supporters of ‘equal validity’, what came to be known as the Difference Theory or the Two-cultures theory (Speer, 2005, p.32), do not view women’s language as socially lacking but argue that both men and women have their own conversational styles that underline their strategic use of language resources, and which are employed to manage interpersonal issues in their daily interactions (Gray, 1992). The notion of style, for instance, was central in Tannen’s work (2005, 1990, 1987, 1983, and 1981). She defined conversational styles as,
all the ways speakers encode meaning in language and convey how they intend
their talk to be understood. Insofar as speakers from similar speech communities
share such linguistic conventions, style is a social phenomenon. Insofar as
speakers use particular features in particular combinations and in various settings,
to that extent style is an individual phenomenon (1981, p. 136).

Style for Tannen refers to whatever features, linguistic, paralinguistic or otherwise, (2005, p. 181-189) that signal the intention of a speaker to be heard in a particular way by the hearer. Building on Lakoff’s theory of politeness and John Gumperz’s work on inference, Tannen maintains that conversation styles are responsive to a myriad of “contextualization cues” available for participants in conversation (1987, p. 251). Elsewhere, she stresses that the fluctuation of styles in accordance with contextual demands is not random but “is made up of devices based on strategies for serving the simultaneous and conflicting need for and danger of interpersonal involvement (2005, p. 36).

The goal of the flexible responsiveness of style, then, is to manage the two basic needs that underlie human communication in general: “the need to be free” and “the need to be liked”. In Tannen’s view, “[l]inguistic systems, like other cultural systems, represent conventionalized ways of honoring these needs” (1981, p. 137). The acquisition of conversational styles is part and parcel of language acquisition in general (2005, p. 16).

With regard to gender, Tannen’s account explains what lies behind men’s and women’s different needs and different stakes in interaction. Her model explains both the how and why of gender differences in language. For one thing, males differ from females as to the primary use of conversation. Quoting Tannen again,

For males, conversation is the way you negotiate your status in the group and keep people from pushing you around; you use talk to preserve your independence. Females, on the other hand, use conversation to negotiate closeness and intimacy; talk is the essence of intimacy, so being best friends means sitting and talking (1990, p. 95).

The implications for mixed-sex conversation are clear. When they come in contact with each other, it is only natural, given their different goals, that men and women use different styles. Females use language to create rapport and a sense of empathy, whereas men use language to report (ibid.).
Consequently, it is also natural that misunderstandings arise because of such differences. An example of men’s orientation towards status and women’s emphasis on rapport is found in Johnstone’s (1993) analysis of personal stories. She remarked that men’s stories were more about context and independence, where the protagonist acted alone and is successful. Women’s stories, on the other hand, reflected community-shared values and joint action. Their stories were a site where groups of women acted together in mutually supportive ways (1993, p. 71).

With regard to the origins of gender styles, champions of the Two-cultures model maintain that the origins of conversation styles are to be found in early socialization patterns of children (Maltz and Borker, 1982). Children prefer same-sex playing groups in early childhood. Their preferences result in their growing up in two separate sub-cultures, totally different from each other. Talbot explains that,

boys and girls groups seem to be rather different, so that children grow up, to an extent, in gender specific cultures; they learn about such things as how to interact in friendly way from their peers rather than from adults. Consequently, learning cross sex-talk can be a big problem in childhood (2010, p. 80).

Tannen (2005) and Maltz and Borker (1982) asserted that children show preference for same-peer style early on at the age of five. Others claim that awareness of gender-linked styles emerge as early as the age of four (Cook et al., p. 1985), or even three (Sheldon, 1993).

Carrying gender awareness to mixed-sex conversations in adulthood leads to communication failure, much as the way communication fails as a result of cross-cultural communication. According to Maltz and Borker (1982), cross-gender communication is one type of cross-cultural communication in as much as men and women approach conversation with different assumptions, expectations, and different conversation styles to put those expectations across; and in as much as, when miscommunication arises, justification for it always turns on personal characteristics and cultural stereotypes. In both cross-cultural and cross gender communication, misunderstanding is inevitable. Negative views, judgments and social stereotypes emerge consequent to those misunderstandings.
3.4. A critique of the early theories of gender

Speer (2005) argues that an adequate approach to gender and language studies should satisfy a number of criteria in order to satisfactorily account for the sociolinguistic practices of gender.

First, because of the essentialist nature of much sociolinguistic work on gender, Speer advocates instead a constructionist approach where “(t)he focus in on how language users produce speakers as male and females, and construct, orient towards, and use gendered identities in their talk” (2005, p. 13). Since in a constructionist approach, gender identity is an accomplishment, produced during interaction, analysis should detail the ways in which the situated reproduction of gender possible, “the ways in which people use language to produce gender difference, and to construct gender dualism as natural, inevitable and timeless” (ibid.).

Second, social scientists have long divided the realms of social phenomena into two incongruent fields, that of sociology which studies social structures, and that of psychology which deals with cognitive phenomena (Heritage, 1884b). Within this paradigm, both social structures and cognitive processes are treated as primary “input” to social action (Speer, 2005, p. 13). Discourse is considered a ‘by-product’, “a window through which to look to the more important mental and social operations” (ibid., p. 43). In an essentialist paradigm, in short, discursive phenomena refer directly to social or psychological states. Their importance lies in providing a ‘resource’ that enables researchers to probe the workings of social and cognitive structures, but neither are discursive activities capable of producing social action nor are they themselves a form of social action.

In a discursive approach, however, discourse itself is the primary object of study since it shapes, not reflects, the social and psychological structures people orient to in their daily interactions. Talk, then, should be studied as a form of social action, and discourse as “a social practice rather than a thing” (ibid., p. 14).

Related to the second criterion is a third that emanates from the same premise. The object of analysis in a constructionist approach is interaction as a form of social action. It urges a focus “on what discourse is doing, how it is constructed to make things happen, and the conversational resources that are drawn on to facilitate that action or activity” (ibid., p. 14). Gender, according to this view, does not reside in interactants as personal selves; but interactants work to genderize themselves and others in interaction to achieve specific outcomes.
Fourth, and unlike work within domains like Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which prioritize the political agenda of the researcher, the study of discursive practices within a constructionist paradigm means that researchers ‘bracket’ their politics in favor of studying participants’ problems and concerns as members themselves ‘see’ them.

In view of the criteria she recommends for an adequate analysis of gender and language, Speer subsequently criticizes the Deficit, Dominance and Difference theories as lacking in their satisfaction of adequate theoretical premises. Discussing the shortcomings of each theory, Speer reaches the conclusion that the former theories share an essentialist view of gender, either in their disregard to contextual sensitivities altogether or their tendency to treat men and women as homogenous groups. Former theories to gender and language, therefore, reify both gender and the social context in which discourse takes place. In addition, the three theories consider language a by-product, second in importance to social structures, like power for example, or to psychological processes like socialization, interests and emotional needs. Rather than seeing interaction as constitutive of the very context that affects discourse (see below pp. 60-64), it is considered as merely ushering to the dynamics, or impact, of wider, and more important, contexts. Language, according to this view, is considered a carrier of meanings that travel across macro-structural contexts regardless of the particularities of the local context where each interaction takes place. In her own words, Speer says that,

> despite first proclaiming that they are sensitive to context, each author simultaneously adopts practices, procedures and categories which strip talk of its contextual subtleties and which ignore the context-sensitive of actual language use. They imply that, at least to some extent, gendered meanings do indeed reside in, and come attached to certain words and linguistic forms, regardless of the precise context in which such words are uttered (2005, p. 37).

Speer also criticizes researchers using the theoretical frameworks of Dominance and Difference for prioritizing their own interests, reflected in research questions they set and explanations they provide. For example, the question of how men and women differ in their use of tags, hedges, and interruption already assumes that differences exists and, moreover, that their explanation lies in the gender of interactants. By a leap of faith, researchers consequently relate gender linguistic differences to social or psychological mechanisms of interest to them. Rather than producing results ingrained in the particulars of each interactional episode encountered, they produce instead generalizations over diverse contexts,
disregarding contextual differences totally. This approach to analysis, Speer argues, “inevitably gives primacy to the perspective of the analyst, over and above that of the participants’, thus preventing an analytically tractable analysis of gender” (ibid, p. 40).

Finally, representatives of the three approaches hold the view that language reflects rather than constructs reality. Given the second-in-importance view of language referred to above, proponents of the three theories consider gender-related language problems as symptomatic of social and/or psychological problems rather than as problems in and of themselves.

Overall then, the interest in gender and language has a long history that had started well before rigorous sociolinguistics probed the effects of gender on linguistic variation. Also, it is possible to see the history of language and gender studies as one line extending from the essentialist views of earlier work to a discursive turn where gender is seen as an accomplishment, a kind of social doing (West and Zimmerman, 1987). The discursive turn in gender and language studies coincided with ascendency in social studies of CA as an approach to language as a form of action manifested in the organization of everyday talk. CA thus provides a useful methodology to study language in its much neglected local context; or, as Schegloff (1987, p. 207) calls it, to study ‘talk-in-interaction’.

Since the perspective adopted in this paper shares Speer’s views as a rationale to choosing a conversation analytic approach to study gender, it is worth looking at the origins of CA and its subsequent adoption especially in discourse studies and Sociolinguistics.

4. Conversation Analysis: Historical Background and theoretical underpinnings

4.1. Historical background

CA grew out of a sociological enterprise undertaken initially by Harvey Sacks (see the two volume compilation of Sacks’ lectures edited by Jefferson, 1992) and later Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) in their attempt to establish the legitimacy of conversation as a prime locus of social order. It is now growing to be an independent discipline with a cross-disciplinary character (Markee, 2000). As Maynard notes, it “has established itself as a worldwide theoretical and empirical endeavor concerned with the social scientific understanding and analysis of interactions” (2013, p. 11).

In a now classic paper in CA, Schegloff undertook to “show that the raw data of everyday conversational interaction can be subjected to rigorous analysis” (1968, p. 1075). By way of analyzing how the openings of telephone calls can be construed as realizing social actions (a
summon-answer pair of actions), he was able to argue that “the stuff of everyday life can be studied for the orderliness it exhibits” (ibid). That mundane conversation can be objected to analysis for showing its underlying structural organization was quite an illumination at that time (Silverman, 1998).

Also throughout his lectures, Sacks was at pain to show, according to Silverman, that talk is constructed with an eye on “how it will be heard”. By fashioning talk is a particular way with a particular position, speakers “make available to our hearer(s) a particular reading of what we mean” (1998, p. 6). Thus, speaking and hearing become social activities, constitutive of a social-exchange system, much like an economy (Sacks et al., 1974), which organizes actions in interaction.

In that sense, it is possible to say that when people engage in conversation, they engage in the collaborative construction of actions constrained by normative rules. The description of those rules and actions becomes the analytic aim of CA researchers (Heritage, 2008; Markee, 2000; Silverman, 1998). Speer more comprehensively defines CA research agenda as such,

[c]onversation analysts are primarily concerned to describe the methods that speakers use to coordinate their talk to produce orderly and meaningful conversational actions. In order to access these methods, they study the procedures which inform the production of both individual utterances and sequences of utterances….these procedures are not idiosyncratic, but display relatively stable patterns and organized regularities that are oriented to by participants, and which are evident in all of our talk. The goal of CA is to establish the structural frameworks that underpin and organize such regularities in interaction- or ‘the structures of social action’ (2005, p. 78)

The regularities in, and the orderliness of, conversations is the product of a ‘machinery’ (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson, 1974) that constitutes part of the shared cultural competence of societal members, and that enables them “to do what they do, produce the activities and scenes of everyday life” (Benson and Hughes 1991, cited in Markee (2000, p. 26)).

Two observations issue from the above definition, First, CA analysts hold that the study of conversation should be recognized as a field within the sociology of action (Heritage, 1984b). Sociology established itself as a field concerned with human social activities and talk is the most pervasive of all human activities (Schegloff, 1986, p. 111). Goffman (1964) was a
pioneer in observing that face-to-face interaction exhibits all the aspects of social order. Its analysis legitimates a new direction in sociological inquiry, what he calls the interaction order (Goffman, 1982; see also Goodwin and Heritage, 1990; Heritage 1984a/b, 2001; Jacobsen and Kristiansen, 2015). The analysis of conversation, in short, is an offshoot of the study of the interactional order.

Conversation was neglected though because, as already said above, language was treated as a resource to access other more important phenomena to the social scientist rather than being itself worthy of study (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998; Speer, 2005). One reaction against this shortcoming is therefore the turn to the study of language as constitutive of social conduct (ibid.)

Second, being concerned with conversation, social action and social order, CA stands at cross-roads between linguistics —more specifically pragmatics and sociolinguistics— and Sociology (Maynard, 2013). Since CA probes structural order as produced by societal members themselves in their daily interactions, it is more particularly related to a form of sociological enquiry known as Ethnomethodology (Heritage, 1984b).

Appropriately therefore, before discussing its bearings on pragmatic and Sociolinguistic investigation, an account of the sociological foundations of CA will be provided, with particular reference to two important figures in the field on whose ideas CA theory stands. These are Ervin Goffman, who advocated the study of face-to-face interactional order; and Harold Garfinkel, who stressed the importance of studying societal members’ procedures for the production of social realities.

4.2. Ethnomethodology and the study of common-sense reasoning

There is a major sense in which CA can be said to be the legitimate heir of the Ethnomethodology and, as such, a purely ethnomethodological enterprise (Hester and Francis, 2000; Heritage, 1984b). In his introduction to Sacks’ lectures, Schegloff (1992, Vol 1) mentions Garfinkel as a major influence on the thinking of Sacks, stating that he admired the way Garfinkel’s ideas were to remodel sociological theory current at that time (Heritage, 1984b; see also Heritage, 2001 ).

According to Hester and Francis,

[t]he mainstream sociological conception is that social order comprises structures and forces which operate at a level 'above and beyond' that of social interaction
and which determine, at least in part, the shape of interactional activities. Allied to this assumption is what one might call an architectural metaphor, in which the organized and orderly character of social life—the nature of society—is conceived as an edifice, or a complex of edifices (2000, p. 395).

Mainstream Sociology, in Hester and Francis’ view, is therefore a discipline that inquires into, the nature of social structures — the complex of edifices — and their effects on the nature of the sort of social order they enable. It is in short a top-down form of enquiry.

One flaw of this view is that it places social agency outside social agents (Heritage, 1984b). In traditional sociology, social actions are, as Heritage (1984b, pp. 7-36) argues, imposed by structures from without and internalized by social agents from within. In choosing a course of action according to this view of agency, a member of a community does nothing but to choose among pre-established courses that the social forces make available for them through the said process of internalization (ibid).

It was exactly this line of reasoning that Garfinkel attacked, accusing mainstream Sociology of treating social agents as cultural and psychological ‘dopes’ (1967; 1971). By this, Garfinkel refers to sociologists’ conception of a social agent as one “who produces the stable features of the society by acting in compliance with established and legitimate alternatives of actions that the common culture provides” (1972, p. 24). ‘Psychological dope’ refers a view of the societal member as one who re-enacts social order as a result of operations similar to conditioning in behaviorist psychology (Heritage, 1984b).

As an outcome of this treatment of the social agent, Sociology has dismissed from investigation what Garfinkel calls ‘common sense rationalities of judgment’, which ought to be the proper subject-matter of sociological study. According to Garfinkel, societal members do not just reaction to social structures, but they act upon them in ways that render structures meaningful to them. In his words, the justification for this view is that a

[a] member of the society uses background expectancies as a scheme of interpretation. In their terms, actual appearances are for him recognizable and intelligible as the appearances of familiar events (1971, p. 3).

Therefore, Ethnomethodology is a field concerned, as Liddicoat says, with the study of “the common sense resources, practices, and procedures” of everyday life. The latter are employed concertedly in interaction to sustain, as well as build, the ‘world as we know it (2007, p. 3).
For ethnomethodologists, according to Liddicoat, social structures and social order are “not a pre-existing framework” (2007, p. 2), but are rather a product of social interaction (See also Hester and Francis 2000, p. 395).

Given their subscription to ethnomethodological doctrines, CA practitioners maintain that the proper object of analysis is interactants’ procedures of sense-making as they engage routinely in social activities. Interaction of course is an essential component of any social activity, and talk is such a routine component of the majority of social events, to which interactants bring their common-sense knowledge (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973). Talk-in-interaction becomes thus a legitimate object of analysis and the focus of CA on conversation is not random, nor is it happenstance. It is quite the contrary. Schegloff and Sacks explain that they started the analysis of conversation under the assumption that,

If the materials [recordings of natural conversations] were orderly, they were so because they had been methodically produced by members of society for one another, and it was a feature of the conversations that we treated as data that they were produced so as to allow the display by the co-participants to each other of their orderliness, and to allow the participants to display to each other their analysis, appreciation, and use of that orderliness (1973, p. 290).

In other orders, orderliness obtains because, as Garfinkel argued, members of society “use background expectancies” in methodic ways to bear upon situations that are “recognizable and intelligible as the appearances of familiar events” (1971, p. 3).

Reflecting on the common theoretical assumptions that CA shares with Ethnomethodology, Lynch (2000, 528-531) explains that there are three ways to think of the connections between the two fields.

The first connection is historical. It relates to the fact that Garfinkel and Sacks were close collaborators. The second concerns the stance Ethnomethodology has against mainstream sociological work on social structure and social action. This stance, Lynch argues, finds its methodological interpretation in CA practices.

Methodologically, CA researchers analyze actions in conversational instances under the assumption that a conversation, or part of it, can be analyzed on a single-case basis since every and each conversational instance embodies social structure as constructed in that instance and not as applied generically (as would be in top-bottom approach). CA
practitioners defy through that practice the well known cumulative-quantitative research which aims to establish abstract patterns of social structures by extrapolating from large amount of data. A related methodological difference emerges out of the first. CA relies on audio-taped and video-taped conversations as data, much against the prevalent tendency in social science to impose constancy upon interactional situations through standardized methods of coding.

The third connection is related to the outcome of analysis. In mainstream sociology, the analysis is supposed to offer answers to research questions that are pre-established prior to conducting the analysis. The researcher simply disregards whatever peripheral issues his/ her data might give rise to in order to focus on their research concerns. In CA, however, the description of participants’ issues at the moment-by-moment unfolding of interactional-activities is given primary importance.

To conclude then, CA inherited from Ethnomethodology a general concern with societal members’ everyday practices as exhibiting order in their organization. Such practices, therefore, merit serious attention for how they bring into existence the very social structures people live by, and which social scientists look for elsewhere, as if they lie outside those very practices (by coding, and aggregating through, large numbers of social practices). CA’s contribution was to focus on a particular social practice: conversation. But sociology was rife with other problems that cast doubt on the legitimacy of CA proper subject-matter- i.e. the study of conversation.

In fact, the problem was related to the status of verbal data in general, and talk in particular. As seen above, the tendency in much social scientific research was to consider language, (verbal data in interviews, questionnaires, focus groups, etc.) just a tool that enables a glimpse at social and psychological dynamics. That talk-in-interaction could itself be studied for its own structures, and as the very embodiment and realization of social and psychological dynamics, was not a conceivable analytical endeavor.

In that, CA’s situation vis-à-vis Sociology resembled that of Sociolinguistics in its relation to formal Linguistics. Much as sociolinguists were at pains to establish the analytic relevance of social structures for which formal linguists had no conceivable place, CA analysts were, almost at the same time, trying to find a place for the study of talk-in-interaction as itself a form of social structure. For this, CA practitioners turned to the sociology of Goffman for help (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998).
4.3. The Social interactional order

For sociological investigation, Goffman proposed to investigate the organization face-to-face interaction (1967, p. 2). Interaction for him was an institutionalized order, no less real than other established institutions. That social interaction was a proper place wherein to look for institutional order, was, according to Heritage (2001), a fundamental achievement of Goffman, given that “the social science of the period was highly abstract and unconcerned with the specifics of everyday conduct” (2001, p. 48).

Also for Goffman, societal members in face-to-face interactions are preoccupied with impression management or “face work” (Goffman, 1967) (see also Jacobsen and Kristiansen 2015). At the verbal level, speakers and hearers manage impressions through the constant processing of each others’ the verbal display (Silverman, 1998, p. 32).

According to Goffman, interaction entails a mutual definition, or a mutual ‘framing’, of the situation by interactants through which, and in which, interaction makes sense.

[w]hen an individual projects a definition of the situation and thereby makes an implicit or an explicit claim to be a person of a particular kind, he automatically exerts a moral demand upon the other, obliging them to value and treat him in the manner that persons of his kind have a right to expect (1956, p. 6).

The interactional order has thus a moral character that compels participants to respect each other’s displayed views of the situation in their ‘labor’ to achieve a particular framing.

With regard to Goffman’s influence on CA, Silverman (1998, p. 33) observed that Sacks took Goffman’s study of interaction as exemplar of how conversational order can be methodologically studied. Goffman himself emphasized the need to study conversation since it is a “socially organized activity”, not by virtue of the linguistic code alone, but also because it is a “little system of mutually ratified and ritually governed face-to-face action” (1964, p. 136).

4.4. Action and talk in conversation

In developing its own character, CA merged the perspectives of both Ethnomethodology and Goffman’s sociology. As said earlier, CA begins with the assumption that talk is orderly and that orderliness is the outcome of societal members’ common-sense modes of reasoning. This is not to say that common sense is a reified mould. Rather, it allows for flexibility is defining
particular frames and appropriate modes of action. Members, in short, apply common sense procedures on a frame-by-frame basis.

Sacks’ translation of this idea was to emphasize that societal members engage in a process of constructing talk with their hearer’s understanding in mind— a process known as “recipient design” which is the most general principle guiding conversation according to Sacks et al. (1974). Liddicoat states that recipient design “refers to the idea that participants in talk design their talk in such a way as to be understood by an interlocutor, in terms of the knowledge that participants assume they share” (2007, p. 5). In this sense recipient design is quite similar to Goffman’s ‘definition of the situation’ in that it is a moral obligation towards hearers; but it also includes a measure of negotiation in so far as each speaker at the same time displays and checks his/her understanding of talk in light of previous understanding displayed by others in interaction. Thus, the principle works in a stepwise fashion.

Exactly how the principle of ‘recipient design’ works is explained by Sacks et al. (1974) account of the turn-taking system. Levinson (2013) exemplifies how the principle operates in naturally occurring conversation by introducing its aspects: the problem part (the “action formation” and the “action recognition” problems), and the solution part (the adjacency pair sequence) (see also Schegloff, 2007a).

Schegloff formulates the action formation problem as thus:

how are the resources of the language, the body, the environment of the interaction, and position in the interaction fashioned into conformations designed to be, and to be recognized by recipients as, particular actions — actions like requesting, inviting, granting, complaining, agreeing, telling, noticing, rejecting, and so on — in a class of unknown size? (2007a, p. xiv).

Levinson defines the action recognition problem as “the assignment of an action to a turn as revealed by the response of a next speaker, which, if uncorrected in the following turn(s), becomes in some sense a joint ‘good enough’ understanding” (2013, p. 104).

Action formation requires speakers to design their turns in such a way that their hearers recognize what the former intend to accomplish (the action of the speaker’s utterance). Action recognition requires hearers to design their subsequent turn in such a way as to display their recognition of the action carried by the speaker’s original turn. The task for the analyst is to study the social organization that allows speakers and hearers to meet those different
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demands. In other words, the problem is to study the organization which allows participants in a conversation to recognize that an action has been made and that this action has been acknowledged. What ‘machinery’, using the word of Sacks et al. (1974) again, provides for the coordination of actions in conversations?

The answer Schegloff and Sacks (1973) provide is that talk is socially organized in sequences, with the adjacency-pair as the fundamental unit.

According to Schegloff and Sacks (1973) adjacency pairs consist of sequences which properly have the features: (1) two utterances length, (2) adjacent positioning of component utterance, (3) different speakers producing each utterance....A given sequence will thus be composed of an utterance that is a first pair part produced by one speaker directly followed by the production by a different speaker of an utterance which is (a) a second pair part, and (b) is from the same pair type as the first utterance in the sequence is (1973, p. 295-296).

The answer, less formally speaking, is that talk comes in small ‘bundles’ that consist of two turns adjacent to each other. Turns are related to each other in an adjacency pair by the fact that the second represents a particular reading of the first. Producing second turn means that the hearer “understood what a prior turn aimed at, and that he is willing to go along with that” (1973, p. 298). Positioning a second part adjacent to a first also enables the first speaker to see whether the action he/she intended is acknowledged or whether amendment is necessary (ibid).

The existence of adjacently pairs demonstrates that societal members produce turns at talk in a systematic way. Turns are not produced randomly and independently of what goes on before them, but are rather subject to a social constraint of their production.

A basic rule of adjacency pair operation is: given the recognizable production of a first pair part, on its first possible completion its speaker should stop and a next speaker should start and produce a second pair part from the pair type of which the first is recognizably a member (1973, p. 296).

There is thus a social-structural constraint on members’ contributions in conversation which is meant to guarantee how actions in talk are coordinated.
Since the constraint on adjacent turns forms part of the common-sense methods shared by interactants, an adjacency pair provides for utterances’ ‘projectability’ (Levinson, 2013); and that is the ability of participants to see actions in sequences of talk and to see those actions as sequentially coordinated. Levinson argues that the “ability to ‘see’ actions, to project coherent sequences from their subparts, and cooperatively offer to do part of them, is part of some special capacity for interaction that seems more or less confined to our species” (Levinson, 2013, p. 125)

For Levinson, projectability refers to the ability of interactants to dissect each other’s utterances in order to “predict both the content and its structure, so that they can predict when it will come to an end” (2005, p. 103).

It is clear from the above that the organization of turns into adjacency pairs provides a solution to the problems of how actions are coordinated in talk-in-interaction and, more importantly, points to a more general fact. In interaction, members bring their knowledge of organizational patterns operative in talk to bear upon the design and the understanding of interaction. Those organization patterns, like the adjacency pair, are assumed as shared and in common by societal members. They form thus part of the interactional order Goffman talked about and the machinery Sacks showed as operative in talk.

It is also clear that the view of social actions as carried by talk-in-interaction intersects a view commonly held by proponents of Speech Act theory (SA) in pragmatics, and of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in Discourse Analysis studies (DA). Common to the approaches is their link of the linguistic to the social. On this ground, CA can be said to be an interdisciplinary approach.

Accordingly in the next section, the affinities that CA bears to Pragmatics and CDA will be outlined if only to show the extent to which CA has an interdisciplinary character. As with the review of Sociolinguistics and gender studies above, the argument will be developed later that both SA theory and CDA fall short of providing an adequate framework for the analysis of gender and that CA provides an better alternative.

5. Conversation analysis and other approaches to discourse

5.1. Conversation analysis and pragmatics

In pragmatics, it was Austin (1962) who developed the analysis of utterances as a form of social action. He analyzed what he called “felicity conditions”. Felicity conditions for a
particular act are the social and linguistic conditions whose fulfillment makes it possible for that act to be considered ‘properly done’ by a particular utterance. SA theory, as developed by Austin and, later, Searle (1969), focused on constructed sentences linguistically decomposed to discover their speech-act forces. The conceived goal of SA theory was the mapping of speech acts into linguistic forms.

As current in linguistics at that time, Austin relied on invented sentences and typical speech situations to develop intuitively the necessary conditions (Geis, 1995).

A consequence of this focus on the sentence was that pragmatists viewed speech acts as primarily linguistic in nature. Their force was to be sought in the linguistic properties of an utterance and not within a conversational context (Searle, 1992). Pragmatics was therefore doubly guilty (see Schegloff’s rebuttal in the same book, 1992b). It used invented sentences and insisted that felicity conditions reside in them. Criticizing this trend in linguistics, Sacks remarked that, while the invention of isolated sentences is an easy undertaking, inventing series of sequences that would amount to a real conversation in any conceivable context is almost impossible (1992, vol 2, p. 5).

It is on that score that CA analysts criticized SA theorists. SA theory was mindless, according to Geis of “the absolutely critical contribution of context” to the realization of speech acts (1995, p. 13). In short, SA analysts’ conception of the relation between sentences and acts inevitably led to the same problem of ‘form and function’, referred to above with regard to Lakoff’s treatment of women’s linguistic features.

Unlike Pragmatics, using natural conversations in their actual context for the study of social action was a hallmark of all Sacks’ work and would later become one distinctive feature of CA. Commenting on the difference between CA’s treatment of interaction as communicative social action (Levinson, 2013) and speech acts as verbal performance, Geis provides an analogy worth quoting at length.

One cannot kiss another/ person without closing one's lips together, drawing air into one's lungs, thereby creating a partial vacuum, and then releasing the bilabial constriction. But if we follow the suggested line of reasoning of Austin we will have to conclude that kissing is primarily, and most importantly, a bilabial, ingressive pulmonary act. It is a bilabial, ingressive pulmonary act, even sometimes a reciprocal bilabial, ingressive pulmonary act, but it is also, and more
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importantly, a social action, ranging in significance from signaling sexual interest to showing affection, to communicating a greeting (the kissing that is done between celebrities on television shows), to communication (1995, p. 14-15).

Geis (ibid.) proposes a re-analysis of speech-acts as social, as opposed to linguistic, units. He argues that SA theory can accommodate an approach that is sociologically driven. Geis in short favors the analysis of speech acts along CA lines.

Instead of viewing a speech act as the property of a sentence, CA treats them as conversationally shared actions. They become the joint achievement of speakers and hearers across segments of conversations (whose minimal unit is the adjacency pair). Geis argues that “there is nothing to be gained, and much to be lost, if we continue to think of speech acts or illocutionary acts as acts performed in saying something” (1995, p. 10). If, in other words, speech acts are treated as monologically (Searle, 1992).

5.2. Critical discourse analysis

CDA is an approach exemplar of interdisciplinarity. Since its foundation, researchers have drawn on findings in many disciplines in order to link language with other social phenomena, disciplines such as linguistics, Sociology, Literary Theory, Ethnography, and Psychology (Chilton, 2005).

The phenomena that CDA addresses are discourse, social inequality, power, ideology, and dominance (van Dijk, 1993). CDA attempts to study how discourse, (which means language in its simplest expression (Chilton, 2005), is implicated in the wider social struggle between those who have power and those who do not. It also aims to show how language constructs and is constructed to mediate the ideological stance of those implicated in the struggle for power (van Dijk, 1998, Wodak, 2002). Van Dijk explains that CDA is to uncover “the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance” (1993, p. 249) and adds that CDA analysts’ objective is to “know what structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events play a role in these modes of reproduction” (1993, p. 250). According to (Fairclough, 1992), CDA practitioners carry this project with an eye on social change.

Considering its stated mission, CDA, therefore, offers a unique stance. It is a field that links the study of language to society in a specific way. Unlike Sociolinguistics, SA theory or CA; CDA takes, as van Dijk describes, the relations of language to power, dominance, and
inequality for granted, as well as “the position of the discourse analyst in such social relationships” (1993, p. 249). CDA practitioners are academically as well as politically engaged in redressing the balance of social power in favor of those who have less of it. Elsewhere, van Dijk says that “CDA is biased – and proud of it” (2001, p. 96).

Notwithstanding their different methods, critical discourse analysts unanimously agree that language (or discourse) is a major social practice which creates and perpetuates inequality in social life.

On the link between discourse and social practices, Van Leeuwen (1993) distinguishes two kinds of relations: discourse as social practice, “as a form of action, as something people do to or for or with each other” and discourse as representation of those practices, “as the things people say about social practice(s)” (1993, p. 193). For CDA, people use language both to produce actions in the world and to account of their production. For Van Leeuwen (ibid.), the aim of CDA should be the analysis of discourse both as the instrument of power and the construction of social reality wherein power relations reside.

The ‘criticality’ of CDA derives from the above relation of language and its context. Wodak suggests that the,

critical account of discourse would thus require a theorization and description of both the social processes and structures, which give rise to the production of a text, and of the social structures and processes within which individuals or groups as social-historical subjects, create meanings in their interaction with texts (2002, p. 12).

Rogers (2004) also comments on the ‘critical’ aspect of CDA and details three meanings that attach to the word. The first relates to the fact that the political commitments of the analyst, as already noted, guide analysis. The second concerns the goal of the analysis, which is the study of the relationship between language form and language function (See also Locke 2004). The third meaning concerns the commitment to address social inequalities; or the way CDA “explicitly addresses social problems and seeks to solve social problems through the analysis of accompanying social political action” (2004, p. 4).

It can be concluded then that, unlike SA theory, with its unifying philosophical foundations and long standing linguistic principles and applications, CDA is hard to characterize as a field. Its coherence, as stated above, derives rather from agreement on a number of political
principles and a systematic use of specific key terms such as ‘power’, ‘dominance’, and ‘ideology’. It is fit at this junction the review to briefly consider how these terms are employed within the CDA framework.

van Dijk (1993) argues that the study of power relations in society entails that social power is given primary importance to the exclusion of personal-power. Social power relates to that form of it which holds among social groups, not individuals within the same group. An interest in the power struggle between individuals is important only in so far as it is a reflection of the larger struggle between social groups. Being social in nature, power accordingly flows from ideology, which Fairclough succinctly defines as “[i]nstitutional practices which people draw upon without thinking” (1989, p. 33). It is the ability to control not only the verbal but also the contextual determinants of discourse as well which leads from power to ‘dominance’. Dominance occurs when powerless groups see unequal social practices as the natural order of things (Fairclough, 1989; Fairclough et al., 2004; van Dijk, 1993). A social group, in its ability to institutionalize discourse practices which legitimate and naturalize unequal social relationships, to the extent that powerless groups ‘consent’ to these practices, can be said to be the ‘dominant group’. Dominance is therefore the ideological manifestation of the exercise of power, as much as it “project[s] one’s practices as universal and ‘common sense’” (1989, p. 33).

The ultimate aim of CDA analysts is to lay bare the workings of ideology in texts. Given that, as Fairclough said, “ideology is most effective when its workings are least visible”, (1989, p. 85), it becomes incumbent upon CDA proponents to make it most visible. CDA has one goal. It is to uncover how discourse helps sustain as well as reproduce ideological social structures that ultimately lead to unequal organization of interaction. One needs only to think of how interruption was considered an ideologically motivated interactional organization that favors the position of men to the detriment of that of women.

5.3. Context: The framework problem

Common to the three approaches discussed above is the rejection of the structural study of language in favor of a context-based analysis of language. For speech acts theorists, incorporating the notion of context entails the study of speech acts and the conditions that must be fulfilled before a speech act is felicitous (socially fulfilled). For CDA proponents, context embraces a wide web of social relations between individuals and conditions through which they live, conceived in terms of structures which are mediated through social practices,
with language being at the front of those practices. Conversation analysts hold a different view of context. It is seen as a local achievement in interaction. Technically, CA considers context in terms of turns sequentially organized in interaction.

All three approaches therefore agree that language is primarily a socially ‘contexted’ phenomenon. However, they disagree as to what the proper limit on context is, allowing for an adequate description of language that makes sense not only for the analyst — being concerned with a theory of language-society— but also for the people who use language in their everyday activities. Gee refers to this disagreement as ‘the framework problem’ and describes it in the following words,

Context...is indefinitely large, ranging from local matters like the positioning of bodies and eye gaze, though people’s beliefs, to historical, institutional, and cultural settings. No matter how much of the context we have considered in offering an interpretation of an utterance, there is always the possibility of considering other and additional aspects of the context, and these new considerations may change how we interpret the utterance. Where do we cut off consideration of context? How can we be sure any interpretation is right if considering further aspects of the context might well change that interpretation? (2004, p. 30)

As McHoul et al recognize, one must necessarily set a limit to contextual elements required for an adequate analysis of discourse, but the question remains of “where do the boundaries of what might be called cultural information lie?” (2008, p. 50).

As a CDA analyst, Gee suggests that,

all discourse analysts can do to deal with the framework problem is offer arguments that the aspects of context they have considered, in a particular piece of research, are the important and relevant ones for the people whose language is being studied and for the analytic purposes of the research” (2004, p. 32).

Phrased in this way, it is clear that Gee conceives of the framework problem as a methodological nuisance for the analyst, to be solved simply by choosing some contextual features among a myriad of others and ‘argue’ for their relevance. That the relevance of a particular feature of context must be argued for and not empirically established is a point that Schegloff (1991, 1997) vehemently criticizes.
Gee’s solution to the framework problem is exemplar, according to Schegloff (1997), of the “theoretical imperialism” that CDA analysts engage it when their political preoccupations gloss over local contexts; preoccupations which might not be viewed by interactants as political in the first place (1997, p. 167). Schegloff takes CDA to task for prioritizing the analyst’s selection of contextual features over those that can empirically be shown to be participants’ understanding of context. CDA prioritization of political issues is groundless since, to paraphrase Garfinkel’s (1972) idea, people are well capable of understanding the social conditions under which they live. They are not the ‘social dopes’ social scientists take them to be. For Schegloff and CA practitioners in general, interactants are sentient being who themselves orient to their context under some formulation or formulations, who grasp their own conduct and that of others under the jurisdiction of some relevancies and not others; who orient to some of the identities they separately and collectively embody and, at any given moment, not others (1997, p. 166).

In CA, Schegloff’s criticism has given rise to a new conception of context. Linell and Thunqvist (2003) for example, make a distinction between a ‘traditional’ and a ‘modern’ conception of context. The former sees context as a “pre-existing and stable environment” which includes biographical background, cultural knowledge, institutions, etc.; and which people draw upon to ensure understanding. The modern view looks at context as only “partly pre-given, and as constructed or reconstructed on-line, i.e. as situationally accomplished” (2003, p. 410). This division is based on Schegloff’s (1991) distinction between approximate and distal contexts and his defense of the CA methodology which takes surrounding textually adjacent features as sufficiently warranting an adequate analysis of talk-in-interaction. In line with Schegloff’s division, Linell and Thunqvist (2003) call for the study of contextual features endogenous to interaction that can be gleaned from talk without recurrence to any exogenous contextual consideration.

Differing from this view somewhat, Mchoul et al. (2008) call for a synthesis of the two ways of looking at context in keeping with the CA principle of accountability of analysis to data. Their solution to the framework problem is to argue for the usefulness of whatever contextual information (biographic, institutional, historical or otherwise) available in talk itself, and which participants display to each other through interaction. This they propose as an aid to a CA analysis in the strict sense. The idea is to allow analysts to avail themselves of contextual
features that might transpire from talk itself and use it as an extra source in validating a CA analysis. This way, the authors suggest, context can be harnessed in favor of a CA analysis. Their rationale is that “contextual knowledge is by no means necessary but, as a luxury, it need not be rejected out of hand if verifiably available” (2008, p. 46).

Weatherall very succinctly summarizes CA’s notion of context when she comments that, in CA, “the interaction is the context” (2000b, p. 114). In Lepper’s view, this notion means that it is “generated on a turn by turn basis by speakers, rather than as a pre-existing ‘frame’ within which interaction takes place” (2000, p. 52).

However, this view of context as local itself was in turn attacked. For example, Wetherell (1998) accuses CA of banning the integration in discourse analysis of the cultural knowledge that people bring to their conversation and which might be shaped by forces other than those consciously brought to bear on the production of discourse. In her view, an analysis limited to textual data only cannot be satisfactory since it ignores the working of discourse in the Foucaulian, but also critical discursive, sense; that is, as historically and socially shaping forces (see also Wodak, 2002).

In her analysis of male discourse on sexuality in conversations with young males, Wetherell (1998) draws on both CA and postmodern theories of subject positions and power struggle (Burr, 1995), to show the workings of identity trouble management in conversation about sexual issues. For her, a close technical analysis of the kind CA recommends is unhelpful and unproductive. It needs to be supplemented with “[t]he more inclusive notion of discourse found in post-structuralist writing [which] provides a better grounding for analysis” (1998, p. 394).

The above discussion has made it clear that consensus over the framework problem is non-existent, as witnessed for example in the many debates over it among scholars (see in this order Schegloff 1997; Wetherell 1998; Schegloff, 1998; Billig, 1999; Schegloff, 1999). It is also quite clear that each proposed solution has its own merits and its own drawbacks.

The present paper adopts a CA view of context as an interactionally emerging phenomenon. It shares Wooffitt’s view on CA commitment to a “principled reluctance to draw on ethnographic [biographical, historical, social or cultural] characterization of the setting and its participants in the analysis” (2005, p. 63). The rationale for such commitment being that context is itself a vague word which, as Schegloff (1997) shows, can be inexhaustibly
definable in a large number of ways, all of which are, in Wooffitt terms, “logically correct or true by any test of correspondence” (2005, p. 63). As CA analysis is guided by data, context awaits emergence. It cannot be specified a priori in any meaningful sense. It is probably the reason why, with regard to the problem of how the analyst is to decide which particular form of context is most appropriate in interpreting data, Wooffitt, provides no proposed solution because of the non-commitment of CA to any pre-defined notion or set of notions prior to analysis.

In other words, the analyst does not take a stance towards a particular contextual feature unless it emerges interactionally in talk; it is participants’ displayed orientation to a contextual feature which makes it relevant. Using Schegloff’s terminology, analysts must demonstrate empirically the “programmatic relevance” of a given contextual item (1987a, p. 112), in order for that item to be valid analytically. With this, it is possible to turn now to see how gender fits into a consequential analysis of the sort CA proposes. The ramifications of this view of context for a categorial analysis will be discussed later (section 6.3, p. 73). Given that gender has always been a contextual source for the analysis of language, and considering that CA is as a late comer in gender studies, the section below reviews how the CA ideas affected the study of gender and language.

5.4. Conversation analysis and gender

As seen above, Wetherell (1998) claims that CA should be complemented with notions derived post-modernism in order to validate any analysis of gendered identities. Her argument is that conversations are shaped by institutionally and historically social forces operating outside talk. Only the analyst, with careful explication of the intricate ways those forces are enmeshed in the texture of everyday talk, can detect their workings since they cannot be gleaned from the surface of interaction. Nonetheless, Wetherell is careful to stress that the relevance of social forces must be demonstrated empirically from within the data.

Recent debates over gender address its claimed ‘omnipresence’ that, as Garfinkel argues (1967), warrants its relevance even in the absence of discursive cues to show participants’ orientation to gender (Billig 1999, Kitzinger 2000, Weatherall 2002b). If, as Wetherell urges, analysts “must be able to show [empirically] that participants had the orientation claimed for them” (1998, p. 392), how can such an orientation be shown in the absence of cues ushering its existence? For instance, how can a focus on gender identities be coupled with a focus on conversational rules, like the adjacency pair rules, which operate over and beyond any
particular identity? As Billig notes, an apparently egalitarian system for the management of turns in conversation might in fact hide “deeply practiced and often unnoticed inequalities” (1999, p. 554) that gender identities might trigger in conversation.

Billig (1999) argues that CA’s insistence on taking talk ‘on its surface value’ disregards the payoffs of an analysis that probes its undercurrent forces in talk, historical, social, psychological, etc. For him, the purported non-critical stance of CA harbors an ideological view of the world as a place where participants in discourse are assumed to have equal rights and equal access to power; a view the study of gender and power has proved misguided. For this reason, Billig, like Wetherell, urges CA analysts to consider the wider cultural context whenever that can fruitfully inform analysis of talk-in-interaction.

To these accusations, Schegloff (1999) responds that no such recourse to approaches outside CA is necessary since a technical analysis of the sort CA advances does not preclude preoccupation with wider social issues, should the analyst find that participants to talk orient to those issues. As an example, Schegloff suggests that the workings of gender must be shown in talk rather than presumed to operate behind it. Analysts will do well if, in the words of Linell and Thunqvist, they ‘background’ their assumptions and ‘foregroun’ those of participants in interaction (2003).

Many researchers take the CA challenge seriously. Studies have appeared that ground gender within the conversation analytic framework and show how people manage issues of gender as they unfold in the turn-by-turn basis of communication (Hopper and LeBaron, 1998; Kitzinger, 2000; Kirzinger and Frith 1999; Speer, 2001a/b; Stokoe 1998; Stokoe and Smithson, 2001; Weatherall 2002a, 2002b; West, 1995). CA’s emphasis on societal members’ orientation as demonstrated in their talk has, thus, presented additional leverage to the social constructionist view of gender. As Weatherall claims, the idea that gender can be studied as members’ orientation “is one that has been missing from the widely accepted (essentialist) psychological theories of gender” (2002b, p. 100), but is ever present in recent CA-informed studies. The rest of this section reviews some such studies.

Hopper and LeBaron (1998) studied how gender ‘creeps’ into talk by using as data extracts of interactions where gender words were the locus of explicit attention in interaction. In their data, a gendered word went through three phases which marked its relevance to the participants and how they oriented to it. Once a gender term was introduced, its status as peripheral was developed through a series of ‘noticings’.
First was the introduction of a gender category in talk. Second, its noticing by participants, and third, the word became the subject-matter of talk in subsequent turns. Hopper and LeBarron (ibid.) argued that the creeping of gender into talk was carried through thanks to the availability in language of resources that index gender, directly or indirectly (Ochs, 1992). One distinctive characteristic of this indexing is that it makes the introduction of gender relevant but not always explicit. That is to say, not all gendered words become the center of talk. Noticing might or might not take place.

On a different level, and as said earlier, work within the power-powerless framework was responsible for the emergence of training programs that purported to teach women how to be assertive in their refusal of unwanted actions (especially sexual intercourse). Using the findings of CA on how people do refusals, Kitzinger (2000), argued against the assumptions behind such training.

CA work on the adjacency pair ‘offer-rejection’ shows that in everyday situations, refusal is not direct and incorporates one or more elements that attenuate its ‘negative’ force (its face-threatening force). Rejecting an offer may be preceded by temporal delays, hedges, palliatives (appreciations, apologies, token agreement etc.) or accounts (explanations, justifications, or excuses for declining an offer). According to Kitzinger and Frith (1999), training programs that urged women to refuse sexual proposals by being assertive, by ‘just say no’, did not appreciate the norms governing refusals and which people orient to in their everyday life. One outcome of this dis-attention had been that women expressed difficulty in carrying out refusals in an assertive manner because, as Kitzinger put it, “refusal skills training programs seem to be offering advice that does not adequately capture the reality of how refusals are done” (2000, p. 178). (The implications of such work will be discussed in chapter V).

Hopper and LeBarron (1998) Kitzinger (2000), and Kitzinger and Frith (1999) all show that CA findings can benefit gender studies in ways that escape prior work in the field of gender and language. In those studies, gender is not a contextual feature always on offer for analysts to be linked to talk features; rather, the contextual relevance of gender is itself a matter for analysis. As such, Stokoe and Weatherall (2002) consider as especially invigorating the CA caveat that analysis be driven by participants’ orientations rather than by analyst’s preoccupations. They argue that prior work is guilty of invoking an ‘ethnographically-
furnished context’ by analysts on behalf of interactants (ibid.), and this invocation, as Watson notes, is a “misconceived analytic formulations of context” (Watson 1997, p. 75).

In light of the recent developments in gender and language studies, the present dissertation proposes a sequential analysis of gender as a contextual feature that emerges, or gets constructed, out of talk. Limiting oneself to gender-as-it-emerges can be said to be as adequate a solution to the framework problem as can be formulated if the aim is to align research in the field of gender and language with the criteria for a constructive approach outlined earlier (see pp. 42-44). This methodological stance not only inoculates possible findings against any accusation of interpretative work on the part of the analyst, but also seeks to ground the researcher’ claims in empirical analysis. Such policy, it is hoped, will escape the limitations of past work.

This said, one must admit that focusing solely on the sequential properties of interaction is not enough, for gender is not a sequential matter like adjacency pairs. Gender is an identity operating within talk but on a different level. To complement sequential analysis, one must turn to another strand of Sacks’ work (1992, edited by Jefferson) which is also suited to the study of the social construction of gender, and on which other scholars draw. This offshoot has grown to a fully fledged approach known as Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA) (Sacks, Lecture 6 (p.40-48; lecture )Vol I, 246; Hester and Eglin, 1997). As Stokoe and Weatherall see it, MCA enables work on gender and language “to move away from a ‘difference’ trajectory” (2002a, p. 708) that is largely the legacy of the Dominance and the Difference approaches (Crawford, 1995). Work that uses MCA to study gender will be introduced in a sub-section below (sub-section 6.3), but first the origins of MCA will be delineated first (sub-section 6.1).

6. Membership categorization analysis

6.1. Principles of MCA

Fitzgerald et al. define MCA as the “analysis of the descriptive and inferential aspects of interaction” (2009, p. 47). Hester and Eglin (1997) discuss the principles of MCA through tracing its beginnings in Sacks work and its uptake by non-American scholars especially in England, after it has remained relegated to the shadows in mainstream CA with its focus on structural aspects of talk.

Sacks’ formulation of the principles of MCA was the outcome of his analysis of a short story “the baby cried mommy picked it up” (Sacks’ lectures, as edited by Jefferson 1992, p. 223).
Sacks wanted to account for the fact that people hear links between the categories ‘baby’ and ‘mommy’ and specifically that the mommy is the mommy of the baby in the story and not of another baby (Hester and Eglin 1997, Lepper 2000, Schegloff 2007b). The link is, according to Sacks, provided by the Membership Categorization Device (MCD) of ‘family’; and of which ‘baby’ and ‘mommy’ are categorial members (1992, Vol 1, 238).

Membership categories, then, “are classifications or social types that may be used to describe persons” (Hester and Eglin 1997, p. 3). An MCD allows the grouping of categories together. Hester and Eglin contend that,

> [t]he idea that membership categories form collections refers to the fact that, in the locally occasioned settings of their occurrence, some membership categories can be used and heard commonsensically as 'going together,' whilst others cannot be so used and heard (1997, p. 4).

Watson also defines MCDs informally as people’s “commonsense equivalence classes for the identification of persons” (1978, p. 106).

The MCD used in Sacks’ story is not explicitly mentioned, but is rather inferred from the juxtaposition of the two categories ‘baby’ and ‘mommy’. The MCD provides an organizing framework with reference to which the two categories in the story can be commonsensically seen as falling into a single collection; therefore, they “can be used and heard as ‘going together’” (Psathas 1999, p. 143). Collections are “made up of a group of categories [which make is possible to] classify any member of the population” (Sacks, 1992, p. 40). To put it differently, the categories ‘baby’ and ‘mommy’ are not used randomly or independently of each other; but are rather purposefully ‘drawn’ from the MCD family and meant to be heard that way. It is their membership in a collection, or a device, that provides for their descriptive adequacy.

In addition to their classification and grouping work, MCDs enable inferences to be made about categories. In his lectures, Sacks referred to MCD as an “inference machine” (ibid.). MCA is therefore the study of the rules that underlie the working of ‘inference generating’ and ‘inference making’ (Lepper, 2000; Silverman, 1998). In the words of Lepper, it is the study of “how speakers and hearers make inferences about what is going on, and how they provide for inferences to be made from what they say or do” (2000, p. 15).
Categories become members of a particular MCD through two rules of application. These Sacks called the ‘economy rule’ and the ‘consistence rule’ (1992, Vol I, p. 246). Lepper defines the consistence rule as such:

> If a population of persons is being categorized, and a category from a membership categorization device has been used to characterize a first member of that population, then hear subsequent categorizations as coming from that device (2000, p. 18-19)

For example, for a group of people, if someone is categorized as ‘goalkeeper’, then other persons in the group would necessarily be referred to as ‘defender’ ‘midfielder’, ‘forwards’, etc.. The consistence rule stipulates that all the categories be drawn from the device ‘football team’. It is even possible to speak of a device within a device or a ‘sub-device’. For examples, if a person is described as incumbent of the membership category ‘center-back’ and other persons as ‘full-back’, ‘wing-back’, etc., then interactants hear that all the categories used as drawn from the sub-device ‘defenders’ (Lepper, 2000, Psathas 1999).

Sacks observed that a category can belong to more than one MCD. In the story, the category baby for example belongs to two devices. Baby can be part of a family (father, mother, baby); but it can also used to refer to as ‘stage of life’ (the collection, baby, teenager, adult, etc.). As a result, Sacks observed that a corollary to the consistence rule is required to ensure that relevance of only one device at a time. This corollary is defined by Silverman as follows:

> Consistency rule corollary: If two or more categories are used to categorize two or more Members to some population, and those categories can be heard as categories from the same collection, hear them that way (1998, p. 80-81)

Therefore, the corollary ensures the hearing of ‘baby’ as belonging to the MCD ‘family’ and not the MCD ‘stage of life’.

On the other hand, the second rule, the economy rule, explains ‘referential adequacy’ (Silverman 1998, Schegloff 2007b). Referential adequacy refers to the preference by interactants for minimal use of membership categories to describe or refer to persons in interaction (1979). Silverman defines the economy rule in the following terms,

> The economy rule: a single category from any membership categorization device can be referentially adequate (1998, p. 79).
The economy rule represents in fact more of a constraint than a requirement. Since there exist virtually infinite ways to categorize people (e.g. a woman can be a mother, teacher, wife, activist, Muslim, etc.), interactants use categories such as to ensure that people described, or referred to, are adequately identifiable with relations to the inferences that can be made about them, and which interactants see as the relevant inferences at the moment of interaction (Schegloff, 2007b). Psathas reformulates the above as meaning that “[o]ne membership category is adequate for describing a member of some population” (1999, p. 143).

In the story then, the use of ‘mommy’ invokes the person as a ‘mommy’, not a teacher or an activist for example, to pick up a crying baby, even if it is the case that the categories ‘teacher’ and ‘activist’ might very well apply to the person. ‘Teacher’ and ‘activist’ are not referentially adequate on that occasion even if they may be adequate categories on some other occasions. It is in this sense that categorization is sensitive to the descriptive, referential and inferential exigencies at hand at the moment of interaction.

In the story, therefore, the device ‘family’ and the two rules of consistency and economy warrant that the two membership categories are referentially adequate such as to ensure that the intended links between mommy and baby are hearable (Lepper 2000, Silverman 1998).

Both the economy and the consistency rules account for the fact that the baby and the mommy are members of the device ‘family’. However, for Sacks, there is still the need to explain the fact that they are heard as members of the same family, not two separate families, and the fact that that mommy is the mommy of that baby in that story (see Lepper 2000, Sacks 1995, Schegloff 2007b, Silverman 1998, emphasis added). The link is actually far from clear in the story. For this, Sacks introduced what he called ‘duplicative organization’ (Vol I, p. 247). Lepper defines duplicative organization as such:

A collection of membership categories treated as a unit. When categorizing a population, potential members are then treated as a unit, not as countable individuals. When one category from that collection is used, then it will be inferred that any other category from that device can be used to construct an adequate description simply by virtue of occupying a position within that device (Lepper 2000, p. 20)

Duplicative organization refers to interactants’ ‘presumption’ (Schegloff, 2007b) that, in interactions, membership categories are heard as falling into a single team, unless otherwise
explicitly indicated. Invoking a given category “will automatically invoke inferences about who else might be expectably present” (ibid., p. 21). Moreover, Silverman notes that duplicative organization is “not just likely but required” in order to see categories as falling into a single ‘unit’ (1998, p. 81). Duplicative organization is therefore characteristic of the common-sense logic to see ‘unit-ness’ of categories in interaction (Psathas, 1999).

That interactants treat categories as duplicatively organized in interaction is the result what is called ‘the hearer’s maxim’. Again according to Silverman,

[i]f some population has been categorized by use of categories from some device whose collection has the "duplicative organization" property, and a Member is presented with a categorized population which can be heard as co-incumbents of a case of that device's unit, then hear it that way (1998, p. 81).

The hearer’s maxim requires the hearer to apply an MCD if commonsense logic requires that MCD for appropriate understanding of categories used by the speaker. Less formally then, the maxim stipulates that ‘if it can be heard that way, then hear it that way’. (Some authors treat the consistency rule corollary and the hearer’s maxim as referring to the same principle. See for example Psathas, 1999).

Duplicative organization is most clearly seen in Standardized Relational Pairs (SRPs). These are pairs of categories that are socially sanctified, such that the pair “constitutes a locus for rights and obligations” (Lepper, 2000, p. 17). Examples include husband-wife, teacher-student, and doctor-patient.

In the story then, not only are the categories ‘baby’ and ‘mommy’ heard as belonging to the same family, but their membership in that device gives rise to expected activities, rights and obligations by virtue of the SRP the baby and the mother form. ‘Crying’ is an expected activity of babies and ‘picking up crying babies’ is an expected activity, an obligation in fact, of their mothers. In this sense also, not only are the categories used and activities in the story ‘co-selected’ (Psathas, 1999), but co-selection invokes for the participants notions of ‘attributes’, ‘motives’, ‘rights and obligations’ (Watson 1978, 1997; Wowk and Carlin 2004).

The outline of the principles of MCA above makes it clear that MCDs, as Schegloff argues, “are not mere taxonomic labels” (2007b, p. 471, see also 2005). He notes that the use of categories extends well beyond the simple issue of mentioning, referring, or describing a person (Schegloff, 2007b). Similar to CA, the use of categories enable interactants to do
actions in talk (Watson, 1978; Wowk, 1984). It is therefore basically because categories are not mere labels that they can “play a profoundly more consequential role” (Schegloff 2007b, p. 469). One such role is that categorization in interaction necessarily taps on moral issues of segregation (Eglin and Hester, 1999; Schegloff, 2005), evaluation (Stokoe and Edwards, 2012), or blame attribution (Wowk, 1984).

Categories store people’s knowledge about themselves and other people in such a way that, as Schegloff notes, “[a]ny attributed member of a category…is a presumptive representative of the category” (2007b, p. 469). Sweeping generalizations and stereotyping are most of the time done through membership categorization (e.g. women’s language is affiliative, men’s is competitive). Categories are also ‘induction-proof’ by dint of the common-sense knowledge stored in MCDs (ibid). If a woman’s language does not seem to be affiliative for example, then the stereotype is never revised, and the conclusion is that “there is something wrong with [her], not with it” (ibid., p. 470). The power of categorization resides in the fact that people rarely check their knowledge about categorial knowledge.

Also, given their concrete import to interaction, categorization does not engage people in making choices from an abstract ‘meaning system’ pre-existing the interactional context. Rather, it involves a competence to combine categories together in ways that advance interactants’ interests in interaction, i.e., those actions and interests that occupy them at the moment of interaction. It is in this sense that categorial work is local. It consists in the ability to use categories in situ for the local purposes of interaction (Hester and Eglin, 1997). The fact that membership categories are, in Hester and Eglin’s words, “assembled objects” (1997, p. 46) for the particular occasion on which they are invoked by participants in an interaction, “provides a functional basis for categories to have those semantic properties [attributed in the here and now], rather than, say, fixed and definitive properties and membership” (Stokoe, 2006, p. 474).

In the words of Lepper, this categorial competence underlies “both knowledge of how things go together and the transmission of that knowledge” (2000, p. 20). By using categories in talk-in-interaction, Fitzgerald et al. observe, participants make a sense of, as well as display it to each other, “who-we-are-and-what-we-know-each-other-are-doing” (2009, p. 58). In addition to ‘who-we-are’, categorization work, as already noted, also provides a sense of ‘who-others are’ who are referred to, described, or invoked in talk-in-interaction. On that account then, MCA analyzes descriptive, referential and inferential work as ‘recipient
designed’ moral actions. They necessarily involve a dimension of ‘selection’ among other categories available.

It is for that same reason that, for Antaki and Widdicombe (1998), membership categorization involves also a dimension of identity work. People invoke their knowledge of categories in order to establish ‘versions of reality’, or ‘the doing of reality’ (Lepper, 2000). Interactants employ different membership categories to create their own accounts of facts which either acknowledge or contest those of others. This function is possible because, as said above, MCD make available inferences users want their interlocutors to hear, which inferences can in turn be accepted or rejected. Identities, or identity work, are interactants’ resources to make available for themselves and their interlocutors what they take to be the natural state of the social order (Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998).

A corollary to treating identity as members’ resource, then, is the view expressed by Hester and Eglin that identities are not “reified entities” (1997, p. 7) invoked by social scientists in their attempt to theoretically explain social order. With regard to gender for example, the inadequacy of earlier theories consisted in doing just that —reifying gender categories. Categories like ‘male’ and ‘female’ were theoretically invoked by scientists to explain interactional phenomena without any warrant in the phenomena itself of the relevance of gender. A gender identity was simply used as a theoretical resource by the analyst even it has no traces in participants’ orientations in the interactional phenomena analyzed. This is precisely what Schegloff meant by ‘theoretical imperialism’ (1997, p. 167). In addition, with regard to categorization work, theoretical imperialism consists of the failure to treat categories as “indexical expressions” whose sense “is therefore locally and temporally contingent” (Hester and Eglin, 1997, p. 18) on how interaction unfolds on a turn-by-turn basis by and for participants themselves.

This view of categories has far ranging consequences as far as the conception of ‘culture’ goes. For, as Hester and Eglin (ibid.) contend, if MCDs and categories are part of the cultural knowledge people possess in their capacity as social members, then “culture is constituted in, and only exists in, action” (1997, p. 20), with action in this sense referring to categorization work in interaction. Arguing the same point, Stokoe argues that:

[b]ecause people often use categories as a ‘short-cutting’ device, studying the recurrent ways through which they are deployed in interaction permits the
empirical investigation of, and sheds light on, the social organization of cultural knowledge. (2010, p. 429)

Conceived that way, it is clear how MCA, like CA, offers a solution to the framework problem that has plagued other approaches to the study of discourse in general. In addition to the turn by turn context that CA attends to, cultural context, as a configuration of the cultural knowledge possessed by interactants and hoarded in categories, does not exist outside talk-in-interaction, but rather, context and categories are reflexively constitutive of each other. Cultural context and categories are, as Hester and Eglin observe “mutually elaborative” (1997, p. 26).

One therefore need not venture outside interactional phenomena to, for example, biographic, historical, or institutional particulars, in order to analyze the workings of gender categories. If gender is relevant, it must be relevant to interactants in the first place, and that relevance must be empirically demonstrable by the analyst. One such demonstration is the analysis of interactants’ categorial work.

Before discussing the recent work on MCA and gender, two points will be discussed briefly and consecutively in two sections below. One concerns the historical tension between mainstream CA and MCA, especially the reluctance of CA to draw on MCA. The second discusses how scholars have come to embrace MCA as offering new venues for the analysis of gender from a constructionist point of view. Both points are introduced with reference to the argument made above (pp. 1-9) that a sequential-categorial analysis promises better payoffs. Following that, the last section briefly reviews a specimen of the literature that emerged out of the marriage of CA and MCA.

6.2. The effect of categorization on talk-sequence
Watson talks of a “disattending of membership categorization analysis” (1997, p. 50) by mainstream CA given the latter’s prioritization of sequential analysis. As he notes, the disregard for MCA was somewhat ironic since the basic key concepts (membership categories, devices, rules of application, category-bounded activities, etc.) were fully established in Sacks’ lectures before his death. Sacks developed an interest in categories side by side with his interest in the formal organization of conversation (ibid.). One reason for the distinction between CA and MCA is that analysts have for a long time considered MCA pursuit quite independent of any concern with sequential analysis which has, until recently, been the sole preoccupation of mainstream CA (Goodwin and Heritage, 1990; Schegloff,
Arguing against this stance, Watson (1997) endeavored to show their interdependence.

Watson argues that formal analysis of the structural aspects of talk does not completely account for the finely-grained organization of its content. While such analysis generally links types of utterances structurally, such as, for instance, the provision of a question makes relevant the provision of an answer, it does not account for categorial relevance, i.e. the relations of the answerer’s answer to the particular questions the questioners asks. In his view, analysis needs to account for how ‘fine tuning’ of a given answer attends to the question as occasionally produced. Attendance to categorial relevance means that analysis accounts for the “identifiable relatedness between this question and this answer” (Watson 1997, p. 59) (emphasis the author’s). Far from being a matter of formal normative procedures, the selection of a category then may be “topic-sensitive and, more generally, thematically-relevant” (ibid.).

In the light of the observations he introduced, Watson (1997) reconsidered Sacks’ analysis of telephone conversations in terms of the categories ‘caller’ and ‘called’, which are relevant by virtue of the nature of telephone conversations. Watson’s argument is that being a caller or a called party in telephone conversations entails a set of ‘rights and obligations” that bear on the turn-by-turn organization of sequences. To illustrate the point, Watson, mentioned the fact that to be a ‘called’ category means that its incumbent has the moral obligation of having to do the opening turn in the telephone call (see Schgloff (1968), for a treatment of opening sequences in telephone conversations). Similarly, by virtue of their being an incumbent of the category ‘caller’, one has the right to initiate a pre-closing offer, which a ‘called’ may accept/reject (1997, p. 69) (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973). Similar in this regard is Stokoe’s (2006) discussion of the sequential aspects of police interviews in terms of the categories ‘interviewer’ and ‘interviewee’ the interview makes relevant. For instance, initiating a question-answer pair is predominantly the prerogative of police officers in their capacity as interviewers.

Watson concluded by observing that “[c]onversational sequences are categorially instructed, both for lay speakers and analysts” (1997, p. 73). For similar reasons, Fitzgerald urged that the rapprochement of sequential and categorial work be done the following way,
the work of MCA may focus on developing ways of exploring members’ use and display of categorial orientations within and as part of doing their social work within the sequentially layered texture of this event (2012, p. 309).

The set of sequential opportunities provided by categorial incumbencies is very important here, since as will be seen later, calls to phone-in programs, which form part of the data set for this work, offer categorial identities that organize the contributions of ‘host’, ‘caller’ and ‘guest’ in specific sequential ways (see chapter III).

Heeding the call to supplement CA-informed analysis of formal properties of talk-in-interaction with insights from MCA, the analysis in the present dissertation will probe the ways in which categorial incumbency informs social actions that are sequentially organized. It will show how the categories ‘host’ and ‘caller’ organize sequences in calls to phone-in radio programs with reference to the specific actions of ‘advice seeking’ and ‘advice giving’. Also, it will be shown how these actions give rise to further categorial incumbencies of ‘advice seeker’ and ‘advice giver’. The latter in turn account for the properties of the calls to phone-in programs and organize members’ turns in the telephone calls, as well as the particulars of categorial work in those turns. For example, being a ‘caller’ also means being an incumbent of the category ‘advice-seeker’. This incumbency gives the caller the right to narrate, in an extended turn, her/his problem for she/he seeks advice from an ‘expert’ hosted by the host of the particular program chosen by the caller. In addition, analysis will focus extensively on the gendering work callers do in those extended turns, narratives and accounts.

6.3. MCA, participants’ orientations and gender

It was stated above that MCA is the study of culture-as-context, culture-in-action, or social knowledge in action as it unfolds on a moment-by-moment basis (Hester and Eaglin, 1997; Fitzgerald, 2012). It was also stated that this view of categorization work echoes Schegloff’s (1997) position regarding the framework problem. Like he does critical discourse analysts, urging them to set their theoretical stances aside and limit themselves to talk-in-interaction as supplying sufficient contextual background to the study of social issues, Schegloff also urges membership categorization analysts to ground their claims “in the conduct of the parties, not in the beliefs of the writer” (2007b, p. 476, see also 1991, 1987). The purpose of Schegloff’s constraints, as he noted, is to avoid making both MCA and CA “a vehicle for promiscuously introducing into the analysis what the writing needs for the argument-in-progress” (ibid) (see also Fitzgerald, 2012).
Gender work

Recently, by heeding Schegloff’s call, as well as other scholars’ calls to combine both CA and MCA, major headways have been made in discourse studies, and in gender and language studies in particular. Particularly in gender studies, MCA has proved quite conducive to the study of gender and language (Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2008) (see also Kitzinger (2008) (2000) and Wowk (2007) for a debate concerning the utility of CA for gender and feminism in general).

Especially useful is the movement away from concern with highly abstract ‘conversational styles’ to a focus on gender categorial work that interactants do in talk-in-interaction (Stokoe, 2004, 2006). What people consider ‘facts’ of gender are, in Stokoe’s view, only “situated accomplishments of local interaction” (2006, p. 468), which consist, according to West and Zimmerman, in the “continuous creation of the meaning of gender through human action” (1987, p. 129). Gender is, in other words, “an ongoing activity embedded in everyday interaction” (ibid., p. 130).

The social ‘doing of gender’ (West and Zimmerman, 1987) irrevocably ties gender work to moral assessment and accountability. Interactants must attend to the normative character of categorial rights and obligations and align their behavior with cultural norms assumed to regulate gendered behavior. They must also monitor the behavior and talk of their interlocutors to check for ‘normativity’ (West and Zimmerman, 1987). Otherwise, men and women “may risk ‘gender assessment’ if they do not live up to normative conceptions of femininity or masculinity” (Stokoe, 2006, p. 469) (see also West and Zimmerman, 1987, p. 136). Since categorization work is done in situ for the local purposes of interaction, that work can be analyzed to check if, and how, it provides for, and sustains, common sense knowledge about gender identities. To demonstrate how this particular line of enquiry is taken up, a number of studies are reviewed below.

Stoke (2004) analyzed fragments from the conversation of four university students who were given pictures of women and asked to write down non-stereotypic descriptions of them. In naming a scribe for the group, one student suggested another for the task. The suggested student happened to be the only female in the group.

According to Stokoe, (ibid.) the student’s account for his choice of the female member revealed the powerful working of categorization. In the turns she analyzed, the student juxtaposed the category ‘secretary’ and ‘female’, and made thereby the link hearable that the two categories belong to the MCD “female professions’. Thus, the student excluded males
from being incumbent of the category ‘scribe’ by constructing a SRP male profession/female profession— a categorization that hinged on the duplicative organization of the SRP male-female.

Stokoe (ibid.) also noted that prior to the sequence where the above link was made, it was a male student who issued the question ‘who’s going to write it?’, which explicitly required an answer, but which implicitly served to make the student-questioner a non-candidate for the category ‘scribe’, by directing his question to the others present.

Stokoe contended that use of the membership category ‘secretary’ by the student helped “construct a version of the social order”; one which ties the category ‘secretary’ to the category-bound activity of ‘note-taking’ that thus excluded its incumbent, the female student, from “active collaboration in the development of the group’s ideas” (2004, p. 116).

In the same study, Stokoe also analyzed a chain of descriptors the students used for one picture-prompt, and showed how the movement from one descriptive category to another helped to create a relevant category environment where the descriptors could be heard as ‘doing sexism’. The way they did this, she observed, was by moving “from one category in the MCD ‘occupations’ to another (instructor /bricklayer /dominatrix), via a cumulative listing of particular predicates” (2004, p. 117).

Analyzing the same interactions, Stokoe (2006) noted that there was nothing inherent in the category ‘secretary’ that made it gendered. Rather, the student who used it drew on cultural resources for the designation of a ‘scribe’ for the group; namely, that professions could be divided across gender lines. Hence, the SRP female/male was exploited to construct a parallel SRP female profession/male profession. It is in this sense that Hester and Eglin (1997) talk of membership categorization as assembled objects. Stokoe suggested that MCA “allows language and gender researchers to see how everyday notions of gender are taken up, reformulated, or resisted, in turns of talk that accomplish conversational action” (2006, p. 467).

In Weatherall’s view, gender categorization in everyday life, as part of doing categorization in general, involves a dimension of ‘negotiation’ (2002a). In order to study the development of that dimension in children, Weatherall first provided groups of children with dolls of ambiguous gender and then recorded and analyzed their interaction while they played with those dolls. She was interested in how children used categorization to solve gender troubles
that arose because of difficulties to assign gender. Her analysis demonstrated that the process of acquiring “competencies necessary for becoming ‘members’” (2002a, p. 769) involves the ability to move from difficulties with gender assignment toward “more seamless construction of gender” (ibid.), largely the prerogative of adults. Weatherall’s analysis showed that, for adults, the ability to do gender categorization is largely the outcome of long processes of socialization into social and cultural patterns. In other words, neither is assigning gender categories natural to societal members, nor are gender categories natural identities (Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998).

One resource interactants draw on to establish gender identities is what Nilan calls the “inclusionary and exclusionary processes of social identity boundary maintenance in everyday gendered discourse” (1994, p. 152). Nilan analyzed dialogues in plays written by students for each other to be rehearsed in the classroom.

She observed that when males wrote roles for males, male performers found the roles assigned them fitting and in accordance with their male identity. However, problems arose when female students wrote dialogues for males to perform. The male students objected to the performance of the dialogues because they depicted characters who were “caring and emotional” (1994, p. 143), category-bound activities that the males strongly rejected.

Nilan accounted for this by showing that the female writers drew on resources available to them through pop culture (romance novels, soap operas, etc.); and argued that the categorial analysis of the dialogues written revealed the “the operative centrality of the binary opposition gay-straight within the dominant discourse of masculinity” (1994, p. 146).

6.4. Summary

The literature review in this chapter has shown that the field of gender and language has come a long way since the first breakthroughs of the seventies. Early ideas have been abandoned because they have come to be seen as essentialist in nature whether in classic sociolinguistics (Cameron, 1990; Smith, 1985), or in language and gender studies (Weatherall, 2002b). Notwithstanding their achievement, the outcome of early studies, according to Smith, was “a myopic concentration of research on sex differences” (1985, p. 16), with the concomitant result that linguistic differences were seen as essential characteristics of women’s and men’s language which defined them as gendered creatures. Linguistic difference, in other words, was their essence as gender beings.
The essentialist view came under attack, and an alternative framework, a constructionist one, has recently gained ground. Within the new paradigm, analysts study language as itself the process, not the medium, of identity construction. In this regard, CA and MCA are suitable to an investigation of how gender is constructed, since the theoretical stance they emanate from, Ethnomethodology, tallies with the modern view of gender categorization as both a social construct and a form of social action. Interactants, in other words, mobilize gender categories to achieve specific outcomes in interaction. Conversation, or talk-in-interaction, then, is not a value-free activity, nor an action-free activity at that, but is attendant on social, cultural, institutional and moral issues that concern gender categorial work in everyday interactions.

The consequences of this work are manifest for example, in the ways people draw for categorization work on social hierarchies, social institutions, and cultural patterns that are reflexively created anew each time interactants invoke them to do categorization. Using CA and MCA, Kitzinger, Stokoe, Weatherall and others try to unravel the social workings of gender via a meticulous attention to the micro phenomena of sequential and categorial work.

Following these authors, the present study subscribes to the constructionist paradigm for which CA and MCA offer suitable methodologies. The aim in the study will be to use both sequential and categorial analyses to study how Moroccan members construct gender identities in calls to phone-in radio programs as well as in mundane conversations.

Since, as said earlier, members enlist their sequential and categorial knowledge for the services of achieving particular consequences in talk, and since the focus of the present study is on gender; their gender categorial work will be examined for what is does in the specific sequences where it is invoked. Like talk in general, gender construction in talk, as said above, is neither a value-free activity, nor is it an action free activity.

Before embarking on such a task, the methodological principles that underline CA and MCA must first be fully explained. This is the purpose of the next chapter. In it figures a discussion of the data collection techniques used, the methodological guidelines followed, the analytical steps pursued, as well as other issues, like transcription and translation.
Chapter II: A methodological framework

Introduction

The ideas presented in this chapter are meant to ground, as well as to provide a rationale for, the methodological procedures followed throughout this thesis. As seen in the previous chapter, CA is an approach to the analysis of social actions as these are principally carried through talk. It derives its distinctive character from its roots in the ethnomethodological conception of social activities as ordered phenomena, and its alignment with Goffman’s call for the study of face-to-face interaction as exhibiting such order. CA is in short a principled approach.

For this reason, a discussion of methodological principles in CA (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998) is due before a detailed account is given of the data collection techniques, the data sets used, and the analysis techniques. Introducing those principles is important since the methodological steps are a translation of them.

On the MCA level, the surging interest in its prospects is a recent event, and no treatment of it has yet been written that discusses its methodological import or its relevance to the study of discourse (but see Stokoe, 2006). The same is also true for the still newly emerging studies that combine both CA and MCA as, for example, in Feminist Conversation Analysis (Kitzinger, 2000, 2008).

Considering this state of affairs, the methodology followed in this work is largely a CA-informed one that is suitable for the sequential or categorial analysis, or both.

Although CA has made major headways in fields as varied as Linguistics, Sociolinguistics, Discourse Analysis, Communication studies and Social Psychology, a number of its practitioners still emphasize its sociological and constructive character (Silverman, 1998).

Seedhouse (2004) for example distinguishes between two types of Conversation Analysis: ethnomethodological CA and linguistic CA. The latter is preoccupied with analyzing conversational units (adjacency pairs, sequences, and acts) in the spirit of grammar analysis. It proceeds by isolating smaller, independent units that make up larger units of conversation. Conversational units are seen as responsible for the production of talk in a rule-like-fashion (cf. Schiffrin, 1994), and the interactional organization of talk is considered a product generated out of the application of those units.
In ethnomethodological CA, on the other hand, units of organization are seen as constitutive of the very talk they are part of. Interactional procedures have a ‘normative’, rather than ‘regulative’ character (Seedhouse, 2004). In ethnomethodological CA, rules are treated as “situationally invoked standards that are part of the activity they seek to explain” (Pomerantz and Fehr, 1997, p. 67).

Ethnomethodological CA, to which the present study subscribes, is interested in social actions as intrinsic to talk-in-interaction. The present work therefore does not regard interactional units in the same way that linguistics regards descriptive rules. The analysis does not consider interactional units as part of a “coding scheme”, to use Seedhouse’s phrase (2004, p. 51). Since no extrapolation of rules is intended, the data for this study is neither codified nor quantified.

A corollary to this view is that sequential and categorial work is not considered the outcome of general cultural rules that must apply in the linguistic sense. If anything, cultural and social patterns are, as indicated above, norms which members’ conduct may or may not abide and which account for the shape members’ conduct takes every time interaction takes place. In this sense, as Have recognized, interactional patterns are not grammatical (2007, p. 51).

Notwithstanding the differences on where they stand on language, Have (2007) sees CA’s relation to Linguistics, as well as to Pragmatics and Sociolinguistics, as one of cross-fertilization. For all those disciplines, language is primarily a social phenomenon. The social stamp of language is most obvious in that social interactions are primarily carried through talk. Therefore, it makes perfect sense that this study, whose goal is the analysis of the construction of gender and its consequences in interaction, keeps it social scope in focus. An overview of the methodological principles of CA is due for that social character to be well appreciated.

Accordingly, section one in this chapter tackles basic issues involved in conducting a conversational analytic work. In it figures a discussion of its ethnomethodological basis more generally. Building on that, section two succinctly discusses principles directly pertinent to CA and their methodological translation into concrete analytical stages. It covers the techniques involved in recording naturally occurring talk, making transcripts and other analytic issues in data analysis. The section ends with a consideration of the techniques used in the present work to cover the three components of gender, sequence and categorization. Section three, the last one, concludes with a brief discussion of other issues that further reflect
the character of the data and data analysis used. Two issues are of concern in section three: why CA refrains from using ethnographic material and how issues of translation of transcripts are managed.

1. Basic methodological issues

1. 1. The ethnomethodological basis of conversation analysis

Seedhouse (2004) discusses five ethnomethodological principles that he argues bear on CA methodology.

1- Indexicality: text and context are elaborative of each other. Ethnomethodology views context as ‘talked into being’. At any given moment in interaction, interactants orient to particular aspects of contexts which display such orientation in talk. Hence, the unfolding of talk is at the same time the unfolding of context (cf. Hester and Eglin, 1997 and the discussion of context above).

2- Documentary method of interpretation: participants to interaction proceed along the assumption that each utterance is an “example of a previously known pattern” (Seedhouse, 2004, p. 7). The analysis of sequences is the analysis of patterned activities. This principle accounts for the claim that the gender patterns discussed in this study, are stable (i.e. have a normative characters).

3- The Reciprocity of perspectives: involves the recognition and the mutual willingness of people to accept the assumption that they are acting on the basis of the same norms (Heritage, 1984b). This shared perspective is the basis through which “intersubjectivity” is reached in talk (Seedhouse, 2004, p. 9).

4- Normative accountability: Normative procedures are constitutive of interaction, part and parcel of the very social actions in talk and are not social constraints imposed from outside (Heritage, 1984b; Zimmerman, 1998). They are constitutive in the sense that “they constitute the setting in which the actions may be performed and interpreted” (Seedhouse, 2004, p. 10). In addition, as Garfinkel (1972) argues, norms are points of reference, not rules; their absence results in moral accountability and does not index degenerate use of communicative competence. Given the assumption of their sharedness, norms are morally abiding. In the analysis of narratives sequences, for example, it will be seen that Moroccan members exploit the normative character of gender to construct particular versions of their problems in order to ask for specific types of advice.
Gender work

5- Reflexivity: For participants to talk-in-interaction, the same methods are used for the production and for the interpretation of utterances (Seedhouse, 2004, p. 12). Reflexivity might be one solution to the speaker’s and hearer’s problems regarding the understandability of talk.

Together, the principles above represent an ethnomethodological framework for the study of interaction. The first principle clearly underlies CA stance on the ‘framework problem’ (p. 57). The second principle reflects CA insistence that talk-in-interaction is orderly. Together with principle three, the first two principles underscore the objective of describing the procedures that ordinary members use in order to reach a particular understanding of talk-in-interaction. Understanding itself becomes a joint achievement, what Heritage (1984b) refers to as intersubjectivity and which Sidnell defines as the “convergent knowledge of the world” (2010, p. 12) (see also Garfinkel, 1972 and Silverman, 1998).

As said above, the principles Seedhouse (2004) discusses reflect the ethnomethodological basis of CA and explain its orientations. For instance, the insistence on the treatment of context as intrinsic to social action explains one specific character of the CA tradition, namely, its reluctance to invoke ethnographic information of participants in the analysis of conversational data (See Have, 2007).

The ethnomethodological basis of CA also explains why it is considered an emic approach (Have, 2007, p. 34), the aim of which is to describe interaction as members achieve it (i.e., as social action), and achieve it in an orderly manner. Accordingly, the basic question analysts ask is, according to Seedhouse (2004), “why that, in that way, right now?” The description of both the formulations (the ‘why-that’), and the format (the ‘in-that-way’), are central to any CA project (Sidnell, 2004; 2010). These questions are basic ones when analyzing gender construction and its consequences in interaction.

1.2. Principles of sequential analysis

In proposing principles specific to CA, Seedhouse (2004) builds on previous work that discussed the origins, theory and methodology of CA (see Heritage, 1984b). The principles he offers pertain to talk as the most pervasive form of social interaction.

1- Talk is rationally designed. To use Seedhouse’s own words, talk “is systematically organized, deeply ordered and methodic” (2004, p. 14). This principle justifies the use of mundane conversation as data in CA, conversation that for linguists are flawed manifestations of a a more perfect competence.
2. Talk-in-interaction is context shaped and context renewing. Any utterance in conversation can only be properly understood with reference to its sequential environment as preceded by, and preceding, other utterances. The principle stems from the ‘indexicality’ principle above and justifies the exclusion of contextual data extrinsic to talk.

3. Attention to details. Given that talk is designed to effect certain outcomes. No detail of talk is random, or “dismissed a priori as disorderly, accidental, or irrelevant” (ibid. 2004, p. 14).

4. Analysis is induction-oriented. One consequence of this principle for the present work is that cultural structures are analyzed as they emerged in talk. It is talk that explains cultural features rather than the other way around.

Translating those stipulations into methodological steps, Have (2007) proposes that analysis would at least follow four phases.

1. Getting or making recordings of natural interaction;

2. Transcribing the tapes, in whole or in part;

3. Analyzing selected episodes;

4. Reporting the research.

Following this general recipe, the next section details the concrete methodological steps that CA analysts follow. The steps consist of data collection methods (participants, research sites, data corpus of recordings and transcription), and data analysis (features of sequential analysis). Within the discussion, the section introduces the participants, research sites, and the data corpus for the thesis. The introduction of the data will therefore substantiate the CA methodological line entailed the principles above and, conversely, this methodological line will justify the data collection and analysis techniques adopted in the thesis.

2. The methodological steps followed in the study
2.1. Recording naturally occurring talk

Before a description is given of the procedures followed to collect data for the present work, a brief discussion of the advantages and the problems of each step starts each section. The discussions put the steps into perspective, in order to better appreciate their specific character as CA-MCA-informed techniques.
In addition to their permanent availability (Sacks, 1984b), recorded conversations offer other advantages. The invention of recording devices allowed the study of the social order at the micro level (Have, 2007, Sidnell, 2010). Traditional techniques like field notes, interviews, and other techniques did not allow a focus on the details of ‘real talk’. This in turn is because those techniques are largely dependent on the researcher ‘recovering’, recapitulating and interpreting events after the fact (Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997; Have, 2007; Sidnell, 2010).

Sacks instead offered recorded talk as an alternative to qualitative methods known to social studies at the time. Many CA practitioners argue that qualitative techniques are manipulative and inherent in them are theoretical and methodological assumptions that taint the analysis of data (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Have, 2007; n.d.). For all those reasons, CA analysts use recorded conversations that are neither edited nor codified.

Recordings were also preferred to other methods for another reason, as Have (2007) and Sacks (1984b) argue. Recorded data of talk are available to the researcher and the readers alike. Researchers use them to analyze talk and readers can use them to check the researcher’s analysis (Have, 2007, p. 6).

The attention given to naturally occurring talk as ‘primary data’ (Sidnell, 2010) was reflected in the focus of earlier CA studies on the analysis of telephone conversations. Telephone conversations presented the advantageous perspective of limiting visual access of participants to each other. In telephone conversation, participants have to rely solely on verbal behavior. It enabled analysts to focus on talk to the exclusion of any other form of interaction (Silverman, 1998, p. 109). In telephone conversations, Sidnell says, the “number of complicating factors are bracketed out” as to make visible other forms of social organization that are dependent on talk (2010, p. 23).

Concerning the choice of research sites and the status of talk as naturally occurring, Have (n.d.) advises that sites be as diversified as possible. In addition to mundane talk, direct or mediated through the telephone, Sidnell (2010, p. 23) considers TV talk-shows and radio phone-in programs adequate choices.

Following the guidelines above, the data collected for the present study fall in three categories. The first comprises recordings made by the researcher himself. The second includes recordings of mundane conversations made by persons other than the researcher. The
third includes calls to phone-in-radio programs publicly available on the radio and or uploaded on internet.

For the first data set, the researcher made his own recordings using a Smartphone (Samsung Trend Plus, GT-S7580) with an application called ‘Smart Voice Recorder’ downloaded free of charge from Play Store, Google’s market for Android-run smartphones. The developers of the application claim that it allows for high quality recordings. The recordings obtained were of good quality, in the sense that they allowed the analyst to proceed along the lines established by most CA practitioners. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the recording procedure did not fully match some of the guidelines described in the literature (see for example Sidnell, 2010, Have, 2007).

The mismatch was related to one point. Most of the work reported in the literature refers to formal procedures of recordings which are based mainly on sticking little microphones to speakers or telephone handsets. This is systematically done in order to be able to record maximum details (breathing, sniffing, quite talk, etc.). The resultant recordings allow researchers to conduct detailed sequential analysis of the type mainstream CA requires. As mentioned above, CA is based on the premise that, to paraphrase Sacks, order is everywhere in talk; hence even tiny bits of details are of big sequential importance. Analysts naturally assume that their production does contribute to meaning making processes in interaction.

This of course remains true for the current study as well. But, since its major objective is sequential-cum-categorial analysis; that is, the descriptive apparatus that members use and what it tells about the social construction of gender in conversation; the logistic problem attached to the recording procedure was not a drastic inconvenience, at least not to the level that would render impossible the analysis of data. In other words, the analysis of gender categorization required more attention to words, descriptors, person reference; in short membership categories, rather than the more purely formal aspects of talk.

Concerning how recording proceeded, the researcher activated the recording application whenever issues about girls, women, boys, men, marriage, personal relationships, work outside home, women’s and men’s human rights, sexuality, and sexual issues, arose during conversation in which he was a member. The recording continued until a topic shift occurred. If gender issues were up again, the operation was repeated.
It should be noted at this junction that the researcher, prior to the data collection phase, was aware his contributions to conversations might contaminate the data, since his research preoccupations might motivate him to stir his interlocutors into specific topics. To circumvent this problem, he often, but no always, took the stance of an unobtrusive observer whenever conversation permitted. However, this stance was actually hard to sustain given that, being a member in conversations, participation was inevitable. This is especially true in dyadic or triadic conversations, or when other participants selected him as next speaker in group conversations. In such cases, effort was made to participate as naturally as possible. It is true that the task proved somewhat difficult during pilot recordings, but it was subsequently easy to forget that a recording machine was going on when immersed fully in natural conversation.

An effort was also made to diversify recording sites as much as possible. This was not done with any theoretical notions in mind but simply to make the number of issues as large as possible. It is to be noted, for example, that, among male friends in informal settings, the issues brought up were very likely to hinge around sexuality, girlfriends and boyfriends, marriage, and views about the opposite sex. For the most part, these were characterized by the use of a large number of sex-related terms and, almost always, of profane language. In more restricted settings, like family talk or talk between people whose degree of familiarity is low, or even between unacquainted people, participants tended to talk about issues of marriage, women’s rights, working women’s duties at home and other issues of tangible, but non-personal, sensitivity.

In addition to data collected by the researcher himself, a second data set was obtained by engaging the assistance of colleagues and family members to do some recordings. Those who agreed were instructed, during a pilot phase, as to how and when to proceed, and were presented with a cover research objective (which was explained as a general interest in young people’s everyday problems versus old people’s problems). They were prompted to take notes of some ethnographic details that would facilitate recognition of setting (time, place, and participants). Uniformly, after a number of recordings were made, samples were played in order to facilitate voice recognition during the transcription phase.

Being themselves conversational participants, the collaborators were told that they held the right to stop recordings whenever they felt it was inconvenient, or whenever the issues that turned up were deemed too sensitive for the participants. The materials collected using this technique allowed access to varied sites, especially female-female and male-female
conversations, to which access would have been limited had the researcher relied solely on his own recordings.

The recording phase was in no way an easy one, since, obviously enough, secretly recording people’s talk raises ethical issues that concern not only consent issues but also the right to privacy. In compliance with standard ethical codes, a first attempt to get participants’ consent during pilot-recordings revealed that an important number of people became rather confused when approached with a request to record their conversation. This happened even with intimate friends or when the topics discussed were rather of the ‘chit-chat’ kind. It seemed that seeking a pre-recording consent restrained natural talk from proceeding naturally. The researcher was in an observer’s paradox as recognized by Labov (1972, p. 209).

In addition to the observer’s paradox, another problem was identified that might very well be qualified as related to the ‘Hawthorne’ effect. In some cases, once the researcher revealed the true purpose of the study and requested consent to proceed with the recording, some participants were more than eager to contribute to its success that they consciously brought up issues related to the theme explained, and increasingly engaged others to talk about them even when the occasion invited no such themes. In short, an increase of ‘productivity’ was observed by dint of tempering with participants’ assumption of ‘naturalness’ of mundane conversations.

In short, during the pilot recording phase, the problems encountered made it ample clear that insistence on getting naturally occurring data run counter to a similar insistence on obtaining consent from participants that would reveal the true purpose of the recording. It was clear that the latter problem might be solved by telling a ‘cover story’ to participants. The former, however, had the researcher take special measures. Instead of obtaining consent prior to recording, the researcher tried to obtain what he called ‘a post-recording consent’ (see appendix II). This is how it worked:

Once an ‘on-the-spot’ decision was made to record a particular spate of talk, and upon the termination of the conversation in which such talk occurred, the researcher informed the participants that part of their conversation was recorded and the purpose, ‘the cover version’, behind doing it was explained. The participants were then given the choice either to authorize the use of the recordings for research or delete them instantly. For recordings made by the collaborators, they themselves did not know the true objective of the study, but were nonetheless required to obtain post-recording consent from participants.
It was noticed that participants showed surprise when they were told their conversations had been recorded. Some participants even jokingly accused the researcher, or the collaborator, of deceit. Overall, since willingness to delete the recordings made was displayed, and since the matters recorded were, with the benefit of hindsight, trivial and the purpose of the recording seemed ‘unthreatening’ for participants, a large majority of participants gave their consent. In fact, it seemed to be a general fact that participants’ objection to being recorded was minimal. In only few cases was ‘post-recording-consent’ withdrawn not because participants felt any kind of deception, but because they claimed the materials were sensitive to be displayed in a research paper. The uneasiness continued even after the researcher or the collaborator assured participants of total anonymity.

Using this technique, it was possible to obtain a large corpus of data; not all of it, however, was of interest to a study about gender, nor found its way to the final version of this work. Some conversations were unrelated to the theme of gender, some only touched on the issue but participants moved quickly to other things, and some were hardly amenable to transcription. ‘Cleaning’ these data off left the researcher with the materials presented in the table below.
Table 1: Time length of recordings of mundane conversations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference of recordings</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rec 001</td>
<td>00:08:18</td>
<td>High school break time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 002</td>
<td>00:00:30</td>
<td>friends’ talk (house of a friend)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 003</td>
<td>00:03:08</td>
<td>friends’ talk (house of a friend)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 004</td>
<td>00:01:55</td>
<td>friends’ talk (house of a friend)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 005</td>
<td>00:24:48</td>
<td>Friends’ talk (house of a friend)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 006</td>
<td>00:12:31</td>
<td>Friends talk at a café</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 007</td>
<td>00:13:35</td>
<td>Two friends’ talk at a café</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 008</td>
<td>00:25:16</td>
<td>Family after meal time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 009</td>
<td>00:12:26</td>
<td>At a barber’s shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 010</td>
<td>00:48:37</td>
<td>Friends’ walk after a mealtime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 011</td>
<td>00:37:05</td>
<td>Friends’ talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 012</td>
<td>00:20:47</td>
<td>Friends’ talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 013</td>
<td>00:01:37</td>
<td>Friends’ talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 014</td>
<td>00:15:15</td>
<td>Friends’ talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 015</td>
<td>00:23:09</td>
<td>Friends’ meal time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 016</td>
<td>00:13:30</td>
<td>Waiting for the train talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 17</td>
<td>00:33:05</td>
<td>Family meal time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 018</td>
<td>00:07:15</td>
<td>Friends talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 019</td>
<td>00:30:42</td>
<td>Train compartment talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec 020</td>
<td>00:47:57</td>
<td>Train compartment talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total time</strong></td>
<td><strong>6 hours 21 minutes 26 seconds</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to researcher’s and collaborators’ type of data, a major subset worked through in this dissertation subsumed instances of telephone conversations from phone-in-radio programs. Calls to such programs offered a handy source of data that alleviated the need to deal with problems similar to the ones encountered with mundane talk. Also, as CA practitioners have long recognized, participants had no visual access to one another (Silverman, 1998, p. 109). Every action is done with talk, and that is a substantial gain to a study concerned precisely with that.
Major findings of CA had telephone calls as their primary data source. Sacks (1972) for examples studied categorization work in calls to a helpline for suicidal persons. Hutchby (1992; 1996; 2008) studied the system of turn taking and its implications for asymmetries in power, politeness and interruption, between host and caller in phone-in radio shows. Among other things, Lepper (2000) analyzed membership categorization in phone-in talk shows. Considering this, it was only natural to exploit the potential of that research site in a conversation analytic work of the kind presented here.

To have access to phone-in calls, the researcher first visited the websites of radio stations broadcast in Morocco in an attempt to locate particular ‘interactive’ radio shows that focused on gender issues. The search consisted of reading the descriptive entries that accompany a given program’s page in the radio station’s website and, once a particular program was chosen, the researcher regularly followed it for a period of one week to one month (depending on its broadcast frequency). This was done in order to get a ‘feel’ of what the issues presented might be about. Subsequent to that, a pool was made among a number of shows that treated gender relations, conflict, marriage problems, divorce and other issues that were deemed possible loci of gender dynamics.

Second, a choice was made from the initial pool, and a third choice from different episodes of a given program. Once the target episode was downloaded from the stations website, a fourth choice involved choosing among the calls in a single episode. Transcripts were then made of sequences of the particular calls chosen. Table 2 gives a list of the programs selected and provides a brief description of their ‘mission statement’.
Table 2: Radio programs selected for analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program’s title</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fidith umyzəl (Talk and work)</td>
<td>A phone-in program where Moroccan women partake of the daily concerns of each other. “women help each other like they do friends”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidayr mʔa lmsrouf (House budget ?)</td>
<td>A phone-in program that addresses problems of, and gives solutions to, home budgets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fidith nsssa (Women’s talk)</td>
<td>A phone-in radio show that discusses “issues pertaining to housewives and the difficulties that face them in the modern world, social, legal, and health issues”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likoul ʔkosra (To every family)</td>
<td>A program that discusses issues related to daily home issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kif Ifhal (How is it going?)</td>
<td>A program that discusses “varied social issues freely, like Moroccan women of today, difficulties between husbands and psychological issues”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data collection strategies detailed in this section reflect the ‘insistence’ of CA on recording naturally occurring data data. The method followed thus constitute a ‘departure’ from most traditional methods known in the social sciences such as interviews, questionnaires, field notes, observation, or even intuitively invented and idealized data (Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997; Psathas; 1995; Psathas and Anderson, 1990). In the view of Atkinson and Heritage (1984), collecting naturally occurring data is “the most economic” technique if one considers that talk-in-interaction provides a wide range of circumstances that a “natural’ laboratory” can provide “for the pursuit of hunches and the investigation of the limits of particular formulations by systematic comparison” (1984, p. 3). Considering the data collection techniques detailed above, it is deemed that the present dissertation allows for both detailed analysis of, and comparison with, a variety of instances.
After the first phase of data collection comes a second one of transcription. The section below discusses issues related to transcription, focusing especially on its status, its aspects and its conventions in CA methodology.

2. 2. Making transcripts

For all CA practitioners, the status of transcripts is quite clear. They are reproduced ‘representations’ of recordings which are themselves representations of particular interactional episodes (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1988, p. 74). Given this status, transcripts are considered partial ‘versions’ that reflect the analytic purposes of the researcher. The goal of transcripts, as explained by Psathas and Anderson, is “to provide in a written, linear format enough of the details of the interaction to permit subsequent analyses of particular kinds” (1990, p. 77).

According to this view, transcripts work as a major “noticing device” (Have, 2007, p. 95) as the phenomena researchers are interested in do not yield after a first, second or even more hearing of the recording. Transcription is thus a way of visualizing data with the purpose of dissecting it into more “manageable pieces” (ibid.). Visualization aims to capture both the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of talk.

Besides the visual advantage, an overriding principle in transcription conventions is the readability of the transcripts by the audience. A balance must be struck between too much technical details and readability by the general public. Because of these constraints, one constant feature of CA transcripts is the avoidance of standard orthography in favor of transcribing the actual speech in use with minimum technical details to allow for its readability.

Both Liddicoat (2007) and Have (2007) offer three ways in which data can be transcribed, with standard orthography and its total modification as two extreme options. The third option, being a compromise between the two, presents ‘consistent’ modifications as the best solution (Liddicoat, 2007, p. 19, Have, 2007, p. 99). However, given that the data for the present work are interactions in a language other than English, and, unlike the latter, has no standard written conventions, the author had to face the additional problem of translation (see p. 99 on the problem of translating and transcribing non-English materials).

In practice, the third option consists of using Jefferson’s transcription conventions (2004). However, of the myriad of transcription symbols introduced by Jefferson, and which are now
standard in CA, analysts choose only those that are related to their research interests. The policy adopted for transcription preferences for each analyst actually reflects the kind of analytical projects they carry. For this reason, transcripts are neither complete nor objective representations of what is in the original recordings. Given this, Hutchby and Woffitt characterize transcripts as “necessarily impressionistic”. They represent what the analyst ‘hears’ on the tape (1998, p. 92). They are not theory-free objects but are produced for a purpose (Psathas & Anderson, 1990, p. 77).

Since the purpose of the present work is to capture gender dynamics, and since, as said earlier, these reside more in categorial than sequential work, no attempt was made by the present researcher to transcribe in greater details the sample of interactional episodes subject to analysis here.

Materials for the present study were transcribed on a step-by-step basis. Utterances were transcribed as a first step. This was supplemented, subsequent to additional hearings, with details of speech delivery; but these were kept to a minimum (intonation, voice rise, interruption and pauses, and sometimes laughs and smiles). Below is an illustration of what a transcribed excerpt looks like.

**VOC6-001- (00:00:32)**

1 Abdrhm: [əzəb LLAH əː: [rbbi dar treːq
2 Salim: [wahd lːbəːnt
3 (.)
4 Salim: wahd lənt kant
5 kːddir li zitiːd franse
6 kant katqra mːxa xti flafak,
7 Hamid: əːː,
8 Salim: uhəjja mdik ʂiha djal mtalsa.
9 wahd lxtra ʂalha= ənɔhja ʃndha dik lhom təmʃi lbrra=
10 kaddir lfranse.
The title ‘VOC6-001- (00:00:32)’ simply means that the excerpt is taken from conversation number 6 (the recording order in the corpus, see table 1 above), and that 36 seconds have passed before the particular excerpt transcribed happened. The title therefore reads ‘36 seconds into conversation number 6’ (for the transcription symbols see the key on p. vi). Each transcript line was numbered for ease of reference when that line is cited in the body of the text. The numbering starts with the first turn in each transcribed excerpt and does not proceed from the beginning of the conversation, given that the research and his collaborators recorded only chunks and not whole conversations.

The telephone conversations selected from phone-in programs were transcribed with the same level of detail, with only a minor change that pertains to the title of the each extract. In the excerpt below, for example, ‘Lalla zhour 05.12.2015 (1:38:21)’ gives the name of the program, the date it was broadcast on air and how much time elapsed prior to the point where the interaction happened (one hour thirty eight minutes and twenty one seconds into the episode).

Lalla zhour 05.12.2015 (1:38:21)

1 Guest2: .h ə: nəbyi ndədxəl fhədə
2: fhad 1hala dja:lə: [( )
3 Host: [NORA
4 Guest2: ŋnora.
5 Guest1: ŋnora [ə:ˈ]
6 Guest2 [.h ana kanqol lnora
7 annaha tflət ə::
8 jənı təxəs təwpəf
9 jənı ma- wila wila xəsət məddik ɐrrəsl

This junction is probably the right place to offer a few remarks on the process of transcription for this work. For one, the details provided were the best obtained because the technology used for recording purposes (smartphones) was not adequate to capture all the speech phenomena that a hard-minded CA analyst would consider important (some analyst transcribe texts down to the last detail of breath taking, sneezing, and other minutia).
For another, and with regard to the radio shows downloaded, the objective of the technology used for broadcasting purposes is principally used to amplify sound quality. Hence it is used to suppress the details that might concern an analyst (like noise, breath intake of outtake).

Notwithstanding those observations, the limitations they offer do not detract from the validity of the transcriptions used for analysis here. Sequential details per se are not the objective but the descriptive apparatus of gender membership categorization is. Mostly, the intersection between MCA and CA lies mostly in an interest in the content of utterances (words and sentences), rather than speech delivery characteristics (intonation, pitch, speed, etc.). As said above, the level of details reflects the research concerns of the analyst. Detailed transcription, in other words, is neither a hindrance to the analysis here; nor is the analysis carried in the spirit of pure CA. The final form transcripts took satisfies the purposes set for this dissertation and stops at that.

With this settled, discussion is geared toward a different issue in methodology —the way analysis proceeds from transcripts. The next section is concerned with just that.

2. 3. Sequence and category in data analysis
The objective of the present work is to analyze gender work in talk-in-interaction that combines both sequential and categorial analyses. As said earlier, it is only recently that analytic programs in that spirit have begun. It is consequently natural that, considering the practical necessity of proving the utility of CA/MCA to gender and language studies, scholars disregarded methodological issues, with the effect that, within the field of gender and language, steps of a sequential and categorial analysis are rarely explained (Stokoe, 2000 & 2012).

In place of an interest in methodology in CA-MCA-informed gender studies, most of the work in the field takes the central findings of CA and MCA and applies them to analyze societal members’ procedural methods of sequence organization in talk and how members orient to, invoke, construct, as well as negotiate the constructions of gender categories (Ostermann et al., 2012; Speer 2005).

Given this state of affairs, and notwithstanding the dearth of methodological work in the field, an analytic decision had nonetheless to be made. Admittedly, a focus on the formal properties of talk (sequential analysis) is slightly skewed in favor of an MCA analysis (but see chapter 3, sub-section 1.1). Still, their intersection illuminates how gender is constructed, exploited, and
made sense of, in everyday talk-in-interaction (Kitzinger, 2005, 2009; Kitzinger & Mandelbaum, 2013; Kitzinger & Rickford, 2007; Kitzinger, Shaw & Toerien, 2012; Shaw & Kitzinger, 2012; Stockill & Kitzinger, 2007; Toerien & Kitzinger, 2007). Therefore, a partial disregard of sequential details in favor of a focus on categorial matters is not a downside after all.

2.4. Data analysis procedure

Have (n.d.) refers to a specific issue in studying common sense methods of societal members, which he calls “the problem of the invisibility of common sense” (parag 18). CA offers one solution to their study. It consists of making recordings of naturally occurring talk, transcribing it and then trying to build an apparatus that describes its orderliness as a social product.

Properly speaking then, analysis begins with the process of transcribing and working through transcripts “in close conjunction with the tape-recorded materials” (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984, p. 12) (emphasis the authors’) in order to build a corpus of data. It demands a “methodical listening” with careful attention given, through repeated listening, to the organizational resources of talk and the activities and actions embedded within sequences (Psathas & Anderson, 1990, p. 76). For the present study, how recording and transcription proceeded has already been detailed. It remains to see how episodes are chosen for analysis and what analysis consists of. This is the concern of the remained of this section.

The delimitation of an interactional episode can informally be done by delimiting related sequences (like adjacency pairs) that recognizably do one series of related actions throughout a space of talk. As such, an interactional episode may contain one or more sequences (Have, n.d.).

Once an interactional episode is delimited, the next step consists of considering the relationship between sequences and categories for the realization of the actions in the excerpt. This means that the researcher analyzes both how sequence organization and categorial organization contribute to the understandability of the episode as a particular kind of action, designed in a particular context for a particular speaker (Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997). The researcher describes the ways in which participants assemble categories within their sequential context and the overall context provided by the interaction (Silverman, 1998; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1988).
As is known by now, the focus of the present work is on gender categorization, the task for the researcher is to describe identities, roles, category-bound activities oriented to, invoked, or challenged, which are implicated by the choices of gender categories and MCDs in the episode analyzed. However, the researcher cannot lose sight of the sequential context of talk since, the categorial choices participants make are, to repeat, always embedded in sequential environments that further specific actions in talk.

It has already been emphasized that the researcher’s task is to ‘describe’, rather than to theorize the interactional work interactants do. He attempts to delineate the set of procedures that enable interactants to arrive at the recognition of a talk episode as a particular kind of social activity, a particular kind of doing, and “how these ‘doings’ interconnect” (Have, n.d.). This said, descriptions must be empirically grounded in the actualities of talk in the sense that they necessarily build on what can demonstrably be shown to be the case for participants in interaction. In other words, analytical claims should be grounded in the details of the episodes under study (Psathas, 1995).

When a description of a single episode is done, the analyst refers back to the data corpus to see if other instances confirm the description hitherto developed (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998, p. 95, see also p. 110). Describing additional episodes is important in order to establish a pattern, that is, to show that the gender categorial practices claimed for participants are systematic, orderly and common sense. Describing other episodes in the data is also necessary to account for any departures from the pattern (Heritage, n.d.). This way the analyst proceeds from what is referred to in the literature as ‘single case analysis’ to collection analysis studies (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998).

The ultimate object of analysis is to build analyses that, to use Hutchby & Wooffitt’s words, “track down the various conversational strategies and devices which inform and drive” interactants’ gendering work in conversation (1998, p. 121). An additional advantage of single case analysis is that it allows cautious application of findings from collection studies in the analysis of single episodes of talk in domains different from the parent CA field. With regard to membership analysis, both collections of similar practices and single cases are ideal for the description of categorization work, especially when category memberships and category activities are in contention among parties to talk. While collections allow general insights about categorial work to emerge, the nuisance effects of this work can only be identified on a case by case basis. This is because categories are always indexically and
reflexively tied to their local context and the outcomes of any interaction (Hester and Eglin, 1997). As said before, categorization devices constitute what Hester and Hester (2012) call “culturally assembled objects” contingent upon aspects of the context to which they are indexically bound.

The analysis procedure thus briefly explained the next section considers how analysis proceeds in a study concerned with gender categorial work. Since as said earlier, methodology in CA-MCA-driven gender studies is still awaiting treatment, the account below is mostly gleaned from work advanced by Kitzinger and her collaborators in developing what they refer to as Feminist Conversation Analysis (FCA), and the work of Speer and Stokoe (2011) who defend, and argue for, the potential of CA and MCA for gender and language studies.

2.5. Gender in a sequential-categorial analysis

Whereas CA focuses on the sequential organization of actions and on the description of the course of turns in sequences, MCA focuses on how categories are used to achieve specific outcomes in interaction. This focus therefore entails collecting interactional episodes that contain instances of gender categories (Jackson, 2011a/b). It also entails paying attention to person reference, word selection and descriptors of people and activities related, implicitly or explicitly, to gender (Kitzinger & Mandelbaum, 2013).

The analyst’s task is then to describe interactants’ orientations to gender only when that orientation can be demonstrated in their talk-in-interaction. However, the idea is not that gender is always relevant (chapter IV argues specifically against this notion), but rather that “[g]ender is invoked and discarded in the interests of local interactional goals” (Kitzinger & Rickford, 2007, p. 220). This observation of Kitzinger (see especially Kitzinger, 2000; 2005), therefore, supplements the procedure described above. Interactional episodes were selected with gender in mind. When instances for analysis were located, the researcher proceeded to describe their sequential context, the actions implemented by their component turns, and the outcomes achieved with the use of gender categories.

Following the description of sequences and categories in a single episode, and the identification of the work that gender does in it, the researcher moves to the description of other instances in order to establish a pattern of gender categorial work. That is, to reiterate, a description of the common sense logic that informs the patterns observed.
The analytical steps followed can thus be summarized as follows,

- Selection of an interactional episode of interest.
- Description of the sequential organization of that episode.
- Description of gender categorial work in that episode.
- Description of other instances that confirm the analysis of the first episode.
- Establishment of a pattern, the systematic nature of gender work.
- Accounting for departures from the pattern.

The steps thus summarized are similar to any CA project. Likewise, an integrated sequential-categorial analysis does not call for drastic modifications of methodological steps, but is nowhere explained in the literature. One exception is Stokoe’s (2012) article where she introduces useful recommendations for the sequential-categorial analysis of gender. Her guidelines are reproduced below in order to show how they compare with, and are informed by, analytical steps above.

1. **Collect** data across different sorts of domestic and institutional settings; collect both interactional and textual materials depending on the focus of the study. Data collection may be purposive (e.g. gathering together instances of particular categories in use because of an a priori interest in that category) or unmotivated (e.g. noticing a category’s use and pursuing it within and across multiple discourse sites).

2. **Build** collections of cases where categories are explicitly used by co-conversationalists during interaction (e.g. man, human, boy-racer, anarchist, teacher, Australian, pianist, prostitute, lesbian, etc.); membership categorization devices (e.g. ‘occupation’, ‘parties to a crime’, ‘stage of life’, ‘sex’, ‘family’, etc.); and category-resonant descriptions, i.e., descriptions of appearances and/or activities, (putting make up, gossipy, moody, whiny, fretting, etc)

3. **Locate** the sequential position of each categorial instance within the ongoing interaction, or within the text.

4. **Analyze** the design and action orientation of the turn or text in which the category, device or descriptions appears.

5. **Look** for evidence that and how recipients orient to the category, device or resonant description; for the interactional consequences of a category’s use; for co-occurring
component features of categorial formulations; and for the way speakers within and between turns build and resist categorizations (Stokoe’s, 2012, p. 280)

3. Other issues in Methodology

3. 1. Ethnographic data
It is essential to register here that ethnographic background is given in the scantiest form possible: pseudo names of interactants and places, and descriptions/summaries of activities prior or subsequent to the excerpts analyzed in the paper. CA reluctance to draw on external context has already been discussed. It was clear that this character of its methodology stems from Ethnomethodology’s stance towards social action and social order.

3. 2. Translation
The preponderant number of CA-MCA studies is carried out in English. Jefferson’s transcription symbols have originally been developed for the English language. However, the adoption of CA in other parts of the world has raised the problem of how to transcribe non-English materials.

Have (2007) counted five ways in which data in a language other than English is presented in published work. They range from the employment of the original language with no translation, through giving an upshot in English of each turn, to the use of the original language with a morpheme-by-morpheme gloss and a translation bellow it line-by-line. Have pointed out that the latter technique was the preferred one since, according to him, it is the most exact and precise one. Of course, he has the international English readership in mind when he made that recommendation.

For the purposes of present thesis, an initial attempt was made to do a word-by-word translation and to write an approximate translation of the entire utterance below the word-by-word gloss. This, however, proved laborious and time consuming. The majority of the interactional episodes presented in the dissertation are long. Adding a gloss and a translation would have tripled their length.

Another added difficulty was the fact that that there is no recognized written medium for Moroccan Arabic (MA). Attempts to establish written conventions for MA have a political and educational history of their own and ones that are rife with tension.

Given that Have offers no aid for the transcription of non-written languages, the researcher thought at first about transcribing the Moroccan Arabic (MA) talk by suing transliteration it;
that is, by using the informal code similar to the one used on billboards advertisement, and commonly employed by social media users (especially Facebook). The outcome of this strategy was something like this,

**VOC12-001**

Hamid: kifach katji kat3tek 1flous ?
(0.2)
Ihsan: kaddewwer m3aya.
Hamid: Hadi rojoula daba kaddewwer m3ak hiyya bnt=
Ihsan: ochno,
Hamid: =rojoula hadi akhay jaw[ad ?
Kamal: [wellah ma rojoula
Hamid: [(h)hehehehe

Though handy, the informal symbols generated addition problems. For example, the symbol “t” is used to transcribe the MA sound /t/ and /ṫ/. Generally, the pharyngeal MA sounds were transcribed using the same symbols that transcribe their non-pharyngeal counterparts. Added to this is the problem of pronunciation. In everyday talk, some words are produced fast so their rendition in the format above does not capture ‘real’ talk. For instance, the second vowel sounds in the word ‘kifach’ is reduced in real talk to ‘fə’ (see the alternative transcription below).

Another problem was related to the shape of the transcript itself. Using these symbols gave the transcript an informal feel that is hardly suitable for a serious study of mundane talk. (And it might be mentioned here that critics of CA/MCA did not miss to comment on what they considered the ‘weird’ Jeffersonian transcription symbols that produced funny looking transcripts. This is not withstanding their long history and the firm establishment of CA and MCA as respected disciplines).

Considering the above hurdle, a last solution was to use broad phonetic transcription conventions. The above excerpt was then rendered as follows,
Settling the question of transcription, the researcher was left with the problem of translating the transcripts into the language of the dissertation. As said earlier, a line by line translation would have unnecessarily complicated the transcripts. The decision was therefore made to do away with translation altogether since, the readership is mostly Arabic speaking. Consequently, the analysis in the body of the text here used the original excerpts with no translation.

**Summary**

Considering the range of issues that flow from the theoretical and methodological stances taken in this thesis, it has become clear by now why this chapter deviates from what customarily figures in a ‘methodology part’. That is, instead of tackling issues of research sites, number of participants and their biographic background, research techniques, response rates, etc., the discussion was devoted to discussing how the recordings were collected, how the transcripts were made, and how the analysis proceeded.

These quite unusual aspects of the methodology reflect the distinctiveness of CA and MCA. Both credit their distinctiveness to their character as a reaction against the epistemological and ontological bases of mainstream social scientific work, which inform most research tools in qualitative as well as quantitative research.
CA practitioners are primarily interested in giving accounts of societal members’ constructs and not in building social scientific accounts or theories of them. Their concern lies in understanding the common sense procedures that enable members to organize their conduct rather than how social scientists understand it. In other words, the task for CA analysts is descriptive and not explicative.

For a social scientist preoccupied with providing theoretical accounts with explanatory power, it is only natural that they ‘design’ research that rigged members’ behavior towards the phenomenon of interest to the scientist wherefrom the manipulation of variables in quantitative studies, and the special arrangements of focus groups, interviews, and questionnaires in most qualitative work. As a consequence, in methodology sections in this kind of work, analysts detail precisely those methods and techniques they designed to favor a particular outcome that itself provided a justification for their selection.

CA and MCA, on the other hand, are motivated by quite different concerns. Analysts who subscribe to the principles of CA and MCA are happy to study whatever talk members’ produce and to examine that talk for the orderliness it exhibits. Characteristic of this talk is that it is produced in the first place for conversational partners in a particular social event, be it a formal event in a court setting or a chit-chat around a dinner table. It is in no way produced for the sake of the analyst (Sacks et al. 1974; Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998).

In this sense, it can be said that CA and MCA researchers study natural data, not only in the sense that they analyze naturally occurring talk, but also in the sense that its original shape is not tampered with (no codification or thematization). Although this kind of data generated methodological considerations of its own, those considerations are different from those generally encountered by classic methods. The methodological issues raised related to how best to capture talk processes, how to analyze them, how to validate a specific analysis. In short, they pertained to issues this part has dealt with.

Consequently, in choosing for the purposes of this dissertation a CA-MCA-informed method over established ones, the researcher did not merely change one tool for another, but has moved from one paradigm to another, one that is altogether different (Heritage, 1984b for an especially illuminating account. Heritage contrasts functionalism in the social sciences to Ethnomethodology as one offshoot of interactionism).
Chapter III: Genderized categories in calls to phone-in radio programs

Introduction

The literature reviewed in the first chapter traced a paradigmatic shift that occurred in the course of the last decades in discourse studies in general, and gender and language studies in particular. In it, the analytical rewards of CA and MCA as constructive approaches were established, namely, that they can be applied to the fruitful study of the dynamic and interactive construction of gender locally in conversations. That identity work is first and foremost the concern of participants in interaction, before it is the analyst’s, was indeed a novel idea that helped very much to gain new insights on gender dynamics in the context of everyday life.

Therefore, building on the conceptual and methodological frameworks introduced in the previous chapters, the present work aims to substantiate the claim that gender is societal members’ concern by demonstrating that it is apparent in, and relevant to, their talk. It is in talk that members explicitly draw on membership categories to do gender work and exhibit, in the course of that work, its social construction in action.

Foreshadowing the discussion in the present chapter, it can be said that gender work consists in invoking membership categories, category-bound activities, and MCDs to display a gender identity that serves some business in talk. The business of the analysis, on the other hand, is to study that identity and that work and how they are both achieved in interaction.

To reiterate an earlier point, to the extent that categories furnish part of the cultural materials out of which social actions are organized and recognized, gender is a concern for the analyst when gender categorization constitutes a resource whose attributes organize the outcomes of interaction. This concern respects Schegloff’s general caveat that a category is not relevant until it is ‘made’ relevant by the sequential and categorial work of conversationalists themselves. More particularly, it respects Kitzinger’s constraints that gender becomes an interactional achievement when conversationalists’ orient to it (see for example Kitzinger, 2000; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 2008). In short conversationalists do work to genderize the world, through categorization, in sequentially organized, locally meaningful, and contextually specific ways in conversations. The task for an analyst concerned with gender is to study what sort of work that is.

Accordingly, this chapter analyzes how gender categories inform a particular understanding of the social world that Moroccan conversationalists inhabit. It shows how categorial work
constructs shared cultural expectations *in situ*. This demonstrates, as ethnomethodologists would argue, that the cultural textile is built at the same time that interaction unfolds and is a commonsensically and morally binding one. More particularly, the analysis here details how the categorial work participants do reflexively ties them to certain genderized roles which, in turn, ties them to certain genderized identities where those are the contextually relevant ones.

The overall argument of the chapter is that talk-in-interaction realizes situated gender work and gender realizes organizational cultural patterns, of which it is itself one aspect. It will be recalled that this reflexive relationship is one of the most fundamental principles of Ethnomethodology.

The argument will be sustained through the analysis of a specimen of interactional episodes that typically illustrate gender in MA interaction. The examples are taken from recorded episodes of calls to phone-in radio programs and their transcripts. As previously mentioned, both constitute part of the data set for this study, the other part being gathered through recording mundane conversations.

The first section describes the overall sequential and categorial organization of phone calls in the programs selected. The second section shows how gender is invoked by Moroccan callers to these programs. Building on the first two sections, section three analyzes how callers build ‘versions of reality’ that are ‘steered’ toward achieving that and only that genderized social world which that talk constructs as self-evidently real. Section four then looks at similar data as the preceding sections to show how reformulation and repair of categories are a means of carrying forward specific actions in the course of talk. It looks specifically at how conversationalists work to achieve ‘social distance’ through reformulation and repair.

Together, the four sections contribute an understanding of gender as an ‘identity’ realized in categories invoked by interactants. Societal members’ categorizations in conversation are thus a form of ‘identity work’, or gender work along the principles detailed by Antaki and Widdicombe (1998),

- for a person to ‘have an identity’ - whether he or she is the person speaking, being spoken to, or being spoken about - is to be cast into a category with associated characteristics or features;
- such casting is indexical and occasioned;
- it makes relevant the identity to the interactional business going on;
- the force of ‘having an identity’ is in its consequentiality in the interaction; and
• all this is visible in people's exploitation of the structures of conversation (1998, p. 3).

1. Building a ‘genderized’ world in calls to phone-in radio shows

1.1 The sequential organization of the calls

This section briefly describes the overall sequential structure of calls to phone-in radio programs. It focuses particularly on the structural organization of the opening sequences where important sequential and categorial work is done with relation to gender work. The delineation of the structural organization is backed up by data excerpts for specific claims made about it.

At the risk of gross generalization, the overall sequential structure of calls to the phone-ins is as follows. (‘Host’ refers to the host of the program, ‘Caller’ to any person calling the program, and ‘Guest-expert’ (or Expert for short), denotes the person invited by the host of the program to advise callers on the issue(s), or the problem(s), that are the reason of making a call. Given the declared stated mission of a given phone-in program, then, the Guest-expert can be a doctor, a lawyer, a marriage counselor, or an expert on budget management, etc.).

1– Caller rings the intended number, reaches the intended destination where his/her call is met by either Host, or by an intermediary third party (a call receptionist).

2– In case a receptionist takes the call, they transmit personal information to Host. The latter introduces Caller usually by first name and geographic location. Otherwise, in case Host is the one receiving the call directly, Caller introduces herself/himself also using first name and geographic location.

3– Caller greets Host and Guest-expert. The greeting is done either individually or collectively; that is, Caller either greets Host then greets Guest-expert (rarely the opposite direction), or they greet them together at the same time.

4– Host and Expert return the greeting. Host asks Caller if he/she has a problem about which he/she wants to consult Guest-expert. Or, since orientation to problem telling is guaranteed by the making of the call and reaching that specific program as destination, Caller proposes to tell his/her problem without explicit request from host. In case Caller asks for permission to tell their problem, the request is guaranteed with only minimal verbal acknowledgment from Host.
5– Caller tells a narrative in which the details of the problem are furnished.

6– The narrative terminates once a problem is identified. If necessary, Guest-expert, sometimes with the help of Host, starts a series of question-answer sequences, repair sequences and other information-seeking sequences in order to get more details about the problem, in case the narrative is not clear to them. If Guest-expert deems that no further details are needed, or no repair is required, she/he proceeds to step seven directly, skipping step 6 altogether.

7– Advice-initiation and advice-giving sequences may come after question-answer sequences, repair sequences, and other information-seeking sequences that may or may not follow Caller’s narrative.

8- Sequences of advice-giving terminate once their reception is acknowledged by Caller (for example, thanking Host and Guest-expert).

9– Host initiates a closing sequence to terminate the call.

It might be observed, following Schegloff’s (1968) work on mundane telephone calls, that the calls made to phone-in programs are monotopical. All parties orient to the call as an interactional site where the caller is expected to tell about one problem. The majority of the calls are indeed monotopical. This said, it is conceded that each and every sequence within the overall format is subject to one or more expansions as problem-clarification requires. This may give rise to other ‘side’ problems which may also require attention from the Guest-expert. A discussion of these two points will follow shortly.

The following example embodies the structural organization of phone-calls in its shortest and and most basic format.

**Example 1:**

**Lkoul Osra (02/05/2016: 12:21)**

1. Caller: .hh [b̪ɨt ɣi nswəel ssəjda mrjəm,
2. Host: [tfədli.
3. Host: a[h.
4. Caller: [wahəd le lain fl ver kanari,
5. Host: əh _əh.
The call started with the caller dialing the number and, once recognizing that she reached the intended program, she moved to step 4 (line 1) where she requested to ‘ask’ the Guest-expert, “byit yi nswwel ssøjda mrjēm” (I want to ask Mrs Meriem) (line 1). That request was launched at the same time that the host signaled, by the token “tfédli” (go ahead) (line 2), that the caller had now the floor to tell the problem. The request and the ‘floor-giving’ signal were launched simultaneously. Line 3 was thereafter uttered to signal the host’s granting of the caller’s request. The opening therefore shows the two ways callers proceed to the sequences of problem telling, namely, caller’s request or host’s proposal to tell the problem.

Lines 4 to 8 represent the sequences where the caller told about a particular situation, the purpose of the call (step 5).
Lines 9 to 17 are sequences of advice-initiations and advice giving (step 7). The sequence ended with the caller acknowledging that an advice had been given (step 8) by expressing gratitude (lines 18 and 19). Incidentally in this call, the host oriented to a missing greeting-greeting sequence (line 10) which should normally have occurred as part of step 3, and prior to problem-telling. However, that orientation was not taken up by the caller (she disregarded the greeting altogether).

Lines 21 to 26 represent a closing sequence, or more particularly a pre-closing sequence (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973). It offered a proposed exit from the problem part and hence projects the end of the call.

It was said above (p. 106) that the basic sequences of a call may be subject to expansion. In this call for example, Caller initiated a repair sequence (line 11) where she repeated the Guest-expert’s utterance word for word, asking thereby for confirmation that this was the exact advice the caller heard. The caller confirmed that understanding in line 12. Also, the advice given in line 9 was itself subject to expansion, in line 13 to 17 where the Guest-expert gave an account, the reason, behind giving the advice she had given.

The extract also shows another property of phone-in calls — their monitopicality. All parties ‘assume’ that Caller introduces one and only one problem during a given call. However, there are variations to this. Callers in a few cases in the data introduce two topics, but only rarely three topics. No cases were encountered where more than three problems were introduced.

In cases where callers have additional problems about which they need advice, work is done to explicitly signal the ‘multitopical’ character of the call. In constrast to ‘first problems’, ‘second problems’ require specific interactional work and entail different interactional responsibilities for Host and Caller. Structurally, then, a first problem is ‘unmarked’, subsequent problems are ‘marked’. The making of problems has evidence in the calls themselves.

First, the ease with which callers proceed to tell about a first problem in step 3 may be explained with reference to steps 1 and 2. That is, the realization of step 1 is itself a request to tell a problem. Once Host ‘picks up’ the phone and Caller recognizes that she/he has reached the program as the intended ‘called’ (see Zimmerman, 1998); then step 2, introducing first name and geographic location, is treated as a pre-beginning to problem telling (The goal of step 2 is to connect problems with their owners if reference is made to them later in the
episode). In other words, dialing up the telephone number for a specific phone-in program itself constitutes a request to tell a problem and ask for advice. The request is granted once the caller is put on air.

Also as evidence of monotonicality, Caller is given as much time as needed to complete the narration of the problem she/he introduces in step 3. She/he is free to offer whatever details she/he deems necessary. Guest-expert also orients to the right of the caller to give full accounts of problems and, as more evidence of their recognition of this right, may initiate repair on ‘ambiguous facts’—ask for more ‘facts’—if they need extra details in order to understand first problems.

In contrast to that, the status of a second problem as ‘marked’ has two aspects: interactional work must be done in order to signal its existence; and a second problem must be brief, considering the overall time during which a first problem is told and treated.

First, Caller must explicitly display his/her orientation that a second problem exists, or at least an extension of a first problem exists. In the following example, after Caller had identified the first problem, one that concerned his wife’s dysfunctional Fallopian tube (talk not shown here), the Guest-expert first recapitulated Caller’s problem, and then gave her medical opinion and advice about that problem.

**Example 2:**

*hditnsa 24-11-2015 (00:34:58)*

1 Expert: mt nʕam glti: lgrn limën maxdamch
2  [hit l: l: hada lli bʏit nweʃwelekk annahu lmra
3 Caller:  [a:h
4 Caller: rah jmlha thml yi bθrn waḥed
5 Caller: [ʃokra::n ha:d– ʃokran hada lli bʏit nsmwʕ
6 [rah mafi
7 [ana ( )
8 Expert: lla. rah rah makajn tta ji jʃka:l
9 ja(h)ni rah ila kan waḥ–
10 wʃhul mxtra kanʃufο mra ga:ʕ .h uw–
11 ʃmla:t udart lmala flgrn ohjʔedna liθe lgrn
12 ubqa ʒndha ʃir grn waḥed Uwl-da:t mnbʕd.
The advice the expert gives in line 4 was treated as conclusive by the caller regarding the problem introduced by him. In line 5, he initiates a thanks-giving turn that shows his acknowledgement that the advice has been complete. The expert nonetheless, expands that opinion in subsequent turns. Even with the expansion, however, all parties treat the call as terminated and the request for advice as satisfied.

As additional evidence that all the parties recognized that an an advice had been given and, therefore, that a closing sequence was due, it may be noticed, for example, how the host’s turn, line 23, orients to the Guest-expert’s expansion as foreshadowing a close. After sufficient warrants given by the expert in the expansion, the host finally mirrors the caller’s concern in the call. It will be recalled that, where hosts intervene after advice giving and advice acknowledging, it is to proceed to terminating the call. All parties therefore initially oriented to that termination after advice was given to the problem.

Nonetheless, the calls did not end up at that point. Notice how the host’s turn in line 23 was simultaneously uttered with the caller’s summoning the expert by “doktora” (doctor), and it is
the host, not the expert, who answered the summons. By answering the summons on behalf of the expert, the host is invoking her role as the regulator (Fitzgerald & Housley, 2002) of talk. She is therefore the person to allow or disallow further talk. Considering, as Schegloff (1968) has shown, that summons require further talk, the call was thus extended beyond a possible point where it might have been terminated.

The “nʕ:am” (yes) (line 23) provides not only a second-pair part to the summons but also makes it necessary for the caller to produce a next turn (Schegloff, 1968). Also, since the expectation is that callers provide advice-seeking-oriented talk, the ‘yes’ orientes toward sustaining this assumption — that either a ‘a second problem’, or at least an extension of the first problem, is to come. In short, then, the caller exploited the sequential aspects of summons-answer in order ‘halt’ momentarily, so to speak, the termination of the call. It is exactly this which constituted the ‘extra’ work done by the caller.

Furthermore, it is interesting that the caller had to repeat his summons three times in lines 22, 24 and 29, and each time his summons was produced against ongoing talk, overlapping it. Recall that this extensive work is falling within a pre-closing sequence. In other words, the caller recognized that his acknowledgment of the advice marked the termination of his call, and that the other parties had treated it as such. He had therefore to do additional work to secure another turn to in which to tell whatever his wants to tell before the call was, almost automatically, terminated.

The caller was indeed sensitive to the fact that the summons was done in a call-closing environment, for he repeated his summons until he secured the attention of the expert (line 30), and, by securing this, was granted a further turn. The point, to reiterate, is that the callers had to do extra work to secure a place where he could introduce another issue after the introduction of his ‘first problem’. Obviously, it was clear to him that the other parties to talk were heading towards ending the call. This proves, again, that in order to suspend the assumption of monotopicality, callers need to do additional interactional work.

In other cases, monotopicality is suspended at the very beginning of the call. Right after the greeting sequence, Caller may indicate how many problems she/he wants to tell and, thereby, request telling them (sometimes time constraints do not allow the introduction of further problems). Once the request is granted, both Host and Expert orient to the production of a second question as expected after a first problem is given. In the following excerpt, for
example, the caller indicated that she had two problems to tell right at the beginning of her narrative (line 4). The host granted their telling (line 6).

Example 3

1 Host: aloγ alalla: [əːː
2 Caller: [ʕafaːk əːː–
3 Host: [tfdli.
4 Caller: [ʕndi zuː ʒ dyal lʔasʔila
5 Host: laj: ʒaziːk [bixiːr.
6 Caller: [əj jəːːh.
7 Caller: əːː ssuʔal ləwwə

Notice that “tfdli” (please go ahead) (line 3) overlaps the caller’s announcement that she ‘has two questions’. It is therefore oriented to first problem telling as ‘granted’, so to speak, simply by making the call. It cannot be said in this sense to be directed to the announcement. Notice also that the caller in this case ‘announced’ she had two problems. In cases where Caller had only one problem to tell, no such announcement is needed (although it is sometimes made, probably to indicate that what comes next is directed to Expert, and not to Host. If this analysis is correct, the announcement of a first problem would be an interesting case of a strategy to effect hearer change in phone-in programs).

Back to the example, once the caller had finished telling the first problem, both the expert (line 13 below) and the host (line 15) recognized it as such and expected the telling of a second problem. The host asked the expert if he wanted to address the first problem before moving to the second (lines 15 and 17).

8 Caller: [difisil baʃ ktxrrəʒəːha:
9 Expert: [nʃaːm. nʃaːm alalla.
10 [.h əːː=
11 Caller: [ʃʔaːː;
12 Host: [ʃmːm.
13 Expert: =hada ssuʔaːl lʔaːwwalam
14 Host: =lwwəl tʒəwb=
A similar example is the following, where the caller mentioned that the number of questions was going to be three (line 3).

**Example 4:**

*Kifhal 02-11-2015/ (12) (01:31:21)*

1 Host: mrhbâ bi:k.
2 Caller: aloɣ ʒә ve: e:tx txe bye:v
3 [ʔn [디 txwa ptit keştjo.]
4 Host: [ale[zi.
5 Expert: [mrhbâ.

The caller then proceeded to a first narrative that detailed the first problem. Once that narrative was finished, she signaled the beginning of the second problem (line 6).

6 caller: la dә:zje:m keştjoʔse ke:

Following the termination of the second problem telling, the caller again explicitly signaled the beginning of a third,
It is interesting that the caller felt the urge to apologize, (line 9), even when her right to tell a third problem was already granted by both the host and the expert right at the beginning of the call (lines 4 and 5 above). The reason of her apology is, nonetheless, ambiguous as “ila smәjtu:)” (if, you know) does not specify a particular reason. One reading of her apology is that she wanted to make sure she would be given enough time by gauging how much of it the host could ‘grant’ the problem telling. However, that reading is not sustained given that callers with only one problem to tell do not feel the need to apologize even if, as in some cases, their calls may take much longer time than it was the case in the above example. The explanation then lies not in the length of the call, but particularly in the status of the problem narrated as a ‘third’. Being a third problem was a severe violation to the assumption of monotopicality that its telling was felt as requiring an apology.

The above examples show that all parties to a phone-in program call — Host, Guest-expert and Caller — orient to the monotopicality of the call as the norm; that is, they treat the call as a site where to address one problem, at least, and three problems at most (nowhere in the data a caller brought up four problems in a row).

It might be suspected that monotopicality is a consequence of time pressure as might be exercised on Host to take as many calls as possible from different callers. Although the data set does not include phone-in programs of the argumentative sort, where Caller calls to take ‘for’ and ‘against’ sides (Fitzgeral & Housely, 2002), the idea that part of the entertainment in the programs selected is to listen to as many cases as possible is, nonetheless, not a far fetched one. It is even intuitively plausible. The number of calls and the time factor, along with the need for diversity, all put a pressure on the parties to the calls to orient to monotopicality.

Going back to the structural steps above, the first and second observations have as evidence the fact that Host introduces Caller by name and geographic location. Unlike ordinary calls, parties dispense with the ‘greeting sequence’ as ‘identification-recognition’ sequence (see Schegloff, 1968). A greeting there is in phone-in calls, but it simply is not a ‘specimen’ of voice to allow recognition as Schegloff analyzes greeting sequences in ordinary calls. No identification and recognition ‘through greeting’ are expected since parties to phone-in callers are strangers to each other. Consequently, if it is a receptionist receives the calls, then she/he transmits name plus geographic location to the host who, in turn, transmits this information to the guest and to the audience at large. In programs where the call is unmediated and callers
introduce themselves directly to Host and the Guest-expert, introductions are nonetheless done using first name and city or village name. The following are examples that illustrate the point. In example 5, it is the host who introduced the caller (line 3); in examples 6 and 7, callers indentify themselves using first name and geographic location (lines 5 and 8 respectively).

**Example 5:**

**hditnsa 09-11-2015/ (3) (00:45:10)**

1 Host: .h ɣadi n:wašlo du⁡iman mu⁡ara⁡aka:
2 mu⁡ara⁡aka hatifija mn Ḳa:ṭ
3 m⁡a bassa:m. mr⁡ha bisi.
4 (.)
5 Bassam: alu: salammə ṣlik:um
6 Host: waṣalikum ssala:m.

**Example 6:**

**Samir lail 05-05-2013/ (1) (00:03:56)**

1 Host: salamma ṣlikum.
2 (1)
3 Caller: alu:? 
4 Host: mœrḥba lalla.
6 Host: mœrḥba lallə dunija.

**Example 7:**

**Samir lail 05-05-2013/ (2) (00:25:47)**

1 Host: .hh ɵ::h sallama ṣlikum.
2 Caller: salam warhmat llah ta⁡ala wabarakaṭh=ssi:
3 (.)
4 mstafa labas?
5 Host: LAH jbarœk fik asidi mr⁡ha bttawašul djalœk=
6 Caller: bixir œʕla xi:r?
The restriction of the introduction to ‘first name’ and ‘geographic location’ as sufficient information about callers does two important things in the context of phone-ins. First, personal name and city/village name give enough information on a caller thus identified in order for the parties (other callers, Host, Guest-expert) to refer to him/her adequately, if they wish to do so later in the episode. For example, if a subsequent caller wishes to refer to a previous caller, the first name isolates the referent from other previous callers who have different names, thus restricting the referent person to a smaller group of callers who have similar names (if it so happens that more that one caller with the same name called the program during the same single episode). Geographic location then isolates the intended referent from the pool of callers who might have the same name. More concretely, if two Callers have the name X and one is from region Y and the other From region Z, then a caller who wishes to refer to ‘X from Z’, uses first name to restrict the reference to just two callers, and then uses geographic location to designate the intended caller. First name plus geographic location guarantees that a caller referred to by another is correctly identified.

The second, and perhaps more important, reason for the introductory sequence ‘first name plus geographic location’ is to guarantee the anonymity of callers. All of the calls involve personal narratives that tell of social problems with other people, groups, or even institutions. Given the probability that any information beyond personal names and location might divulge sensitive personal information, and, consequently, jeopardize the rights of others to privacy, Host (or Caller) introduces just enough information that does the work of ensuring adequacy of reference (Schegloff, 1996a) among the parties to the call, and of ensuring the right to privacy to Caller and any third parties involved in her/her narratives.

It was said earlier that being on air itself guarantees caller’s right to tell of their problem (step 4). Once a person is admitted to being the ‘now caller’ (Fitzgerald and Housley, 2002), she/he has the the right to tell about her/his problem(s) (step 5) and is entitled to a ‘piece of advice’ given by the Guest-expert (step 6). The upshot of this organization is that the parties to any
given call construct it as ‘problem-oriented’ and as ‘advice-giving oriented’. The following extracts show how, once the identification and greeting actions are done with, Caller is expected to ‘do the telling of a problem’ related to the stated social domain the program targets. As it was already said, in some cases caller may request permission to tell a first problem, but, considering that he/she is expected to do so, the request seems redundant (or probably used to effect hearer change, i.e., from Host to Guest-expert) (see example 8).

In example 8 below, the host issued a floor-giving’ token (line 4) once the greeting sequence terminated (lines 1 and 3). The host again re-issued that token at line 12, after the caller asked for permission. By giving the floor before the caller was asked for, the host therefore considers that the end of the greeting is the place for the caller to tell a problem. The caller’s request was in this sense redundant. But notice that the reading of the announcement as the ‘doing of hearer change’ is very plausible. The caller was cut off midsentence that started with “obyit ns: -”, which, if complete, would very plausibley read as something like “obyit ns:wwәl l?ustada” (I want to ask your lawyer). The same analysis applies to example 9.

Example 8:

hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (14) (00:50:39)

1 Host: mrhba sidi.
2 (0.2)
3 Caller: mрh(h)ba xti;
4 Host: tfddәl,
5 (0.2)
6 Caller: ʕafak axti ʕndi wa:hd–
7 ʕndi wahd lmwdo:ʕә(h):;
8 xa:ş bhadʃʃi djal:: lmudawwanә
9 obyit ns[::
10Expert: [m:m=
11 =nʕә:m °a[sidi°
12Host: [mrhba bi:k tfddәl.
13Caller: ʃokran xti.
14 (0.5)
Example 9:
Kiflhal 02-11-2015/ (05) (01:05:25)

1 Host: tfddәl bssuʔaːl djalk.
2 Caller: aːh axtiː
3 ġndi wahd ssuʔaːl djalәː
4 djal lwәjjeɗ dyali

In example 9, “tfddәl bssuʔaːl djalk.” (go ahead with your question) embodies the expectation that the caller had a problem for which she needed advice. The host therefore granted the caller’s request, to tell problem, even when none is explicitly made.

The examples show that the structural organization of the calls to phone-in program requires callers to narrate a problem at exactly that specific point in the call. Host, rather than asking Caller if she/he has a problem, takes the shortcut of directly giving the floor to Caller without his/her explicitly asking for it.

In this sense then, the occurrence of a question-answer sequence in example 10 below after the exchange of greetings seems redundant, and maybe treated as an expansion on the basic organization in steps 5 and 6. The host asked “ġndәk suʔaːl?” (Do you have a question?) (line 2), but only after the green light to tell the problem was given by “tfdli” in line 1. The sequence of question answer (lines 2 and 3) is more likely to be a redundant expansion.

Example 10:
Kiflhal 02-11-2015 (00:22:19 )

1 Host: aloɣ tfdzi
2 ġndәk suʔaːl?
3 Caller: aːh.
4 ġndi wahd ssuʔaːl
5 anә ġndi ɬchriːn saŋna

In the telephone calls analyzed, once the narrative is terminated, no request for advice is explicitly done by Caller. In other words, the telling of the problem by Caller, in which the relevant persons, objects, times, locations and other things are introduced, stands for the
request for advice. Both Host and Expert orient to the narrative as itself the ‘request for advice’ on whatever problems the narrative raises. In a substantial majority of cases, therefore, the problem, or the question, in the story is inferred rather than directly stated.

The upshot of this last observation, that the narrative is a presequence (a pre-request) doing the request for advice, is consequential for the claims advanced in this study. The narrative is considered here the central element in phone-in calls for its production is a major aim behind making them. In the narrative, places, objects, times, and, of course, persons, are invoked, described and categorized. Additionally, the importance of the narrative also derives from the fact it is addressed to hearers who are total strangers to callers. Callers, therefore, build their accounts out of a myriad of narrative possibilities so as to suit both their purposes and their audience. In that, an account is only a constructed version of reality.

An account is at the same time purposive and manipulative, for it constructs the social and cultural world not as it is –the existence of a social world with a true essence is dubious anyway– but as the caller takes it to be. Likewise, it is a world whose workings the audience would effortlessly know, a world in common with others, but at the same time a world constructed for the local purposes served by the calls and in them.

With regard to the purpose of the present study, a caller’s narrative is a rich site of gender categorial work. In any given call, persons introduced, characters described, and identities invoked are part and parcel of the narrative in a way that categorization contributes to the construction of the problem as is it for the caller, but also to display a world known in common with others. The remainder of this chapter accordingly presents a detailed analysis of callers’ gendering work in their narratives.

1.2. Invoking culturally genderized roles

Kitzinger (2005) offers a re-analysis of data in classic CA papers for what they reveal about cultural heterosexist ‘assumptions’ that are normatively oriented by speakers in everyday interaction. Making use her preoccupations with ‘hidden assumptions’ (2005, p. 223) in categorial work, it is worth revisiting that Sacks’ story. Membership categorization rules aside, the story also shows how cultural assumptions and expectations imbue categories invoked in ways that are taken-for-granted by conversationalists.

The invocation of the category ‘mommy’ shows that the category-bound activity of ‘picking up crying children’ is the default cultural expectation when woman’s role of ‘mothering’ is
invoked. Not any person occupies the category ‘mommy’ but only women do so. ‘Mothering’ in other words, is predicated on women only. It is for this reason called here a ‘genderized’ category.

The default status of such an expectation could be made clearer if a different scenario is proposed; one in which the child furnished the story along a different line that invoked other categories, for example ‘the baby cried, daddy picked it up’. If ‘daddy’ were the category invoked that did the picking, then the absence of ‘mommy’ from the scene would be “observable-reportable” (Eglin, 2002, p. 819). The story’s hypothetical recipient might have registered the fact that the baby’s mother is absent and might have asked a question that brings to the front that noticeable fact. For example, noticing that father’s picking up of children is non-default; the recipient might ask the question, “where was her mommy?” as a relevant follow up to the story.

Pressing the speculation further, the child might even use the story as a special kind of talk, a preface, to project exactly the question above from the recipient, and to announce the news about mommy he wanted to tell. In the language of CA, the child might use the story as a ‘pre-announcement’ that projects the action of ‘inquiring’ about the mother as an appropriate next action in order to enable him to tell the news. The hypothetical scenario might run along the following lines,

Child: The baby cried. Daddy picked it up.
Adult: Where was his mommy?
Child: She had a row with daddy and she went away.

In this sense then, one can talk about roles, identities and categories as genderized. Their invocation carry with them cultural assumptions related to gender.

Applying this notion to the calls to phone-in programs, one can say that callers construct gender in situ; yet, their construction ties back to normative ways that are culturally sanctioned, i.e., normative (Kitzinger, 2005). Both the construction and the invocation of gender do specific actions. One such action, an overarching one, is to construct facts in a social world shared and in common, which enables callers to pursue the more specific goal of advice-request.
A corollary to this pursuit is that genderized identities are built into the very categories that speakers’ utterances make necessary for the specific purposes served by talk. In order to illustrate the above points, the following extract will be examined.

**Example 11**

*Kiflhal 02-11-2015/ (02) (00:44:25)*

1 Iman: aloγ >ljum anε ɭndi< un bebe
2 dəːː də deux ans.
3 Host: mːm. tﺑrктl1[aːh.
4 Iman: [Əːːː: lajbark fık.
5 uːː udabε wšnna lwakd letaːp
6 lli mabqaʃ dak
7 dak lə bebe lli mzjaːn=
8 =gals fbljɛstː kɛkay:.h dhaːk
9 ojlɛːb:
{(A few lines omitted)}
10 Iman: donk. baħl dbbaː maː−
11 anε lli maːrftʃ, −
12 ŋnɔ humaː−
13 ŋnʊwε lli xsʃɛk ddiːʁu:
14 .h əː oyadi jbqa fnitaːq °bhaldba<°
15 l’exploration de son ɭmonde.
16 Expert: əh hːm. ((sniffing))
17 Iman: ŋnʊ lli xsʃɛk tmnʃu,
18 umatwllihʃ jdiru.
19 >bha1 dba< matalan
20 Expert: [əh h:
21 Iman: kajn de txyk( )lli kajdirhɛm
22 lli kaj Chesbona.
23 matology ɭnajː "matology"
24 jhrrɛɣɛː−.hh (.) ( )
25 matology ɛː jhɛj jɪ haja
26 mɛxssʃ jhzha. mn
27 yiːr matology hh ɛːː .
28 skije− ʔɛːː skije dɛʒɛ.
Initially, it is possible to start with the observation that the word “bebe” (baby) (line 1), which is a French word that refers either to a baby girl or a baby boy, is used by Iman to refer to a ‘baby boy’. However, even if the word ‘bebe’ is marked for the masculine, its semantic
status is the same as the English word ‘baby’, in the sense that it can refer to either a ‘baby boy’ or a ‘baby girl’. Initially then, the sex of the referent of the word “bebe” remains an interactional problem until it is solved by the subsequent use of appropriate pro-terms (i.e., pronouns) (line 6). In French as in English, pro-terms are used to make the sex of the referent explicit.

It seems to be the case for Iman that her subsequent use of pronouns, the equivalent of ‘he’ (line 6) and ‘his’ (line 8), makes explicit that she is talking about a baby boy. Interactionally, then, Iman’s talk orients the expert to hear the sex of her baby in the pronouns rather than in the word “bebe” itself. Initially, then, the category “bebe” is ambivalent – it belongs to both the device ‘stage life’ and the device ‘family member’.

Iman opens her account by mentioning first the fact that she has a baby and that baby is of a certain age. She then moves to describe the baby’s behavioral change as a particular sort of problem to her. The baby has changed his behavior in ways that transform the initially quiet, docile, and all-smiles baby (line 5 to 9) into one whose behavior the mother does not approve of (lines 11 to 18). Noticing this transformation, Iman finds herself in a dilemma. The boundaries between what the child is and isn’t allowed to do are quite unclear to her (lines 13 and 17). This dilemma she expresses in the form of a three-part list (lines 25, 30, and 32) (Jefferson, 1990) of the activities now ascribed to the baby. (Notice that she also uses the three-part list in citing approvable activities that are no longer the case in lines 8 and 9).

Through the three-part list, Iman emphasizes the escalating degree ‘complainability’ about the baby’s activities and coaches her request for advice in terms set by that list. In other words, Iman is exemplifying the sort of activities she has encountered problematic. They are these and similar behavior that constitute her dilemma.

That the expert understands such citation of activities as a request to help sort them in ‘allowed’ versus ‘prohibited’ categories is clear in that he picks up one item from the list of activities the mother has furnished in order to advise her on how she can transform them into ‘allowables’ (line 49).

On the categorial level, the above sequence is an elaborate story told by a grown-up to a grown up; yet it shows striking similarities to the very short story told by the child in Sacks’ example. It may be recalled from Sacks work that the word like ‘baby’ is ambiguous in that it
simultaneously belongs to the MCDs ‘stage of life’ and ‘family’. In the opening of Iman’s account, the dual status of the category is exploited to do some interesting interactional work.

First, Iman indicates the relevance of the device ‘family’ by stating explicitly that the baby is hers through the possessive “ʕandi” (I have) (line 1). The use of the pronoun ‘I’, together with the possessive, orients to her role, given her sex, as the mother of the baby. Immediately after establishing the interactional relevance of the MCD ‘member of family’ for the baby, she moves on to explicitly indicate her baby’s age (line 2). The relevance of age is therefore also established, and the incumbency of the MCD ‘stage of life’ is also made relevant. The outcome of this dual status of ‘baby’ is exploited to construct a particular version of mothers’ role, and one that is culturally sanctioned for that matter.

As a mother, Iman is required to watch over her child. The requirement applies not only because she is the child’s mother only, but because the child is at a young age he can’t watch over himself (for an exploration of similar links between gender care-giving and old age see Paoletti (2002)). Moreover, there seems to be a negative correlation between the child’s age and the degree of ‘mothering’ demanded— the younger the child, the higher the degree of care given to it.

A default cultural assumption is at work in Iman’s case. Its upshot can be glossed thus: the care-giver be the same as the birth-giver. Since birth-giving is definitively the business of females, invoking age as a stage of life displays the degree of mothering required by the female member of the family. Being a category that belongs to ‘family’ and ‘stage of life’, the word ‘baby’ mediates the leap, back and forth, from the role of female birth-giver to the role of ‘care-giver’. In the story above, Iman the birth-giver is required to take notice of what stage of life the baby is in. As a mother, she is required to administer appropriate ‘treatment’ when things go wrong for the child. Unless specific interactional work is done to show otherwise, the hearing that ‘birth-giver’ and ‘care-giver’ are one and the same person is guaranteed by the hearer’s maxim.

The analysis above shows that the invocation of age is interactionally relevant in a specific, locally meaningful way. The mother is expected to know in detail about her child’s life-line growth. Possessing that knowledge is predicated on her identity as a mother in the first place. That Iman orients to her category-bound identity as the mother of the baby is
commonsensically explicit, because it is the very duties of a mother she invokes as the locus of the problem (lines 35 to 40).

Second, Iman does not only observe the behavioral change of the baby, but she moreover observes it over time. Her failure to interpret the change in behavior in the baby only attests that she executes her roles dutifully—closely monitoring the child as he moves from one stage to another. Her failure to interpret the change; then, only testifies to her meticulous and keen observation of the baby and her assuming the role of guardian and provider of whatever is necessary to guarantee his well being.

Being part of the MCD ‘family’ thus imposes on mothers a particular role related to activities bound to the MCD ‘stage of life’; that is, they are normatively required to monitor physical and behavioral change in their babies (Heritage & Sefi, 1992). Looking after children in that particular way becomes predicated on mothers. It is, in other words, constructed as a genderized role, that only women can discharge.

Additional evidence that this role is culturally expected of women is found in the interactional episode itself. It may be noticed for example that, although the behavioral transformation in the baby resulted in inconveniences for the mother and the father, as attested by Iman’s use of the first person plural pronoun in “kajʕsbona” (they make us nervous) (line 22), she enquires about what might be done by her, in her capacity as the mother, rather than by the father, or even by both the father and the mother. While the baby’s behavior affected the family as a unit, it is only the mother who is expected to redress whatever damage caused from that behavior. Indeed, it is to enquire about what to do to redress the damage done to the family that Iman calls the Guest-expert in that particular radio phone-in program. In making the call, therefore, she at the same time invokes her identity through category-bound activities narrated and engages in one such activity: making the call to request advice in her capacity as a mother. The call itself documents her genderized identity.

Iman’s narrative thus constructs an interactional texture where the activities, roles, and identities within the family follow a ‘known-in-common’ cultural pattern.

Another way to state this is to say that categorial work in the call establishes a frame (Goffman, 1982, Malone, 1997) in which interpretation is possible and alignment of understanding is achieved. In the episode above, the call sets up a frame where a lay member, the caller, requests the advice of a knowledgeable expert (Sacks, 1972) (Sacks refers to
Professional as members of collection ‘K’ to highlight their possession of specific knowledge lay members do not have).

Yet, being a lay person does not mean being void of knowledge. It is worth noting that the caller’s narrative above displays the knowledge she has on the issue at hand. The caller invoked her categorial membership of ‘mother’ as normatively supposing, or requiring, a degree of ‘expertise’ about babies. The result was that the parties to this episode jointly negotiated, even though on less-than-equal terms, what was allowed and what was not for the baby.

Again, evidence for Iman’s claim to knowledge is present in the sequential organization of the interaction and is linked to what Heritage and Sefi (1992, 391) call “unmarked acknowledgment of advice-giving”.

In their analysis of interaction between health visitors and first-time mothers, Heritage and Sefi (ibid.) distinguished between three ways in which visitor-initiated advice is received. The first is ‘marked acknowledgment’ in which mothers acknowledge information given as ‘new information’ and acknowledge it as advice. The second is ‘unmarked’ acknowledgement, in which mothers tacitly refuse to acknowledge that an advice has been given. The third way is “the assertion of knowledge or competence” (Heritage and Sefi, 1992, p. 391), where claims to knowledge or expertise are explicitly made by a mother in order to reject the advice-aspect of the health visitor’s talk.

Assertions of knowledge or competence constitute an outright denial of the newness of information given; they are therefore a direct resistance to its character as advice giving. In addition to that direct strategy, Heritage and Sefi argued that unmarked acknowledgments constitute a strategy to perform what the authors call ‘passive resistance’ (ibid., 409). Characteristic of the latter is the use of “receipt objects as mm hm, yeh, and that’s right” (ibid.,395) that overlook the pieces of advice given by offering a less than acknowledgment to them.

In the data above, it is possible to claim that the ‘receipt objects’ used by Iman, (lines 47, 53, 58), constitute a mild form of passive resistance to the pieces of advice given by the expert, even though she is the one who initiates the call. Notice for example that the token “↓a::h. [exactement]” (yes exactly) (line 58) is an agreement token rather than a receipt object. The utterance shows concurrence of opinion rather than receipt of new information. Also, in
seeking agreement with a yes-no question (line 57), the expert shows that he, too, is sensitive to the knowledge status of Iman. The activity that the expert seeks agreement on is, in addition, drawn from Iman’s previously introduced list formulation. As a mother, the caller is expected to know particular details about her child. It is those specific details that the Guest-expert orients to in order to grant the advice sought.

Overall then, although the expert and the caller are members of different MCDs (knowledgeable professionals and lay persons), achievement of understanding is possible thanks to the cultural norms their categorial work invokes. With regard to the question of how that happen, the argument so far has been that categories, MCDs, and category bound-activities are the building blocks of the cultural patterns conversationalists invoke in order to display the kind of world they live in. A “working consensus” (Malone, 1997, p.98) about the social organization of identities in the calls is thus achieved via the way categories are assembled to invoke specific roles (Hester and Eglin, 1997).

This way, an understanding of the category ‘mother’ as a ‘genderized’ category is so because the activities tied to it are organized by reference to gender roles locally invoked in talk, therefore interactionally relevant to parties’ understandings of themselves and other person referents.

One intriguing thing about this and other extracts is that genderized roles are oriented to by speakers in such a way that they incidentally reinforce cultural divisions of labor along gender lines. Yet, they do so without any explicit mention of division, or role, or even gender for that matter. How is this possible?

The extract above enables a glimpse to the answer: categorial work always establishes the context where participants invoke, hear and/or infer a characterization of callers’ problems, and more particularly, a characterization of callers’ genderized roles in the problems. The invocation, hearing, or inference cues Guest-experts as to what sort of problem it is, and what advice should be given. In the above extract, it was seen that the first category term that immediately commands attention was the category ‘mother’ although, surprisingly enough, it is not at all mentioned in the interaction. This is proof that it is not necessary to explicitly mention categories to do categorization (Watson, 1997; lepper, 2000). Similarly, it is not necessary to explicitly mention gender in order to genderize people’s activities.
Let’s stay with the notion introduced above that the role of ‘mothering’ is oriented to by members of the Moroccan society as a genderized property predicated on women; and let’s keep that in mind when analyzing the next example.

Example 12
Kiflhal 02-11-2015/ (05) (01:05:25)

1 Host: .hh alors ssimohemməd,
2 Simohammed: nɔa:m aːləllə.
3 Host: tfəddəl bssuʔaːl djəlk.
4 Simohammed: aːh axtiː=
5 =ʔndi waḥd ssuʔaːl djəː=
6 djəl lwəyyəd djaliː=
7 =ʔndu dasaɔaːma:jn.
8 (.)
9 Host: mːm
10 Expert: [əh hːh
11 Simohammed: [əːː ləl knt əːː mɔah fddar
12 had lʔajjəm (h)adɨ=
13 =>wkntɔaːet jiwjjaː d ləplejstejʃən
14 w lkos ohaːdɨ=
15 Host: [mːm
16 Simohammed: =wlla muʔaxxaːʃən wlla ə-
17 wlla baʒi ljuːtub.
18 (.)
19 ljuːtub asnu baʃi bə ə: baʒi
20 Host: [mːm
21 Simohammed: (h)ir her tonobjɪːlaːt.
22 Host: vidjo[wəːt.
23 Simohammed: [(h)er tonobjɪːlaːt
24 omb9ach baʒi jnuːd lməmaːh
25 mlː mn foːq (lpesə) bmarra.
26 Expert: .hh [mːːm
27 Simohammed: [hija kant flwwəl ə:
28 baʒijaː dik lqadɪjjaː ʃlaːʃ=
29 Expert: [mːh
30 Simohammed: =katʃqa jwjjaː (]}
As is expected, Simohammed introduces a personal narrative, prefaced by “ʕndi waḥd ssuʔaːl” (I have a question) (line 5), an announcement that, together with the narrative, does the action of requesting advice. Even though the caller starts by telling the host and the expert that he has a question, neither it nor the request materializes. It has been said that such a formulation is redundant in telling first problems. As an action, it effects hearer change, from the host to the guest. It might be added here that the utterance “ʕndi waḥd ssuʔaːl” a pre-request that makes the narrative understood as itself the request. The narrative furnishes all the components of a problem; therefore, it alleviates the need to directly request advice, given that the telling is granted once the call is received; and given also the dispreferred status of requests (see Schegloff, 1987b & 2007a for pre-expansion sequences).

Also, Simohammed invokes the MCDs ‘family’ (line 6) and ‘stage of life’ (line 7), which the host and the expert understand as the relevant MCDs to the problem. However, in this example, it is the father who makes the call and describes, how, in the course of his provisional stay at home (lines 11 and 12), he noticed a behavioral change in his child.

The interest of this episode lies in the fact that, whereas for Iman, her observations about her baby’s behavior are hearable as part of her role as a constant presence inside the house, the observations of Simohammed are, on the other hand, hearable as only ‘accidental’ on a specific event (line 13), during a specific time (line12), and specific to one particular behavior (line 17). Whereas constant presence at home is the condition upon which Iman built her
narrative, it is the implicated constant absence, with intermittent stays at home, which is the condition upon which Simohammed builds his. Thus, as said before, ‘who makes the call’ is itself a display of genderized roles.

More importantly, roles are hearable even in a simple thing as the introduction of the mother’s observations as a normal course of events, (example 11), and the introduction of the father’s as consequent on something else—his not doing something else outside. It is in this sense unremarkable that Simohammed qualifies his stay at home as ‘temporary’, continuing only for “had lʔajjam (h)adi” (these last days) (line 12).

There is evidence in the interactional episode that shows how the boundaries between roles are spatially drawn along the lines of ‘inside–outside’ the family house. There is also evidence that genderized roles assumed are operative, with default cultural patterns providing for understanding those roles as linked to problems of child care. Their invocation organizes the structure of the problem that, in turn, justifies making the call to the specific phone-in program selected.

Evidence for it is that, what starts as a problem for the child’s father for which he, the father, seeks advice, turns out to be the child’s mother’s problem. Simohammed’s playstation palying with the child causes the problem (lines 13 and 14); but it is the mother who suffers its consequences. The child now “omb9ach bayi jnu:d lmama:h ml– mn fo:q (ipesse) bmerra.” (He refuses to get off the PC for his mom, at all) (lines 24, 25, 37 and 38). It is remarkable here that the mother is invoked as the authority-figure who had failed to carry out the task of getting the child off the PC. The invocation of her membership in the MCD orients hearers to a particular understanding of the problem. Given her being the female in the SRP ‘father-mother’, and given the cultural expectations that accompany that SRP, the father’s talk is designed to unceremoniously invoke her role as the one who is always responsible for the baby’s behavior. More than that in his narrative, her responsibility extends well to the cause of the problem itself. Following is an explanation of this state of affairs.

Simohammed insinuates that his play with the child was tacitly permitted by the mother (line 28) and, this way, he implicates her in causing the problem. Later, he also shifts the blame on her in an adroit way. He invokes her other category-bound activities as the reason the mother allowed the play in the first place (line 30). The father and child played video games, not because the father liked it, but because the mother “katʃa jwiːjə” (She exhausts herself) (line 30), obviously by doing house chores. Simohammed then orients to the category-bound
activity of ‘housework’, as predicated on the mother, as the reason she couldn’t fulfill her role of child care. He explicitly invokes ‘doing house chores’ as they limit the mother’s capacity to devote her time and energy to the child.

The shift of blame is tacitly achieved via the construction of the mother’s other category-bound activities as an account for the mother’s action vis-à-vis the child. According to Evaldsson (2007), an account is “a norm-oriented explanation designed to recast the pejorative significance of the action and resist responsibility for the action”, but simultaneously confirms the action as pejorative (2007, p. 385). Accordingly, at the same time that Simohammed finds excuses for the mother’s permission, he implicitly construct her action as an instance of ‘neglecting’ the child, therefore, as blame-worthy.

Both the host and the expert in this example agree with the import of the account given. Following the caller’s reference to the mother’s house chores (line 30), the host makes explicit the implication in the caller’s reference, saying “kajtla:ha” (it makes him busy) (line 31); and the expert shows that same understanding with an agreement token “m:h.” (line 32). Both, therefore, ratify the implied distribution of blame. The ease with which the account succeeds attests to the implicated boundedness of ‘child care’ to ‘mothers’.

This way, father and child’s play is made to appear as responsive to, not causative of, the problem in the first place. The account can therefore be read thus: since the child’s mother was busy doing other chores, the father stepped in with video gaming because that kept the child busy (line 35). Consequently, the caller has built a local context in which the act of playing is hearable as a form of assistance.

Video gaming was then the means through which the father helped the mother, the one in charge, to do activities other than watching over the baby. The outcome is that hearers are invited, so to speak, to see the origins of the problem in activities other than the father and son’s playing together. More specifically, it is its ratification inside the home by the mother that is also, if not the cause, then at least an exacerbating factor. It is through the mobilization of that understanding that the effects of the problem were introduced by Simohammed with relation not only to himself but to the mother of the child as well.

One way the caller did the blame shift was by drawing on cultural patterns in categorial work. Moving first in and then out of the problem was done through tacitly building on hearer’s understanding that mothers are, by default, responsible for whatever happens inside the home.
They are the ones to blame for problems therein and the ones, as in the previous example, to redress them.

The neat outcome is that, unlike Iman who grappled with the problem as hers by reporting it as hers, Simohammed in this example is doing ‘reporting’ on behalf of his wife. He is reporting the behavioral change of the baby that his wife, as a mother, suffers from. Here, it is worth reproducing the steps whereby the reporting is achieved in the interaction.

First, Simohammed introduces his membership as ‘father’ through his SRP relation with a ‘child’ (line 6). Again, the category ‘child is ambiguous with regard to MCDs ‘stage of life’ and ‘family’.

Second, the SRP father/child provides for the hearing, through the hearer’s maxim, of the activity of playing videogames, as an activity categorically bound to ‘child’, with that boundedness working as the backdrop for understanding the role each member in the SRP has. Therefore, the problematicity in the caller’s talk, (line 17), is, at least initially, hearable as built around that SRP. It can be rephrased as ‘the son’s insistence on performing an unauthorized activity that goes beyond the allowable activities he is, as a child, entitled to’.

Initially in the caller’s talk then, it might be expected at that stage where Simohammed introduces the problem (lines 17, 19, and 21), that, since the problem included category bound activities that related to both his occupation of the devices ‘adult’ and father’ and his son’s occupation of the devices ‘child’ and ‘family member’, the problematic issue would include some kind of clash between the activities bounded to those membership categories invoked at the beginning. Speculating somewhat, the problem might have called forth a clash between the child’s stubborn insistence on watching Youtube and the father’s authoritatively forbidding it, with all the subsequent tension this might have given rise to within the family. Handling the problem on those terms would genuinely have made it the father’s, but this was not the case.

Third, subsequent to the introduction of a contentious point that might possibly be ‘the problem’, Simohammed shifted the burden off his shoulders’ and threw it on the mother’s. This was done simply by invoking her categorial membership and letting hearers make the link— that child care is the female’s problem.
The problem then was not one of authoritative decisions taken by the father and the son’s challenging them, but one that involved the child’s abstinence from compliance with the mother’s commands.

Fourth, the invocation of the caller’s membership within the MCD ‘family’ guaranteed his epistemic right to ‘report’ the problem. He knows and reports such problems as might occur between other members of the family. It is worth noting that the reporting is done not through explicit markers of reported speech but through a reliance on hearers’ understanding of the properties of the category ‘mother’, embedded in the activity of telling by a member of the SRP father/mother. As said before, the caller implicated the mother as the one ‘creating’ the problem of the child’s addition to YouTube, for she agreed at the beginning to his playing playstation games with the father. Ostensibly, the play provided her with enough time to do her other ‘wife-wise’ activities. Here is then, an instance of categorial work that provides for the reading of the problem as one involving the female member in the family, the genderized roles of whom accounts for the caller’s implication of her.

Establishing that Simohammed in this call is doing ‘reporting’ on a problem that is not specifically his, it is possible to ask about what sort of social organization permits the reporting in such a way that the reporting is not itself problematic for parties to the call, i.e. that the parties to talk in that episode do not question the legitimacy of Simohammed to report problems encountered by someone else. Why is it that hearers of this narrative do not doubt its veracity or ask for the mother’s view on the problem?

Briefly, the answer to the question shows how the hearer’s maxim works. The maxim informally states that if two or more categories can be seen as belonging to the same device, then hearers assume that device as the one meant to organize speaker’s talk. In the example above, only the SRP father/child and child/mother are explicitly mentioned. The understanding that the categories ‘father’, ‘mother’ and ‘child’ belong to the ‘same family’ is guaranteed by the hearers’ maxim, thereby making relevant the SRP husband/wife. To all appearances, and ordinarily, Simohammed is talking about the child’s mother who is at the same time his wife. All the parties are therefore members of the same family.

The duplicative organization of the device ‘family’ allows one of its members, the father, to report not only his problem but also the mother’s problem with a third party— the child, itself part of the same operative device. Being husband or wife calls attention to the obligations each has towards the spatial context of the house, and towards each other. As Sacks (1972)
showed, being a member of collection R (relative), the husband then has a moral obligation to help his partner. However, the help he provides in this example was of a specific kind. It is not in matters of child care, but in only faithfully reporting his wife’s problem with the intention of seeking advice on them. In this example, ‘who makes the call’ documents such help; but, in contrast to example 11, it documents the identity of the caller as a male member of the family.

Narrating the problem the way he did, Simohammed has genderized the problem by making it his wife’s. In telling about the problem, he re-introduces, indexes, and reproduces a division of labor that is normative in the Moroccan society. As in the previous example, the caller in this one invoked an arrangement of the social world treated by parties to the call as unproblematic.

The analysis of the caller’s categorial work has thus made it ‘possible’ to glimpse’ at the gender work of the caller; a work that depended on a known gender division of labor which is treated as default by Moroccans. The analysis so far corroborates the claim that, far from being just kinship terms in some abstract semantic web, ‘father’ and ‘mother’ are more than referential terms. They are are genderized membership categories that attach to a social order (Malone, 1997).

The way a narrative is designed has consequences for subsequent talk. Both the expert and the host display their understanding in subsequent talk. They also display how they take for granted the genderized roles embedded in narratives. They orient to the relevance of genderized roles, the reference to ‘mother’ and especially to the “relevant thing about her” (Edwards, 1998) in the problem — i.e care-giving. Evidence of this is found in Simohammed’s example, where subsequent talk shows what the expert made of the former’s use of inferentially-rich categorization.

The excerpts below are the beginning turns of the expert’s sequence

**Kifhal 02-11-2015/ (06) (01:06:11)**

1 Expert: ₁aːːh. ᵗ: ssiː ssi muḥammad, (.)

2 Simohammed: nʕә:m aʕsidi°.

3 Expert: jәŋni ᶦkul saraḥaː jәŋni maː—
The expert orients to the narrative as advice-seeking and confirms this in the way he designs his talk. He starts with a preliminary ‘rebuke’ for Simohammed (lines 3 to 8) and then Simohammed and his wife (line 11), before moving directly into the technicalities of child’s growth (lines 13 to 16). Later he finishes by giving concrete pieces of advice to the mother alone (talk not shown here).

In addition to advice giving, the design of the expert’s talk reveals what he has made of the categories the caller introduced; and the kind of understanding he has of the roles of the parties to the narrative. A number of issues are worth pointing out that show how the genderized nature of child-care is produced and reinforced and how genderized roles operate in talk rather than in a social or cultural space outside it.

First, in the excerpt above, the expert addresses Simohammed as ‘recipient of talk’ (line 1) by explicitly summoning him. He then invokes the ‘family’ as his real ‘addressee’ (line 11). In shifting from talking to the single individual at the other end of the line to addressing the family, the expert orients to Simohammed as ‘hearer’ and Simohammed and his wife as ‘adressee’ (Greatbatch and Dingwall, 1998) (Malone, 1997). Using the pronoun with the categories “nta wzzaw3a djalək” (you and your wife) (line 11) brings forth his understanding of the MCD ‘family’ that subsequently justifies his use of the plural second person pronoun.
Second, the identification reformulation from “wlʔum” (mother) (line 10) to “wzzawğa djalek” (you and your wife) (line 11), is directed to the inferential import of the categories invoked. The expert cuts off the ongoing sentence “anә kangullәk nta wlʔum djale: djal” (I’m telling you and the mother of) only because it dissociates the recipient of talk, Simohammed, from the other recipient, ‘mother of the child’ as members of the same device. The ongoing sentence had the projectable ending as “wlʔum djale lwәld djalek” or “wlʔum djale tәfәl djalkum”. This would have caused inappropriate inferences to be made, similar to cases, for example, where the parents of the child are divorced (section 2.3. on ‘doing distancing’ in this chapter). The repair is sensitive to the caller’s initial reference to the MCD ‘family’. More specifically, the sensitivity to that device as relevantly standing is invited by the earlier juxtaposition by Simohammed of the SRPs ‘father/child’ and ‘mother/child’, and of activities that only married couples do. The reformulation from “wlʔum djale lwәld djalek” to “ntә wzzawğa djalek” avoids treating the parties involved as two separate entities by addressing them as a family.

If the MCD ‘family’ is interactionally invoked, it is to orient to the arrangement of the household in such a way that women are permanently in the house, and men are only temporarily in the house, each separately attending to problems ensuing from their membership categories of wife/husband and mother/father respectively. In this regard, that the expert addresses his advice solely to the mother shows his stance towards, and confirms his reading of, the problem as the mother’s alone. The advice is directed first at the father, then the father and mother, and lately to the mother alone; but nowhere to the father alone. Since looking after babies of a very young age is mostly done within the house, it is a corollary to the in/out division of labour.

This and other examples show that societal members display their knowledge of the ‘default’ patterns of the social sphere through the local use of MCDs, categories and activities that bring into play gender as consequential for how parties to the calls understand actions in talk-in-interaction. Appealing to membership categorization implicitly or explicitly in inviting a particular understanding of problems in talk, besides grounding them in certain genderized roles, has consequences for the subsequent display of that understanding by hearers.

For the caller in example 12 above, his construction of a genderlized division of labor and space relied for its success on shared cultural patterns. The claim of course is not to say that women are always in and men are always out, but it is to stress that this kind of spatial
division of labor is the default organization, and this has consequences for the categories that are divided across gender lines, and also the moral obligations that issue from incumbency of categories so divided.

This kind of arrangement is ‘default’ because it is often assumed to be the case when no talk is introduced by callers to discredit the understanding it engenders. In short, it is default in the sense that it requires not extra, or explicit, talk to show otherwise. To quote Kitzinger (2005), this default understanding of the social world is happening when “nothing special is happening” (2005, p. 259).

1.3. Working wives as a marked status

If callers make no extra work at the beginning of interaction to annul the normal organization of genderized roles, such as the explicit mention of working outside the house for a woman; then hearers will orient to the default arrangement. Using the notion of default cultural organization of gender roles, the next example can be appreciated as an instance of a deviant case that confirms the rule— that extra categorial work is needed to annul default understanding. As such, the example constitutes a striking evidence for the default social management of gender with regard to the division of labor. It also corroborates the previous analysis of categories in relation to the division of space as well.

After greeting exchanges, the caller begins her talk as follows.

Example 13:

Mesrouf 19-04-16 (1) (00:11:39) }

1 Expert:       mrḥba bik.
2 Afaf:         duktu:r xodri llah jkttṛ xireq
3 ⌾ndi sale:r djal kat mil diɣ(h)am.
4 Expert:      ɛjjɐh,
5 (.)
6 Afaf:        u:: vraiment maʕrɛftʃ jn-
7 ji ʕam unəʃ daba wlla ʕamajn
8 wane kantʃnnet likum
9 kanhaweq nqaːd walakoʃ rah ma– ma–
10 mab yatʃ tqaḍli had lmizaniʃja.
As said before, speakers ask for advice with a preliminary turn in the form of a narrative. That is, what usually follows greetings is not direct advice-request but a narrative that describes a social state of affairs. Description does the work of establishing necessary knowledge of the problem as well as references to whatever sets up its various constituents—especially people.

It was also mentioned previously that the host and the expert, as addressees, orient to the narrative as itself a ‘doing of request for advice’. They orient to this understanding once enough elements are introduced by the caller, or required by the host and the expert through information-seeking sequences, in order to establish the problematicity in the call. Once the problematicity identified, callers either—redundantly—produce a request, stop talking to signal the end of their turn, or the host and the expert identify the problem and thereby limit callers’ further talk. The expert may then proceed to advice-giving or an information-seeking sequence.

The coherence of the call depends, therefore, on producing a SPP (advice-giving) to a hanging FPP (advice seeking), either projected by the narrative itself, or explicitly produced after it in a separate turn. (For an account of how a pre-expansion FPP replaces the action projected in the base adjacency pair see Levinson (1983) and Schegloff (2007a). Schegloff (1990) empirically demonstrates that a base adjacency pair is the relevant unit of coherence in talk even when the FPP and the SPP are separated by quite long expansion sequences). What usually happens, given the kind of narratives recounted in the phone-in program from which example 13 is taken, is that the elements the expert inquires about include marital status, number and age of children, whether the house is bought or rented, how much is paid for rent, and other various details.

In example 13, the caller sought advice on budget management, and detailed the financial situation of her and her husband in the narrative (not shown here). After the caller finished the narrative, the expert began a sequence of question-answer where he sought confirmation about some inferences he made, which of course had their basis in the narrative the caller constructed.

11Expert: ḋafa:f,
The sequence comes after talk in which Afaf complained about the difficulty in reaching the program (example 13 above) and detailed some elements of her problem concerning her salary (not shown here). The expert summons Afaf (line 11) and directs a question to her (line 12). His turn thus marks the termination of the narrative and the beginning of the question-answer sequence. Once the expert gets Afaf’s attention (her answer to the summon showing this (line 14)); and his question is answered, he begins a series of inference-display sequences.

In the first sequence (line 12), the expert asks about the marital status of Afaf with a yes or no question format, to which Afaf replies by confirmation token (line 14) plus, and gives additional information “咣di bnita razione un an et trois mois.” (I have a daughter of one year and three months) (line 16). The expert registers the information by repeating elements from the answer in both cases (line 15 and line 17).

After some talk inconsequential to the analysis (therefore not shown here), the expert’s turn begins with the first inference-display statement. Coming after the information-seeking
sequence, the statement reveals the relevance of the previous question to the kind of understanding he is taking Afaf’s narrative to warrant.

The expert’s turn “hada Método djal zaawza djalek ila fhmt.” (that’s your husband’s salary if I understand correctly) (line 20), marks an assumption that awaits confirmation by a ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Unlike the previous question “mzawza wlla lla?”, which orients to the genuine ignorance of information, the assumption advances a proposition about the world, a hypothesis, so to speak.

To corroborate this analysis, notice that the downward intonation on the tag ‘ila fhmt.’ functions more like ‘you know’ described in Holmes (1986)). Its turn final position carefully recasts the illocutionary aspect of information-seeking in the utterance into an inference-display utterance. The tag turns the ignorance-state normally displayed by a question into an assumption the expert is somewhat certain about– a hypothesis to be confirmed or rejected. To see how the inference-display works, consider what is done in each utterance below,

1) hada Método djal zaawza djalek?
2) hada Método djal zaawza djalek lla?
3) hada Método djal zaawza djalek ila fhmt.

There is a clear change in the illocutionary force with the movement from a question to a statement. Contextually, the expert’s utterance is motivated by the categorial import in the caller’s narrative. He is careful in bringing out *inferences* based on previous talk by Afaf against surface *evidence*. The tension between what was said by Afaf and what is inferred, or assumed to be the case, by the expert is detailed below.

In the narrative, and without preliminary introduction to her status with reference either to the family or workplace, Afaf presented her problem as one of budget management and the difficulties she encountered in keeping up with different expenses by her own means. Throughout the narrative, she clearly referred to the ‘budget’/’salary’ she gets as her own, using in many places the equivalent of the expression ‘my salary’. The reference is clearly made to “a fixed amount of money agreed every year as pay for an employee” (Electronic Cambridge Advanced Learners’ Dictionary, third edition) which, in the case of Morocco, is paid every month. The use of the possessive adjective ‘my’ therefore makes explicitly clear
that in talking about the salary, she is unequivocally referring to her categorial incumbency of ‘employed person’.

Afaf’s use of the first person pronoun in ‘my salary’, therefore, makes no room for doubt that the salary is hers. However, in the absence in her narrative of references to her status as a working person outside the household —i.e., the absence of categorial work to show her membership in an MCD ‘working person’— the expert assumes that the salary referred to is the husband’s (line 20); and this understanding is so because the information seeking sequence (lines 12, 14 and 15) has already established that Afaf is a ‘wife’. It is almost as if the expert is caught in a web of default assumptions, based on Afaf’s categorization as a ‘wife’ and the genderized division of labor it invoked.

In the absence of devices related to ‘working person’ in Afaf’s talk, the expert displays his understanding of ‘my salary’ as that of the working husband, the default cultural organization if the status of the woman as a working-person is not explicitly mentioned. The inference-display sequence therefore enables him to bring to the front his suppositions as a matter of course, albeit hedgingly, on the basis of the previously, and the only, invoked device ‘family’.

In this sense then, the surface literal meaning of the sentence “ куди салар джал кат мил диы(м)ам.” (I have a salary of four thousand dirhams) (line 3) is overridden by the MCD ‘family’ that introduces the genderized SRP ‘working man/housekeeping woman’ that the expert considers operative. The source of the tension is the absence of devices and membership categories that dissolve the cultural pattern in the SRP. It is the absence of that extra turn required to revoke a ‘default’ categorial organization.

One might object that the inference-display turn is a banal question that was meant to check whether the salary is the wife’s or the husband’s, without any ill-intension on the part of the guest to ‘downgrade’ the caller by referring to ‘her salary’ as the husband’s. It is after all a single question that has nothing to do with working women, household, or gender, and certainly does not refer to any culturally-sanctified gender division of labor. With the now changing values in the nuclear family, a woman working outside her home is an ordinary fact of life. But is it?

Until 2011, it was still possible for some to claim that,

[w]omen’s attainment of economic independence and the role of women as financial providers are still opposed by traditional views. Interconnected is of
course also men’s view of their role as the sole provider. Islamic instructions dictate that the husband/father serves as the provider of the family regardless of his wife’s possible wealth; ingrained in culture and tradition, using his wife’s money can be considered humiliating and shameful (Laskaridis, 2011).

What is curious is that, even if not opposed by modern views, “women’s attainment of economic independence” and their role as breadwinners must explicitly be mentioned in talk, through categorial work. If gender “traditional views” are to be revoked, they are to be revoked interactionally and publicly in talk.

Even more curious is to notice that, in order to seek (dis)confirmation of default cultural assumptions against Afaf’s “ʕndi sale:r djal kat mil diy(h)am.”, the expert displayed his inferences by relying on the MCD ‘family’ and not the MCD ‘working force’. The relevance of the former the expert already established through the information-seeking sequence. The guest could have asked Afaf if she worked outside the household, thereby orienting to device ‘working force’ that the word “sale:r” (salary) makes relevant. That he could have checked her professional status via the simple question “waʃ xeddama?” (Do you work?), but didn’t, shows how inferentially rich MCDs and categories are, and how imbued they are with cultural assumptions organized around them. Curious then is the fact that, even though Afaf is a member of the working force outside the household, her failure to mention that membership legitimizes a reading by the expert of the problem as one that concerned the husband’s salary.

The first inference-display turn was subject to repair (line 21). The sequence that followed also contained an inference-display turn, and as such, it also demonstrates how inferentially-rich categorization is. Even after the fact of Afaf’s working status was established, her now-established membership subsequently formed the ground on which further categorial inferences were made. This time, the inference concerned Afaf’s simultaneous incumbency of the positions ‘breadwinner’ and ‘wife,

27Expert: fhømt annə zzawɔ maʕnduːch daxl iðaːn.
28Afaf: LAA Lla.
29ʕndu normalment trois milles cinq cent diyham.
Again, the interest of this sequence resides in how, given categorization work, related inferences seem to follow naturally. Categories lay behind the reasoning that is apparent in the use of the logical connector “idaːn” (then) at the end of the expert’s turn (line 27). Because she was silent on her husband’s salary, the expert assumes that the latter is jobless and, again, that inference was rejected (line 28), and then repaired (29), by Afaf. Once again, the basis of the second inference revolves around the category ‘breadwinner’, which is a genderized category when the MCD ‘family’ is relevant.

In other words, the logical reasoning with regards to ‘breadwinner’ is both contrastive and exclusive. Informally, it seems to go like this: If MCD ‘family’, then,

1) If Husband is breadwinner, then assume Wife is housewife.
2) If Wife is ‘working person’, then assume Husband is ‘jobless’.
3) If otherwise, categories must be explicitly established.

For clause one above, categorial membership is contrastive along the line ‘inside/outside’ referred to above. However, notice that, for clause number 2 above, if the wife is a working woman, the husband is then understood as a member of the category ‘jobless’ and not ‘house-husband’. Another legitimate inference, if the wife is ‘breadwinner’, is to assume the absence of the category ‘husband’, as in divorce. In this sense, then, and whatever the case maybe, membership categories within the MCD ‘family’ are contrastive and exclusive. Women retain an exclusive membership of the category ‘housewife’ (the link between ‘house’ and ‘wife’ is abundantly suggestive of the role a woman is supposed to play after marriage. This also applies to the Moroccan Arabic word /rabbatu bajt/).

For the third case, the indication must of course come early in interaction, at the phase where callers invoke membership categories to design their version of the problem. Categorial work must explicitly be done during the narrative-pre-request.

The categorization-based lay reasoning finds its explanation in the cultural assumptions implicated in categories. Culturally, it is men’s job, indeed man’s ‘prerogative’, to support the family. That women might be ‘breadwinners’, while their husbands are not, is simply unavailable as ‘default’; considering the social and cultural arrangements of the Moroccan society.
What the analysis of the calls so far demonstrates is that cultural progress and change find their expression in gendered categories invoked by Moroccan Arabic members in their talk. The episodes show ways that categorial work brings into play default inferences that are oriented to, displayed, repaired, rejected, or confirmed by parties to talk. That gender is relevant as a central basis for inferential patterns by Moroccans is evident in how specific MCDs are locally deployed by speakers, and locally heard by recipients, for the purposes of reaching a ‘working consensus’ about their social world, even if it transpires that their social world somewhat differs from the one traditionally taken for granted.

With regard to example 13, the upshot of the analysis is that the absence of person reference to the husband in the caller’s talk incidentally called for ‘uncalled for’ cultural assumptions. As such, they displayed the genderized default social organization of the Moroccan society, even though they were later subject to repair.

Moreover, and crucial to the claim of this chapter, the analysis showed how the expert tapped on the caller’s categorial work (Sacks, in Jefferson, 1992, Vol 2, p. 40). It runs through and binds the alignment of understandings in talk. Membership categories organize participants’ social world and people’s roles in it. This social world is itself reconstructed every time participants reflexively tie categories introduced in talk to cultural knowledge—what everybody knows—as the basis for understanding at the moment of interaction.

In cases where genderized default assumptions are inoperative, participants will seek to repair them, but the repair work itself shows that default assumptions are, time and again, an achievement about gender. If they are to be revoked, callers must explicitly and interactionally revoke them in talk; otherwise, as in the previous examples, default organization is normatively at work. Categories confirm or disconfirm a particular social organization. Either way, it is an interactional achievement.

One such routine achievement is that gender categories realize a social and economic division across male-female lines. This division is unavoidably invoked every time gender categories are invoked in talk-in-interaction. Categorial work, therefore, mediates the link between macro and micro (context and discourse) that has long being missing from theorizing about gender identity (Zimmerman, 1998). The question of how social identities translate into performance has occupied theorists of gender for quite a long time. The theories reviewed above constituted one attempt to answer the question by locating gender in social conversational performance. However, one of their shortcomings consisted in seeing gender
identities as relevant whenever a person opens their mouth to talk, regardless of whether or not context warrants their relevance. Members’ gender identities were considered at work above and beyond the contextual contingencies specific to each situation; hence the essentialism that plagued the theories.

Against this view, a sequential-categorial analysis demonstrates that, if gender is relevant, it is in situated talk that one enacts a gender identity that is interaction-oriented according to contextual demands.

If, therefore, it happens that gender is operative across a variety of contexts, its operation must be an observed product of a process of categorial work; that is, a process of mapping sex division onto the social sphere. It is inevitably apparent in categorial work in talk-in-interaction. In other words, the recurrence of similar social expectations across situations is indexed in recurrent gender categories in talk, each reflexively relies on the other for its enactment in a way that makes sense for societal members. In short, then, since social actions are members’ work, it follows that gender identities in talk are also members’ work, each depends on the other for its performance.

1.4. Gender role boundaries in categories

Nilan calls “social boundaries maintenance” (1994, p. 142) the practice of marking out identity territories through categories. In the previous section, the argument was that callers invoke genderized roles through categorization. This section extends the argument by claiming that “social boundaries maintenance” subsumes role boundaries maintenance which is also done through categorial work. To sustain this argument, a sample of interactional episodes is analyzed for the import of categorization to role maintenance. Foreshadowing the analysis below, the interactional episodes reveals that the deferral of the invocation of ‘father’, until later in the conversation (example 14 and 15), can be appreciated for that import.

In addition, it was claimed in the foregoing analysis that ‘house’ constitutes a spatial boundary in the delimitation of gender roles. The analysis argued that the housewife-in and husband-out is the default assumption if no talk is done to repair it in the calls to the phone-in radio programs. In this section, it is interesting to see how this assumption is itself sometimes explicitly invoked as a justification for re-organizing the social world across different lines.
The excerpt in example 14 below comes at the end of a call by a working woman. The narrative can be summarized as follows. Early in the call, the caller identified herself as a mother who works outside the house in a confection factory. Her work demands that she be outside her household for the good part of the day—from sunrise to sunset. For her, being a ‘mother’ and, at the same time, a ‘breadwinner’, therefore, resulted in conflicting demands.

On the one hand, she is required, as a mother, to take care of her children and to attend to their needs inside the house. On the other, her job causes her to be permanently away from them. In making the call to the phone-in program, the caller specifically sought advice on her seven-year-old child who tenaciously complained about the mother’s constant absence and demanded her presence in the house and in the child’s life.

Prior to the extract presented below, the expert suggested a number of steps the caller might take which could help in attenuating the child’s insistence on the caller’s presence inside the house. He suggested, for instance, that she take her child with her to the factory; explain to her the importance of money in providing for the family’s needs. He also advised her to turn from factory-based to house-based work. However, the expert’s advice turned out to be impractical, given the conditions of the caller’s work, which are not that flexible. For the expert’s suggestion of taking the child to the factory, the caller reported that it did not solve the problem. All of the expert’s pieces of advice were thus met with objection. The sequences in example 14 took place after that.

Example 14:
Kiflhal 02-11-2015/ (11) (01:50:32)

1 Expert: uʔum tasniːm
2 ŋafak tklimilijja ʕla lʔab djalu.
3 waf ʕndu fː waf ʕndu fː–
4 ki ki ʔeqxdaːm mʕa wlidatu?
5 kaj mː mdaxl mʕahum jwijjaː?
6 Um tasniːm: ənnivuː jwijjɑ waɬakim–
7 Expert: LLA MAkandreʃ ʕla lqrajɑ lalla.
8 Um tasniːm: aːh.
9 Expert: waf kajtʃwaːd waf huwa muˈtaːʕid
10 mʕa wlidatu, kajxɾeq mʕahum?
11 Host: dqiːqa.
What is interesting in this example is that, during the whole call between Um tasnim and the Expert—that is, from the first narrative to the sequence of advice-giving—nowhere prior to the extract above was the father mentioned as relevant to the problem. Both parties oriented only to the relevance of ‘mother’ and her category-bound obligations towards her child and her house. And both oriented to the solution as pertaining to her role of ‘mothering’ as the caller’s business (she is the female in the family).

It was only when all advice-giving failed that the expert invoked the category ‘father’; and he invoked him in a very specific way. The analysis below details how the sequential and the categorial organization of the episode provides for the reading of the father’s invocation as quite specific.

First of all, it is worth noticing that the expert’s invocation of the father is seen as an unremarkable event. The device ‘family’ established by prior talk makes it a relevant category to invoke by virtue of the fact that it is part of the relevant SRP mother/father. The family is a collection of categories; hence, the categories ‘father’, ‘mother’, and ‘child’ “can be used and heard “commonsensically as ‘going together’” (Psathas 1999, p. 143).

Second, relying on the collection ‘family’, the expert designs his talk to ask for information about the father. The first part of his turn “Ca̱fak tklimilajja ʕła Ɂab djalu.” (please talk to me about his [sic.] father) (line 2), is vague on the kind of information required. The expert subsequently substantiated his request, in the same turn, by asking about details of the father’s activities vis-à-vis the children (lines 3, 4, and 5).

The expert twice cuts off the ongoing turn “waʃ ʕnda ji:: waʃ ʕnda ji−” (does he have some kind of) (line 3) and reformulates it into another new one “ki ki kəjxəm mʕa wlidatu?” (does he work with his children?) (line 4), and then produces a next turn that is also explicatory of the kind of ‘work’ he has in mind, “kaj m:: mdaxl mʕahum ʃwijjaː?” (Is he involved with them) (line 5). Um tasnim replies by saying that the
educational level of the father is “ʃwijja” (a little) (line 6), an adjective that perhaps refers to ‘below average’ or ‘below expected level’.

It turns out, however, that Um tasnim misunderstood both of the expert’s questions as shown by his subsequent repair work “LLA MAkanhderj ʕla lqraka lalla.” (no I’m not talking about education.). The misunderstanding might have originated from the fact that the question “kəjxəm mʕa wlidatu?” is conventionally used to ask about parents’ work with their children in doing school homework. In initiating repair, the expert interrupts Um tasnim’s ongoing turn, since her misunderstanding is projected in the very beginning of her turn (line 6).

Third, once the expert initiates repair, Um tasnim’s token “a:h.” subsequently yield the floor for him to do the repair; which he does by asking about the father’s presence in his children’s lives “waf kajtwa:zd waf huwa mutawəgəd mʕa wlidatu,” (is he present in the life of his children?) (line 9), and then asking specifically “kajxreʒ mʕa:hum?” (does he go out with them?) (line 10).

Considering, as in the previous turns (lines 2 to 5), that each subsequent question elaborates or explicates the other, it seems to be the case that the expert is asking about a specific kind of father’s presence in the children’s lives, by asking whether he ‘goes out’ with them, not whether he ‘stays in’ the house with them. The spatial orientation clearly betrays the expert’s commonsense assumption about the division of space between Um tasnim and her husband. Commonsensically, he treats the activity “kajxreʒ mʕa:hum?” as a proto-type of the kind of activities bound to the category ‘father’.

Fourth, in answering that question, however, Um tasnim invokes activities that might be done inside the house, treating the specific question about ‘going out’ as only an instantiation of the type of activities the expert had in mind when he asked about the SRP father/children, and not a question to be answered literally. Her answer (lines 14 to 16) then disattends to the surface locution of the expert’s question (a yes/no question) (Nonetheless, it might be observed that the father’s sitting with children is done on the mother’s demand, and not initiated by the father, an activity predicated on him).

In addition, example 14 illustrates a common categorial aspect of calls to phone-in radio shows. The invocation of the category ‘children’ readily invokes the SRP child/mother; whereas it does not as readily invoke the SRP child/father. The caller and the expert oriented
Gender work
to the relevance of the father only later in the call. It is only prior to closing the conversation that ‘father’ is invoked and only because the ‘project’ (Levinson, 2013) of the interaction failed (i.e. providing practical advice for the caller to help in solving a problem). Both parties then treat the SRP child/mother as primary, and child/father as secondary to issues related to ‘child care’. Such a late invocation of the father corroborates the argument that ‘child care’ was, all the way up to the point prior to the invocation, seen as inextricably bound to the caller in her capacity as a mother. One might ask, then, what sort of work the category ‘father’ is designed to do?

As an answer, it is possible to say that the expert used it to deal with the aftermath of the failure of the project. Its invocation touched on the moral consequences of the caller’s failure to carry out the suggestions provided by the expert; and which are caused by her membership in both the category ‘mother’ and ‘working person’. Since it is the caller’s role as mother which is ‘unmarked’, the demands of her ‘marked’ status as ‘working person’ caused the sense of blame, or guilt, that visibly runs through her call. It is obvious that her assumed negligence of her duties as mother prompted her to make the call in the first place.

In trying to alleviate the sense of blame-guilt resulting from the conflicting demands of the caller’s categorial incumbencies, the expert worked to extend gender role boundaries in order to complete the project of the call. Basically, the extension consisted of invoking the father as also concerned with ‘child-care’; but it displayed the father’s unmarked role of ‘breadwinner’. Hence, any sense of blame for him is absent that category.

Even with the extension, the genderized spatial boundaries between inside and outside are apparent. The parties oriented to the father’s activity outside the house as a gauge of how helpful he might be inside it (lines 10 and lines 14, 15, and 16). Um tasnim for example invoked his ‘busy-ness’ outside the house as a justification for his not helping enough inside it (line 16). Ironically enough, whereas the category-bound activities of the father outside home exempt him from duties inside it, it is precisely the mother’s presence outside the house that renders her culpable, morally speaking. The account given for not offering help –busy-ness– justifies the father’s conduct and confirms Um tasnim’s responsibility of the problem.

In this context then, reference to ‘father’ is done only to draw the caller’s attention to the idea that he might assist her in discharging her, and primarily, her duties. Whereas child-care is a feature of the mother’s role, the father in this case is introduced, and only late in the conversation, to suggest that he might ‘borrow’(see Watson, 1978), so to speak, the
incumbency of the category ‘care-giver’ by dint of his possible availability. Otherwise, the roles are clear-cut.

In this context also, the availability of the category ‘father’, after advice-giving fails, does not only allow the expert to suggest the exceptional extension to work, but it does apportion moral responsibility in the very attempt to alleviate it, in a way similar to how accounts works (Evaldson, 2007).

In that sense then, the invocation of the category ‘father’ in talk about issues of children is interactionally designed to do specific work. It attends to the moral implications in ‘child care’ problems. In the excerpt above, although the boundary roles could be trespassed, as the last resort to complete the goal of the call, the moral responsibility could not.

As additional evidence, it is possible to notice that the utterance “huwa ta(h)wa mʃɣu:1.” (he too he is busy) (line 16) refers to busy-ness ‘outside the household’, since it is the feature in common between the caller and her husband. Their simultaneous incumbency of the categorical position ‘breadwinner’ gave rise to substantially different moral values that essentially ensue from their gender categories as women and men. The category ‘breadwinner’ was the grounds of exoneration and incrimination at the same time.

Aided by the analysis of the extract above, and noting how Um tasnim defended the father’s withdrawal from children’s life on the basis that he was ‘busy’ (line 16), the explicit marking of ‘working person’ for the category ‘mother’ can be appreciated for its work in interaction: It offers a justification, an account (Evaldson, 2007, p. 385), for the non-fulfillment of activities bound to mothers at the same time that it confirms the non-fulfillment as morally binding. In short, categorization entails moral judgments (Jayyusi, 1984). It is perhaps for this reason that one hears an undertone of self-incrimination running through Um Tasnim’s narrative in the call.

Armed with the notions introduced above, example 15 can be examined for the import of the categorial work the caller does.

Example 15:
Kifhal 02-11-2015/ (12) (01:32:14)

1 Um ghita: la deuxième question c’est que:
The similarity between the two calls in 14 and 15 is clear. In trying to morally justify her dilemma concerning child-care by invoking her category as ‘working person’ (line 2), Um ghita, like Um tasnim, reproduces the ‘natural’ genderized organization of activities as well as space (lines 9 to 12).

Again, in the face of the impracticality of advice addressed to Um ghita as a ‘working person’, the expert extends the category ‘care giver’ to include the father. In his view, and drawing on the common knowledge about family organization, the father is the first ‘near enough’ relative to borrow the incumbency of the category ‘care giver’. Needless to say, the father’s membership in collection R, in SRP husband/father, and their membership in the device ‘family’ all constitute the basic justification for their invocation to offer help.
Unlike in example 12, where the expert addressed the mother even when she was absent, invoking the father is done with a transition from the single ‘you’ (line 3) to the plural ‘you’ (line 4), to the inclusive ‘we’ (line 10). The upshot of the expert’s advice is that the father can share in taking care of children because “nous sommes des intellectuels” (we are intellectuals) (line 13). The ‘we’ stands for a collection which includes the caller, her husband, the expert himself, and probably the host. Therefore, the extension of the role of ‘care giver’ is done through an MCD other than the ‘family’. The ‘we’ is a marker of a wider ‘group identity’ of intellectuals, (Malone, 1997) — wider and hence irrelevant to the identities originally relevant to the problem.

One thing is clear. The extension of roles is imbued with moral ramifications that accompany membership categories. For women, the extension of their incumbency from ‘mother’ to ‘working person’ becomes for them a source of moral blame, guilt, and possibly condemnation. Their blame can only be attenuated by the extension, for men, of the incumbency from ‘father’ to ‘child care giver’. What the grounds are for such proposed extension is a interactional problem locally solved in each call.

In the example above, the expert urged the mother to include the father since they are all intellectuals. The important thing, however, is that the extensions for men and women work in different directions. Whereas for mothers, their membership in the category ‘working people’ is deplorable, father’s potential membership in the category ‘child caregiver’ is laudable. The moral stance vis-à-vis categories has its basis in memberships culturally organized.
Whereas males occupation of multiple categories within the device ‘family’ is unmarked—‘father’ and ‘husband’ concurrently with ‘breadwinner’ outside the household, women’s work outside the household is, at least for some Moroccans, incongruent with their primary categorial role of ‘caregiver’, even in opposition to their culturally delineated role of child caregivers. In so far as women-callers themselves orient to the predicaments engendered through their status as workforce outside the household, their categorial work point to the moral conundrums they face of being in and out their home — conundrums that are inexperienced by men. As Watson (1978) analysis of MCD illustrates, membership categories are invoked by interactants to distribute blame and moral responsibility due to their power as hoards of cultural expectations. (As an aside, and given the activities bound to each category, it is perhaps still the case that, for some Morocans at least, a ‘working mother’ sounds like an oxymoron while the expression ‘working father’ sounds more like a tautology. No matter how modern one’s views are, cultural knowledge ingrained in categories is hard to sidestep since that knowledge is the basis of common sense understanding in daily interaction).

2. Gender problems, advice giving, and repair.
2.1. Problematicity in talk and categorial work

In the previous section, the discussion has treated callers’ narratives as problem-oriented. Callers construct and invoke gender roles that orient to a taken-for-granted world. However, the discussion did not detail the ways in which ‘problematicity’ itself is constructed in the narrative. It just took it for granted.

Accordingly, this analytical lacuna is addressed in the present section. It analyzes how participants negotiate problems in the social world and how categorial work stands behind their negotiation. The examples below provide an opportunity to deal with the ways the rather simple task of description invoke structurally genderized ties for the benefit of hearers, in order to guarantee that they ‘see’ the problem in talk, or more particularly, the specific version of the problem that is the reason for the call.

Following Stokoe’s guidelines (2004, 2006 & especially 2000), the present section focuses on how categories dissect the social world that people live in, a world that is made up of ‘couples and their offspring’ as a major source of not only identity but also problematicity.

The following extract is exemplar of opening sequences in which speakers set the terms for the problem they are going to relate in the narrative. The excerpt enables a glimpse at the
ways hearers anticipate the crux of the problem, based on the categories introduced at the very beginning of the narrative.

**Example 16**

*hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (27) (01:58 :42)*

1 Naṣima: ana ṣndi tlaṭe dləwlida:t umzwʒa.
2 Host: laj xəllihum lik.
3 Expert: nʕa:m a ḥlalłe.
4 Naṣima: zzawʒ djali kənt ḥamla [bttalət].
5 Host : [°m:°
6 Naṣima : bttalət ḥəʕni.

Categories that participants use at the opening accounts offer an important clue to hearers as to the reason of the call. Since callers make the calls to request advice from a person of the collection K, a professional in a specific field, the use of specific MCDs allows callers to display that their problem is pertinent to that field of knowledge of the expert. In the above extract then, since the show’s stated mission has to do with social problems, the invocation of a set of categories by the caller orients hearers to ‘await’ the telling of a social problem which involves the persons invoked. Callers’ categorization work projects what kind of problem it is going to be.

The narrative-openings are therefore the site for two important types of action. Sequentially, it secures an extendend turn (announces that a story-problem is coming). Callers are allowed to proceed uninterrupted (otherwise repair is due, see below). Categorically, the opening projects what kind of problem it will be.

Thus, the invocation of an MCD is not gratuitous (Moerman, 1988). The organization of ‘the family’, for example as an arena where gender relations can be the locus of problems, is guaranteed by the fact that that device is itself imbued with specific cultural assumptions concerning gender appropriate behavior within it (the previous sections fully demonstrated that point). Where a device is invoked, it allows hearers to see the collection of categories within it as a possible source of problematicity. After all, relational problems almost always involve a disruption of categorically organized activities. In a narrative designed to tell a
problem, there is no sense in invoking a category if it does not contribute to the problematicity in the call. Given the normative assumptions in categorial work, it is the infringement of norms that provides for problems. For example in the call above, if one surmises that the problem was between wife and husband at the time of the former’s pregnancy, the assumption is indeed borne out in the call. Specifically, the problem concerned an escalating tension between the caller and her husband following the former’s refusal to travel with the latter. The category ‘pregnant woman’ enables hearers to immediately see who to blame for the tension. Therefore, it is to that effect that the category was introduced in the first place.

Being the potential source of problems, category membership organizes solutions as well. In offering advice, the expert invariably introduces members from collection R (Relatives), who are expected to offer help when needed (see Silverman 1998, p. 82). If members of collection R are themselves the locus of the problem (husbands, wives, etc.) members turn to collection K (Knowledgeable professionals) to seek help. As members of collection K, experts in the phone-ins analyzed refer callers back to members of collection R to seek help. If R’s are not available, they refer caller back to other members of K (Sacks, 1972). Persons who offer help are, therefore, categorically ordered.

The organization of the the ‘problem-solution’ pair has consequences for the categorial membership of experts. They cannot remain neutral. In fact, the data here belie one of Stokoe’s remarks on the ‘neutral’ stance’, assumed by radio and TV presenters and which “may account for why the presenter does not display shared category knowledge at the point at which it might be relevant for her to do so” (2010, p. 430) (for a specific treatment of the alignment of, and display of shared, categorization in phone-ins, see Fitzgerald and Housley, 2002, in calls to emergency services see Zimmerman, 1998). Stokoe’s analysis is only valid for TV and radio interviews and also for hosts in programs that require callers to express their points of view on a given topic, but it cannot be generalized to all sorts of phone-in programs).

At least for the present set of phone-in programs selected, hosts and their Guest-experts do display exactly the same shared knowledge as that of callers. In some cases, that shared knowledge allows variously to blame, rebuke, commend, sympathize with, callers or persons introduced in their narratives. Since, naturally, categorial work is one way in which shared knowledge is displayed (McKinlay & Dunnet, 1998), the shared knowledge about genderized
categories that constitutes the reason for why the advice given at the end of the call is attuned to the categories made relevant in the preliminary narrative at the beginning.

To summarize the argument so far, whatever categories callers invoke will be assumed to bear upon later details of the problem and, much later, upon the advice-aspect of it. Any narrative introduced offers a unique opportunity to provide a ‘version of the problem’ which favors the caller’s stake in it, since it is the structurally available place where they are offered a chance, so to speak, to provide the reason for the call. Invariably, narratives in the calls include membership categories.

To support this view, it is worth noticing what happens where no categorial work is introduced. The example below is taken from the preliminary narrative of a woman who called to tell about her problem with a ‘house blueprint’, an inanimate, rather than a person, referent.

**Example 17**

**hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (28) (02:06:20)**

1 Host: mria ṭba mia=  
2 Mina: =barkan llaho fik axti.  
3 >b[ṛk llaho fik<  
4 Host: [ṭfddəl  
5 Mina: jkraːn >a(h)ti<  
6 Host: [lṣafw alalla.  
7 Mina: [ana ẓndi waḥd lμṣkil axti  
8 f: fwaḥd lbjlan  
9 (1)  
10 Host: blaːn? [blan djamē djam ddar?  
11 Mina: [m: blan djamēː du djam  
12 e:jjəh [djam ẓddar.  
13 Host: nṣa:m.  
14 Mina: ẓndi jarikaː  
15 Expert: nṣa:m a "ləl".  
16 Host: əb h:mm,
Notice what happened when the caller’s problem did not involve a person referent, but involved rather an object referent (line 8). Mina prefacing account with “ana ḥndi wahdlmujkil axtifwahdlḅaln” (I have a problem sister with a plan). What follows this utterance is a one second silence, after which the host initiates repair on the object referent. The silence that followed the introduction of ‘the plan’ can be contrasted, for example, with the short pause in example 12 (line 8),

4Simohammed: a:h axti:=
5=ḥndi wahd ssuʔa:l djale:
6djalelwəyyəddjali=
7=ḥndubabaʕəmajn.
8(.)
9Host: m:m
10Expert:[əh hə:h

or with the absence of a gap in example 16,

**hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (27) (01:58 :42)**

1naʕima: ana ḥndi tlateləlwəldətumzwəa.
2Host: laj xəllihum lik.
3Expert: nʕa:m a ʔlaˈlə.

In example 17, the one second silence can be attributed to either the host or the caller. Either both the host (and the expert) bypassed her opportunity to speak after the completion of Mina’s turn, since she oriented to a multi-unit turn narrative; or the caller paused mid-turn in her narrative. In either case, it is clear that the reference to “blaːn” (plane) is the reason of the silence.

Taking silence as the host’s, the absence of uptake immediately after Mina finishes producing her turn might be due to the ambiguity of introducing an ‘object’. It does not after all cue them as to what might be expected as a problem in a program on social relations.
Given this, the host initiates repair (line 10). Notice that the repair does not indicate a hearing problem, as attested by the fact that she repeats the repairable “plan” with a rising intonation (line 10). Such repair work would be unlikely, were the narrative to start with person referents. As the examples above show, when people categories are introduced, even as banal an uptake as ‘m:m’ is quick to come. Here is additional evidence,

**hditnsa 09-11-2015/ (3) (00:45:10)**

1 Bassam:  $\text{ʕndi wahi} \text{zzawja}$
2  $\text{kt tsawwet mCaha tegriben}$
3  $\text{ji ʕri:n sana}$
4  $\text{wma3abʃ llah lwld:at mCahə}$.
5 Host:  [əjjəʃ,]
6 Expert:  [mh həh,]

**Kiflhal 02-11-2015/ (02) (00:44:25)**

1 Iman:  aloγ >ljum anə ʕndi< un bebe
2  də:: də deux ans.
3 Host:  m:m. tbrkl1[a:h.
4 Iman:  [ə::ːː lajbark fik.

Given that the object referent does not offer a clue as to the type of the problem, problematicity is actively sought very early in the call by the host and the expert through repair sequences and information-seeking sequences. The turn-type they use, whether continuers or repair initiators, displays their grasp, or failure to, of the relevance of the referents introduced.

This of course does not mean that none other than persons can be introduced. It just means that where an inanimate object is introduced, it is in cases where such introduction is expected. The specific local context should warrant its introduction. In the example below, the guest is an expert in a program that gives advice on ‘budget management’. Reference to ‘salary’, and money in general, is not only unproblematic, but it is expected. Reference to any other object would be problematic.
What this means is that problematicity is established right at the beginning of the phone calls by descriptive, referential and categorial work. In the absence of initial clues that guide the hearer’s understanding, repair work becomes necessary; and repair temporarily stops the continuation of the narrative.

With regards to gender, whenever genderized categories or genderized categorial activities are introduced at the beginning, both ‘caller’ and ‘called’ orient to their relevance as categorial organizers of problematicity. In calls about social relations, therefore, gender categories introduced, implicitly or explicitly, are inoculated against repair work,
The point is worth emphasizing because, as will be shown in the example below, gender membership categories are crucial to understanding the ways in which callers constitute versions of the problem.

Example 18

hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (8) (00:37:48)

1 Expert: hada ṭalaq [riʒi mafi fiqaːq?
2 Mustapha: [tˤəːəː ʔːː:
3 (.)
4 lla lla: ṭalaːq fiqaːq=
5 =anə lli mʕelləqha.
6 (.)
7 Expert: nʕə:m. m[h.
8 Host: [uhh.
9 Mustapha: jist dbaʃ fi sbɣa ʕelməlijuːn
10 wuː anəː wkaʔ- xddəːm (h)aːː b-
11 baʔiʃ mutaʔawwil.
12 (0.75)
13 Expert: jʕamm sana wntuːma mzəwʒiːn?
14Mustapha: ʔʕʃriːn ʕaːm.

Mustapha called to consult with the expert about a court sentence concerning the payment of an alimony he found heavy. He complained that he did not have the means to pay the sum asked of him.

After the expert has inquired about the type of divorce issued by the judge (line 1), Mustapha answers, first, that it is a “fiqaːq” type of divorce (irredeemable) (line 4); and then provides more information on the financial consequences of the divorce type enacted (lines 9 to 11).

His utterance “anə lli mʕelləqha” (it’s I who divorced her) (line 5) makes reference, though indirectly, to his ex-wife. What is remarkable is that up to the point where the locally initial pronoun (Schegloff, 1996a) “ha” (her) is introduced, nowhere in the call has the caller referred to his ex-wife by explicit categorization. The introduction of the (ex)wife was
previously done through the category-bound activity of ‘divorcing’ which, culturally speaking is an action done by men.

Mustapha mentions that he has done a category-bound activity (divorced his wife). Therefore, he shows that he is not just a man, but a specific type of male— a husband. His incumbency of that specific category entitled him to perform the act of divorcing. Moreover, since the category ‘husband’ is part of the SRP husband-wife, and since the act done by the former is only applicable to the latter, the reading of “ha” as not referring to a female, but a specific type of female, a wife, is therefore guaranteed by the hearer’s maxim, i.e., hear the pronoun as referring to ‘wife’.

The pronoun therefore does not just index gender; but it constructs a gender identity. It would indeed be hard to imagine a locally initial pronoun pinpointing a gender identity had it been the case that ‘divorce’ is also a problem in other relational pairs (boyfriend-girlfriend for example). Parties to the call not only make their orientation to the device ‘family’ observable through the categories used/inferred, but in their very act of invoking that device, re-invoke a legally regulated social norm, and reflexively re-produce that social norm as consequential to the understanding of the problem.

Like other categories, ‘divorcee’ and ‘divorced’, are divided across lines which are clearly genderized, and which are sanctified both socially and legally. They also locally constitute the problem— in the form of tension between incumbents of different membership categories. In the case above, the invocation of the identities divorcee-divorced regulates the problem as seen by participants in this episode.

It is indeed remarkable that subsequent to this first introduction of ‘ex-the wife’ in the call, both parties made reference to her only through pronouns. Never once had the referent of the pronoun “ha” been made explicit until later in the conversation, and in repair sequences after that.

**hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (10) (00:38:40)**

1 Expert: m:m. .hh e:: l- glitilija: sr-
2 bəʃ srrəhti b:-bdaxl djalək
3 glti: jha:l ddaxl dja:lk ka:n?
4 Mustapha: dəxl djali: e:: [sməjtu:=
Mustapha then introduced a categorial identity—an ex(wife)—through a locally initial pronoun. Following that, the expert referred to that identity via the category “zzaw3a” (wife) (line 14 above) in an information-seeking turn. In the same sequence, Mustapha answered by providing the necessary information, and therefore confirmed the expert’s understanding of
the pronoun as referring to the ex(wife). In other words, Mustapha confirmed the inferences the expert drew from the activity of ‘divorce’ introduced earlier.

Participants then not only take turns to produce TCUs, but each turn confirms the understanding a previous turn displays and offers a new understanding that gets confirmed, or rejected, in a subsequent turn (Schneider, 2000). To quote Atkinson and Heritage (1984), the shared knowledge in categories is part and parcel of the “publicly displayed and continuously updated intersubjective understanding” (1984, p. 11), which is, in the present case, of problemativity in the calls to phone-in radio programs.

Example 18 is also interesting for another reason. Unlike linguists’ identification of pronouns as pro-terms whose referents are specified in prior talk, participants do display their orientation to common referents via what ten Have calls “available categories”, meaning points of reference culturally available (2007, p. 47). Genderized categories are one such set of ‘available categories’. Both Mustapha and the Guest-expert above know that problematicity involves a woman whose relevant identity at the moment of the interaction is ‘caller’s ex-wife’. It is the only available referent given the set of activities introduced during the call. As such, no prior work is needed to identify the pernoun’s referent.

Being an available category, a genderized category is then ‘obvious’. In the call above, members of the Moroccan culture would consider it tautologically absurd to specify the identities of the persons in an utterance like “I divorced her”. Nailing down for each pronoun its specific referent would constitute an interactionally laborious task, were it not for the reflexivity of categories and their category-bound activities. The table below shows how gender identities could be invoked via category bound identity alone.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tied activities</th>
<th>Non-tied activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a- /llaqtha:/</td>
<td>/klitha:/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b- /šetha sdaqha:/</td>
<td>/šetha flu:sha:/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c- /waštha: hadi ŋamajən/</td>
<td>/qrri:tu ŋamajən/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d- /šetha bratha/</td>
<td>/šetu : bratu:/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hester and Eglin (1997) observe that successful identification may be achieved by naming only one category from any SRP. In some cases, successful identification is done through
category-bound activities. In each example on the left column of the table above, members of the Moroccan culture can tell ‘who is doing what to whom’, without any person reference provided (husbands and wives in a, b, and d; mother in c). On the other hand, unless referents are specified in advance for activities on the right column, information on the possible speakers as well as referents remains inaccessible. The conclusion is clear. With regard to gender, categorial work informs problem-construction locally for the purposes of the calls.

Here is another example from the same call. Notice how implicit reference to ‘wife’ runs implicitly and smoothly for many turns. (The sequences in this example come before the explicit mention of ‘wife’ in line 14 above).

**hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (9) (00:38:08)**

1 Mustapha: ʕndi: smëjtut m(h)aha f flkayat
3 (1)
5 (0.5)
6 maʕndəkʃ moʔaxxar šadaːq?
7 (1.5)
8 Mustapha: .h fhalaːʃ mx- m(h)axxar šadaq
9 mafhəm[tʃ.
10Expert: [.hh
11Expert: flkayə:t. ʕtetiha šdaqha kamæl=
12 =xmsmjaːt drhm ŋddat(h)ə kamla=
13 =wbqə ndha ḏə qa ʕndha 1ː ə:(h)
14 bqat katsaːlək jihæə Matalan d-
15 dfeʔti(h)ə xmsmja wxllitila matələn
16 .hh jə:[d dlmljun=
17Mustapha: [llaː=max-
18Expert: =wlla tlata wlla:,

Bringing together the observations made in this section, one can say that the construction of a particular version of a problem is done along the following lines. First, the genderized division of activities is a cultural expectation that parties to talk orient to when membership
categories, MCDs, and category-bound activities are introduced. Second, through categorial work, participants invoke genderized local identities, even in the case of referential absence of holders of those identities. Third, such local identities, where invoked, create observable consequences, through the (mis)match between cultural expectations and what callers report. Problematicity then is located in that (mis)match. Categorial work, therefore, provides for the understanding of the calls as a context where general gender dynamics are enacted (expected) and, at the same time, specific gender relations are enacted (problems).

It is worth observing that the ideas above are in line with the principles introduced in the methodology chapter. The provision of an adequate understanding hinges on how each category relies on ‘what is known in common’ based on previous contexts. In turn, each category ‘documents that understanding once more in a still new one (Garfinkel, 1967).

The next section introduces yet a fourth line. For experts in the shows, locally-invoked categories provide also for the kind of ‘denouement’ expected to the problems announced in callers’ narratives.

2.2. Categorial work and the action of advice-giving

Categorial work at the beginning of the calls provides both for advice-seeking and advice-giving. Gender identities, as part of that work, are brought into play by the callers themselves. An overarching gender identity is not warranted simply because a person happens to be a man or a woman. They are many more things beside that. Since people are always invoked as having one or more identities on any given occasion of talk, it is that invocation which is the proper object of analysis.

In orienting to situated, locally managed, and contextually relevant identities, callers make them procedurally consequential (Speer, 2005) to the way phone-in calls unfold. In this section, an attempt will be made to show how the procedural consequentiality of identities introduced by caller is located in advice-giving sequences. The discussion will show that gender categorial work in a caller’ narrative not only constructs a particular version of a problem, but also orients the expert to offer a particular version of ‘advice’ to that problem.

The beginning is with the example below. Its analysis focuses on the way categorization and reference shape the outcome of the interaction and projects the kind of advice given later by the expert.
Example: 19

hditmsa 02-11-2015/ (14) (00:50:39)

1Çalaʔ : ŋafak axti ŋndi wa: hd
2 ŋndi wa:hd lməwdo: ə(h)::
3 xa:s hadiffies djal:: lmudawwana
4 ubyit ns[::-
5 Expert: [m:m= 
6 =nÇa:m ´a[sidi°
7 Host: [mRhba bi:k tfddel.
8 Çalaʔ: jokran xti.
9 (0.5)
10Çalaʔ: anaje da:be mjwej,
11Expert: əh [hə:h,
12Host: [m:m,
13Çalaʔ: o:mqbl kan ŋndi Çalaqa
14 mÇaji- ji whda x;
15 ra:
16Host: mh hə:h,
17Çalaʔ: >katskn fmadinət rri;ba:t< =
18 =u:wlət mÇaha:: øwljjed.
19Host: [mh hə:h.
20Çalaʔ: [wəlakn dak> lwəld ma-
21 mamÇəkkədʃ mnno
22 wəf wldi wllə məʃi wldi.
23Expert: nÇa:m.
24Host: [”n(h)a:m°.
25Expert: [mh hə:h,
26Host: ssuʔA[:l
27Çalaʔ: [ka:n t ŋənda Çalaqa:t.
28Host: mh həh,
29Expert: mh hə,
30Çalaʔ: suʔali: huwa daba:
31 kattas1 bijja dək ʃsəjDA.
32?Expert: mh həh,,
33?Host: mh həh
34Çalaʔ: katgollijjaa byina ndəxlu lwəld.
35 ( .)
It was already said that categorizing persons in talk is a not a gratuitous work. Interactants trust that whatever categories are used, they are used for a reason, and that reason is relevant to the work that categories are doing at the moment of talking. Inference and reference are two faces of the same coin (category).

Their interaction is in fact interesting. Sacks and Schegloff (1979) describe a preference organization operative when people do refer to others in talk. The preference is for speakers to use recognitionals where they assumed hearers know—or can recognize—the person referred to. First names are the clearest form of recognitionals. Where recognition is not assumed, speakers use non-recognitional terms, of which category terms are preponderant (a man, a lady, a driver, a doctor, etc). Categories are therefore preponderantly, but not always, used as ‘non-recognitional’ terms. Although inferentially-rich, they make no demand on hearers to know the person referred to.

In phone-in calls, it is routine that callers make references to other people. They do not assume any prior knowledge of those people by the host and the expert. As mentioned before, callers and ‘calleds’ are after all un-acquaintances; and this alleviates the preference for recognitionals altogether. This leaves callers with the only option of using non-recognitionals. However, even non-recognitional terms are theoretically infinite. One can refer to the same person as ‘a woman’, ‘a Muslim’, ‘a Moroccan’, ‘someone’s wife’, ‘a professor’, ‘someone’, ‘someone at the university’, etc.).

The upshot is, as said above, that neither reference nor categorization is free-floating, or gratuitous (Moerman, 1988). Picking up a categorial reference over another is recipient-
designed (Sechglöflf, 1995) in that it entails inferences that a caller wants their interlocutors to make, and that even when recognition is absent.

In the excerpt above, ʕalaʔ makes reference to his present marital status at the beginning of the narrative. In it, he mentions that he is now a married person (line 10) who, previously in the past, had a relationship with another woman (lines 13 and 14). This woman gave birth to a child and asked ʕalaʔ to acknowledge him and to add him to the civil birth registry (lines 34 and 36). ʕalaʔ, however, is not sure whether or not the baby is his, since he mentions that the woman had other relationships (line 27).

The advice ʕalaʔ seeks is of a social-legal sort. This is in keeping with the situated identity of the expert as ‘lawyer/legal counselor’ in this program. Indeed, it is the main capacity in which she enters the program, although she sometimes veers to offer social counseling or personal advice. What is interesting is that, in the excerpt above, there is evidence that the caller orient to the situated identity of the expert ‘legal counselor’ in a way that curbs her stepping in as a social counselor.

Notice for example ʕalaʔ’s introduction of the membership category ‘married at the present’ at the very beginning (line 10), prior to reaching the crux of the problem (line 34 and 36), and after reaching it (lines 37 and 38). He could have stated his problem without referring to his marital status at all, that is, and without orienting to the relevance of the MCD ‘family’. Omitting the turns where reference to his marital status is made, in lines 10, 37, 38 and 40, would still make the problem understandable. It would not, however, preserve the problem as a legal one. Since talk is recipient designed, it is legitimate to enquire about what sort of work this reference to marital status is doing.

Through invoking the category ‘husband’, ʕalaʔ claims that this is pertinent to the problematicity of the call. He asks his interlocutors to take it into consideration since his identity as a husband displays how his problem should be understood when offering advice.

When one is married, the slot for ‘wife’ in the SRP is not only occupied, but sanctified socially and legally. When one is in a relationship outside marriage and its consequence are such that it results in offspring, then one can amend it either socially (through marriage) or legally (through acknowledging the relationship and assuming the legal consequences). Invoking the SRP ‘husband/wife’, ʕalaʔ constructs the problem as such: what are the legal, not the social, arrangements to be made in order to accommodate his outside-marriage
situation? This particular hearing, then, hinges around the introduction of the MCD ‘family, especially the SRP ‘wife/husband’. The slots for ‘wife’ is not empty after all.

Still in the Moroccan society, a ‘husband’ who is involved in an outside-marriage relationship can still take a second wife, but this possibility ʕala? removed through the invocation of his partner’s other relationships (line 27). Presenting the partner as the sort of person who engaged in multiple relationships cast her as someone unsuitable for marriage. This way, ʕala? restricted the problem to the offspring, resultant of the illegal relationship, by constructing a contrast between different categories: wife/partner (lines 10 and 13), legal child/illegal child (lines 18 and 40). Each incumbent of the first category renders social arrangement for the second, if not, impossible, then at least complicated. The expert is then left with the crux of the problem.

hditnasa 02-11-2015/ (14) (00:50:39)

ʕala?: hadə həwwa lmuṣki:l daba=  
=wane ba:yi walakin: [ə(h)::  
?Host: [mh [hm:  
?Expert: [m:m  
ʕala?: byit ntʔəkəd.

The advice the expert introduces later in the call was indeed sensitive to the categorial work of ʕala?. To appreciate its sensitivity, it is possible to imagine how her advice would have been different had ʕala? not been married. His marrying the girl with whom he had a child would most likely be proposed as a solution to the problem. However, since he is already a husband, the slot in the SRP pair where a ‘wife’ fits in is already taken. Invoking marriage, and also children from that marriage oriented the expert to notice the occupied slots; and perhaps, discouraged her to propose a second marriage as an appropriate solution. Not surprisingly, marrying the girl with whom he had a child would have been a moral, if not a legal, obligation had the categorical slots for ‘wife’ and ‘child’ been vacant. It is, therefore, sensitivity to invoked categories that restrained the expert’s identity in this example to a legal counselor only. She kept the advice directed exclusively to legal issues.

In relation to that, another point needs clarification here. Reference to the outside-marriage partner is done through a non-recognitional “whda xīra” (another+female) (line 14). It has
already been said that when category-bound activities are invoked, speakers can dispense with persons reference. In the case of non-bound activities, however, referents must be explicitly stated. This explains why “мзывэцы” (married) makes available the category ‘wife’; and therefore a social arrangement; in a way “ъэндэ ќалаа” (have a relationship) does not. “ъан ќиди ќалаа мэгаф – џи ћхда ћи:ра:’ (I had a relationship with someone else (female)) (lines 13 and 14) alludes exclusively to a sexual-relation, perhaps sexual orientation, but no more. The reference invokes no social obligations. This explains the different hearings of the non-recognitional references ‘woman’ and ‘child’ in ќалаа?’s talk,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Utterance</th>
<th>Hearing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kattaшл бижжа дэй њеъжA (line31)</td>
<td>‘сэйда’ means ‘former partner’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>:влаotent мэгаа:: влэъджед. (line18)</td>
<td>‘влэъджед’ means ‘a child’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wане ќиди хале маднэйжа дабэ мэгаalмра jди:дэ: (line 38)</td>
<td>‘лмра’ means ‘wife’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ќиди влэъджед ћнит мэгаа. (line 40)</td>
<td>‘влэъджед’ means ‘a son’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To corroborate this analysis, consider also the following example

hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (15) (00:56:42)

1 Saliха: [биит ѣир нэ:– нэ:– н::: нэ:– н:–
2 nswwәл ќла:: (. ) talaq ѣ(х): лиъиqa:q
(lines ommited)
3 Sali7ә: [ила кан мн таraф 1mәr2ә
4 Guest: nәғә:м.=
5 Host: =nәғә:м.
6 Saliха: б漕 ѣ(х): ана ќиди моъкил
7 mә зawә дjaли lli:
8 tә:л wahд lmudda ћwi:ла,
9 .h ѣ(х):: ssабаб дjaло ћ1xiyannya=
Even when the same term ‘woman’ is used (lines 3 and 15), the reference to the social arrangement of marriage and sexual relations outside it are different. Different categorial activities (divorce and adultery in lines 2 and 11 respectively) map different social inferences into talk; therefore, different social relations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Utterance</th>
<th>Hearing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ɂarna (line 3)</td>
<td>From the MCD ‘family’ and MCD ‘stage of life’ (married adult, wife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mra (line 15)</td>
<td>MCD ‘gender’ and MCD ‘stage of life’ (adult woman).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hearers can distinguish between the two readings thanks to the categorial activities cited. Those tie to the appropriate devices.

In keeping with the argument that reference, categorization and identities in callers’ narrative shape the course of the whole call, and are consequential for the form of advice experts give as well, the analysis below focuses on the general reference expression that has the format: “waḥad + category term”.

It is common knowledge and practice in a lot of cultures that the SRP ‘husband/wife’ is formed following a proposal by a man to a woman. It is on the man’s initiative and the woman’s acceptance that the SRP pair becomes the locus of matrimonial rights and obligations. Prior to the formation of the pair, however, the parties may or may not be strangers to each other. They are, reference to each by the other is adequately made using non-recognitional terms.
As said above, non-recognitionals are reference terms that speakers use because they assume that hearers do not know the person referent. When categories are used as reference points, they are mostly used as non-recognitionals. A membership category can mark one as ‘total stranger’. In Moroccan Arabic, unqualified words like “waḥəd xajna” (some guy), “waḥəd lwaḥəd” (some male person), and “waḥəd” (someone ‘a male’) signal that recipients are not assumed, not even required, to know the person referred to as such. The examples below demonstrate the point.

**hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (12) (00:46:18)**

1 Fatima: ana: kan xatbni waḥəd xəjna
dabə ji Çam onə.

((line omitted ))

2 Host: fatima ʔalɭu:,

3 Fatima: ʔallu (ʔalu) gətlək dabə ana xatbni waḥəd lwaḥəd

**VOC20-003: (00:06:23) (continuation VOC20-002)**

1 Z: nzəlt mn::: ſfo;bi:s onəqteʕ ʕriːq.

2 Y: [( )]

3 Z :[<waːḥəd maʃrəftuːch mnin xəʃ>,

With this in mind, the following example will be analyzed,

**Example 20**

**hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (12) (00:46:18)**

1 Fatima: ana: kan xatbni waḥəd xəjna
2 dabə ji Çam onə.

((Lines omitted in which the parties attend to a hearing trouble))

3 Host: fatima ʔalɭu:,

4 Fatima: ʔallu (ʔalu) gətlək dabə

5 ana xatbni waḥəd lwaḥəd

6 Çam onə daː;buː(h)
Non-recognitionals pin down a person referred to, but only on general grounds. In the case of phone-ins, no knowledge of persons is shared; therefore, no recognitional terms are used. This of course does not mean any categorial descriptor goes. What non-recognitionals to use is an interactional problem for parties to the calls; and it is a problem tied to the purposes of the calls.

In the example above, Fatima’s first identifies the person through her use of ‘wahed xajna’ (line 1) and “wahed lwahebp” (line 5), roughly the equivalents to the word ‘a guy’ and ‘someone’ in English. She then goes on to describe her relation with this person as the reason for the call, namely, that after a year and a half of formal engagement, she has not yet met the guy—a problem in front of which she remains helpless (line 16).

As it transpires, Fatima’s problem concerns her ‘fiancé’, who she displays as a ‘stranger’ through the use of the non-recognitionals terms usually reserved for strangers. Here is how the call continues,

17Expert: °hh°[,hh ukifa] xetbek=xetbek=  
18Host: °hh°.hh  
19Expert: =b:: [llasilki? hehe  
20Host: [øLLA: >anelli mffhəmtʃ< bəʔda  
21 yatəməməli a: ə- kifʃ ləxəba b̪̊da  
22 djal ʕam onəʔ?  
23 anə ma:: ə(h) jəʃni:-  
24 .hh umakajzi:].
First of all, it is worth noticing that Fatima’s narrative is, structurally speaking, terse but adequate. However, even if it satisfies the sequential aspects of advice-request calls in that particular radio program, it does not satisfy the categorial ones. On the one hand, the category Fatima implies (‘fiancé’) raises cultural expectations of a newly formed acquaintance on the fiancé’s initiative. On the other, the reference form she uses “wahed xajna” and “wahed lwahed”, that imply stranger before courtship, constitute the locus of the problem. It lies specifically in the continued status of the fiancé. It is exactly that mismatch the host and the expert oriented to when they stopped to repair their assumptions in light of Fatima’s talk (lines 17 to 27).

In Moroccan Arabic, when someone is ‘someone asking for a girl’s hand’, it is often assumed that he is a ‘stranger’. It is their membership of that device which is often displayed by the use of “wahed lwahed” and “wahed xajna”. Therefore it is this display of ‘unaquaintance’ that makes no claim on the part of hearers to read beyond the reference. Unlike other categorial references, the non-recognition expression ‘wahed lwahed’ in fact makes no demand at all beyond the existence of a gendered being—a male. Because of its ‘emptiness’, it is neither problematic, nor carrying the seeds of problematicity. It is the tying of the category to a specific activity that vests on it a categorical specificity. To see how the categorial information of “wahed lwahed” is minimal, compare the utterance “ana xatbni wahed lwahed” to “kan xatbni wahed lbulisi”. Whereas in problematicity in the former is pending, it is in the latter expected to hinge on the membership category ‘policeman’ introduced. Here is a concrete example to drive the point home.

**VOC20-003: (00:06:23)**

1 Z: nzelt mn:: tto:bi:s oneqtәʕ tri:q.  
2 Y: [( )]  
3 Z: [<wahed maʕretu:ch mnin xraj>,}
In VOC20-003 above, the problem becomes a problem when the “waːħed” begins doings some action. The problem then is still pending and awaits subsequent talk to clarify it. It is only then that its identification as a specific category of person becomes relevant (line 4 below). The identification of the person as a “kidnapper” is understood only after the introduction of the non-recognitional “waːħed” and is not embedded in it.

4 Z: ana waːħed hazzah fdәhri әwldi jaddah hakk(h) ә(h)waj bya jәjjәd lija wldi(h),

Similarly in Fatim’s example, the use of “waːḥed 1wәḥed”, or its variant, keeps categorial information to the minimum. Given that only minimal categorial information was introduced, the host and the caller gleaned talk for clues as to what the problem exactly was. The following is how the interactional context created by Fatima enabled a particular construction of her problem by the host and the caller.

Right from the beginning then, Fatima’s has made expected that when a ‘stranger’ asked for her hand, he did it personally; or, if someone did it for him, hearers at least expect that the ‘fiancée’ would now engage in activities bound to the newly formed SRP ‘fiancée-fiancée’ during the courtship period. The implication of the category ‘fiancé’ for a previous ‘stranger’, with category-bound activities are now appropriate, clues the host and their expert to wait for ‘trouble talk’ to emerge because of this categorization. When it did not, the category itself, its category-bound activities and the concomitant cultural expectations have become the target of repair (lines 17 to 21). This is perhaps the reason why, following Fatima’s narrative (line 16), the expert does not engage in seeking additional information or giving advice, but both she and the host initiate repair on the categorial aspects the problem. For them, rather than explicating a problem, the caller’s narrative blurs it.

For the host and the expert then, Fatima displayed, through her categorization of the suitor, that she was unacquainted with him before. Following their engagement, their new pistions as ‘fiancé-fiancée’ entail certain cultural norms that go with these categories. Of relevance to Fatima’s new position is the assumed right not only to talk to her fiancé but also the right to see him. Both her hearers locate her problem in the absence of those rights and norms, orienting to their absence (lines 19 and 24). The expert orients to the failure of the suitor to
show up on the engagement day, an obligation that, as a stranger, had to fulfill, while the host orients to the length of the engagement period and the abnormal lack of ‘courtship’.

Given that the host’s and the expert’s initiated repair on membership categories, Fatima’s subsequent action was to ‘repair’ her previous categorization,

28Fatima : ha:nti httaj huwwa jaÇni
29 kajçiini wd xalti.
30Expert : aj[je:h.
31Host: [anÇa:m=“dakor“.

Notice how the introduction of a new categorial membership (line 29) is treated by the expert as ‘making sense’ of previous talk (line 30) and by the host as a piece of news. The expert introduces an acknowledgment token and the host first introduced a ‘change of state token’ (Heritage, 1984a) “anÇa:m”, with an emphatic stress on the onset of the expression, followed by the acknowledgment token “dakor”. The token in this respect is similar in its function to the particle “oh” in English (Heritage, 1984a). The device ‘relative’ then changes the host’s and the expert’s understanding of Fatima’s previous story.

More significantly, it allows them to see the problem in it. While the category ‘fiancé’ remained intact, it is Fatima’s repair from “waħad xajna” to “wd xalti” that illuminates both hearers as to the nature of Fatima’s problem. It turns out that the fiancé is not a total stranger after all— a reading that the reference format ‘waħad + category term’ called for— but is rather Fatima’s cousin— a member of the device ‘relative’

Concerning its impact on advice-giving, the new device obliterated the reading of the suitor’s absence as inappropriate and also diffused his ‘responsibility’ for it. The category ‘relative’ the absence somewhat expected. Fatima’s problem is now one of ‘arranged marriage’ and, indeed it is that aspect of the problem that the expert oriented to in offering advice. The expert advised Fatima to insist on talking to her fiancé and demand explanations for his absence. The expert also alluded to the possibility that the fiancé’s abstinence from visiting Fatima’s house was probably a sign of refusal on his part of the family-arranged marriage, an allusion that would indeed be strange if the fiancé were a complete stranger. After all, it is on the man’s
initiative that strangers become members in the pair ‘fiancé/fiancée’ and later in ‘husband/wife’.

Conclusively then, the inferences beneath the format ‘\textit{wa}\textit{ḥad+category}’ references’ were the locus of repair work in the example above precisely because those inferences implicate one sort of problem and not another. The format had consequences for the shape of the advice that the expert gave in due time in the call. Had the fiancé been a total stranger to Fatima, as the initial reference format suggested, the course of action she might have been advised to take would have been completely different from the one she was urged to follow, and this only when it transpired that the fiancé was a family member. Given how categorization changes the way people see a problem, one might even speculate on the organization of ‘advice-sequences’ in the calls, and the way their organization is responsive to the categorial work at the outset of the calls.

Categorial work then has consequence not only for the shape of callers’ narratives but also for experts’ understanding of the problem and the administration of advice. This means, to reiterate, that categories are introduced for a purpose. Naturally then, their reformulation is also done for a purpose. The next section examines this particular aspect of categorial work, namely, the repair and reformulation \textit{in situ} of membership categories.

2.3. Reformulation and repair of genderized categories

Having established above that ‘family’ is an MCD around which gender relations are organized, the present section moves to another issue in studying the work gender does. The title of this section brings to the front the issue of how participants to talk, in reformulating and repairing categorization, display their sensitivity to the inferences, norms, expectations, activities, rights and duties that are attached to it.

More specifically, this section considers what interactional work is done when callers to phone-in programs invoke devices other than those of ‘family’ in talk about referents that are, or used to be, members of family. What interactional work is done when, for example, a caller refers to a (former) ‘husband’ through invoking categorial memberships other than those related to ‘family or the SRP husband/wife? What interactional goals are achieved when callers make ‘strangers’ out of former wives by dint of what Stokoe refers to as the “subversion procedure” (2006, p. 474) — a way of tacitly correcting inferences in ways that make category membership “deniable”.

The answers to these and other questions will figure centrally in the analysis that follows. Moreover, the answers extend the argument in the previous sections on the way gender social dynamics are lodged in categories (Lepper, 2000).

Right from the outset, it has to be mentioned that whenever a change of reference is done by the caller himself/herself during a sequential episode, it is treated as an instance of reformulation. Whenever it is the hearers, either the host and the expert or both, who ask for clarification (as in the previous section), it is considered repair. Also whenever hearers introduce a category, for a referent, not originally used by the caller, the introduction is considered an ‘embedded’ repair (Jefferson, 1987). In CA terms, reformulating genderized categories is then a speaker-initiated sort of action. It guides hearers to disregard the relevancies that are attached to a former category introduced and orient to those attached to a ‘new’ one subsequently introduced. Repair on the other hand is hearer-initiated. It is a way of seeking alignment.

Whether the change of category is speaker’s reformulation or hearer’s repair, the argument is that the change constitutes a negotiation of inferences, expectations, activities, rights and duties attached to categorial use. Lauded as it is, categorization work involves doing actions that foreground and background specific aspects of categories used; and which organize their negotiation between parties to call. This section extends the focus given to genderized categories and will try to show that, in doing categorial reformulation/repair, speakers manage issues of responsibility, blame, social relations, and social distance.

As an entry to the analysis, it is fruitful to see how participants sometimes reformulate or repair categories in ways that bring forth ‘specific aspects’ meant to display their command of categorization. As such, reformulation and repair can both be an action whose aim is to show that both speakers and hearers share the same knowledge within a participation framework. For parties to talk, participation involves an orientation to the same perspective. This point is illustrated though example 21 below.

In the phone call from which the example is taken, the caller, Malika, called the program in order to ask about some solution to a problem related to her ‘son’ and ‘his wife’. In her capacity as a ‘caller’ and ‘advice-seeker’ she introduced the relevant referents, through appropriate categorization, to establish the terms on which the problem will be defined. In doing so, she at the same time gave off her allegiances vis-à-vis the referents.
Prior to the segment of interest below, Malika described the problem as one having to do with the wife’s demand for a “saka:n mustaṣīl” (private lodging) and her complaint that the one the husband provided was not ‘private’ after all. The lodging the husband provided was situated in the same building where his parents lived, an arrangement the wife refused.

Right before the beginning of the excerpt below, Malika cited the wife’s refusal to return to the “ssaka:n lmustaṣīl” (private lodging) as an instance of disobedience both to the husband solicitation and the court’s order. It was this word which which triggered repair on the part of the expert (line 7 below).

Example 21
hditnsa 09-11-2015/ (1) (00:23:06)

1 Malika: ẓat mṣaha maṣreft [wəʃ ẓriːfa
2 Host: [mt. .hh
3 Malika: wllə [mufawid qaḍaʔi ( ).
4 Expert: [sːsuʔAL djalə malika
5 Malika: laj ḫaṣək bixir:=
6 Malika: [nɡːam.
7 Expert: =ʃərhilijjə ḟnu (h)uwa ssakaːn lmustaṣīl
8 lli [x- lli ẓta had ṭrəzəl l l l:
9 Malika: [lmusta–
10Expert: .h lli [ẓta ԝəldək=
11Malika: [ʔbɾtmaː.
13Malika: [ppəɾtma. PPRtMA.

The particular turn of interest is the one where the expert says ʃərhilijjə ḟnu (h)uwa ssakaːn lmustaṣīl lli [x- lli ẓta had ṭrəzəl l l l: .h lli [ẓta ԝəldək l: lzzawzə [djalu. Malika tries to provide an answer before the expert finishes her turn, hence the overlap. The projectability of the TCU’s ending being sufficiently clear for Malika to understand its purpose.

Within that turn, the expert reformulates from “ḥad ṭrəzəl” (this man), (line 8), to “ԝəldək” (your son), (line 10). Her category reformulation is one instance of Stokoe’s
subversion procedure’s referred to above. The expert might have risked the use of a category that would have distanced the caller from the referent of “had rrą3ął”. Even thought the reference is clear enough, the reformulation to “wąłdąk” (your son), (line 10), emphasized the close kinship relationship between the caller and her son. The reformulation is indeed sensitive to the fact that caller was a mother reporting her ‘child’s problem.

As noted, the categorization “had rrą3ął”, while referentially adequate, is inferentially distancing. Knowing the person to be a relative to the caller (her son), it becomes relevant, indeed a requirement even, that reference to him be made using a kinship term which observes and preserves its categorial relationship to the caller. The use of “had rrą3ął” would possibly have the consequence of turning the referent to an “un-acquaintance”. More than this, “had rrą3ął” is a categorization that involves what is later referred to later as ‘social distancing’ (see this chapter, sub-section 2.3).

Categorial reformulation and repair are, therefore, ways of showing that hearers are attendant to what speakers say. The former show they are sensitive to categories introduced by the latter who define the situation first and foremost for hearers’ benefit. Reformulation in the example above was a way of demonstrating a grasp of the ramifications of the problem introduced by the caller. One way of demonstrating it was through relevantly reproducing category terms from the same MCD the caller employed earlier in her narrative.

As said earlier, membership categories callers invoke are designed to set the terms of, reveal, and constitute problematicity in, the interaction. Those same categories constrain subsequent categorization work. However, problematicity and understanding apart, categorial work in the calls to phone-ins constitutes a web of connections. It reveals the cultural textile and the social organization in the here-and-now twists of interaction (Moerman, 1988). As categorization is always enmeshed with the moral order of social relations, reformulation and repair are never “innocent” deeds (Moerman, 1988). This brings back the arguments made in section two of the present chapter, and it is in the same spirit that analysis of the extracts below proceeds.

In example 22 below, Achraf deploys categorial reformulations for a number of purposes. Through them, he deals with changing situations across past and present in order to juggle his way through a web of social and moral issues. Below is the opening sequence of Acharf’s narrative after the greeting-exchange sequence,
Achraf opens his narrative by stating directly his present situation as a “devorše” (divorced) (line 6). Then he continues directly with a piece of information that constitutes the reason of his incumbency at the present moment of that categorical position (lines 11, 12, 13 and 14). The self-categorization as ‘divorced’ calls attention to a change in the relevant SRP—from a former SRP of husband/wife that is no longer applicable, because of the reason introduced by Achraf. Now, the categorization ‘divorced’ is itself part of an SRP divorced/divorcee, with the woman occupying the second position in the pair.

The point is that, if Achraf chooses to refer to himself as divorced, then he could as relevantly have referred to his former wife as “taliqa djali” (my divorcee), or even “zawʒa dyali ssabiqa” (my ex-wife). Both terms are referentially and categorially adequate to do the referring. However, Achraf chooses to ‘do referring’ to his ex-wife in terms that usually mark a stranger “had səjjida” (that lady) (line 12). This reference is embedded, in the same turn, with an activity that he performed during the time when the SRP husband/wife became effective “had səjjida lli kənt mʒewəʒ bi(h)a” (this lady I was married to).
As stated earlier, except in family marriages, the activity of ‘marrying’ occurs between a man to a woman, who are initially unacquainted, in order to remove the social distance due to being initially ‘strangers’. Reference, then, to an ‘ex-wife’ using a category that marks prior-marriage strangeness (“had ṣejjida”) is a way to re-effect that same social relation of ‘un-acquaintance’, and make it attending to Acharf’s present relation to his ex-wife. “had ṣejjida”, implies a social distance even divorce does not warrant.

To clarify this, consider social distance as a score on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means very close socially (family relationships) and 10 marks total absence of acquaintance (stranger). Prior to marriage, a man and a woman start at level 10, then after marriage move to level 1. If divorce occurs, then they are not as close as they were in marriage, but neither are they as ‘un-acquainted’ as they used to be before marriage. What the utterance “had ṣejjida lli kent mȝәwwәȝ bi(h)a” does is that it marks a wider social distance than would the use of ‘divorcee’ or ‘ex-wife’ implies. In other words, what Achraf cannot proclaim factually for his ‘ex-wife’, he proclaims categorically through the use of a term reserved for ‘strangers’. The expression is thus a categorial tour de force.

Understandably then, in referring his former wife, Achraf had a gamut of categories out of which he could have relevantly, and adequately chosen. However, what the categories ‘divorcee’, ‘my ex-wife’, and ‘a lady to whom I was married’ do not share is the particular social distance holding between the speaker and the persons thus categorized.

To back up the above analysis, further talk in the same call will be examined. As will be clear, Achraf’s narrative, long and uninterrupted, showed him pushing the social boundaries between himself and his former wife even further.

Sometime after the episode above, Achraf’s talk runs as follows,

Example 23
hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (19) (01:19:43)

1 Achraf: u: ya(h)ni tatȝәwwәȝt >ane wejjja(h)<
2 wȝina lwe3da uskәnna fwe3i:da
3 walakin fʃ lqi:t dak l mj:ʃ kil
4 jә(h)ni:: SAFI::
5 wәmjә:- mjәt ʃәnd darhu:m
It might be useful to remember that all the talk above was inserted between the beginning of the preliminary announcement “xt(h) bx(h):t yi nswwel l ?ustade lah j3azi:k bi[xi:r” (sister I just want to ask the laywer please) and the narrative, which almost always
replaces the ‘intended’ question. In the example above, the caller never asked a question, but it was nonetheless ‘retrieved’, conjointly by the host and the expert, from the narrative. Both displayed their understanding of the problem in the narrative after the caller identified the amount he was ordered to pay (talk not shown here). Again, it is in this sense that Achraf’s narrative allowed his hearers to ‘see’ the problem, but also to see Achraf’s stance via-à-vis the problem.

More to the point of this section, references in the narrative were done through multiple categorizations. Semantically, they were referentially adequate in that they all designate to the same persons. On the categorial basis, though, each category contributed something different. The analysis showed that Achraf was doing something similar to a flashback. Referring to his ex-wife with the terms “ḥad ẓejjida” re-constituted their relationship as ‘less socially close’ than divorced people are; which is in turn ‘less socially close’ than married people are. The validity of this analysis rested on the fact that divorce does not reinstate a relationship of stranger/stranger; but rather introduces a new one— that of divorcee/divorced that Achraf chose to disregard through a subversive procedure.

There are other features of the calls that are worth to mention here. In example 23, Achraf tells first of his move to Oujda with his wife (line 2), and then of the course he took after the discovery of his wife’s problem, mentioned in example 22 as infection with a sexually transmissible disease. The measures included, first, discussing the problem with his wife’s family (line 5), and, second, resorting to a family court to ask for divorce (line 23).

At the starting point to his telling of the story, Achraf establishes his newly acquired status as a husband through the utterance “ṣatgawwagt >anә ẓejja(h)” (when I married her). The story then makes the device ‘family’ operative for past events narrated. Talking about events prior to divorce makes clear that the person referred to by the pronoun in “anә ẓejja(h)” is the ‘wife’.

Achraf reformulates the embedded category ‘wife’ to the explicit one, ‘your daughter’. The reformulation is occasioned by the context where the wife’s parents are invoked. The problem is now between himself and their daughter “bini wbin bentkum” (line 8). Again, the net effect of this reformulation is the distancing of the wife on the social closeness scale. In invoking the relevance of the relationship of daughter/parents, Achraf shows himself taking as yet another step backward, categorically speaking, and refusing to admit any responsibility that might incur from his duties as a husband. The problem is not between the caller as the
Later in the call, Achraf pushes the social boundaries between himself and his ‘divorcee’ even further through the invocation of the social milieu (line 20). By implication, ‘social milieu’ boundaries are social class ones. For Achraf, the invocation of social milieu is conclusive since it does not only distance him from his wife, but also from her parents (her original family) as well. More importantly, not only does Achraf distance himself from his ex-wife’s family, but he finds an objective justification for doing so. His personal disconnection with his ex-wife now has a class basis, and he clearly depicts himself as standing higher than his ex-wife and her parents.

It is noteworthy how Achraf’s narrative betrays his acclaimed social superiority. As he makes clear in the call, he discussed the problem with the parents knowing exactly where blame should lie: “huma xas(h)um ja(h)ni jlumu benthum” (they had to blame their daughter) (line 17). ‘Talking’ to the wife’s family meant for him ‘dictating’ what they should have said. He has the upper hand in determining who is to blame in the problem. When the parents refused to discuss the problem on Achraf’s terms, then, it became for him a matter of ‘social milieu’ difference; one where the wife’s family stands lower because they couldn’t see how reasonable Achraf’s point of view was. Within this framework of class difference the use of “benthum” (their daughter) can be understood. Invoking one’s wife as someone’s daughter demonstrates a resolution to get out of the problem by categorically invoking before-marriage relations.

In the call then, the effect of Achraf’s categorial work is clear. As the narrative went forward in describing the problem, Achraf’s categorizations went backward on social distance. To do this, he manipulated membership categories to push the social gap between himself and the wife further and further.

The analysis of the sequences in Achraf’s call has been concerned with tracing the work categorial reformulation does. It reveals that the shift from the SRP categories ‘divorced/divorcee’ to “sejjida” (roughly the equivalent of ‘lady’), and lastly to ‘daughter’, was intentionally provided by the caller in order to distance himself from the obligations attached to being a husband at the beginning (attending to his wife’s illness), and from any sense of blame that might incur from his eventual initiation of divorce.
The example then shows callers deploying categories in order to monitor the social distance displayed as holding between themselves and the persons they refer to in talk. Hearers in turn monitor that deployment for cues that might reveal information about the social distance between caller and referents.

This being the case, MCA can be used to see how both speakers and hearers use categorization to gauge social distance that holds between different participants to talk at different levels of social relation. The idea that talk is an indicator of social distance between participants is, however, not new. A classic sociolinguistic study of the use ‘tu-vous’ pronouns revealed how their differential use in talk reflects the social status of the speaker and the addressee (Brown and Gilian, 1960). What is new is the realization in MCA that membership categories can also be studied for the variation it tells about the parameters of social distance and solidarity.

Keeping the argument on categories and social distance in mind, the next example is san interesting one. Initially, the caller claimed a social distance closer than actually the case between himself and the person he referred. However, he failed due to his use of ‘wrong’ categorization. The example demonstrates that hearers pay attention to categorization together with the intended ‘message’ a caller wants to put across. The sequences run as follows:

**Example 24**

**hitnsa 09-11-2015/ (2) (00:30:40)**

1 Abdelwahed:  
daba ana: alallə kənt mzəwwəŋ
2 ʕa:m alfaqn osəb;ʕa[əː] =
3 Expert:  
[əːməə]  
4 Abdelwahed:  
=knt mzəwwəŋ lmu(h)im
5 wbddəbτ (‘(caller gives geographic lcoation))
6 Expert:  
mh _əː:m,
7 Host:  
ŋaːm.
8 Abdelwahed:  
əlmuhim hadik ssjəda mʃaya
9 ʕaːm uhijja mʃaja fddar.
10 təqriban.
11Expert:  
m[hm.
12Host:  
[mhm.
Abdelwahed establishes his marital status by ascribing to himself the category ‘husband’ (line 1). It has been argued before that right after this introduction of ‘husband’, a contextual environment is created where hearers anticipate other members of the ‘family’ to follow, be it ‘the wife’, ‘children’, or other members.

The category ‘wife’ indeed shows up in the story, but the caller refers to her not as ‘wife’ but rather uses a reformulated category “ssjəda” (line 8). As argued before (see note iii), the reformulation from the embedded category ‘wife’ to ‘lady’ implicates unavailability and politeness, two factors that normally attend one’s relationship with more distant members, socially speaking. Notice the similarity between Achraf’s turn in the previous example and Abdelwahed’s turn in the present one:

Achraf: ana de:ʒa devorše f: deux mille onze

Abdelwahed: daba ana: alallə kənt mzəwwəʒ
çaːm alfajn osəbʕəa

In both turns, the callers use the utterances “devorše” and “kənt mzəwwəʒ” to refer to a past membership in a marital situation. In Achraf’s talk, his incumbeny of the category ‘divorced’ leaves no doubt about the current status—he divorced his wife in 2011. In Abdelwahed’s, however, his marital status is impending on coming talk, because “mzəwwəʒ çaːm alfajn osəbʕəa” (I was married in the year two thousand and seven) could mean, initially at least, either ‘I married in two thousand and seven and now I’m not’ or ‘I have been married since two thousand and seven till now’. It turns out that Abdelwahed married in two thousand and seven and his wife had stayed with him for approximately a year (line 9). Apparently then, both callers indicate a similar movement from a past situation of marriage to a new one (non-marriage).

The stories in the two examples are also similar. Both callers indicate their current status in order to tell a story about past events that happened during marriage. It was within that contextual environment that the use of categories other than the ‘then-relevant’ (i.e., husband and wife) was claimed to do distancing. The similarity extends to categorization work as
well. Since it was previously argued that Archaf used “səjjida” to distance himself further than the category ‘ex-wife’ allowed; would it be true to say the same thing for Abdelwahed? Would it be that, given the pattern of categorization, hearers ‘see’ the right social distance that holds between himself and “hadik səjjida” (that lady) (line 8), who, to reiterate, he designates as his ‘then-wife’? More of the call is needed to see if this observation is borne out. The episode continues like the following,

13Abdelwahed: uwaḥəd nха:r dexlу ʕlijja
14 zuʤ dja:l lμu3rimı:n
15 (.)
16 ugalulijja had ssəjjida fin katʕrfha,
17 udaba ana dak ssəjda ʕęndi mʕaha wədl
18Expert: kifaʃ g[alulęk ø:: əʃ] katʕrəha,
19Host: [kifaʃ? kif əʃ] katʕrəfha?
20Abdelwahed: dexlу ʕlijja alallə wxdawha mnni bzzəz=
21 =gləjjə knnə katʕəfuha qɓə{l mn-
22Host: [wəʃ MRATəK?
23Abdelawhed: [mrati mr- mrə ʕallə.
24 Expert: ["mraːtu aːh."
25Abdelwahed: xtaʕfuha lijə wxdawha lijə=

After establishing relevant identities in the preface, Abdewahed continues to tell of an incident that happened while he was married. Two ‘criminals’, he claimed, assaulted him. To all likelihood, the assault took place inside Abdelwahed’s family home as evidenced by the use of the verb “dexlу” (they broke in) (line 13). Next, Abdelwahed reports what one of the attackers asked him “ugalulijja had ssəjjida fin katʕrfha” (and they asked me how you knew this lady”) (line 16). Notice how the criminal’s use of “had ssəjjida” parallel’s Abdelwahed’s (line 8 above). Whereas it is natural for a stranger to use the expression, is it just as natural for a ‘husband’ to use it?

In fact, the persistence in using “ssəjjida” to refer to his wife is quite remarkable in Abdelwahed’s talk. The expression is used again when he mentions other members of ‘his family’ in “udaba ana dak ssəjda ʕęndi mʕaha wədl” (I have a child with that lady) (line17). The design of that turn is at odds with the device ‘family’. To see this, the
categorization of the ‘lady’ and ‘child’ can be contrasted with a similar categorization in a previous call reproduced below,

**From hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (14) (00:50:39)**

13şiŋalaʔ: oːmqbl kan ɭndi ʃalaqə
14 mʃajɨ- jì wìndə xːraː:
15 (.)
16Host: mh ḥə:h,
17şiŋalaʔ: >katskn fmadinət rriːbaːt< =
18 =uːwlət mʃahaːː əwljjəd.

şiŋalaʔ uses “əwljjəd” (a child) (line 18) to indicate the social distance that holds between himself and “ji whda xːraː:” (line 14), with whom he had a non-marriage relationship. “u uːwlət mʃahaːː əwljjəd.” (line 18) is similar to Abdewahed’s categorization of ‘his child’, the diminutive form “əwljjəd” notwithstanding,

17şiŋalaʔ: >katskn fmadinət rriːbaːt< =
18 =uːwlət mʃahaːː əwljjəd.

And

17Abdelwahed: udaba ana dak ssəjda ɭndi mʃaha wəld

In the first example, “əwljjəd” belongs to ‘stage of life’ (the diminutive in fact *reinforces* age), but unlike the example above, its membership in ‘family’ was excluded by dint of ściŋalaʔ’s earlier categorization of the mother as “whda xːraː:”. The categorization does distance him from the mother (she is his ‘wife’). Given that Abdewahed uses “ssəjda”, a categorization that also does distance referent from the caller, the categorization work of Abdelwahed again raises the question about the real social distance that holds between himself and the person he claimed to be his wife.
Going back to the example, and following the characterization of the assault incident by Abdelwahed, the expert and the host both initiate repair (lines 18 and 19). The expert with a specific repair initiation (how + repeat) “kifaj g[alulәk ә:: wәʃ kat-chiefә,],” and the host with “kifach?” (what?), a general repair initiator, before making the repairable more specific with “kif wәch kat3rfha?”, triggered, and hurriedly in tandem with the expert’s repair format (line 19). The format of the repair makes it clear that it is not a hearing problem that caused it, but rather the event narrated by Abdelwahed. In addition, what triggered the repair seems not to be the event of kidnapping someone’s wife itself, but rather the content of the question itself.

In other words, both the host and the expert orient to the incongruency of the attacker’s question. In asking for the reason of asking (“kifaj g[alulәk ә:: wәʃ kat-chiefә,”), they mark the question as inappropriate. The host and the expert are not therefore doubting the veracity of Abdewahed’s narrative (for this is not the import of the repair they initiate), but they are as if asking Abdelwahed to account for the attacker’s inappropriate question. For them, the “ssәjjida” is Abdelwahed’s wife and it does not make sense to ask how he came to know her.

Next, Abdelwahed does repair by rewording his turn “dәxlu әlijja alallә wxdawha mnni bzzәz” (They came and took her from me by force) (line 20). He subsequently adds the true background for the attacker’s question : “gllijә knna kantәfuha qbә{l mn–” (He told me they knew her before I did) (line 21).

However, and before he finishes his turn, the host cuts him off with the question “wәʃ MRATәK?” (is she your wife?) (line 22). The louder and more emphatic “MRATәK” explicitly, and for the first time, marks the SRP husband/wife, hitherto assumed operative, as problematic, even doubtful.

The host, in other words, sensed that ‘a skeleton is in the cupboard’ of the caller’s narrative; but, up to the turn where she displays this doubt (line 22), there is nothing in the narrative that ushers to its imminence. This is corroborated by the fact that against the host’s doubt, the expert joins Abdelwahed (line 23) in confirming that the woman in question is his wife (line 24). Given that the narrative has not developed to a point where the true status of the referent is questionable, what then was the basis of the host’s doubt?
Were it a face-to-face interaction, Abdelwahed, would probably give off many clues that would raise hearers’ doubts—facial and body expressions, eyes contact, hesitation. A whole lot of visual expressions could belie what someone says in face-to-face encounters. As it stands, however, the host had no access to visual clues. In addition, Abdelwahed’s narrative displays no sign of dis-fluency markers beyond what normal interaction allows. The basis of the host’s doubt must therefore be sought somewhere in the talk itself. The claim here is that it is exactly the categorization work of Abdelwahed that forms its basis.

As said earlier, categorization does a lot of work in talk. It establishes relevant identities, defines the problem itself, projects the form and nature of advice (as well as the capacity in which the expert can provide it), and last, gauges the social distance between the characters in the narrative. All this work is done at one and the same time and, each aspect is interwoven in the other. Now, it is especially categorization work that Abdelwahed does not sustain in his narrative, exposing the whole narrative to the host’s doubt, and exposing it even further through the introduction of category bound activities in dissonance with his membership as ‘husband’. The call continues thus,

26 Host: nʕa:m. [wenta ġnu dәrti=
27 Expert: [nʕa:m a sidi a:
28 Host: =wəʔnu dәrti nta,
29 (0.7)
30 Abdelwahed: la: lalle madәrt wa:lu [b9it ( )
31 Expert: [A:H?
32 Abdelwahed: madәrt tә tta ʃi ٷәә madәrtha.
33 [hade huwa–
34 Host: [kifaj ʃa– mamʃiti ٷәәd lbuli:s maʃkiti?
35 .h annәk tәdәrbти?
36 biʔannahum xtaʃfolәk ٷәәә ۇәәә djalәk
37 ma: (hh) (.) mawәʃәʃ assi ٷәәd lwaḥәd
38 had lмаәʔәla ٷәәәdк.

The host has registered her doubt and then moves on to ask Abdelwahed’s about what he did after the attackers kidnapped his wife (line 26). The question is clearly oriented to the caller category-bound activity as ‘husband’ of the ‘wife’ kidnapped. After Abdelwahed’s answers
that he did nothing “madərt wa:lu” (I did not do anything) (line 30); and before he goes further in the narrative, the expert interrupts with an emphatic and loud “reaction token” “[A:H?]” (WHAT) (line 31) that expresses her incredulity.

Given the fact that husbands are assumed to helpwives, the host and the expert rebuke Abdelwahed for not doing an activity bound to him. Commonsensically indeed, to do ‘nothing’ is an incredulously atypical action in such a critical situation as kidnapping. The absence of the category-bound activity of ‘help’ is markedly noticeable in the narrative. Its absence detracts substantially from the veracity of the SPR ‘husband/wife’ claimed at the beginning. It renders Abdelwahed’s story ‘unclear’ (line 37).

Noticing his hearers’ doubt, Abdelwahed declares his true position vis-à-vis the lady he introduced as his wife.

39Abdelwahed: daba anə alallə lmujkila lli əndi
40 had ssəjda əndi məxəh wəld–
41 intkəlləm məxəkum bişarəha
42Expert : a:h.
43Abdelwahed: had ssjda əndi məxə əwəld
44 umamkatbʃ məxəh.
45 əndi məxə wəld omamkatbʃ məxəh.
46Host: WA vəwala məjt mra:tək
47 swəltək qəltk waj zəwəxa djələk=
48 =qəltili ejjəh zəwəxa djali.
49 məj mra:tək donc.
50Expert: daba hadi kənti məxərəha
51 fəxəd ddə:a:r u:w– uħəmlə:a:t
52 uʒaw: jı wəhdin
53 kane kajʃərfoʃə qəbəl mənək
54 oħajduhalek. jak?
55Abdelwahed: [(   )
56Expert: =hada huwa lḥadra, yak?
57Abdelwahed: aː θa: ḥada (h)uwa lmujkili
58 [lli trə lijja
59Host: [wa vəwala (talk continues)
It transpires then that the claimed category membership of ‘husband’ and the embeddedly claimed category of ‘wife’ are not the case. Abdelwahed admits that the woman he referred to as “had ssəjda” throughout his narrative is in fact his sexual partner (line 45).

There is another thing to note here. The repair initiator occurred much earlier in the call, prior to the host’s ‘mawadəḥj assi ʕəbd lwaḥəd had lmesʔala ʕəndk.’ (this thing, Mr. Abdelwahed, is not clear) (line 37-38). Precisely, it occurred where the host asked the caller “waʃ MRATəK?” (Is she your wife?) (line 22).

Since, before line 22, no apparent clue of ‘doubt’ was clear, its seed must therefore have lied in the inferences that the caller gave off because of categorization. The use of the category “had ssjda” throughout his narrative betrayed a wider social distance than that normally holding between a ‘husband’ and ‘a wife’ at the time when the events narrated took place.

After Abdelwahed did categorial repair, and, with it, the true social relations became visible, the expert invoked the true categorical identities of the parties to the narrative (line 50) to offer a summary of the problem (lines 50 to 54). With the new story line acknowledged by the caller, the parties then proceeded with question-answer sequences and later to advice sequences.

The lesson out of this example is interesting. Abdelwahed’s explicit categorization was inadvertently counteracted by his use of a reformulation (had ssjda). First, he implicated the category ‘wife’ to introduce his partner but reformulated this to ‘that lady’ and kept using the latter throughout the narrative. The reformulation betrayed a distance greater than he intended.

The irony in the example is that, at the same time that Abdelwahed deployed the category ‘husband’ to explicitly self-categorize himself, he was at the same time, and unknowingly, engaged in ‘implicit self-categorization’ (Psathas, 1999) through reformulation. The reformulation and the activities he brought up created for him what Lepper referred to as “disjunctive categories” (2000:36). These are asymmetric category pairings which generate conflicting characterizations of the same person.

Lepper however used the term to describe how different interactants differently categorize the same person; here it is used to draw attention to the fact that categorial reformulation by the same person can generate, by the subversion procedure, and even unintentially, a disjunctive
category. The implied disjunction in Abdelwahed’s example leads to disjunctive understanding of two different “versions of reality” (ibid) — one given and the other given off by categorization in the narrative. The host’s question “waf MRATәK?” was therefore the incipience of a challenge (Silverman, 1998) to Abdelwahed’s narrative, and which culminated later in his confession that ‘that lady’, was not actually his wife, but his sexual partner.

The example also shows another aspect of the narratives in calls to phone-in radio programs. All the narratives introduced share a basic aspect. They are all specimen of what Silverman calls “hearably fragile stories” (1998, p. 93). The stories caller construct are designed to ‘immune’ their ‘version of reality’ from prospected challenge by hearers (ibid.). However, where callers in the other examples succeeded to immune themselves from challenge to identities claimed, Abdelwahed in the last example failed to do so.

The last episode introduced in the section shows how categorial reformulation and repair can be a tricky matter when no culturally available category is fit to describe a situation.

Example 25
Kiflhal 02-11-2015/ (10) (01:11:46)

1 Hasna: lhaːle djali huwə annaːː øː lmuhim
2  øː zzawə djali huw- lli huwa baːbah
3 .h jə(h)ni txəlla ɬлина: whəwa ɬndu
4 jallah xəms jhoːr qəl ji ᵃʃemə.
5 Host: mːm.
6 Expert: mh ɬəh, mh ɬəh,
7 Hasna: txəlla ɬliːna umʃə: >lμuhim<ːm:
8 ɬajəʃ ɬjatu: whada:
9 fəmdina xra, matajː-
10 ldarəʃ et annahu mətajnfəq 3liːh
11: [ldarəʃ et annahu-
12Host: [mataʃ swəʃʃ ɬliːh mem ppa?
13Hasna: mətaj swəʃʃ ɬliːh utal ʔahl djalu
14 mem ppa 1ʔahl djale mətay sə[ʍluːʃ ɬliːh=
15Host: [mːm.
16 =mattaʃi ɦaːʃaː øː-
17Host: [.h aloʃ mli katquli txəlla ɬliːkum=
The absence of category terms that are culturally sanctioned to provide for a situation leads to extended talk to reformulate just those inferences that may be drawn from the use of categorial terms that do not best describe that situation. In the particular extract below, the caller has recourse to extensive interactional work to explain her incumbency of a category for which there is no appropriate term, in the sense that there is no culturally available default term (lines 1-16).

All the talk above is introduced by the caller to describe a social organization that is neither marriage nor divorce (line 25). The problem is that there is no culturally available term to describe a husband who leaves his family and lives his own life independently of them. The caller, Hasna, invokes her husband’s activities to warrant her membership in what might be glossed as ‘deserted wife’ (line 7). Of course, ‘deserted wife’ is a linguistically available description, but not a culturally sanctified one. There are no social consequences, nor assumptions, nor rights and obligations attached to it. In short, there are no category-bound activities that follow from membership in that category.

When a husband deserts his wife, or vice versa, it is not a fulfillment of a category-bound activity of a ‘deserter’ but it is rather the non-fulfillment of the category-bound activity of ‘wife’ or ‘husband’. It is for this reason that there is no pair such as ‘deserter/deserted’ the cluster of which would entail a culturally recognized set of activities.

The case of the category ‘deserted wife’ is similar in this regard to ‘boyfriend’ or ‘girlfriend’. Relations there are, but no expected consequences follow (like moving together, bringing
children, etc, in short, normalizing the SRP). Unlike the other categories introduced so far, the one negotiated through the sequences above are what Jayyusi (1984) refers to as an ‘occasioned category’. It only serves an identity of the caller for the purposes of that call where this category is consequential for the projected advice-giving sequence. The occasioned nature of the category is clear in the length of the reformulation sequence above. First, Hasna describes her situation vis-à-vis her husband to show how that category does not fit her present situation. Hasna then summarizes the husband’s activities as “txəlla ʕliːna ūmja:” (he deserted us and went away) (line 7). This turn then generates the occasioned categories ‘deserter’ for the husband and ‘deserted’ for the wife. However, since the generated categories have no culturally recognized status, the host initiated repair on them by trying to accommodate them to culturally recognized categories (line 19),

17Host: [.h aloyd mllic katguli txəlla ʕliːkum=  
18Host: [əː=  
19Host: =ttalæqtuː wlla ɣi mjə fhaluː m-

In doing repair, Hasna makes clear the unsuitability of that categorization ‘divorced’ as “the problem” (line 21). She, however, does not provide repair per see; but she just rephrased the problem as “mahna mzewziːn mahna mtəlqiːn” (we are neither married nor divorced) (line 25). After a long turn, then, Hasna denies incumbency of the established categories ‘married’ and ‘divorce’ (lines 25). Lacking a shorthand category, then, both Hasna and the host had to work extensively through many turns to reach agreement just over an appropriate category to describe Hasna’s situation (line 28).

At the end of Hasna’s extended turn, the host offers the occasioned category “mfruːqiːn” (separate) (line 28) and Hasna agrees with the description. Notice, however, how this categorization merely re-introduces the previous one implied in “txəlla ʕliːna ūmja:”. Its re-introduction displays that the parties have now reached a ‘working consensus’ on the appropriate category to use. They can therefore proceed with the business of the call that the repair sequence halted; and this they did.

The last example demonstrates that reformulation and repair are not done randomly but are geared towards actions that parties to the calls want to implement. The availability of
culturally and socially sanctified categories provides callers with a handy way to squeeze referential and descriptive clusters into a single category. In the absence of culturally available categories, categorization, reformulation and repair can indeed be a tricky business. To corroborate this, it might be noiced that, had the caller used ‘mfru:qi:n’ right at the beginning, it might have been unclear as how that category describes her situation. There are many ways a husband and wife can be ‘separated’ than there are for them to be ‘divorced’. They can live under the same roof yet live separately; they can be physically or emotionally separated, or they choose just not ignore each other; or do no longer care for each other, etc. each of these situations can be described as ‘separation’. Had the caller above used the category right from the outset of the narrative, it might have triggered repair to what exactly ‘seperated’ means. In this sense it is possible to talk of culturally-sanctioned and culturally-unsanctioned categories.

An example of a category which has fared well toward normalization in the Moroccan society is ‘single mother’. Calling a woman a ‘single mother’ now brings forth a collection of moral assumptions, social and legal organizations, and a whole set of what has now become common knowledge, that go with it. Instead of narrating the whole story of how one came to be pregnant with a child outside marriage, and narrating the consequences of it socially, legally, economically, etc., one can use the categorial shorthand ‘single mother’. The acceptance of occasioned categories as natural therefore tells a lot about the development and change of cultural values.

**Summary**

The purpose of the chapter was to study the categorial and sequential aspects of gender work in the calls to Moroccan phone-in radio shows. Following a somewhat general characterization of the sequential structure of the calls in section one, section two detailed the work participants in the programs do to set up the scene as exactly shared, therefore expected, for a gender division of labor. The social roles women take on (e.g. giving birth to children, mothering them, and working inside the house) are invoked as natural for parties to calls. It is exactly where the power of categorization lies—to invoke a world that is ‘natural’ every time appropriate categories are invoked.

In order to depict that naturalness, one may here draw attention to specific cases where categorization ‘fails’; if only to press further the argument made in the foregoing discussion. One needs only think of cases where a husband who chooses to take care of babies and of a
wife who sustains her family by working outside. In a case like that, the notion that the wife is ‘mothering’ her baby is, for members of the Moroccan society, suspended. The wife is simply not doing what ‘being a mother’ involves. On the husband’s side, while what he does is appropriately ‘mothering’, it is hard to refer to him as ‘being a mother’. It is twice as hard to refer to his activities as ‘fathering’ either.

The ‘unnaturalness’ of roles reversal proves how very gender-linked, and therefore, how naturally genderized, those roles are. ‘Mother’ and ‘father’ only begin when a child is given birth within the family; the culturally sanctified division is for women to ‘mother’ and males to ‘father’ their children.

A similar example, and a more troubling one for that, is the case of same-sex couples who adopt children. The partners can of course fulfill every role a mother or a father does; but the difficulty, in fact the unnaturalness, of categorizing them individually as ‘father’ and ‘mother’ is further evidence of the culturally genderized nature of the activities organized around membership categories.

Within the analytical framework of genderized categories, the third section constituted further evidence of the taken-for-granted naturalness, within the Moroccan society, of the social division of labor across gender and across space. That ‘work’ has to be explicitly invoked marks women’s status only against a culturally natural role of ‘housewives’. The analysis in the section also showed how women build on their incumbency of the category ‘working person’ to construct versions of their problems to deal with social and moral dilemmas in ways inexperienced by men. In sum, the category ‘working woman’ raises social and moral issues for its incumbents.

Section four claimed that categories have role maintenance boundaries built in them. Doing categorization is definitely a business of drawing lines between incumbents of different identities. The boundary maintenance function is enabled by duplicative organization, standardized relational pairs, and in most genderized categories (husband/wife, father/mother, father/child, mother/child, etc.). The examples is the section showed that the device ‘family’ makes relevant categories that are divided, in addition to role, with regard to both gender and space. Woman-cum-wife-cum-mother is expectedly an inside-the house member. On the other hand, man-cum-husband-cum-father is a membership outside the houseiv. Again, the unnaturalness of categorical permutations is worth remembering for how stable these categorizations are.
Gender work

Analysis in sections five and six was carried out on similar data as the previous sections but from a different angle. Section five looked at how categories construct that and only that identity on which the identification of the problem hinges. This in keeping with a powerful CA- and MCA-informed caveat: Since people can be categorized in a virtually countless number of ways, the relevance of a category, like gender, must be shown to be relevant for members themselves before it is analytically relevant for the researcher.

By way of showing their relevance, the identities invoked by callers were shown to do specific actions in the context where they were used. One such action is to construct specific versions of callers’ problems. Since the calls were advice-driven, relevant identities allowed callers to align prospective advice with the version of the problem presented. Neither the host nor the expert advised on just any life-area a caller may have problems in, but only those areas as invoked in the narrative and restrained by categorization. For instance, for a caller asking about a child’s problem, the knowledge that they are married does not justify the expert in giving advice on family life in general. However, the expert is justified in using that knowledge to bear upon any other advice given for the problem.

Callers therefore color the problem as ‘family problem’, ‘work problem’, ‘legal problem’, ‘financial problem’, etc., essentially through categorial work. They invoke their relevant identity in the problem through that work. Categorization, therefore, carries the seeds of the shape the problem will take as well as the shape the advice will take. The analysis in section six has demonstrated how that was possible.

Section seven considered a different, but related, aspect of categorization. It showed how reformulation and repair display social distance between people involved in callers’ stories. Like other linguistic aspects – styles, register, pitch, pronouns choice, etc.– the analysis of reformulation and repair can be studied for what it tells about the social relations of power, solidarity, and distance. Section seven considered only one such aspect, social distance, but categorial repair (and its uptake in sequences) can also be studied to measure power and solidarity in that it constitutes a site where contention is likely to arise.

Overall, the analysis in this chapter makes one conclusion clear. Participants to calls to phone-ins draw on the structural — i.e. sequential aspects of the calls, given their overall format—and the categorical —i.e. descriptive resources provided by the linguistic, social, and cultural organization of society— to display themselves as sharing the same framework operative in
the calls. How genderized categories do achieve a common framework in the calls is what is here referred as gender work.

Notes

¹ That the expert thought the ‘caller’ divorcee was suggested to me by my supervisor. However, even that assumption is based on the MCD ‘family’ and orients to the category ‘breadwinner’ as the male’s prerogative in the first place. The point is that in the absence of explicit categorization of a woman as ‘working person’, the inferences made about her are related to her default categorization as ‘housewife’.

² In fact, an analysis along the CA/MCA line is needed to track the systematic sequential and categorial conditions that enable the expert to step aside from situated identity as legal counselor in order to provide personal opinions and advice.

³ It might be noted, as an aside, that the choice of ‘sājjida’ (lady), over ‘lmra’ (woman) for example, marks a greater degree of politeness and a sexual unavailability, aspects that attend social relations between strangers. In this, the choice of ‘sājjida’ over ‘lmra’ has probably the same underlying motivation as the choice of the word ‘lady’ over ‘woman’ in English. ‘Lady’ is more polite and is stripped of social connotations associated with ‘woman’. As such ‘lady’ has come to be used euphemistically (Lakoff, 1975) in relation to sexual connotations. Also, in contrast to example 21 where the reformulation from “ḥad ṭraẓal” to “waldk” was done to bridge the social distance the former word might conjure, the category “sājjida” in this example is done to widen the social distance if taken as a tacit reformulation of the category ‘ex-wife’ embedded in Aḥrāf’s self-reference as ‘dirvoced. It can therefore be said that membership category reformulation in talk can be a metric of social distance between person referents there in.

⁴ I agree with my supervisor’s suggestion that the unnaturalness of ‘working mothers’ lingers in traditional societies only; but I hold that Morocco is semi-modern. ‘Working mothers’ are only tolerated and not fully naturalized. Housework is still women’s business, which explains why working women assume responsibility particularly for child-related, problems. The fact that work-wife and housewife are exclusive of each other for women, in a way that workman and houseman are not, suggests that the Moroccan society is on the way to modernity, as far as cultural values go, and not a fully modern society.
Chapter IV: The interactional relevance of gender to talk and its moral character

Introduction

As said earlier in the review, an analyst is bound by the categorization work their data warrant, and has no right to impose their own categories, unless of course they are willing to engage in what Schegloff termed an act of ‘analytical imperialism’ (1997, p. 167). Categorization, it was said, is a “situated accomplishment of social interaction” (Stokoe, 2006, p. 468) that parties to talk achieve. Given such a view of category work, gender is not omni-relevant as West and Zimmerman (1987) argue (see also Klein, 2011), but is of analytic importance only when it is demonstrably relevant for societal members in their everyday conduct. This latter idea is fully embraced by contemporary scholars working in the field of gender and language, and who use CA and MCA as research methods (See for example Jackson, 2011).

Embracing that idea entails that researchers study the interactional ways in which gender affects the outcome of interaction, in addition to its furnishing a cultural backdrop to the understanding of genderized categories in talk (previous chapter). Besides the cultural assumptions displayed through members’ use of genderized categories, gender, as a contextual property, must also be “procedurally related” for the stepwise unfolding of actions in interaction (Schegloff, 1987a, p. 219), if it is to be warranted an analytical consideration. It will be remembered that ‘procedural consequentiality’, according to Speer (2005, p. 171), is a criterion by which the utility of a ‘constructionist’ approach to gender is judged for its validity (see chapter one, p. 42).

The current view on gender outlined, the present chapter takes up such dimensions of it as aptly provide for its consequentiality in Moroccan mundane conversations as well as in calls to phone-ins. The chapter begins by tackling a recently emerging debate resulting from the consideration of gender and procedural consequentiality. The debate concerns the analytical grounds for the separation, on interactional grounds, of the linguistic relevance of gender, on the one hand, from its interactional relevance (Kitzinger & Rickford, 2007; Jackson, 2011). The difference concretely translates into a distinction between using gender categories to achieve certain outcomes in interaction, and using gender — because of linguistic necessity — as a property categories have, including their linguistic marking of the gender of interactants. Concomitant to the distinction between ‘linguistic gender’ and ‘interactional gender’ is a claim that only the latter allows fruitful analytical observations to be made about the work of
gender categorization in conversation. It is fit to say at this juncture that the body of the present analytical chapter hinges around this distinction in the following ways.

First, section one applies the distinction between linguistic and interactional gender to data from the Moroccan Arabic context. It argues, along the lines established by Kitzinger and her associates’ argument for English, that linguistically-marked gender categorization does not necessarily mean that gender is relevant to the outcomes of interaction (Kitzinger & Rickford, 2007; Kitzinger, Shaw and Toerien, 2012). To concretize this claim, section one opens with an empirical exemplification of the sort of issues the differentiation entails for the present analytical undertaking.

Second, the study of gender for its interactional import permits a detailed analysis of those actions which are done through talk and that bear on interaction. The study allows one to see gender not only as one parameter of the intelligibility of interaction (i.e., as a cultural backdrop), but also to see it, ‘creeping into talk’ (Hopper and LeBarron, 1998), in a way that is visible in interaction (Klein, 2011). One way to see gender at work is to consider the relevance of gender categories to everyday moral judgments. It is that line of analysis that section two takes up.

Section two specifically pursues the moral character of gender work and reveals a world of what Stokoe and Edwards call ‘mundane morality’ (2012) (also, Stokoe and Edwards, 2009). Analysis therein details the descriptive and categorial procedures behind, and which allow for, the accomplishment of gender categorization as part of the task of doing morality, that is, of holding people up for judgments, evaluations, criticisms, appraisals etc. More particularly, the analysis traces those talk episodes where the moral character of ‘a person’, upheld for moral judgmental, becomes related to their gender (Stokoe, 2006). In short then, the section analyzes the moral aspects of gender categories where those contribute to the action of ‘doing morality’ in interaction.

Taken together, the two sections that make up the present chapter substantiate the claim of procedural consequentiality — that gender explicitly affects the outcomes of interaction in ways visible in talk. In addition to that, the chapter illustrates such consequentiality within the domain of morality. It shows that gender categorization has a normatively moral character, and is a locus of judgments, descriptions, blame, decisions, etc., that reflexively tie moral conduct to standards of morality locally defined, as well as invoked, by members in interactional situations. Mundane morality does not, therefore, involve the application of
abstract moral reasoning to concrete situations. It does involve, however, the work of constructing moral principles out of contextual particulars and categorial specifications that are interactionally constructed. It is here that one can start to appreciate the uniqueness of a sequential-categorial analysis of gender work. Unlike other essentialist approaches, CA and MCA do not consider gender an inherent feature of interactants that can statistically be co-related to types of moral reasoning (Stokoe, Edwards, 2012). Instead, both gender and morality are interactional achievements— i.e., products of interaction.

CA and MCA study whether or whether not gender bears on interaction; and if it does then what the nature of its effects is. A said above, this approach stems from the focus of CA and MCA on sequences in interaction; but also from the fact that gender is not an overarching factor affecting interactions now and always. After all, people do judgmental descriptions, evaluations, condemnations, assessments, and all sort of moral work based on all sorts of categories (Jayyusi, 1984 for a analysis of categorization and moral work, and see Jackson, 2011, Stokoe & Edwards, 2012 for specific analyses of gender and moral work, see also Nilan, 1994).

In short then, the chapter holds the distinction between the linguistic relevance and the interactional relevance of gender. The crux of the chapter argues for the primacy of the latter. First however, an illustration of what linguistic gender means is due, if only to provide the relevant background for the argument.

1. Linguistic and interactional relevance of gender categories

The first section empirically tackles a contentious point in the literature on gender, CA and MCA. Briefly, the contention hinges on the following: When and how does gender turn into an issue for analysis? Are analysts to assume the relevance of gender dynamics each time a gender term surfaces in member’s talk, i.e., treating gendered-marked words, for example, as warranting an analytic stance that incorporates gender issues? Are they to assume its relevance based on the gender of parties to talk? Or are they to assume the relevance of gender only when members invoke its relevance, regardless of categorical work in talk?

Klein (2011) for example, argued for the omni-relevance of gender as witnessed in the preponderance of words that refer to men and women in conversation, especially the words ‘man’ and ‘women’ themselves, or some variants thereof (through chains of references). She argued that since gender is linguistically coded in English, that codification warrants its
‘system relevance’ if not its action relevant in interaction (Klein, 2011, p. 69). Kitzinger and her associates, on the other hand (see especially Stockill and Kitzinger, 2007; Jackson, 2011), hold that gender becomes of analytic importance only at the interactional level, notwithstanding its linguistic relevance.

Among other things, linguistic gender is ordinarily displayed in personal names, pronouns, kinship terms and categories. Jackson (2011) analyzed episodes where linguistically gendered terms, especially categories for referring to persons, were used. She concluded that, even though gender-marked, such terms did not make gender and issue. According to her "[i]t appears that the marking of gender through linguistically gendered references is the norm…a kind of baseline noticing that does not necessarily make gender relevant for participants". (2011, p. 180)

Furthermore, the differentiation between the linguistic and the interactional relevance of gender allowed Jackson to incorporate in her analysis what she referred to as “gender-neutral references that invoke gender” (2011, p. 194); categories which include not only job references (doctor, player, professor), words like ‘person,’ and people, but also pronouns like ‘we’ and ‘they’ (Malone, 1980 chpt 3).

It was said above that the insistence on distinguishing between linguistic and interactional gender is a analytical step that follows from the kind of theoretical stance MCA and CA advocate. Within these two approaches, it is the formal organization of, and the actions embodied in, talk, as demonstrably evidenced in talk itself, which constitute the goal of analysis. To say that gender is omni-relevant, and to find it in larger or smaller contextual cues, without tangible proof in talk, is to allow for the kind of contextual laxity that befalls other approaches (see the discussion on the framework problem (pp. 59-62).

Subscribing to the theoretical stance of CA and MCA, this section shows how the action-course of a sequence is not always dependent on gender, although gender categories may be present linguistically in talk (or contextually as interactants can be categorized in males and females). The detailed analysis of some samples in this section argues for that stance.

Similar to other languages, Moroccan Arabic indexes gender not only through personal names, but its inflection system marks almost every word for gender. This being the case, distinguishing between the linguistic and the interactional relevance of gender is as pressing in Moroccan Arabic as it is in English, if not more pressing.
For Moroccan Arabic as well, categories can be marked for gender linguistically without its being an issue for parties to talk. The actions being realized are not dependent for their realization on gender categorial work. All the examples in this section demonstrate how the course of actions is separate from any consideration of gender categories; therefore, gender cannot be said to be relevant. The beginning is with one such example.

**Example 1**

**VOC6-001- (00:00:32)**

1. Abdrafiq:  
   [o3ab LLAH əːː [rbbi daː tɾɛːq
2. Salim:  
   [wahd lːbəːnt
3.  
4. Salim:  
   wahɛd lbɛnt kant
5. k/ddir li zitiːd franse
6. kant katqra mʕa xti flafak,
7. Hamid:  
   əːː,
8. Salim:  
   uhujja mdik ziha djal mtalsa.
9. wahd lxtra salha=
10. =huʃja ʔndha dik lholm tɛmʃi lbraa=
11. kaddir lfranse.
12.  
13. (1)
14. za wahɛd xtɛbha mndk-
15. (0.75)
16. dak dik jʃi rah madahir
17. flə(xx) maːtxɛʃəʃ.

In this example, neither the reference to ‘wahɛd lbɛnt’ (line 1), nor to ‘xti’ (line 6), nor indeed ‘wahɛd’ (line 13), does make gender a focal point for the interactants. Both ‘wahɛd lbɛnt’ and ‘wahɛd’ are non-recognitionals. As Sacks and Schegloff (1979) demonstrate, non-recognitionals make no demand on the hearer to try to identify the person referred to, beyond the fact that such a person exists. ‘xti’, on the other hand, is a recognitional reference, since it refers to a known person—known by virtue of its being a kin to the speaker. The import of the categories, and the information they encode are, however, not a matter
relevant to the action of done in Salim’s turn, which is to secure an “extended turn” (Liddicoat, 2007, p. 283), where a second story can be told (Sacks, 1992, Vol 2, lecture 1 p.4). The excerpt above constitutes then one component of the story that Salim wanted to tell after Abderrafiq brought his to a close.

Technically, the turn is not a ‘preface’, in Sacks’ words (1986, and also 1992, Vol II, lecture 1) which normally announces the coming of a story to secure a conversational placement for its telling. It is more of an ‘orientation’ part of the story, in Labov’s terminology (1997), where speakers established characters, time, and place (Labov and Waletzky, 1967, Labov, 1997). Salim then, jumps headlong in the telling the story without any prefaces. This is so because the narrative does not occur as a ‘first’ story since Salim tells it after Abderrafiq finishes his narrative. The sequential placement of the story as ‘second’ guarantees its interactional relevance (Sacks, 1992, Vol II, p. 7). In other words, Salim does not need to provide for the relevance of the story with a ‘preface’.

Sequentially then, the introduction of the characters is the beginning of the narrative, (Labov and Waletzky, 1967, Labov, 1997). It gives “some indication of roughly what the story is about” (Liddicoat, 2007, p. 286) and whom it is about. The formulation at the end of Abderrafiq’s story (line 1) offers a sequential space where parties to talk may tell another story that relates to the first; and, in the telling of that new story, demonstrate their understanding of the first story and what it accomplishes (Sacks, 1992, Vol II, p. 6).

Obviously then, Salim’s turn falls in a sequential environment where the telling of a second story is appropriate (Sacks, 1992, Vol II, lecture 1). After the introduction of the characters, notice how Salim formulates its moral, “dak dik fji rah madahir fllæxxr ma:t xmin skf” (They are just appearances that should not fool you), which sums up the morale, not of the story to come only, but also displays what analysis he makes of the first story and the kind of action it does. In other words, both Abderrafiq’s and Salim’s story are related through a ‘similarity’ of the morale each teaches (ibid). It is that understanding which the latter makes of the former’s story, and it is that understanding that attaches to the latter’s yet-to-come narrative. In his lecture, Sacks (1992, Vol 2, lecture 1) takes the analysis of similarities of conversational first and second stories further towards establishing a general formal principle by which the similarities can be viewed as an interactional achievement concertedly organized by parties to talk. Roughly speaking, the principle stipulates that B, as a hearer of A’s story, actively engages his memory to bring a second story in which B occupies
the same position A occupies in his. In the example above, Abderrafiq’s entitlement to telling the story derives from his being, so to speak, a first-order acquaintance (friend) to the main character. Similarly, Salim’s entitlement originates in his being a second-order acquaintance in the way explained below.

Taking the above into consideration, the introduction of the characters then establishes the relational grid organizing their relationship to each other, and to the speaker right at the beginning. The introduction, in addition, guarantees that subsequent reference to the characters, via pronoun chains and other expressions, is referentially clear and adequate through the story. The reference to story characters in gender-marked expressions had the purpose of clarifying subsequent pronominal use (see Klein, 2011). As Klein (2011) argues, reference using gender has the purpose of clarifying their subsequent replacement with pronouns after the initial introduction of categories.

The expression ‘wahed lbent’ (a girl) (line 4) introduces the main character in the story. The kinship term ‘xti’ (my sister), on the other hand, indentifies the main character with relation to the speaker (she studied with his sister, line 6), and furnishes the epistemic basis on which Salim is entitled to narrate the story—i.e. he knows about the story because the main character, the girl, was his sister’s classmate (line 6). The sister figures in the story as the basis for the epistemic authority the teller has in telling it. For this reason, the pronominal chain in the rest of the story, beginning in line 8, is understood to refer to the girl and not to the sister. The story recipients un-problematically process the pronominal references without apparent difficulty even though both characters are female.

Interactionally therefore, it is the action of introducing the characters of a story that is important. Even though the words “wahed lbent”, ‘xti’ and ‘wahed’ are gender-marked terms, gender had no further contribution to the action beyond the linguistic indexing of the characters. It is, in other words, one linguistic parameter of the intelligibility of pronouns in the story.

**Example 2**

Gender is also not an issue in the following example, although the action patterns are more complicated than in the previous one. The excerpt is taken from a long conversation where the speaker, Zoubir, tells about a girl he encountered a few months ago,
Zoubir’s declaration, “kanqlleb ʕla bənt nna:s.” (I’m looking for a good girl to marry), is designed to achieve two things. First the declaration serves to clear his ground as to the meaning, at least to him, of his ‘going out’ with the girl he met a few months before. That is, it is not for fun, and the relationship has a purpose. In addition, the invocation of ‘bənt nna:s’ (line 2) sets a benchmark of ‘eligibility for marriage’ for the girl referred to.

The categorization ‘bənt nna:s’ is a sort of tacit moral evaluation of potentially marriageable girls, and of which the girl in question is a candidate. It oriented his interlocutor to gauge the fit between the girl’s description in the conversation, with the standards a ‘girl’ should meet in order to qualify for marriage (a ‘bənt nna:s’).

Considering the above, the categorization, ‘bənt nna:s’, then exonerates Zoubir from any impeachment of moral depravity as well as establishes, tacitly and reflexively, a standard to consider in descriptive work that concerns the girls, if invoked.

Zoubir’s talk continues thus,
The personality items cited in the list (lines 13 and 14) are built through an external logic to the list— they have no shared characteristics except their falling under the rubric, the heading, ‘bənt nna:s’ (Jayyusi, 1984 on the construction of lists). As Jayyusi observes, “the items may ‘fit’ together [not] because of some family resemblance, some common denominator…[but] because they all relate to a person or thing external to the list by virtue of which alone the list was organized” (1984, p. 76). She calls this type of lists “task-related list” (ibid.). Given this property, the qualities above (lines 13 and 14) are assembled out of a myriad of other qualities that, commonsensically, could have been added, but were not, added to the list. Also, Zoubir uses a three-part list that is almost always used when constructing list in conversation (Jeffesron, 1991).

The qualities are not only hearable as a post-identification of the general categorization ‘bənt nna:s’; but also display Zoubir’s vested interest in the logic of their production— These are the terms (the qualities) on which he is willing to defend the girl as a member of the category ‘bənt nna:s’. The link is guaranteed by the juxtaposition of the category ‘bənt nna:s’ (line 2) to the descriptive work that followed it (lines 13 and 14). Also, that the list is locally assembled is shown in its open-endedness, as is clear first from the cut-off “w-” (and-) (line 14) and the “w ansi dswit.” (and so on and so forth) (line 17), after the one second pause (line 15). The items cited became therefore just instances of a general stock.

Given these properties of Zoubir’s list construction, the etcetera-clause in it (line 17) renders the qualities both potentially defeasible but also potentially defensible. Should hearers challenge the description “drwiʃa wzweːːwna txoː bel bzzaf wdriwiʃa” (nice and cute very beautiful and nice); or should they argue that these are not important criteria to qualify someone as a ‘bənt nna:s’; or that there are other more important qualities, Zoubir could retort that any other item is included in the etcetera-clause of the list. It is in that sense that Zoubir’s descriptive items are at the same time immune from, and open to, challenge. Hearers can question their relevance; speakers can defend it, and both are interactationally managed. In short, the expression ‘bənt nna:s’ metaphorically stands for a marriageable
girl with certain qualities that are locally negotiated. However, the expression itself does not make gender an issue for the parties to this episode even if it is gender marked.

It was noted above that category ‘bənt nna:s’ was post-identified by a three-part list. Neither was the list close-ended and, so other qualities could have been added, nor were the qualities universal; so disagreement could have arisen. Notwithstanding this openness, one second elapsed in the conversation (line 15), after the descriptive work was done without the list raising a gender issue (disagreement over the item of the list for example). Hamid’s turn “[əh hh.]” was a continuer that marked his forgoing of the turn and orientation to Zoubir’s talk as unfinished. The continuer is in fact sensitive to an item already displayed by Zoubir in order to show that his turn was unfinished (the “walkin” (but) in line 10).

Since the list figures between the contrastive “walkin” and the etc. clause, its parenthetical status allows Zoubir to mark his sensitiveness to the job description he has introduced (line 6) right after his invocation of the standard ‘bənt nna:s’ was introduced. Indeed, the parenthesis with which Zoubir has opened up the list could be said to orient to the inferential inappropriateness of the invocation of ‘job’ right after ‘bənt nna:s’— that Zoubir treats ‘job status’ as the criterion for the intelligibility of the category ‘bənt nna:s’.

As it stands, the above sketch of the action course of the episode demonstrates its openness for other potential issues. While it could raise potentially gender-relevant issues, neither party to the talk pursued arguments concerning, for instance, male criteria of social desirability of working women, male judgments of female character, female beauty standards etc. Gender could have been, but is simply not, an issue for the interactants here.

Another way to put this is to say that the expression ‘bənt nna:s’ sums up an implicit set of qualities a female, as a potential candidate for marriage, must have. However, what the qualities of a ‘bənt nna:s’ are, how the qualities translate into a ‘good wife’, and by what standards girls are separated into ‘bənt nna:s’ in contrast to those who do not qualify for membership in that category; all these issues were glossed over by Hamid’s acknowledgment token ‘ma[ʔgo:la.’ (line 4) and the continuer “[əh hh.” (line 16), subsequent to Zoubir’s declaration of intention. As it stands then, the parties to this interaction chose to preserve their tacit agreement over the relevant aspects of the categorization “bənt nna:s”. Although the categorization is imbued with a host of cultural assumptions, the Hamid and Zouhir chose to pass them by.
This glossing over is in fact interesting because, as Kitzinger and Wilkinson (2016, in press) gender-marked words could, but need not, trigger gender issues. The decision whether or not to pursue them is members’ problems. The problem is not that members do not orient to gender, they do (and section 2 illustrates that), but it is that they sometimes choose to disregard gender to pursue other issues that are, for them, more important in the business of talk. The interactional instances provided above have exemplified that.

Example 3
The examples provided below draw on another aspect of the linguistic relevance of gender. The categorization work in them illustrates how categories that are marked for the male-gender are un-problematically used and understood as referring to both males and females.

In example 3, the group categorizations ‘lwli:da:t’ and ‘dra:ri’ are interactionally used as a cover term for both ‘boys’ and ‘girls’, notwithstanding the explicit linguistic marking of the two words for ‘male’. This is revealed only in turns that come after the invocation of the two categories.

hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (22) (01:37:07)

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Host: fin mxə[l]a lwliːdaʔ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aziz: (bhaliː)-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aziz: aː[:h(h)]?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Host: fin xlləːːt lwliːdaːt?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ʂənd lʔuːm djalhaʔ=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aziz: [(k)txliːhiːm=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>=ʂənd mrt xoːhaː &gt;wme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>məːɾft ʂən[d ( ) xoːhaː ana knʃəf=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Host: [aːh ʂənd ɬaʔila djalha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Aziz: əna draːri [anə kanʃof=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Host: [məːm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Aziz: =kənchuːf mkərfsin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Maha: .hh chhalː chhaːl fʃməɾhoːm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>lwliːdaːt assiːː aziz?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Aziz: dabə drriːːː lbnijjə dabə ʂəndha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>təqribən ḫi ɬdaːch tlʃaːm.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The host’s initial question “fin mxə[lja 1wlidat?” (where does she keep the children?) (line 1) receives a pertinent answer only after a repair sequence (lines 4 and 5). Also, the question is repeated with a likely candidate answer “ʕənd 1ʔu:m djalha?” (with her mother?) (line 6). The repeated question receives an answer that closes the sequence of question-answer. However, the question is subsequently modified to allow for uncertainty—the expression “mə3rft” (line 9). The host then terminates the sequence through the use of the acknowledgment marker “a:h” (line 10), followed by a TCU that displays the reason she has asked the question and introduced the candidate answer. Namely, her goal was to check whether the host of the children is, or is not, a family-member (stranger). This is evident in the fact that, although the caller has answered the question only in uncertain terms, using “mə3rft ʔən[d ( ) xoha:” (line 9), the uncertainty is nonetheless acknowledged as satisfying. The category proposed by the caller “xoha:”, and the one proposed by the host “1ʔu:m” make relevant the device ‘family’. It is then the children’s keeper’s membership in the device that was acknowledged by the host and not a particular category therein, hence her paraphrase “ʕənd 1ʔaʔila djalha.” (line 10).

After the question-answer sequence has terminated, Aziz introduces his assessment of the children’s well being in terms of an observation (an assessment that was previously abandoned because it was interrupted, line 9),

11Aziz: əna dra:ri [anə kanʃof =  
12Host: [mʰəm  
13Aziz: =kəŋchu:f mkərfsin.

Aziz picked up on the host’s use of the word ‘lwlidat’ and introduces another synonym ‘dra:ri’ (line 11). What both ‘dra:ri’ and ‘lwlidat’ (male-children) have in common is their linguistic marking for ‘male’, considering that ‘lwlidat’ and ‘dra:ri’ are understood by Aziz and the host as synonymously referring to the same collection of persons, identified as Aziza’s children. After that, the host uses the variant ‘lwlidat’ to initiate another question “chha:l fΣmerho:m wlida:t assi:: aziz?” (how old are your children Mr.
Aziz?) (lines 14 and 15). It is in the answer to that question that Aziz reveals the true gender of his children. One child is a ‘girl’ (line 16) and the other is a ‘boy’ (line 18).

Evidently, the revelation causes no comments on the gender of the children and, as such, does not make gender relevant. Clearly the caller did not orient to the linguistic ‘maleness’ of ‘lwlidat’ in the host’s initial questions; even though he knew the gender of his children as a matter of course. Likewise, the host does not treat her use of ‘lwlidat’ previously as problematic; even after the gender of the caller’s children is now revealed (she uses an acknowledgment token and a continuer, line 19 below). The parties, therefore, do not treat the gender of the children as important to the series of question-answers here and indeed, nowhere was the business of the call contingent on their gender.

16Aziz:  dabə drriːː-- lbnijjə dabə ʕəndha
17  teqribən jı .hasClass tlʕaːm.
18  udrriːː raː: tələʕ dəbaː lxmlmsniːn.
19Maha:  nʕaːm mhm,
20Ilham:  mhm,

The revelation of the children’s gender occurs in talk when Aziz maps age onto individual cases of his children rather than in talk where the category ‘children’ was treated as a collectivity (group).

As an aside, it may be noticed, given the case discussed, that the translation of the words ‘lwlidat’ and ‘draːri’ using the English word ‘children’, rather than ‘boys’ right at the start might not be accurate, semantically speaking. The equation of ‘children’ with ‘wlidat’ is a retrospective operation that can be done only after Maha’s question about their age forced the breaking of the group to its individual members.

Had it transpired that the category ‘lwlidat’ contained male members only, the translation to ‘boys’ would have been more appropriate. Similarly, had the collectivity contained ‘girls’ only, then ‘girls’ would have been the appropriate English word to translate ‘lwlidat’. The example actually shows that the interactional dimension can in fact add a layer of complexity to translating transcripts into English, French or another language where a gender-marked generic word exists. It also shows how the cultural assumptions embodied in talk might be
distorted by the mere fact of translation. Consider, for instance, how the use of ‘boys’ for a collectivity that contains both girls and boys would be responded to by an English speaker.

**Example 4**
In the example above, it was the breaking up of the group category ‘dra:ri’ to its individual members that brought up the gender heterogeneity of that purely male-marked category. However, even in the face of that interactional opacity of the word ‘lwlidat’, with regard to gender, the analyst is in no way justified to build an analytic case for its relevance, since parties to talk, for whose interest the talk was produced, did not take up issues with what might appear for the analyst an example of everyday discourse that obscures the visibility of women. Such use of male-marked words for both ‘males’ and females is quite ubiquitous in Moroccan Arabic. Regardless of their gender, the collective category ‘lwlidat’ is routinely used to refer to ‘children’ in general. For evidence, another example is given below,

**hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (17) (01:08:58)**
1 Expert: ʔədra:ri ŋno ŋaddirə fihuːm=
2 =li(huma waslən ltmjntə:ʃ lsnə=
3 =lil fajt ltmjntə:ʃ lsnə
4 oba9it kay9ra.
5 bnisba lddokuːr bnnisba lʔinaːt=

It is the expert in the excerpt above who unpacks the linguistically marked ‘dra:ri’ (line 1) into male and female members later in the same turn (line 12). Prospectively, then, female children are part of the referential information in ‘dra:ri’, and this without the word being problematic for the caller. Again, the linguistic opacity of the term did not translate into an interactional one. The business of interaction goes on with no noticeable gender issues uprising to the surface.

**Example 5**
In addition to gender-marked categories, gender neutral terms can also be used to refer to gender without making it an issue in Moroccan Arabic in ways similar to those Jackson (2011) describes for English (also Kitzinger and Stockill, 2007). Neither the topical axis nor
the interactional one hinges upon the gender-marked categories introduced. The following example illustrates the point,

Prior to the above extract, the caller complained that her husband had an affair with another woman. The caller reported earlier in the call that she more than once thought about leaving the household. In the particular excerpt presented above, the expert informs the caller that he, the expert, advises against such a course of action. However, he does not issue a direct prohibition to the caller not to quit her husband, but rather attributes to himself the inability to issue such a piece of advice: “ana majəmə llijaːʃ ngul lnnaːs” (I cannot tell people) (line 4).

This is indeed a point worth noticing. The expert’s turn is not formatted as a “should/shouldn’t” utterance with the illocutionary force of getting the hearer do/not do something. Rather, it is formatted as a kind of telling, or informing, about his inability to urge a course of action that would result in a person quitting their husband (lines 4 and 5).

This format is sensitive to the seriousness of the action of quitting (given the obvious fact that it might afterwards result in separation or even divorce). It is likewise sensitive to the fact that it is the caller who previously revealed her intention to carry the action out, and to whom the telling implies discouragement, but not direct prohibition. Taking the sensitivity in direct prohibition into consideration, what the expert achieves by such format is that he avoids some kind of clash of perspectives, or opinions. He avoids to strongly and directly advise against a
course of action the caller has already contemplated, but did so only in such terms that might not appear as blunt ‘order’— he did not say for instance ‘you don’t quit your husband’.

Moreover, in formulating his turn the way he does, the expert makes it visible that his self-asscribed inability is not occasioned only by that particular case of the caller, but is general to all the cases where ‘nna:s’ (people) (line 4) are hearably in a similar situation to that of the caller. In issuing his piece of advice to the collection ‘people’, evidenced by the use of the group word “nna:s”, the expert displays a principled moral stance rather than a case-specific advice.

Consequently, by addressing the advice to ‘the people’, the expert invokes two addressees in the call. One is the caller who was concretely present at the other end of the line, and the other is ‘constructed’ in the turn as the would-be receiver of the telling, i.e. “nna:s” (people). This way, the expert directs his prohibition to the caller, as the concrete receiver, only indirectly. The indirectness is, moreover, enhanced by the use in his subsequent talk of the second person pronouns in “xlli” (quit-you) (line 5). Whether it refers to the ‘caller’ or ‘nna:s’ is not clear. What is clear is that it could be exploited to refer to each and to both.

As a consequence, the ambiguity of addressee allows for defeasibility. For it not only contributes to indirectness, but also to its potential non-applicability for a caller. Since ‘quitting the husband’ was suggested earlier by the caller herself, she can always protest that her case is special and requires as desperate a measure as ‘quitting her husband’. As a piece of advice, then, the design of the turn is sensitive to the likelihood of its rejection.

By addressing a collectivity instead of the present hearer, the expert in the above case is exploiting a common way in everyday interactions to avoid direct clash with the recipient of advice. Below is a similar example where the caller also complained about her husband. The expert, afterwards, used a group collectivity ‘tarafajn’ (the couple) when addressing her advice to the caller. However, the latter pointed out that the problem was not with her, as part of couple, and was clearly rejecting the application of the advice to herself. The expert then fell on the group collection ‘couple’ previously constructed to address the rejection.
It is exactly by directing her previous talk to the couple instead of the caller alone that the expert is able to displace the hearer from the role of ‘interlocutor’ to a person not addressed by the talk at all (line 3). Instead, the ‘real’ addressee becomes the husband and people like him “zzawə djalək unnas lli bhalu” (line 2).

The upshot of this is that, in cases of advice rejection, a person using a collectivity as the intended addressee can always retort to “makəqəsdəkʃ nti” (I’m talking about you) or a variant thereof. Indeed, this is a common way of deflecting hearership in talk where stakes are high, as in advice about marriage issues. It is then a way of proceeding cautiously (see Greatbatch & Dingwal, 1998 for a discussion of the management of hearership roles in marriage consultation services, especially useful is their distinction between ‘hearer’ as unintended recipient of talk, and ‘addressee’ as the intended recipient).

Going back to example 5, and with the actions done by the turns outlined above, it is now possible to direct attention to what is specific to the word “nnaːs” as used in the expert’s talk.

Ordinarily, and literally, the word ‘nnaːs’ means ‘people’, and when used generically, it subsumes both males and females under its semantic umbrella. However, in example 5, the word got its specific meaning not by reference to a linguistic definition, but by reference to the activities tied to it, and the categories cited prospectively to define the category of people meant by the word ‘nnaːs’. Following is the expert’s talk again,

Leaving a husband “rrəzəːl” can only be performed by a “wife”; and one constitutive-feature of the category ‘wife’ is her gender as a female. The action of leaving a husband can
only be performed by a female member. Accordingly, to be a member of the group “nnā:s”, as used here in this interaction, is to be a female person.

The word ‘people’ here is a gendered one (Kitzinger & Stockill, 2007). It hangs on actions performed by ‘female wives’, towards another one group ‘male husbands’. But even in the face of such potential relevance of gender, parties to this interaction do not build upon it to orient to gender in any consequential way. Again, it is one of those cases where issues pertaining to men and women could, but did not, become the locus of subsequent interaction. In short, the linguistic gender of the categories did not translate into an interactional one here.

**Example 6**

In the last example in this section, a detailed analysis is undertaken to show how the action and gender planes necessarily intersect each other, but only occasionally affect each other; that is, if parties to talk demonstrably choose to (see section two below).

**VOC5-007- (00:20:30)**

1 Hamid: ñno gatlik hadik a:: Çabdessamad
2 Adbessamad: m:m?
3 Aziz: hadik fin tlaqitiha fla:fa:k?
4 Adbessamad: ñku:n?
5 Hamid: had 1bnita 1lj dmmərtiha əhhə:=
6 Adbessamad: =a:: e::nnəmrə wsafi wxdit nnəmrə djalha

The episode opens with Hamid’s FPP to a question-answer adjacency pair (line 1). He asks about a female person, given that Morrocan Arabic is inflected for gender (in addition to number). Instead of stating the person for which the reference is made by name, an appropriate locally initial reference full-form, Hamid instead uses a ‘locally initial indexical’ “hadik” (that) (Kitzinger, Show, & Toerien, 2012; Schegloff, 1996a). One characteristic of this form is the absence of referents, since speakers rely on previous talk to establish the referent. Abdessamad, however, fails, to locate the person intended. This in spite of the ‘she’ inflection of the verb and the demonstrative pronoun ‘hadik’ in “ñno gatlik hadik” (what did that(-she) tell you that-female).
His failure is demonstrated by his initiation of repair. The generic repair word “m:m?” (line 2) shows that the previous turn is problematic, but does not specifically locate the source of the trouble. This leaves open the class of repair work to be done to redress the problem (Kendrick, 2015). In other words, “m:m?” does not make clear whether the problem is one of hearing, semantic, lexical deletion, etc.. It is generic. After the utterance of the token “m:m?”, Hamid is then provided with an opportunity either to treat the problem as one of hearing, which would make the repetition of the question an appropriate next action; or he can attempt to figure out what specifically was wrong in his turn and address only those items as requiring repair.

Noticeably, Hamid’s next turn starts with “hadik” (line 3), which is a repetition of the demonstrative pronoun previously introduced. As a repairable, the pronoun here displays what the speaker thinks the problem is, a display that the recipient could either accept or reject, using, if rejection is due, another repair FPP as appropriate. Otherwise, the turn itself becomes subject to further repair work (1992a; Kendrick, 2015).

Formally then, the turn “hadik fin tlaqitiha fla:fa:k?” is a repairable launched after the repair initiation item “m:m?”. Clearly, the repetition, together with the description, demonstrates that he treats the referent of the demonstrative as the problem. Besides repair, however, Hamid does another action. He asks a new question at the same time that he provides descriptive information as to whom “hadik” (that-she) refers. The description “fla:fa:k” (of the university) at the end of the turn identifies the referent of the demonstrative pronoun, making available the description ‘the girl of the university’. Hamid’s “the girl of the university” is a repair item that is at the same time embedded in a new FPP to a question-answer sequence “fin tlaqitiha?” (line 3).

‘that girl of the university’ is among the class of what Sacks and Schegloff (1979) call recognitional. Implied in recognitional is the assumption of mutual knowledge of the referent. In their work on person reference, Sacks and Schegloff (1979) showed that in cases the hearers are assumed to know the person referred to, speakers use recognitional expressions that orient to co-knowledge of the referent. In addition to personal names, a recognitional glass per se, members use other markers of recognition. Examples include kin terms, and expressions such as ‘the lady I met yesterday’, ‘the guy who called you’, etc. Similarly in the example above, the identification of the person by location, ‘the girl of the university’, assumes a shared knowledge. Since recognitions embody the assumption of
common knowledge of the referent. Cases where such assumption does not hold are subject to repair work on a turn-by-turn-basis until recognition is achieved.

Going back to the sequence of interest,

1 Hamid: ʃno gatlik hadik a:: ġabdessamad
2 Adbessamad: m:m?
3 Aziz: hadik fin tlaqitiha fla:fa:k?

The sequence follows the same sequential pattern of cases where a recognitional expression fails. The repair item ‘m:m?’, although an open-class repair item’, is treated by Hamid as oriented to the non-shared aspect of the assumption; hence the extra information “flafa:k” to achieve recognition (line 3).

However, the repair item is relegated to the end of the turn, only after a new information-seeking question “fin tlaqitiha” (where did you meet her), and the overall turn is wrapped in an interrogative intonation contour.

As said above, the turn does double work here. It introduces repair on “hadik” and, at the same time, checks for its validity as itself appropriate to achieve recognition. In other words, the initial demonstrative ‘hadik’ could have been followed by ‘dlafa:k’ (that-she of the university); but given that Hamid is not sure of the status of that description as a ‘fact’ about the girl meant by ‘hadik’, he chooses to formulate it in a question the factual validity of which yet to be confirmed by Abdessamad. To understand the double work the turn did, it would be better to break apart its action parts.

1) That girl you met at the university (the repair)
2) Did you meet her at the university (the question per se)

Given that Hamid is not sure about the location, he offers a candidate recognition expression — an identification by location — at the same time that he asked about it.

What happened afterwards is repeated below,
What is evident is that the smooth flow of talk (from line 1 to 6) was stoooped until recognition was achieved, and it took two repair sequences (lines 2 and 3, and lines 4 and 5). Following Hamid’s turn at line 3, Abdessamad again treats the repair as referentially problematic using, this time, a specific repair initiator “ʃkuːn?” (who) (line 4). This may not be surprising given that the referentially inadequate demonstrative, already problematic in the previous sequence as a stand-alone recognitional (line 1), is not followed by repair *per se* work in 3, but rather by a question to establish the factual status of the repair item(line 3). Neither the demonstrative nor the allusion to place, ‘faculty’ was sufficient to establish the person referent—beyond the fact that it was a ‘she’.

As said, it is only after two repair sequences that Hamid offers a piece of description that refers to a ‘fact’ (line 5), given the affirmative intonation of the turn. It is precisely after the failure of two recognitionals that a gender-marked word “lbinta” is used. The word “lbinta” figures in a turn the action of which was to achieve recognition. It is, in addition, precede by a ‘demonstrative’ ‘had’, and followed by a characterization of an action done by the hearer to the referent.

Hamid then used ‘hadik’ in the first turn. In a subsequent turn, he used the demonstrative ‘had’ plus the lexical item ‘lbinta’. The word ‘lbinta’ unpacks, or lexicalizes, the inflectional item in ‘hadik’ and stops at that. This is demonstrated in Abdessamad’s next turn (line 6), repeated below,

6 Abdessamad: =aːː əːːnəmra əsəfə wədət əːːnəmra ədələ
“e::nnəmrə wəsəfı wxdìt nnəmrə djəlha” makes up an answer to the previous question “fin tlaqitiha” (line 3), though not an answer to the original question that triggered repair. That is, the original question “ʃno gətlik hadik” was left unanswered. Abdessamad’s turn is then oriented to an interactional business quite apart from the relevance the word ‘lbnita’ might have for gender. The relevance of the word ‘lbinta’ to the interaction is linguistic and not interactional. It succeeds in lexicalizing the referent of the demonstrative and, as a result, in achieving recognition.

The conversational episode demonstrates that the use of the categorization ‘lbinta’ did not make gender an issue, but was recruited for the pursuit of achieving recognition that was, for parties to the conversation, more important. The example, together with the ones before it, demonstrate that gender-marked categories can serve interactional issues way removed from any interests gender analysts might have (e.g. the belittling of girls by using diminutives or the exploitation of girls for pleasure purposes).

To summarize the argument about the linguistic and the interactional relevance of gender, a review of the points tackled in this section is appropriate. First, instead of making gender relevant, the expression “waḥed lbənt” was used to introduce the main character of a story in a story preface. The gender of the character was irrelevant to the understanding of the example as an instance of story beginning.

Second, a set of examples has shown that the words ‘lwliːdə:t’ and ‘draːri’ are commonsensically used to refer to both boys and girls. Their use as generic categories raises no problems for members of the Moroccan culture. That such use may be considered an example of the invisibility of women in language is quite irrelevant for the parties to talk.

Third, in the last example the word ‘lbinta’ was used to repair an otherwise problematic recognitional expression, i.e. a demonstrative pronoun in a repair sequence. Once recognition was achieved, parties moved on with the business of talk unconcerned about the linguistic import of the word ‘lbinta’ with regard to gender.

The examples analyzed above show that, instead of pulling categories out of their interactional and sequential context, analysts had better stick to the outcomes of interaction in order to be able to say anything meaningful about gender. Since the gender-marking of Moroccan Arabic is one effect of the linguistic requirements (Jackson, 2011), or ‘system’ requirements (Klein, 2011), it does not automatically make gender an issue simply by the fact
that categories interactants use are gender-marked. Linguistic marking is not ipso facto interactional relevance. In interaction, more than linguistic marking is required to analyze gender work.

The existence in data of gender-marked words – linguistic relevance – does not therefore warrant the existence of gender dynamics, problems, or controversies, disagreements etc., in talk. Gender may or may not ‘creep into talk’ but only the unfolding of interaction ushers to its (im)pertinence to talk. Issues of gender are an interactional matter in the sense that no pre-givens, linguistic or otherwise, settle them prior to interaction.

One result of this view is obvious. For one thing, the distinction between the linguistic and the interactional relevance maintains an analytic borderline between the interests of researchers and those of members (Schegloff, 1997). Since, as Schegloff recognizes, “sentient beings…who grasp their own conduct and that of others under the jurisdictions of some relevancies and not others” (1997, p. 166), analysts cannot supersede the interests of societal members for the sake of advancing their own. As Schegloff urges (1987, 1991, 1997), and Jackson demonstrates (2011a), If an analyst claims that gender is relevant theoretically, then the first analytic step is to show how it is relevant for societal members. If gender is relevant, then it is necessarily reflected their everyday talk. A theoretical concern with gender should be grounded in the actualities of the business of talk.

For another, it is not that members do take up issues with gender, it is just that they may have different stakes in talk. An interest in the workings of gender may not be the primary concern — if a concern at all— for interactants. As such, the distinction does not preclude the study of sexism, the exclusion and the devoicing of women, etc., but it does ask of the analyst to be clear on whether the issues studied are theirs or members’, whose talk the researcher studies. The distinction between the linguistic and the interactional gender simply asks for more methodological and theoretical rigor than is the case for other approaches.

To demonstrate the utility of the distinction between linguistic and interactional gender, the next section focuses on one metric of its relevance in talk. It illustrates the use of gender categorization in the realm of moral descriptions, evaluations and judgments. The section shows how gender categories are used as moral categories mobilized to advance specific courses of action in interaction. What sort of moral actions gender serves is also detailed in that section. As usual, the discussion is carried on a case-by-case basis.
2. The moral character of gender categories

It is an ordinary fact of life that human beings are sometimes upheld for moral judgments based on their gender. This fact is also a point of concern for the social sciences. Gender Studies, for example, began as a re-action by Feminist scholars to social scientists in general on moral grounds. As a field, gender studies emerged as a backlash against, and a corrective to, all the ways women, women’s writings and scholarship, were marginalized based on putatively ‘scientific’ accounts —historical, social, physiological, and philosophical. Marginalization on neurological grounds is a late comer which emerged as brain studies developed.

Beginning with the early feminist scholars, the field developed as some kind of condemnation of the bias in social studies against women and their exclusion from being subjects of study. Feminism has developed as a coherent reaction against the ‘unjust’ treatment of women within and outside academia, and it is in this way that the field has opened up a moral debate where judgments and counter-judgments are played. It exposed a long-standing male-view of the world that was harmful to women essentially because it was a ‘male view’.

Gender categorization into ‘male’ and ‘female’ has played the greater part in the development of Feminism and gender studies. Its effect has propagated to almost every field in the social sciences.

Wrapping the above ideas in MCA terminology, one can say that gender is therefore procedurally consequential to the recent developments in the Feminist social science. Moreover, gender was not only consequential, but also morally consequential, in that the social scientific discourse about men and women cannot be separated from their relative treatment within the social institutions. The very categorization of ‘women’ was their denigration.

Building on the above view, the present section sets up to carry the centrality of gender categories to the ‘less grand’ field of talk-in-interaction and to study gender, not as part of a broad theory of morality, but as interactionally relevant to what Stokoe and Edwards refer to as “local morality” (2012). Using sequential and categorial analysis, the present section seeks to probe, and establish, the ways in which gender categories play a part, interactionally and morally, in everyday discourse. Tying gender and local morality, as meant by the Stokoe and Edwards (ibid.), and adopted here, simply means the management of value judgments at the interactional level where those values judgments have a gender categorization basis.
Also, the analysis in this section constitutes an extension and a substantiation of the point raised in the introduction to this chapter; namely, that there is a distinction between linguistic and interactional relevance of gender. As such, it both pursues the argument therein and takes up another thread of the work gender does in interaction—the moral work.

Example 1

The beginning is with the example below, which illustrates what is meant by interactionally relevant gender as well as constitutes an entry to its moral side. The excerpt figures in a call that opened with the caller complaining that, after fifteen years of marriage, she discovered that her husband cheated on her. She called to ask for the expert’s advice on the proper course of action to take with the husband. The excerpt below begins with the expert starting her question-answer series.

Lalla zhour 05.12.2015 (15:05)

1 Guest: jufi a: naʕima hada- kənti
2 Naʕima: katʕəfrih qəl ʔla?
3 Guest: ʕəftu ʕa: muddat ʕəhrajn
4 Naʕima: utzəwwəst bih.
5 Guest: maʕəftu:ʃ bzza:ʃ.
6 Guest: tayyəb.

It was said earlier (pp. 91-103) that guest-experts launch a series of question-answer in pre-advice sequences. The extract above therefore constitutes the beginning of the expert’s intervention (line 1), which was cut off midway for the sake of pursuing another action—establishing relevant facts necessary for the advice delivery. This new pursuit comes in the form of enquiries about some biographical information about the couple (line 2). In it, the question “katʕəfrih qəl ʔla?” (you used to know him before no?) is a question about the status of the couple’s relationship prior to marriage—whether the caller used to know her husband before they married.

Formally, the turn is a yes/no question with a tag (the “ʔla?” (no-particle). The falling intonation on the tag makes it clear that its use in this instance is similar to one type of tags, a modal tag, identified by Stubbe & Holmes (1995) for English. In this type of tags, the concern
for the positive face of the recipient overrides the epistemic considerations. Unlike ‘ja:k?’ in Moroccan Arabic, which makes strong claims of certainty, ‘lla?’ has a negative polarity that makes it possible for the recipient to ‘deny’ the proposition in the speaker’s utterance with its weak form of certainty.

Formally also, the answer the caller gives is a non-conforming answer. Raymond (2003) calls a conforming answer to a yes/no question one that employs either a ‘yes’ or ‘no’, or some variant of them, as an answer. Any other answer is ‘non-conforming’ and it does extra interactional work. In answering the question, the caller provides more information than a yes-or-no required. This ‘more’ came in the form of a delimitation of the length of the courting period before marriage. The provision of the specific time-period in the yes/no question does extra work and orients to an issue other than ‘answering’ conformingly. This issue will be taken shortly after considering other sequential characteristics of the episode.

Instead of a short yes/no answer, then, the caller gives information that concerned a time period. She first specifies that she had known her husband for two months (line 3) and immediately says that she did not know him long enough (“maʕRAFTU:f bzza:f.”) (line 5). Whatever the introduction of the time-period and the comment did was clearly accepted at that point as an answer, since the expert produces an acknowledgment token “tayyəb.” (alright) (line 6) as an uptake. The acknowledgement token “tayyəb.” then registered the answer and marked the closing of the first round of the question-answer sequences. Proceeding in the conversation, the expert initiates another question. As FPP, that question ushered to the beginning of a new adjacency pair.

7 Guest: uhaː:t xməstaːfr ʕaːm
8 kan kəjdiːr had ssuluːk ajdan
9 wəlla jəlah bda muʕaxxaran,
10 caller: maʕemri jddiːt ʕliːh tsəːwər tal daba.
11 ((sobbing))
12 Guest: waxxa əːː naʕima rəxfi ʕla rasək
13 maːtʃəjriːʃ.
Whereas the expert’s first question relates to the couple’s pre-marital relationship, her second question was concerned with the marital-period itself. The expert asks about the husband’s behavior during the period of marriage (lines 7 & 8), whether the caller had caught him cheating during the period they stayed together, or whether it began only lately in the relationship (line 9), “uhaːd xmœstaːːr Caːm kan kəjdiːr had ssuluːk ajdan wəlla jəlah bda muːʃaxaran,” (and in those fifteen years has he been doing that behavior too r has he just started lately).

In moving temporally from the courting period through the marriage period and until the present, the expert is scanning the couple’s personal history for a precedence of cheating on the part of the husband. She is, in other words, rummaging through his personal historical record for instances of cheating, or signs thereof, as the wife, given her epistemic privileges in the SRP ’husband/wife’, may have witnessed during the time she had known him, either prior or during marriage.

In her answer, however, the wife does not explicitly deny the absence of any precedence of ‘cheating’ but points to fact that, up to the cheating incident she is now reporting, she has never run across evidence of any specific kind, e.g. photos, that may have convicted the husband conclusively (lines 10).

This time also, the caller’s answer was a non-conforming one, and its content was ambiguous in so far as it did neither confirm nor disconfirm the charge of cheating in the expert’s question. The caller’s answer could either mean that she was certain her husband was cheating but she never found any proof; or that she did not think he was cheating until now that she found a proof (the photo). Either way, it may be noticed again that the answer is registered through an acknowledgment token “waxxa” (ok) (line 12), which marks the closing of this second sequence of question-answer. With this second round terminated, the expert’s talk continued thus,

14 Guest: əːː məː lʃasaf bkuːːl ʃasaf
15 kajn nuːːʃ mn rəːl kajxəllî lmra fddar
16 məː wladha wkajbdə jgəlləb fsawajew xriːn.
17 ˌhː [faː maːʃəftʃ had sʔjəd kifaj=]
18 Caller: aːːh ((talk continues))
At the end of the second adjacency pair of question-answer, the expert therefore launches into descriptive work (line 15), through which she displays what she makes of the answers the wife has given. Since the import of the previous questions was to establish a precedence of the husband’s cheating in the history of the couple, and since that attempt failed, notice the shift from the historical/personal to gender in the expert’s utterance. Here is the turn repeated below,

15 kajn nuːʕ mn Ṿraːl kajxəlli lmra fddar
16 mʕa wladha wkajbda jgelləb fswajəh xriːːn.

Her utterance ‘there exists a type of men that leaves off their wife at home with her children and starts looking somewhere else’ (lines 15 and 16) was a moral judgment, not of the caller’s husband alone, but of a ‘type of men’ who search for women outside the marital relationship. The invocation of “lmra” (wife) and “kajxəlli” (abandons) makes the object of ‘looking somewhere else’ clear. A man who forsakes his wife and starts looking somewhere else, “wkajbda jgelləb fswajəh xriːːn.”, is hearably searching for other women. Since the expert condemned that specific type of men (line 15), a gender categorization; and since the condemnation occurred within a context of moral judgment of a specific man (the caller’s husband), the gender categorization ‘men’ therefore guarantees the hearability of the moral judgment as applying to the husband by the hearer’s maxim. Two categories ‘type of man’ and ‘husband’ could be heard as belonging to the same device ‘male’. Recipients hear them that way.

The outcome was, therefore, an implicit moral denunciation of the caller’s husband as an instance of, or a member in, the ‘type of men’ explicitly denounced— the kind of man who forsakes his wives and cheats on her back.

The moral judgment, in other words, has its basis in the gender of the husband through his membership in a ‘type’. Jayyusi (1984, p. 25) shows that type categorization, [i.e. type + category], involves the moral evaluation of a person by reference to a group whose features are locally constructed for the purpose of the evaluation, which provides the explanation required to condemn that person.
As Jayyusi argues, “[t]he description of the type…proceeds through the production of a list of traits and practices” (1984, p. 23). In the present case, the expert’s production of the type category is based on gender, and the list of traits and practices is predicated on that category: a type who forsakes wife and children and cheats. What links the caller’s husband and the group-type together is not membership in a professional category, doctors, lawyers, etc. or membership of class category the rich, the poor, etc. or any other group membership, but their common denominator as members in a gender category.

It is in this sense that the husband’s practice, as a man, and as reported by the wife, is morally deplorable. The ‘type categorization’ and the practices attached to it are constructed as morally deplorable.

Following from that, the important point, as Jayyusi observes, is that ‘type categorization’ and its predicates are locally constructed for the purposes of the action in situ. The descriptions, in other words, could be predicated on any other category and not necessarily on the type invoked (ibid). For instance in the excerpt above, the judgment may sensibly apply to a type of doctors, of farmers, of politicians, of the non-religious, or indeed any other category, were any of them made relevant by the expert. However, what was constructed by her was a ‘gender type’ that was subsequently linked to a set of activities of one of its members. As was said, the result is a moral condemnation on the basis of gender.

To see in what way gender, and gender alone, is relevant in the example cited, notice that although any other category (doctors, farmers etc.) would still refer to a male by dint of the features attributed (forsaking wife and children is hearably as done by husbands), any other categorization does not invoke ‘maleness’ as the feature upheld for judgment. No other categorization makes gender conspicuously relevant. A ‘type of doctors’, for instance, would make relevant their profession categorization and not their gender. In short then, the moral condemnation of the act of cheating here has a gender basis. It is the cheater’s maleness which is the explanation for his act of cheating.

Here then is an instance where gender is relevantly invoked as the basis of a moral judgment. A ‘type of men’, as a gender group, is hearably mobilized for the sake of ‘doing’ moral condemnation of the caller’s husband.

One last point, also observed by Jayyusi (ibid.), is that the moral judgment and the description are not separately presented. Type categorization is not merely a description of a ‘state of
affairs’ (i.e. what people do), but the description itself is a moral judgment. It is perhaps for this reason that the expert, before constructing the gender type and appending the description to it, issued a condemnation tokens “mʕa lʕasaf bku:l ʕasaf” that emphasized her stance vis-à-vis the type. The moral judgment of the ‘men’ was done in the very terms of the description. The categorization, description and the moral evaluation are one and the same thing.

Going a little backward, it is now possible to see how the expert has incrementally built upon the series of question-answer in order to arrive to the moral judgment. Sequentially, the moral judgment issued comes on the heels of two previous sequences whose import is to establish historical evidence of cheating, and which the wife is entitled to give, given her epistemic rights in the SRP ‘husband/wife’. After the delineation of the moral work gender does in this instance, the import of the series of question-answer can be fully explained now.

In asking about personal history, the expert’s purpose was twofold. First she tried to check against evidence if the present instance of cheating was not news to the wife. Supposedly, if cheating was not news, that non-newness would itself constitute an explanation for its recurrence— he had done it before and, therefore, he was likely to do it again. Considering this, the action of the question answer sequence can therefore be glossed as ‘the search for character explanation for the cheating’ (Jayyusi, 1984). It is quite likely that had the questions in the previous two sequences been answered in the affirmative, the explanation for the husband’s behavior would have been personal and related specifically to his character, either before or after marriage, rather than his membership in the category ‘men’.

The caller’s answers themselves demonstrate that the expert’s questions were concerned with a search for character. Their import was quite sensitive to that search. The first sequence is repeated below,
The caller’s first answer is composed of two parts. The first part “ʕreftu ʕa: muddat ʃəhrajn utzəwwəst bih.” (I knew him for two month and I married him) offers a specific time-period of the pre-marital relationship. The second part, “maʕreftu:j bzza:f.” (I did not know him for too long) offers an ‘evaluation’ of that time period. Not knowing someone for too long does not mean that the wife did not know her husband long enough as to know some basic biographic information about her then-suitor (name, age, profession, etc.). Rather, ‘I did not know him for too long’ before marriage orients to the fact that a two-month period courtship is not enough to adequately know someone’s character.

It was this assumption in the caller’s turn that the expert acknowledges. As such, it was the recognition of that assumption in the question which constituted the extra work of the caller’s non-conforming answer. Clearly, the wife’s answer is minutely sensitive to the ‘character-knowledge claim’ embedded in the question, and which a simple ‘yes’ answer would confirm.

Since the first attempt for explanation by character has failed, the expert continues her search for an incident of cheating. The second adjacency pair which shows this is repeated below,

7 Guest: uha:d xməsta:jr ʕa:m
8 kan kəjdi:r had ssulu:k ajdan
9 wəlla jəlah bda muʕaxxaran,
10 caller: maʕəmri ʃddi:t ʕli:h tsa:wer tal daba.

Sensitivity to character-knowledge claim is also found in the caller’s second answer “maʕəmri ʃddi:t ʕli:h tsa:wer tal daba.” (I never found something against him until now). Importantly, while the answer seems to tacitly acknowledge that fifteen years of marriage are more than enough to know the character of one’s partner – a logical assumption the wife cannot deny – she denies instead the existence of evidence to prove that the husband has engaged in any questionable behavior that would lead to establishing his character as cheater. (The ambiguous denial, referred to above, may have resulted from the character claim implied in the question and resisted by the answer’s non-conformity).

It was after this two-round question-answer series that the expert launched a moral evaluation. It was after the absence in the husband’s history of instances of cheating that the expert
invoked gender as a “collective attribute categorization” (Jayyusi, 1984, p. 35) to explain the present instance of cheating the caller reported.

Instead of character explanation, then, the expert resorted to ‘explanation by categorization’ (Jayyusi, 1984, p. 35), when biographic evidence failed to provide an appropriate reason for the husband’s cheating. Gender was therefore her last resort to explain his behavior: The explanation by categorization may be glossed thus: He cheated because he is a type of man who cheats.

This way, the reason the husband cheats on his wife lies outside their marital relationship altogether. It is not marital problems, personal propensities, psychological or social problems that the husband may suffer that has caused the problem (nowhere in the call were these issues raised). Instead, it is the claim of his being a type which generates moral judgments of character based on group membership in ‘men.’ As Jayyusi argues, it is that those activities performed, and habits engaged in, by particular individuals categorized under 'type' rubric do not find their various explanations in their biography: they become de-historicized (1984:25).

In short, it is gender, as a categorization independent of people’s history, that does the moral work in the excerpt above.

Consequently, one way gender intervenes in interaction is by providing an “explanation by categorization”; that, it is not “by virtue of a specific reason or grounds but simply by reference back to the 'type's' attributes, i.e. class features” of gender (Jayyusi, 1984:35).

One corollary of this ‘evaluation by gender-categorization’ is that it does not follow logico-semantically from the categories invoked. Being a type of man does not presuppose or presume cheating; but the category and its feature are assembled locally for the moral evaluation of the person thus categorized. It therefore constitutes part of mundane reasoning (Jayyussi, 1984) in the service of mundane morality (Stokoe & Edwards, 2012).

Evidence that the categorization and the moral judgments are ‘assembled object’ is found in subsequent talk in the same call. In a moral judgment issued later, the expert ‘de-gendered’ (Kitzinger & Rickford, 2007: 219) the practice of cheating by using, this time, a more general categorization “baʕd nnaːs” (some people) (line 7),
It is important to register how the exploitation of the properties of categorial knowledge and activities has enabled the defeasibility of the moral judgment, and, in the course, made them local, rather than universal. Notice how the de-gendering is done. The use of ‘baẓẓa nnaːs’ (some people) makes explanation by gender categorization entirely irrelevant. The specification ‘type of men’ was replaced by ‘type of people’ to do the de-gendering (line 7). Had members pursued the question why ‘some people’ cheat on their partners, the list would include all sorts of social and psychological reasons other than gender; for it would then be as odd to say ‘because people men’ as to say “because people are doctors”— gender categorization would become as irrelevant as categorization by profession.

Example 2
Continuing with the relevance of gender to mundane morality, the next example also constitutes a case where the assembling of category and judgmental work is evident. The excerpt is taken from talk among friends around table after dinner at Abdessamad’s house. Prior to this sequence, Samir was telling the others about his relationship with a girl that he had met and who used to support him financially, at a time he was broke and his pay was not dispensed yet. Earlier in the story, Samir mentioned that the girl ended their relationship because of his refusal to see her father. The breaking up happened soon after the financial situation of Samir got better after his reception of back pay.
VOC4-002 (00:01:00)

1 Hamid: waxxa xsekk dirlha ji kado=
2 =wro3u:la
3 =wkajna wlla lla axaj ġabśśamad?=
4 Abdsmd: =kajna.
5 Samir: wa:: maktabf °maktabf°

Sequentially, Hamid’s turn is made up of three TCUs (lines 1, 2, and 3). The first is addressed to Samir, in which the latter is strongly urged to offer his girl friend a gift (line 1). Apparently, the second is addressed to both Abdessamad and Samir, where the reason for the suggestion is specified as “wro3u:la” (manly) (line 2). The third TCU seeks Abdessamad’s agreement on both the suggestion and its rationale (line 3).

Specific to this example is that the three TCUs are latched to each other (the = sign in transcript). Interactionally, what it is latched are both the suggestion and the grounds on which it is made, along with an agreement-seeking ‘yes/no’ question.

Knowing that ‘latching’ is one technique to withhold speakership after a TRP (Transition Relevant Place), and to secure another turn (Liddicoat, 2007; Schegloff, 2007a), Hamid used it both sequentially, to prevent turn transfer, and interactionally to prevent potential opposition to the action of the TCU (i.e. the suggestion).

Hamid then is sensitive to the fact that, has he presented the suggestion with no rationale, the next speaker after line 1, either Samir or Abdessamad might, for example, question the reason a gift should be given after a break up. The second TCU is therefore latched to the first so as to preempt any potential contribution by hearers. The third TCU is then latched to the second. In it, Samir seeks to ensure Abdessamad’s agreement with the rationale proposed in the second TCU.

It is interesting to note that the reason is given for the suggestion is an abstract noun, “ro3u:la” (manly). To consider the work it does notice that, were Samir to comply with the suggestion, then his act would be a ‘manly act’ because, evidently, the rationale proposed specified that the action of gift-giving be heard as tied to the collection ‘manly practices’. But
Hamid did not explicitly invoke the category membership ‘man’ for Samir to show the latter’s case as impertinent to the suggestion. Instead, he relied on the taken for granted knowledge of all the parties that Samir was such a member.

Given this oblique reference to Samir’s gender, Hamid’s turn can be read as a construction of moral reasoning with two premises, one explicit and one implicit, and a conclusion. Here is a gross characterization of the reasoning implied,

1) A man performs manly practices.
2) Samir is a man.
3) Therefore, Samir should make his girlfriend a gift

Using the abstract noun explicitly (premise 1), and relying implicitly on the known gender category of the recipient to do the rest (premise 2), Hamid was able to morally bind Samir to gender by urging him to exercise a manly act, while he at the same time avoids any negative implication to his gender categorization were he, Samir, to choose not to perform the act.

This management of the moral implications through the careful selection of the premises is detailed in the paragraphs below.

1) *A man performs manly practices.*

The action of gift-giving is hearable as tied to acts that men engage in. As with type categorization earlier, there is nothing in the utterance ‘ro3u:la’ that makes the act of gift-giving follow from it, either logically or semantically. It is not even a culturally expected manly practice (gifts are in fact given by men and women to each other for a variety of social reasons than being part of manhood). Tying the action of gift-giving to the collection ‘manly practices’ as its rationale constitutes here an instance of what Jayyusi calls ‘category-generated activity” (Jayyusi, 1984:37). These are categories and activities that are constructed for the occasion, locally, and are based on the relevant categorization of a person invoked at the moment of their construction.

As said earlier, that a person should give his girlfriend a gift after their breakup does not follow logically or semantically from the fact that this person is a man. Hamid’s suggestion of gift-giving is then only tied to ‘manly practices’ for the purposes of the interaction. In short, it is an instance of practical mundane reasoning.
2) **Samir is a man.**

Since manly practices are expected of the category ‘men’ it is only one small step, that of noticing the obvious (Samir’s gender), to see how the performance of the activity applies to his case; and the relevance of that rationale to him on that occasion. Naturally for members to that episode, Samir is bound to act manly by performing manly practices which his gender imposed on him.

3) **Samir should make his girl friend a gift**

However, what makes up manly practices is not pre-defined in advance, but is up for interactants to define *at the moment of interaction*. Hamid constructs the action of gift-giving as such practice for the purposes of that interaction. It is in this sense a category-generated activity (Jayyusi, 1984).

Now, one property of category-generated activities is their “open-texture”, which refers to the fact that what features a specific group has are open-ended and thus open for disagreement among members (Jayyusi, 1984, p. 39).

What is open for disagreement in the example above is the membership of the act of gift-giving in the device ‘manly practices’ and, clearly, not the membership of Samir in the device ‘gender’ (i.e. his maleness). In other words, the parties could disagree as to whether or not it is manly to comply with the suggestion, and not whether or not Samir is a man if he complies (or does not comply) with the suggestion.

In order to see what is at stake, consider the implications of Hamid’s argument if Samir refuses to, or chooses not to, accept the moral principle implied in the suggestion.

1) He did not give a gift to the girl, so that is not a manly practice.

2) He did not give a gift to the girl, so he is not a man.

Clearly, 1 is the result based of the first premise above — that gift-giving is a manly practice, which is understandably open for contention. Hearers could disagree with the premise and Samir could, if he wished, argue against the premise, without his objection referring directly to his categorization as a man.

On the hand, the logic in 2 invokes directly Samir’s gender in order to pass a judgment that evidently tints his moral character a man. This being the case, 2 could lead to disaffiliation,
even escalates to antagonism if meant seriously, as indeed the expression ‘not a man’ is routinely used as an insult—insulting a man by denying him his gender identity.

The above analysis of the moral assumptions in Hamid’s suggestion makes it possible to see how it was strategically assembled and was sensitive to gender categorization and its moral implications. If Samir chose, for example, not to give his girlfriend a gift, that action—of ‘not giving’—would of course not be part of the collection of ‘manhood practices’, but would not deny him gender-category membership in ‘men’. The use of the abstract noun ‘ro3u:la’ was, therefore, sensitive to the commonsense fact that evaluation of persons is stronger, morally speaking, than the evaluation of practices. For a man ‘not be a man’ is morally more pejoratively implicative than for a practice to be ‘unmanly’.

There is more to the organization of the above excerpt that shows how its conversational structure was finely tuned to suit the moral basis for the suggestion Hamid urged at the beginning of the sequence. Particularly, its structural organization is strikingly similar to the widely known organization of “insert sequences” that generally take the following form, (Liddicoat, 2007: 144).

A: \( \text{FPP}_\text{base} \)
B: \( \text{FPP}_\text{insert} \)
A: \( \text{SPP}_\text{insert} \)
B: \( \text{SPP}_\text{base} \)

Consider the example (Liddicoat, 2007: 145),

(26) [Lunch]

Harry: Arent’ you supposed to go up there with John though? \( \text{FPP}_\text{base} \)
Joy: Wha’ ? \( \text{FPP}_\text{insert} \)
Harry: Y’ aren’ t goin’ up there with John. \( \text{SPP}_\text{insert} \)
Joy: na:h that fell through weeks ago. \( \text{SPP}_\text{base} \)
The similarity is then clear if Hamid’s turn is broken into its constituent TCUs,

1 Hamid: waxxa xssək dirlha ji kado= FPP_{base}
2 =wro3u:la
3 =wkajna wlla lla axaj ʕəbdssama:d= FPP_{insert}
4 Abdsmd: =kajna.
5 Samir: wa:: maktabʃ °maktabʃ° SPP_{base}

Insertion sequences point to a general principle in mundane conversation. That is the principle of contiguity (Schegloff, 2007a, p. 15). In conversation, Sacks et al. (1974) demonstrate, there exists a preference for FPP and SPP in an adjacency pair to be contiguous. In adjacency pairs where insertion occurs, the preference for contiguity is maximally preserved for the insertion sequence (FPP_{insert} and SPP_{insert}) at least, leaving the second part of the base sequence pending. (Notice that an organization such as FPP_{base}, FPP_{insert}, SPP_{base}, SPP_{insert} would make parts of neither pair contiguous).

What is peculiar to the example above is that it is the same speaker who produces both the FPP_{base} and the FPP_{insert}. However, the speaker selected next is different in each FPP. The FPP_{base} selects Samir and the FPP_{insert} selects Abdessamad as next speaker. Given the contiguity principle, Abdessamad had the right to speak after the TRP of the FPP_{insert}, producing the SPP_{insert} (line 4). The explicit selection of Abdessamad by first name (line 3) as next speaker consequently blocked the way for Samir to respond only to the first TCU in Hamid’s turn— that is, to respond to the suggestion only.

Formally, the FPP_{insert} is a ‘yes or no’ question “wkajna wlla lla axaj ʕəbdssama:d”, designed to prefer a ‘yes’ as a type-conforming answer (see Raymond, 2003). On the action level, the turn is an agreement-seeking action that as Pomerantz (1984) has demonstrated, makes agreement the preferred next action. In all, Hamid’s turn (line 3) maximizes the chances for a yes-answer, and it is a yes-answer that Abdessamad produces. He answers with “kajna.” (yes) (line 4), an answer that is both type-conforming and action conforming (Raymond, 2003)
In all then, taking the above formal considerations into account, it can be said that the technical design of the FPP\textsubscript{insert} served an interactional purpose. Through it, and the order of speaker-selection it enforced, Hamid was able to secure the agreement of Abdessamad first before Samir could respond to either to the suggestion or its ground.

Given that both the suggestion and its rationale were matters that could be challenged by Samir, the person to whom they were directed, securing the agreement of Abdessamad in the insertion sequence, before Samir could interfere with a SPP\textsubscript{base}, made any potential challenge on Samir’s part difficult, for it would mean that he was challenging not one, but \textit{two} interlocutors; and on a matter on which they both agreed.

Furthermore, it would mean that he was challenging his interlocutors on a matter-of-course, for, as Raymond claimed, type-conforming and action-conforming answers to a yes-no question — what Abdessamad produced — do not treat the import of the question as problematic in any way for the hearer. In the case above, the import of the question was the construction of a chain of moral reasoning through a category generated activity: that a man, \textit{qua} a man, should do manly practices.

The analysis of the example above has shown how the design of Hamid’s turn exploited the conversational structure of insertion sequences to affect a particular order of next-speakers that in turn guarded against any potential challenge to the moral principle he constructed using a gender category— giving a gift to the girl friend who supported you is a manly practice even if the relationship is long since it ended. The categories ‘men’ and ‘manly practices’ figured centrally in this piece of mundane moral reasoning.

\textbf{Example 3}

The next conversation illustrates another way in which the two categories of ‘men’ and ‘manly practices’ can be used as morally-imbued categories. Whereas in the previous example the categories were used as the reason for advising a particular action —giving a gift to a girlfriend— the present one illustrates its use by the same speaker for blame distribution.

Since the moral work in the example is done through long strings of sequences, the excerpt will be broken down in order to show the ways its structural organization allowed one member to do blame distribution via gender.

Prior to the episode reported below, Ihsan was telling his two friends Hamid and Kamal about how he lived comfortably at the expense of his many girlfriends thanks to his ability to
conquer both hearts and purses. He narrated one of his adventures with a girl who used to give him money and pay for his telephone bills. The topical axis of the example concerns that sort of behavior. The excerpt begins with Hamid’s intervention in Ihsan’s narrative.

VOC12-001

1 Hamid: kifəʃ katʒi ktʕte:k lflu:s?
2 (1.2)
3 Ihsan: kaddəwwər mʃ:aja.
4 (2)

The sequence (lines 1 & 4) is an insertion sequence — inserted in the narrative — which is composed of a question-part and an answer-part. What ties the two parts is not simply their juxtaposition one next to the other, but the obligation on the part of the hearer of the FPP to effectuate repair in the SPP that necessarily ties to the type of work required by the FPP.

In the example, once Hamid produces the question part (line 1) it becomes incumbent upon Ihsan to answer. If he did not answer, he would be held accountable for not producing a SPP. Ihsan then orients to the accountability of not-answering in his answer after an extended period of silence (1.2 seconds), the content of his answer shows his orientation. It is a ‘paraphrase’ of the part of Hamid’s turn which required clarification, substituting, with grammatical adjustments made, “kaddəwwər mʃ:aja.” (she tips me) for “ktʕte:k lflu:s” (she gives you money). Even if circular, then, Ihsan’s answer complies with the structural requirement for a SPP.

Hamid’s question “kifəʃ katʒi ktʕte:k lflu:s?” (what do you mean she gives you money?), demands repair on a previous utterance (not shown here). What is important is that the repair does not relate to a hearing problem. The question “katʒi ktʕte:k lflu:s” is one of a class of repairs initiated with “interrogative + partial repeats of previous talk (Kendrick, 2015, p. 170). Given its content, the initiation of repair with “kifəʃ” (how come) requests clarification on the action reported — of money giving. It works in a similar way to the why-questions which, as Sacks (1992) shows, require an account be given for some action reported. In asking for an account, Hamid’s repair initiation clearly orients to blame and responsibility.
Gender work

Notice also that ‘how come?’ is open with regard to the kind of information it requests and, as such did not exclude others actions besides account-giving as appropriate next action.

Requests for accounts and clarification from interlocutors holds them accountable for doing the actions reported. The implication in account requests is that what interlocutors report somehow violates an expectation. In the example, the nature of the expectation violated becomes clear only in subsequent talk (extract below); and concerns the expectation that ‘men’ do not take money from girls. As such, the moral principle behind Hamid’s initiation of repair is brought to the front subsequent to the repair sequence.

5 Hamid:  hadi ro3u:la dabe kaddewwər mʕa:k hijja bənt ?
6 Ihsan:  °uʃnu°,
7 (1.2)

It now becomes obvious that, for the two participants in the conversation, what is at issue relates to the moral implications of Ihsan’s action for his gender. The issue can be glossed as ‘whether or not a man should take money from a girl’. As with the previous example, the aim is to show how gender is central to the way participants discuss the moral dilemma they face in this interaction and how, given its centrality, it is consequential for how talk unfolds.

Similar to the repair sequence above, it is interesting that following an FPP of a question-answer pair (line 5), Ihsan answers the question only minimally using one word “°uʃnu°,” (why not). His answer can be read as dodging the moral principle explicitly invoked while complying with the structural requirement to give an answer. It can thus be considered a face-saving response, structurally speaking, due to its minimum form. What Hamid makes of this minimum response is talk that comes after the above sequence; and which run as follows,

8 Hamid:  ro3u:la hadi axaj kam[al?
9 Kamal:  [wəlːaːh ma ro3u:la.

Even after the second sequence of question-answer was brought to a termination (lines 5 and 6), as the pause makes clear (line 7), the moral accountability of Ihsan’s action is brought up in a new sequence. This shows that the categories Hamid used to construct his blame are still
relevant—the categories of ‘manly practice’ “roʒu:la”, ‘girls’ “bənt” and by extension Ihsan gender as man.

By bringing the moral question to the surface of talk again, Hamid takes it, and displays to his interlocutors that he takes it, that even though a formal answer was given (lines 6), a satisfactory account/justification is still missing. The missing explanation enables him to pursue the topic further, even with another interlocutor (Kamal).

Peculiarly this time, Hamid directs his question to a third party (line 8) in order to secure his alignment with a moral principle which he evidently considers violated, and the violation demands an account. What is also interesting is that the alignment seeking strategy is similar to the one discussed above, example 2, even if the outcome is not the same. Following is the sequence repeated with further talk,

8 Hamid: roʒu:la hadi axay kam[al?
9 Kamal: [wəllah ma roʒu:la.
10 Hamid: [(h)hehehehe
11Ihsan: [wllah ila roʒu:la= wəlla[hima n5-

In example 2, Samir accepted the moral grounds on which the suggestion of gift-giving stood. Samir’s answer, “wa:: maktabʃ °maktabʃ” (it was not meant to be), did not argue with the invoked principle on which the action of ‘gift-giving could be performed. In this example, however, Ihsan openly challenges the same moral ground on which his impeachment stands. In order to understand the way his challenge is formulated, it is necessary to consider Kamal’s agreement form first (line 9).

The shape of Kamal’s answer is peculiar in that “wəllah ma roʒu:la” is type unconforming and signals, together with the additional weight added with “wellah”, a stronger agreement form than a “yes” answer would register (see Raymond, 2003).

Ihsan copies Kamal’s non-conforming answer to issue a similarly strong disagreement with both interlocutors in order to challenge the agreement between them on the accountability of his reported action (line 11).
Again, what is remarkable in the whole sequence is that Hamid, in a similar move as in example 2, constructs his accusation/blame against Ihsan only indirectly, through the same reasoning steps as the previous example, to arrive at a mundane moral principle. The principle says that ‘taking money from a girl’ is not constituent of the device ‘manly practices’ “ro3u:la”.

Also, similar to the previous example is the indirect tying of Ihsan’s action with his gender category so as to mitigate the threat to his face, a threat that is usually consequent to asking for an account. Hamid is not saying, for example, “nta maji ra3l kat3i bent kattek 1flous” (you are not a man to take money from a girl), for that would constitute a belligerent act and a severe threat to Ihsan’s positive face, indeed his identity as man. Instead, Hamid locally constructs the activity as part of an open-textured collection of ‘manly practices’. Given that he held the practice, not the person, accountable, the open-textured nature of the category-generated activities provided Ihsan with an opportunity to challenge the principle (if he wants to of course). That is he could challenge the implicit boundedness of the act to his gender.

Indeed, Ihsan, unlike Samir, has chosen to mount a challenge against the moral principle constructed to judge him. How he does so is clear in further talk,

11Ihsan: [wllah ila ro3u:la=wella[hima nÇ-
12Hamid: [BAʃ ro3u:la?
13Ihsan: wella[hima nÇql Çla bna:dm.
14Hamid: [baʃ °ro3u:la°
15Ihsan: [( ) hit ana TAL:ib okaxddamʃ.
16 (.)

So Ihsan challenges the accusation that his act of money-taking is unmanly (line 11). This he does by dissolving the implied link between his gender categorization as ‘man’ and abstinence from taking money from a girl as ‘manly’ (line 15), which, as was seen, is locally constructed as a category-generated activity. He unties the link between his action and his gender by invoking a different category from a different device — that of ‘student’ (line 15).
By linking the activity to the category “TAL:ib” (student) instead, Ihsan succeeds in both providing an account for his act and discrediting the interactional relevance of gender. The relevance of the self-categorization “TAL:ib” (notice the rise in voice on the first syllable) is further highlighted by explicitly bringing up a specific feature of it, i.e. joblessness, which is hearable as furnishing enough justification for Ihsan to take money from whomever, even from a girl.

This said, it is not clear whether “okaxddamʃ” (not working) is a feature predicated on the category ‘student’ or an altogether separate categorization. That is, whether it is meant as indicating incumbency of a separate and juxtaposed category — ‘student’ and ‘jobless person’ — or is meant as a logical consequent of the incumbency of the former — ‘student’ therefore ‘jobless’. Either way, the invocation of this feature allows Ihsan to dispute the moral principle hitherto invoked and enables him to construct new grounds on which his act could read. A reading that does away with the relevance of gender altogether by de-gendering (Kitzinger & Rickford, 2007) the practice accounted for.

Subsequent talk, (not shown here), illustrates another strategy used by Ihsan to avoid the negative moral implications of his action. The strategy relied on his narrating the story of his money taking as a funny story. In the story, Ihsan told about his feigned resistance to take the money his girlfriend offered. The story ended by his surrendering to the girl’s insistence on his taking the money. The sequence below shows what happened after the story-telling ended,

17Hamid: iwa jno ballək fhadʃʃi
18 a kamal əhhə[hh.
19Kamal: [ʕa:wllah maʃrə axoja=
20 =majəftʃ fiha roʒu:la hadik.
21Hamid: {{laughs}}
22Kamal: xsajəl djalmən hado?
23Kamal: wa::[x–
24Ihsan: [ana ʕteni yi lflu:s
25 gaʃ mabayʃ rrəʒu:la (hhəh)s:[ʃəʃə
It is clear that, even after Ihsan’s two strategies were deployed, his interlocutors were still orienting to the relevance of gender after he finished telling about his feigned resistance (see lines 17 to 20). Their re-invocation of gender illustrates how it sometimes is, and sometimes is not, an interactional matter that concerns parties to talk in the first place. In the face of that re-invocation, Ihsan now openly rejects the principle implied in the principle. He openly rejects ‘acting manly’ for the sake of money (lines 24 & 25). The rejection clearly orients to the failure of his account (i.e. student and jobless) to secure the sympathy of his interlocutors; or even to treat the incident as a funny instead of morally incriminating.

The analysis of the above conversational episode highlights another way in which gender categories can be used in conversation. Specifically, the gender category ‘men’ was used to blame a member for doing ‘unmanly practices’. The blame worked essentially because one person was treated as being a member of the category; therefore bound to ‘manly practices’. The blame was administered not on the basis of personal or biographic details but rather on the basis of the gender category deployed in the service of producing a practice ‘money-taking from a girl’ as a gendered practice. Also, it is interesting that, for the party blamed to defend himself, he tried, without success, to de-gender the activity for which he is blamed essentially by invoking bits of the personal and biographic.

**Example 4**

That gender can be the categorial basis members deploy to do blaming for doing a particular action is also clear in the subsequent example. In it, another guest (referred to as ‘Guest’ in the transcript) was temporarily invited to the program by the host, but she was not the one callers consulted for their problems. Prior to the episode below, the expert had just finished ‘advising’ a caller who complained about her husband’s mistreatment of her. The guest then introduced her remarks by way of opinion on the call was terminated. Her opinion was a parenthesized one, neither solicited by the other parties during the call, nor relevant to topic the parties raised after the call ended.

**Lalla zhour 05.12.2015 (1:38:21)**

1 Guest: [.h ə: nəbyi ndɛdxxəl fhaðə
2: fhad lhala dja:la: [ ( )
3 Host: [NORA
4 Guest: ↓nora.
5 Expert: °nora [ə:°
6 Guest :↓h ana kango %nora
7 annaha tflet e::
8 jɔɔni tɔrexɔ tewqef
9 jɔɔni ma— wile wila xɛrsɛt mɔeddik %rrasł
10 hada lajɔɔni .h annaha:
11 maγatakelf omaγadiʃ tɛʃrəb.
12Expert: °sɑhe:h°.
13Guest: .h tɛnفđ bsəldʃa utrəbbi bɲɛjʃətha
14 utʃəriri utʃəmmər=
15Expert: °ɔla draʃh(h)a°
16Guest: :↓.h ɔla draʃha
17 utqlləb ɔla nʃa:t mudir ldda[xl.
18Expert: [ddax1
19Guest: li annahu ila bqa:t ga:lsa wɛdçiʃafa
20 kəjnìn bzzaf dɛrsə:l
21 maʃi yi rrəsɛl djal nora
22 .h lli kajstayaʃɛlu ddaʃf djanna
23 kanısa:ʃ ɬasaf.

Conversationally, the guest forms her talk as a piece, or pieces, of advice, for the benefit of the caller ‘Nora’. What is special about those pieces is that they come bundled with rationales for their advisability. An explanation of how the advice works in the above sequences is detailed below.

The guest first urges the caller, Nora, to escape the mistreatment (lines 7 and 8) she suffers at the hands of her husband (line 9). According to the guest, Nora’s escape would not consequently mean that she would remain ‘dependant’ on the husband for her daily sustenance (line 11). What the guest denies then is that Nora’s escape would be her starvation. It clearly orients to the cultural assumptions around the SRP husband-wife and its default corollary SRP provider/dependent in the Moroccan culture. By default, it is meant that if no explicit talk is done to annul it, it is the assumed division— not for example a division of ‘working wife’/‘dependent husband’. (Incidentally, since no Nora is not a ‘working person’, the understanding that she is ‘housewife’ is reinforced).
The denial then orients then to Nora’s economic status as subordinate to that of her husband and, clearly, offers a glimpse of the way her economic status in unfavorable conditions is negotiated.

To reiterate, the guest offers the reason for the first piece of advice by denying an assumption implied by the advice itself. The assumption is that a housewife would starve with no husband to provide for her. The guest then suggests that, for the wife Nora, escaping her husband’s mistreatment would not mean starvation.

Appended to the first advice is a result that might ensue from Nora’s renunciation of her membership in the SRP wife/wife. This is the fact that feeding oneself needs work. It is that fact that constitutes the basis of the guest’s second advice (line 17). She urges Nora to seek a job “utqlləb ʕla nafaːt mudir ldda[xl.” (and she looks for an income generating activity). Obviously, the pieces of advice are attached to each other: If Nora forsakes her husband; she has to look for a job. If she remains jobless, joblessness would cause her to remain weak, exactly as she initially was when she had been dependent on her husband (line 19).

17  utqlləb ʕla nafaːt mudir ldda[xl.
18Guest1: [ddaxl
19Guest2: li annahu ila bqaːt gaːlsa wədšiːfa

While it is true that, regardless of gender, a ‘working person’ is ‘stronger’ (less dependent on others) than a ‘jobless person’, the way the guest draws the line between ‘the strong’ and ‘the weak’ makes gender relevant to the division.

19Guest2: li annahu ila bqaːt gaːlsa wədšiːfa
20  kæjnin bzzaf dərsaːl
21  mafi ɣi rrasəl djal nora
22  .h lli kajstayaːllu ddaʃf djanna
23  kanisaːʕ lʃasaf.
The gender division becomes then relevant at a place in the conversation where the rationale for the second piece of advice builds on gender categorization. The guest constructs the rationale as a hypothetical case of ‘if-then’ (lines 19 to 23). The rationale translates like this,

1) If Nora remains weak
2) Then there are lots of men, not only Nora’s man, who exploit our weakness as women.

The “if-clause”, the antecedent, predicates an action done by Nora as a single person. The consequent, on the other hand, concerns people that are invoked from the collectivities ‘men’ and ‘women’ from the device gender. Since Nora and her husband can categorically be heard as belonging to that device, then the hearing maxim ensures that they are heard as members of that device; i.e. they are heard in their capacity as a ‘woman’ and a ‘man’. The leap from single individuals to their membership in a collection plays on what is commonly known about gender categorization, which is itself a consequent of the hearer’s maxim.

It is interesting to see how categorization shifts from the SRP wife/husband, which forms the basis for the first advice, to the SRP women/men. Essentially, the shift is an interactional leap guaranteed by the gender of the parties to this call. The leap turned the problem from one that concerns the caller and her husband to one that concerns women and men in general. Gender is then central to the second piece of advice gender since it invokes the contrast ‘women’ vs. ‘men’.

Therefore, the weakness, or dependency, cited by the guest above, was that of Nora qua woman via-a-via the husband qua a man. This is to say that in initiating advice, the guest invokes gender rather than the institutional and genderized roles of husband and wife. The utterances “bzzaf dersa:l” (a lot of men) and “rraəl djal nora” do not refer to them as husbands, but as males.

As evidence, it can be noticed that it was the device ‘gender’ which allows the guest to include herself in the first place using the inclusive pronoun ‘our’ in “ddaʕf djanna” (our weakness) (line 22). She includes herself in the collectivity mainly because of her gender and not her marital status in “kajstaye[lu ddaʕf djanna kanisaː” (lines 22 and 23). Like Nora, the guest is exploited by ‘men’, not because she is a ‘wife’, for her marital status is unavailable in talk, but because she is, like Nora, a ‘woman’. Hence the use of the inclusive ‘we’ and the reliance on the hearer’ maxim to do the connection (i.e., the guest and Nora,
along with the host and the expert, can be categorization as women, therefore the pronouns refer to them as a collectivity of women).

The above analysis makes it possible to see the ways in which the pieces of advice the guest offered had their basis in gender. Like other examples in this section, gender was also interactionally relevant to that instance of ‘doing advice’. More importantly, it was relevant in a moral way. The rationales the guest gave to reinforce the applicability of the advice are grounded in the gender division ‘women’ vs. ‘men’.

Moreover, the example is interesting since it makes the division between linguistic and interactional gender even clearer. It is in fact the distinction between linguistic and interactional relevant that explains categorization in the sequence. An illustration suffices to see how the division works. The excerpt of interest if reproduced below,

20 kəjnɪn bzzaf dərsa:l
21 mafj ɣi rrəəfl djal nora
22 .h lli kajståɣəllu ddaʃf djanna
23 kanisəːf ɭasaf.

Given that ‘rəəfl’ is the plural of ‘rrəəfl’, it stands to reason, at least initially, to assume that the categories have a plural/singular relationship. Either ‘rəəfl’ should be understood as meaning ‘husbands’, referring to their social identity, or ‘rəəfl’ should be understood as meaning ‘males’, referring to their gender. The turn can thus be read as meaning either,

1) there exist a lot of men, not only the man of Nora, who exploit out weakness.

or,

2) there exist a lot of husbands, not only the husband of Nora, who exploit our weakness.

Given the invocation of ‘women’ later in the talk, as well as the ‘we’ in the absence of information on the social identity of the expert, hearers, as members of the Moroccan culture, understand that “bzzaf dərsa:l” (a lot of men) makes relevant the gender of the referents, in the action of the utterance (advice/rationale), in either way specified above.
Given that the expression “rrazəl djal nora” (line 21), could be understood as referring to marital status (i.e. husband), a third reading is possible.

3) There exist a lot of men, not only the husband of Nora, who exploit our weakness as women.

However, given, as argued above, the opposition ‘men’ and ‘women’ constructed by the guest, and her employment of the inclusive ‘we’, the hearing of “rrazəl djal nora” as referring to ‘husband’, foregrounds the gender feature implicit in the category ‘husband’. Interlocutors hear more in the expression “rrazəl djal nora” than a simple reference to the husband with a category that is gender-marked, essentially because the subsequent categories invoked make gender the interactionally relevant feature. In short then, the collectivity constructed as ‘we’ calls upon gender interactionally rather than only linguistically.

Again, this example shows that, if interactionally relevant, gender can have a bearing on issues of understanding and the translation of that understanding from one language to another— whether to understand “bzzaf dərəːːl” and “rrazəl djal nora” as referring to husbands only or to men in general.

**Summary**

This chapter began with the distinction between the linguistic relevance of gender, on the one hand, and its interactional relevance, on the other. The distinction was throughout maintained in order to see what work gender does in interaction, apart from furnishing a linguistic element to pursue other actions in interaction (section one). Section two showed how interactants tap on gender categories per se to implement actions, interactionally and locally, which further the purposes talk is designed for. It specifically focused on how members construct moral principles using gender and, as such, traced the moral work of gender categories. Also in section two, it was seen that gender categories can occasionally be exploited to offer explanations, suggestions/advice, and distribute blame based on moral principles locally constructed.

This does not mean of course that the moral realm is the only place where gender does work, nor does it mean that the actions illustrated are all that can be done with gender categories. Looking at morality and gender through the lenses of MCA and CA was meant to show what
the interactional relevance of gender looks like first, and, second, to offer a specimen of the work gender does in the special field of local morality (Stokoe and Edwards, 2012).

Since morality subsumes, among other things, how interactants manage issues and dilemmas through moral reasoning, the examples analyzed in this chapter glimpsed at how moral evaluations, judgments, and descriptions can have categorization as a vehicle allowing interactants to invoke MCD, SRP and, together with them, activities, obligations, duties, responsibilities, etc., for the sake of moral reasoning. As such, the chapter illustrated one way of ‘doing gender’—a doing irrevocably ties to ‘gender assessment’.

The chapter started with a discussion of how Feminism could be viewed as a moral condemnation of male practices which perpetuate the downgrading of women in all spheres, historical, economic, social, psychological, and linguistic. It ended with a discussion of how gender could furnish the basis of moral condemnation, in everyday life, of male practices that perpetuate the downgrading of women (example 4). The analysis of the last example clearly showed how the preoccupation with gender is not the prerogative of the social scientist, the psychologist or the sociolinguist alone, but is also the concern of societal members where gender ties relevantly to social conduct in everyday life.

This similarity of concerns between scientific discourse and everyday discourse notwithstanding, one difference stands out. While social scientists draw on data-talk (interviews, questionnaires, etc.) in ways that abstract from, and theorize about, gender, thus contributing to its reification, societal members draw on gender not only to make sense of the multiple contexts they find themselves in (previous chapter), but they also draw on gender to perform actions in talk. In both the sense-making and performing operations, societal members make gender dynamics visible in talk. It is that dynamicity that defies reification simply because, to borrow Hester and Eglin’s (1997) phrase, it is culture-in-action.

It therefore becomes imperative to begin, first of all, with the study of members methods of sense making, the way Garfinkel (1967, see also 1972) and his followers did as the foundation for a scientific understanding of society. CA and MCA, as one branch of this study (Heritage, 1984b, especially chapter 8) follow that line of inquiry. One way CA and MCA contribute to the study of society is by clarifying the interactional basis of members’ categorization in interaction, as means to better understand the social and cultural domains, or frameworks, that make sense for societal members.
The next chapter will discuss the contributions a sequential-categorical study of gender can make, along with the implications of the view of gender as culture-in-action to the study of gender and language. Before that, the chapter will briefly summarize the results of the analysis in the body of the present dissertation, in order to offer a review of how the research questions are answered by the analysis.
Chapter V: Gender work, conclusions and implications

Introduction

Some general conclusions are offered here to the detailed discussions that figured in the preceding chapters. The chapter will then quickly, but relevantly, move to a consideration of some implications of the line of inquiry adopted in them, and throughout the dissertation as a whole. Specifically, it reflects on whether a sequential-categorial analysis can contribute to the respecifying of language and gender studies research program by taking up the vigorous analytic mentality, and therefore the theoretical principles and methodological tools, of much CA/MCA-driven research. It should be mentioned right at the beginning that CA and MCA have recently risen to prominence in Discourse Analysis and its techniques are much appreciated, even adopted, wholesale, to inform discursive approaches (Antaki, 2011). The discussion in this chapter is geared with a view to detail, within reasonable limits, the impact CA has on discursive approaches as well as on other fields of study.

This said, respecifying the research agenda is only one impact of CA-informed gender studies. Another recent, and much significant, development in mainstream CA are the attempts to apply its core finding on talk-in-interaction to help solve real social problems (Antaki, 2011). Accordingly, the chapter then concludes by pointing to venues the present analysis can be applied and, hence, by proving, hopefully, how a CA and MCA-informed researcher can contribute to domains wider than the close circle in which academic work is consumed.

CA practitioners’ services are now solicited in some settings for how they can help with their scholarly interventions in order to improve, or change for better, practices that impede the achievement of institutions’ desired outcomes (Kitzinger, 2011, Stokoe, 2011, 2013). The discussion in the present chapter reports on settings where CA scholarship was applied, with a particular focus on fields where gender and women’s issues are at stake. At a final stage, an attempt will be made to adumbrate the contributions the findings of the present dissertation can make to social issues specific to the Moroccan context. Taken together, the sections of this final chapter nutshell some answers to the research questions raised at the very beginning of this study as well as demonstrate how the research objectives set out are met in both the analytical findings and their implications.
1. Gender work: Summaries

As a first step, the different tasks the analytical chapters carried were girded by a single objective to study societal members’ practices of doing gender work; the latter idea meant studying “if, when, and how” (Stokoe, 2013, p. 537) gender contributes to the understanding of the interactional episodes that participants find themselves in, and how gender contributes to the overall action trajectory embodied in the sequential development of the episode. Drawing mostly on data from calls to Moroccan phone-in radio programs, the analysis made it possible to see how the categories callers draw on, in seeking advice from a particular expert invited by the program’s host to offer advice, are not ‘innocently’ invoked, but are rather purposefully chosen, to further specific courses of actions that for the most part betray callers’ motives, objectives, interests, or stakes, in making the calls. In other words, callers do not merely use categories to report on a social state of affairs, nor are categories a mere reflection of a social reality out there, but categories are first and foremost are designed for their recipients and with an eye on achieving, and enabling recipients to achieve, a particular understanding of the problem. In the analysis part, it then was possible to glimpse at the working of the general principle of recipient design as it empirically manifests itself in the categorial architecture of the narratives introduced at the beginning of calls to the phone-in programs selected.

Hence, after the overall sequential organization of the calls was briefly discussed, analysis focused, at a second stage, on scrutinizing the network of gender categories that run through the narratives, and which, among other things, contribute to the intelligibility of the narratives as requests for advice. Embedded in the overall action of advice-request were other, small scale, actions designed to effect particular, also small scale, outcomes. Ones that cumulatively shaped the course of the overall call, i.e., they shaped the way advice is sought by the callers and the way advice is delivered by the host. The sections of the first analytical chapter demonstrate how, where gender is concerned, those multiple embedded actions have their basis in the categories invoked by the callers and which enable the overall shape of the interaction to unfold in a stepwise sequential fashion towards the final goal of advice delivery. Thus, it was possible to see how callers fall on available stock knowledge stored in default gender categories, relying as Stokoe acknowledges on their “cultural familiarity” (2013, p. 544) to provide intelligible descriptions of themselves and their roles, as well as descriptions of persons they refer to in the narrative and their roles. Gender categories, it was seen, are conveniently invoked, oriented to, and exploited, to unpack those descriptions that, in the very
act of describing, put across a view of the world in common with the host and the caller, and by extension with each and every member of the Moroccan society. It provides a worldview inhabited by women for household duties inside the house, as housewives and child-caring agents; and men for household duties outside it, as breadwinners. In essence then, categorial descriptions of gender feed into the commonsense view of the world of Moroccans. Whenever invoked in talk-in-interaction, gender categorial descriptions orient to whatever is known in common about the social organization of women’s and men’s roles in society. The significance of this, together with the other results of the analysis, will be taken up later. Below, however, the rest of the results will be summarized.

The social division of labor achieved through gender categorization work points to the fact that a substantial part of the texture of the cultural backdrop against which narratives are constructed is woven out of gender categories. The latter grants a commonsense entry to conversation, an intersubjective orientation to cultural knowledge about the workings interaction, content of, relationships in, identities of, selves and others, and purposes of interaction. Once established, the situation becomes thus open for some possibilities but not others. Members’ sensitiveness to those possibilities and limitations characterizes their responses to categorial work. Both what can be done and what cannot be done within a given situation is exhibited in talk. Gender categories, in other words, organize social situations, but one in, the situation is very much organized by them.

Categorization work enables callers to construct social organization of the Moroccan society in talk that shows to what extent gender is institutionalized in the conduct of everyday affairs. The ‘world as everybody knows it’, in other words, comes off naturally as a gendered one.

This of course does not imply any sort of determinism in the use of gender categories; they are after all selected from a large, even if restricted, pool of possibilities, but it demonstrably points to the “seen but unnoticed”, to use Garfinkel’s expression, genderized patterns that are taken for granted. To disrupt those patterns, one needs to do some ‘extra work’, and do it necessarily in interactions, i.e., through categorization. Appropriately then, and following the analysis of default genderized patterns, the task was to empirically check the claim of ‘default-ness’ by taking up another set of calls. In the latter, it was possible to see how working women should explicitly mention their ‘working status’ in order not to be taken to be housewives; or only housewives. Men’s work outside home is taken for granted. The interactional requirement for working women ties to, and is perhaps explained by, the overall
social organization the Moroccan society. To reiterate a point made earlier on assumptions on default categories (chapter III section 1.2), two such features are tentatively introduced here.

1) For a married couple, if both the man and the woman are not working, it is only the man who is ‘jobless’. This explains the moral guilt the man feels vis-à-vis the family. It also explains the way other societal members blame him, and him only, for that family’s state of affairs. The woman is exonerated of blame.

2) For a married couple, if both the man and the woman are working, it is only the woman who is not doing child-care and household duties. This explains the moral guilt the woman feels towards the family. It also explains the way other societal members blame her, and her only, for the children’s state of affair. The man is exonerated of blame.

While the first feature was not of specific interest to the analysis, the second point was amply demonstrated by analyzing working women’s exploitation of gender categories, MCDs, and category-bound predicates to manage the moral issues of blame distribution emergent from ‘violating’ commonsense assumptions of social organization. Here though, it must be pointed out that, by ‘violating’, is meant the way different categorizations give rise to different modes of understanding, assumptions, presuppositions, etc., quite independent of any correspondence between categories and actual states of affairs. To paraphrase Schegloff (2007b), any person can be correctly categorized in an infinite number of ways with different assumptions and implications tied to them. Logical and semantic correspondence is simply not the issue. Working ‘mothers’, in other words, do not mention they are working because that is after all the case. By explicitly stating their working status, women manage moral responsibilities they know issue from their membership in the category ‘mother’ and co-membership in the DMC ‘working force’ along with men. Their double membership in two devices entails moral and social issues inexperienced by men and explained by the default genderized cultural assumptions, implications, presuppositions, beliefs, in short, culturally organized modes of understanding. To use again an idea made earlier (p. 153), while ‘working father’ is a tautology, ‘working mother’ is an oxymoron. In this sense, unless household work responsibilities are viewed as a shared responsibility between man and woman, and unless this view is unnoticeably wired into the culture’s default categorial stock, ‘working woman’ in the Moroccan society is still a ‘special status’.

Given the claim of the existence of default and special roles and identities organized in and through gender categories, and visible in interaction, it was curious to see how gender role
Gender work

boundaries are maintained, altered, and negotiated in ways that are also visible in interaction. Gender role maintenance was visibly managed against the background of ‘housewife-in’ and ‘husband-out’; or ‘mother-in’ and ‘father-out’, hence the naturally analysis constituted an extension to the previous one. However, it was analytically more rewarding to zoom on those interactions whose objective was to negotiate this division and alter a cultural division by invoking factual information plus reasoned choices. The common problem to the callers in the subset of the data corpus analyzed was exactly their double membership in ‘mother’ and ‘working person’. It gave rise to their sense of guilt that justified asking for professionals help in the programs they called. Recognizing this double membership, and the moral guilt felt by the callers, the experts tried to un-bound the activities, obligations, and responsibilities predicated on each category by invoking, as a final resort and in the last few minutes of each call, the father as a potential source of help. In one case, calling on the father to help was justified by his being an ‘educated person’; in another, he was invoked because there was no other way the working mother could be relieved from her duties vis-à-vis her daughter. It is very much telling to note that, while the interactional negotiations of gender roles is done more or less randomly (i.e. the call on the notion of education, personal traits like helpful or duty are random choices), the knowledge systematized in the default categories renders the remaking of boundaries difficult to achieve. The expert, in other words, was drawing on whatever other categories that may turn up in interaction, educated father, modern father, sensible father, helpful father, etc., in a sustained attempt to redefine the boundaries of gender roles against a culturally sanctified and highly systematized knowledge wired in the default gender roles, identities, and categories.

The random and highly contingent characters of the expert’s attempt can be appreciated if one notices that, while any member knows that a mother should take care of children because she is a mother, it is highly unlikely that everyone will sustain the view that a male should help a female because he is ‘an educated person’, or ‘modern’, or ‘sensible’, or even ‘understanding’. The invocation of other categories to un-do the category-bound activities attached to gender categories can easily be overridden by the invocation of the default-category-bound activities. It was seen how, in one call, it was the caller-mother who resisted the expert’s advice of getting the father involved on the ground that he, the father, is ‘busy’ in his work. Curiously, the justification for the introduction of the father has reinforced the cultural expectations bound to the category and to the other categories in the MCD.
The remainder of the first analytical chapter was concerned with a different set of issues. The task in it was to show how categorization plays a key role in the management of problem-telling, or story-problem-telling. The calls were made to specific recipients, and designed to specific outcomes and realized specific actions; categorization work was sensitive to all those issues in the calls. The analysis of this work showed that versions of the problems were established through the categories callers introduce. Recipients’ understanding (experts and hosts) was displayed and their advice tailored accordingly. Intersubjectivity was therefore closely displayed, confirmed, or repaired, in the finely tuned coordination of categorial work across interactional turns.

Detailed as it was, much as categorial analysis revealed about how problems are introduced and understood, it could have been enhanced substantially if the sequential character of the calls received the attention it deserves, other than the rather sketchy treatment it received in the first analytical chapter in this work. The understanding of the extended narratives as problem-oriented talk is dependent in a crucial way on its sequential placement in the overall structure of the call, and the close management of the turn-by-turn contingencies in ‘real-time’. However, sketchy as it was, the description of the sequential flow of the call enabled the in-depth pursuit of detailed characterization of categorial work without losing sight of sequential organization, but also without rendering the analysis thick and lengthy. As it stood, the analysis showed how the request for advice, in the narrative introduction, and the giving of advice, in the expert’s talk, are coordinated through the categorial and sequential organization of interactional contingencies in real-time.

The final section in the chapter looked at another layer of coordination, i.e., the realization of local actions through repair and reformulation of gender categories. Instances of repair and reformulation were introduced, and their actions were analyzed in the same sequential/categorial spirit, that is, with close analytical attention to gender categories as they unfold in turns at talk.

The second chapter in the analysis was motivated by quite a different set of concerns. the task was to show how gender categories are not only a cultural backcloth on which talk makes visible cultural patterns, and in which it is understood, but rather to show how members can actively exploit their knowledge of gender categories to deal with moral issues that arise in the course of their interaction. Members’ talk was analyzed with an eye on how gender intersects morality at a local level. Rather than being abstract concepts in the terrain of any
theory, and rather than being resources for any specific theoretical explanations, gender and morality were treated as a topic of study (Stokoe and Edwards, 2012). Excerpts of talk-in-interaction were analyzed for how members’ ‘genderize’ and ‘moralize’ their everyday activities. The objective was to see how participants do gender and morality visibly in talk.

This goal was enabled by initially introducing a recently upheld distinction between the linguistic and the interactional relevance of gender. Briefly, the idea behind the distinction boils down to the following: not every gender category that surfaces in interaction does a specific action (although, as is argued here, it does offer a particular understanding of the situation). For a gender category to be relevant, it must be interactionally consequential, that is, it must bear visibly on the trajectory of interaction subsequent to its introduction.

With this distinction introduced, the first section of the chapter was devoted to exemplify the difference between the two kinds of relevance. Only in the second, and final, section were interactional instances analyzed for the import of gender categories to the actions; where the latter were of a locally moral color (conduct evaluation and judgment mainly).

A general summary of the findings having been given, it is now time to turn to the implications they have. Right at the outset, it is fit to mention that the implications CA and MCA have for other domains been developed in parallel to the development of pure CA and MCA themselves. For instance, Stokoe (2011) argues that Levinson’s work (1983) was such an early attempt to incorporate in pragmatic analysis key findings of CA. To this can be added Schegloff’s own engagement in debates over the utility of CA for scholars in different domains, especially Linguistics and Pragmatics, (1992b, 1999) Sociolinguistics (1989) Applied Linguistics (Schegloff, 1990; Schegloff et al. (2002), discourse analysis (1996b) and his concern over what he saw a wrong understanding of CA principles which resulted in the use of CA for, to quote Have “non-CA purposes” (1999, p. 197)\(^1\). In the present work, however, only those implications which relate to the field of gender and language studies will be introduced.

2. Gender work: Implications for gender and language research

Gender and language is an interdisciplinary field that has always been receptive to change in conceptual, theoretical and methodological tastes. As an interdisciplinary enterprise, it even thrives on them (Kitzinger, 2000). Some implications of the analytical strand taken up here will succinctly be introduced in the present section. It will quickly be apparent that those implications follow naturally choices made to confront the research question(s) posed at the
beginning. Specifically, the field’s need for a constructionist approach, especially one with a solid empirical basis of the sort provided by CA/MCA to support any claims made about the social construction of gender, is more urgent than ever (ibid.).

In fact, the need emerges as a pressing one. For one thing, the linguistic turn in vogue in other disciplines has offered new venues for research. For another, the raison d’être of the field itself, its capacity to provide insights at the intersection of language practices and gender and its practitioners’ capacity to respond responsibly and seriously to criticisms addressed to their work, are issues in need of immediate attention. The payoffs researchers promise, the illumination of the social organization of linguistic practices with relation to the social organization of gender, and the consequences of both sets of organization, for issues of power, oppression, heteronormativity, sexism, abuse, harassment, etc, are far from realized in the sea of conflicting claims characteristic of the previous studies. The purpose behind the whole enterprise can then be a matter of serious doubt.

Going back to implications, one set relates to purpose of the field as being shortsighted, concerned only with gender differences (Smith, 1985). The focus has been rather counterproductive in two fundamental ways. For one, the scope of the purported differences, and the range of techniques used to probe them has given rise to non definitive results, sometimes even inconsistent findings. Reviewing studies on tags, interruption, and other linguistic features for what they say about the gendered use of language, commentators found themselves in a stalemate, often unable to conclusively discern the effect gender has on language to a satisfying degree. Much often, the findings of one study on one specific feature can easily be dismissed by citing the opposite findings of another on the same feature. Driven by desire to explain the effect gender has on language, the very results achieved resist such explanations. Understandably then, the field is short of a coherent theory with sufficient explanatory power to explain, synthesize, or transcend, a multitude of contradictory findings.

The lacuna left by the absence of consensus was detrimental to the wider project on which the field justified its existence. Where the study of gender and language established itself on the study of linguistic practices that sustain women’s subordinate social status and correct them, it has proved itself incapable of reaching an agreement over what practices to change, what to introduce and what to modify in order to fight against those practices for the rights of women. While feminists for example succeeded in introducing some important changes (the non-use of generic ‘he’ in academic writings, for example), similar interventions in ordinary life
practices failed, or were not even initiated. For example, of the many linguistic features ascribed, and sustain, unequal power relations, it is bewilderingly astonishing that no attempts were made to rectify the balance. The resistance of ‘Ms’ in English, for example, as an address form attests to this failure. That sexism, women’s abuse in proverbs (Sinaceur, 2002), media (Debbagh, 2011; 2012), and ordinary life are as lively issues as they were thirty of forty years ago is also another evidence to the failure of gender and language studies to effectively relate to the social problems of women when it comes to language. In short, in their very attempt to confront concrete linguistic problems that bear on women’s social situation, scholars ended by overlooking both ordinary language and ordinary women. The former was treated as merely a ‘window’ (Speer, 2005) to more important social and psychological phenomena, the latter as passive bearers of gender. An entry to a much fruitful study of the intersection of language on gender is to repudiate any theoretical model based on ‘difference’ and to reinstitute to both language and ‘participants’ their real and concrete senses: the former as talk-in-interaction and the second as real social actors who use talk-in-interaction to act on the world. According to this view, a gender identity is a local construct of conversational practices in which social members actively engage (this view in fact motivated the use of ‘genderize’ as a verb). To start by categorizing actors in ‘males’ and ‘females’ in order to study how their gender bears on the way they use language is simply to move along the wrong path. It is in this spirit that the analysis was conducted. The present work has refrained from alluding to the sex of callers as in any way affecting the sequential and categorial properties under study. Gender identity is primarily an interactional matter for participants. When relevant, it has consequence that are visible in talk. The task of the analysis has been to show what the consequences are and how they are organized. As such, the present study tried to meet the challenge raised by CA, to show in empirical data the relevance of gender (Schegloff, 1991). The challenge has been a powerful one as to indeed promise to respecify the field beyond recognitions to difference-minded scholars. A second set of implications of the current, and one that is closely tied to the point raised above, concerns the way the difference model was detrimental to the purpose of gender and language studies. Its essentialist treatment of gender, always coupled with a view of it as part of a social structure resulted in a view of men and women as merely enacting differences against their will as social actors (West, 1979). This in effect means that rather than treating
gender as an outcome of differential social practices (that is, as an achievement), gender was seen as its cause. On this account, and to invoke Garfinkel’s cultural and psychological dope again, men and women do not, and cannot help but act in ways their social, psychological, and linguistic dispositions dictate for their essentially gender identities (Kitzinger, 2000). What is left, according to Burr, are “puppets operated by structures” (1995, p. 99). This second feature of gender and language studies explains the first. That is, rather than challenging a view of gender as the passive enactment of dictates of social or psychological structures, research actually sustains it as the acceptance of the widely acclaimed theories of Difference and Dominance makes clear.

In view of this, as Kitzinger argues (2000), a CA-MCA-driven approach is much needed to reassert the agency of social actors, and women particularly, as active participants in the making of their own social realities, indeed, as “agents actively engaged in methodical and sanctioned procedures for producing or resisting, colluding with or transgressing, the taken-for-granted social world” (Kitzinger, 2000, p. 168). In adopting CA/MCA then, it is clear that the paradigm of difference has to be discarded because it does not answer fundamental questions about how members produce gender as a methodical achievement of a social identity (ibid., 2000, p. 170). In fact, the issues that Kitzinger raises against early research agenda constitute key motivations to undertake the study of gender in the present work. It reflects a concern with gender construction, gender achievement, and identity work, rather than a preoccupation with a set of well formulated research questions, of a theoretical sort, about what the researcher takes as a given prior to analysis: that gender is relevant to whatever he is trying to find as an answer to his research questions. Instead of taking gender as a resource, it is taken here as a topic for study; and instead of asking in what way men and women differ on a set of linguistic practices in phone-ins or mundane conversation, the researcher has sought to probe how gender is oriented to, displayed in, responded to, resisted, constructed, and identified in, the very practices themselves. How, in other words, talk practices constitute a fragment, part and parcel, of the gender reality of everyday life.

As the above statement shows, the implication of CA-MCA for gender and language does not stop at the level of theory. For, even if one accepts CA-MCA and their underlying theoretical basis in Ethnomethodology, the acceptance still has implications for research questions to ask and methodological choices to make. With regard to the former, one problem stands out. It pertains to finding a way to reconcile researchers’ orientations and concerns with members’ orientations (Schgloff, 1997, Kitzinger, 2000). A researcher with good reasons to analyze
gender identity and power may decide that talk is not good data after all, since mundane conversation is a ‘trivial’ thing that can hardly be a politically charged site for the study of as socially significant an issue as power and identity (Maynard, 1988, 314).

A related problem surfaces here. Since it is often perceived that people are not always aware of the working of power (in CDA and the Foucauldian brand of discourse analysis), the tendency has been to re-organize data in such a way as to interpret them in the light of the theoretical concerns of the researcher power (Maynard, 1988). The raw materials of talk is glossed and along with it the general or specific concerns of those who produced it. This way, the very research that seeks to ‘validate’ subjects’ experiences proves detrimental to that goal (Harding, 1987). In providing an outlet for women’s voice, for example, researchers ended up drowning it for their voice to stand out (Kitzinger, 2000, p. 171; see also D. Smith, 1987).

The tension between analysts’ concerns and participants’ is a not a new one. What is new, as Kitzinger argues, an analysis along the sequential-categorial line offers a nice solution to how to reconcile motivated research with the daily realities of societal members, especially their agency as social actors (Harding, 1987, 5; Kitzinger, 2000). To quote Maynard at length,

it is erroneous to assume that because of their social identities, parties become involved in patterns of domination and subordination. Instead, at the interactional level, displays of power include the asymmetric use of conversational resources…and these are the very means by which parties achieve the visibility or social reality of their identities. Both of these issues point to understanding the interaction order as a prelude to investigating the complex relations of identity and power (1988, p. 316).

To put differently, the implication has to do with CA-MCA stricture to refrain from interpretative analysis in favor of descriptive work in order to engage with data directly. Using empirical data, the present thesis has sought to engage with the raw materials of conversations and phone-in calls in order to study some of the ways gender categories work in the everyday life of Moroccans.

Although not specifically concerned with gender and patriarchy, power, ideology, oppressions, injustice, inequality and other larger issues, the present work, nonetheless, opens the possibility for their study in a very situated way. Further analyses can depart from the
results of this study to show how, for instance, the use of gender categories realized patriarchal practices as common sense.

An example may be indicated here. Based on the analysis in the present study, one can see that, for a woman to refer to herself as ‘mother’, she is not only refers to herself, but she at the same makes visible and expectable a set of category-bound activities, rights and obligations that go with that reference. The woman then not only produces intelligible talk, but also a form of patriarchal social order that is, and that’s the crux of it, common sense, one on which talk itself stands for its intelligibility. To adapt Heritage’s (1984b, p. 118) ethnomethoddological ideas on reflexivity, a ‘routine achievement’ of a patriarchal social order is realized by the use of categories. Or, as Burr succinctly puts it, “when people talk to each other, the world gets constructed” (1995, p. 5). The point is that the world is conjointly constructed, and such a construction is a matter for analysis.

Likewise, it would be interesting to study how the notions of ‘male’ and ‘female’ are differentially used in everyday speech to do particular actions (using ‘female’ gender to insult and ‘male’ to praise for example). The study would then analyze the sequential and categorical properties of the environment where the categories are used, and how, actions are carried, supported, or resisted. A sequential-categorical analysis, of the sort undertaken here, can indeed reveal new insights in the workings of gender that a content, thematic, or simply list-compilation, study cannot (see Debbagh, 2011; Iraqui-Sinaceur, 2002; Oumlil, 2017). Also for feminist media studies, a sequential-categorial analysis of verbal properties can benefit media studies to reveal the particular details in media discourse that allows it to support or resist patriarchal assumptions. A particularly appropriate site to use the tools of CA and MCA would be in film studies, where most of the claims on gender are reliant on the semiotic analysis of imagery. Verbal performance in film is all a simulation of real life situations, but is an attempt to construct alternative realities. The study of the interactional basis of those performances can reveal much about media constructions. It can be used, for example, to support or refute a semiotic analysis of imagery.

The discussion of the implications for gender and discourse analysis of the theory and methods adopted in the present work has thus spilled over to a discussion of their applications in other domains. Indeed, the adoption of the analytical tools CA and MCA have on offer constitutes a form of applied work (Antaki, 2011, p. 1) Below is a list-summary of major implications the line of inquiry of the present dissertation has for the study of gender and
language in general. In the next section, the application question is taken up and a brief consideration of how the results can be applied closes up the chapter.

- A bottom-up approach rather than top-down.
- Descriptions of members’ gender work rather than its interpretation (no transcending).
- Focus on talk as action rather than as form-meaning.
- Gender as a performance, construction and enactment noticeable in talk, rather than an essential characteristic residing in individuals.
- Technical analysis first then a political and social one (CA can be turned to serve political purposes as in Feminist CA (Kitzinger, 2000), and to study social problems (Maynard, 1988, Schegloff, 2005)

3. Gender work: Some new venues of research

Generally speaking, applying the research findings is always a concern that is late to emerge, when, as Antaki says, “scholars become confident enough to claim that their knowledge might bring about change” (2011, p. 8). The core analytic findings of sequential CA have already found their way to application in studying social problems (Maynard, 1988). In addition to CA offering new insights in the interactional order as an institutional order in its own right, Maynard discusses the contributions the study of interaction can make to enhance understanding of social problems, and by extension, to offer appropriate interventionist solutions (Antaki, 2011) that can either enhance sociologists’ understanding of these problems or can be applied to counter at least some of their obnoxious aspects.

Traditionally, social problems have always been thought of as global, socio-structural, issues: diversity, conflict, media, institutions, identity, gender, etc.. It is all too easy to see how the tendency to think in social structural and abstract terms has obscured a real understanding of the effect of gender on language or alternatively has glossed both by invoking social processes (culture and power, themselves glossing structures). One way, then, the study of interaction can be applied to gender and language, as social issues, is by engaging with them at the most basis level, to see their working at the level of interaction. As an example, CA work on power (Hutchby, 1996), and MCA on identity and subcultures (Widdicombe, 1998), has already demonstrated its utility in bringing a new understanding to the old and vexing problems.

Schegloff (2005) ingeniously observes that social problems such as poverty, ethnicity, delinquency, crime, or gender, are the results of institutionalized categorizations that “involve
segments of the population defined by category membership” (2005, p. 449). Vis-à-vis those categorizations societal members take ‘stance’ “toward various types of persons and various types of conduct” (ibid., p. 450). Thus, one often hear that black people are lazy, the poor are the root of the social vices, younger people today have no respect for their elders, etc. Categorization and stance are therefore basic processes to complain about social problems, to turn them into ‘complainables’ (ibid.).

As the present study shows, each single problem becomes not a problem between unrelated individuals, but a problem between wife and husband, husband and child, son and mother, etc., in short, a problem within the family as a social institution. The tools of CA and MCA were brought to bear on the study of phone-in programs to explain how personal troubles were ‘validated’ as social problems in need of the services of an expert. However, the present study has barely touched the surface of this area and, undoubtedly, more work needs to be done.

This said, it is unfair to expect its application to yield quick results that concern traditional issues related to gender and social problems in general: gender identity, women subordination, male power, gender conflict, sexism, gender media representation, etc. The study of gender in a sequential-categorial context is relatively recent, and the results are not definitive. However, some applied projects are already underway and indeed usher to new directions in how CA and MCA tools can be used by scholars “whose detailed familiarity with particular social problems would empower them to use these tools to best advantage” (Schegloff, 2005, p. 475). A brief mention of this work is given below.

Past work in communication skills training tried to teach women how to be as assertive as men (Kitzinger, 2000). In its ambition to empower women linguistically, this work sometimes offered practical advice that run counter to specific dictates within the interaction order and which CA detailed study of that order. For example, women were advised to directly and assertively say to ‘no’ unwanted sex regardless of the effect this might have on the party requesting it. However, as CA demonstrates, and regardless of gender, refusals have a dispreferred status and are ordinarily done indirectly. In most ordinary encounters, refusals are interactionally achieved through offering delays, prefices or hedges, palliatives, accounts and other strategies (Kitzinger, 2000, p. 178). To achieve refusals, women were thus required to engage in a practice that is interactionally at variance with their most basis common sense procedures, and therefore at variance with their interactional intuitions.
There was another negative side to it too, Kitzinger observed. A women who could not say a direct ‘no’ to unwanted sex was actually blamed for being responsible to let it happen. The rapist, on the other, was allowed to run away with it by claiming the woman issued no explicit refusal. The victim was thus blamed for acting within the dictates of the interaction order of their culture, as embodied in the organization of refusals. Instead of blaming the rapist for feigning not to understand a refusal, blame was heaped on the victim for issuing it appropriately. Instead of empowering women, assertion training programs thus contributed to their disempowerment—robbing them of, and alienating, their common sense interactional means to initiate actions in the world.

In short, women were victimized not by the act of rape itself, but by invalidating their experience of resisting it. It is at that point that applied CA work is relevant. Validating women’s experience is indeed a large feminist project (Harding, 1987, p. 6). Kitzinger (2011) draws on her work with helpline centers that offer advice on childbirth. She uses her conversation analysis of calls to those helpline in order to offer advice for call-takers on particular interactional matters, eliciting problems, validating experience, showing empathy, etc., both in group workshops and individual cases. In one individual case Kitzinger reports how the calls taker withholds ‘showing empathy’ to trouble talk by the caller in order to attend to the more factual and urgent business of providing advice. Interestingly, the resistance to ‘show empathy’ on the part of the call-taker, which is an appropriate next action after a sequence of trouble talk (Jefferson, 1988, 420), resulted in resisting advice on the part of the caller. The interactional misalignment created thus contributed to the failure of the carrying out the service.

Stokoe’s (2011, 2013) application of CA findings to social issues is even more systematic. Her effort resulted in a new approach to role-play training. Stokoe (2011) criticizes role-play as a communication skills training technique claimed to be sufficiently similar to real-work encounters in order to justify its use in training. In light of her critique, she introduces her method of ‘Conversation Analytic Role-play Method’ (CARM) (also Stokoe, 2013) (see Stokoe (2011) for a detailed account of this method, see also, www.carm.com).

CARM relies on the findings of CA to provide training workshops rooted in the use of real data and guided by the analytical insights of CA work. Like Kitzinger, Stokoe uses CA-based workshop sessions to reflect and change institutional practices in calls to mediation organizations on neighborhood dispute. She exemplifies her work by focusing on two issues:
turning callers into clients by ratifying their calls as relevant to the business of the organization (mediating in neighborhood disputes); and dealing with ‘isms’ in calls.

Kitzinger and Stokoe’s applied research indeed suggests venues for the possible application of the present study to real-life situations with an aim to train, change, and intervene. For example, experts in phone-in radio and television programs as well as hosts to specific programs related to social problems can be trained to pay particular attention to the ways social relational patterns and gender identities detrimental to women’s image get infused in narratives about family and children problems in a way that ratifies unfair status quo.

To give an example of the significance of categories as common sense organizing devices, it was noticed that, in the calls to the phone-ins, working mothers primarily orient to their identities when children’s welfare is at stake, and only secondary to their ‘worker’ identity’ as a hindrance to carry out the activities bound to their primary identity. Interestingly, this orientation runs opposite to that of ‘father’, whose very use of that category triggers the identity of ‘worker’. In matters of child care, working women thus experience social and psychological problems that might lead them to think of themselves as ‘bad mothers’ (Burr, 1995, p. 104) by dint of their perceived negligence of their primary activities as ‘child care providers’. It is after all this activity that provides for ascribing the identity of ‘mother’ for a woman in a patriarchal culture.

Even worse, it was noticed that experts in the calls ratify that order of things by offering advice to women on the basis of the identities they orient to. In here there is opportunity for change. The categorial grounds of the problems as a social problem and the stance taken towards it by the parties to the calls, to recall Schegloff (2005), should be explicitly discussed, even challenged, and only on the basis of a new understanding of it can advice be tailored.

Two examples come to mind here, the inclusion of fathers in matters of child care inside and outside the house can be done on the basis of activities tied to that category and not any other (like temporary helper, or educated person as in some calls). That is, child-care can be negotiated as predicated on the category ‘father’ much in the same in does on the category ‘mother’.

Likewise, in a substantial number of calls, only women suffer the social and psychological consequences of ‘having children’ to rear. There is here opportunity for remedial intervention. For instance, women may be made ware that the categorization into a ‘father’ or ‘husband’ offers men an easy exit from the family-life problems. The realization that family affairs are a
joint burden, must be kept alive in front of a division of labor easily invoked by categorial work.

There are then larger social domains where the findings of CA and MCA can be fruitfully applied to offer new a understanding, new insights, and new solutions. In order to do so, it is clear that social activism is entailed. The findings and applications of the analysis can be usefully disseminated through public agencies. Also, training can be done in collaboration with organizations of civil society.

With activism however, the work of CA ends, as Kitzinger (2011) rightly argues. In applying CA findings, one has to recognize that the apolitical stance of pure CA and MCA does stop at the threshold of application. But this of course has its own good side, for it means that one is allowed to take up again issues of power, conflict, patriarchy, women subordination, issues that are at the heart of gender politics today. In this, sequential and categorial analyses can have good benefits. The following are mentioned only by way of illustration:

- To uncover the subtle interactional everyday practices in which women are still relegated to subordinate status.
- To make women aware of the linguistic choices they have in dealing with problematic situations.
- To uncover the interactional basis of much psychological and social dilemmas of women and how their and men’s linguistic practices perpetuate those dilemmas.

To summarize the argument so far, the sequential-categorial analysis of data does not block a politically engaged analysis, but, as Schegloff argues in many places (e.g.1997), only asks of analysts to produce an empirically robust one — to be able to point to the data and point to whatever issues they claim exist therein.

This said, it must also be pointed out that the kind of analytical work required is indeed tremendous. In the Moroccan context, the obscure status of sequential and categorial analyses is surprising. Of all the material encountered during a reading career of four years, and to the best of the present researchers’ knowledge, only two works were encountered that explicitly refer to conversation analysis as a research tool. One of them (Tahtah, 2005) is a serious attempt to study conversational structures of Moroccan Arabic (turn-taking organization, adjacency pairs, pre-sequences, insertion sequence, and preference organization.) as well as some of its non-verbal aspects. The other (Debbagh, 2011) was a partial attempt to apply CA
to the study of identity construction in medial discourse (partial because CA was used side by side with CDA whose underlying theoretical foundation is the antithetical counterpart to that informing CA and MCA work).

There is, as a consequence, no solid cumulative work on the sequential structures of Moroccan Arabic, nor is there a serious engagement with Membership Categorization Analysis to be found. In attempting to address some sequential and categorical properties of Moroccan conversations, the present work has thus sought to remedy a lack in the field of gender and language in Morocco. Mostly however, the present work has only sought to draw attention to this lack. If it succeeded in this, it has done the job.

The present chapter offered some capsule conclusions to the analytic results of the present thesis as a whole. It also discussed some implication of the CA-MCA line of enquiry taken here for the larger field of discourse, gender, and language. Following those implications were some of the ways the results can be applied to help to better understand social problem as a necessary step towards devising solutions to them. The discussion of CA/MCA applications necessarily brought up a consideration of the current state of knowledge of the interactional order and practices in the Moroccan society as to consider seriously intervention in its social problem. It was conclude that the current state of knowledge is indeed limited; that there should be more work on the CA and MCA aspects of the Moroccan interactional order if serious engagement with social manifestations is to be reached.

4. Limitations of the study

Naturally enough, the analysis provided in the body of the present work has its limitations, which stem from adopting conceptual, theoretical, and methodological choices while disregarding others. The materials used for analysis comprised both telephone calls and mundane conversations. Only in the former was participants’ access to the visual context limited. For the latter, a more fruitful approach would be to include the non-verbal aspects of interaction into analysis. Many an Action is sometimes done with only a slight nod of the head, a wave of the hand, a gaze of the eye, etc. While the reliance on audio-recording had its advantages, video-recording and the analysis of the visual context of interaction would have enriched the analysis. This however does not mean that video analysis would come handy, a whole different set of methodological issues would arise, not least among them problem of authenticity.
Second, to save time and effort, the researcher’s the transcription procedure was eclectic. The calls chosen for analysis were transcribed only in parts. It would have been better to transcribe the calls in whole to collect a large corpus which would have enabled the identification of still more robust patterns across a large number of calls. Customarily in CA and MCA projects, researchers recruit professional transcribers and focus instead on analysis, which is of course no less laborious but it is at least more rewarding. Given that the present researcher had to simultaneously prepare the transcripts and conduct the analysis, the result was a relatively small corpus. Its smallness, however, does not an easy attitude towards analysis. Indeed, the analysis was is diligently done to the best capacities of the researcher.

Another point is pertinent in this context. Being a competent member of the culture, the researcher made constant effort not to let his assumptions sieve through the analysis of a culture. He scrutinized both the cultural patterns and his assumptions, hunches, and expectations for their meaning The analyses provided were produced with the researcher painstakingly sticking to the data in order to investigate it in a detached and scholarly manner. In most CA and MCA work, however, analysis is often done in what is know in the literature as ‘data sessions’. In a data session, researchers discuss their transcripts beforehand, listen or watch excerpts of interaction, comment on each other’s analyses and broaden, in this way, each other’s understandings of the interactions analyzed. It is truly in this way that one’s cultural aspects are publically and open ‘questioned’.

In attempting a similar activity, the researcher continuously searched for other like-minded collaborators from within the small PhD community of students he is acquainted with, but could not manage to find any willing partners to work with. Data sessions are indeed an important. To the extent that sequential-categorial analyses are a matter of group work, the present work is lacking, being, as it is, the product of only two individuals (a supervisee and his supervisor).

**General conclusion**

The rough history of the present work may very well offer some indication of how the study of gender and language, or a discursive analysis of gender, has evolved from a first conception of it as a discourse analytic project. The initial proposal offered to undertake a study of women and men ‘styles’, the latter roughly conceived in term set by Deborah Tannen’s work. The search was meant for those linguistic items and their differential pragmatic understanding, or use. The research site selected was that of weddings as it was
deemed a rich place for interaction to take place; hence for data to come out in the shape of
group conversations in mixed-sex and same-sex conversations.

No sooner had the project been established than a cursory survey of the recent literature
offered some theoretical and methodological indications that threatened to snag the project
conceived. Not only was the study of gender differences exhausted — with no conclusive
results — and, more importantly, somewhat outdated, but the field also witnessed a foray of
new approaches, some old but rose to prominence, and some new and tried to vie for
recognition. Conversation Analysis and Membership Categorization Analysis belong to the
latter group, for, although the study of gender from an ethnomethodological vantage point is
as old as Ethnomethodology itself, carrying the research program as a feminism project, or a
work in women’s studies, is only a new one. For scholars enthusiastic about introducing
sequential-categorial analyses, it meant, among other things, adapting them for the purposes
of an interdisciplinary community of linguists, sociolinguists, culture analysts,
anthropologists, and text and discourse analysts, not all of whom are ready to embrace the
implications of the new framework. The primary task for the CA-MCA enthusiasts was,
therefore, to argue for the utility of their tools through first supplementing the criticism of the
field of gender and language with new arguments. Only later could they argue for
contributions they tools could make.

The task of supplementing arguments against the study of gender linguistic styles was made
easier by the existence of alternative studies in constructionism. A common thread that holds
constructionists and CA and MCA analysts together is their concurrence on the social roots of
gender in interactive and discursive practices. However, CA and MCA analysts put much
emphasis on ordinary members’ constructions of gender rather than analysts’ construction
from member’s accounts of gender. The analysis reported in the present work tried to show
that the direct engagement with members’ common sense has much to offer that renders any
explanation or interpretation of it redundant at best, misleading at worst.

With such work available to instigate a departure from the original proposal, and having
reached a point where the project could progress no further, the researcher then decided, with
the consent of the supervisor of the work, to pursue an analysis along CA and MCA lines. The
outcome of the pursuit culminated in the present dissertation. The search for different styles
for men and women left behind, it was then possible to focus on the details of interaction and
the emergence of gender through those details. The payoffs of close attention to details can therefore be taken to constitute a general point made by the dissertation.

There is another points also made by the present dissertation. It was brought up during a discussion session at a national conference and concerned the added value, the applied side, contribution, in short the utility, of looking for gender in mundane talk and telephone calls.

Back at the conference, the analytical results presented were culled from the various analyses of the cultural background of interaction in terms of gender categories, and from the analysis of how the reflexive and indexical character of gender categories inform such background in a way that confirms the type-honored social patterns of gender. The analysis therein then confirmed that gender patterns are skewed in favor men (as in here, the audience was warned that the results may seems hackneyed); but, given the theoretical and methodological commitments of the researcher, he refrained from saying anything about power, hegemony, ideology; nor did he allude to the exploitation of women as housewives, the incrimination of working wives ‘morally guilty’, or any other topic conventionally related to feminism. As it turned out, and ordinarily enough, the link to such critical topics was made by commentators during discussion time; but the link was quickly followed by the question: ‘What of it?’ and ‘why specifically studying talk in an analysis of gender?’. Why, in other words, bother studying as crude a thing as talk, for as serious an issue in discourse analysis, as gender, power relations, male dominance, or, indeed, gender cultural practice that are traditionally and conventionally studied is as equally serious domains as cinema, media, cyberspace, novels, and literary work? If anything, CA’s and MCA’s claims of legitimacy were questioned on the basis of essentially similar views in their mother field. Writing on the sequential organization of telephone calls as routine achievement, Schegloff (1986) expresses a point close in spirit to the one above,

The beginnings of telephone conversations can seem a peculiar object on which to lavish scholarly attention. Being historically shallow products of technological innovation, they may seem parochial when set beside other specific subgenres of speech such as political oratory, for example, whose occurrence and study have greater historical depth and cross-cultural generality, and whose consequences seem self-evidently potentially substantial (1986, p. 111).

Schegloff’s article is a defense of the study of telephone openings as ‘action’ on a par with other, supposed more serious, actions, like marriage proposals or political oratory. So it was
not very strange, nor indeed surprising, that their validity was again doubted in the host field of gender and language studies.

Indeed, it seemed as though the shift from the very crude and seemingly unimportant — the domain of conversation— to the very lofty was very hard to digest. To use interactional instances to study social issues of such weight was puzzling— for ‘power’, ‘hegemony’, ‘ideology’, ‘discourse’, and ‘identity’ are all big words after all; they are always regarded with a theoretical ‘awe’. To probe the working of the former in order to uncover the latter seemed an infringement of academic dignity, a breach to academic respect due to discourse analysts, so to speak.

It is curious to notice that a similar set of questions is not asked of studies of gender in relation to diverse domains as cinema, media, Internet, literary works, and neither is its methodological counterpart asked of well-established research techniques, i.e. questionnaires, interviews, or focus groups. The former are considered domains where the study of gender has obvious payoffs, given that their analysis is part and parcel of the analysis of culture in general. But it can be observed nonetheless that talk was the earliest form in which culture was transmitted from one generation to another in any given community. If anything, the recent forms of cultural expressions all have they pedigree in oral expression, i.e., talk-in-interaction (Schegloff, 1986). It is fit, therefore, to study gender this site which is primordial with regards to all the cultural forms that build on it for their existence. CA and MCA studies of gender in mundane talk can therefore lay the foundations for its study in any other domain where it is of concern. The implications and applications part has demonstrated in what way CA and MCA can inform other approaches. This is a second point made by the present work.

If, as a final point, the viability of an approach in as competitive a domain of study as discourse analysis is to be measured against analytical and applied contributions, it is the researcher’s firm belief that the present work justifies its existence and the final shape it took on both points.

Notes

1Interestingly, that much quoted phrase is omitted from the second 2007 edition of the book. It certainly says something about how conversation analysts are now willing to engage with issues once considered outside the remit of a purely structural domain.
References


Accessed: 13th January 2015


Accessed: 13 January 2015


Appendix I: sample transcripts **Mundane talk**

**VOC1-001 (00:4:10) (speaker selects next)**

Said: A::: haṛna daba ḋadi nzidu lqddam.
Driss: kajqtlouh duk llila
Driss: safi [kayqolha djal=]
Said: [safi:– safi ḥbës.
Driss: ŋno a xaj su:ʃjan?
Said: kanshəb axojaa [?ana dik lkalima djali.
Soufiane: [max– maxllitili mangu:l axoja

**VOC11-001- (00:11:45)**

Moʕad: <həwwa tahowa> kajəi jəgəs dak ;lha:ʒ 
kajˈʃjə:b,
Sʕid: AlHA:ʒ fih zitu:n hadi wllə b°laʃ°= ((at the kitchen))
Moʕad: =ʒib ʒib zitu:n rah təmaː ʒib dik–
Sʕid: llaː fəlmərga ndir fiha ŋwije dzziˈtun°
Moʕad: [Aː diːr as(h)–
          diːr laka WAːːsi3 nndadar assi ʕəbdlmagiatanː]
Moʕad: la jumkinu monaː monaːqajatu qaraːraːtika
Moʕad: uʒibnna ʃi chwiyya naklo.
Sʕid: (  )
Moʕad: okajtəjʃəs ((to the other conversationalists))
Adbessamad: ʃəjʃə:h
Moʕad: bħali. ((talk continues))

**VOC12-005 (11:02)**

Ihsan: awəllah məjddit wəhda ḥda(h)
sakna ḥda ddar tmmajə.
   yiː ʃartnaː
hawwa ʃgullək ẓawad kidajr=
   =rah ʃafha
   ((makes plosive sound with lips tightly pursed))
ppa:x.
llajnSel ġed lbna:t.

( ) ja ssahi:b kidajrəa wille wille.

Kamal: tajhder yiSel lbna:t w- ew
tma yi tajhder eʃl lbna:t

Ihsan: aəwllal ila ḡrəfi ḡrtasa°.

VOC22-001 (00:01:42)
Fatiha: Haஅ:r firra dik lqala:m?
Samar: rah 3nd wafa:?.
Fatiha: hadik lqalam lli kənti kaddir bih,
Samar: rah ɣend wafa:?.
Meysem: lla: lli gaitləek nti djə:lek ahaʒar=
=AHAʒA:r qtləek djə:lek lli katsə[wbi-
Samar: [djali ana?
Fatiha: m:m.
Samar: anæbulə:k?
Fatiha: m:m.

VOC20-002: (00:05:06) (recording made at a train compartment. No names retained))
X: kathdi tatəʃjaj [utajdiruha jdiruha bi:k.
Y: [waːd-
Y: wahəd lməra [əuːʒ bənaːt
(0.75)
labsin məzjaːːne zəʕma bnat majiː-
X: ʔaːh.
F: mːm.
() : mːm.
Y: telʕu felkar meʕ- maː- mʕ - mː- meʕəbhumʃ lkar.
Y: .hhh (h)aːʃqi hadak anə maʕəbnif
(0.2)
ohəbto.
Y: (h)fti ʃno darli(h)om wahəd xəjna bəlmeʕʃjuːr
X: ʃlaʃ tnaʃlu,
F: °m[:°
Y: [(h)ti ʃdarli(h)m- osbaːh
Y: (h)ti du:k lēbna:t msaken
bkətrêt dakm- umaʃj:r=
Y: =zəɾma ma(h)angulləkʃ dak l-
(.)
.h ləməʃju:r lli: lliʕajru:m.
(.)
Y: ləbna:t yardjî bhilla tgulî hʃəlhom tajsrqo fʃə:9q.
(0.75)
Y: u wllaw ləbna:t ɣadjî:n hakk(h) taj-
Y: rjğlihum tajj- tajj-[ tj- tj-
X: [ʕlaʃ tjnəzu.
F: [(
Z : bkətrək wa- u- u- wahad l-
zəɾma hət(h)om fwaəhəd lmoṣtawaw:
: jhke[r ʕli(h)om
Y : ʕrefti kiladjər hada lli tajʕjər?
(.)
Y: mangollekʃ kida<jər ile> jttih jxəʕək.
F: (cik sound) t a:(h)
Y: awaː:j1
F: hadok aʃ[lan lli kajkunu fəʃk kam- kaj:-
Y: [omglda:m umʃerret kɔllo

Calls to phone-in radio shows
hditnsa 02-11-2015/ (12) (00:47:06)

Fatiha: [hit ana ( )
Expert: [wa:xxa. .h fatema ʃhal fɔərmək?
Fatiha: aʃna(h)? aʃə tʃəʃtaːʃ.
Expert: [aːh.
ʃəʃtaːʃ rsanə=katəquaːj?
Fatiha: llaʔ. ʕafddaːr.
Expert: 3afddaːr. .h o: olli fəʃ ʒiti=
=ʃəʃ ʒiti tʃətbi: xaltək hijja lli
jaːk xəʔbatək?
Fatiha: aːh xalti hijja lli ʒaːt.
Expert : oʃərmək tlaqiti mʃa had sejawəd hada: rraʃ frraʃ?
Gender work

Fatiha:  l'la?

Expert:  lla, ?.

(. ) (talk continues).

Kifhal 02-11-2015/ (03) (00:51:10)

Expert:  rah manxafu:t mn wəldna

jela bda kajbki nhar lləwəl wənhar tta:ni
ujAh sSi:b annahu jenʃəs ohada.
.h waləkin mn bəCd wlləf wlla mzjə:n
sse- sse superbe.
rahna tkələlemna flwwəl
[bi?ennə [l7irʒma:n .hh=
Aziza:  [mːm
Expert:  majənəmkəʃ lina annaŋə nmənʃu wəlidəna mlhiran.=
Aziza:  ["n(h)am";
Expert:  = et d’ailleur lhirmaːn ra:wə lli kajxəlli(h)um jkəbru.
 .h [fəhjath[um annahum jətʃəlmu-
Aziza:  [mːm
Expert:  lhirmaːn huwwa lli kajxəlli(h)e annahum jnəəhə
Aziza:  utajqəlulu 3la::: hə e: vwaːlə
Expert:  [akiːd.
Aziza:  [kifəj jraːbhu hadik [lʔaʃjaː?=
Abdelhadi:  [ʔakikːd. =
Aziza:  [llı t7rumu mnha
Expert:  lawla l7irmaːn [manktuːch [umanziduch 3la rjлина=
Aziza:  [egzakt.
Expert:  =əmannəʃəːtuːch [omanməxuch=
Aziza:  [mːm.
Expert:  n9əlbu, .hh 3la zzaw[jaːt dianna endiru lwəlidət diann-
Aziza:  [lmutaː:babra=lmətabara f13amal=
Aziza:  [uhada:k °thya ms°?altəː]=
Expert:  [extactement
Aziza:  [.hh
Expert:  [et donc manxafuːch mn dik la transition dial une seːməine=
 : =di jour lli kajbki...
Appendix II: Post-consent form

CONSENT TO AUDIO RECORDING & TRANSCRIPTION

Title of the study: Communication styles of young and old people in Morocco

By: Najib BOUHOUT, Moroccan Cultural studies Centre, Faculty of letters and human sciences, University Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdellah, Fes.

The study conducted under the title above involves the use of audio material recorded.

I am aware that the researcher (Najib BOUHOUT), or a third party doing the recording for the researcher, recorded parts of conversations in which I am a party, and without me being aware of the recording taking place. The researcher, or a third party doing the recording for the researcher, informed me of the recording, the parts recorded, and the uses to which the said parts will be put. Also, the researcher, or the third party doing the recording, asked for my consent to keep the recordings and use them for research objectives.

I declare that I give my full consent to keep, transcribe, and use the recording made for research objectives, under the following conditions

- Any information that would identify me be deleted, or anonymized, including names, names of places, cities, etc.
- Parts or whole of the recording be reproduced in written form only under the first condition above.
- All recorded materials involving me be destroyed once the project for which it is used is complete.

Participant's Signature:

___________________________________________